[Cite as State v. Chapman, 2014-Ohio-1059.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 99960 

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

LITRELL CHAPMAN

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-96-345621 

BEFORE: Jones, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Kilbane, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 20, 2014 
FOR APPELLANT 

Litrell Chapman, pro se 

Inmate #334-875 

Trumbull Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 901 

Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Litrell Chapman appeals the denial of his postconviction 

petition. We affirm. 

{¶2} In 1997, Chapman was convicted of aggravated murder and aggravated 

robbery in the death of Anthony Pauletta. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. 

State v. Chapman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73609, 2002-Ohio-5558 (“Chapman I”). He 

filed an application for reopening that this court denied. State v. Chapman, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 73609, 2003-Ohio-4163 (“Chapman II”). He also filed a writ of habeas 

corpus that was dismissed in federal court as being time-barred. Chapman v. Moore, 

N.D.Ohio No. 1:04 CV 0361, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33139 (Dec. 15, 2005). 

{¶3} In 2013, Chapman filed a postconviction petition that the state opposed. The 

trial court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. 

{¶4} Chapman filed a notice of appeal and raises seven assignments of error for 

our review. See appendix. The second through seventh assignments of error will be 

combined for discussion. 

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Chapman argues that he was denied the right 

to a direct appeal. Chapman claims that because his appeal in Chapman I was a delayed 

appeal, he was not afforded the right to directly appeal his conviction. 

{¶6} First, we note that this argument does not directly relate to the denial of 

Chapman’s postconviction petition; it relates to his first appeal, Chapman I. Therefore, 

we could summarily dismiss the argument. See App.R. 3(D) and 4. We use our 
discretion, however, to briefly address Chapman’s claim. 

{¶7} Chapman was sentenced on November 7, 1997. He filed his notice of 

appeal on December 1, 1997, but his appeal was initially dismissed because he failed to 

file the record. He filed an application for reopening on February 1, 2002, that this court 

converted into a delayed appeal. This court issued an order stating that his original 

appeal was “reinstated to active status” and assigned him appellate counsel. Chapman 

I, Motion No. 335518. His conviction was subsequently affirmed. 

{¶8} Chapman’s delayed appeal was a direct appeal of his conviction; therefore, 

his argument is without merit. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶9} In the second through seventh assignments of error, Chapman challenges the 

trial court’s denial of his postconviction petition. 

{¶10} R.C. 2953.21 through 2953.23 set forth the means by which a convicted 

defendant may seek to have the trial court’s judgment or sentence vacated or set aside 

pursuant to a petition for postconviction relief. A defendant’s petition for 

postconviction relief is a collateral civil attack on his or her criminal conviction. State v. 

Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 48. The statute affords 

relief from judgment where the petitioner’s rights in the proceedings that resulted in his or 

her conviction were denied to such an extent the conviction is rendered void or voidable 

under the Ohio or United States Constitutions. R.C. 2953.21(A); State v. Perry, 10 Ohio 

St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph four of the syllabus. 

{¶11} R.C. 2953.21 provides that a postconviction petition must be filed within 
180 days from the filing of the trial transcripts in the petitioner’s direct appeal. 

Chapman’s motion for reopening, that this court converted into a motion for delayed 

appeal, was filed in 2002; he filed his postconviction petition in 2013. Therefore, 

Chapman’s petition was untimely filed. 

{¶12} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), the trial court may entertain an untimely 

filed petition only if: (1) the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from discovering the 

facts on which the petition is predicated, or (2) the United States Supreme Court has 

recognized a new federal or state law that would apply retroactively to the petitioner and 

he or she asserts a claim based on that new right. 

{¶13} Chapman alleges he has newly discovered evidence, which is that his trial 

counsel should have been found to be ineffective for failing to fully investigate a state’s 

witness, Kenneth Gay. He also claims that because another state’s witness, David 

Lehecka, admitted he was drunk and did not see the shooter, Lehecka could not have 

reliably assisted the police in developing a composite sketch of the suspect. 

{¶14} But Chapman’s arguments are not new and certainly do not rely on newly 

discovered evidence or facts that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering before 

he filed his postconviction petition. In fact, his same arguments have already been 

rejected by this court. Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a valid, final judgment 

rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of 

the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” State v. 

Patrick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99418, 2013-Ohio-5020, ¶ 7, citing Grava v. Parkman 
Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). 

{¶15} In his application for reopening, Chapman raised the same arguments that he 

raised in his postconviction petition: (1) he was convicted based on hearsay evidence and 

perjured testimony; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not 

investigate Gay’s criminal record or challenge Lehecka’s credibility; and (3) the failure to 

disclose exculpatory evidence. 

{¶16} In Chapman II, this court dismissed Chapman’s arguments in toto, finding 

that neither appellate counsel nor trial counsel was ineffective. This court noted that 

trial counsel established that Gay was a drug dealer who had used crack cocaine just 

before the murder and Lehecka was drunk during the incident and could not identify the 

shooter. Id. at ¶ 20. As to Gay’s criminal history, this court noted that Chapman was 

merely speculating that Gay had a more extensive criminal history than what was testified 

to at trial. Id. at ¶ 19, fn. 3. 

{¶17} With regard to Chapman’s claim that the state failed to disclose exculpatory 

evidence, this court found: 

Chapman * * * argues prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose 

exculpatory evidence, i.e., that the two eyewitnesses at the time of the crime 

were under the influence of cocaine or alcohol and that one eyewitness 

seemed confused about the location of the crime and the identities of the 

shooter and the helper. The court has reviewed the portions of the record 

to which Chapman cites to support this argument and concludes that it is 

baseless. 

Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶18} Chapman’s “newly discovered evidence” used to support his postconviction 
petition is the same or similar to those claims that he made on appeal and in his 

application for reopening of his appeal. Therefore, his claims are barred by res judicata 

and the trial court did not err when it found that his postconviction petition was untimely 

filed. 

{¶19} Chapman also contends that the trial court erred when it denied his 

postconviction petition without issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. But a 

trial court need not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when it dismisses an 

untimely postconviction petition. State ex rel. Kimbrough v. Greene, 98 Ohio St.3d 116, 

2002-Ohio-7042, 781 N.E.2d 155, ¶ 6. This rule applies even when the defendant, as 

here, claims, under R.C. 2953.23, that he or she was unavoidably prevented from 

discovery of the facts to present his or her claim for postconviction relief. State ex rel. 

Reynolds v. Basinger, 99 Ohio St.3d 303, 2003-Ohio-3631, 791 N.E.2d 459, ¶ 7. 

{¶20} Finally, Chapman claims the trial court erred when it denied his motion 

without first holding an evidentiary hearing. But a court may dismiss a postconviction 

petition without an evidentiary hearing if the petition shows that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief. R.C. 2953.21(C); State v. Piasecki, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98952, 

2013-Ohio-1191, ¶ 21. Because Chapman’s petition was entirely without merit, the trial 

court did not err when it denied his petition without holding a hearing. 

{¶21} The assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶22} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR 

Appendix: Assignments of Error

I. The appellant was denied his constitutional right to due process and 

equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution when 

the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to re-enter its judgment 

granting the appellant a direct appeal as of right. 

II. The appellant was denied his constitutional right to due process and 

equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution when 

the trial court abused its discretion when it determined the appellant was 

untimely in presenting the new evidence to support his claim the trial court 

had a duty to inquire into his dissatisfaction of appointed counsel. 

III. The appellant was denied his constitutional right to due process and 

equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution when 

the trial court abused its discretion when it determined the appellant was 

untimely in discovering the newly discovered evidence pertaining to 

Kenneth Gay’s criminal history. Where the appellant made a specific 

request for it and was told if it existed, it would be disclosed. 

IV. The appellant was denied his constitutional right to due process and 
equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution when 

the trial court abused its discretion when it determined the appellant was 

untimely in discovering requested Brady (Kenneth Gay criminal history) 

information. The prosecution fail[ed] to disclose after the appellant made 

a specific request for it. 

V. The appellant was denied his constitutional right to due process and 

equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution when 

the trial court abused its discretion when it determined the appellant was 

untimely in discovering the evidence pertaining to the prosecution 

knowingly using false/perjury testimony and evidence where he showed a 

composite to the jury and stated it was the killer he knew this to be false. 

VI. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied the petitioner[’s] 

petition without [finding of facts] and conclusions of law denying the 

appellant his constitutional right to due process and equal protection of law 

guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 

VII. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant an 

evidentiary hearing denying the appellant due process and equal protection 

of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Article I Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.