[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Lee v. Weir, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8104.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of De cisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O . 2016-O HIO -8104

L EE , A PPELLANT , v. W EIR , D IR ., A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Lee v. Weir, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8104.] Habeas corpus—Appellant had alternative re medies at law to challenge juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody of minor child to county agency—Court of appeals’ judgment de nying petition affirmed. (No. 2015-1536—Submitted August 16, 2016—Decided December 14, 2016.)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-150417.

________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Appellant, Ricardo G. Lee, appeals from the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals denying his petiti on for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Lee had alternative remedies at law to challenge the juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody of minor child, R.L., we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Facts {¶ 2} On July 6, 2015, Lee filed his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the First District Court of Appeals, alleging that appellee, Hamilton County Job and Family Services (“Family Services”) Director Moira Weir, is unlawfully restraining his biological minor son, R.L. (d.o.b. 3/14/2012), pursuant to a juvenile court order. {¶ 3} The petition asserts that on December 26, 2012, Family Services filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Juven ile Court alleging that R.L. was dependent and seeking emergency removal and temporary custody. The court, through a magistrate judge, held a hearing on the emergency request on December 28, 2012. {¶ 4} After the hearing, the magistrate issued an order stating that Lee is the “alleged father of [R.L.]” and th at the mother’s husband, Alisher Shermukhamedov, is the “legal father by law of [R.L.].” As to Lee, the magistrate’s
order states that “Ricardo has a turbulent relationship with [R.L.’s mother]. Mother
was the victim. Ricardo Lee has been violent and abusive toward mother. He has been charged multiple times with aggravated menacing and domestic violence. He had a stay away order and was convicte d of Menacing. He is currently on probation.” The magistrate concluded that the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that R.L. was in “imminent risk of harm,” that the child was currently missing, and that the child’s mother was a “flight risk.” Based on its determination that “[t]he child’s continued residence in or return to the home would be contrary to the child’s best interest and welfare, ” the magistrate judge granted temporary custody of R.L. to Family Services. {¶ 5} More than two years later, in Ap ril 2014, the juvenile court granted permanent custody of R.L. to Family Services.January Term, 2016

3 {¶ 6} Weir filed both a motion to dismiss Lee’s petition and an answer, arguing that Lee’s petition was successive a nd barred by res judicata and that Lee
had—and had used—alternative remedies at law to challenge the custody order. {¶ 7} One week later, the court of appeals issued a one-page judgment entry granting Weir’s motion to dismiss and noting that Lee’s petition “demonstrated no grounds for relief.” {¶ 8} Lee timely appealed to this court and on August 29, 2016, filed a motion to expedite. Analysis {¶ 9} In a child-custody action, a writ of habeas corpus will be granted only if the petitioner establishes that “(1) the child is being unlawfully detained, and (2) the petitioner has the superior legal right to custody of the child.” Holloway v. Clermont Cty. Dept. of Human Servs. , 80 Ohio St.3d 128, 130, 684 N.E.2d 1217 (1997). In this context, “[h]abeas corpus relief is the exception rather than the general rule.” Id . Further, a petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus in a child-custody action “ ‘when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.’ ” In re G.T.B. , 128 Ohio St.3d 502, 2011-Ohio-1789, 947 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 8, quoting In re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller , 103 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6. {¶ 10} Lee had the right to challenge the magistrate’s order granting temporary custody by filing a motion to se t aside the magistrate’s order. Juv.R. 40(D)(2)(b). Moreover, Lee had the right to challenge to the magistrate’s decision “in any subsequent hearing in the case, and appeal any adverse judgment by the juvenile court.” Rammage v. Saros , 97 Ohio St.3d 430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 10. Indeed, Lee, represented by counsel, appealed the juvenile court’s order granting permanent custody to Family Services. The availability of
alternative remedies in the or dinary course of the law, even if those remedies wereS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 not sought or were unsuccessful, pr ecludes a writ of habeas corpus. State ex rel. O’Neal v. Bunting , 140 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-4037, 18 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 14-15. {¶ 11} Lee had—and has used—alternative remedies at law to challenge the juvenile’s court’s judgment granting perman ent custody of R.L. to Family Services. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. We also deny Lee’s August 29, 2016 motion to expedite as moot. Judgment affirmed
and motion denied.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , K ENNEDY , F RENCH , and O’N EILL , JJ., concur.

_________________ Ricardo G. Lee, pro se. Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Pros ecuting Attorney, and Christian J. Schaefer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

_________________