U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Four House Fires that 

Killed 28 Children

USFA-TR-020/December 1987

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Four House Fires That Killed

28 Children

Jeffrey M. Shapiro, P.E.

Daniel J. Carpenter, Jr.

Philip S. Schaenman

Hollis Stambaugh

This is Report 020 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Table of Contents

Four Fires that Killed 28 Children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Summary of Key Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Milwaukee House Fire Kills Twelve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CAUSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix A: Fatalities in First Milwaukee House Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Appendix B: Second Floor Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Appendix C: List of Slides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

SECOND MILWAUKEE HOUSE FIRE KILLS SIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CAUSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

APPendix D: Fatalities in Second Milwaukee House Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Appendix E: Plan of Second Floor Showing Location of Fatalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix F: List of Slides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Appendix G: Locations From Which Slides Were Taken. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
viii U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SIX CHILDREN DIE IN HOUSE FIRE in Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

FIRE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Fire Safety Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Juvenile Firesetting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Cause, Investigation, and Community Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Smoke Detector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Rapid Fire Spread. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Windows in Older Houses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Overcrowding in Low-Income Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Appendix H: List of Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Appendix I: Fire Department Incident Report, Investigation Report, and 

Dispatch Transcript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

SIX CHILDREN DIE IN HOUSE FIRE in Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

 OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

THE HOUSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Fire Safety Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Problem with Escape Windows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Ratio of Children to Babysitter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Time For Escape or Rescue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Smoke Detectors: Still More To Do. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Property Damage Was Limited. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Appendix J: List of Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Appendix K: Fire Department Incident and Casualty Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
1

Four House Fires That Killed

28 Children

Milwaukee, Wisconsin September 30, 1987 10 Children, 2 Adults

Milwaukee, Wisconsin October 15, 1987 6 Children

Prince Georges County, Maryland November 26, 1987 6 Children

Pleasantville, Ohio December 18, 1987 6 Children

Summary

In the last quarter of 1987, four fires in three communities killed 28 children and two adults. Each 

fire shocked its community. The basic lessons were similar, and common to many other fires:

• There were no working smoke detectors.

• The houses were overcrowded at the time of the fire, which hindered escape.

• Wooden, non-compartmented construction allowed rapid fire and smoke spread.

• Lack of escape planning and practice and lack of general fire prevention education characterized most of the victims.

The Summary of Key Issues chart on the following page shows a more detailed comparison of the 

key aspects of these four fires. Three of the fires exemplify the largest and least easily solved fire 

safety problem in the United States – overcrowded homes in poor neighborhoods where the people 

have had little or no fire safety education and do not maintain smoke detectors. The fourth fire 

shows it can happen elsewhere, too. Together they represent high hazards that working detectors 

and escape plans can reduce.

The first fire occurred in Milwaukee on September 30, 1987. The cause of the pre-dawn blaze in 

the 93-year-old wood frame house has not been determined. The house was not equipped with 

smoke detectors. A Milwaukee city ordinance requires smoke detectors in all homes built before 

1980; occupants were responsible for detector installation in rental properties such as the house in 

this incident.
2

Summary of Key Issues

Issues Milwaukee 1 Milwaukee 2 PG County, MD Pleasantville, OH

Fatalities 12 6 6 6

Could some

have been 

saved with

earlier warning?

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Cause Accidental but 

unknown

Misuse of space 

heater by child

Misuse of matches

by child

Unattended cooking

Smoke 

Detectors

None present

(2 present)

None working

(1 present)

None working

location

Not in recommended

Occupancy Overcrowded;

15 people present

11 people present

Marginally 

overcrowded;

Overcrowded;

15 people present

Not crowded

Construction

problems

Old, wood 

construction;

open stairway

Old, wood

construction;

open stairway

Old, wood 

construction;

open stairway

Very old wood 

construction;

open stairway; 7 foot 

ceiling in bedroom 

where deaths 

occurred

Delayed 

Alarm

Yes Yes; neighbors 

attempted rescue 

Yes Yes

Window problems No No Yes Yes

Furnishings High fire load Ordinary High fire load Ordinary

Fire spread Very rapid Very rapid Very rapid Very rapid

Would escape

plan have helped? 

Yes Possibly Yes Yes

Would fire

prevention

education

have helped?

Yes Yes Yes Yes

At the time of the fire, the house was occupied by 15 people, five adults and 10 children, most of 

whom were related. The main tenant was in the process of getting settled after moving north from 

southern Florida. Her sisters and brother, and seven of their children, had joined her and her two 

children in Milwaukee. A friend and another friend’s child were also staying there at the time.

The fire killed two of the adults and all 10 children.

Only two weeks later, on October 15, 1987, another Milwaukee fire in a large, 75-year-old wood 

frame dwelling occurred when a 10-year-old put a blanket over a space heater. Gas service, the main 

source of heating for the house, had been suspended after bills had gone unpaid. The family had 

been cautioned twice within a few days of the fire about using electrical appliances such as a toaster 

oven for heating and about the need to keep combustibles away from space heaters. Although the 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 3

house apparently was equipped with smoke detectors, batteries had been removed from at least one; 

it is likely that batteries were dead in the other.

While it was not precisely determined, it is estimated that the house was occupied by 12 to 15 

people; 11 people, including a babysitter, were in the house at the time of the fire. Ironically, the 38-

year-old mother of the occupants had been taken to a hospital two days prior to the fire to give birth 

to her thirteenth child; a 17-year-old girl had come over to babysit while the mother was away.

The fire killed the babysitter and five young children.

On November 26, 1987, Thanksgiving Day, an early morning fire in a 50-year-old house in Prince 

Georges County, Maryland, was set by two children playing with matches. Batteries for the smoke 

detector in the house had been disconnected.

At the time of the fire, the house was occupied by three generations of a family, 15 people in all. 

Some had been up all night preparing Thanksgiving dinner. The youngsters who set the fire, ages two 

and four, woke up before the others, found some matches, and set fire to a child’s school bag that 

was next to a sofa in the living room. Apparently surprised at how quickly the fire grew, and worried 

they would be punished, the two retreated to their bedroom and left the fire burning.

The two children had a history of firesetting. Their grandparents, who headed the household, had 

warned the other adults in the house that corrective action should be taken or that the consequence 

might be a serious fire, but no professional counseling had been sought for the children.

The fire killed five children and the babysitter, and injured four adults. The youngsters who set the 

fire were among the survivors.

Another tragic fire occurred in Pleasantville, Ohio, on December 18, 1987. The blaze was caused 

by an unattended pan on the kitchen stove. A smoke detector was located on the first floor but was 

not installed in a recommended location. It apparently did not operate, even though it had new batteries and reportedly had been tested only two weeks prior to the fire. Its location may have been a 

contributing factor. The detector was adjacent to a large stairway opening; smoke was able to leave 

the kitchen and pass up to the second level without ever reaching the detector.

At the time of the fire the house was occupied by one adult and six children. A woman had taken 

her three children to her brother’s home to babysit for his three children. They had left a pot of 

water heating on the stove while she went up to quiet the children who said they could not go to 

sleep because they were afraid of “monsters.” She had decided to lie down with them until they fell 

asleep, but she fell asleep as well, apparently forgetting about the pot on the stove.

The fire killed all six children. Although she was overcome by smoke, the woman survived.

These four fires, with their tragic results, re-emphasize several very important lessons. Chief among 

them is the importance of public fire education focused on the need for smoke detector maintenance 

and escape planning and specially targeted to reach high-risk groups, such as low-income families 

and their children.

The majority of these fires involved old, overcrowded houses in primarily low-income neighborhoods. In most cases, the ratio of children to adults was high. This paints a classic picture of high 

fire risk and includes those who have been traditionally hardest to reach with fire safety information. 

Communities should increase their efforts to involve these people in fire safety programs.
4

The warning and extra escape time offered by smoke detectors could have made a difference in the 

number of lives lost in these fires. Not only the need for detectors but the proper installation and 

maintenance of them should be a consistent topic of fire safety messages.

There was little evidence in most of these fires that any attention had been given to escape planning 

or practice. In a home with a large number of occupants, knowing how to get out takes on added 

importance.

In addition, the escape planning process could have pointed out obstructions in time to eliminate 

them. In two of the fires, escape was hampered by old, poorly maintained windows that would not 

remain open by themselves. And in one case, bars installed on windows as a protective measure 

blocked exit.

That the lessons learned from these fires are not new makes these deaths all the more tragic. What 

more incentive is needed to step up efforts to end the loss of children to fires?
5

Milwaukee House Fire Kills Twelve

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

September 30, 1987

Report number 1 of 4.

Investigated by: Dan J. Carpenter

Consulting

Investigator: Richard Custer

Local Contacts: Chief Richard Seelen

Battalion Chief James Rechlitz

Deputy Chief William J. Walker

Deputy Chief Don Jackson

Deputy Chief Gerald Frank

Asst. Chief Dispatcher Barnes

Milwaukee Fire Department

841 North Broadway

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

(414) 278-3642

Detective Will Tingue

Arson Squad

Criminal Investigation Bureau

Milwaukee Police Department

749 W. State Street, Room 304

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 54304

(414) 344-5656, Ext. 

327/360/302

Code Enforcement Supervisor 

Robert J. Peterson

Department of Building Standards 

and Safety Engineering

(414) 278-3155

Special Agent Gregory J. Eggum

Department of Justice

State of Wisconsin
6

OVERVIEW

At approximately 0442 on September 30, 1987, the Milwaukee Fire Department received a public 

telephone alarm from an unknown person advising the dispatcher of a residential fire at 1738 North 

23rd Street. Thus began the most tragic residential house fire in the city’s history. The pre-dawn 

blaze killed 12 people, 10 of whom were children under the age of nine. Three adult occupants 

escaped unassisted.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Fire Cause Unknown

Casualties 12 dead, including 10 children. All fatalities from high carbon 

monoxide level.

Smoke Detectors None found; occupant was responsible for installing, by local 

code. Owner claimed he had installed two detectors. Earlier 

detection probably would have saved lives.

Overcrowding 15 occupants in small single family dwelling, including 10 

children. High fire load of possessions.

Structure Old wooden house, hollow walls. Stairway acted as chimney 

– fire and smoke spread rapidly.

Human Behavior Large number of children overwhelmed capacity of adults to 

help. Adults also did not know sleeping location of all children.

That a total of 15 people occupied the property at the time of the fire points to one of the major 

reasons why this fire took such a toll and serves as a sad reminder that poverty and overcrowding 

create an especially dangerous potential for disaster. Moreover, the home had no smoke detectors 

and a high fire loading in large part due to the bedding, clothes, and other household items of the 

15 occupants. An open stairwell to the second floor enabled the fire and smoke to travel unimpeded 

from the first floor – trapping the occupants.

Had working smoke detectors been present it is likely that at least some lives would have been saved. 

Neighbors heard cries for help. Some of the occupants had awakened and succeeded in escaping. The 

adults and most of the children who died were found in locations other than their beds, indicating that 

they too had been aroused from sleep and had made an attempt to flee the fire. With more lead time 

the number of survivors likely would have been greater. The lesson of how critical smoke detectors are 

to saving lives is taught once again in this fire and in the others discussed later in this report.

BACKGROUND

Three weeks before the fire a city building inspector, responding to complaints from the home’s 

principal tenant, checked conditions and noted over 20 code violations. Most of the violations, 

however, posed no immediate threat. The inspector also was reported by the local press to have 

mentioned after the fire that detectors were absent, but that fact was not included in the list of repairs 

and improvements cited in the inspector’s report. Whether the inspector did or did not note the 

absence of detectors is a subject of controversy. The owner of the building claimed that the house 

had had two functioning smoke detectors – one upstairs and one downstairs, but evidence of them 

was not found.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 7

The city ordinance in effect at the time of the fire required smoke detectors in all homes built before 

1980; however, occupants were responsible for installing the alarms in rental properties with one 

or two families. The lack of smoke detectors ended up being far more critical than damaged ceiling 

plaster, broken window panes, and missing door knobs – items that were included in the inspection 

report, which focused on repairs required from the owner.

Crowded into this 93-year-old house at 1738 North 23rd Street on the night of September 29th was 

an assortment of friends, cousins, and sisters – some just visiting, others residing there permanently 

or periodically. The main tenant was a member of a large family that was in the process of getting 

settled in the north to escape the heat and drugs of her former community in Southern Florida. 

Concern for their children led the tenant’s sisters and a brother to join her in Milwaukee. Though 

she survived, two of her children, seven of her nieces and nephews, and one of her sisters died. A 

friend of one of the sisters also perished as did the young child of another friend.

When the building inspector last checked the property she observed the crowded conditions. 

However, there were no codes or city ordinances limiting the number of occupants and therefore, 

no legal basis for objecting to the number of adults and children staying at the house. Also, it was 

difficult to ascertain how many were permanent residents and how many were simply visiting.

THE FIRE

Shortly before dawn on September 30, an unidentified person notified the Milwaukee Fire Department 

of the fire. When firefighters arrived three minutes later, the small, 1 1/2 story, wood frame house 

already was heavily involved and fire was extending to the exposure building on the north side.

According to the Officer-in-Charge, 5th Battalion Chief James Rechlitz, the response of Engine 

Companies #32, #5, #28, and Ladder Companies #9, and #2 was routine until they arrived to view 

a “raging fire” that was coming out the first floor windows and had already begun to spread to the 

adjacent building (1740). Black smoke was coming out of the second floor window on the west 

side. Flames were also observed spreading under the eaves of the house to the north and through 

first floor windows. A special alarm for extra help and manpower was sounded and a total of 40 

firefighters, including Squad #1, Car #3, and #15 were called to the scene, bringing the fire under 

control shortly thereafter.

The extent of fire damage was confined to the building of origin in spite of the close proximity 

(approximately 8 feet) of adjacent structures. The 20 foot by 30 foot structure consisted of a first 

floor with three rooms and a partially partitioned attic. The interior was extensively burned. The 

heat of the fire was evidenced on the outside of the building by low heat lines and melted tar and 

asbestos siding.

Annie Ruth Phillips, the main tenant, was asleep on the first floor when the fire began in the kitchen 

area. By the time she was aroused, flames blocked a rear window and had burned out the stairway 

(and only access) to the second floor. “When I pulled the door open, I seen (sic) the fire just shooting up. I was going to get everybody (upstairs). I heard all the kids crying.”

Phillips and a male friend, Willie Cross, ran outside where Cross climbed up the roof to an upstairs 

window in hope of rescuing the 12 occupants who were sleeping on the second floor. A female 

adult raised the window and Cross pulled her out, but heavy smoke prevented him from entering to 

save the rest. She jumped to the ground and sustained a crushed vertebrae, two fractured ribs, and a 

partially collapsed lung. He broke windows with a shovel in an attempt to rescue the other people, 
8

but only succeeded in providing the fire with an influx of fresh oxygen. A neighbor tried to help, 

but he too was beaten back by the heat, flames, and smoke. Firefighters were equally daunted in 

their efforts to reach the victims.

Firefighters raised a 30 foot ladder to the roof and began ventilation. Meanwhile, engine companies 

laid two large diameter lines and worked them on the fire building and the exposure building to the 

north. As the companies made progress, they reduced the lines, donned breathing apparatus, and 

initiated mop up and overhaul. A lieutenant made his way to the kitchen and closed the oven door of 

the cooking stove so that he had room to turn the corner toward the staircase. Finding the staircase 

burned out, he ordered a 14 foot ladder brought in and used to access the second (attic) level and 

begin searching for occupants.

Meanwhile, another engine and a ladder company were ordered to the exposure building to extinguish the fire, make top side ventilation, and search for occupants. None were found. All residents 

of that property had escaped uninjured.

One by one the victims from 1738 North 23rd Street were found. Eleven people (nine children and 

two adults) died on the upstairs level where a number of makeshift sleeping areas had been created. 

A child, the twelfth victim, was discovered on a bed in a first floor “closet” or small room. Upon 

discovery, all bodies were moved to the first floor to permit an accurate accounting of the occupants. 

This action may have contributed to some of the problems later encountered by investigators in 

determining what actions the victims may have taken to escape. The table presented in Appendix A 

shows the relationships of the fatalities to the household. Appendix B shows the second floor plan 

and locations where fatalities were found.

All the victims died of smoke inhalation, according to the medical examiner. Carbon monoxide 

levels ranged from 60-90 percent – much higher than the 45-50 percent considered lethal. All 

blood-alcohol and drug tests proved negative. The high carbon monoxide levels could indicate that 

the fire smoldered for some time before gaining sufficient oxygen to burn freely.

While the loss of life in this fire was exceptionally high, the dollar loss was not extraordinary, owing 

in part of the age and condition of the properties. The main property suffered $50,000 damage to 

the home and contents and the exposure building losses were estimated to be $25,000. But for a 

low-income family, these non-spectacular amounts can be devastating. 

CAUSE

In Milwaukee, the responsibility for determining the cause and origin of a fire of suspicious, undetermined, or incendiary nature rests with the police department. The State’s Department of Justice 

has concurrent jurisdiction and may become involved at their discretion or upon invitation by the 

police department.

Several days after the fire, investigators tentatively had ruled out heating, electrical problems, and 

arson as the cause. Carelessness with smoking materials was a possibility but the fire’s intensity 

destroyed most of the evidence, and the real cause may never be established. Newspaper accounts 

revealed there were smokers in the house and some of them were smoking the night of the fire, 

possibly while sitting on a sofa which was entirely destroyed. Other reports indicate the fire began 

in the kitchen area. In any case, it appeared as though some type or careless behavior, rather than 

electrical or mechanical malfunctions or arson, caused the blaze. The cause was still under investigation at the time of this report.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 9

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

Many factors contributed to the rapid spread and high death toll of this fire. None of them are new, but 

rather reflect an all-too-common scenario typical of many low-income, inner-city neighborhoods.

Structure – The structure was an old (93 years) wood frame building. Constructed before the fire 

safety features of current codes were on the books, the property had hollow walls that helped the fire 

spread. The stairway acted as a chimney for the rising heat and smoke.

Overcrowding – The large number of occupants led to the house having a great deal of furniture, clothing, bedding, and other items that added to the fuel load. Overcrowding also taxed the available exits 

and, of course, heightened the tragedy with greater loss of life.

Smoke Detectors – The fire spread rapidly before the first floor occupants awoke and became aware of 

the danger. The people on the second floor apparently had even less time to respond. Whether more 

people would have survived had working smoke detectors been in-place can only be surmised, but it 

seems likely. With a fire discovered in the incipient stage, rescuers would not have been confronted 

with heavy clouds of smoke and the intense heat and flames. Perhaps at least some of the children 

could have been saved.

Also at issue is the question of who should have been responsible for installing and maintaining 

smoke detectors in the rental property.

The landlord said he had installed a detector on each floor, even though by Milwaukee code it was 

the occupant’s responsibility to install and maintain the detectors. No detectors were found. After 

the fire, an ordinance was proposed making installation the responsibility of the occupants.

Even if landlords install detectors, all too often occupants neglect or disable the units. New codes 

alone may not solve this problem; it requires public education as well, especially for high risk 

populations.

Escape Routes – The escape routes available to the second floor occupants were no more nor fewer than 

in most single family dwellings of comparable size. As a 1 1/2 story home it would not be expected 

to have a fire escape. There were windows in the front and the back of the upper level and a staircase 

leading down to the first floor. The victims were prevented from escaping not so much because of 

inadequate exits, but because the rear exits (stairway and window) were too heavily involved, the 

occupants did not have enough warning to escape earlier, and because most of the victims were very 

young and needed more training or more help from adults to escape.

Human Behavior – When the lower-level windows were broken by an occupant’s shovel to help others 

escape, the fire received a fresh supply of oxygen. Also, had the people on the first floor thought about 

(or known?) a child was sleeping in the closet right by the front door, they might have been able to 

grab him as they hastily exited the house. The woman with serious injuries who had escaped from 

the second floor window originally had a baby in her arms, but then put him back, perhaps thinking 

that the fall was more perilous than the fire, or perhaps being too panicked to think rationally.

Exposures – The proximity and similar type of construction of the adjacent property facilitated the fire’s 

spread to that home. The fire department’s quick response prevented the fire from extending even 

further in the exposure property and down the block to other nearby, closely-spaced dwellings.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

LESSONS LEARNED

In this fire there were no new lessons learned, but several longstanding ones were confirmed. Once 

again, it was shown that poverty, overcrowding, old housing stock, and lack of smoke detectors can 

add up to a fire disaster.

1. Fire departments need to focus public education on the need for smoke detectors, especially 

in those areas with the highest fire rates and the lowest coverage of detectors.

The public – whether owning or renting the property where they live – must understand how 

extremely important it is to have and maintain detectors, and how to obtain them if they cannot 

be afforded. This requires understanding of how fast a fire can grow, and the danger of smoke 

inhalation. Milwaukee is examining how they can reach more homes by a combination of 

regulatory means, public education, and smoke detector giveaway programs, as have been used 

successfully by other cities.

2. Fire departments need to emphasize escape planning in low-income areas.

Knowing two ways out needs to be taught to adults and children, especially where overcrowding in combustible old houses exists. Adults need to know where children are sleeping and to 

practice helping children escape from windows. Adults and children need to understand that a 

drop from a second story window is not as risky as staying in a smoky fire.

3. City management, not fire departments, must be the ones to address the underlying issues of 

poverty and overcrowding.

The issues of poverty and resultant overcrowding are complex and do not lend themselves to 

immediate solutions. Even where codes establish limits concerning the number of occupants 

allowed in a house or housing unit, the code is difficult to enforce. Who is a permanent resident 

and who is just visiting? Local governments or landlords who do insist on regulating occupancy 

levels invite bad press and run the risk of adding to the problem of homeless people. Often 

when people are forced to leave they just move on to the home of another relative or friend so 

that the new property then joins the ranks of overcrowded units. Resources beyond the scope 

of the fire service are needed to solve this problem.
11

Appendices

A. Fatalities in First Milwaukee House Fire

B. Second Floor Plan and Location of Fatalities

C. List of Slides Followed by Selected Photos and a Diagram Showing Where Slides Were Taken. 

(Slides are included with the master report at the United States Fire Administration [USFA].)
12

Appendix A

Fatalities in First Milwaukee House Fire

Female, age 29, and her four children:

Boy, 5

Girl, 4

Girl, 2

Boy, 11 months

Children of principal female tenant:

Girl, 8

Girl, 7

Children of another female tenant:

Girl, 5

Girl, 4

Boy, 3

Visitors:

Boy, 2

Adult male, 41
13

Appendix B

SECOND FLOOR PLAN
14

Appendix C

The complete set of slides is included with the master report at the USFA. Enlarged reproductions of 

the four slides (#3, #8, #10, and #17) appear on the following pages.

Slide Number

2. South side of fired building looking towards rear, shows where heavy smoke and heat had 

escaped after windows were broken out.

3. Southeaster corner rear shows where fire burned though at end of roof and also where fire 

department had vented the roof.

4. East end of fired building. Debris removed by firefighters.

5. Area where fire had vented itself above inside stairwell, indicating extensive heat buildup.

6. South side exposure of building on north side of fired building showing close proximity and 

fire spread to adjacent building.

7. North side of fired building shows extensive smoke and heat emission.

8. Attic window and corner of front porch on west side of building where escape was made.

9. North side of fired building looking from front to rear. Area shown is where tar had run down 

side of building as a result of heat in this area.

10. Fence rail between fired buildings and exposure indicating extensive heat on first floor level.

11. Exposure building (1740) indicates sufficient heat to begin to melt tar behind asbestos 

shingles.

12. Northeast corner of roof area of fired building looking west, shows extensive heat buildup on 

this side of the building.

13. North side of fired building shows close proximity to exposure and extensive heat at lower 

level.

14. Rear window on east end of building above inside stairwell where fire had gained access to 

attic area.

15. Low burn area indicates extensive heat at floor level, sufficient to melt tar.

16. Debris on northeast end of fired building reflects extensiveness of interior fire.

17. Front view of fired building (looking east) on right and exposure on left. Note where fire 

had already gained sufficient headway to burn through roof. Also note the closeness of the 

houses.381017

Locations From Which Slides Were Taken
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 153. Southeaster corner rear shows where fire burned though at end of roof and also where fire department had vented the roof.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

8. Attic window and corner of front porch on west side of building where escape was made.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 1710. Fence rail between fired buildings and exposure indicating extensive heat on first floor level.
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

17. Front view of fired building (looking east) on right and exposure on left. Note where fire had already gained sufficient 

headway to burn through roof. Also note the closeness of the houses.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 19

21

SECOND MILWAUKEE HOUSE FIRE KILLS SIX

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

October 15, 1987

Report number 2 of 4.

Investigated by: Dan J. Carpenter

Consulting

Investigator: Richard Custer

Local Contacts: Chief Richard P. Seelen

Deputy Chief Gerald Frank

Deputy Chief William T. Voboril

Battalion Chief Howard Glassel

Milwaukee Fire Department

841 North Broadway

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

414-278-3155

OVERVIEW

Only two weeks and one day after the previously described fire on Milwaukee’s north side that took 

the lives of 12 victims, six more people, all children, lost their lives in a fire one mile away. This 

second inner-city fire occurred on October 15, 1987, at 2045 N. 32nd Street. It was called in by an 

unidentified female at 0152.

Firefighting efforts brought the fire under control shortly after entry on the first floor, but firefighters 

once again were confronted with the realization that their rescue attempts were in vain. There were 

no survivors after arrival of the fire department.

While it has not been precisely determined, between 12 and 15 people are thought to have been 

occupying this house; 11 were home at the time of the fire. Of the five occupants who escaped the 

fire prior to the arrival of the fire department, three were hospitalized for cuts and held for observation. Five of the fatalities were located in second floor bedrooms, and a one-year-old girl was located 

on the stairs between the first and second floors, under debris. The table presented in Appendix D 

shows the relationships among the fatalities.

Once again, children were the primary victims, an old wooden structure was involved, the occupancy level was high, and there were no working smoke detectors.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Fire Cause Children misusing flammables near space heater.

Casualties Six dead; five children plus 17-year-old babysitter.

Fire Origin Fire started on first floor, cutting off stairway exit from second floor before occupants were 

alerted to the fire.

Delayed Report Fire department contact may have been delayed while neighbors unsuccessfully attempted 

rescue.

Structure Old wooden house with no fire breaks in walls and open stairway allowed fire and smoke 

to spread rapidly.

Smoke Detectors Smoke detectors were present but not operational; at least one was intentionally disabled.

Exposure Closely-spaced old wooden houses allowed quick spread.

Firefighting Operations Conditions untenable on arrival; rescue not possible for any who were not already out. 

Quick action limited further spread.

Human Behavior Lack of detector maintenance. Lack of escape planning. Lack of prevention knowledge by 

children.

Disconnected Gas Service Gas service disconnected because tenant failed to pay heating bills and failed to provide 

information required by gas company to get assistance.

Family resorted to alternative heating that was ignition source.

BACKGROUND

Two days before five of her children were to perish in an early morning blaze, a 38-year-old mother 

of twelve and grandmother of five was taken by paramedics to Mt. Sinai Medical Center to give birth 

to her thirteenth child. A 17-year-old girl came over to stay at the house and babysit the children. 

Ironically, one of the paramedics who came to help the mother to the hospital when labor began 

noticed space heaters and warned the family to keep them away from combustibles. “I’d hate to hear 

about you on the news,” he said.

Several nights before the fire the landlord visited the house and also cautioned the family about fire 

safety. He saw that they were using electrical appliances for heating and warned the oldest boy about 

warming the kitchen with a toaster oven. It was the responsibility of the tenants to pay for heat but 

not electricity. The family had lived at the property only six months, but had resided in other properties owned by the landlord, who knew the family fairly well. On several occasions he had forgiven 

their rent, provided groceries to them, and given a job to one of the sons.

Because the six-bedroom, two-bath property was built in 1912, it did not meet current code standards as applied to newer housing. However, there were no code violations outstanding and the 

house was in good repair. The electrical system recently had been upgraded, the gas heating unit 

was still within its expected life cycle, and the landlord had completed carpentry, tiling, and painting 

work not too long before.

Even though the heating system was functional, it was not in use on the night of the fire. Four 

months earlier in May, the Wisconsin Gas Company had disconnected gas service to the house after 

sending two notices warning the occupants of the consequences unless the gas bill was paid. On 

September 15, the company discovered that the outside gas meter had been tampered with, thus 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 23

restoring service, illegally, to the home. Two days later service again was shut off and the utility 

installed a tamper-proof meter.

On October 8 and 12, one of the older sons personally called the customer service office of the gas 

company to ask that service be restored and that the account be registered in his name, rather than 

his mother’s. But since he could not provide identification nor prove that his mother no longer lived 

at that address, gas company employees declined to act on his request. A gas company administrative 

ruling prohibits resumption of service if the delinquent customer still resides at the billing address.

The nights began to get chilly and the family resorted to electric space heaters and other appliances 

to ward off the cold. There was a special concern for heat because three of the children were under 

two years of age and the 16-year-old girl was pregnant. These were the conditions the night of 

October 15.

THE FIRE

Sometime after retiring for the night, one of the children, a 10-year-old boy, became sweaty from 

the heat produced by an electric space heater. He threw a blanket over it to stop it from putting out 

so much heat. Later he saw the couch on fire and flames licking the curtains. He tried to put out 

the fire with a cup of water, then fled the house. Meanwhile, the 19-year-old son ran through the 

house frantically trying to awaken the babysitter and his sisters and brothers and help them escape. 

His pregnant 16-year-old sister and her 9-month old child escaped from a window on the second 

floor by jumping to the ground. A witness saw her drop the baby to the ground, then jump out 

herself, followed by the older brother. The 12-year-old sister also escaped with only minor injuries. 

This occurred before firefighters arrived; the rest of the occupants, including the babysitter and five 

other children, perished.

As they escaped the burning house, the survivors ran to neighbors’ homes searching for help. The 

older brother shouted to neighbors to douse him with water so he could attempt re-entry. They 

poured water on him but he could not get back into the house. A man tried to enter the back of 

the house by breaking windows, but, according to a neighbor, “the fire kept blowing him back.” A 

woman and two other men from the neighborhood also tried to get in. “You could feel the heat 

from across the street,” the woman was quoted as saying. Placing a bench at the back of the house 

they attempted to climb up to the second floor. One of the men succeeded in entering but then was 

driven back by the heat. Most of this activity apparently occurred before the fire department was 

contacted.

The fire department switchboard received the first call at 0152. Firefighters from a station five blocks 

from the burning home arrived at the scene within four minutes. Battalion Chief Howard Glassel, 

along with Engine Company #32 and Ladder #9, arrived to find the home fully involved with flames 

showing in all front windows and the attic. A captain from the ladder company said of conditions 

when he arrived, “Superman couldn’t have gotten in there without melting.” A lieutenant claimed 

that from the fire station five blocks away, “it looked like high noon...we could see the glow...” Fire 

already had spread to the adjacent property at 2041 North 32nd Street, where all nine occupants got 

out safely.

Engine Company #32 laid a 2 1/2-inch line and knockdown lines to the southeast corner of the 

building and a 3-inch line and knockdown lines to the northeast corner to attack the fire building 

and protect exposures. The rear entrance on the first floor was covered with a 1 3/4-inch attack 
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

line to extinguish flames and facilitate search and rescue. That line then was advanced to the second 

floor via the interior stairway. Ladder Company #9 advanced the 3-inch line to the rear and raised a 

portable ladder to the second floor porch, reduced the line, and advanced into the second floor.

Meanwhile, Engine #5 was directed to lay a 2-1/2-inch line off Engine #32 and to work alternatively 

on the north and south sides. They laddered to the attic window, reduced the line, and assisted in 

second floor search and rescue operations. Ladder #13 worked on ventilating the southern exposed 

building. As victims were found, fire personnel stood by the areas of discovery while police officials 

and the Medical Examiner conducted their preliminary investigation.

A total of more than 40 firefighters responded to the fire. Six engines, two ladder trucks, two medical units, and a mobile hospital unit were dispatched. The fire was under control in an hour.

CAUSE

A week after the fire, officials confirmed that evidence pointed toward the living room space heater 

as causing the fire. The family’s 10-year-old son admitted to investigators that he placed a blanked 

on or next to the space heater because he was too hot. And it was at that location that the same child 

later found flames engulfing the couch and curtains. During overhaul, investigators found three 

space heaters, two on the first floor and one on the second floor.

Sadly, the family would not have had to use space heaters had they applied for help from a fuel assistance program established to help low-income families meet fuel bill payments during the heating 

season. They qualified for the assistance.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

Many of the circumstances surrounding this second high-fatality fire in Milwaukee are similar to 

those of the first fire.

Structure – The property was old (75 years), highly flammable house constructed before fire breaks 

in walls and other fire protection building features were required. These factors contributed to the 

rapid spread and the intensity of the fire, which considerably reduced the time for escape. Adding 

to the problem was the open stairway that quickly ushered the smoke and heat upstairs where most 

of the occupants were sleeping.

Smoke Detectors – Though investigators found no smoke detectors, the landlord claimed and an occupant confirmed that two were installed: one above the stairway and another in the kitchen. The 

older son admitted to having removed the batteries in at least one. He did not recall hearing the 

other detector sound the night of the fire. Possibly the batter in the other detector had been allowed 

to go dead, or another family member may have removed that battery, too. In any case, the issue 

in this fire was not a failure to install the hardware, but, tragically, the intentional disabling of one 

detector and the possible failure to maintain another.

Exposure – As with the first fire, the neighborhood of the second fire featured closely-spaced houses 

that heightened the risk of exposure fires. Again, the fire department’s actions held the spread to that 

which was present when they arrived.

Overcrowding – In this second fire it is questionable as to whether one can say there was overcrowding. 

Certainly the house was fully occupied, but unlike the property in the first fire where 15 people were 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 25

crowded into a small, 1-1/2-story home with only two bedrooms, this home was 2-1/2-stories and 

had six bedrooms to accommodate the eleven people sleeping there the night of the fire. What can be 

noted is that large families living in fire-prone dwellings clearly stand to suffer a greater loss of life.

Fire Origin – Both this fire and the previous fire originated on the first floor and cut off the stairway 

exit for second floor occupants, who were left with only the windows as an escape route. While the 

windows were a viable option, there was not enough time for most of the occupants to use them. 

Also, many of the victims were young and may not have realized they could get out the window or 

may not have been able to do so alone.

Human Behavior – Of all the factors affecting this fire, the most significant was human behavior. Had 

the smoke detector battery not been removed and/or the other detector properly maintained; had 

a blanket not been placed too close to the space heater; or had the family been informed and taken 

advantage of a fuel assistance program, this fire could have been prevented or, at a minimum, the 

death toll lowered.

A separate factor in this fire concerns the utility. Few people would argue that a gas company is 

obliged to provide gas service free (in fact, their inability to collect on past due accounts at this 

property meant they had provided free service for a while; and they did follow proper notification 

procedures before cutting off service). Moreover, based on a staff report from the Public Service 

Commission of Wisconsin on the investigation of the events surrounding this fire, it is evident that 

the gas company carried out a comprehensive effort to inform the occupants of pending service 

cutoff, the requirements for getting service restored, and the procedures for obtaining fuel assistance 

grants. The report recommended that the utilities “include warnings about the dangers of space 

heaters” in the utility safety information programs.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. A tragedy – or multiple tragedies – can be used to overcome apathy, raise awareness, and 

stimulate citizens to take fire safety actions.

If the first fire that claimed 12 lives was not enough of an incentive, the second fire within 

two weeks which claimed yet another six lives spurred the neighborhood and city council to 

action.

Neighbors, as well as residents in other areas of the city, voluntarily began stocking up on 

smoke detectors. Meetings were held to review the tragedies and to seek ways to avoid recurrences. City aldermen quickly passed an amendment to the smoke detector ordinance changing 

the responsible party for detector installation from the occupant to the landlord in single and 

two-family rental units. (Landlords already were responsible for detectors in units with more 

than two families.) Landlords also must now provide batteries with every change in tenant and 

annually when leases are renewed. Occupants must supply batteries at other times.

2. Special efforts must be made to target fire prevention education programs at high-risk areas 

– especially on smoke detectors and escape plans.

The combination of poverty, combustible construction, and crowding creates a high risk for 

serious fires. Most fire departments throughout the Nation have an area or group of neighborhoods in their community where a disproportionate number of fires occur. Even the most 

austere budget must make room to fund educational outreach to those at greatest risk.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3. The fire department must act to help firefighters cope with the trauma of multiple fire 

deaths.

The impact on family and friends of those who died in this fire and the first Milwaukee fire 

was keenly felt by the community, but also the firefighters. When two such horrible fires occur 

back-to-back and some of the same firefighters respond to both, psychological trauma should 

be expected and mitigated.

The personnel from Engine #32 had the difficult job of, not once but twice in a span of two 

weeks, discovering and helping to remove the bodies of young children. These men reported 

feeling “numb” and “helpless.” Programs to assist firefighters to recover from such shocking 

situations should be investigated beforehand so departments are prepared to lend assistance or 

refer individuals to appropriate counseling programs.

4. The use of alternative heating is one of the leading causes of fires in residences and requires 

special attention, especially in low-income neighborhoods.

Alternative heating sources used by low income families are often highly dangerous – dangerous because they may be misused, because the danger is not apparent, and because the appliances may be old and in disrepair.

Education efforts need to be focused on this particular problem, especially in the early fall before 

the heating season starts.

5. Multiple city agencies/departments need to work at the root causes of fire.

Perhaps the hardest lesson of all learned from these fires is that real and permanent solutions 

require far more than smoke detector programs and talks on how to prevent fires and escape 

from them. As necessary as those are, it becomes evident after a serious of fires like those 

described in this report, that preventing fires touches more agencies of local government than 

the fire department alone. Attempts at solutions need to include those agencies handling housing, utilities, code enforcement, planning and development, taxes, welfare and human services, 

and police.
27

Appendices

D. Fatalities in the Second Milwaukee House Fire

E. Plan of Second Floor Showing Location of Fatalities

F. List of Slides Followed by Selected Photos and a Diagram Showing Where Slides Were Taken 

(Slides are included with the master report at the United States Fire Administration.)

G. List of Photographs, with a Diagram Showing Where Slides Were Taken.Appendix D
28

APPendix D

Fatalities in Second Milwaukee House Fire

Babysitter:

Girl, 17

Children of one mother:

Girl, 13

Girl, 11

Girl, 8

Boy, 2

Boy, 1
29

Appendix E

Plan of Second Floor Showing Location of Fatalities
30

Appendix F

List of Slides

The complete set of slides is included with the master report at the USFA. Enlarged reproductions of 

the six slides (#18, #22, #28, #31, #34, and #36) appear on the following pages.

18. Front view of fired building looking west. Note close proximity of adjacent buildings (approximately 3-4 feet).

19. Close-up of north side front porch roof, showing heavy burn marks and smoke stains over 

lower and upper floor windows.

20. Close-up of south side of front porch roof shows extensive burn. This suggests that flames 

apparently came from a door or window left open after the fire started.

21. Exposure to the north of fired building indicates sufficient heat buildup to begin to melt tar 

from shingles at upper level.

22. Rear porch area on west end of fired building shows light smoke stains while window on 

right shows heavier smoke.

23. Heavy smoke and charring on first floor window in rear.

24. Close-up of rear view of fire building and exposure shows heat at upper level of exposed 

building on south side of fire building.

25. Close-up of north side of fired building shows the close proximity of adjacent structures and 

probability of fire spread.

26. Lower door at north end of fired building indicates extensive smoke buildup, even below the 

area where the fire is believed to have started.

27. View of north side of fired building toward window on selected floor shows extensive smoke 

with slight smoke from lower windows.

28. Front porch rail on east side of fired building shows extensive heat patterns and alligatoring at 

first floor level again indicating that front door was probably left open and windows broken.

29. Underexposure.

30. Front of fired building directly over front porch shows extensive charring on porch roof, 

windows on second floor and roof of building.

31. Distance shot shows where greatest concentration of heat and smoke buildup at second floor 

level was in front and center of building over open stairwell.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 31

32. Same view as #31.

33. Front of fired building.

34. Same as #33.

35. Southeast corner of 32nd and Brown gives pictorial view of neighborhood and type of houses 

common to this area.

36. Southwest corner of 32nd and Brown gives pictorial view of neighborhood and type of houses 

common to this area.
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

18. Front view of fired building looking west. Note close proximity of adjacent buildings (approximately 3-4 feet).
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 3322. Rear porch area on west end of fired building shows light smoke stains while window on right shows heavier smoke.
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

28. Front porch rail on east side of fired building shows extensive heat patterns and alligatoring at first floor level again indicating 

that front door was probably left open and windows broken.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 3531. Distance shot shows where greatest concentration of heat and smoke buildup at second floor level was in front and center of building over open stairwell.
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

34. Same as #33.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 37 36. Southwest corner of 32nd and Brown gives pictorial view of neighborhood and type of houses common to this area.
38

Appendix G

Locations From Which Slides Were Taken
39

SIX CHILDREN DIE IN HOUSE FIRE

Prince George’s County, Maryland

November 26, 1987

Report number 3 of 4.

Investigated by: Jeffrey M. Shapiro, P.E.

Local Contacts: Chief M. H. Estepp

Captain Danny Jarboe

Prince George’s County Fire Department

6820 Webster Street

Landover Hills, Maryland

(301) 772-9080

OVERVIEW

A smoke detector located only a few feet from the area of origin had an empty space where the battery belonged. Two children with a history of firesetting had gone without professional counseling. 

Such were the ingredients that resulted in the deaths of six children and the injury of four adults in 

an early morning fire in Prince George’s County, Maryland, on Thanksgiving weekend in 1987. Even 

with a progressive and long-standing county program in fire prevention and fire safety education, 

the message did not reach the family who sacrificed nearly an entire generation to this fire. An overcrowded house and a window that would not stay open added to the difficulties of escaping.

BACKGROUND

Prince George’s County, Maryland, is a large county in suburban Washington, DC, with a population 

of 675,000, and covering approximately 500 square miles. The town of Seat Pleasant, where the 

fire occurred, is located within the county just outside of Washington. Seat Pleasant is primarily a 

residential community with a high percentage of low- and middle-income families. Fire protection 

and emergency medical services (EMS) are provided by the county fire department. It coordinates 

county-operated facilities and local volunteer companies, and provides fire prevention, fire investigation, and other central services to the entire county. The town of Seat Pleasant is protected by a 

volunteer department supplemented by paid county firefighters.
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Fire Cause Juvenile firesetting.

Delayed Report Occurred in early morning while occupants slept; lack of immediate reporting by neighbors.

Structure Single-family residence. Two-story wood frame. Lightweight construction of porch contributed to 

quick spread.

Smoke Detectors Batteries removed from smoke detectors.

Overcrowding Fifteen occupants were sleeping in the home at the time of the fire.

Human Behavior Juveniles had history of playing with matches. Occupants apparently had little fire safety education 

despite strong county education program.

Windows Bedroom window would not stay up by itself; contributed to loss of three children in the room.

Fire Investigation and 

Follow-Up

Prince George’s County Fire Department made an extraordinary effort to investigate the cause of 

the fire and sensitively break the news to the community. Aunt of children used as intermediary in 

interrogation.

The house where the fire occurred (Figure 1 in Appendix H) was more than 50 years old and of 

wood frame construction.

The house was divided into two levels, of approximately 960 square feet each, connected by an open 

stairway. It had six bedrooms, two on the first floor and four on the second. Residing there were 

three generations of a family and a friend. (A photograph location key and floor plan are shown in 

Figures 2 and 3.)

On the night of the fire, there were 15 occupants, ranging from less than 1 year to 51 years of age. 

Fourteen of the 15 normally resided in the house, which could be considered overcrowded. A family 

tree and occupant code numbers used for purposes of this report are shown in Figure 4.

Previous episodes of juvenile firesetting had occurred. Two youngsters, ages two and four, had been 

caught playing with matches on at least two previous occasions. In one instance, the children set fire 

to a bed; in the other, a teddy bear was burned. Clearly, a problem existed.

The remedial action taken by the grandparents, who owned the house, was to call the adults together 

and tell them that the match play must stop or somebody was going to burn the house down. There 

was sensitivity to the problem, but professional help was not sought. Unfortunately, a smoke detector in the living room on the first floor with a disconnected battery was the family’s first line of 

defense.

THE FIRE

On the morning of November 22, just before 0800 hours, the 15 occupants had all finally gone to 

bed, some after being up all night preparing Thanksgiving dinner. Two of the children, brothers aged 

two and four (occupants number 2 and 3, respectively), awakened before anyone else and went into 

the living room to play, where the grandmother was sleeping on the sofa. The two children apparently found a pack of matches behind the sofa and proceeded to ignite a children’s school bag that 

was adjacent to the sofa. The area of origin was an area where the children normally played.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 41

Apparently surprised by how rapidly the fire grew and worried that they would be punished if 

caught, the children retreated to their first floor bedroom and left the fire burning. Remains of the 

area of origin are shown in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows the locations of occupants, the fire size, and 

smoke spread at this time.

Shortly thereafter, the grandmother, awakened by the fire, apparently attempted to put the fire out by 

beating it with her bathrobe. Unable to extinguish the flames and with fire continuing to grow, she 

left the house using the front door, leaving it open behind her. This additional ventilation is likely to 

have contributed to the speed of fire growth. 

The inoperative smoke detector was located on the ceiling of the living room immediately adjacent 

to the area of origin. It most likely would have alarmed at this time if it were working. From the 

outside, the grandmother began to scream to the occupants to get out and get the babies out. Figure 

7 shows the locations of occupants, the continued growth of the fire, and smoke spread.

The first extension of the fire occurred after the living room window vented and allowed the fire to 

spread into the porch area under the porch roof (see Figure 8). Driven by the wind, the fire quickly 

penetrated the lightweight soffit (see Figures 9 and 10) and entered the second floor bedroom 

directly above the living room, where occupants 6, 7, 8, and 9 were sleeping. Two of these occupants 

were twins seven months of age; the other two were 10 and 23 years old.

The first occupant in this room to detect the fire was the 23-year-old daughter (#9), who rolled out 

of bed onto the floor and raised the window (see Figure 11). Shortly thereafter, the 10-year-old 

son (#8) awakened in the same bed, sat upright, apparently was overcome by superheated gases, 

and fell back into bed. By now, the fire had progressed to such a level that the smoke in the second 

floor bedroom had banked down to approximately three feet off the floor, and it is likely that the 

three children in this room could not have been saved. The grandmother had been going around the 

house clockwise from the front door, saw her daughter (#9) at the window, and told her to jump, 

which she did-head first. (She survived.)

Meanwhile, one of the four-year-old grandsons (#4) had been awakened in the first floor bedroom 

and attempted to exit from the front door (see Figure 12), but was driven back by fire and exited 

via the bedroom window. A 21-year-old son (#5) had also been awakened in the other first floor 

bedroom, become aware of the fire, and attempted to exit. After checking the bedroom door and 

determining exit through the house to be impossible, he closed the door and passed the twin grandsons, occupants 2 and 3, through the window before exiting himself. The door to this bedroom was 

normally kept open, but when the 21-year-old son awakened, the door had already been closed. It 

is thought likely that when the children ran back into the room after lighting the fire, they closed the 

door to separate themselves from the fire.

Shortly thereafter, the five-year-old grandson (#15), who was sleeping in his own bedroom, detected 

the fire and went to his mother and father’s room (occupants 11 and 12, respectively). He banged 

on the door, went into this parents’ room, and climbed into bed with his parents and two siblings, 

apparently too scared to tell them about the smoke. The parents were apparently still unaware of 

the fire. This family of five, located in the bedroom directly above the kitchen, were now the only 

occupants still alive in the building besides the 41-year-old visiting family friend.

Shortly, the family friend (occupant 10) detected the fire, attempted to exit through the hallway and 

retreated to exit from the bedroom window.
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Cumulative progress of the fire is shown in Figure 13.

The first adult in the other room to become aware of the fire was the mother, who grabbed one of 

her children by the hand and pulled him/her to the window. The mother needed two hands to open 

the window, and when she reached back to grab the child, she was unable to hold the window in the 

raised position and hold the child, who reportedly fought her. As the heat became unbearable, the 

mother was unable to continue rescue efforts and went out the window by herself. Directly behind 

her came her husband. He had looked out the window, saw his wife and several children on the 

ground level, assumed the children were his own, and climbed out. In an effort to save the children, 

the 21-year-old son (occupant 5) re-entered the house through the rear stairway (Figure 14) and 

made his way into the second floor hallway (Figure 15).

Cumulative progress of the fire is shown in Figure 16.

By this time, the fire had progressed such that the heat and smoke were unbearable. The 21-year-old 

son was unable to make entry into the bedroom and left the second floor through a rear doorway 

from the second floor (Figure 17). Figure 18 shows the progress of the fire just before the arrival of 

the fire department and the locations of the six fatalities.

FIRE DEPARTMENT ACTIONS

The fire department received an initial call reporting the fire at 203 69th Street with people trapped, 

which had been radioed in by a police officer. The police officer had been driving in the area, 

noticed the smoke coming from the vicinity of 69th Street, and then located the fire. This means 

there was a significantly delayed alarm; by the time the alarm was turned in, the house’s interior 

would have been fairly well involved.

Before the police officer called in the alarm, two neighbors had also become aware of the fire. 

However, neither called the fire department. One did not have a telephone, and the other ran directly 

to the house to help without calling the fire department. Only one neighbor called the fire department, and that was after the police officer had called in the alarm. (People sometimes assume others 

have reported a noticeable fire.)

The nearest fire station was only three blocks away. It was a volunteer station with a career driver. 

Several volunteers were in the station when the call came in, and an engine and squad responded 

with full staffing within three minutes after initial receipt of the alarm at 0807.

The first units arrived on the scene at 0808 and quickly extinguished the fire. However, by that time, 

all six children remaining in the house were deceased. Four of the adults who escaped sustained 

injuries ranging from lacerations to first- and second-degree burns.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Fire Safety Education

Prince George’s County operates a substantial fire safety education program managed by its fire prevention division. Included among the program elements are three major areas. First, the “Learn Not 

To Burn” (LNTB) program, published by the National Fire Protection Association, is used in schools 

throughout the county in grades kindergarten through eight. Second, the Fire Prevention Bureau 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 43

visits preschools, conducting approximately eight classes per week at four day care centers for ages 

three through five. Their program is a scaled-down version of the LNTB program, emphasizing 

the key lifesaving points. This preschool program is conducted 12 months out of the year. Third, 

the department puts on displays three to four times per year in major shopping malls, handing out 

brochures and information pertinent to fire problems identified by analysis of the county’s recent 

fire data.

In addition to these programs, the department provides classes for Parent-Teacher Associations, 

senior citizen audiences, and numerous civic organizations requesting speakers. A highly successful 

juvenile arson aversion program was established in 1983 when the department became an affiliate 

with the National Firehawk Foundation. This program alone annually assists approximately 50 to 60 

children who have experimented with fire or set fires.

Unfortunately, in this fire, the children were all too young to have attended public schools and did 

not attend preschool due to financial constraints and the availability of babysitters within the family. 

The family seemed unfamiliar with some basic fire prevention measures, such as storing matches 

away children, education of children regarding use of matches, and smoke detector maintenance.

Juvenile Firesetting

Juvenile firesetting is a significant part of the fire problem in the United States and was the cause of 

ignition in this fire. The grandparents in this case had tried to get the family to do something about 

the juvenile problem, but did not succeed. Incredibly, two days after the fire, an aunt of the children 

awakened to find one of the two children involved in the start of the first firesetting at the foot of her 

bed, throwing matches at the bed as she slept.

 Previous episodes of firesetting were treated in a punitive manner. By attempting to cause fear in 

the child, the child’s curiosity was quite possibly increased. In addition, by having threatened the 

children about using matches, the children failed to notify an adult when the fire got out of hand 

and did not attempt to wake up their grandmother. Rather, they sought to avoid being caught by 

returning to their bedroom and closing the door.

The Prince George’s County Fire Department operates a two-phase juvenile firesetter program. After 

an initial evaluation by a fire department investigator, children who are retained in the program are 

either referred to the Firehawk Program or to professional counselors. The Firehawk Program is a 

program used in many departments to place juveniles (aged 7-14) with a history of firesetting with 

a firefighter in a manner similar to the Big Brother Program. The professional counseling program 

arranges for counseling either through an individual counselor retained by the department, consultants with the county’s health department, or the psychiatric ward of the local children’s hospital.

The county’s juvenile firesetting program has recorded a 99 percent effectiveness rate; most of the 

juveniles treated did not have a reported incident of setting an additional fire. The fire department 

uses an outreach approach, doing press releases on the juvenile firesetter program on a periodic 

basis, and advising school counselors through the LNTB program. Typically, the fire department 

evaluates approximately five children per month.

Cause, Investigation, and Community Relations

The Prince George’s County Fire Department made a significant investment in determining the 

cause and origin of the fire. A team of ten fire department investigators worked around the clock 
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

for 10 days studying every element of the fire and taking witness statements to eliminate all possible 

accidental causes. Although a kerosene heater was originally suspected (see Figure 19), the investigation determined that the fire must have been started intentionally. Ultimately, the two surviving 

youngsters were thought to be the likely suspects. To interrogate the youths, an aunt was brought 

in to question them using questions relayed by the investigators. This probably eased the children’s 

anxiety, and they eventually admitted to starting the fire, revealing enough details to verify that they 

had done so.

With the origin and cause determined, the fire department conducted a press conference to release 

its findings. They made a valiant effort to be compassionate toward the family and the community 

regarding the loss of so many children, and stressed the lessons learned. Such lessons from the successful investigation of a tragic fire are often well received by the community and are an important 

vehicle for fire safety education.

The Prince George’s County Fire Department also provides the victims with a post-fire guide that 

answers the many questions raised as the result of having a fire. Various telephone numbers and 

checklists help a citizen recover after a fire.

Smoke Detector

A single smoke detector was located in the living room on the first floor to protect the household. 

The detector was located only a few feet from the area of origin; however, the battery had been 

removed. Nationally recognized standards also would have recommended at least one additional 

detector to protect the sleeping areas on the second floor.

Prince George’s County had passed an ordinance retroactively requiring smoke detectors in all existing dwellings in September 1982. To announce the new law, the department issued press announcements and contacted realtors to request their assistance in checking for smoke detectors when selling 

or buying residences. In addition, the department distributed brochures regarding the smoke detector ordinance. Since the county does not inspect single-family residences, the fire department promotes compliance by education. It also requires that fire and EMS crews responding to a residence 

check for smoke detectors and issue a correction order if a detector is not present.

Prince George’s County also maintains one of the most aggressive smoke detector giveaway programs in the country. The Prince George’s County Board of Trade donates 2,000 smoke detectors per 

year to the fire department. Anyone in the county may call the fire department and request a smoke 

detector, which will be delivered by their first due engine company. The fire department does not 

require any qualifications regarding income or owner/renter status. In addition, all fire investigators 

carry smoke detectors in their fire department cars to be given away as needed. The fire department 

also provides detectors in food baskets given to new residents via a community relations program.

Prince George’s County also gives batteries free of charge to county residents upon request, and batteries are available free through such clubs as the Tandy Radio Shack Battery-A-Month Club. Despite 

these county-wide detector and battery programs, the family in this fire did not maintain their detector, nor did they have an adequate number of detectors.

Rapid Fire Spread

The story of this fire adds additional credence to the fire service’s message to the public that fire 

spreads through a house far faster than they may believe possible. With the use of plastics and highly 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 45

flammable interior finished and furnishings, the speed of fire and smoke spread in today’s residential 

fire absolutely dictates the need for a smoke detector to protect the occupants. No longer can a fire 

department be expected to get to the scene in time to perform rescue, as may have been the case 20 

years ago.

The message to the public needs to be even stronger: that fire departments, contrary to what we 

might wish to believe, are not able to rescue occupants in most residential fires. In the majority of 

cases, either the fire is small and they survive on their own, or the fire and smoke are severe and the 

occupants remaining in the house at the time the fire department arrives are already dead. The fire 

service still affects many rescues, but people need to be persuaded to take more responsibility for 

detection and escape.

Windows in Older Houses

In at least one case in this fire (and in the Pleasantville, Ohio, fire described next in this report), a 

window proved to be a factor that inhibited exiting. In the bedroom above the kitchen, it appears 

that the counterweights on the old style double-hung window were no longer connected and that a 

significant effort was required to open the window. The window may or may not have been able to 

remain raised on its own.

Fire prevention literature teaching emergency exit drills to date has not given adequate attention to 

the specific problem of windows being difficult to open. For those who do not practice exit drills, it 

is likely that such a problem may not be related to fire safety in the homeowner’s mind. Accordingly, 

the fire service needs to get the message out that windows need to be checked to be sure they are free 

of obstructions and that they will open easily and remain raised once opened. Even if a family were 

reluctant to practice a complete exit drill, they might be motivated to check the windows.

Overcrowding in Low-Income Areas

A recognized fire hazard in low-income areas is overcrowding within a dwelling. In this case, 15 

occupants were all sleeping within a house that was less than 2,000 square feet in area. Overcrowding 

may also contribute to behavioral problems in juveniles. These same low-income households often 

are least likely to receive fire prevention messages. Because of the urgency of other problems, they 

may also be less able to do something about fire-related problems.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Fire safety education programs should specifically target families with preschool children, 

low-income families, and adults without children.

Although the Prince George’s County Fire Department has a broad fire safety education program, 

this incident demonstrated that programs concentrated around schools may be inadequate to 

reach some high-risk groups.

2. Communities must establish and advertise programs for juvenile firesetter counseling, and 

how to deal with children’s curiosity about fire.

The juvenile firesetter program for Prince George’s County is publicized through school counselors, the LNTB program, and in the media. There also is a need to educate parents that fire 

cannot be made forbidden to young, curious children, but rather should be respected. Even 
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

with children in the 2- to 4-year age group, we must teach them what to do with matches or 

lighters they find. In addition, to satisfy the natural curiosity of children about fire, we should 

teach children how to light matches under supervision and explain the proper use of fire. And 

certainly when firesetting is repeated, it is necessary to seek professional help.

3. Smoke detectors must be maintained.

Failure to properly maintain smoke detectors once installed is a common problem; about onequarter to one-half of all smoke detectors in homes are out of service at a given moment. A 

smoke detector without batteries is no better than no smoke detector at all. New and innovative 

programs are needed to ensure proper maintenance of smoke detectors by as large a fraction of 

the population as possible. Some people may never listen, and some may be impossible to reach, 

but we probably can do better than we are doing.

4. Every effort should be made to learn from a major tragedy.

The Prince George’s County Fire Department was able to capitalize on increased community 

awareness after the fire to advertise the importance of smoke detector maintenance. The fire 

department did an excellent job of dealing sensitively with the local area press. Chief Estepp was 

ultimately able to get the community to face the sad facts that children in a family had set a fire 

that killed their siblings and cousins.

5. Questioning of very young juveniles via relatives or friends can be a useful approach.

Here, the children’s aunt was the intermediary who asked the children aged two and four the 

questions posed by fire investigators. It was thought that the children were not likely to have so 

readily confessed in detail to investigators directly.

6. Public education needs to address the maintenance and operation of windows.

A significant factor in the deaths of some of the children in this fire (and the Pleasantville, Ohio, 

fire described later in this report) was the improper maintenance of windows needed for escape. 

Windows in older homes that were counterweighted with lead weights and pulleys that are not 

properly maintained generally cannot be opened by an adult with one hand while assisting a 

child with rescue. The fire service has not given significant attention to this problem. It is likely 

that the problem is widespread and deserving of attention as a separate and additional item from 

recommendations regarding exit drills. The need to maintain the operability of windows potentially needed to escape, the need to keep the windows free of batteries that cannot be quickly 

removed, and the need to practice opening them and preparing to escape should all be stressed. 

Parents of babies should consider how well they can escape holding a child in one arm.

7. Stress management programs for fire personnel can assist in overcoming the trauma of tragedies such as child fire fatalities.

In this incident, many firefighters were devastated by the deaths of so many children. 

Recognizing the increased emotional stress of a job such as firefighting, Prince George’s 

County, as does many other fire departments, operates a critical incident stress debriefing program for personnel after incidents such as this. By allowing personnel to talk with a trained 

counselor, the level of stress and emotional damage may be reduced and personnel returned 

to peak operating efficiency sooner.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 47

In the case of Prince George’s County, the employee assistance group is trained in the basic 

elements of critical incident stress debriefing, and the program is supported by professional 

counselors. Prince George’s County’s program has successfully been in-place three years.

8. Residential sprinklers can protect homes even when prevention fails.

Prince George’s County is the first community in the Nation to pass on ordinance that will 

require all new houses to be built with sprinklers by 1991. A single sprinkler head would have 

easily controlled the fire in this case.
48

Appendices

H. Photographs, Diagrams Showing Where Photographs Were Taken, and Floor Diagrams.

I. Fire Department Incident Report, Investigation Report, and Dispatch Transcript.
49

Appendix H

FIGURE 1: After the fire at 203 69th Street.

FIGURE 2: First floor plan showing area of origin; also notes positions from which photos 

were taken.

FIGURE 3: Second floor plan showing location of fatalities.

FIGURE 4: Family tree of occupants.

FIGURE 5: Area of origin in living room. Grandmother was asleep on couch at right.

FIGURE 6: First phase of fire growth and occupant locations (numbers identify the occupants). The 

children who started the fire (occupants 2 and 3) had gone back to their bedroom.

FIGURE 7: Second phase of fire growth and occupant locations. Grandmother (1) escapes.

FIGURE 8: Front porch area where fire first spread to second floor.

FIGURE 9: Lightweight soffit under porch roof allowed rapid fire spread.

FIGURE 10: Area around dormer where fire first entered second floor.

FIGURE 11: Window from which the 23-year-old daughter escaped. The window closed behind 

her.

FIGURE 12: Area in front of the bedroom where a 4-year-old grandson (occupant 4) originally tried 

to escape.

FIGURE 13: Third phase of fire growth and occupant locations.

FIGURE 14: Looking up the rear stairway where occupant 5 re-entered.

FIGURE 15: Hallway at the top of the rear stairs where occupant 5 was forced to abandon rescue 

attempts.

FIGURE 16: Fourth phase of fire growth and occupant locations.

FIGURE 17: Rear of the house, Note the second floor doorway where the 21-year-old son (occupant 5) escaped after his rescue attempt.

FIGURE 18: Fifth phase of fire growth and occupant locations.

FIGURE 19: Location of the kerosene heater originally suspected to have ignited the fire.
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 1

After the fire at 203 69th Street
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 51

FIGURE 2
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 3
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 53

FIGURE 4

Family Tree Of Occupants
FIGURE 5

Area of origin in living room. Grandmother was asleep on couch at right.

54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 6

First phase of fire growth and occupant 

locations (numbers identify the 

occupants). The children who started 

the fire (occupants 2 and 3) had gone 

back to their bedroom.
FIGURE 7

Second phase of fire growth and occupant 

locations. Grandmother (1) escapes.

USFA-TR-020/December 1987 55

FIGURE 8

Front porch area where fire first spread to second floor.
56 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 9

Lightweight soffit under porch roof allowed rapid fire spread.

FIGURE 10

Area around dormer where fire first entered second floor.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 57

FIGURE 11

Window from which the 23-year-old daughter 

escaped. The window closed behind her.
58 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 12

Area in front of the bedroom where a 4-year-old grandson 

(occupant 4) originally tried to escape.

FIGURE 13

Third phase of fire growth and 

occupant locations.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 59

FIGURE 14

Looking up the rear stairway where 

occupant 5 re-entered.

FIGURE 15

Hallway at the top of the rear stairs where occupant 5 was 

forced to abandon rescue attempts.
60 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 16

Fourth phase of fire growth and 

occupant locations.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 61

FIGURE 17

Rear of the house. Note the second floor doorway where the 21-year-old son 

(occupant 5) escaped after his rescue attempt.

FIGURE 18

Fifth phase of fire growth 

and occupant locations.
62 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 19

Location of the kerosene heater originally suspected 

to have ignited the fire.
63

Appendix I

Fire Department Incident Report, Investigation Report, 

and Dispatch Transcript
64 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 65
66 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 67

69

SIX CHILDREN DIE IN HOUSE FIRE

Pleasantville, Ohio

December 18, 1987

Report number 4 of 4.

Investigated by: Jeffrey M. Shapiro, P.E.

Local Contacts: William B. Hammond, Jr.

Fire Chief

Pleasant and Walnut Townships Fire Department

P.O. Box 147

Pleasantville, Ohio 43148

(614) 468-3214

Terry Webber

Chief, Fire Prevention

Ohio State Fire Marshal’s Office

8895 East Main Street

Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068

(614) 864-5510

OVERVIEW

Six children died in a private home fire in Pleasantville, Ohio, on December 18, 1987. The adult caring for the children, a mother of three and aunt of the other three, left a pot of water heating on the 

stove and fell asleep. She was overcome by smoke, but was the sole survivor. This was one tragedy 

among many, for 24 children were killed in fires in Ohio that month alone.

The family involved was concerned about fire safety and had a working smoke detector. But it was 

not in a proper location, and there were wooden bars across a key window needed for escape.

BACKGROUND

Pleasantville, Ohio, is a town located in the distant suburbs of the city of Columbus. The town is a 

bedroom community characterized by older homes housing middle-income families. Fire protection is provided by the Pleasant and Walnut Townships Volunteer Fire Department, an all-volunteer 

organization. The fire department also provides emergency medical services (EMS) and has a large, 

well-maintained fire station with a variety of up-to-date fire suppression and emergency medical 
70 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

vehicles, all staffed by well-trained personnel. Dispatching is handled by three dispatchers who work 

at home and have the ability to alert fire department members through a pager network. Although 

the fire station is normally unstaffed, the fire department is proud of its record of normally being 

able to put a first-due vehicle on the street within two minutes after an alarm is dispatched. Several 

firefighters live or work within a few doors of the station.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Fire Cause Unattended pan on stove on first floor.

Casualties Killed six children and injured one adult. Occurred in evening while occupants slept.

Smoke Detectors Had new battery which had been tested recently. Detector not in a recommended location. 

Detector apparently did not go off.

Delayed Report Reporting to fire department delayed by neighbors’ rescue efforts.

Human Behavior Occupants were awake and together before succumbing.

Windows Window needed for escape apparently would not remain raised by itself. Owner-installed 

protective bars inhibited exiting.

Structure Two-story wood frame dwelling; fire spread rapidly. Low ceiling (7 foot) in bedroom where 

deaths occurred.

Fire Prevention Education Statewide fire safety education program in schools. Local volunteer fire department conducted 

fire safety education classes attended by one child. Family involved was concerned about fire 

safety but nevertheless made several errors in safeguarding house.

Response Time Local fire station was immediately next door to fire scene.

THE HOUSE

The house where the fire occurred was immediately next door to the Pleasant and Walnut Townships 

Fire Station (see Figure 1 in Appendix J; a photo location key is provided in Figures 12 and 13). The 

house was wood frame and built around 1900. It had been divided into two sections, each of which 

was rented separately. The section where the fire occurred was two stories, and the other section was 

a single story. The side where the fire occurred was occupied by a family who had been living in the 

house as renters for approximately 1-1/2 years. The family consisted of a husband, wife, and three 

children ranging in age from a new baby to seven years.

The floor plan of the house is detailed in Figures 2 and 3. Upon entering from the front, one would 

walk through the living room into the dining area, from which an open stairwell led to the second 

story. Beyond the dining area is the kitchen, where the fire originated. On the second floor, an 

open area at the top of the stairs provides access to three bedrooms and a bathroom. As is typical 

in many older homes, the ceiling height in the second-story bedrooms is only seven feet, providing 

little space for smoke to accumulate before banking down from the ceiling level and endangering 

occupants.

The windows on the second floor were sited low on the wall, with the bottom sill of the window 

just above floor level. Because of the danger of a child falling through the window, protective bars 

had been installed inside over their lower section. These bars were constructed of wooden dowel 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 71

rods framed into supports on the top and bottom, which were screwed into the window frame (see 

Figure 4).

An owner-installed smoke detector was located on the first floor ceiling just above the base of the 

open stairway (see Figures 5 and 6). The detector is thought to have been functional since the 

occupant changed the batteries only two weeks before the fire and tested the detector with smoldering paper; it also had alarmed previously from cooking. There was no detector on the second level, 

where the bedrooms were located.

THE FIRE

On the evening that the fire occurred, the parents of the household were attending a Christmas 

party away from home. The regularly scheduled babysitter had canceled at the last minute, and the 

husband’s sister, who had babysat for the family many times before, volunteered to substitute. This 

aunt, in her late 20s, had three children of her own whom she brought with her to spend the night, 

thereby placing six children and one adult in the house. Although many accidental fires involve 

adults under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the adult in this incident was a religious woman with 

no history of alcohol or drug problems. (We shall refer to the woman who was watching all of 

the children as the “aunt,” even though she was the mother of some of the children, to remind the 

reader that the household was not her own and that she was babysitting.)

Having put the children to bed for the night, three in each of the two connected bedrooms, she 

went downstairs and put a pot of water on the stove to heat for making coffee. She then heard the 

children making a commotion upstairs and went up to determine the problem. The children said 

they were afraid of “monsters” and did not want to be alone. The aunt decided to lie down in bed 

with the children in the bedroom that is most remote from the hallway until the children fell asleep. 

Apparently having forgotten about the pot of water on the stove, she fell asleep as well.

Sometime after 1000 hours, the pot on the stove apparently boiled dry and radiated sufficient heat 

to the adjacent wall to ignite the wall covering. Evidence linking the pot on the stove as the cause of 

ignition is fairly conclusive. The aunt remembered leaving the water on the stove. The base of the 

pot was found melted to the burner, which was found in the “on” position (see Figure 7).

A neighbor who lived across the street was driving home when he noticed a large volume of smoke 

issuing from the area of the fire station. Upon closer examination, he found the smoke to be coming from the house immediately next door to the station. He went in the front door of the house, 

which had been left unlocked, and attempted to determine if anyone was home by yelling inside. At 

this time, there was very heavy smoke on the first floor level, preventing the neighbor from entering 

more than few feet. He was only 15-20 feet from the detector and did not hear any alarm. Through 

the smoke, he saw the glow of the fire burning in the kitchen.

Hearing no answer, he retreated outside. He then went a few houses down the street to the home 

of a fire department member to get help. The firefighter’s wife called in the alarm, but a second 

neighbor had already done so by now. While the firefighter dressed, the neighbor returned to the 

fire scene.

At that time, the aunt who was babysitting was standing at the second floor window indicated in 

Figure 1. The lower portion of the window had been raised, and she was screaming and waving her 

arms outside. The neighbor then climbed onto the lower roof level, which was located just below 

the window, and went to rescue the woman. When he got near the window, she said something 
72 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

that was unintelligible, turned away, and the window closed. The window apparently was unable to 

remain in the up position without being held, and it is suspected that when the aunt turned away, 

presumably to get the children, the window dropped.

As it did, the firefighter whom the neighbor had notified arrived at the scene, and the neighbor 

climbed down from the roof and went to advise the firefighter that there was a woman trapped 

upstairs. He and the firefighter then went next door to the fire station and got a fire department 

ladder to attempt rescue. When the firefighter got to the window, he decided that the glass was so 

hot that opening the window might draw the fire through the house and kill the occupants. He, 

therefore, did not immediately open the window.

The first call was received by the fire department at 1020 from a neighbor living across the street 

from the house. Dispatch was rapid, and in one minute the first responding unit marked on the air 

and on the scene. The time of dispatch was approximately the same time that the firefighter living 

down the street had entered the fire station to get a ladder, so arrival of a firefighter on the scene was 

almost immediately after receipt of the alarm.

After his decision not to open the window, the firefighter who had been on the roof went back to the 

station to get full turnout gear. Shortly thereafter, the first responding engine began to set up hoselines. While the firefighters were setting up, the fire apparently flashed over and vented through the 

kitchen window, but the fire department estimated that within a minute and a half to two minutes 

after arrival, they had knocked down the bulk of the fire.

Fire damage was limited to the kitchen, utility, and bath areas, where heat damage was quite extensive 

(see Figure 8). An old, unused chimney located behind the kitchen ceiling likely played a large role 

in inhibiting the passage of fire and superheated gases into the dining area and upstairs by providing 

a vertical vent directly outside once the ceiling had failed. This venting action would have delayed 

flashover and perhaps was the only reason that the occupants had any chance of survival at all.

As soon as the fire had been knocked down, the firefighters entered the second floor through the 

exterior window and began removing the occupants. All occupants were reported to have been 

removed at 1031, approximately 10 minutes after arrival on the scene of the fire due unit.

The aunt was found immediately adjacent to the bedroom window, and the six children were found 

just inside the same bedroom’s door, which, based on the burn pattern, had been open during the 

majority of the fire but was closed by the occupants sometime before the fire department made entry 

(see Figure 9). Three children were found to the left of the door, and three children were found to 

the right of the door. This indicates that they had been awake and moving about before becoming 

unconscious. The aunt had gathered all of the children in one room. Based on the smoke stains 

on the sheets in the baby’s crib, the sitter had removed the baby from the crib after the smoke had 

already become very thick in the bedroom. All victims were discovered in cardiac arrest.

The fire department established a triage area in the engine room of the fire station next door. Victims 

were treated by fire department paramedics and emergency medical technicians (EMT) who had 

immediately begun cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and initiated intravenous fluids. Two of 

the victims were evacuated to a local hospital by helicopter, and the remainder were transported via 

ambulance. The baby was pronounced dead on the scene. Three children were pronounced dead at 

the hospital, and the last two children died shortly after their arrival at the hospital. The aunt was 

successfully resuscitated at the fire scene and survived the incident.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 73

All fire units cleared the scene just after midnight; however, back at the station, the firefighters 

participated in the first of several critical incident stress debriefings (CISDs). Given the magnitude 

of this tragedy, the chief made an extra effort to ensure that his personnel received counseling by a 

CISD-trained specialist in several later sessions.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Fire Safety Education

Residents of Pleasantville were in the jurisdiction of two fire safety education programs. The first, 

operated by the State Fire Marshal’s Office, is targeted for grades kindergarten through four, and 

highlights 17 key lessons, including stop, drop, and roll; crawl low in the smoke; exit drills in 

the home; how to call the fire department; etc. In addition, programs conducted by the State Fire 

Marshal’s Office provide take-home information for children to give parents on smoke detector 

education. Only one child in this incident was old enough (seven years of age) to have attended 

such a program. However, based on the State Fire Marshal’s records, it is unlikely that the child had 

attended the State-sponsored program as of the time of the fire.

The local fire department also conducted a safety education program in the schools that included 

grades kindergarten through four. The curriculum involved having the children visit the local fire 

station and participate in interactive presentations of stop, drop, and roll; exit drills; and smoke 

detector education. As did the State program, the fire department’s program included brochures on 

these topics. It is believed that the seven-year-old child killed in this incident had indeed attended 

the fire department’s class.

According to interviews with family members, the mother of the three children who lived in the 

house had practiced with them how to get out in case of fire and what to do if their clothes caught 

on fire. In addition, the mother tested and maintained the smoke detector because she reportedly 

considered the house a fire trap. These fire safety efforts are thought to be a direct result of the 

pamphlets brought home by the oldest child. It is not known why the mother did not consider the 

“baby bars” installed over the second floor windows an obstruction to emergency exiting (she was 

not available for interview).

Problem with Escape Windows

As was true in the Prince George’s County fire discussed previously in this report, it appears that the 

old windows in this residence were unable to remain open on their own. Hence, the window shut 

when released by the aunt. She also had to cope with the bars on the windows, which were present 

in the adjacent bedroom as well. They did not have a quick release mechanism.

Ratio of Children to Babysitter

With so many children to evacuate in so little time, plus the problem of the windows, it is clear that 

the aunt had been pressed to evacuate herself and all six children, especially with the children being 

so young. She successfully had gathered all the children together and had the door to the room 

closed, but could not get them out before being overcome. Coping with the window problem and 

the children, all in heavy smoke, was overwhelming. The aunt could not remember details of her 

actions immediately prior to being overcome. Her glasses were found on a nightstand; not having 

them may have contributed to her difficulties.
74 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Time For Escape or Rescue

This incident is an excellent example of the need for citizens to purchase and properly locate and 

maintain smoke detectors, and not just rely on the local fire department to successfully perform 

rescue. Figure 10 shows the estimated timeframe of events versus fire growth for this incident. It 

shows the greater escape time available for a residence properly protected by a smoke detector versus 

a residence that is not.

Fire protection professionals usually consider that people in the immediate vicinity of a fire at flashover will almost surely be severely injured or perish. Had this residence been properly protected by 

a detector, there would have been an estimated seven minutes to escape before flashover occurred. 

Without the detector giving early warning, occupants became aware of the fire about three minutes 

before flashover, during which time conditions were rapidly deteriorating. However, it is possible 

that even in the conditions present, there would have been adequate time for the aunt to evacuate 

herself and the children had the baby bars not been present and had the window remained open.

The fire department’s response in this case was optimal. The combination of a prompt dispatch, one 

minute get-out and response time, and two minute set-up time until extinguishing operations begin 

could not be surpassed except in vary rare instances. The key factor was the delayed detection.

Examples of the time scale of the fire growth versus fire department and victim actions such as 

known in Figure 10 may be useful to local fire departments to graphically demonstrate the need 

for smoke detector laws. It is clear that with the rapid fire growth scenario experienced in today’s 

residential occupancies, occupants need early warning to help survive in fires.

Smoke Detectors: Still More To Do

Overshadowed by the tragedy of the deaths of six children is the tragedy of the failure of such an 

extensive fire safety effort by the fire department and the family. Here is a case where a smoke 

detector was installed by the owner of a rental property, the rental occupant received smoke detector maintenance information, and the occupant practiced proper smoke detector maintenance. It 

is almost certain that the smoke detector was functional at the time of the fire. The fire department 

investigators were told by the occupants that the detector had alarmed previously when a towel had 

caught fire on the stove. In addition, approximately, two weeks before the fire, the wife placed a 

new battery in the detector and tested the detector with a smoldering paper. The detector was found 

operational in this test.

The failure here was that the detector was not installed in a recommended location (see Figure 2). In 

a two-story residence such as this one, at least one detector should have been located on the second 

floor outside of the sleeping areas (see Figure 11). The location selected was particularly troublesome because the detector was adjacent to a large stairway opening and remote from the area of 

origin. The smoke was able to leave the kitchen and pass up to the second floor without reaching the 

detector. It should be noted that although the detector was not located in the position recommended 

in the manufacturer’s instructions, no statement was made in the instructions indicating a significant 

problem with a location adjacent to a large ceiling opening such as a stairway, as was indicated for 

areas adjacent to air supply vents.

It is unclear why the detector had operated properly when a towel was set afire on the stove, but it 

is likely that the type and temperature of smoke was different because of the fire size and material 

involved. A low-energy towel fire could produce light smoke that is relatively cool and follows room 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 75

air circulation patterns, whereas rapidly burning, high-energy fire such as occurred in the later incident can produce entirely different flows.

In this incident with rapid fire growth in the kitchen, the heated smoke could have quickly gone 

up the stairwell and not reached the smoke detector. The smoke detector might have operated for 

a short period later in the fire as the smoke became very intense, which would have been a delayed 

alarm, but, due to its location, it is possible that by the time the detector would have operated, the 

temperatures had gotten so hot that the detector was already disabled. (The detector was found to 

have melted and fallen to the floor; it did not work when found.)

Property Damage Was Limited

There was only a small amount of heat damage beyond the dining area. Temperatures in the living 

room are thought to have never exceeded 300 degrees Fahrenheit, given that sheer curtains on the 

front door remained intact and some plastic candles located in the front window melted only slightly. 

Upstairs, the extent of visible damage was a light soot covering of exposed surfaces and a slight blistering of paint on the upper portions of doors and door frames. The overwhelming feeling after 

examination of the bedroom where the bodies were found was the disbelief of how six people could 

have died and yet there could be so little property damage. A review of three of the coroner’s reports 

made available showed carbon monoxide levels ranging from only 2.6 percent to 18.9 percent. No 

autopsies were performed, but the fatalities were all thought to be caused by smoke inhalation.

Documentation of fire tests, such as depicted in the recent National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) film “Firepower,” have shown that gases given off by the fire can cool rapidly after traveling 

as little as 20 feet from the seat of the fire, especially when venting is present. Therefore, it is speculated that at the time smoke reached the upstairs bedroom, its temperature was probably 150 degrees 

Fahrenheit-200 degrees Fahrenheit, which would be survivable for a short period. However, the 

firefighter feeling the glass from the outside sensed this temperature as “hot.” Should the firefighter 

have opened the hot window and gone for rescue without protective gear?

If the fire was in a backdraft situation and oxygen-starved, opening the window could have caused 

an explosive burning that could have killed the firefighter and the family. He considered that and 

decided not to risk it.

Some firefighters and engineers have felt differently in hindsight, but we could not recommend a 

different decision with the information that the firefighter on the scene had.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Smoke detector literature should further clarify the proper and improper placement of 

detectors.

Although this incident demonstrated proper action on the part of the owner to install a smoke 

detector, it is apparent that the information provided with the detector either was not reviewed 

by the installer, not understood, or not properly followed. In addition, the information brochure provided by the fire department to the occupant did not adequately specify proper location criteria, and the occupant probably assumed the location was alright. A 1980 study by the 

International Association of Fire Chiefs for the USFA showed that placement was correct in over 

90 percent of the homes checked, but that still leaves many homes with a potential problem. 

There has been no recent or broader study. In circumstances such as this where the detector is 
76 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

installed by the owner and not the occupant, precise installation advice would prove helpful. 

Smoke detector literature and fire prevention information should be reviewed in this regard.

2. Fire safety education should include safety practices for babysitters.

Considerations such as checking emergency exit routes, babysitter-to-child ratios, and sleeping 

with bedroom doors closed should be included in fire safety education programs and materials 

for babysitters and other child caregivers. In this case, the babysitter was the children’s aunt and 

familiar with the house. But even she would not necessarily know how to remove a homemade 

window barrier in heavy smoke with six scared children around her.

3. Fire safety education should point out the inability of fire departments to provide rescue in 

many instances.

Citizens may rely on the fire department’s ability to rescue them too much. The attitude that fire 

safety is a personal responsibility of citizens needs to be instilled. More fire prevention education is needed to prevent fires such as this and to make sure the crucial details of detection and 

escape are understood by all citizens.

4. Fire prevention programs need to address the obstruction of secondary exits in residences.

With concerns for home security and protection from falls, homeowners turn to placing bars, 

lock, etc., on windows. Such behavior disregards fire safety. It is incumbent upon the fire 

service to educate their communities about the security versus fire safety dilemma. This is especially important in areas where citizens are highly aware of crime problems and may be blind to 

fire hazards that their anti-crime precautions may create.

Again, in this fire, as was the case in the fire in Prince George’s County, the failure of windows to 

remain open on their own can be directly linked to the deaths of several children. The need to 

address this problem may be significantly greater than currently thought. Fire safety educators 

should take specific measures to educate homeowners regarding the hazards of windows that 

will not remain up on their own, especially in circumstances where small children are present.

5. Stress debriefing sessions are important for the wellbeing of firefighters.

As was the case in Prince George’s County, the Pleasant and Walnut Townships Volunteer Fire 

Department engaged a professional counselor for CISDs to ease the effect on personnel of experiencing a tragedy of this magnitude. Fire departments without such a program should establish 

one for the wellbeing of their personnel.
77

Appendices

J. Photographs, Floor Diagrams, and Time – Temperature Graph

K. Fire Department Incident and Casualty Reports
78

Appendix J

FIGURE 1: A three-quarter view of the rear of the house. The arrow points to the window where 

the woman was seen screaming for help. Note that it is located immediately above a 

lower level roof, to which escape could have been made if the windows had not been 

barred.

FIGURE 2: Second floor plan, shows location of fatalities.

FIGURE 3: First floor plan, shows area of origin and smoke detector location.

FIGURE 4: Due to the low elevation of the windows in the second floor bedrooms, homemade bars had been installed to prevent a child from accidentally falling through the 

window.

FIGURE 5: General location of the smoke detector at the base of the stairwell.

FIGURE 6: Specific location of the smoke detector on the ceiling adjacent to the stairway opening. This is not a preferred location.

FIGURE 7: Area of origin around stove.

FIGURE 8: Actual fire damage to the house was relatively limited. The only significant evidence 

of a fire on the exterior of the house was above the kitchen window, where the fire 

ventilated during flashover.

FIGURE 9: Just inside the bedroom, the six children were found behind the closed door (which 

was closed during the fire). Three children were found on the left of the door, and 

three children were found on the right of the door. Note that the baby had been 

removed from the crib.

FIGURE 10: Estimated time sequence of events versus fire growth (time/temperature graph).

FIGURE 11: All seven of the fire victims were inside the bedroom on the left. Note the location 

of the doorway (which was open) with respect to the stairwell opening, allowing 

smoke direct access into the bedroom, and the low ceiling of the bedroom, which 

would have caused a rapid descent of the smoke layer.

FIGURE 12: First floor plan showing positions from which photographs were taken.

FIGURE 13: Second floor plan showing positions from which photographs were taken.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 79

FIGURE 1

A three-quarter view of the rear of the house. The 

arrow points to the window where the woman was seen 

screaming for help. Note that it is located immediately 

above a lower level roof, to which escape could have been 

made if the windows had not been barred.
80 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 2
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 81

FIGURE 3
82 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 4

Due to the low elevation of the 

windows in the second floor bedrooms, 

homemade bars had been installed to 

prevent a child from accidentally 

falling through the window.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 83

FIGURE 5

General location of the smoke detector at the base of 

the stairwell.
84 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 6

Specific location of the smoke detector on the ceiling 

adjacent to the stairway opening. This is not a 

preferred location.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 85

FIGURE 7

Area of origin around stove.
86 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 8

Actual fire damage to the house was relatively limited. 

The only significant evidence of a fire on the exterior 

of the house was above the kitchen window, 

where the fire ventilated during flashover.
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 87

FIGURE 9

Just inside the bedroom, the six children were found 

behind the closed door (which was closed during the fire). 

Three children were found on the left of the door, and three 

children were found on the right of the door. Note that 

the baby had been removed from the crib.
88 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIGURE 10

Estimated Time Sequence Of Events Versus Fire Growth
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 89

FIGURE 11

All seven of the fire victims were inside the bedroom on 

the left. Note the location of the doorway (which was 

open) with respect to the stairwell opening, allowing 

smoke direct access into the bedroom, and the low ceiling 

of the bedroom, which would have caused a rapid 

descent of the smoke layer.
90 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 91
92

Appendix K

Fire Department Incident and Casualty Reports 
USFA-TR-020/December 1987 93
94 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
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96 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
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98 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
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100 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
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102 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series