A REVIEW OF THE NRC’S REACTOR 

OVERSIGHT PROCESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 19, 2006 

Serial No. 109-104 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 2006 

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29-895PDF 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

 Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, Mississippi 

 Vice Chairman

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

 Ranking Member 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director 

DAVID CAVICKE, General Counsel

REID P. F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky, Chairman 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, Mississippi 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

 (EX OFFICIO)

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

 Ranking Member 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

 (EX OFFICIO)

(II)
CONTENTS 

Page 

Testimony of: 

Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and the Environment, Government 

Accountability Office.................................................................................................... 10 

McGaffigan, Jr., Hon. Edward, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission... 37 

Gunter, Paul, Director, Reactor Watchdog Project, Nuclear Information and Resource 

Service ............................................................................................................................ 54 

Additional material submitted for the record: 

Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and the Environment, Government 

Accountability Office, response for the record.............................................................. 62 

McGaffigan, Jr., Hon. Edward, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

response for the record ................................................................................................... 65 

(III) 

(1) 

A REVIEW OF THE NRC’S REACTOR 

OVERSIGHT PROCESS 

MONDAY, JUNE 19, 2006 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in Room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Whitfield [Chairman] 

presiding. 

Present: Representatives Whitfield, Burgess, Barton (Ex Officio), 

Schakowsky, and Inslee. 

Staff Present: Dwight Cates, Professional Staff Member; Matthew 

Johnson, Legislative Clerk; Edith Holleman, Minority Counsel; 

Elizabeth Ertel, Minority Senior Staff Assistant; and Jonathan Brater, 

Minority Staff Assistant. 

MR. WHITFIELD. If I could have your attention, it was our intent to 

begin this hearing at 4:00 p.m., and as you can see, it is about five after. 

There has been a delay in some transportation as members come back to 

the District, and we do expect a couple Members will be here in about 5 

or 10 minutes. And when they arrive, we will get started. So I apologize 

for the delay, and we will get started as soon as possible. Thank you. 

The hearing will come to order. It didn’t take as long as I thought, 

Jan. Today we are going to review the status of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission’s Reactor Oversight Process. Initiated in the year 2000, the 

Reactor Oversight Process was intended to create a risk-informed tiered 

approach to ensuring plant safety by focusing on three key areas: reactor 

safety, radiation safety for plant workers and the public, and physical 

security of the plant against sabotage or security threats. 

The NRC developed the reactor process to apply more objective, 

timely, and risk-informed criteria in assessing plant performance while 

seeking to more effectively and efficiently regulate the industry. Given 

the fact that it has now been in place for almost 6 years, last spring I, 

along with several other members requested the GAO, the General 

Accountability Office, review the effectiveness of the NRC’s Reactor 

Oversight Process. 

We asked for this review in part because there have been a few very 

serious safety incidents that have raised questions about NRC’s ability to 

identify and resolve significant safety issues before they occur. For 
2

instance, in February of 2002, a very large hole was discovered on the 

reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio. Up until that point, 

NRC inspectors had given the Davis-Besse plant “green” findings for all 

aspects of plant performance. For those of you who are not familiar with 

NRC’s color coding system, a “green” finding indicates that performance 

objectives are fully met. 

Unfortunately these green findings were entirely wrong. For several 

years, NRC failed to identify near catastrophic boric acid corrosion so 

severe that less than one half of an inch of metal remained on the reactor 

vessel head. Clearly, the NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process failed to 

anticipate the significant safety issue. To its credit, NRC has made 

significant strides in the Reactor Oversight Process in the years since the 

Davis-Besse incident. I understand that new revisions are about to be 

implemented to the Reactor Oversight Process to address safety culture 

issues that led to the problems at Davis-Besse. 

NRC is also working closely with industry to improve selected 

performance indicators. These reforms are critical, particularly in light 

of the nuclear industry’s renewed interests in the development of a new 

fleet of nuclear reactors. We need the nuclear industry to construct 

several new reactors to meet growing energy demands. However, we 

must also maintain the aging fleet of existing reactors. I expect that 

many of the 103 domestic reactors will be in operation decades beyond 

their initial 40-year design. Thus, NRC must continue to adapt the 

Reactor Oversight Process to anticipate new safety challenges presented 

by new reactor designs and also adapt to new safety challenges 

associated with the aging component issues that NRC and the nuclear 

industry have yet to discover. 

We look forward to the testimony today of all the witnesses. And at 

this time, I’d like to recognize Ms. Schakowsky of Illinois for her 

opening statement. 

 [The prepared statement of Hon. Ed Whitfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. ED WHITFIELD, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

This hearing will come to order. Today we will review the status of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s Reactor Oversight Process. Initiated in the year 2000, the 

Reactor Oversight Process was intended to create a risk-informed, tiered approach to 

ensuring plant safety by focusing on three key areas - reactor safety, radiation safety for 

plant workers and the public, and physical security of the plant against sabotage or 

security threats. 

The NRC developed the reactor oversight process to apply more objective, timely, 

and risk-informed criteria in assessing plant performance, while seeking to more 

effectively and efficiently regulate the industry. Given the fact that it has now been in 

place for almost 6 years, last Spring I along with several other Members requested the 
3

General Accountability Office review the effectiveness of NRC’s reactor oversight 

process. 

I asked for this review, in part, because there have been a few very serious safety 

incidents that have raised questions about NRC’s ability to identify and resolve 

significant safety issues before they occur. 

For instance, in February of 2002, a very large hole was discovered on the reactor 

vessel head at the Davis Besse plant in Ohio. Up until that point, NRC inspectors had 

given the Davis Besse plant “green” findings for all aspects of plant performance. For 

those of you who are not familiar with NRC’s color coding system, a “green” finding 

indicates that performance objectives are fully met. Unfortunately, these “green” 

findings were entirely wrong. For several years NRC failed to identify near-catastrophic 

boric acid corrosion so severe that less than one half of an inch of metal remained on the 

reactor vessel head. Clearly the NRC’s reactor oversight process failed to anticipate this 

significant safety issue. 

To its credit, NRC has made significant strides in the reactor oversight process in the 

years since the Davis Besse incident. I understand that new revisions are about to be 

implemented to the reactor oversight process to address safety culture issues that led to 

the problems at Davis Besse. NRC is also working closely with industry to improve 

selected performance indicators. 

These reforms are critical, particularly in light of the nuclear industry’s renewed 

interest in the development of a new fleet of nuclear reactors. We need the nuclear 

industry to construct several new reactors to meet growing energy demands. However, 

we must also maintain the aging fleet of existing reactors. 

I expect many of the 103 domestic reactors will be in operation decades beyond their 

initial 40-year design basis. Thus, NRC must continue to adapt the reactor oversight 

process to anticipate new safety challenges presented by new reactor designs, and also 

adapt to new safety challenges associated with aging component issues NRC and the 

nuclear industry has have yet to discover. 

I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses, and I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

MS. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding today’s hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 

Reactor Oversight Process, the ROP. A number of recent incidents at 

nuclear plants in Illinois and throughout the Nation have put in doubt 

whether the NRC’s safety standards and inspection processes are 

adequate. I’m interested to know whether the NRC has learned from 

incidents like Davis-Besse and restructured its oversight process 

sufficiently to prevent their recurrence. 

Since President Bush has proposed new nuclear development as a 

signature part of his energy policy, we must ensure that the NRC safety 

procedures are foolproof and that they deter future incidents. Since the 

Reactor Oversight Process was implemented in 2000, safety inspections 

found plants or employees had failed to comply with safe operating 

procedures in over 4,000 instances. And while many of those incidents 

were classified as “green” under the system, “green” doesn’t mean all 

clear. It means that a plant or an employee failed to meet the NRC safety 

standards. 
4

I look forward to hearing whether that number is an improvement 

over the number of incidents that occurred before the ROP was in place 

and whether the ROP has promoted a culture of safety and accountability 

in our Nation’s nuclear plants. 

In Illinois, which has 11 nuclear reactors, several incidents at Exelon 

plants has demonstrated that even after the implementation of the ROP, 

there have been a number of safety hazards and radioactive leaks that 

have threatened public health. This February, Exelon disclosed to the 

public that between 1996 and 2003, two Illinois plants spilled radioactive 

cancer-causing tritium on four occasions. Not only did this expose holes 

in oversight, it also highlighted the nuclear industry’s failure to disclose 

threats to public health. One of the most immediate ways the Energy and 

Commerce Committee could promote nuclear safety would be to 

consider the Nuclear Release Notice Act, sponsored by Senator Obama 

and Congressman Weller, which would force the nuclear industry to 

notify the State, county, and public, whenever there’s an unplanned 

release of radioactive material in excess of legal limits. 

Illinois enacted legislation this year which requires nuclear plants to 

report leaks of radioactive material that contaminate groundwater, 

surface water, and the soil to regulators within 24 hours. In addition to 

these unannounced radioactive leaks, on February 20, there was a rare 

onsite emergency at Exelon’s LaSalle facility involving control rods that 

are used to shut reactors down. The NRC has subsequently released a 

report that states that the side area emergency declared at LaSalle 

overstated the problem, but the incident raised several questions. 

First, shouldn’t there be Federal standards regulated by the NRC 

which outline what constitutes a nuclear emergency and mandates a 

particular Federal response? In addition, under the ROP, individual 

plants are inspected more or less regularly based on their individual 

histories. The incidents at Davis-Besse and LaSalle beg the question, 

aren’t all of the nation’s 103 nuclear plants inspected and regulated with 

the highest possible frequency and standards? 

Mr. Chairman, the residents of a town like Seabrook, New 

Hampshire; Salem, New Jersey; and Braidwood, Illinois, want to know 

definitively things have changed since Three Mile Island. They and their 

families want to believe that they have nothing to fear from the nuclear 

plants in their towns and from the water supplies which feed the plants. 

Over the past several years, there have been over 4,000 unsafe incidents 

at the Nation’s 103 nuclear plants. I ask our witnesses, is the ROP the 

best and safest reactor oversight system that we could possibly have? 

Knowing that so many plants have failed to meet the NRC’s current 

safety standards, do we have the capacity and oversight system to safely 

expand the number of reactors in this country? 
5

Today we should not only judge whether the ROP has been effective, 

but we should also take a broader look to determine whether the 

President’s plan to expand nuclear development in this country is safe 

and warranted. Thank you. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Ms. Schakowsky. At this time, 

Dr. Burgess, do you have an opening statement? 

MR. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I will submit 

what I have for the record, and we’ll go right on to the witnesses. 

 [Additional statements submitted for the record follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

AND COMMERCE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. Nuclear power is a 

critical source of approximately twenty percent of the electricity we generate each year. I 

want that number to increase over the next decade, and many of the provisions in the 

Energy Policy Act we passed last year will help pave the way for the construction of a 

new generation of nuclear power plants. Principal among these provisions was the 

reauthorization of the Price Anderson Act. 

The public has a strong and growing confidence in nuclear power because it is 

proven to be reliable, and it is proven to be safe. The nuclear industry has demonstrated a 

willingness to adapt quickly when new safety or design issues are discovered, and it has 

worked closely with the NRC to resolve these issues quickly. 

The reactor oversight process at NRC continues to evolve, and I am pleased with the 

Commission’s willingness to seek feedback from external stakeholders. All groups 

ranging from nuclear power supporters to environmental activists have a seat at the table 

when NRC seeks feedback on its reactor oversight process. 

The future of nuclear power will depend on whether we can maintain the public trust 

that NRC and the industry have developed over the years. I feel confident that the 

Commission and the NRC staff are committed to this task. 

With respect to licensing new power plants, there is a lot of work yet to do at NRC. 

The Commission will be challenged with a significant workload as new license 

applications arrive. It is critical that NRC maintain the public’s trust by keeping a clear 

focus on safety. 

I understand that GAO has a generally positive review of NRC’s reactor oversight 

process. I look forward to hearing from both NRC and GAO on what we can do to 

further improve the process. 

I thank the Chairman, and I yield back. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. CLIFF STEARNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 

FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 

gives us an opportunity to learn more about the efficiency and effectiveness of the reactor 

oversight process (ROP). Six years after its deployment, I am eager to see if the 

development of objective, risk-informed, and timely measurement criteria of the ROP has 

brought some improvement in safety and efficiency. 

The NRC fulfills a vital role in safeguarding our health and environment. Our 

nation boasts the safest reactors in the world--and the nuclear industry shares our desire 

to keep it that way. 
6

The ROP was developed in order to improve the performance, reduce unnecessary 

regulation, while improving the NRC’s management of reactor safety. The ROP focuses 

on three key areas: reactor safety; radiation safety; and security of the plant against 

sabotage and other physical threats. Combining these performance indicators with NRC 

inspections, we end up with a color-coded rating system. Green indicates good 

performance, red indicates sub-par performance, yellow indicates a reduction in safety, 

and red indicates a serious reduction in safety. A plant earning any rating less than green 

triggers further inspections and reviews. Without improvement, the NRC can resort to 

civil orders or even the suspension of the reactor’s operating license. 

The color-coded system appears to offer improvements in compliance and safety, 

but we must be wary of simplifying regulation too far--we have no wish for a trite 

oversight program. Nor do we want to see a color-coding system as useless as the 

Department of Homeland Security’s color-coded alert system. 

Of course, while I share the concerns of our witness from the activist group Nuclear 

Information and Resource Service that the NRC vigilantly protect our nation, I do not 

equate the number of enforcement actions with the quality of oversight or the level of 

safety improvement. 

Indeed, the NRC appears to be exercising greater flexibility in methods of safety 

improvement. For instance, following the discovery of severe corrosion on the reactor 

vessel head at the David Besse (pronounced BESS - EE) plant in 2002, the NRC 

evaluated the problem, and adapted its findings to expand the ROP performance 

indicators into new areas, and to tailor new recommendations for plant operators. 

Mr. Chairman, we have devoted significant time and effort in this Committee to 

expanding America’s supply of nuclear power. I hope our witnesses this afternoon will 

help us see how far we have some on the safety of our 103 nuclear reactors, and what 

factors we still must address as we seek to add many more. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. Today we’re going to have 

two panels of witnesses, and in the first panel--I welcome you--we have 

Mr. Jim Wells, who is the Director of Energy in the Natural Resources 

and the Environment, at the Government Accountability Office. And I 

certainly welcome the Honorable Edward McGaffigan, who is the 

Commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mr. Wells, 

you are accompanied today by Alyssa Hundrup. Will she be testifying? 

MR. WELLS. Yes, she will, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. WHITFIELD. As you know, this is an Oversight and 

Investigations hearing, and it is our practice to take testimony under oath. 

Do either of the three of you have any difficulty testifying under oath? 

And do you intend to be represented by legal counsel today? 

MR. WELLS. No. 

MR. WHITFIELD. If you would stand, I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 
7

TESTIMONY OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, ENERGY, 

NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND HON. 

EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN, COMMISSIONER; U.S. 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you. You are now sworn in. And 

Mr. Wells, we’ll call upon you for your 5 minute opening statement. 

MR. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

subcommittee. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Be sure to turn your microphone on. 

MR. WELLS. It’s on, but it’s not recording. Light’s on. Hello. 

Testing, one two. Testing, one two. Okay. We’ve got it now. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you. 

MR. WELLS. The safe operation of commercial nuclear power plants 

is a private industry responsibility. The law says that the NRC as the 

regulatory commission must ensure that this happens. A lot is riding on 

how good a job NRC is doing. Some of us remember Three Mile Island 

in ‘79, the 2000 steam pipe leak at Indian Point, and Davis-Besse in 

2002. Avoiding accidents is paramount to achieving public confidence 

that the industry and NRC are doing a good job as we think about 

advancing the future of nuclear power. 

Given how complex and how hard we are using these plants to 

produce 20 percent of our Nation’s energy needs, the safety record is 

pretty good. Prior to 2000, NRC was criticized for doing oversight that 

was redundant, inefficient, overly subjective, and not always focused on 

the most important safety issues. GAO, the Congress, the industry, and 

even many in NRC were not happy with the old inspection program. 

NRC’s new process, based on what we’ve been able to learn, is similar to 

the old in terms of physical plant inspections, but it’s now more 

objective, predictable, and risk informed. The unexpected discovery at 

Davis-Besse plant as, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the pineapple-sized 

hole in the reactor vessel head, I think it was a wake-up call that the ROP 

did not work as planned. 

Some good came out of this, as NRC has changed and improved its 

operations, and improved oversight as a result and incorporated new 

things in the ROP process which we can talk about later. As mentioned, 

NRC has identified over 4,000 inspection findings in the 5 years of the 

new operation of the ROP program. About 97 percent of those findings, 

3,900, were for actions or failures NRC considered it was important to 

correct, but they were of low significance to overall safety operation. 

The good news is that these findings have been corrected. In contrast, 12 

of the findings that have occurred, or less than 1 percent, were the 
8

highest level of significance to safety, that still allows continuous 

operation at those plants. All of these caused NRC to immediately 

inform the public and increase the levels of inspection in oversight. 

Some of these are still outstanding 3 and 4 years later, due to the 

significance of the finding or the time it’s taken to resolve them. 

Nothing has been found to date to warrant a shutdown of a nuclear 

power plant. This possibility, however, was debated within the 

Commission during the early days at Davis-Besse as the plant was 

experiencing problems. GAO, when it did its work at Davis-Besse, told 

the NRC that we thought that their procedures for knowing when to shut 

a plant down should be revised. Overall, the ROP process has worked to 

subject more than three-fourths of the Nation’s 103 operating plants to 

some oversight level beyond the regular baseline inspection over the last 

5 years. 

When we issue the report later this September, it will give good 

marks to what appears to be good quality inspections being performed by 

regional and on-site inspectors, and that NRC is being responsive to 

independent reviews and feedback from stakeholders like GAO. The 

new risk process based on our assessment is better focusing its current 

inspections on areas that are most important to safety, and NRC is 

showing willingness to continuously improve. 

One significant shortcoming in the ROP is that it is not as effective 

as it could be in identifying early indications of deteriorating safety 

cultures within the plant before problems develop. Clearly, safety 

culture attributes, such as attention to detail, adherence to procedures, 

and effective, corrective, and preventive actions have a significant 

impact on safety performance. The findings of Davis-Besse showed this. 

Although somewhat slow to act, NRC is beginning to get the safety 

culture worked into the oversight process, even though it’s somewhat 

controversial as we talk about it today. There is pushback from the 

commercial nuclear industry about its workability. Having a regulatory 

body, such as NRC, getting into issues that have traditionally been 

viewed as the purview of the licensee such as maintaining a safetyconscious work environment, human performance, and problem 

identification and resolution can be viewed by some as adding undue 

subjectivity to the NRC oversight as a regulator. On the other hand, 

providing NRC better tools to address safety culture to detect 

deteriorating safety conditions, such as existed at Davis-Besse, before an 

event occurs can be a positive thing. GAO’s conclusion is that the 

evidence says that NRC needs to do safety culture reviews. 

The verdict is still out as to whether they can do that or not. I will 

stop here and say that NRC is devoting considerable effort to its 

oversight activities. The current and changing process to GAO appears 
9

logical, well structured, and rigorous. This does not mean that the NRC 

process is perfect. NRC’s safety culture may be the most important 

improvement in the future ROP program. As we complete our work, we 

will be examining whether NRC needs to do more, and we think there 

are some areas of improvement in how information on how well nuclear 

power plants are operating safely can be presented to the public and other 

stakeholders in a more understandable manner, and we look forward to 

issuing our report in the next few months. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Wells. 

[The prepared statement of Jim Wells follows:] 
10

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE 

ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
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MR. WHITFIELD. At this time, Mr. McGaffigan, you are recognized 

for your 5 minutes. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to 

appear before you today on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission to discuss the Reactor Oversight Process. I should say at 

the outset, I find myself in almost total agreement with almost everything 

that Mr. Wells said. So you won’t see a lot of disagreement today. 

When Chairman Diaz and I came to the NRC in 1996, our Reactor 

Oversight Process needed serious attention. It was not as transparent or 
36

risk informed as it could be, and the watch list of problem plants, which I 

think grew to as many as 13 plants, did not integrate the results of 

performance indicators, although we had performance indicators. The 

process was criticized by the public, by the industry, and as Mr. Wells 

just added, by the Commission itself. 

Therefore, the Commission unanimously decided to develop a new 

process that would be better than the one the staff was using, and we 

decided to involve the industry and other stakeholders in the 

development of the process from its very beginning. The new process 

was piloted in 1999 and was fully implemented in April of 2000. Since 

implementation, we have continued to improve the process by 

incorporating lessons learned from our experiences. We know we’re not 

perfect, and we know we have a long way to go to achieve an even better 

product. The Commission believes that the Reactor Oversight Process is 

one of the NRC’s most important achievements over the last 10 years. 

I have a few view graphs up there, and they’re in my testimony. 

There are five columns in an Action Matrix. That’s the viewgraph on the 

left. We have no plants in the far right, or unacceptable performance 

column, at the current time. We have 89 of 103 plants in the far left 

licensee response column. Every quarter we produce an updated 

summary that is two clicks away from our home page for every plant in 

America. We happen to have the Seabrook plant up there. I guess we 

thought Congressman Bass might be attending. And you can see the 

performance indicators and the inspection findings for that plant and for 

all 103 plants are at our Web page, and you can click on that and 

understand what the inspection findings were for that plant during that 

quarter, and you could also go back to previous quarters. 

So we have constructed a program that we’re very proud of in terms 

of its transparency. I would contrast it to, say, the FAA’s program. 

Mr. Stupak’s plane, he probably could have gotten on time-data from 

FAA if he had clicked on their Web page for whatever airlines he was 

taking back here today. He would not have any data about the 

maintenance on that plane. This industry is unique in having data on 

maintenance and every aspect of these plants, other than security, very 

publicly available, and we’re very proud of that. 

The performance indicators and inspection findings determine what 

level of oversight a plant receives. You receive more oversight as you 

move down the columns. Very, very infrequently, we’ll make a 

deviation from the so-called Action Matrix and do more or less 

inspections at that plant. But most of the time, it’s to do more. Seven 

out of nine times during the 6 years, we’ve made numerous 

improvements to the Reactor Oversight Process. The three most 

important recent ones are the safety culture change that’s going to be 
37

implemented on July 1 that Mr. Wells referred to, a Mitigating Systems 

Performance Indicator that is going to give us deep insight into the 

performance of mitigating systems at these plants, and we’re going to 

have several white findings in the first quarter. 

That’s implemented this quarter, and the data will become available 

in July. And the third is a very robust change to our engineering 

inspection program that was advocated by Chairman Diaz and that we 

believe is providing very good insights into the engineering aspects of 

the plant. The Reactor Oversight Process will continue to improve and 

evolve. It is our intention to take criticism from wherever it comes, 

Government Accountability Office, our Inspector General, the industry, 

the public, and try to make improvements based on that criticism. 

As I say, we’re going to continue to improve as we go forward. We 

do not set ourselves a perfection standard, but we set ourselves a very 

high standard, and we know that the process that we have today is far, far 

better than the process that Chairman Diaz and I inherited when we 

joined the Commission in 1996. 

If I could just, for one moment, just say one thing, Mr. Chairman, 

about Chairman Diaz. He couldn’t be here today. He’s in his last 11 

days as Chairman of the NRC. I happen to be a Democrat. He happens 

to be a Republican. But he has done an absolutely outstanding job 

during his 10 years working for the American people, and he deserves all 

the credit that he’s going to get in these last 11 days in office, probably 

far more than he wants to get. And it’s been an honor serving with him. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Edward McGaffigan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN, JR., COMMISSIONER, U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before 

you on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to discuss our Reactor 

Oversight Process (ROP). When Chairman Diaz and I came to the NRC in 1996, the 

reactor oversight process needed serious attention. It was not as transparent or risk 

informed as it could be, and the watch list of problem plants did not integrate the results 

of performance indicators (PIs). The process was criticized by the public and the 

industry. Therefore, the Commission unanimously decided to develop a new process that 

would be better than the one the staff was using and to involve the industry and other 

stakeholders in its development. The new process was piloted in 1999 and fully 

implemented in April 2000. Since implementation, we have continued to improve the 

process by incorporating lessons learned from our experience. The Commission believes 

that the Reactor Oversight Process is one of NRC’s most important achievements in the 

past 10 years. 

The ROP is a risk-informed process that focuses inspections on activities or areas 

that are most important to plant safety based on each plant’s design and that increases the 

level of regulatory oversight as a licensee’s performance declines. The ROP requires that 

inspections be performed by NRC inspectors in seven fundamental areas that we call 
38

cornerstones, to measure plant performance and maintain safe plant operation. These 

inspections routinely evaluate plant design, modifications, maintenance, and operations. 

The ROP also uses PIs which are reported to the NRC each quarter by the licensees. The 

NRC uses a four color system to characterize inspection findings and performance 

indicators. The color of an inspection finding or PI is determined by a defined 

significance determination process. Green inspection findings or PIs indicate very low 

risk significance and therefore have little or no impact on safety. White, yellow, or red 

inspection findings or PIs represent increasing degrees of safety significance. 

The performance indicators and inspection findings determine what level of 

oversight a plant receives. For example, the NRC determines if a plant should be in a 

column requiring greater scrutiny of its performance. If so, it receives more inspections. 

A plant is assigned a column based on its performance as indicated by the inspection 

findings and PIs. Therefore, the licensee’s performance ultimately determines the 

column in which a plant is placed, it is not based on a subjective determination by NRC 

managers. Currently 85 of the 103 operating reactors are in the lowest, or licensee 

response, risk column of the Action Matrix and are receiving the baseline inspections. 

Eleven plants are in the second column, while 4 plants are in the third column, and 3 are 

in the fourth column; all of these 18 plants are receiving additional oversight. No plants 

are in the fifth or unacceptable shutdown performance column. 

The NRC has focused on improving the transparency of the ROP to the public from 

its inception through stakeholder involvement and open communications. The staff has 

used a variety of communication methods to ensure that stakeholders have access to ROP 

information and results, and have an opportunity to participate in the process and provide 

feedback. The ROP web page provides the public with easy access to PIs and the latest 

plant assessment results and other useful information about the ROP. For example, these 

posters, which reflect the information posted on our web site, provide the latest 

information for the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire, including PIs and inspection 

findings, with links to the plant’s inspection reports, assessment letters, and other ROPrelated information. The ROP has allowed us to provide the public better and more 

current information on the safety of the nuclear plants than is provided to the public for 

other elements of the infrastructure. I should also add that the NRC staff conducts an 

annual meeting near each reactor to share the staff’s assessment with the public. 

Very infrequently the NRC staff decides to modify the amount of oversight that is 

prescribed by the Action Matrix. This has happened nine times in five years, and in 

seven of the nine cases, the staff has decided to do more than prescribed. Any deviation 

from the ROP is first proposed by one of our four regional Administrators, and a public 

and well documented process is used to decide on the deviation. Deviations from the 

ROP must be approved by the Executive Director for Operations, and the Commission is 

informed. An example of a current deviation involves an increase in NRC oversight for 

the Salem and Hope Creek plants in the area of safety conscious work environment. The 

staff reviews each deviation to determine if changes to the ROP program are needed. 

Deviations are described and their significance is explained during a public Commission 

meeting held annually. 

The NRC has made numerous improvements to the ROP since its initial 

implementation, many as a result of independent program evaluations and feedback from 

internal and external stakeholders. The inspection program and associated resources have 

been adjusted to better focus on risk-significant issues, with significant enhancements in 

the areas of problem identification and resolution, fire protection, safety culture, design 

engineering, and in-service inspections of safety-related components. Some of these 

changes were based on lessons learned from the agency’s experience with the DavisBesse reactor vessel head degradation. The timeliness and consistency of determining 

the significance of inspection findings have notably improved over the past several years 

due to program enhancements and an increased management focus. The plant assessment 
39

process has been modified to improve its predictability, particularly in the treatment of 

cross-cutting issues such as human performance, old design issues, and plants with 

significant performance deficiencies. 

Three recent improvements to the ROP are the use of a new performance indicator, a 

greater focus on licensee safety culture, and a strengthened engineering inspection. This 

quarter, we have implemented the Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI), a riskinformed performance indicator that combines component reliability and availability with 

plant-specific probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) information to arrive at a single 

performance index for five important systems. This performance indicator is complex, 

but it will give us real insights into key systems for mitigating accidents. Most 

importantly, it has brought the entire industry to a needed level of quality for so-called 

Level 1, internal initiating event probabilistic risk assessments. The MSPI replaced the 

safety system unavailability PIs, and licensees are scheduled to submit their initial data 

sets in July 2006. The NRC has also been working with internal and external 

stakeholders to enhance the ROP to more fully address safety culture. We have enhanced 

inspection procedures and developed processes to determine whether an assessment of 

safety culture is needed for plants with recognized performance deficiencies. The NRC 

staff is nearing completion of this effort and plans to fully implement the enhancements 

on July 1, 2006. The NRC recently undertook a substantial effort to strengthen its 

engineering inspection to increase the scrutiny of risk significant components and 

operator actions. The new component-based inspection ensures that the selected 

components are capable of performing their intended safety functions by verifying that 

the design bases have been properly implemented and maintained. The review includes 

evaluating the adequacy of the engineering calculations and analyses, the installed 

configuration, operating procedures, and testing and maintenance activities. A similar 

process is used to inspect risk significant operator actions. 

The Reactor Oversight Process continues to evolve and improve. The staff performs 

an annual self-assessment of the reactor oversight process to evaluate the overall 

effectiveness of the process. In addition to the annual ROP self-assessment program, 

several independent evaluations have been performed since the beginning of the ROP to 

analyze its effectiveness and identify improvements. The Office of the NRC Inspector 

General (OIG), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), our Advisory Committee 

on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), and a task force formed as a result of the Davis-Besse 

vessel head degradation have all performed evaluations related to the ROP. These 

evaluations have generally provided favorable results but have also suggested potential 

areas of improvement for the agency to consider. The Commission welcomes these 

critiques. For example, the OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) evaluation 

of the ROP in 2003, resulted in a score of 89 percent, which corresponds to an 

“Effective” rating of the management of the program. The Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) in its work following the Davis-Besse vessel head degradation incident has 

suggested areas for improvement in the ROP and is currently performing an independent 

evaluation of the ROP. The GAO has completed numerous staff interviews, reviewed 

ROP guidance documents, and performed a number of case studies over the past several 

months. We expect to receive a draft report of the GAO’s findings in the next month or 

so with the final report later this year. 

The NRC will continue to improve the ROP, increase its transparency and 

incorporate additional risk informed measures. Since I arrived at the Commission, the 

oversight process has become a much better system. We welcome feedback from our 

stakeholders and believe that such feedback will assist us as we continue to refine the 

process. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and the Commission looks 

forward to continuing to work with the Committee. I welcome your comments and 

questions. 
40
41
42

MR. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you, Mr. McGaffigan, and I appreciate 

you mentioning Mr. Diaz because I think we all believe that he’s done a 

real good job and has made some significant improvements in the 

agency. And we appreciate the testimony of both you and Mr. Wells. 

In the second panel today, our witness is Mr. Paul Gunter, who is the 

Director of the Reactor Watchdog Project for the Nuclear Information 

and Resource Service. And Mr. Wells, I wanted to ask you a question 

about in Mr. Gunter’s written statement, he suggested that the NRC has 

cut corners in several of the safety cornerstones, including reactor safety, 

barrier integrity, physical security, and mitigating systems. 
43

Now, you’ve had extensive research of the Reactor Oversight 

Process and have been involved in this. Do you agree with that 

statement? Or do you feel like that’s inaccurate? 

MR. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I’ve not had the pleasure nor am I 

aware that my team has had any opportunity to look at the evidence that 

he’s basing that statement on. I can tell you that the GAO was aware of 

the old program that the NRC had. It is clear that they had more 

inspection staff at the time. It’s clear that they had more findings than 

the current ROP program. They were looking at different things, and 

sometimes that’s what they were being criticized for. They were more 

procedural or administrative in nature and maybe not as significantly 

related to the actual safety concerns. It’s clear that the existing ROP has 

fewer inspectors available, but from my understanding when I looked, 

they’ve been better targeted in terms of what they’re looking at. So I’m 

unable to really comment on his conclusion without seeing his evidence. 

I would be glad to seek him out after this testimony. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Okay. Mr. McGaffigan, Mr. Gunter also made the 

comment and he expresses serious concerns with NRC’s Fire Safety 

Program. Can you please explain the current status of the NRC’s Fire 

Safety Program and also explain whether you believe the NRC has done 

everything they can do in this area. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Sir, we put very significant resources into fire 

safety inspections. We are, at the moment, in a transition, we hope, to a 

risk-informed fire safety regime based on National Fire Protection 

Association Standard 805, which is a consensus standard that we 

endorsed in a recent rulemaking. We have, I believe, almost 40 plants 

lined up to try to utilize this new risk-informed program. Fire protection 

has been problematic, in all honesty, since the early ‘80s, when the NRC 

adopted a fire protection rule 10 CFR 50.48, and then we were sued by 

the industry, and the only way the appeals court said the rule could go 

into effect was if we promised to hand out exemptions left, right, and 

center, which we did promise, and we did do. 

It’s a very problematic area at the current time, because every plant 

has its own fire safety basis. So we’re hoping, and we have invested our 

resources in recent years on making a transition to a risk-informed fire 

protection system to replace 50.48 based on the NFPA 805 standard. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you. Mr. McGaffigan, we have a list here 

of each of NRC’s “yellow” and “red” inspection findings. And 

Mr. Wells, I guess, mentioned in his testimony, there are only a total of 

12 such findings issued since the beginning of the Reactor Oversight 

Process. But of the five “red” inspection findings, three were given to 

the Point Beach plant in Wisconsin relating to problems with the plant’s 

auxiliary feed water pumps, and these problems date back as far as 2001, 
44

yet each of these “red” inspection findings at Point Beach is still open, 

meaning the underlying safety problems are unresolved. 

So why has the NRC been unable to resolve these ongoing safety 

issues at Point Beach over the past five years? 

MS. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, before you get that answer, I am 

just wondering--I’m sorry, I have to run. I’m wondering if I could have 

permission to submit these questions to be answered in writing. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Absolutely. Without objection, absolutely. 

MS. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

MR. WHITFIELD. And thank you for coming to help us. Thank you. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Mr. Chairman, the Point Beach facility has been 

in the fourth column of our Action Matrix for several years now. It is 

frustrating to the Commission and to the staff and I’m sure to the 

licensee. We have closed out part of the issues. There has actually been 

some internal controversy within the agency about closing out one of the 

issues recently, and we have a process for trying to resolve that. The 

hope is that they are now on the path to resolving these issues. There 

were engineering issues. There were issues in terms of follow-up that 

have beset that plant for the last, as you say, 3 or 4 years. 

It does not mean that the plant is unsafe. It is much better today than 

it was when we first found these issues, but it has not yet been released. 

Open means that they are not yet released from the additional oversight 

in our process. They have not performed all the actions required under a 

confirmatory action letter that was issued to them, outlining what they 

had to do to close out all aspects of their “red” findings. 

MR. WHITFIELD. But I take it you don’t see anything fundamentally 

wrong or systemically wrong with the oversight Reactor Oversight 

Process? 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. We don’t see anything fundamentally wrong. 

At the last annual meeting we had last month, we talked about whether 

we needed to have licensees who were in this fourth column of the 

Action Matrix appear before the Commission, particularly licensees who 

had been in that for an extended period of time, and we’ve asked the staff 

to come back to us and for next year’s annual meeting, that might be the 

extra push needed to encourage people to not spend too much time 

carrying out the corrective actions that we want them to carry out. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Now, Commissioner McGaffigan, the NRC 

recently briefed our committee staff regarding several ongoing physical 

security problems at the Turkey Point plant in Florida. And I understand 

that over the past few years, there have been a series of security 

infractions at Turkey Point with respect to security equipment. For 

instance, in one case, a security guard at the site intentionally removed 

the firing pins from two weapons, rendering the weapons useless. In 
45

another case, body armor was tampered with. In another case, someone 

drilled a hole in a gas mask used by one of the guards. And I was 

wondering if you might just comment on how the Reactor Oversight 

Process found what went wrong that allowed these chronic security 

problems to go undetected for several years before NRC became aware 

of the problem. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Sir, the security part of our process is one where 

we have put enormous resources since 9/11. We believed that we do find 

problems at these plants. We are particularly proud of our force-on-force 

exercises in the post-9/11 environment that are enormously better, 

infinitely better than what we did before 9/11. I’m not totally 

comfortable discussing the details of Turkey Point in public because I 

don’t want to put a finger on Turkey Point. Turkey Point, we have said, 

that there was a very bad incident publicly in which we brought in the 

FBI with a hole drilled where it should not have been during a recent 

outage, but Turkey Point is not an outlier by any means. I don’t want to 

rate the plants in security space because we haven’t done that since 9/11 

on our home page. 

We have deleted the performance indicators, all of which were 

“green” forever. They didn’t provide useful information to the public, 

and we deleted the inspection findings. What we have just recently 

done--and I will admit I was in the minority--is that we decided to put 

summary inspection reports about security findings onto the Web page. 

Just a summary, not the details. And if there are greater than “green” 

findings, we will note that without noting the number or without noting 

what the exact nature of the security findings were. For less than “green” 

findings--or for “green” findings, we will simply note that there were 

“green” findings and again, not discuss the details. So I’m not 

comfortable getting into security details. We don’t want to help terrorists 

target any particular plant or know anything that is current information 

about any security deficiency at one of our plants. 

MR. WHITFIELD. And this looks like maybe some disgruntled 

employee or whatever. I won’t speculate on it. But I think overall, this 

GAO report was quite positive, and I think you all should be commended 

for the great progress that you’re making. Obviously, any infraction or a 

problem in this area is something we have to be quite concerned about, 

but I appreciate it. My time has expired, and I thank you for your hard 

work. 

I recognize the full committee Chairman, Mr. Barton from Texas. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Mr. Chairman, I’m actually supposedly 

chairing another meeting right now. So I just came to show support for 

the hearing. I think the reports that have come out are generally 

favorable. I share some of the concerns some of the watchdog groups 
46

do, especially on anti-terrorist security. I think we still need to be 

vigilant there, but we appear to be addressing that. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Sir, the amount of resources that we’re putting 

into security today is a large factor of what we put in before 9/11, and we 

believe that we have excellent force-on-force exercises that we’re now 

carrying out once every 3 years at every site, and we’re getting deep 

insights, we’re finding problems, and people are fixing them before we 

leave the site. I don’t want to go into the details, but we are finding 

problems, and we’re fixing them. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. I guess I should give the other two witnesses 

an opportunity to comment on that. 

MR. WELLS. We have been active in reporting on the NRC security 

program in both classified and unclassified reports. Clearly NRC, I 

would agree, has expended a tremendous amount of resource and has 

come a long way in terms of testing the security at our commercial 

nuclear power plants, but I too would share some interest and concern 

that the NRC continue to seek ways to inform the American public about 

the types of activities that are underway and the types of activities that 

exist to help improve the public’s perception about the quality of security 

that exists at our nuclear power plants. We have shared 

recommendations with the NRC to look at ways in which more 

information can be made available to the public and still protect security 

concerns. We think NRC could still do a better job at that. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Is she with you? 

MR. WELLS. Yes. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Burgess. 

MR. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McGaffigan, if I 

could just ask you a question on the force-on-force exercises, and if it is 

information that you can’t tell us, then just so indicate. But on a forceon-force exercise, are all sides aware that these exercises are happening? 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Yes, sir. We have to. We are criticized for 

giving too much lead time to the licensees. We have tried to cut that 

back, but we have to conduct an exercise at one of these sites, say, South 

Texas or Comanche Peak, the licensee has to have enough lead time so 

that they can have two sets of security guards there. One protecting the 

plant. One armed with so-called MILES gear, laser target 

designator-type gear to play in the exercise. So they have twice the 

normal security force there for the exercise. We are increasingly doing 

night exercises because that would be the time when the plant might be 

more vulnerable, if you were a terrorist, you might have less to worry 

about in terms of being identified as you approach the plant. So we give 

them about 8 to 10 weeks notice. They put together their plans. We 
47

table top with them. We have some ideas for how to improve the table 

top aspect by bringing in something called JCATS, which is used by the 

military, which we’re hoping to pilot soon. Joint combined arms tactical 

simulation that’s used by--Lawrence Livermore is the keeper of that 

software. 

We have vastly improved the quality of the attacking force that we 

use. They are professional now. We used to have retired state 

policemen or retired security guards from other plants serving as the 

attacking force. We have a professional attacking force today. They are 

under NRC’s supervision. We have a very qualified government 

contractor who comes in and helps us design the attacks that we use. 

The typical exercise has three attacks on each of three consecutive 

evenings, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday typically. And we exploit 

where our experts believe the weaknesses in that plant’s security strategy 

are. 

And most of the time, the vast majority of the time our attacking 

force is repelled. In some cases, the attacking force is successful in 

reaching target sets, and we don’t want that to happen but very, very 

infrequently. But the vast majority of the time, I will tell you--we’re 

working on an annual report at the current time, Mr. Chairman, 

Mr. Burgess, that will summarize last year’s results of force-on-force 

exercises, and that should be available to the Congress next month. 

We’re not going to identify individual plants, but we will tell you what 

we found as a general matter, and we will tell you examples of the sort of 

things that we did find and that we did improve as a result of the 

exercises. 

I will give you one example. We did this in a closed session that 

Mr. Wells and I were at recently. I’m not going to name the site, but this 

particular site had decided to use an armored personnel carrier as part of 

its protective strategy. That’s a pretty bad thing in the hands of a 

terrorist adversary. And unfortunately, the adversary managed to get 

control of the armored personnel carrier for reasons that I won’t go into 

now, but that will never happen again. The licensee now understands 

why it cannot have the armored personnel carrier, which is theoretically a 

good idea, located where it was. They were using it for owner-controlled 

area patrols outside the protected area. They are never going to allow 

that armor personnel carrier to be overwhelmed again and seized. 

MR. BURGESS. I hope not. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Yeah. 

MR. BURGESS. We’ve had a lot of discussion here in this committee 

about the issue of cyber security. Can you address what you’re doing in 

that realm? 
48

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. We have a program that we have worked out 

with the experts and with the industry itself. The Department of 

Homeland Security is very supportive of it. They have a draft nuclear 

sector security plan out for public comment at the current time that has 

cyber security and whether the industry implements fully pursuant to the 

NRC guidance in cyber security as one of the metrics that they’re 

proposing. Our plants are not particularly vulnerable to cyber security 

problems currently because all of the safety systems are generally analog 

and separated. They’re not accessible. Some things like, you know, the 

grid--the interconnection between the plant and the grid are accessible 

because they have to be--but a terrorist, the plants are not particularly 

susceptible to cyber security, and we have, we think, a sound program 

that if fully implemented by the industry will preclude problems with 

cyber security. 

MR. BURGESS. I don’t know whether I should ask this of Mr. Wells 

or Mr. McGaffigan, but this list that the Chairman alluded to earlier 

under the “yellow” indicator at Indian Point II, four of seven operator 

crews failed to pass annual license requalification exams. That, to me 

just as a layperson, that’s a little startling. Are we taking steps to address 

that and correct that? 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Sir, those steps have been taken a long time ago. 

If they don’t pass, they don’t run the reactor. We have a very vigorous 

program both of initial qualification and requalification for all of our 

operators. They all have to have an NRC license to operate a power 

reactor. We take that very seriously. The industry takes it very 

seriously. 

MR. BURGESS. But you had a 50 percent failure rate according to 

this. 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. One plant. One plant that was in trouble, as you 

can see above, for other reasons in the same time period, and that plant 

also has undergone a change in ownership since that time period. 

Entergy Corporation now runs that plant. Indian Point II in 2001 was--I 

forget whether it was Con Ed or NYPA, I always got them mixed up, 

New York Power Authority--the Consolidated Edison was then running 

Indian Point II, and Entergy, which it runs a fleet of nuclear plants, holds 

itself to a very high standard, is now in charge there. 

And you know, as a general matter, I personally believe that the 

consolidation that has taken place in the industry, getting rid of people 

like Con Ed and NYPA and Boston Edison at Pilgrim and lots of other 

folks who were single-unit utilities back when I joined the NRC and 

having them instead now be part of large fleets run by the Exelons and 

Entergys and Dukes and Constellations, it has been a huge step forward 

in safety. These folks are serious. They’re committed to the nuclear 
49

business. When the CEOs of some of those former firms used to come 

into my office, you could tell that they were just figuring out how to exit 

from the nuclear business, and they sometimes provided resources to the 

staff, commensurate with their desire to not be in the nuclear business. 

The new folks provide resources that are needed to maintain the plant in 

a highly safe condition. 

MR. BURGESS. It seems like whenever there’s an incident or an 

accident, it wasn’t just one event that caused it but a chain of events, and 

the Navy’s been so successful with their nuclear submarine program 

within their culture of safety that just will accept no deviation. I just 

wondered if we would be better served if we sought to achieve that high 

a safety standard. Now, Mr. Wells, you point out that the NRC, over 5 

years has over 4,000 inspections and 97 percent of these were considered 

of low significance to the overall safe operations of the plant. And in 

fact, if we have such a low level of findings, is it because the plants are 

doing a good job or we’re not looking hard enough? 

MR. WELLS. Could be both. 

MR. BURGESS. Yeah. And therein is part of the problem. And 

that’s when it wasn’t part of this committee, but it’s part of the 

investigation for the space shuttle disaster 2 years ago, reviewing the 

nuclear submarine program in the Navy, again, they’ve compiled a 

remarkable safety record since 1963, and one that they’re rightly very 

proud of, and it stems from an unwillingness to accept any deviation, any 

deviation from standard. And I just wonder if our Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission should achieve to strive for that same high standard. 

MR. WELLS. Mr. Congressman, you know, my first reaction is that 

clearly, we’ve heard debate within NRC as well as in the industry. The 

industry itself talks a lot about excellence and a lot of their inspections 

are designed to excellence, which is a little different than what you were 

talking about in the Navy program, even within the NRC circles, they’re 

talking about the safety culture, which, in their mind, is a little different 

definition than excellence. Clearly the results that we’ve seen, the three 

plants that are in the highest level of safety oversight, the four plants that 

are in the second highest level of oversight, and the 11 plants that are 

currently in increased levels of oversight, in each and every one of these 

plants there are issues relating to repeating and recurring type of events, 

and repeating and recurring examples where corrective action has not 

been as timely or corrected the first time. So there seems to be a theme 

across the industry in terms of what causes some of these plants to be 

less good performers than other plants, and it seems to be this 

cross-cutting environment where there’s a safety culture out there that 

they’re not, in fact, doing the types of things that maybe you’ve 

experienced and seen in the Navy program. 
50

MR. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, this is an important aspect. I hope 

this is not the last time we’ll visit it. With that, my time’s expired. I’ll 

yield back. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Dr. Burgess. And one other comment 

I would make, Commissioner McGaffigan, I touched on this earlier about 

the Reactor Oversight Process, but I will just ask you in closing, are you 

confident today yourself as a commissioner that this Reactor Oversight 

Process can proactively identify emerging safety issues like the one at 

Davis-Besse before similar major safety problems occur? 

MR. MCGAFFIGAN. Sir, I don’t think I can honestly answer that in 

the affirmative. I think that’s too high a standard for a program. Will we 

ever make the Davis-Besse mistake again? No. But the problem is we 

do not have a leading indicator of bad performance. 

When I first came to the Commission and we were designing the 

Reactor Oversight Process, Mr. Edward Jordan, who was one of our most 

senior staff and had been with us since the day the NRC was created, 

gave us new commissioners a lecture about leading indicators, and the 

then-two-decade-plus effort by the NRC staff to find leading indicators 

and to find ways to get ahead of problems; and every time we find one, 

or we think we find one and we pilot it, we find out it’s a leading 

indicator of both good and bad performance. 

So we don’t have a magic indicator. Do we have the best program 

that human beings can design at this stage? Yes, I will affirmatively 

answer that. But will we always be ahead of degrading performance? I 

think that is a standard that a human institution is probably not going to 

achieve. Are we doing all we can to try to achieve it? Yes. But I cannot 

promise you there will not be another incident in the future where we get 

surprised. We’re doing all we can to prevent it, but I cannot promise you 

that the system is infallible. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you all very much. We appreciate 

your being here. We appreciate your testimony. And as I said earlier, 

the GAO report on this was generally positive with some areas of 

concern, obviously. But we look forward to maintaining contact with 

you as we continue efforts to improve nuclear safety in the country. So 

with that, you all are dismissed. 

At this time I’d like to call up the second panel, which consists of 

one person, and that is Mr. Paul Gunter, who is, as I said, Director of the 

Reactor Watchdog Project for the Nuclear Information and Resource 

Service. 

Mr. Gunter, it’s good to see you this afternoon. We appreciate your 

being here. 

MR. GUNTER. Thank you very much. 
51

MR. WHITFIELD. As you know, in Oversight and Investigations, we 

take testimony under oath. And do you have any difficulty of testifying 

under oath today? 

MR. GUNTER. I do not. 

MR. WHITFIELD. And do you have legal counsel with you? 

MR. GUNTER. I do not. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Gunter. You are now under oath, 

and I would recognize you for your five-minute opening statement. 

Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL GUNTER, DIRECTOR, THE REACTOR 

WATCHDOG PROJECT, NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND 

RESOURCE SERVICE 

 

MR. GUNTER. Good afternoon. My name is Paul Gunter. I am 

director of the Reactor Watchdog Project. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Do you have your microphone on, Mr. Gunter? 

MR. GUNTER. I believe it is on. Is it on now? It’s on now. Thank 

you. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to share with you today some 

of the public interest community’s concerns and insights with the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s current Regulatory Oversight Process. 

Whether you are for or against nuclear power, we can all agree that 

safety and security must be regarded as top priorities at all of the 

Nation’s atomic power plants. While the new Reactor Oversight Process 

represents an improvement over the old systematic assessment of 

licensee performance, NIRS does not have confidence that this latest 

version is being fairly applied to hold the public safety and security in 

the highest regard. The public is concerned with evidence that the 

regulatory agency is cutting corners at safety and security cornerstones 

under the new process, particularly in the areas of assessment, inspection 

and enforcement. In March 2002, the Davis-Besse nuclear power station 

20 miles outside of Toledo had not one greater than “green” finding 

when the worst reactor safety condition in the United States since Three 

Mile Island accident was discovered. The public became acutely aware 

with the discovery of the severely corroded hole in the head of the 

reactor pressure vessel that a lack of greater than “green” finding under 

the new oversight process does not necessarily equate to an assurance of 

safety. The NRC technical staff, in fact, had identified a potentially 

significant safety issue at Davis-Besse where six of the seven operating 

Babcock & Wilcox reactors had received inspections identifying 

cracking in susceptible material that fabricated the control rod drive 

mechanism penetration sleeves. 
52

Davis-Besse was the only other Babcock & Wilcox reactor not 

inspected. Using its regulatory guidance, the NRC technical staff 

quantified the uncertain but growing risk of continued operation of 

Davis-Besse and found the risk to be unacceptable. An order was drafted 

and finalized in November of 2001 by the staff of the Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation to shut down the reactor in December 2001 for a safety 

inspection of the reactor vessel head. However, the final order was never 

issued. Instead, according to the NRC Office of Inspector General 

report, quote, “during its review of the potentially hazardous condition at 

Davis-Besse, the NRC staff considered the financial impact to the 

licensee of an unscheduled plant shutdown” which “was contrary to the 

goal of NRC bulletin 2001-01 to have at-risk reactors conduct timely 

inspections to ensure that NRC regulatory requirements related to reactor 

coolant leakage were met.” 

The OIG went on to state that, “with respect to Davis-Besse 

specifically, OIG reviewed a November 21, 2001 internal NRC 

memorandum related to a discussion between the nuclear reactor 

regulation director and First Energy Nuclear Operating Corporation 

president. The document conveyed that the NRR director had spoken to 

FENOC president and was aware of the licensee’s financial concerns 

pertaining to an unscheduled shutdown. According to the memorandum, 

the FENOC president told the NRR director that the impact of shutdown 

prior to February 2002 would be significant, and Davis-Besse would be 

better positioned for a shutdown in February because of the availability 

of replacement fuel. The FENOC president confirmed to OIG that this 

discussion took place.” 

The NRC order was pulled. Moreover, the OIG reported that “NRC 

appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden for 

requiring absolute proof of a safety problem versus lack of reasonable 

assurance of maintaining public health and safety before it will act to 

shut down a power plant. The staff articulated this standard to OIG as a 

rationale for allowing Davis-Besse to operate until February 16, 2002, 

even in light of information that had strongly indicated Davis-Besse was 

not in compliance with NRC regulations and plant technical 

specifications and may have operated with reduced safety margins.” 

When the reactor was shut down in February 2002, not only did the 

licensee find cracking in the identified trouble spot but corrosive reactor 

coolant had been leaking through a crack over an extended time period 

and eaten a cavity into the reactor vessel through 6 3/4 inches of carbon 

steel. 

A Federal laboratory study postulated that if a reactor continued to 

operate for as little as 2 additional months, the reactor pressure vessel 

may have ruptured during operation. To date, there has been not a more 
53

compelling case for shutting down a reactor for safety-related inspections 

under any NRC regulatory oversight process and, in this case, occurred 

under the new oversight process. 

A NRC lessons-learned task force was formulated to address the 

many mistakes that led up to the near miss accident at Davis-Besse and 

looked extensively at how to avoid similar accidents in the future. 

However, the task force leaves one glaring omission unaddressed 

and unanswered in its mission: how in order to shut down Davis-Besse 

for safety inspections based on the agency’s technical staff’s risk 

informed and study judgment was canceled subsequent to the meeting 

between NRC senior management and a Davis-Besse executive officer. 

Furthermore, the Davis-Besse task force still leaves open the issue of 

how the new oversight process informally requires, quote, “absolute 

proof of a safety problem,” unquote, to shut down a reactor for safety 

inspections, while the same oversight process only requires reasonable 

assurance to start up that reactor. 

In view of the identified public safety concerns and findings of the 

OIG report, an effective ROP should not set the bar so high for the 

burden of proof of the safety problem to be beyond the reach of timely 

regulatory action so as to first consider the financial interests of a 

licensee. 

Similarly, NIRS’ written testimony reflects that the public has no 

confidence in the security cornerstone for the ROP that is more 

determined by the regulators’ assessment of how much the nuclear 

industry is willing to afford rather than a set of requirements of what is 

realistically needed to defend these potential radiological targets against 

existing threats. 

My written testimony also looks at how under both the old and the 

new ROP widespread noncompliances with critical fire protection 

regulations for qualified fire barrier protection of the safe shutdown of 

the reactor in the event of fire have lingered unresolved for more than a 

decade, without resolution and without Federal enforcement action to 

require compliance. In the meantime, more firebearing materials are 

emerging as inoperable. 

Congressman Dingell stated the obvious at a 1993 Oversight and 

Investigations hearing on fire protection noncompliances and the NRC 

oversight process more than 13 years ago. He said, “One must inquire 

whether a regulatory process which approves matters as a matter of 

courtesy is serving the public interest or, in fact, whether it is in fact a 

regulatory system. The question is, how does this happen. It results 

from a curious blind faith of NRC regulators and assurances made by 

utilities and by the industries they regulate.” 

Thank you. 
54

[The prepared statement of Mr. Paul Gunter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL GUNTER, DIRECTOR, REACTOR WATCHDOG PROJECT,

NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE

The public must look to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 

oversight process to establish and uphold the safety and security standard in the day-today operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants through a rigorous process of 

assessment, inspection and enforcement. While the new Reactor Oversight Process 

(ROP) represents an improvement over the old Systematic Assessment of Licensee 

Performance, NIRS does not have confidence that this latest version is being fairly 

applied to hold the public safety and security in the highest regard. 

The public is concerned with evidence that the regulatory agency is cutting corners 

at safety and security cornerstones under the new process particularly in the areas of 

assessment, inspection and enforcement. 

In view of identified public safety concerns, an effective ROP should not set the bar 

so high for the burden of proof of a safety problem to be beyond the reach of timely 

regulatory action so as to first consider the financial interests of a licensee. 

The public has no confidence in a Physical Protection Cornerstone of the ROP that 

is more determined by the regulator’s assessment of how much the nuclear industry is 

willing to afford rather than a set of requirements of what is realistically needed to defend 

these potential radiological targets against existing threats. 

Under both the old and new ROP, non-compliance with critical fire protection 

regulations for the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of fire has lingered 

unresolved for more than a decade without resolution and without federal enforcement 

action to require compliance. 

Congressman Dingell stated the obvious at that 1993 hearing on fire protection noncompliances and the NRC oversight process more than 13 years ago, “One must inquire 

whether a regulatory process which approves matters as a matter of courtesy is serving 

the public interest or, in fact, whether it is in fact a regulatory system. The question is, 

how does this happen. It results from a curious blind faith of NRC regulators and 

assurances made by utilities and by the industries that they regulate.” 

 Good afternoon. My name is Paul Gunter. I am Director of the Reactor Watchdog 

Project for Nuclear Information and Resource Service in Takoma Park, Maryland. 

 I want to thank you for the opportunity to share with you today some of the public 

interest community’s insights and concerns with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 

current Reactor Oversight Process. 

 Whether you are for or against nuclear power, we can all agree that safety and 

security must be regarded as top priorities at all of the nation’s atomic power plants. It is 

all the more true with aging reactors in the Post September 11th world where safety 

margins and the security bar must be regarded with the highest standard. 

 Today, the public must look to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s 

(NRC) oversight process to establish and uphold that standard in the day-to-day operation 

and maintenance of nuclear power plants through a rigorous process of assessment, 

inspection and enforcement. Unfortunately, we do not have confidence that the latest 

version of the oversight process is being fairly applied to hold our safety and security in 

the highest regard. 

 Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, NRC developed the Systematic 

Assessment of Licensee Performance. A significant drawback to the SALP process was 

the fact that the program did not have a rating for unacceptable performance. Following a 

near-miss accident in 1985 at Ohio’s Davis-Besse nuclear power station, NRC 
55

established a “Watch List” of reactors that warranted heightened safety-related regulatory 

attention. Public confidence steadily eroded under the old SALP where reactors like the 

two units at the Dresden nuclear power station outside of Chicago were allowed to 

remain on the agency’s “Watch List” for eight years of an eleven year period all the while 

NRC management knew that reactor safety margins were significantly eroded. As the 

U.S. General Accounting Office pointed out, “NRC has not taken aggressive enforcement 

action to force the licensees to fix their long-standing safety problems on a timely basis. 

As a result, the plant’s condition has worsened, making safety margins smaller.” 1

NRC 

senior management’s repeatedly failure to address declining safety performance at 

nuclear reactors eventually emerged on the cover of TIME magazine.2

 In April 2000, NRC implemented the current reactor oversight process. In the view 

of industry the revision of the oversight process came about as the result of improved 

reactor performance and the need to remove overly burdensome regulatory oversight 

process. In the view public interest and safety groups the revised process was 

necessitated by the repeated failure of NRC management to address documented and 

declining reactor safety performance. 

 The obvious question today is whether or not we have a better reactor oversight 

process that accurately assesses reactor safety and security conditions, timely captures 

problems without gambling public safety and security and carries out enforcement 

actions to assure that problems are effectively remedied and not recurring. The Reactor 

Oversight Process is only as effective as the agency is able and willing to accurately 

assess safety and security problems and take timely enforcement action when violations 

occur and problems are not addressed. 

 The public is concerned with evidence that the regulatory agency is cutting corners 

at a safety and security cornerstones under the new process particularly in the areas of 

assessment, inspection and enforcement. 

Cutting Corners in Reactor Safety and the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone 

 In March 2002, the Davis-Besse nuclear generating station, 20 miles outside of 

Toledo, Ohio had not one greater-than-Green performance indicator or inspection finding 

when the worst reactor safety condition in the United States since the Three Mile Island 

accident was discovered. The public became acutely aware with the discovery of the 

severely corroded hole-in-the-head of the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel that a lackof-greater-than-Green finding under the new Reactor Oversight Process does not 

necessarily equate to an assurance of safety. In fact, disturbing photographic evidence of 

extensive corrosion was available to the NRC oversight process when the reactor was 

allowed to restart in April 2000, the same month that the new ROP was initiated. 

 The NRC technical staff had, in fact, identified a potentially significant safety issue 

at Davis-Besse where six of the seven operating Babcox & Wilcox reactors had received 

inspections identifying cracking in a susceptible material that fabricated the control rod 

drive mechanism penetration sleeves. Davis-Besse was the only other B&W reactor not 

inspected. An Order was drafted and finalized in November 2001 by the staff of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation to shut down the reactor in December 2001 for a safety inspection of 

the reactor vessel head. However, the final Order was never issued. When the reactor 

was shut down in February 2002, not only did the operator find cracking in the identified 

trouble spot but corrosive reactor coolant had been leaking through the crack over an 

extended time period and eaten a cavity into the reactor vessel head through six and three 

 

1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Nuclear Regulation: Preventing Problem Plants Requires More 

Effective NRC Action,” GAO/RCED-97-145, May 1997, pp. 2-3 2

 A Special Investigation “Blowing the Whistle on Nuclear Safety: How a showdown at a power 

plant exposed the federal government’s failure to enforce its own rules,” TIME, March 4, 1996, pp. 

46-54. 
56

quarter inches of carbon steel. A federal laboratory study postulated that if the corrosion 

rate had been allowed to continue for as little as two additional months the reactor 

pressure vessel may have ruptured. 

 A subsequent investigation by the NRC Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

concluded that “during its review of the potentially hazardous condition at Davis-Besse, 

the NRC staff considered the financial impact to the licensee of an unscheduled plant 

shutdown” and “was contrary to the goal of NRC Bulletin 2001-01 to have at risk 

reactors conduct timely inspections to ensure that NRC regulatory requirements related 

to reactor coolant leakage were met.”3

 The OIG went on to state that “With respect to 

Davis-Besse specifically, OIG reviewed a November 21 2001 internal NRC memorandum 

related to a discussion between the NRR (Nuclear Reactor Regulation) Director and the 

FENOC (First Energy Nuclear Operating Corporation) President. The document 

conveyed that the NRR Director had spoken to the FENOC President and was aware of 

the licensee’s financial concerns pertaining to an unscheduled shutdown. According to 

the memorandum, the FENOC President told the NRR Director that the impact of a 

shutdown prior to February 2002 would be significant, and Davis-Besse would be better 

positioned for a shut down in February because of the availability of replacement fuel. 

The FENOC President confirmed to OIG that this discussion took place.” 4

 The NRC 

Order was subsequently pulled. 

 Moreover, the OIG also reported that, “NRC appears to have informally established 

an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack 

of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health and safety, before it will act to shut 

down a power plant. The staff articulated this standard to OIG as a rationale for 

allowing Davis-Besse to operate until February 16, 2002, even in light of information 

that strongly indicated Davis-Besse was not in compliance with NRC regulations and 

plant technical specifications and may have operated with reduced safety margins.”

5

 In view of such public safety concerns, an effective Reactor Oversight Process 

should not set the bar so high for the burden of proof of a safety problem to be beyond 

the reach of timely regulatory action so as to first consider the financial interests of an 

operator. 

 The tendency for NRC to overlook significant safety warnings signs under the 

current ROP remains a concern to the public interest community today. 

Cutting Corners in Safeguards and the Physical Protection Cornerstone 

 Along the same lines, the security bar for nuclear power stations should not be set so 

low so that Reactor Oversight Process performance indicators can not accurately assess 

the adequacy of reactor site security to defend against a terrorist attack and assess site 

vulnerabilities in need of timely resolution. 

 For example, testimony given this year by the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations in the House Committee on Government Reform, raises concerns 

about the Reactor Oversight Process and the Design Basis Threat (DBT), which sets the 

thresholds for adversary characteristics that reactor sites are required to be able to defend 

against with a high degree of confidence.6

 

 The GAO looked at the rigor of inspections and drills used to test security force 

readiness that determine the findings of the Physical Protection Cornerstone. GAO 

 

3

 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Inspector General, “NRC’s Regulation of DavisBesse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head,” Case No. 02-03S, December 30, 2002, p. 23 4

 Ibid, OIG, p.17 

5

 Ibid, OIG, p.23 

6

 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Nuclear Power: Efforts Made to Upgrade 

Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Design Basis Threat Process Should be 

Improved,” April 4, 2006, 
57

identified that NRC staff analyzed intelligence information in determining adversary 

characteristics including weapons that could be used in an attack as well as exchanged 

information with the Department of Energy, which has a DBT for comparable facilities 

that process or store radiological materials and as such are potential targets for 

radiological sabotage. GAO found that “NRC generally established less rigorous 

requirements than DOE—for example, with regard to the types of equipment that could 

be used in an attack. The DOE DBT includes a number of weapons not included in the 

NRC DBT. Inclusion of such weapons in the NRC DBT for nuclear power plants would 

have required plants to take substantial security measures.”7

 The GAO report reflects the concern of a broad range of public interest groups that 

the DBT as measured under the current Reactor Oversight Process does not reflect staff 

recommendation as formulated from intelligence information. Instead, GAO found “the 

NRC staff made changes to some recommendations after obtaining feedback from 

stakeholders, including the nuclear industry, which objected to certain proposed 

changes, such as the inclusion of certain weapons. NRC officials said the changes 

resulted from the further analysis of intelligence information. Nevertheless, GAO found 

that the process used to obtain stakeholder feedback created the appearance that changes 

were made based on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend 

against rather than on what an assessment of the terrorist threat called for.”8

 The public has no confidence in a Physical Protection Cornerstone of the ROP that 

is more determined by the regulators assessment of how much the nuclear industry is 

willing to afford rather than a set of requirements of what is realistically needed to defend 

these potential radiological targets against existing threats. 

Cutting Corners in Reactor Safety and Mitigating Systems Cornerstone 

 As stated on the NRC website with regard to the Reactor Safety and Mitigating 

Systems Cornerstone “The objective of this cornerstone is to monitor the availability, 

reliability, and capability of systems that mitigate the effects of initiating events to 

prevent core damage. Licensees reduce the likelihood of reactor accidents by 

maintaining the availability and reliability of mitigating systems.”

9

 Fire is potentially one of the highest risk initiating events. NIRS has long been 

concerned with the regulatory oversight process and specifically the protection of 

electrical cables for control, power and instrumentation equipment necessary to safely 

shut down the reactor in the event of fire. A nearly catastrophic fire that burned for seven 

hours at the Browns Ferry nuclear power station in 1975 resulted in the promulgation of 

new requirements for NRC’s fire code. 

 We remain concerned with the questionable adequacy of the Reactor Oversight 

Process for post-fire safe shutdown requirements, today. 

 In 1992, NRC declared Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers inoperable. Thermo-Lag 

330-1 was then the most widely deployed fire barrier system used throughout the nuclear 

power industry. An industry whistleblower had exposed that the fire barrier wrap system 

could not pass standardized industry fire tests and did not meet the fire endurance 

requirements for protecting safe shut down electrical cables from fire damage, 

specifically where redundant safe shut down electrical systems were co-located in the 

same fire zone and could be destroyed by a single fire. 

 In March 1993, this Subcommittee held a hearing on “Fire Safety at Nuclear Power 

Plants” then chaired by Congressman John Dingell. I attended that hearing on behalf of 

Nuclear Information and Resource Service with particular concern for public safety 

involving the inoperable fire barrier wrap system. 

 

7

 Ibid, GAO, p. 9 

8

 Ibid, GAO, Introduction 

9

 http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/cornerstone.html#MS 
58

 Congressman Dingell stated at that hearing “This is what Yogi Berra might describe 

as déjà vu all over again.”10 As Congressman Dingell further stated, “The regulators, 

again appear to have exhibited some substantial failures in regulatory oversight, in 

passivity and in paralyses.”11 Congressman Dingell went on to say, “NRC accepted the 

utility’s assurances, apparently without adequate scrutiny, and the material (Thermo-Lag 

330-1) was installed in about 80 reactors across the country. The committee has received 

serious allegations that these result in substandard fire protection in those plants. The 

certifications continue to be accepted by NRC, in spite of the fact that NRC staff was 

given ample evidence of problems over a period extending over ten years.” 

 The bogus fire barrier resulted in NRC staff reviews and repeated meetings for five 

more years with nuclear power plant operators and the industry lobby group, then 

Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and now the Nuclear 

Energy Institute. During that time, fire watches, as compensatory measures, were put in 

place for what would amount to more than six years at some sites despite the 1993 

testimony by then Commissioner Ivan Selin before the same Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations stating that fire watches were only intended for temporary durations of 

6 to 9 months. “They don’t expect them for 2 years fulltime,” said Selin.12 During that 

extensive period of non-compliance many operators came to agreements with NRC staff 

to bring reactor fire protection violations into compliance with the applicable fire code 

(10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R III.G.2). About two dozen units were finally 

issued NRC Confirmatory Action Orders in 1998 to come into compliance by 2000 

because of their inability to provide an acceptable and timely corrective action program 

for the inoperable fire barriers. 

 In 2000, the NRC implemented the new Reactor Oversight Process which included a 

series of systematic inspections of licensees’ safe shutdown capability. A series of 

baseline fire protection inspections were conducted at reactor sites by NRC inspectors. 

During these baseline inspections, NRC inspectors discovered that many licensees had in 

fact not upgraded or replaced inoperable Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers as agreed to 

NRC staff in their Thermo-Lag Corrective Action Programs and Confirmatory Action 

Orders. Between 1998 and 2001, licensees that received NRC Orders sent NRC letters 

indicating completion of the ordered Thermo-Lag corrective action. To date, those Orders 

remain in effect, neither rescinded nor relaxed. What has happened to the enforcement of 

those Orders under the Reactor Oversight Process? 

 We now know that instead of complying with Thermo-Lag Action Programs and 

Confirmatory Orders, licensees widely substituted “operator manual actions” that were in 

large part unreviewed and unapproved by NRC staff. These industry self-initiated manual 

actions allowed electrical circuits required under regulations as to be maintained free 

from fire damage to be sacrificed in the fire by taking no action on installing compliant 

fire barriers or establishing a minimum cable separation between redundant systems. The 

operator manual actions would instead send station personnel to the end piece of safety 

equipment and manually operate it or turn off spurious operations. The manual actions 

can be complicated, multi-tasked and require tools, ladders, key cards and even breathing 

apparatus to accomplish safety-related functions under duress of fire and potentially even 

attack. Given the difficulty in predicting fire behavior, the manual actions might not be 

achievable. 

 Enforcement Discretion and non-cited violations for non-compliances were put into 

place by NRC for unapproved operator manual actions. In 2005, NRC initiated a 

 

10 “Fire Safety at Nuclear Power Plants,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigation of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred 

Third Congress, March 3, 1993, Serial No. 103-21, p. 1 

11 Ibid, p.1 

12 Ibid, p. 110. 
59

rulemaking to codify operator manual action in lieu of coming into compliance with 

physical fire protection design features; rated and operable fire barriers and minimal 

separation requirements used in conjunction with detection and automated suppression. 

After failing to get an endorsement from either the nuclear industry or the public interest 

community, NRC abandoned the rulemaking effort in March 2006. 

 NRC is now planning to accept “feasible and reliable” Operator Manual Actions as 

“temporary” compensatory actions (an additional three years on top of non-compliances 

going back to 1992) for inoperable fire barriers and failure to provide minimum cable 

separation while licensees to submit a large number of exemptions from fire protection 

requirements and move to a voluntary risk-informed and performance-based fire 

protection system.13 The public lacks confidence in such analytical fire protection over 

physical fire protection features. To offer one basic reason for this lack of confidence, fire 

protection is fundamental to the security infrastructure in protecting the public from 

radiological sabotage. Terrorism can neither be effectively risk-informed or performancebased. 

In the mean time, there is the recurrence of the Thermo-Lag “déjà vu all over again” 

with additional inoperable fire barrier system materials widely employed by the nuclear 

industry for protection of safe shut down electrical systems having been identified.14 

HEMYC and MT fire barriers, are now demonstrated to dramatically fail the same 

standardized fire tests and do not assure that safe shut down equipment can be maintained 

free from fire damage in the event of a significant fire at a U.S. reactor. NRC has set 

about to take regulatory action along the same paths as its 1992 discovery of inoperable 

Thermo-Lag barriers that remain an unresolved problem today under the new Regulatory 

Oversight Process. Given the unresolved nature of the problem created by inoperable 

Thermo-Lag, the public has little cause to have confidence that the current Regulatory 

Oversight Program will find closure any time sooner for HEMYC / MT fire barriers. 

Congressman Dingell stated the obvious at that 1993 hearing on fire protection and 

the NRC oversight process more than 13 years ago, “One must inquire whether a 

regulatory process which approves matters as a matter of courtesy is serving the public 

interest or, in fact, whether it is in fact a regulatory system. The question is, how does 

this happen. It results from a curious blind faith of NRC regulators and assurances made 

by utilities and by the industries that they regulate.”15

MR. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Gunter. 

Obviously, you have some real concerns about this process, and I 

would ask the NRC and the GAO in its written testimony point out that 

the NRC has a proactive approach to improving the reactor oversight 

process and several mechanisms in place to incorporate feedback from 

both external and internal stakeholders. 

And I was just curious from your experience, do you provide 

feedback and give-and-take with the NRC about these issues that you 

find deficient? Do you feel like you have an open dialogue with them or 

not? 

 

13 NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-XX, Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph 

III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions, Public Meeting, June 6, 2006 14 NRC Generic Letter 2006-03, “Potentially Nonconforming HEMYC and MT Fire Barrier 

Configurations,” April 10, 2006, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Accession No. 

ML053620142. 

15 Ibid, Subcommittee Hearing, p.2
60

MR. GUNTER. Yes, sir. We have been involved in meetings, public 

meetings both with the staff and the Commission. It remains a concern 

as to whether or not those meetings result in actions that we believe serve 

the public interests, particularly with--an example is in the area of fire 

protection-- 

MR. WHITFIELD. Right. 

MR. GUNTER. --where we have been in meetings for well on 13 years 

with this regard. And we remain concerned that the issues are not only 

not closed, and the lingering safety concerns, but we have more 

inoperable fire barriers emerging. 

MR. WHITFIELD. I have never met you, Mr. Gunter, before, and I am 

assuming that you are supportive of the use of nuclear energy; but your 

organization and you, personally, feel that there are some major safety 

issues out there that just have not been addressed to the way that you 

would like; would that be correct? 

MR. GUNTER. No, sir. We are openly opposed to the continued 

operation of nuclear power and its expansion. This industry has had 50 

years to prove itself, and it not only has not met the market tests, but it 

continues to raise growing safety concerns as well as nuclear waste and 

environmental concerns. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Okay. You also point out that the public has no 

confidence in the physical protection cornerstone of the reactor oversight 

process. So I am assuming that you feel like they are vulnerable to 

attack, that it is just inadequate, the protection in place is simply 

inadequate; is that right? 

MR. GUNTER. There is the question, first of all, of design, and it is 

hard to suggest that all reactors carry the same vulnerability. They don’t. 

We have recognized that there are some sites that are more vulnerable 

than others, some designs more vulnerable than others. And it also 

comes down to the question of how much security is enough and how 

much security is to be afforded, and is the industry willing to afford that, 

and is the agency in a position to enforce such levels of adequate 

security? 

So there are many aspects to this that, you know, make it a Gordian 

Knot. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Okay. We have a vote on the floor. We are going 

to have three or four votes. And rather than keeping you for the entire 

time, at this time I will recognize Mr. Inslee for any questions that he 

may have. 

MR. INSLEE. Thank you. 

I just wonder, bottom line, how do you compare public safety, the 

status, from before the Reactor Oversight Process was put into place. 

Better? Worse? The same? 
61

MR. GUNTER. You know, it is difficult to measure if, in fact, the 

process is not picking up the significant safety issues. Again, I go back 

to our concerns with the Davis-Besse finding that there were no greater 

than “green” findings, that everything was running along safely, 

supposedly, about three-sixteenths of an inch of stainless steel was 

bulging off the top of the reactor vessel head. 

It raises significant confidence in the current oversight processes’ 

ability to not only identify safety issues in a timely fashion, but for 

technical assessments to be translated into enforcement actions, which I 

think was a significant failing in the Davis-Besse issue. 

MR. INSLEE. Thank you. 

MR. WHITFIELD. Is that all of your questions, Mr. Inslee? 

Dr. Burgess, do you have any? 

MR. BURGESS. I’ll submit them in writing. 

MR. WHITFIELD. All right. Well, Mr. Gunter, I want to genuinely 

appreciate you being here today to express your concerns. We do have 

your testimony, and I want to thank the other panel of witnesses again. 

As I said, this is a very important area. Nuclear energy does provide 

about 20 percent of the electricity produced in the U.S. today, and we do 

need to ensure the safety so that hopefully we can expand nuclear 

energy. I know that is not where you all are coming from, but we can 

continue to have the dialogue and the debate, and thank you very much 

for being with us today. 

And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
62

RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE 

ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

The Honorable Jan D. Schakowsky 

1. Four years ago, the fifth most dangerous nuclear reactor incident in 25 years 

occurred at FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse plant. The Reactor Oversight Process was 

already in place, and Davis-Besse was in the green with its ratings. The public 

obviously wasn’t safe then. Is there any guarantee that this type of incident 

wouldn’t occur again? Are we safer now than we were then? 

• There is no question this event caught NRC and many by surprise. The 

event did cause action and the industry and NRC thoroughly explored the 

causes, learned lessons, and NRC’s ROP was improved. It is not possible 

to guarantee that this type of incident won’t happen again, but it is 

unlikely there will be another incident identical to that at Davis-Besse. I 

think that NRC’s oversight overall has improved as a result of the wake-up 

call that it got from such a serious incident. 

• NRC’s recent actions to assess and focus attention on safety culture should 

better provide early indications of declining plant performance. 

2. Early this year, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff raised questions 

about the effectiveness of the performance indicator program, saying that if all the 

results were “green,” perhaps it didn’t really measure anything of value. What is 

your position on the performance indicator program? 

• I would respond that we share NRC’s and industry’s concern that the 

existing performance indicators are less than perfect. Performance 

indicators can be valuable because they provide objective measures that 

licensees can use for managing their plants. Performance indicators also 

focus attention on areas important to safety. However, if measures are 

always green as they have been, you should question their value. It’s good 

that they are green if this means that licensees are performing well nearly 

all the time. But there have been cases where performance indicators did 

not seem to accurately reflect performance (e.g. Davis Besse or the issue 

with warning sirens at Indian Point). We understand there are changes 

being made to improve these indicators in the future. 

3. Initially, NRC staff estimated that about 5 percent of the findings under the Reactor 

Oversight Process would be greater than green. But less than 1 percent have fallen 

into that category. Does that mean all the reactors are safer than they were five 

years ago, or are the findings not measuring the right safety indicators? 

• It is true that the industry has logged a pretty impressive safety record over 

many years of operations and many issues related to safety have been 

corrected and improved. Nevertheless, NRC has acknowledged that many 

indicators may need to be redesigned to serve as a better measure of 

performance. In cooperation with the industry, NRC recently introduced 

one new key performance indicator, the mitigating systems performance 

indicator, and they intend to assess others as well. 

• At the nuclear power plant sites we looked at, we found that plant 

managers pay close attention to performance indicators and manage their 
63

plants so as not to exceed thresholds—that is, they stated they would take 

action to fix the issue well before the indicator exceeded the threshold. In 

reality a lot is riding on well these plants perform, for example within the 

financial and shareholder community as well as the public perceptions of 

how safe these plants are. 

 

4. At Davis-Besse, prior to the 2002 incident, the plant was all green, but there were 

serious problems under this new system. One of them was an overall poor safety 

culture. But it has taken the NRC four year to make changes to the oversight 

process to address safety culture. Why has it taken so long? 

• Our 2004 report, which analyzed the events at Davis-Besse, confirmed the 

findings that a poor safety culture played a major role in the unfortunate events 

that played out. Based on what we found, as well as others, we recommended 

NRC take action to get involved. We concluded their oversight should address 

safety culture issues. I think it is fair to say NRC has been hesitant to become 

involved in areas related to plant management. NRC officials told us for years 

that their role as the regulator was to regulate and not tell the industry how to 

run the plants. Their view was safety culture perhaps crossed the line too far 

into operations of the plant. Also, subjective issues such as safety culture are 

difficult to incorporate into their objective processes under the ROP. We think 

it is fair to question how quickly NRC moves forward to incorporate this 

change in oversight. 

5. You stated in your testimony that overall plant performance declines when there are 

ineffective corrective action programs, problems related to human performance, or 

complacent management. How successful is the NRC in uncovering these kinds of 

“culture” problems? 

• The case of Davis Besse illustrated that the ROP failed in a sense, and did not 

have adequate tools for addressing declining safety culture. The primary tool 

being used at the time was the identification of substantive cross-cutting issues. 

NRC was struggling somewhat in consistently applying, identifying and 

watching these types of indicators. As a result, the meaningfulness of these 

determinations did not necessarily result in any real consequences. A weakness 

of the ROP was an underlying assumption that problems in these areas will be 

revealed through inspection findings. As Davis-Besse illustrated, however, this 

assumption is not always valid. 

• NRC’s new safety culture initiative should provide them better tools to assess 

plant safety culture, but officials acknowledge this initiative is only a first step, 

and further modifications to the ROP may be needed. 

6. What is the Government Accountability Office’s view of the new safety culture 

oversight process? 

• As we have testified, NRC’s ROP is not perfect, but we believe it is getting 

better than it was when it was created in 2000. NRC’s initial step to implement 

revisions or modifications related to monitoring safety culture within the plants 

is being met with resistance and a challenge to NRC’s existing authority. Even 

within the NRC there are varying opinions on how or if this will work. It is an 

important step toward preventing future problems like those encountered at 
64

Davis-Besse. But NRC is just starting its implementation and will need to 

carefully monitor this initiative to ensure that it is achieving the goals for which 

it was designed. 
65

RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF HON. EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN, JR., COMMISSIONER, U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE BLACKBURN:

QUESTION 1. Mr. McGaffigan, what advantage does a risk-informed, 

performance-based approach to fire safety have over the prior 

deterministic approach? 

ANSWER: 

The advantage that a risk-informed, performance-based approach offers is that it 

allows licensees to perform realistic assessments of the risks to the public due to potential 

fires at plants. The results of these assessments enable the licensees to gain risk insights 

associated with specific fire protection issues and focus their resources where the most 

risk-significant issues exist, thereby improving the protection of the public health and 

safety. Additionally, the NRC staff may independently consider such insights to help 

focus its safety reviews and resources on the most risk-significant issues. Consequently, 

a risk-informed, performance-based approach enhances both the NRC and its licensees’ 

focus on safety, while simultaneously reducing unnecessary burdens. 

The deterministic Fire Protection Regulation 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection," was 

first published in 1981, in the aftermath of a significant fire that occurred at the Browns 

Ferry Nuclear Plant in 1975. The NRC required a large number of nuclear plants that 

were already in operation or in advanced stages of construction in 1981 to comply with 

the deterministic requirements imposed by this rule. At that time probabilistic risk tools 

were not sufficiently mature to be used for this new rule, and some of the requirements 

imposed undue hardship that was not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 

fire protection rule. As a result, many licensees requested relief from certain of these 

new requirements using the NRC’s exemption process under 10 CFR 50.12 "Specific 

Exemptions." NRC staff then reviewed and approved about one thousand exemptions of 

specific requirements of the rule. These reviews posed significant resource burdens on 

both the licensees and NRC staff, in most cases without commensurate safety benefits. 

The fire protection inspections continue to reveal additional findings, many of which 

have limited safety benefit, where licensees do not meet some of the deterministic 

requirements. Therefore, resolving these issues provides a very limited increase in safety 

while continuing to pose undue resource burdens on the staff and the licensees, and 

simultaneously diverting limited licensee and NRC staff resources from more safety 

significant issues. 

QUESTION 2. The NRC advisory committee on reactor safeguards state that 

only a few nuclear plants have full scope fire risk assessments. 

(A) How many plants have this assessment? 

ANSWER: 

Performance of a full scope fire risk assessment is not a regulatory requirement. All 

operating reactors have performed evaluations of the risk associated with fires as a part of 

their response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, entitled "Individual Plant 

Examination for External Events." These assessments used conservative bounding 

assumptions in their analysis and identified the important factors that contributed to the 

risk imposed by fires. Therefore, even though these analyses did not constitute full scope 

risk assessments for most licensees, they were of sufficient quality to identify "risk 

outliers," i.e., instances where the relative risks were high. 
66

The NRC has not collected information on the exact number of plants that possess a 

full scope fire risk assessment. However, to date 40 nuclear units have informed the 

NRC that they intend to adopt the performance-based fire protection rule, 10 CFR 

50.48(c), "National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805." This 

performance-based rule is commonly referred to as the "NFPA 805 Rule," since it 

endorses a standard developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) with a 

few exceptions. Most licensees who have committed to adopt the NFPA 805 Rule, 

committed to perform Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs). 

 

(B) Does your ROP contain a requirement for nuclear reactors 

to have this assessment? 

ANSWER: 

At the present time, there are no NRC requirements for nuclear reactors to have a 

full scope risk assessment and NRC requirements do not require a fire PRA specifically. 

The ROP defines the NRC’s inspection and assessment activities for nuclear reactors and 

does not impose regulatory requirements. 

(C) (If no) Why not, especially since the advisory committee 

says it is absolutely necessary as plants move to the risk-informed 

approach? 

ANSWER: 

The advisory committee’s statement pertains only to those licensees who voluntarily 

adopt risk-informed alternatives to the current regulations, specifically, in reference to 

those licensees who plan to adopt the NFPA 805 rule (10 CFR 50.48(c)). 

Licensees that adopt the performance-based alternative to the current deterministic 

requirement must use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools to justify changes to the 

plant. The NRC staff plans to review the fire risk assessment capability of licensees that 

plan to adopt a performance-based alternative to the deterministic regulations, prior to 

granting their request to adopt a risk-informed, performance-based licensing basis for fire 

protection. 

QUESTION 3. It is my understanding that the NRC sent a generic letter to 

nuclear plants that use Hemyc and MT fire barrier systems to take 

corrective actions. 

(A) What is the status of compliance with this letter? 

ANSWER: 

The NRC issued Generic Letter 2006-03, entitled "Potentially Nonconforming 

Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Configurations," on April 10, 2006. This Generic Letter 

requested licensees to inform the NRC whether they are in compliance with NRC’s fire 

protection regulation 10 CFR 50.48, in light of the new information developed by the 

NRC during testing on the Hemyc and MT fire barrier systems’ performance. 

Under 10 CFR 50.54(f), all licensees are required to respond to NRC’s request for 

information communicated via this Generic Letter. All licensees have complied with the 

requirement to respond to Generic Letter 2006-03. 
67

(B) What penalties are available if they do not comply? 

ANSWER: 

All plants have complied with the NRC requirements to provide responses per 10 

CFR 50.54(f), to the Generic Letter. 

Most licensees have informed us that they are in compliance with 10 CFR 50.48, 

primarily because they do not use Hemyc or MT fire barriers in their facilities. However, 

some plants have declared their Hemyc and MT fire barriers inoperable in light of the 

new testing data developed by the NRC regarding the performance of these fire barriers. 

Licensees may continue to operate in certain instances where noncompliances are 

discovered while such noncompliance are being corrected, as long as the NRC has 

reasonable assurance that the noncompliance conditions have minimal effects on public 

health and safety. Since all plants with potential noncompliances have implemented 

compensatory measures, and informed us of their plans to take corrective actions, the 

NRC concluded that the plants may continue to operate until they re-establish 

compliance. 

As such, currently the NRC has no plans to take any enforcement action. The NRC 

plans to use its periodic fire protection inspections to ensure that the licensees are 

implementing and following their corrective actions. 

(C) What is the likelihood of a fire causing a nuclear plant to 

meltdown or causing core damage if the plants are using these 

inadequate fire barrier systems? 

ANSWER: 

 The NRC staff has assessed the likelihood of a fire causing a nuclear plant meltdown 

or core damage of plants using these fire barrier systems and determined that the 

likelihood is low for several reasons. 

 As a 1-hour rated fire barrier, Hemyc is installed only in fire areas where fire 

detection and automatic fire suppression systems are present, or in fire areas where the 

licensee has previously obtained an exemption from the automatic fire suppression 

requirement because such suppression was deemed unnecessary (for example in areas 

where there is a negligible potential for fire due to low or no combustible material or 

ignition sources). The Hemyc fire barrier systems used at these plants constitute just one 

of several layers of defense-in-depth (fire detection, manual suppression, and automatic 

suppression) designed to protect the plant in the event of a fire. 

 For MT fire barrier systems, which consist of several layers of materials, the 

outermost being Hemyc, the NRC staff also concluded that the risk was low. In 

confirmatory fire testing, the MT fire barrier system demonstrated nearly an hour of 

protection in every test run. As such, the NRC concluded that the MT fire barrier 

systems would provide sufficient time for a fire brigade to reach and actively suppress the 

fire before cable damage is expected to occur. 

 The NRC’s tests exposed the Hemyc and MT material to higher temperatures and 

more rapid temperature increases than are expected in fire areas where Hemyc and MT 

fire barrier systems are installed. The NRC considered the safety margins between the 

test and actual conditions to be sufficient such that the installed Hemyc and MT fire 

barrier systems are unlikely to be challenged at a level where failure sufficient to cause 

cable damage would occur. 

QUESTION 4. What collaborations has NRC had with other countries in 

developing an adequate fire risk assessment of nuclear plants? 
68

ANSWER: 

 The NRC is actively involved in a number of national and international fire risk 

assessment programs. On the international level, the NRC is a member of the 

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy 

Agency (NEA) Fire Incident Records Exchange Project. In this project, the NRC is 

partnering with members from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, 

Czech Republic, Netherlands and Switzerland to develop an international nuclear power 

plant (NPP) fire event data base. This data base will provide insights on fire frequency 

information and insights regarding international NPP fire experience. 

 The NRC is an active member of the International Collaborative Fire Model Project 

(ICFMP) with members from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Finland. The 

goal of this working group is to exercise the current fire modeling tools and determine 

their merit for use when performing risk assessment of NPPs. The NRC, in collaboration 

with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) issued the draft joint report NUREG1824, “Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant 

Applications,” in January 2006 for public comment. NUREG-1824 utilized experimental 

data from this international project to perform the analysis of the fire models. The final 

report, NUREG-1824 will be issued early in 2007. 

 The NRC, again in collaboration with EPRI, issued NUREG/CR-6850, “Fire PRA 

Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities” in September 2005. This report documents 

state-of-the-art methods, tools, and data for the conduct of a fire PRA in a commercial 

NPP. The NRC and EPRI have held two public workshops to date on this report. In 

addition to the US stakeholders and NRC inspectors, the workshops have been attended 

by foreign regulators and licensees from the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, 

Japan, Korea, Finland and Sweden. Feedback from these international attendees indicate 

that the joint NRC/EPRI program is currently the most advanced NPP Fire PRA program 

available today. 

 While the Fire-Induced Damage to Electrical Cables and Circuits - Working Group 

was active, the NRC along with representatives from Germany, France, and Canada 

worked together to improve the technical basis for understanding the damage thresholds, 

damage mechanisms, failure modes, and consequences of fire-induced cable failures in 

NPPs, and supported the development of improved methods, tools, and data for 

predicting fire-induced circuit responses. 

 The NRC has met twice this year with Germany, France, and Belgium, to discuss 

conducting a joint research program to better understand electrical failures and resulting 

explosions and fires from High Energy Arcing Faults. These events have happened 

world wide and have the potential to pose a significant challenge to a NPP. Meetings are 

being scheduled for 2007 to finalize a work plan to start this research. The NRC 

continues to collaborate with national and international partners in the area of fire risk 

assessment and actively seeks partners when projects can be mutually beneficial to all 

parties. 

QUESTION 5. What type of risk (low, moderate, high) does your ROP assign to 

inadequate medium voltage switch gear? (This type of gear can 

affect a significant electrical fault and cause fires.) 

ANSWER: 

 The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) does not assign a universal risk 

characterization for medium voltage switchgear. The relative risk importance of this 

class of switchgear depends on the specific type of power plant, the location of the 

switchgear within the plant, the proximity to other plant equipment and electrical cables, 

and/or the specific electrical loads being serviced by the switchgear. The ROP contains a 
69

Significance Determination Process (SDP) that provides a means for the NRC to 

characterize the risk significance of licensee performance deficiencies including those 

that may result in deficient medium voltage switchgear. The SDP uses probabilistic risk 

assessment methods and qualitative methods to characterize the potential increase in 

plant risk using risk metrics such as change in core damage frequency (CDF). 

 For switchgear failures that do not represent a potential fire issue (e.g., an electrical 

breaker that prematurely opens and de-energizes equipment), the SDP under NRC 

Manual Chapter 609, contains general guidance on how to assess the importance of the 

issue. In these types of cases, the risk significance depends on factors such as a 

switchgear defect indirectly causing a reactor shutdown, unavailability of the service 

loads affected by the switchgear in question, and in some cases the length of time the 

condition existed. 

 Additionally, energized medium voltage switchgear in itself creates a potential fire 

hazard. NRC regulations require fire protection from these hazards when such 

switchgear is located in important locations within nuclear power stations. For inspection 

findings related to licensees’ failure to meet federal fire protection requirements, the SDP 

contains a dedicated section (NRC Manual Chapter 609, Appendix F) to assess the risk 

significance of the condition including technical guidance on the treatment of medium 

voltage switchgear. Risk analysis for such cases are often complex since issues involve 

numerous variables such as fire growth modeling, time to fire damage of any adjacent 

equipment/cables, automatic fire suppression capability, fire brigade response, and plant 

operator’s response to place the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. However, it 

should be noted that in the five years of the ROP, no fire protection issues have resulted 

in risk greater than the low-to-moderate risk range. Issues that are of low-to-moderate 

risk are called >White’ findings under the color scheme used in the SDP and is the 

second lowest color in the hierarchy of significance. 
70

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE STEARNS: 

QUESTION 1. Would you please explain how the new ROP system will improve 

the regulatory review process for approving new nuclear power 

plants? 

ANSWER: 

 The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) is focused on operating power plants. The 

ROP allows the NRC staff to evaluate and respond consistently to licensee performance 

issues by using a series of performance indicators and NRC inspections. Both the 

performance indicators and inspections are focused on operating reactors. As a result, the 

ROP has no role in the licensing review and approval of a new nuclear plant. However, 

once licensed, constructed, and operating, each new plant will be monitored using the 

tools of the ROP, including the performance indicators and NRC inspections. 

QUESTION 2. With respect to "risk-informed" regulations, how does their 

oversight fit into the new reactor oversight process? Do you see 

the two efforts complimenting each other? Are you happy with 

the progress that you are making in this regard? 

ANSWER: 

 The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) assesses, through scrutiny of carefully 

selected samples, whether licensee activities are properly conducted; whether licensees 

comply with NRC regulations; and whether plant equipment is properly maintained to 

ensure safe operations. Because there are many aspects of facility operation and 

maintenance, the NRC inspects utility programs and processes on a risk-informed 

sampling basis to obtain representative information. As regulations change and as we 

pursue other risk-informed initiatives, we evaluate the ROP to determine if changes need 

to be made in the oversight of licensee activities. Therefore, the ROP and the riskinformed regulatory changes will complement each other. 

 The NRC has made significant progress in the area of risk-informing its activities 

over the last several years. Nevertheless, a significant amount of work remains. NRC 

continues to pursue a number of risk-informed initiatives, including rulemaking and 

licensing actions. At the same time, the industry and the NRC are working to develop 

appropriate standards for the probabilistic risk analysis tools needed to support these 

activities. NRC is continuing to work to expand its capabilities in this area. 

QUESTION 3. I understand that the reactor safety aspects of the ROP have a 

reasonably objective set of criteria for determining safety impacts 

and associated colors. However, it appears that the non-reactor 

safety aspects (Emergency Preparedness, Radiation Protection 

and Security) are far more subjective, and can generate results 

that don't make sense. This can confuse the public and may 

contradict your own assessment. What steps is the NRC taking to 

improve the objectivity of these non-reactor aspects, to ensure 

findings are colored more consistently with the reactor findings? 

ANSWER: 

 The creation of significance determination processes (SDPs) across all seven 

cornerstones of safety, was a significant shift toward improved objectivity and 

transparency from our previous reactor assessment process. The SDPs for non-reactor 
71

safety cornerstones, such as Emergency Preparedness (EP), Radiation Protection, and 

Security, are not able to utilize probabilistic tools as those SDPs associated with reactor 

safety systems do. In establishing the SDPs for the non-reactor safety areas, it was not 

possible to consistently relate deficient performance to quantitative risk measures such as 

core damage frequency or large early release frequency. From the start the staff has 

worked with industry and public stakeholder input, to the extent possible, to define SDPs 

in the non-reactor safety areas that result in agency responses that are considered 

appropriate for a range of performance problems. We continue to meet monthly with 

industry in public meetings to discuss SDP issues and potential improvements. 

 For example, the EP cornerstone risk-informs the significance of a finding by 

reflecting the potential impact on public health and safety. A group of emergency 

preparedness subject matter experts, including NRC staff, industry stakeholders and 

members of the public, identified the most risk significant aspects of emergency planning 

as (1) emergency classification; (2) notification of offsite response organizations; and (3) 

public protective action recommendations. Identification of the most risk significant EP 

aspects established a reasonably defined hierarchy of the significance of emergency 

planning findings consistent with the risk-informed approach utilized by the reactor 

safety aspects of the reactor oversight process. 

 With respect to the Security cornerstone, the NRC reviews all security-related 

inspection findings before they are included in an NRC inspection report. The review is 

conducted by an agency-wide panel that is headed by a manager from the Office of 

Nuclear Security and Incident Response. The Security Findings Review Panel assures 

consistency between all licensees and all four NRC regions, and helps assure that the 

significance of the security findings are consistent, objective, and predictable. In 

addition, findings that potentially could be greater than very low security significance are 

forwarded to an NRC enforcement panel named the Significance and Enforcement 

Review Panel to reach an agency determination of significance. 

 The agency issued its current physical protection significance determination process 

(PPSDP) for security in July 2004. The PPSDP provides for consistent, objective, and 

predictable results. Since then, the NRC staff has been continuously evaluating and 

monitoring the results of the PPSDP, further ensuring an objective and consistent 

approach. The end result of this evaluation will be to make any noted improvements to 

the SDP for security. 
72

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE SCHAKOWSKY:

QUESTION 1. The near-accident at FirstEnergy's Davis-Besse plant in 2002 was 

ranked as the fifth most dangerous incident in the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission's (NRC) history. Boric acid leaks had 

put a very large hole in the reactor vessel's head. This occurred 

under the Reactor Oversight Process reviewed in the recent 

hearing. The Union of Concerned Scientists and the Nuclear 

Information and Resource Service said this failure occurred 

because NRC headquarters staff did not back up the inspection 

staff who had proposed a mandatory shutdown because 

FirstEnergy refused to shut down voluntarily as the owners of all 

of the similar reactors had done. The NRC Inspector General 

found that the NRC put the financial impact of the shutdown on 

FirstEnergy above public safety. What has the NRC done to 

change those priorities? 

ANSWER: 

 Assuring the public health and safety is and always has been the highest priority of 

the NRC. The NRC Chairman’s response to the Inspector General and the NRR 

Director’s response to David Lochbaum corrected factual inaccuracies in the referenced 

documents. 

 In his January 8, 2003, response to the NRC Inspector General, then NRC Chairman 

Richard Meserve stated: 

“There are several significant failings in the report. First, and perhaps most 

important, the report incorrectly indicates that the decision to allow the brief period 

of continued operation was driven in large part by the interest in reducing the 

financial impact on the licensee. The underlying inspections of reactor pressure 

vessel heads at all pressurized water reactors were undertaken as a result of staff 

safety concerns about circumferential nozzle cracking. And, as your report has 

found, the NRC staff allowed the Davis-Besse reactor to continue to operate only 

after the relevant expert staff reached unanimous agreement that there was no 

significant safety concern relating to nozzle cracks that would preclude the brief 

period of extended operation. It is a significant failing that the report does not 

acknowledge this fact in its findings. Assuring the public health and safety is the 

highest priority of the NRC, and we believe that the staff’s action was consistent with 

this requirement.” 

Similarly, in a letter dated December 13, 2002, Samuel Collins, Director of NRR, 

responded to the assertions in David Lochbaum’s letter dated October 14, 2002, as 

follows: 

“With regard to the NRC’s regulatory activities, contrary to your assertion in Item 4 

of your letter, NRC management did not overrule safety concerns of the staff in 

allowing Davis-Besse to operate until February 16, 2002. Rather, the technical staff 

recommended to management its conclusion, based on risk-informed decision 

making criteria and the information available to the staff, that the plant could operate 

until February 16, 2002, without undue risk to the public health and safety. In 

addition, the 

NRC sent Davis-Besse a closeout letter in response to Bulletin 2001-01. It provides 

much greater detail regarding the staff’s decision making process.” 
73

QUESTION 2. Have any changes been made in procedures used by the NRC 

headquarters staff when considering a shutdown recommendation 

from the inspection staff? Because any unplanned shutdowns will 

have a significant financial impact on the licensee, is it now NRC 

policy that public safety takes precedence over financial impact in 

a situation such as Davis-Besse? 

ANSWER: 

 Assuring the public health and safety is and always will be the highest priority of the 

NRC. Following the Davis-Besse reactor vessel corrosion issue, the NRC Executive 

Director for Operations chartered a Lessons Learned Task Force which was charged with 

conducting an evaluation of NRC’s regulatory processes. Significant improvements have 

been made to NRC processes and procedures as a result of implementing the 

recommendations made by the task force. These improvements include a more proactive 

program for evaluating materials degradation; a revitalized and robust assessment of 

operational experience; enhanced internal and external communications and 

communications protocols; specific and detailed inspections program enhancements 

including resident inspector staffing; and the maintenance of a safety-conscious attitude 

by the NRC staff. 

 As an example, a new office instruction was issued which gives guidance on the 

performance and documentation of an analysis conducted to determine the appropriate 

regulatory response to an emerging issue. The guidance builds on the principles of riskinformed regulation presented in Regulatory Guide 1.174, “An Approach for Using 

Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to 

the Licensing Basis,” and includes consideration of conformance with regulations, 

maintenance of defense-in-depth and safety margins, performance monitoring, as well as 

risk considerations. This office instruction is intended to apply when there is not an 

otherwise applicable NRC decision-making process. 

QUESTION 3. In the Davis-Besse incident, the concerns of the regulatory 

division staff over the effectiveness of FirstEnergy's mitigation 

steps used to justify keeping the nuclear plant open beyond the 

proposed shutdown date were never documented. Could that 

happen today, or does the NRC have better procedures to track 

and document its discussions and decisions? 

ANSWER: 

 As a result of the examination of the Davis-Besse reactor vessel corrosion incident, 

and the report generated by the Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force, NRC has made 

several key changes to how it communicates both internally and externally. There has 

been substantial advancement in the use of information technology in making operating 

experience available to internal users and members of the public. There is a new 

database for managing all reported events, as well as a new operating experience 

information gateway that consolidates a large collection of individual databases and Web 

sources of information onto a single Web access page. The NRC Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation has a new communication tool to promptly notify NRC staff of 

developing operating experience in their areas of expertise. Users may also use this tool 

to examine recent or developing operating experience in their respective areas. The NRC 

issued improved guidance in developing generic communications, establishing criteria for 

acceptable responses from licensees, properly documenting evaluations of licensee 

responses, and performing follow-up verification of licensee information. 
74

 As an example, NRC developed Office Instruction LIC-504, “Integrated RiskInformed Decision-Making Process for Emergent Issues,” which provides a number of 

templates for documenting both the analysis supporting a decision, and the decision itself. 

In documenting the decision, the office instruction stresses the importance of identifying 

the driving factors behind the decision, the limitations of and uncertainties associated 

with the supporting analyses, and providing the rationale behind the decision. LIC-504 

has been issued for use and is expected to be invoked whenever there is not an otherwise 

applicable NRC decision-making process for dealing with a licensing issue. 

QUESTION 4. In Davis-Besse, it was clearly a situation where the licensee that 

protested got the NRC to back off. Licensees that did the right 

thing and closed down their plants in a timely manner were 

penalized. Unfortunately, Davis-Besse had the most serious 

corrosion and cracking problems of all of the reactors. What has 

the NRC done to prevent that from happening again? 

ANSWER: 

 As indicated in the response to Question 1, the NRC staff made the decision based on 

a determination that there was no significant safety concern associated with the brief 

period of extended operation. This risk-informed decision took into account 

commitments by the licensee to reduce the proposed period of operation by half and to 

institute additional compensatory measures. The responses to Questions 2 and 3 detail 

the additional procedural guidance provided to the staff since the event. 

QUESTION 5. Critics have stated that the NRC's fine of $4.5 million against 

FirstEnergy, the owner of Davis-Besse, was "paltry" and a "slap 

on the wrist" for an incident in which the NRC later calculated the 

odds of a nuclear meltdown were 6 in 1,000. What are your 

views on the size of the fine? 

ANSWER: 

 The total civil penalty was $5.45 million, and represented the largest ever issued by 

NRC. When determining the amount of the civil penalty, NRC considered several factors 

which included risk, safety significance and the economic benefit that FENOC gained by 

operating Davis-Besse with primary coolant pressure boundary leakage, a Technical 

Specification (TS) violation. In addition to the civil penalty, FENOC experienced 

substantial adverse economic impact resulting from their extended outage to replace the 

reactor pressure vessel head and to make improvements to satisfy NRC requirements and 

concerns. NRC also referred potential criminal aspects of the case to the Department of 

Justice which resulted in FENOC’s agreement to pay $28 million to defer prosecution. 

 The NRC does not consider its approach in assessing civil penalties to be punitive, 

but rather a deterrence to emphasize the importance of compliance with requirements and 

to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations. 

Therefore, the NRC determined that a civil penalty of $5,000,000 was appropriate for the 

violation of the Davis-Besse TS pressure boundary leakage requirement. The TS 

violation was processed under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and determined to be 

a RED finding (a finding of high safety significance) under the Significance 

Determination Process (SDP.) In addition to the TS related violation, the NRC issued 

civil penalties totaling $450,000 for four willful violations of NRC requirements 

associated with corrective actions, adherence to procedures, and incomplete and 

inaccurate information. 
75

 This was the first time the Commission exercised its discretion to issue a civil penalty 

for a violation processed under the ROP and given a color under the SDP. While a civil 

penalty is not usually considered for issues evaluated under the SDP, absent actual 

consequences, the NRC considered this RED finding to be of significant regulatory 

concern and, accordingly, issued the civil penalty. 

QUESTION 6. In order to have an effective oversight program, the NRC needs 

adequate staffing and resources. The Davis-Besse Lessons 

Learned Task Force concluded that staffing and resource issues 

"challenged the NRC's ability to provide effective regulatory 

oversight" at Davis-Besse. Has that problem been resolved? Does 

the NRC have more budget and resources for reactor inspections 

than it did in 2000 and 2001? 

ANSWER: 

 The resource issues that challenged the NRC’s ability to provide effective regulatory 

oversight at Davis-Besse have been resolved and the NRC has more resources for reactor 

inspections. 

 Reactor inspection resources were increased in FY 2004 as a direct result of the 

Davis-Besse events. Resources for supplemental and reactive inspections were increased 

by approximately 15 full time equivalents (FTE) to provide for inspection of a plant 

under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a 

Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns, for 

follow-up activities to verify licensees’ improvement plans pursuant to Inspection 

Procedures 95002 and 95003, and for reactor pressure vessel head inspections. There is 

also increased interaction between headquarters staff and regional inspection staff during 

monthly conference calls and periodic workshops. 

 Additionally, in 2003, the staff revised the resident inspector policy to allow early 

assignment of new resident and senior resident inspectors to a site. The policy allows the 

regional administrator to assign a permanent resident inspector up to 12 months before 

the planned departure of the incumbent resident inspector. Similarly, the regional 

administrator can assign senior resident inspectors up to six months before the planned 

departure of the incumbent. Regional management also implemented actions to reduce 

inspector vacancies through active recruiting; training new hires; and over-hiring in 

anticipation of retirements, attrition, and staff movement. 

 Resources for reactor safety and security inspections increased approximately 15 

percent, by 110 FTE, between FY 2001 and FY 2007. 

QUESTION 7. In May of this year, you were recently quoted in Nucleonics 

Week as asking if Davis-Besse could be relieved of its 

independent assessment obligations at an earlier date than 

prescribed. Can you explain your reasoning in light of the fact 

that this company is still under criminal investigation, just paid a 

$28 million fine, and had two former employees indicted for lying 

to the NRC? 

ANSWER: 

 To be more specific, Commissioner McGaffigan noted during the NRC’s May 16, 

2006, Agency Action Review Meeting that perhaps the NRC should consider whether 

some of the four independent assessment requirements stated in the confirmatory order 

could be suspended, particularly in those areas in which Davis-Besse seems to be doing 
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very well. The order states that the regional administrator can suspend all or part of the 

requirements for the independent assessments based on good cause. Commissioner 

McGaffigan was suggesting that perhaps the resources could be better spent in other 

areas. Commissioner McGaffigan mentioned that at least two of the independent 

assessments need to continue and should not be considered for suspension, specifically 

the safety culture and corrective action program assessments. 

 If the licensee believes that any or all independent assessments are no longer 

necessary based on acceptable performance in those areas, it can formally request relief 

from the requirements. The staff specifically evaluates the progress of the order 

requirements on at least a semiannual basis during the mid-cycle and end-of-cycle 

performance meetings. In determining whether to suspend all or part of the four 

independent assessment requirements prior to the 5-year expiration date, the staff needs 

to consider the licensee’s position as to why these additional assessments are not 

necessary, the results of the independent assessments, the robustness of the licensee’s 

programs in these areas, and whether those areas and the specific issues are adequately 

covered by the NRC’s baseline inspection program. Any agency decision to relieve the 

licensee of its independent assessment obligations ahead of the 5-year time-frame 

prescribed in the order will only be achieved through thorough analysis and a justified 

rationale. 

QUESTION 8. One of the great failings at Davis-Besse was the lack of a 

corporate "safety culture." Next month - more than four years 

after the discovery of the corroded reactor vessel head at 

Davis-Besse - the NRC will put in place a process to evaluate a 

licensee's safety culture. Why did it take so long? 

ANSWER: 

 The time required to implement the safety culture enhancements to the NRC 

processes was due to a number of factors, including that the staff sought to develop an 

approach to assess safety culture in an objective manner by (1) staying within the Reactor 

Oversight Process (ROP) framework, (2) being guided by the principles of the ROP (i.e., 

being objective, transparent, understandable, predictable, performance-based and riskinformed) (3) integrating information from inspections to develop an objective 

conclusion about licensee safety performance, and (4) seeking external stakeholder input 

throughout the development process. The staff also sought and received direction at a 

number of points from the Commission on safety culture initiative policy issues. Safety 

culture, as a new area of emphasis, necessitated that the staff expend considerable 

resources to develop an appropriate process. Finally, the analysis of safety culture is very 

fact dependent and is subject to the possibility of subjective outcomes if it is not correctly 

developed and applied. Given the difficulty of this area, the Commission wanted to take 

the time necessary to get it right. The following is a summary of some of the NRC 

activities over the past four years. 

Summary of Activities: 

The degraded reactor vessel head problem was identified by the licensee at DavisBesse on March 5, 2002. The NRC initiated a number of responses to the problem, one 

of which was the formation of the Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force. The 

purpose of the task force was to conduct an independent evaluation of the NRC's 

regulatory processes related to assuring reactor pressure vessel head integrity and to 

identify and recommend areas of improvement for the NRC. The final task force report 

was issued on September 20, 2002. While the recommendations spanned a wide crosssection of NRC activities, further information is provided below to describe the 
77

intervening actions (between 2002 and 2005) that the NRC took with respect to safety 

culture. 

Several of the task force recommendations related to enhancing the reactor oversight 

process. The staff initiated a number of safety culture-related improvements in the 

inspection program during the period 2002-2005 including: 

1) Providing required web-based training on the Columbia space shuttle 

accident for inspectors and their managers on having a more questioning 

attitude in the conduct of inspections toward safety and the potential 

consequences when an organization's questioning attitude (a safety culture 

aspect) is lost or compromised. 

2) Modifying inspection procedures to include additional inspection 

requirements to more closely inspect licensee corrective action programs (a 

safety culture component) to be alert for conditions such as repetitive 

equipment failures or human performance issues that might warrant additional 

follow-up inspections. 

3) Modifying an inspection procedure to more rigorously screen and review 

licensee corrective action program (a safety culture component) deficiency 

information using a semi-annual review to identify trends that might indicate 

the existence of a more significant safety issue. 

4) Providing more specific guidance for handling inspection issues in the areas 

of human performance and problem identification and resolution (which are 

related to a number of safety culture components). These efforts were designed 

to provide a more direct way to assess and react to licensee performance 

weaknesses in these areas. 

 With regard to a licensee’s Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE), the staff 

proposed some options and recommendations to the Commission and received further 

Commission direction on how to proceed. A public workshop was held in 2004 to 

discuss the development of a Regulatory Issues Summary (RIS) which would provide 

guidance to the industry on establishing and maintaining a SCWE. Following the public 

meeting, a draft RIS was published in the Federal Register for public comment. The RIS, 

entitled "Establishing and Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment," was 

issued on August 25, 2005. The RIS provided guidance and best practices for licensees 

to establish and maintain an effective SCWE. 

 In support of Commission direction provided in 2004, the NRC staff formed a Safety 

Culture Steering Committee, Working Group, and Support Team to develop further 

improvements to the ROP relative to safety culture oversight. Between November 2005 

and February 2006 frequent public meetings were held with external stakeholders where 

the staff, with the participation of stakeholders, developed an approach to further enhance 

the ROP to address safety culture. The enhanced ROP inspection documents were 

revised based on this approach and were then provided for further public review and 

comment. The NRC staff evaluated the public comments and finalized the ROP 

inspection procedures and other ROP documents. The enhanced ROP provides the NRC 

with a range of regulatory responses to licensee safety culture issues that include 

requesting the licensee perform an assessment of its safety culture and for the NRC to 

assess independently the licensee’s safety culture. The staff developed and provided 

training for inspectors and their managers on safety culture and on the changes to the 

ROP prior to implementing the revised ROP inspection protocols. The training included 

focused computer-based training as well as in-depth classroom type training. 
78

 All but one of the revised ROP inspection protocols were issued on June 22, 2006, 

and were implemented on July 1, 2006. The remaining revised inspection procedure is 

expected to be issued in August 2006. The staff is also developing a RIS to provide 

operating reactor licensees information on the changes made to the ROP to improve 

oversight of safety culture. The RIS is expected to be issued shortly. 

 In summary, the staff has expended considerable resources since the Davis-Besse 

head incident to make stepwise improvements in the ROP inspection and assessment 

programs. The staff will assess the safety culture improvements as part of its annual ROP 

self-assessment, to ensure that they are meeting the goals of the ROP and the 

Commission direction. 

QUESTION 9. Three years ago, the NRC Inspector General did a survey of 1,525 

NRC employees and found that only half of them felt it was safe 

to speak up at the NRC. Twenty-four percent did not believe that 

the NRC's commitment to public safety was apparent in what the 

agency did on a day-to-day basis. Has the NRC made any 

changes to improve its own "safety culture"? 

ANSWER: 

 Several press reports following the NRC Inspector General’s 2002 safety culture and 

climate survey report highlighted the survey’s results in a single category, noting that 

nearly a third of the agency staff question the agency’s commitment to safety. However, 

it is important to note that employee attitudes about the effectiveness of the NRC as a 

regulatory entity were covered by several other categories in the survey. As the report 

notes, the results in these categories, “in whole, demonstrate a workforce that has become 

much more positive about the NRC as an organization.” 

 In addition, the NRC has taken a number of steps to improve its safety culture since 

2002. This includes an increased emphasis on better face-to-face and employee to 

supervisor communications, development of better senior management communication 

tools to reinforce the agency’s safety consciousness, and enhanced leadership training. 

The agency also reinforced the paramount importance of the NRC’s safety mission 

relative to its other strategic goals in a number of communication vehicles. 

 The agency also revamped its Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) program, which 

encourages employees to raise any concerns and express differing views on any issue 

with their supervisors on a regular basis. In 2005, the staff participated in another safety 

culture and climate survey. On average, the NRC improved its scores in virtually every 

category from the 2002 scores and 66% of the staff indicated they felt it was “safe to 

speak up” in the NRC. The contractor who conducted the survey noted that it is rare, in 

their experience, that scores improve to this degree between survey iterations. In their 

evaluation report, they noted that “Efforts to follow-up on the results from 2002 appear 

to be successful and should be implemented once again in 2005.” The contractor also 

noted that in the 2005 survey, the results indicated that employees are encouraged to 

communicate ideas to improve nuclear safety, and the scores for continuous commitment 

to public safety were greatly improved. 

 The agency recognizes that there is always room for improvement. In response to 

2005 survey results, to foster continuous improvement in the agency’s safety culture, 

individual offices and regions are developing action plans to address specific 

improvement areas. In addition, the agency has developed a non-concurrence policy, so 

that individuals who may not agree with a staff proposal may voice their opinion in a 

more informal manner than is the case with the DPO program. 
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QUESTION 10. Early this year, NRC staff raised questions about the effectiveness 

of the performance indicator program, saying that if all the results 

were "green," perhaps it didn't really measure anything of value. 

What is your position on the performance indicator program? 

ANSWER: 

 The performance indicator (PI) program continues to provide the NRC with objective 

indications regarding plant performance, and it has met the goals and intended outcomes 

of the ROP. The PI program has generally fulfilled the regulatory principles of being 

objective, risk-informed, understandable, and predictable, and it has accomplished the 

three applicable NRC strategic goals (ensuring safety, openness, and effectiveness). 

 The acceptable “green” performance threshold was established based on mid-1990's 

industry performance. However, the staff and some public stakeholders remain 

concerned with the capability of the current PIs to contribute to the identification of 

declining performance. As a result, the staff is working with industry to revise several 

PIs (changes to the voluntary program require agreement by industry). A new riskinformed PI, mitigating system performance index (MSPI), has been developed and is in 

the initial stages of implementation. Also, the NRC/industry task group is working on 

another indicator for monitoring complicated rapid automatic or manual reactor 

shutdowns. The staff believes that this new PI has the potential to be a leading indicator 

of declining performance in that a plant that has a history of complicated scrams may be 

more likely to have a risk-significant scram. The staff plans to continue to work with the 

industry to revise and/or introduce other PIs to improve the program’s effectiveness in 

contributing to the identification of declining performance. 

QUESTION 11. Initially NRC staff estimated that about 5 percent of the findings 

under the Reactor Oversight Process would be greater than green. 

But less than 1 percent have fallen into that category. Does that 

mean all the reactors are safer than they were five years ago, or 

are the findings not measuring the right safety indicators? 

ANSWER: 

 Every year the staff provides an assessment of the reactor oversight process (ROP) 

and the status of the industry trends program to the Commission. As part of the ROP 

assessment, the staff reviews the inspection program and how those resources are being 

used. Based on the CY2005 review, the Commission believes the ROP program is 

monitoring the correct safety performance areas. 

 With respect to industry performance over the last 5 years, the number of plants in 

each of the ROP action matrix columns has remained relatively stable. The number of 

green findings has increased 34%, but the number of findings that are greater-than-green 

has decreased by 45% over the last 5 years. In addition, most of the industry trend 

program metrics have shown stable or improved trends over the last 5 years. Based on 

this information, the Commission believes the NRC has seen some improvement in 

licensee performance over the last 5 years. 

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