667

Additional Views

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Carl Levin, 

Senator Daniel K. Akaka, Senator Th omas R. Carper, 

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and Senator Mark L. Pryor 

On White House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation 

With the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed Command

As it did with the investigation that preceded the issuing of this Report, the Committee has 

produced a thorough and thoughtful piece of work, which we are proud to have worked on 

and wholeheartedly support. Indeed, the conduct of this investigation and the draft ing of 

the Report should serve as a model for future such endeavors. In its comprehensiveness and 

non-partisanship, the Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee’s Hurricane Katrina investigation did exactly what the American people have a right to expect 

from a Congressional investigation. For that, we are very grateful to Chairman Collins and 

Ranking Member Lieberman, who have worked closely since they fi rst announced, last 

September, their intent to investigate the tragedy that Katrina – and the fl awed government 

response to it – wrought upon the citizens of the Gulf Coast.

We write separately here to express our additional views on three matters on which the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member were ultimately unable to reach a meeting of the 

minds: Th e role of the White House and the President in the events leading to and following 

last August’s storm; the level of cooperation provided by the Administration to this investigation; and the failure to establish a unifi ed command in Louisiana to respond to Katrina.

Th e Committee’s eff orts to understand the role the White House played in events leading 

up to and following the catastrophe were severely hindered by the White House’s failure to 

comply with Committee requests for information, documents, and interviews. As a result, 

we learned much too little about what the White House and the Executive Offi ce of the 

President were doing during the critical days before and aft er Katrina struck. 

Based on the information the Committee was able to obtain, we have reached the following 

conclusions: 

1. As the head of the federal government, the President has a unique responsibility to ensure government preparedness and response at critical times. For 

Hurricane Katrina, the President failed to provide critical leadership when it 

was most needed, and that contributed to a grossly ineff ective federal response 

to Hurricane Katrina.

2. Th e White House was aware long before Katrina struck that FEMA did not 

have the capability to handle a catastrophe, but failed to adequately address the 

critical shortcomings in preparedness.

3. Th e White House had been aware of the “New Orleans Scenario,” a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans. Despite this awareness, the White 

House failed to ensure that the federal government was prepared to respond to 

this catastrophic scenario. 

4. Despite the clear warnings before landfall that Katrina would be catastrophic, the President and the White House staff were not suffi ciently engaged and 

failed to initiate a suffi ciently strong and proactive response. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 
Additional Views

668

5. Although the President and the White House were following events aft er 

landfall, they seemed surprisingly detached until two days later, Wednesday, 

August 31, 2005. 

6. Aft er the hurricane, the White House continued to demonstrate a lack of 

understanding of the magnitude of the catastrophe.

7. Th e White House’s failure to cooperate with this Committee’s investigation 

wrongly deprived the Committee and the American people of the ability to assess a key aspect of the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Part I: The Role of the White House

As the head of the federal government, the President has a unique responsibility to ensure government preparedness and response at critical times. For 

Hurricane Katrina, the President failed to provide critical leadership when 

it was most needed, and that contributed to a grossly ineff ective federal 

response to Hurricane Katrina.

A catastrophic event in the United States requires clear, decisive, and constant Presidential leadership. 

Th e President is the head of the federal government. Th e Constitution vests executive 

power in him. He is personally charged with taking care that the nation’s laws are faithfully 

executed. And while he has the apparatus of the entire federal government to aid him in discharging his Constitutional functions, he is no titular head of government. To the contrary, 

only he – or those working in the White House on his behalf – has the authority to order 

all federal agencies to take action, to resolve disputes among participating federal agencies, 

and to ensure that the government as a whole functions as it should in a time of crisis and 

catastrophe.

He has another, more symbolic role, which is also very important. As Presidential scholar 

Clinton Rossiter has written, the President is “the one-man distillation of the American 

people.”1

 President Bush showed the power of that role in the wake of 9/11, when he made 

clear to the nation that he was in control of the response.

But in the events leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the President 

and his staff did not provide early, urgent, and strong public leadership, and the nation suffered. 

The White House was aware long before Katrina struck that FEMA did not have the 

capability to handle a catastrophe, but failed to adequately address the critical shortcomings in preparedness.

Th roughout his term as FEMA Director, Michael Brown sounded the alarm to White House 

offi cials about the degradation of FEMA’s capabilities and that the agency was not prepared 

to handle a catastrophe. For example, aft er the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia in 2004, 

Brown told President Bush that FEMA did not have the resources to respond to a catastrophe of that magnitude.2

Brown also repeatedly told then-White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief 

of Staff Joe Hagin, and then-Offi ce of Management and Budget Director Josh Bolten that 

FEMA did not have the capabilities to respond adequately to a catastrophe and sought additional resources.3

 Brown said that he told these offi cials several times that “We [FEMA] 

weren’t getting the money we needed; we weren’t getting the personnel that we needed, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

669

that DHS was – I don’t think I ever used with them the word emaciating us, but I described 

to them, you know, DHS was not really following the Homeland Security Act and giving 

[emergency preparedness and response] the muscle that it was supposed to have.”4

We do not know what the White House did with Brown’s requests, but we do know that 

FEMA was underfunded and unprepared heading into the 2005 hurricane season. As the 

chief executive of the federal government, the President bears responsibility for FEMA’s 

lack of preparedness.

Th e White House had been aware of the “New Orleans Scenario,” a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans. Despite this awareness, the White 

House failed to ensure that the federal government was prepared to respond 

to this catastrophic scenario. 

As discussed in the Committee’s report, the threat of a Category 3 storm to New Orleans 

was well known, and the White House was among those who clearly knew of it. In early 

2004, for example, Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor General John 

A. Gordon traveled to New Orleans to receive a briefi ng on the region’s catastrophic-hurricane planning eff orts. Th e briefi ng was comprehensive and detailed. Gen. Gordon learned 

about the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 hurricane striking New Orleans, and 

reported the information to the White House with a request for funding that resulted in the 

Hurricane Pam exercise, the fi rst inter-governmental exercise to test preparation for and 

response to such a contingency.5

Another White House aide, Janet Benini, Director of Response and Planning for the White 

House Homeland Security Council, attended the Hurricane Pam exercise (although she did 

not work at the White House during the Katrina response).6

 Benini also chaired the group 

that developed the National Planning Scenarios, a set of 15 plausible, high-consequence 

events used by the federal government to come up with preparedness goals and lists of 

emergency-response capabilities necessary for federal, state, and local responders. One of 

the scenarios was a hurricane hitting New Orleans.7

Both Benini and Kirstjen Nielsen, the Senior Director for Preparedness and Response at 

the White House Homeland Security Council, received an e-mail in February 2005 indicating that fl ooding in New Orleans “could cause similar devastation” as the tsunami did in 

Southeast Asia.8

When Katrina landed in the United States in August 2005, we found a federal government 

that was unprepared for a catastrophic hurricane. Th e White House’s failure to ensure such 

preparedness is therefore particularly profound, in light of its understanding of the catastrophic New Orleans scenario for close to two years before Katrina hit.

Despite the clear warnings before landfall that Katrina would be catastrophic, the President and the White House staff were not suffi ciently engaged and 

failed to initiate a suffi ciently strong and proactive response. 

Th e White House’s – and the President’s – knowledge of the risk of a massive storm to New 

Orleans became even more specifi c in the days leading up to Hurricane Katrina. Katrina 

was a lesser challenge to the nation’s emergency-management apparatus than the 9/11 attacks in one critical way: It was preceded by 72 hours of increasingly dire predictions. In the 

days before landfall, the White House received repeated warnings from top offi cials at the 

National Weather Service and the National Hurricane Center that Katrina’s impact would 

be catastrophic. FEMA and DHS’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 

echoed the alarm in direct messages to the White House, as did senior state offi cials.9
Additional Views

670

Saturday, August 27, 2005 (Two Days before Landfall)

Th ese warnings began on Saturday, August 27, 2005, two days before landfall. FEMA Director Brown says he spoke directly to President Bush, saying that Katrina could be catastrophic – “the big one” that meteorologists, emergency-management experts, and government 

offi cials had feared for years.10

On Saturday, White House staff in Crawford, Texas, where the President was vacationing, 

members of the White House Homeland Security Council, and other White House offi ces 

participated in a noon video teleconference call organized by FEMA. Th e potentially catastrophic nature of Katrina was discussed during this conversation as well.11 Brown said: 

I know I am preaching to the choir on this one, but I’ve learned over the past 

four and a half, fi ve years, to go with my gut on a lot of things, and I’ve got to 

tell you my gut hurts on this one. It hurts. I’ve got cramps. So, we need to take 

this one very, very seriously.12

During the same call, a National Hurricane Center forecaster discussed the danger of 

Katrina’s storm surge: 

Well, obviously, where it’s headed, you’re at the worst possible locations for 

storm surge. You remember [Hurricane] Camille and its 26 feet. I would advise 

all the folks that are in the potential path of this storm to be looking at their 

maximum off the storm surge models, the meows [maximum envelopes of 

water] and whatnot off of a Category 4 or 5 storm, and plan accordingly.13

Yet White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, the senior White House offi cial participating in the FEMA video teleconference, asked no questions aft er Brown’s severe forecast. 

Instead, Hagin limited himself to a perplexingly optimistic assessment of FEMA’s readiness: “We’re here, and anything we can do, obviously, to support you, but it sounds like the 

planning, as usual, is in good shape, and good luck to the States and just know that we’re 

watching, and we’ll do the right thing as fast as we can.”14

Th e warnings continued through the night. At 11:24 p.m., the White House received a 

National Weather Service–National Hurricane Center report which said: “Th e bottom line 

is that Katrina is expected to be an intense and dangerous hurricane heading towards the 

North Central Gulf Coast ... and this has to be taken very seriously.”15

Sunday, August 28, 2005 (Day before Landfall)

Th ere was another FEMA video teleconference at noon on Sunday. Th is time, President 

Bush took part, along with offi cials from DHS, FEMA, Louisiana, and Mississippi.16 Dr. 

Max Mayfi eld, Director of the National Hurricane Center, predicted Katrina would be a 

“very dangerous hurricane,” adding that the possibility that levees could be overtopped was 

a “very, very grave concern.17

FEMA Director Michael Brown reiterated his concern: “My gut tells me – I told you guys 

my gut was that this [missing] is a bad one and a big one,” and that Katrina could be “a 

catastrophe within a catastrophe.”18 Bill Doran, the Chief of Operations for Louisiana’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, said that the state was undergoing 

“planning for a catastrophic event.”19

Neither the President nor his staff made any inquiries. Th e President off ered only the following statement: 

I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not only 

help you during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and assets 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

671

we have at our disposal aft er the storm to help you deal with the loss of property. And we pray for no loss of life, of course. 

Unfortunately, we’ve had experience at this in recent years, and I – the FEMA 

folks have done great work in the past, and I’m confi dent, Mike, that you and 

your team will do all you can to help the good folks in these aff ected states. 

Again, I want to thank [Louisiana] Governor [Kathleen] Blanco and [Alabama] 

Governor [Bob] Riley and [Mississippi] Governor [Haley Barbour], Governor 

[Jeb] Bush of Florida, for heeding these warnings, and doing all you can possibly do with your state folks and local folks to prepare the citizenry for this 

storm. 

In the meantime, I know the nation will be praying for the good folks in the 

aff ected areas, and we just hope for the very best.20

Th e White House continued to receive warnings about the storm’s projected force throughout the day.21 Early Sunday morning, it had been notifi ed that Katrina had been upgraded 

to a Category 5 storm; at approximately 5 p.m. ET, DHS’s Homeland Security Operations 

Center sent to the White House a report that included a National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration update, which repeated Dr. Mayfi eld’s warning about fl oodwaters overtopping New Orleans’ levees.22

Th e warnings continued throughout late Sunday night and early Monday morning, just 

hours before landfall. At 1:47 a.m. ET, the Homeland Security Operations Center sent the 

White House a report from DHS’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, 

which predicted: “Any storm rated Category 4 or greater on the Saffi r-Simpson scale will 

likely lead to severe fl ooding and/or levee breaching. Th is could leave the New Orleans area 

being submerged for weeks or months. ... Th e magnitude of this storm is expected to cause 

massive fl ooding.”23

To his credit, the President did take at least two steps that showed some understanding of 

the urgency of the impending crisis: First, at the requests of Governors Blanco, Barbour, 

and Riley, the President issued a pre-storm declaration of emergency for the Gulf Coast 

states, which ensured that the federal government would fi nance many pre-landfall and 

post-landfall activities undertaken by state and local offi cials.24 Th is had only been done 

once in the previous 15 years, when President Clinton issued four pre-landfall declarations, 

all for Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Second, on the day before landfall, at the urging of FEMA 

Director Brown,25 the President called Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation 

of New Orleans; however, that call occurred “just before she walk[ed] into the news conference” with Mayor Nagin to announce the evacuation of New Orleans.26 Th erefore, the 

President’s call came too late, as the Governor and Mayor had already decided to announce 

the mandatory evacuation.

With the exception of these two steps, in the face of dire warnings of the catastrophe before 

landfall, there was a failure of presidential leadership and initiative.

Although the President and the White House were following events aft er 

landfall, they seemed surprisingly detached until two days later, Wednesday, 

August 31, 2005. 

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has said that the President was “acutely 

aware of Katrina and the risk it posed” during the weekend before landfall.27 “[W]e went into 

the weekend before,” Secretary Chertoff said, “with an understanding and with warnings that 
Additional Views

672

this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I think people have talked about for years in 

terms of New Orleans.”28

Unfortunately, the President’s behavior didn’t refl ect this awareness. Instead of exercising 

the actual and symbolic leadership of the President, he seemed detached. 

Th e President didn’t return to Washington until two days aft er Katrina hit,29 sending a clear 

message to the rest of the federal government about the storm’s perceived importance in the 

federal hierarchy, and depriving the government of the clear and signifi cant focus the storm 

required at that point. As Congressman Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina aptly 

put it, “Th e director ... of the National Hurricane Center said this was the big one,” but 

“when this happened ... Bush is in Texas. Card is in Maine. Th e vice president is fl y-fi shing. 

I mean, who’s in charge here?”30

Th e White House’s failure to set in motion a more proactive set of pre-landfall preparations 

by the federal government was part of the reason the response was so ineff ective. 

Th is presidential detachment is particularly unacceptable because of the fl ow of specifi c information coming into the White House about the growing catastrophe that was occurring 

on America’s Gulf Coast.

Monday, August 29, 2005 (Day of Landfall)

Katrina came ashore in Louisiana at 6:10 a.m. CT, Monday morning, August 29, 2005.31

As early as 11:13 a.m. ET, the White House’s own Homeland Security Council circulated a 

report with the following information:

• A levee in New Orleans had broken;

• Based on a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center, water was 

rising in the city’s Lower Ninth Ward; 

• Based on a report from Governor Blanco, water was rising at one foot per 

hour; and

• Based on a report from Mayor Nagin, problems with a pumping station were 

undermining the city’s ability to relieve fl ooding.32

Minutes later, the Homeland Security Operations Center e-mailed the White House that 

at 7:30 a.m. CT, Mayor Nagin had announced that there was “water coming over the levee 

system in the Lower Ninth Ward;”33 that the State of Louisiana’s Adjutant General, Maj. 

Gen. Bennett Landreneau, had confi rmed that water was rising in the Lower Ninth Ward;34

and that local offi cials had said that “fl oodwaters are encroaching on roads in the lower-lying parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines.”35

At noon, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin, who was traveling with the President on 

Air Force One, participated in a conference call with state and local offi cials who reported 

fl ooding of eight to 10 feet in St. Bernard Parish.36 Th e President did not take part in the call.

Th e White House, and Hagin in particular, also received direct reports from FEMA Director Brown.37 According to Brown, he informed Hagin no later than 6 p.m. CT Monday that 

New Orleans’ 17th Street levee had broken, and that the city was fl ooding.38 Brown testifi ed that he was certain that the information reached the President: “I never worried about 

whether I talked directly to the President because I knew that in speaking to Joe [Hagin], I 

was talking directly to the President.”39
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

673

FEMA Director Brown testifi ed that he made some 30 calls to the President, White House 

Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, and other senior White House 

offi cials throughout the weekend before landfall.40 Because the White House refused to 

cooperate with the Committee’s requests, we don’t know what the President and his staff 

did with the information about the impending disaster from Brown and others. What questions did they ask? What instructions did they give? Card and Hagin were getting direct and 

unequivocal assessments of a catastrophe from the federal offi cial charged with coordinating the response to the storm. Brown recalls telling Hagin in a Sunday aft ernoon call “how 

bad this one was going to be” and was “adamant” that the White House should understand 

his concern about New Orleans.41 Did Hagin tell the President, as Brown assumed? Were 

there discussions about marshaling federal assets? Were calls made from the White House 

to Secretary Chertoff ? Did Card or Hagin reach out to other Cabinet secretaries? Did they 

contact Secretary Rumsfeld about the readiness of the military to enter the Gulf Coast to 

help? Th e White House has declined to answer such important questions, and so the Committee therefore is unable to off er any insights into these critical issues.

What we do know is that instead of responding to the ominous reports from the Gulf Coast, 

the President spent the day of landfall discussing Medicare in Arizona and California, as 

well as joining Arizona Senator John McCain at his birthday celebration.42

At 4:40 p.m. New Orleans time, as Hurricane Katrina was fl ooding and battering the city, 

the President was in Rancho Cucamonga, California, delivering a speech on Medicare and 

new prescription-drug benefi ts. He off ered only this brief assessment of the unfolding crisis 

in the Gulf during a 30-minute speech: 

We’re in constant contact with the local offi cials down there. Th e storm is 

moving through, and we’re now able to assess damage, or beginning to assess 

damage. ... For those of you who are concerned about whether or not we’re 

prepared to help, don’t be. We are. We’re in place. We’ve got equipment in 

place, supplies in place. And once the – once we’re able to assess the damage, 

we’ll be able to move in and help those good folks in the aff ected areas.

43

President Bush had off ered similar assurances to survivors of the storm earlier in the day, 

during a “Conversation on Medicare” at the Pueblo El Mirage RV Resort and Country Club 

in El Mirage, Arizona:

When the storm passes, the federal government has got assets and resources 

that we’ll be deploying to help you.44

As we now know – and the President should have known then – this was not the case: As 

the Committee has demonstrated throughout this report, various levels of government were 

not prepared to help. 

Th e White House received additional reports that the levees had broken in the early hours 

of Tuesday, August 30 (the day aft er landfall), but continued to operate as if it hadn’t. At 

12:02 a.m. ET, the White House received a report from the Homeland Security Operations 

Center that included this chilling assessment by the lone offi cial FEMA had sent to New 

Orleans, public-aff airs offi cer Marty Bahamonde: “Th ere is a quarter-mile breech (sic) in the 

levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to 

fl ow into the City ... an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.”45

Another DHS situation report, at 6:33 a.m. ET, confi rmed the extent of fl ooding and damage in New Orleans:
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674

Widespread and signifi cant fl ooding has occurred throughout the city of New 

Orleans, extending eastward, across the Mississippi gulf coast into coastal 

Alabama. Th e following fl ood reports have been received for the city of New 

Orleans:

• Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has been breached, with water to a 

depth of 5 feet at Jackson Barracks

• 17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached – breach extends several 100 

meters in length

• Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at 

this time.

Th e U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates are in progress and project that it 

could take months to dewater the City of New Orleans.46

A 10:23 a.m. ET report from the Homeland Security Operations Center detailed the locations of the breached levees and noted specifi c concerns about the 17th Street Canal and 

Tennessee Street levees.47

Th ese reports notwithstanding, no one from the White House participated in an inter-governmental conference call at noon organized by FEMA. Instead, the President was at a naval base 

in San Diego, where, once again, he off ered a falsely reassuring assessment of the crisis: “Our 

teams and equipment are in place and we’re beginning to move in the help that people need.”48

In fact, it seems as if President Bush and, consequently, the Administration, did not grasp 

that Katrina was a catastrophe until later in the day – a full day and a half aft er landfall 

– when Michael Brown informed President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary Chertoff , and Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove in a telephone call that at least 90 percent of New 

Orleans’s population had been displaced and that responders “needed military assets; this 

was the big one.”49 He added that FEMA “needed the help of the entire cabinet ... DOD and 

HHS and everybody else.”50

Brown testifi ed that this, at last, may have been the turning point in the President’s comprehension of the catastrophe:

And as I recall my fi rst statement to him was, you know, Mr. President, I 

estimate right now that 90 percent of the population of New Orleans has been 

displaced. And he is like, My God you mean it is that bad? Yes, sir, it was that 

bad.51

Brown added that he thought the offi cials on the call continued to fail to grasp how badly 

FEMA and the state were overwhelmed,52 but Brown’s alarm seems to have prompted a 

“discussion about convening the Cabinet.”53

On Tuesday morning, while in California, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan 

announced that the President would return to Washington, D.C., on Wednesday in order to 

“oversee the response eff orts from there.”54

Soon aft er, the President began to take steps to amplify and organize the government’s 

response. At 5:11 p.m., nearly 60 hours aft er landfall, President Bush, surrounded by his 

Cabinet, addressed the nation from the Rose Garden, announcing that he had convened the 

Cabinet and “directed Secretary of Homeland Security Mike Chertoff to chair a Cabinetlevel task force to coordinate all our assistance from Washington.”55 Notably, the task force 

demanded a list of available resources from each federal agency assigned responsibility in a 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

675

disaster under the National Response Plan.56 For example, FEMA was asked for “the inventory of all department agency operations/activity. ... Are [there] any Federal powers or other 

processes that could be implemented to expedite the response or make it more effi cient. ... 

What are the plans for providing housing to ... displaced people by hurricane damage?”57

Th ese questions were being asked for the fi rst time more than two days aft er landfall.

When Hurricane Rita threatened the Gulf Coast weeks later, the nation saw what can happen when the White House becomes more actively engaged in catastrophe preparedness before landfall. For example, on September 20, 2005, three days before landfall, the President 

participated in a hurricane briefi ng shortly aft er Rita had become a Category 1 hurricane.58

Aft er the briefi ng, the President announced that a Coast Guard admiral would be stationed 

in Texas to coordinate the response59 and later that day made an emergency declaration for 

the State of Florida at the request of its Governor. On September 21, two days before Rita 

made landfall, the President also issued disaster declarations for Louisiana and Texas.60 On 

September 22, the day before the storm hit, the President visited Texas to “get a fi rsthand 

look at the preparations”61 and then traveled to Northern Command, the domestic military headquarters in Colorado, where he participated in a series of briefi ngs detailing the 

response and coordination between DOD, other government agencies, and state and local 

governments62

In the case of Katrina, the President did not take equally meaningful action until two days 

aft er landfall. Th e President should have made these critical moves – returning to Washington, convening the Cabinet, taking stock of the federal government’s readiness for Katrina, 

making sure key White House staff were at their posts, and directly addressing the people of 

the Gulf Coast – before landfall. 

Aft er the hurricane, the White House continued to demonstrate a lack of 

understanding of the magnitude of the catastrophe.

Even several days aft er landfall, statements from the President and the White House suggested that they still did not understand or appreciate what had happened to New Orleans.

On the Th ursday, September 1, edition of “Good Morning America,” the President said that 

“I don’t think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees.”63 He was later given an opportunity to correct his statement. Th e President said he was not misinformed and affi rmed his 

view, continuing:

When that storm came by, a lot of people said we dodged a bullet. When that 

storm came through at fi rst, people said, Whew. Th ere was a sense of relaxation, and that’s what I was referring to. And I, myself, thought we had dodged 

a bullet. You know why? Because I was listening to people, probably over the 

[airwaves], say, the bullet has been dodged. And that was what I was referring 

to. Of course, there were plans in case the levee had been breached. Th ere was a 

sense of relaxation in the moment, a critical moment.64

But the President was wrong. 

Th e levees breached soon aft er the storm came ashore,65 as was noted in the reports that 

arrived at the White House.66 Th e vulnerability of the levees to a catastrophic storm was 

known long before Katrina.67 Besides, the city was threatened as much by fl ooding from 

overtopping as it was from breaches, a danger forewarned in the years before Katrina and 

reiterated in the months before landfall by federal agencies.68

During a press conference in Mobile, Alabama on Friday following landfall, President Bush 

infamously said of Brown, “Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job.”69 Brown’s performance 
Additional Views

676

was anything but worthy of praise. Th is comment was totally at odds with what was apparent to all – that the federal government’s response, which was supposed to have been led in 

part by then FEMA Director Brown, was grossly inadequate. It serves as an example of just 

how disengaged President Bush was from the failed response. It illustrates the President’s 

failure to understand Katrina’s devastation and the suff ering of Katrina’s victims. 

Th e White House received a massive amount of information from a wide range of authoritative sources describing in dire terms the catastrophe unfolding in the Gulf.70 While some 

media reports inaccurately described the storm as a near-miss that had mostly spared the 

city, the President of the United States should have been fully and accurately informed and 

should have acted urgently on that information. 

Decisive presidential leadership before and immediately aft er Katrina was missing. How 

much it could have mitigated the loss of life and anguish of survivors in the Gulf Coast will 

never be known.

Part II: Lack of Administration Cooperation in Investigation

Th e Administration’s failure to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation had regrettable consequences. In too many instances, the Committee faced agencies and Departments 

that saw its eff orts as a nuisance – and their own response as up to their discretion. And 

the worst off ender was the entity that should have stood above the fray and worked hardest 

with the Committee to uncover the government’s failings in Katrina: the White House.

Despite President Bush’s pronouncement early on that he recognized that “Congress also 

has an important oversight function to perform” and his commitment that “I will work 

with members of both parties to make sure this eff ort is thorough,”71 our Committee faced 

a White House less willing to cooperate with a Senate investigation than any we have 

witnessed in our many years in this body. Th at is why we ultimately concluded that the 

Committee should issue subpoenas to the White House to produce the material that the 

Committee asked for during its investigation. Unfortunately, the Chairman disagreed with 

Senator Lieberman’s request to issue subpoenas, and so, the Committee did not obtain all 

that we believe was necessary for a comprehensive investigation.

Th ere are matters that we could not fully explore because of agency and Administration 

recalcitrance and, in some cases, intransigence. We don’t know what we don’t know – for 

example, as a result of the Justice Department’s failure to produce large volumes of what the 

Committee had requested. But one thing we do know is that because we were denied the 

opportunity to fully explore the role the White House played in preparing for and responding to Katrina, we have little insight into how the President and his staff monitored, managed, and directed the government’s disaster preparedness in the post-9/11 world, how they 

coordinated the rest of the federal bureaucracy in response to Katrina, or how leadership 

was exercised by the only entity in the federal government with the authority to order all the 

others to act. Without this information, the Committee’s investigation necessarily lacked 

the ability to fully and fairly analyze and assess a critical element of the response to Katrina.

We have plenty of circumstantial evidence to believe that there were signifi cant failures of 

leadership at the top and actions that should have been taken but were not. Th at evidence 

is discussed in the previous section of these additional views. But there remain too many 

important questions that cannot be answered conclusively because the White House did not 

provide the information necessary to do so. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

677

Clearly, our government was unprepared to deal with the catastrophe of Katrina. Only 

through a thorough and comprehensive investigation of what went wrong could we be assured that the government will know what steps are necessary to get it right the next time. 

Full cooperation in this investigation was critical, but was denied.

The White House

A Chronology of Efforts to Obtain Information from the White House

On October 7, 2005, the Committee sent a letter, signed by Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman, to White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr. Th e letter was similar to 

those sent to over twenty federal agencies and Departments, as well as to the Governors of 

Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, the Mayors of New Orleans, Biloxi, Gulfport, and Mobile, and a number of other state and local agencies. Th e goal of these letters was to help the 

Committee collect a comprehensive set of documents and information that would allow it 

to understand what those at all levels of all relevant governments did or didn’t do to prepare 

for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. 

Th e White House letter sought a variety of documents and information. Some requests 

were basic, like those that asked the White House to identify its various components with 

emergency-preparedness and response responsibilities, to explain how the White House 

learns of and monitors hurricanes, and to provide an organizational chart of the relevant 

White House components. Others sought more detailed, Katrina-specifi c information, 

such as how the White House and the President fi rst learned about the storm, who was 

responsible for processing requests from the Governors for emergency declarations, how 

much the White House understood about the vulnerability of New Orleans to fl ooding, 

and, perhaps most importantly, a description of what the White House specifi cally did to 

prepare for and respond to the hurricane. Th e Committee also asked for documents related 

to all of these issues.

Th e closest cognates we have to the White House – the governors of the aff ected states – responded well to similar letters. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco’s offi ce, for example, 

produced over 8,000 pages of substantive documents, including a large number of e-mails 

to or from the Governor herself, and granted the Committee access to all six members 

of her staff with whom it requested interviews. Similarly, Mississippi Governor Haley 

Barbour’s offi ce provided the information that the Committee asked for, including material directly involving the Governor’s offi ce and his staff , and the Committee interviewed 

both members of the Governor’s staff for whom it asked. Th e cooperation the Committee 

received from these offi ces greatly enhanced the Committee’s ability to understand what 

happened, and helped ensure that it could be confi dent in the Committee report’s fi ndings 

and conclusions.

Th e White House was an entirely diff erent story. On November 3, 2005, the Committee 

received its initial response. In a letter signed by Deputy Counsel to the President William 

K. Kelley, the White House started off well, pledging that “[t]he Administration is committed to cooperating with your Committee.” Unfortunately, it then off ered very little to show 

for that commitment. Kelley’s letter and the accompanying documents made clear that the 

White House had little intention of giving the Committee what it had requested. His letter 

noted that the Committee had sought information and documents from other Executive 

Branch agencies and observed:

As is customary for any examination of an issue addressed by many components of the federal Government, the Administration’s principal form of 
Additional Views

678

assistance will be through the production of information from those agencies 

and departments most directly involved in preparing for and responding to 

Hurricane Katrina. . . . As is traditional for responses to Congressional Committee requests for information, the [White House] stands ready to assist your 

Committee in appropriate ways once the scope and content of the agencies’ 

and departments’ production of information can be assessed in relation to 

your Committee’s remaining requirements.

As discussed further below, the views expressed by Kelley were neither customary nor 

traditional, but given them, it was not surprising that the near entirety of the nearly 4,000 

accompanying pages of documents were publicly available. In fact, a portion of this production – White House press releases, copies of press conferences, and copies of press gaggles 

– could be found on the White House’s web site. Th e production also included situation 

reports and updates that were sent to many recipients, only one of which was the White 

House, from other federal agencies and departments, as well as widely circulated e-mails 

sent by DHS as part of its responsibility under the National Response Plan to disseminate 

information throughout the federal government. Th ese latter e-mails primarily consisted 

of DHS and FEMA press releases as well as Department “Talking Points.” In sum, not only 

did Kelley’s letter decline to answer a single one of the questions posed in the Committee’s 

October 7 letter; it also did not bring with it much in the way of responsive or informative 

documents.

To make matters worse, the Committee soon learned that despite the White House’s suggestion that the Committee seek its information elsewhere, the White House was in fact 

directing the federal agencies that were producing documents and witnesses for the Committee’s investigation to withhold from the Committee any material or testimony relating to 

the agencies’ or witnesses’ interactions with the White House.

Th e Committee spent the next two months attempting to work these matters out at a staff 

level. Committee pressure yielded marginally more documents and a three-hour briefi ng 

from the White House’s Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, Ken Rapuano. Many of the 

additional documents were of the same type as previously produced. Th e White House provided several e-mails, updates, and reports it had received from DHS’s Homeland Security 

Operations Center (HSOC), consisting primarily of repackaged material that other agencies, including federal and state entities, sent to the HSOC. In many cases, the White House 

produced multiple copies of the same widely distributed material. As for material actually 

generated within the White House, though the Committee did receive a small number of 

substantive e-mails from a very small number of lower-level White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff , those e-mails off ered little insight into what the White House was 

actually doing, and the Committee received nothing from the fi les of those in higher-level 

positions.

In short, the Committee did not receive information or documents showing what actually 

was going on within the White House and was still left with little insight into the White 

House’s substantive actions in preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. And 

Rapuano’s briefi ng, while informative, focused primarily on what the White House had 

learned about the federal response writ large; it did not address roles played by specifi c 

White House offi cials or specifi c actions taken by the Executive Offi ce of the President 

(EOP). 

Frustrated by the White House’s omissions (its failure to produce what the Committee had 

requested), as well as its commissions (its interference with productions and testimony 

from other agencies), the Committee sent Card a second letter on January 12, 2006. Th e 

letter, again signed by both Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman, expressed concern 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

679

about the White House’s response to the investigation. It assessed the status of the White 

House production this way:

We have received several boxes of documents, which we do appreciate. However, a majority of that material was either publicly available or originated in 

other agencies, off ering little insight into what the EOP knew or did during this 

catastrophic event. We also received a briefi ng from the Homeland Security 

Counsel (HSC), which we view as a constructive and useful attempt to convey to the Committee some information about the HSC’s “Lessons Learned 

Review” as well as, generally, some of the key events the EOP was aware of in 

the days leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina. Th e briefi ng did not, 

however, address roles played by specifi c EOP offi cials or specifi c actions taken 

by the EOP. As a result, to date, we have yet to receive the bulk of what we 

requested, and the Committee is unable to fully understand and assess actions 

involving White House personnel during the preparations for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina.

Th e Committee’s letter saved its harshest language for its assessment of the White House’s 

directions to agency counsel to keep White House-related information from the Committee: “Th is practice,” Senators Collins and Lieberman wrote, “simply must cease.” Th ey 

continued:

We are willing to discuss claims of executive privilege asserted by the White 

House, either directly or through a federal agency. But we will not stand for 

blanket instructions to refuse answering any questions concerning any communications with the EOP.

Th e Committee’s letter also took issue with another of the White House’s arguments: Th at 

the White House was acting within tradition by telling the Committee that it must wait for 

the White House’s response until aft er other agencies provided theirs: “Respectfully,” Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman wrote:

We are aware of no such tradition. Indeed, this Committee, as well as others, 

has repeatedly conducted investigations of matters involving this and previous 

White Houses and has never held White House requests in abeyance.

In an eff ort to end the impasse, the Committee off ered the White House a signifi cantly 

pared-down list of priorities and asked that it produce particular documents and provide 

specifi c individuals for interviews by January 23, 2006.

On January 27, 2006, the White House responded. In a letter again signed by Kelley, the 

White House once again paid homage to “Congress’s important role in examining events 

surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the need for the Executive Branch to assist those inquiries.” Th en, once again, it declined to provide what the Committee had asked for. Instead, 

it off ered to address the Committee’s requests through a combination of a briefi ng and additional documents. It declined to furnish any of the requested witnesses.

As for the complaint about the White House’s hindering of Committee eff orts to obtain 

from other agencies information related to the White House, Kelley explained that the 

White House was allowing agency personnel to “discuss factual and operational communications involving nearly all EOP personnel other than a relatively small number of 

offi cials most directly involved in supporting the President’s actions and determinations.” 

Th is category was later described to Committee staff as including all individuals at the level 

of Deputy Assistant to the President and above and all individuals, regardless of level, in 
Additional Views

680

the Chief of Staff ’s offi ce. While Kelley’s letter suggested that this left a wide area of inquiry 

open to the Committee, the reality was that it walled off documents and testimony involving virtually anyone in the White House who had any level of responsibility or involvement 

with Katrina, regardless of whether that person actually had anything to do with advising 

the President.

On February 3, 2006, the Committee received its second briefi ng from Rapuano, and by 

February 8, it had in hand the additional documents the White House promised in its 

January 27 letter. Rapuano’s briefi ng, while again helpful in answering questions about the 

activities of some of the federal agencies and about the White House, off ered few of the 

additional specifi c details the Committee had sought about the White House’s actions. Th e 

documents did not diff er markedly in type from those received already: Th e Committee had 

obtained virtually all of them previously from other agencies; consequently, they off ered 

little new insight. As an example, the Committee asked for all White House documents related to the deployment of federal troops to the Gulf region. Given the weighty implications 

of deploying our premier fi ghting force on domestic soil, and the controversies surrounding 

the timing of those deployments and the allegations that Governor Blanco was responsible 

for the delay, the Committee believed that access to this information from the White House 

was critical to understanding and informing the American people of this important part 

of the Katrina story. But the documents provided by the White House consisted mainly of 

situation reports, most of which already had been produced to the Committee by the Pentagon, and did not address the issue of troop deployment.

Around the time of this exchange, the Committee gained virtually its only signifi cant 

insight into what actually happened within the White House immediately before and aft er 

Katrina’s landfall. It learned this information only because former FEMA Director Michael 

Brown refused to decline to answer the Committee’s questions about his communications 

with the White House absent an assertion of executive privilege by the President. When the 

President declined to invoke that privilege, Brown testifi ed before the Committee on Friday, 

February 10, and shortly thereaft er sat for a more detailed, transcribed interview with Committee staff . In both instances, Brown made clear that he saw the White House as a critical 

player in the preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Brown testifi ed that, before landfall, he had conveyed to the President that, depending on 

where it struck, the storm could be catastrophic.72 He also told the Committee that he believed that on Monday, August 29, the day of Katrina’s landfall, he spoke with Deputy White 

House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin on at least two occasions to inform him of the situation on the 

ground in New Orleans.73 Brown testifi ed that in a call with Hagin – placed aft er Brown received FEMA employee Marty Bahamonde’s eyewitness account of the extent of the devastation – “I think I told [Hagin] that we were realizing our worst nightmare, that everything we 

had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years, was 

coming true.”74 According to Brown’s interview, by Monday evening there was no doubt that 

Hagin knew from Brown that the 17th Street Canal levee had broken and that New Orleans 

was fl ooding.75 Additionally, at approximately 10 p.m. that night, White House Chief of Staff 

Andy Card informed Brown in an e-mail exchange that Hagin had kept him “well-informed” 

of Brown’s reports. Brown reiterated to Card that “this is a bad one.”76

Just as importantly, Brown made clear that he believed that informing and seeking action 

from the White House was capable of producing faster results than contacting the designated leader of the federal response, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff .77 Brown’s 

testimony made clear that he believed that the White House had a signifi cant role to play in 

coordinating and helping to manage the response to Katrina. Aft er putting that testimony 

together with what the investigation had already revealed about the federal government’s 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

681

activities during the week aft er landfall, Senator Lieberman concluded that the Committee 

would be remiss if it did not follow up on the multiple questions regarding White House 

action left unanswered by Brown’s testimony and the rest of our investigation.

In sum, despite the Committee’s detailed requests, intended to enable an understanding 

of the actions taken by the White House during Hurricane Katrina, the Committee had 

received interviews with none of the requested White House witnesses, written answers to 

none of the questions posed in the October 7, 2005, letter to the White House, and roughly 

17,000 pages of documents, the vast majority of which consisted of publicly available material, material otherwise generated by other agencies, and reports and updates from DHS’s 

Homeland Security Operations Center. In addition, the Committee failed to receive from 

federal agencies an unknown volume of responsive material as a result of White House 

orders to withhold anything related to or referencing virtually anyone of signifi cance in the 

White House.

Aft er reviewing that response, Senator Lieberman wrote Chairman Collins on March 15, 

2006, asking her to issue subpoenas to (1) the White House for the documents requested 

in their joint January 12, 2006, letter; (2) to fi ve members of the White House staff most 

involved in the response, ordering them to sit for Committee depositions; and (3) to each 

federal agency to which they previously sent request letters, compelling them to produce 

previously withheld White House-related material.78 Th e Chairman declined. And we believe that the investigation is the worse for it.

Analysis of the White House’s Arguments

We do not believe that the White House, or any Executive Branch agency, must automatically turn over material to a Congressional committee simply because it has been asked 

to do so. What we do believe – indeed, know – is that Congressional committees have 

signifi cant authority to seek and obtain material from the White House and Executive 

Branch agencies when they are conducting legitimate oversight or investigations on matters 

within their jurisdiction, absent an assertion of a valid privilege to the contrary. During the 

Committee’s months of eff orts to obtain the information sought from the White House, the 

White House provided no satisfactory reason for its limited response.

We have already referenced the fallacy of the White House’s assertion that it appropriately 

directed the Committee elsewhere for its information. As noted above, Chairman Collins 

and Senator Lieberman rejected that argument in their January 12, 2006, letter to Card. 

And, in a November 29, 2005, report, the non-partisan Congressional Research Service 

(CRS) agreed that the White House was wrong to assert that custom or tradition allows 

it to point Congressional investigative committees elsewhere to seek information or that 

the White House is permitted to defer answers to specifi c requests until it has assessed the 

Committee’s needs:

Without question, under Senate rules, your Committee has jurisdictional 

responsibility and authority to conduct an investigation of the preparations for 

and response to Hurricane Katrina by all governmental entities that had roles, 

responsibilities and authorities in dealing with that catastrophic event. Th at 

investigative authority reaches the White House and concerned elements of 

the Executive Offi ce of the President. We are aware of no legal authority that 

allows a targeted entity, whether it is a government agency, including the EOP, 

or private party, to dictate to a jurisdictional committee the manner, order or 

timing of the exercise of its exercise of investigative authority.79

Kelley’s January 27, 2006, letter also suggested that our requests implicated “very important 

Executive Branch interests,” including “avoiding the burden on offi cials most directly sup-
Additional Views

682

porting the President, threatening to impair the President’s ability to discharge his constitutional duties; preserving the confi dentiality required to support Presidential decision-making; and adhering to the course of dealings between the branches, in analogous contexts, 

regarding the occasions for broad inquiry into EOP policymaking and deliberations.”

But the Committee tried to accommodate those interests to the extent they were legitimate. 

In informal conversations throughout the fall and then in the Chairman’s and Senator 

Lieberman’s January 12, 2006, letter, the Committee sought to prioritize its requests, but 

that prioritization yielded precious little additional information in return. Perhaps even 

more importantly, the virtually complete immunity from our inquiry claimed by the White 

House to protect its asserted interests was far out of proportion with those interests and 

highly inconsistent with the manner in which Congressional investigations have been conducted in the past.

Th is Committee has repeatedly conducted investigations touching on or directly involving the White House. But never before have we seen a White House that not only denies 

the Committee most relevant information, but also precludes the Committee from receiving from other agencies most material relating to the White House’s involvement. In his 

January 27, 2006, letter, Kelley asserted that the White House was giving the Committee 

access to material involving “factual and operational communications involving nearly 

all EOP personnel other than a relatively small number of offi cials most directly involved 

in supporting the President’s actions and determinations.” But, as already discussed, this 

exception neutralized the rule: Virtually anyone in the White House whose actions had operational signifi cance to the preparation for and response to Katrina falls into the category 

made off -limits to the Committee.

And, of course, the Committee was denied requested interviews with even those lower-level 

employees about whom the White House said it was willing to give us information. Th is left 

the Committee unable to obtain any real sense of what the White House did or didn’t do to 

direct or assist the federal response to Katrina. And it kept the Committee from obtaining 

key information from Executive Branch agencies about the government’s response to Katrina. For months, Committee staff repeatedly asked White House staff for precedent for the 

White House’s sweeping assertion of near-immunity from inquiry. Th ey were given none.

Th e Congressional Research Service confi rmed that the White House position was wrong. 

According to a February 9, 2006, CRS memorandum prepared for the Committee:

Th e Supreme Court has held that “the scope of [Congress’] power of inquiry ... 

is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution,” “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes,” and 

is at its peak when the subject is alleged waste, fraud, abuse or maladministration. [citations omitted] In the last 80 years, Congress has consistently sought 

and obtained documents and testimony that refl ects deliberations in agencies, 

including almost every offi ce and bureau in the Department of Justice and the 

Executive Offi ce of the President (EOP). Th ere have been some 75 instances in 

which EOP offi cials have testifi ed before congressional committees, a list that 

includes chiefs of staff to the President, White House counsels and National 

Security Advisers.

80

In short, while we certainly recognize that there are important Executive Branch interests 

at stake whenever the Congress seeks to conduct oversight – interests which we believe the 

Committee tried to accommodate – the White House failed to recognize in return that there 

are countervailing and constitutionally based Legislative Branch interests at stake as well, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

683

namely the uncontested authority of the Congress to inquire into the Executive Branch’s 

administration of federal programs. 

It is the traditional view of the Congress that the only basis on which the Executive Branch 

may ultimately resist providing information requested by a Congressional committee is an 

assertion by the President of executive privilege. Th is Constitutional safeguard ensures that 

the Legislative Branch’s determination that its constitutional functions require certain information may be outweighed only if the President is willing to conclude and assert that his 

constitutional interests demand otherwise. Of course, even then, the privilege is a qualifi ed 

one and may be overcome, but the competing interests can’t even be weighed if the President is unwilling to meet Congress’s assertion of Constitutional authority with an equivalent assertion of his own. In the words of this Committee’s former Chairman Fred Th ompson, when addressing the previous Administration’s eff orts to resist a document request on 

a basis short of executive privilege:

If the President is claiming special status because he is President, then his 

assertion is really one of executive privilege and not attorney-client privilege. 

While I can still remember [Watergate Committee chair] Sam Ervin’s repeated 

admonitions that no man is above the law and that we are entitled to every 

man’s evidence, I still concede that executive privilege can be a valid claim, 

under some circumstances. However, the President must assert it.81

Th is is a point the Committee itself recognized when Brown testifi ed. Having asked the 

White House whether the President wished to assert executive privilege and having heard 

that it did not, the Chairman instructed Brown to answer questions regarding his contacts 

with the White House.82

It is due to this experience with Brown that we must respectfully disagree with one of the 

reasons the Chairman provided for declining Senator Lieberman’s request to issue subpoenas, namely that it would merely force the President to assert executive privilege.83

Based on the experience with Brown – and the fact that a signifi cant portion of the material 

the Committee requested likely falls outside any legitimate claim of privilege – we fi rmly 

believe a subpoena would have been met with at least a modicum of compliance that would 

have aided the Committee’s investigation signifi cantly. Aft er all, previous Administrations 

repeatedly have been willing to provide information of this sort to Congress. Th e current 

Administration also has provided to investigators even material that clearly could have been 

subject to a claim of privilege. Both the President and the Vice-President, for example, sat 

for a personal interview with the 9/11 Commission. Surely, the White House would have 

provided the Committee with more information than it did had it faced a Congressional 

subpoena.

Before leaving this topic, we want to comment on one more issue raised by at least some 

Administration representatives in response to the Committee’s information and document 

requests. In seeking to justify the demonstrably lower level of cooperation seen from this 

Administration than from its predecessor, we heard that a diff erent standard should apply 

in this investigation because of the absence of any allegations of criminal conduct.

We could not disagree more. Congress surely has a role to play in the investigation of 

conduct that may violate the law, and we have supported such investigations in the past, 

regardless of the political affi liation of the Administration. But if the case for White House 

cooperation is more persuasive for one type of investigation than the other, surely it would 

be for an investigation like the one into Katrina. 
Additional Views

684

To the extent Congressional investigations involve allegations of criminal wrongdoing, a 

Congressional investigation simply isn’t necessary to discover facts or hold perpetrators 

responsible, as it is likely to be accompanied by a parallel investigation by the Department 

of Justice, as we’ve seen with many of the recent scandal investigations.

Th ankfully, there has been no such criminality on the part of government workers alleged 

here; instead, this was an investigation into wholesale errors, and, in many cases, incompetence. No other independent investigator with the authority to go fully where the facts lead 

has or will review this matter, and so the need for a full and fair review by the Congress is 

absolutely critical.84

The Department of Homeland Security

Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) presents a diff erent case from the White 

House. In contrast to the White House, DHS did provide the Committee with a signifi -

cant amount of information and access to a large number of witnesses – material without 

which the Committee could not have conducted its investigation or issued its report. But 

the Department did so in an oft en slow, spotty, and incomplete manner. On one hand, the 

Committee received a large amount of information and many witnesses from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). But on the other, when we sought documents 

and witnesses from elsewhere in the Department, and particularly from DHS leadership, 

the Department frequently dragged its feet, taking an adversarial posture and ultimately 

producing only a small fraction of the documents and witnesses that reasonably could have 

been expected. For example, it took until January 13, 2006, for the Department to produce a single witness from outside FEMA or the Coast Guard. Similarly, the Committee 

did not receive documents from the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)– an 

entity at the center of DHS’s emergency-response mandate – until January 12, 2006. And 

despite increasingly urgent requests for the document, it took the Department until January 11, 2006, to give the Committee the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the National 

Response Plan, a foundational document that the Committee could have used to question 

witnesses more knowledgeably had it only had it sooner. When combined with the Department’s practice of waiting until the last minute to tell the Committee who it would supply 

as witnesses and providing a witness’s e-mails and documents as late as the night before a 

scheduled interview, there is no doubt that the way in which the Department responded 

to the Committee’s document, information, and witness requests signifi cantly hampered 

the Committee’s ability to conduct its investigation. As a result, though the Committee 

has gathered key facts, it still does not have as complete a picture as we would have liked of 

DHS’s preparations and response to Katrina. Given Secretary Chertoff ’s public statements 

asserting the importance of learning the lessons, “even painful lessons,” from Katrina, reasonably we had hoped for more.85

Chronology of DHS’s Production 

It was clear from the start that much of this Committee’s investigation would turn on 

information provided by and about the Department of Homeland Security. DHS is the 

Department given the offi cial responsibility to lead and coordinate preparations for and 

response to disasters, whether natural or man-made. Various DHS component agencies had 

signifi cant operational responsibilities in the response as well; eventually, some 16 DHS offi ces became involved in the response.86 Th is included not only the high-profi le involvement 

of agencies such as FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard, but also the National Communications System (NCS), an agency charged with coordinating the federal government’s disaster 

communications support, and the Department’s law enforcement assets – Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (including the Federal Protective Service), the U.S. Secret Service, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

685

Customs and Border Patrol, among others – many of which provided assistance with public 

safety and security in the Gulf Coast aft er Katrina.

Th erefore, on September 28, 2005, the Committee sent four letters to DHS: (1) to FEMA; (2) 

to the Coast Guard; (3) to NCS (through the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection); and (4) to Secretary Chertoff for the remainder of the Department. Th ese letters asked 

for a range of information and documents related to the Department’s and its components’ 

response to Katrina. In addition, in the weeks and months that followed, the Committee 

sought to interview witnesses with relevant knowledge from throughout the Department.

Responses to the Committee’s four request letters to DHS were due October 27, 2005. Th e 

following day, FEMA produced its fi rst documents to the Committee; the Coast Guard followed with a small production approximately a week later. And even before these documents 

arrived, the Committee began interviewing FEMA witnesses, beginning with Marty Bahamonde, an External Aff airs employee who was stationed in New Orleans during the storm, on 

October 7, 2005. Interviews with Coast Guard witnesses began not long thereaft er.

During this time, however, the Committee received no response at all to its two other request letters, to the National Communications System and to Secretary Chertoff for the remainder of DHS. Concerned as time continued to pass, in November, Committee staff sent 

to DHS a short list of initial witnesses from other parts of the Department that we thought it 

important to interview.

Notwithstanding this request, no witnesses from outside FEMA or the Coast Guard were 

made available for interviews at that time. And by the end of the year – three months aft er 

the request letters had been sent – only a small number of documents had been produced 

in response to the letter to Secretary Chertoff . No documents related to NCS had been 

produced at all. On December 30, 2005, Senators Collins and Lieberman expressed their 

concerns directly to Secretary Chertoff . Th ey wrote him that the Committee lacked the 

“documents, information, and access to Department personnel that we need to conduct a 

thorough and timely investigation” and included a prioritized list of documents, information, and witnesses that they wanted in the following two weeks.

On January 9, 2006, the Committee received a disappointing response from Philip Perry, 

the General Counsel of DHS, in which Perry off ered little that was new, but made clear that 

much of what the Committee asked for would not be forthcoming in the requested time 

frame. Specifi cally, he indicated that the Department was declining to respond to any of 

the information requests the Committee had submitted and stated only that the Department “should” be able to provide the Committee with a “substantial number” of the priority 

documents by the revised January 13, 2006, deadline (in fact, only a small number were 

provided by that date). He indicated that three of the twelve priority non-FEMA witnesses 

the Committee had requested would be made available for interviews, but made no further 

commitments on the remaining ones. 

Finding little reassurance in Perry’s response, Senator Lieberman wrote to Chairman Collins on January 12, 2006, requesting that the Committee issue subpoenas to DHS. Th ree and 

a half months aft er sending the Committee’s initial request letter and with three weeks of 

intensive Committee hearings on Hurricane Katrina rapidly approaching, the letter argued, 

the time had come to insist on the additional documents, information, and witnesses that 

were crucial if the Committee were to attain an accurate understanding of what occurred in 

the days leading up to and following Katrina, and how the government’s response could be 

improved in the future. Chairman Collins declined to issue a subpoena to DHS, but she did 

personally intervene with the Secretary and insisted upon greater cooperation.
Additional Views

686

DHS’s cooperation in the following weeks – eff ectively the fi nal weeks of the investigation 

before attention would turn to craft ing the report – improved, somewhat, with some additional witnesses and documents produced to the Committee. With respect to non-FEMA 

matters, however, it never reached the level the Committee had the right to expect from the 

Department.

In the end, 300,000 of the approximately 344,000 pages of documents that DHS produced 

to the Committee – 87 percent – were produced by FEMA. Th e National Communications 

Systems (NCS) produced approximately 3,100 pages of documents (roughly one box’s 

worth), with its fi rst materials not provided to the Committee until January 18, 2006. Th e 

Coast Guard provided a total of some 7,400 pages of documents. Approximately 33,000 

pages of documents – the rough equivalent of fewer than a dozen boxes – were produced 

in response to the Committee’s letter to Secretary Chertoff from the remainder of DHS, 

including its law enforcement components, the Homeland Security Operations Center, and 

front-offi ce personnel.

Interviews broke down in somewhat the same fashion: Th e Committee conducted formal 

interviews with 46 FEMA, or ex-FEMA, employees; 11 representatives of the Coast Guard; 2 

NCS employees; and 12 individuals from the remainder of DHS. 

Apart from the numbers, it is clear that DHS failed to fully comply with the majority of the 

requests for documents and information contained in all but one of the Committee’s original letters. Th e same goes for a signifi cant portion of even the priority requests set out in the 

Committee’s letter of December 30, 2005.87 DHS did eventually make available all but one 

of the non-FEMA witnesses on the Committee’s December 30, 2005 priority list,88 although 

subsequent requests for additional non-FEMA DHS witnesses were, with two exceptions, 

ignored.

Specifi c Concerns

Limitations on witness interviews

Signifi cant delays in producing witnesses. Th e Department did not provide the Committee 

with any witnesses from its leadership staff , from the HSOC, from NCS – indeed, from any 

component outside FEMA or the Coast Guard – until January 13, 2006, a full three months 

aft er the Committee began to conduct investigative interviews. In contrast, by mid-October, 

the Committee staff had already begun to speak to state and local offi cials in Louisiana and 

Mississippi, as well as to FEMA and Coast Guard personnel. By mid-November, interviews were underway with Department of Defense personnel, as well as with the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, among others. Th e signifi cant delay in providing witnesses from DHS’s 

leadership, the HSOC, NCS, and the Department’s law enforcement components inevitably 

constrained the Committee’s investigation. Th e late start in interviewing these important 

witnesses, as intensive weeks of hearings were underway and the investigation was coming to a close, meant that there was simply insuffi cient time to follow up eff ectively on new 

information that invariably and predictably came to light in those interviews. Unlike the 

Committee’s scrutiny of the performance of FEMA or the State of Louisiana, for example, 

the examination of the actions of other parts of DHS was not permitted to evolve organically based on what was learned at each stage. Although the Committee was ultimately able 

to uncover important and enlightening facts even from the limited number of witnesses and 

documents made available, we simply cannot know where those facts would have led if the 

Committee had been allowed greater time to pursue leads to their logical conclusions. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

687

Failure to produce additional witnesses. Even within the signifi cant time constraints, the 

Committee staff was able to identify a relatively small number of additional DHS witnesses 

who appeared to have information important to the investigation; eff orts to bring in these 

additional non-FEMA, non-Coast Guard witnesses were largely ignored.89

For example, as discussed in Chapter 19 of the report, the Committee discovered during 

the course of its investigation that the HSOC, the central organization within DHS charged 

with maintaining situational awareness, issued a report at 6 p.m. on the day Katrina made 

landfall stating that preliminary reports indicated that the levees had not been breached.90

Th is unfortunate report, issued despite considerable evidence to the contrary, may have 

falsely reassured a variety of government offi cials, who went home Monday, August 29, 

ignorant of the ongoing catastrophe in New Orleans, and it may well have contributed to a 

delayed federal response. Th erefore, Committee staff sought to interview the HSOC’s Senior 

Watch Offi cer who was on duty at the time and who would have been responsible for issuing that erroneous report. Notwithstanding Committee staff ’s request, the individual was 

never made available. Th e Department, moreover, has never provided any explanation for 

not complying with the Committee’s request. 

DHS also failed, without explanation, to produce, in response to a Committee staff request, 

Scott Weber, Senior Counselor to the Secretary and the member of the Secretary’s immediate staff responsible for FEMA-related issues.91

DHS limitations on the terms under which witness interviews were conducted. Even 

when DHS made witnesses available, it oft en did so under conditions that limited the effectiveness of the interview. It became routine for DHS counsel to produce witnesses with 

unreasonably short notice, limiting Committee staff ’s ability to prepare. In one case, for 

example, staff was informed only Tuesday morning that a FEMA witness would be made 

available that aft ernoon; when questioned, the witness revealed that he had been informed 

of the interview by the previous Th ursday or Friday and had arrived in Washington on 

Monday aft ernoon.92 In some cases, none of the witness’s e-mails or other documents were 

made available to the Committee before the interview.

Perhaps the practice that most directly restricted the ability of staff to gather information 

was DHS Counsel’s unilateral insistence, in almost all the interviews with DHS employees 

outside of FEMA and the Coast Guard, on limiting the time the witness would be made 

available to a single session lasting three to four hours.93 Th is artifi cial time constraint was 

not imposed (or accepted) by other agencies or in other contexts. Th us, for example, staff 

conducting interviews with state and local offi cials in Louisiana were routinely given access 

to signifi cant witnesses for extended periods of time: Among others, Major General Bennett 

Landreneau, Adjutant General of Louisiana, was interviewed for approximately eight hours 

and Terry Ebbert, Director of New Orleans’ Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public Safety, 

sat three times for interviews for a total of approximately 10 hours. Th e Department of 

Defense, for its part, made Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander of First Army 

and Commander of Joint Task Force-Katrina, available for a seven-hour interview. But with 

high-level staff at DHS, relatively short time limits were almost always imposed. 

A particularly notable example of this was the interview Committee staff conducted with 

Robert Stephan. By his own count, Stephan wore fi ve “hats” at DHS at the time Katrina hit. 

Among others, he was Acting Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; Director of the Interagency Incident Management Group; and Manager 

of the National Communications System. He also had led the development of the National 

Response Plan, the central document guiding the federal response. By virtue of these various responsibilities, Stephan appeared to possess a wealth of information important to the 

Committee’s investigation, and as the relatively short period that had been allotted for his 
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688

interview came to a close, it was obvious that the range of critical topics had only begun to 

be explored. Appropriately, the Committee’s Minority staff asked to continue the interview 

at another time.94 Stephan, however, was not made available again to Committee staff .

Inadequate Document Production

As outlined above, DHS produced only a fraction of the documents and information 

requested by the Committee – particularly in response to those requests contained in the 

three letters that were sent to components of the Department other than FEMA – and failed 

to fully comply even with many of the Committee’s priority requests. Notably, DHS at no 

time asserted any basis for withholding the material from a legitimate Congressional inquiry, nor, in most cases, did its lawyers seek to reach agreement with the Committee on the 

scope of the material to be produced. Rather, it frequently appeared to be the case that DHS 

simply unilaterally decided what material it would and would not produce to the Committee. As a result, there are gaps, perhaps signifi cant, in the materials (and, in particular, the 

non-FEMA materials) that the Committee has in its possession. A handful of prominent 

ones are noted below.

FEMA budget documents. Although DHS produced a substantial number of documents 

the Committee requested from FEMA, the Department largely refused to provide documents related to FEMA’s budget. As the report discusses, concerns were raised by several 

FEMA witnesses that FEMA’s budget was not suffi cient to fulfi ll its mission and about 

DHS’s “taxing” of FEMA to support the overall operations of the Department, and how 

these budget matters may have aff ected FEMA’s preparedness for a catastrophic disaster 

such as Katrina. DHS refused to provide all but a very few of the relevant requested documents – a request made in the Committee’s original September 28, 2005, letter and reiterated in the priority list submitted to DHS on December 30, 2005. As with other areas in 

which DHS declined to produce documents, information, or witnesses, the Department did 

not cite any authority that would exempt it from the Committee’s oversight jurisdiction 

other than its own preference. Th is refusal has prevented the Committee from fully addressing and resolving these issues.95

HSOC documents. As is evident from the Committee’s report, the problems in maintaining accurate situational awareness during the storm became a focus of the investigation. For 

that reason, both in the Committee’s original September 28, 2005, letter and in its December 30, 2005, priority request, we sought all the communications into or out of the HSOC 

that related to Katrina in the days immediately before and aft er landfall. DHS, however, 

chose to produce to the Committee only e-mails that were sent from or to a computer account associated with the Senior Watch Offi cer on duty;96 although some 45 agencies staff 

desks at the HSOC, information coming in to these individuals was ignored. 

Th e signifi cance of this came to light in one instance where the Committee obtained, 

through other sources, an e-mail that the Coast Guard had sent to the HSOC at 1:51 pm on 

the day of landfall, informing the HSOC that a levee in New Orleans had breached;97 this 

e-mail, though obviously important and clearly within both the Committee’s original and 

priority requests, had not been produced to the Committee. 

In another area of concern, though sources at the Coast Guard indicated to the Committee 

that the Coast Guard had produced documents to DHS responsive to many of the Committee’s requests, DHS had not turned all of them over to the Committee. Because DHS has 

not produced a log of withheld documents, however, we do not know if DHS is deliberately 

withholding documents, based on a claim of privilege or otherwise, or whether it simply 

determined that the documents were not responsive.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

689

No answers to information requests. Finally, DHS declined to answer any of the requests 

for information contained in each of the four letters that were sent to the Department 

– even basic information such as which components of the Department were involved in 

the response to Katrina,98 or the identities of key personnel at NCS. DHS has not posed 

any objection to the questions raised, although in his January 9, 2006, letter, Perry asserted 

that DHS “cannot fully respond to several of these questions before it completes its lessons 

learned process and has a trustworthy understanding of the underlying facts” – though he 

did not identify to which questions he objected on these grounds. He also argued that so 

much information has already been provided to staff through documents and interviews 

that the Committee already had much of the information it sought; and that if the Committee would provide access to transcripts of witness interviews, DHS would produce responses 

more quickly. Th ese arguments are unpersuasive, especially when they apply across the 

board even to requests to which the Department surely knows the answer and to which 

none of its objections apply. For example, the Committee asked for a statement of when the 

National Response Plan was activated and which annexes were activated. Th ere is no reason 

why that information cannot have been provided by the Department during the past six 

months.

The Department of Justice

Th e Department of Justice (DOJ) was highly uncooperative with the Committee. DOJ has 

important responsibilities under the National Response Plan, most signifi cantly for maintaining security during a disaster when local and state law enforcement personnel are overwhelmed. In addition, the Department, as the Executive Branch’s principal legal advisor, 

surely played a role in off ering advice on the very controversial issues involved in deploying 

the military to aid the Katrina response, among other matters. DOJ was necessarily a critical 

part of the Committee’s investigation.

Yet DOJ was utterly uncooperative throughout the Committee’s investigation. Th e Committee sent its initial request letter on October 7, 2005, asking for information and documents by November 3, 2005. On October 24, 2005, the Committee received its fi rst communication back from the Department, in which the Department simply acknowledged 

receipt. Not until November 18, 2005, did DOJ produce its fi rst installment of documents. 

Th e Department ultimately produced a very limited quantity of documents (approximately 

2,000 pages) and answered only some of the questions that the Committee asked in its 

October 7, 2005, letter and none of those asked in its February 21, 2006, follow-up list of 

prioritized items. Most disturbingly, DOJ’s refusal to make any witnesses available for transcribed interviews ultimately required the Committee to serve its only witness subpoenas of 

the investigation on the Department.

Th ese defi ciencies seriously impeded the Committee’s ability to investigate DOJ’s preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. Most signifi cantly, the delay in providing 

information or interviews necessarily kept the Committee from pursuing important leads 

generated by the little information it had received. For example, on August 30, 2005, the 

head of the Louisiana State Police, Colonel Henry Whitehorn, wrote to FBI Director Robert 

Mueller requesting “any assistance you can provide,” noting that New Orleans had “suffered massive damage”; that the state police were “utilizing all state assets to stabilize the 

situation” but that “looting continues to be a signifi cant problem.”99 Yet at his January 26, 

2006, interview, William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, said that 

DOJ was limited in its ability to provide law-enforcement assistance because the request did 

not come sooner, and from the Governor.100 Th is assertion made us especially interested in 

DOJ’s response to the Committee’s request to identify all requests for assistance that it re-
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690

ceived and its response to those requests, including “the date and time orders were issued to 

fulfi ll the request”; “the entity within the Department tasked to provide the assistance”; and 

“the key personnel involved in processing and responding to the request.” But DOJ never 

answered this question, nor did it provide the documents the Committee requested that 

would have shed light on DOJ’s reaction to the Whitehorn letter at the time. As a result, the 

Committee is left unable to fully understand why DOJ did not respond to the letter from 

Col. Whitehorn, either by soliciting the letter from the Governor it claims was required or 

otherwise,101 and why it took the position that it hadn’t received an adequate request.

As for the documents the Committee did receive, the production was, plainly, incomplete. 

For example, the Committee received documents from Mercer’s fi les refl ecting communications with individuals in the Attorney General’s offi ce and showing the signifi cant – albeit 

belated – involvement of that offi ce in the Katrina response, but received virtually no materials originating in the Attorney General’s offi ce itself.102 Mercer’s documents also show discussions on the National Response Plan with Senior Counsel for National Security Aff airs 

James McAtamney, but McAtamney’s fi les were not produced.103 Th e Committee received 

no aft er-action reports or similar documents examining the response of the Department or 

its various components to Katrina, raising the troubling possibility that DOJ has made no 

systematic eff orts to examine its own conduct for future benefi t.

Equally disturbingly, the Committee received a scant amount of e-mails from many component agencies involved in the response, including, notably, the FBI. FBI e-mails likely 

would have off ered insight into the circumstances under which the FBI operated in the fi rst 

days of the response. Hundreds of FBI agents were deployed to the area, but the Committee 

has no e-mails concerning this deployment exchanged between personnel at FBI headquarters; between agents in the fi eld; or between headquarters personnel and agents in the fi eld. 

E-mails produced by DHS law-enforcement offi cials convey a sense of confusion about the 

respective roles of DOJ, FBI, and DHS, and suggest that there was, at least for a time, a “turf 

war” between the FBI and DHS.104 Th is investigation is not complete without full insight 

into these issues. 

Finally, because the Department has attempted to excuse its tardy response to Katrina by 

claiming that its authority to provide the types of support contemplated under the National 

Response Plan is limited by federal statute,105 it is important that the Committee see any 

internal DOJ documents that analyze DOJ’s authority and that refl ect when this issue was 

researched and/or resolved.

In short, DOJ’s response was one of the investigation’s true disappointments. By treating 

the requests of a duly authorized Congressional investigative committee so cavalierly, we 

cannot but conclude that DOJ obstructed the Committee’s investigation and prevented the 

Committee – and, through it, the American people – from knowing the full story of the 

government’s failed response to this catastrophe.

The Department of Health and Human Services

Th e Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also did not cooperate with Committee eff orts to obtain information. HHS plays a signifi cant role in the federal response to 

disasters. Th e National Response Plan charges it with coordinating the federal government’s 

health and medical assistance to state and local authorities. During Katrina, HHS deployed 

over 2,100 U.S. Public Health Offi cers to assist in the response. HHS also sent over $38 

million of medical supplies to aff ected states through its Division of the Strategic National 

Stockpile at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, providing essential supplies 

to a region where large parts of the health-care system were damaged or destroyed. As the 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

691

federal government’s primary agency for public health and medical assistance, HHS was 

also responsible for ensuring that other federal medical assets, such as the National Disaster 

Medical System, were used eff ectively.

Th e Committee raised serious questions about the federal government’s fulfi llment of its 

mandate, ranging from the role it played in evacuating hospital and other acutely ill patients 

from New Orleans to recovering the bodies of Katrina’s victims. Th e Committee could not 

truly assess the adequacy of the federal medical response to Katrina nor make informed 

judgments for future recommendations without a comprehensive assessment of HHS’s actions. For that, the Committee needed HHS to have answered the questions and provided 

the documents the Committee had requested in its September 28, 2005, letter.

Yet, HHS was oft en unresponsive to the Committee’s requests and, to this day, its production remains incomplete. Key witnesses have not been interviewed and important information remains undelivered. Delays in providing access to information and witnesses severely 

hampered the ability of investigators to fully examine HHS’s performance prior to and 

during Katrina. 

Perhaps most disturbingly, HHS did not respond to the Committee’s September 28, 2005, 

information request until February 24, 2006.106 Even then, the HHS response had major 

gaps and shortcomings. For example, the Committee’s original request asked HHS to 

provide all emergency and contingency plans for all Department elements and relevant 

regional offi ces that were in eff ect at the time of Katrina. What HHS gave the Committee 

included, in essence, only one headquarters-level plan.107 Th e Committee requested aft er-action reports for emergency events and drills for the past fi ve years. While the Department’s 

response identifi ed 60 events and drills in this time frame, not a single aft er-action report 

was provided until April 7, 2006. In several cases, such as two Committee questions about 

the provision of mental-health services, there was no response whatsoever. Similarly, the 

Committee asked HHS to describe the extent to which two volunteer credentialing systems 

were used to help process volunteer medical personnel seeking to provide medical care in 

Mississippi and Louisiana during Katrina, but no response was provided.

Th e Committee’s original request also requested “copies of all communications, including, but 

not limited to, all records or logs of such communications” for numerous activities related to 

HHS’s response. HHS did not begin to provide relevant documents until December 2, 2005. 

Without exception, the responses for “all communications” were incomplete. For example, no 

records or logs of communications were provided. Th is was true even with regard to information logged into the HHS electronic incident-tracking system described by the Department (at 

the Committee’s request). Even documents produced by HHS were incomplete. For example, 

numerous e-mails provided in response to the Committee’s request did not include attachments – even when the sole purpose of the e-mail was to transmit the attachment.

Frustrated by this unacceptable lack of compliance, Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman wrote to HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt on January 13, 2006, expressing concern 

about the Department’s response. Th e letter noted that HHS “has been slow and disorganized – failing to provide attachments to e-mails, preparatory or pre-landfall materials, interrogatory responses, and basic situation reports.”108 Th e letter went on to identify 

priority items for production and stated that “[a]t this point, nearly four months aft er we 

fi rst requested the Department’s assistance, we must insist on a production of the requested 

documents by Wednesday, January 25, 2006.” Not having received a satisfactory answer, 

on February 17, 2006, they again wrote to Secretary Leavitt asking for a status report, no 

later than February 24, 2006, detailing when fi nal production would be complete. Some of 

the priority materials were fi nally provided on February 24, 2005. Still, a great deal of material remained outstanding. 
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692

HHS’s response to requests to interview Department employees was also unsatisfactory. Although two informational briefi ngs were provided to Committee investigators on December 

9, 2005, by staff of the Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, and on January 12, 

2006, by offi cers of the U.S. Public Health Service who deployed to Katrina, HHS resisted 

eff orts to schedule staff interviews. Th e fi rst did not take place until Monday, January 30, 

2006. Ultimately, the Department did make a number of requested witnesses available. 

However, the delay in initiating the process hampered the ability of investigators to conduct 

a thorough investigation and left inadequate time to interview several important witnesses.

Part III: Failure to Establish a Unifi ed Command

We want to comment on one more issue. Th e report places primary blame on the State of 

Louisiana for the inability of all the response agencies to establish a unifi ed command in 

that state during the fi rst week aft er landfall. In our view, the issue is far more complex. 

We believe that the failure to establish a unifi ed command resulted from three factors: Th e 

severity of the disaster; the failure of FEMA to have adequate numbers of personnel with 

suffi cient expertise and training to cope with a disaster of this magnitude; and the failure 

of the State of Louisiana to have suffi cient expertise and trained personnel to cope with a 

disaster of this magnitude. 

As the report acknowledges, local, state, and federal response agencies were responsible for 

establishing a unifi ed command under the Incident Command System (ICS). As the lead 

federal response agency, FEMA shared this responsibility. Th e evidence before the Committee is that the ability of many of the local responders to participate in a unifi ed command 

was severely impaired by extensive fl ooding and the destruction of much of the communications infrastructure. Neither FEMA nor Louisiana had a suffi cient number of trained 

personnel to establish an Incident Command System and a unifi ed command in the face of 

such extensive damage and the incapacitation of local offi cials. Both FEMA and Louisiana 

had to train additional personnel during the crisis. 

William Lokey, the FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana, told the Committee, 

“Th e locals were overwhelmed. We were going to be overwhelmed. Th ere was no way, with 

my experience and what I had to bring to the table, I was taking a knife to a gunfi ght.”109

Lokey said that FEMA employees, including those in Baton Rouge responding to Katrina, 

had not had suffi cient ICS training,110 and that FEMA’s requirement that National Emergency Response Team (ERT-N) members be profi cient in ICS by January 1, 2006, was just 

“wishful thinking” because “we’ve had no training dollars [and] we’ve had no opportunity 

to bring the folks together.”111 William Carwile, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer in 

Mississippi, testifi ed similarly: “Th ose of us who were somehow responsible for the teams 

felt very uncomfortable that the teams weren’t really ready to go.”112 As a result, William 

King, FEMA’s Chief of Planning in Louisiana during Katrina, reported, FEMA had to train 

its own people in the midst of the response: “We had to what I call ‘crawl, walk, run’ it and 

do the training of people and implement it over several days.”113 Tony Robinson, FEMA’s 

Operations Section Chief in Louisiana during Katrina, agreed that FEMA would have been 

able to respond better if it had more personnel available for deployment.114

Th is testimony leads us to conclude that neither FEMA nor Louisiana had a suffi cient 

number of trained personnel to establish the appropriate command-and-control structure 

in Louisiana. As FEMA and Louisiana shared the responsibility to establish a unifi ed command, FEMA and Louisiana share the accountability for the failure to do so. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

693

1 Clinton Rossiter, Th e American Presidency, 2nd Ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960, p. 4.

2 Commitee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 141.

3 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 143.

4 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 137-138, 141. Brown did not address these concerns publicly or in 

writing with Congress. However, during his appearance in front of the U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on Sept. 27, 2005, Brown alluded to having had some conversations with Members of Congress, though not with any Members of this Committee, regarding FEMA’s emaciation. 

When asked about the “emaciation” of FEMA, Brown suggested that for several years, he privately discussed how FEMA 

would become extremely limited in both personnel and fi nancial resources hindering its capacity to handle a disaster. In 

response to a question about Brown expressing his concerns about FEMA privately, but not publicly, Brown stated: “I 

can go to bed at night and sleep because I know I fought that battle.” In addition, later in the hearing when asked why he 

expressed his views about FEMA’s emaciation privately versus publicly, Brown testifi ed that he wanted to work within 

the system to make the needed changes. Source: Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. 

House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005.

5 Committee staff interview of Gary Jones, Acting Director, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript 

pp. 48-49, 149-152; Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA 

conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 2, 57-58.

6 Eric Tolbert, e-mail to Janet Benini and Ron Castleman, July 1, 2004, 4:24 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-0058-0000261.

7 Janet Benini, e-mail to Eric Tolbert and Ron Castleman, July 1, 2004, 4 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-0058-0000261 (“Th e Louisiana Hurricane is one of the potentially ‘catastrophic’ scenarios we’ve been working 

on at HSC”). 

8 Stephen Black, e-mail to Kirstjen Nielsen and Janet Benini, Feb. 22, 2005, 4:41 p.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. WHK 001059 through 001061.

9 Th e White House does not dispute that the President received these warnings and communications before landfall: 

“Th e President ‘received regular briefi ngs, had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local offi cials, and took 

extraordinary steps prior to landfall.’” Source: U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, 

pp. 28-29 [hereinaft er Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned]. But the White House did not detail in 

either its report, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Frances Fragos Townsend’s February 13, 

2006, speech at the National Emergency Management Association’s mid-year conference, or elsewhere, any specifi c details about the briefi ngs or conversations. Source: Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, pp. 28-29, 174. 

10 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S Department of Homeland Security and Federal 

Emergency Management Agency Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Deposition of Michael Brown, before U.S. House Select Committee staff , Feb. 11, 2006, p. 11 (testifying that during a call to the President, he said that Hurricane Katrina could be 

“the big one”).

11 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript pp. 22-23. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-000061 through 0000062.

12 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 22. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-00000061.

13 Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000044 through 0000045.

14 Joseph Hagin, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 24. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000063.

15 Andrew Akers, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 

11:24 p.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 05865 through 05867. Th e other addressees for the 

e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliot Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, 

Gail Kulish, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, John Wood, National Interagency Coordination Center, Secretary Briefi ng 

Staff , Homeland Security Operations Center, Homeland Security Information Network. Attached to that e-mail was 

“Fast Analysis Report (Update to Refl ect Category 5 Status) to DHS IP on Hurricane Katrina, Gulf Coast,” the Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 1.

16 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 1, 14-16, 20. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000066, -0000079 through 0000081, 0000085.

17 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 2, 6. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000067, 0000071.
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694

18 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 37. Provided to the Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000102. During his staff interview on February 23, 2006, Brown discussed a telephone 

call with Joe Hagin aft er the noon VTC. He described the conversation as follows: “And Hagin and I were having a 

conversation just about . . . how bad this one was going to be and, you know, dad-gamut all the – I mean, I was really 

bitching at Hagin about all of the planning I’d been asking for and you know, the catastrophic planning we’d been wanting to do, you know, now – and now here we are, and, you know, saying to him, you know, dad-gamut, why didn’t I quit 

earlier – then, you know, you guys knew I wanted to quit. I mean, we’re having this sparring match about all of this stuff 

that I was really mad about because I knew I was walking into this hornets’ nest . . . I’m really ticked off , because I know 

how bad this thing’s going to be.” Brown further described the conversation: “ . . . I’m just adamant that they understand 

my concern about New Orleans. I mean, I don’t know how to get this across to people that I have pushed and pushed for 

catastrophic disaster planning; we had chosen New Orleans as the fi rst place to do catastrophic disaster planning; and 

now, damn it, here was a, you know, a Cat 5 bearing down on – on New Orleans.” Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 

34, 36-37.

19 Bill Doran, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000081 through -0000090.

20 President Bush, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28. 2005, transcript pp. 14-15. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000079 through 0000080. Th e White House’s own report, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, describes the President as actively engaged the weekend prior to landfall, communicating 

with state and local offi cials and off ering federal assets. Th e White House’s report also cites the August 28 video teleconference as the mechanism used by the President to communicate with offi cials and off er federal assets. Source: Th e White 

House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, pp. 28, 174. But on March 2, 2006, Trent Duff y, a spokesman for the President, downplayed the utility of that call: “I hope people don’t draw conclusions from the president getting a single briefi ng 

... He received multiple briefi ngs from multiple offi cials, and he was completely engaged at all times.” Source: Robert 

Block, “Tape of Pre-Katrina Briefi ng Shows Bush Was Warned Of Dangers,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 2006, p. A3.

21 breakingnews@foxnews.com, e-mail to BREAKINGNEWS Subscribers, Aug. 28, 2005, 7:51 a.m., Provided to Committee; Bates no. WHK-08489 (printed out by Landon Gibbs).

22 Steven York, e-mail to Andrew Akers and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

WHK 05319 through 05320. Th e other addressees of this e-mail are Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch 

Offi cer, DL-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward 

McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , Homeland 

Security Operations Center Homeland Security Information Network; breakingnews@foxnews.com, e-mail to BREAKINGNEWS Subscribers, Aug. 28, 2005, 7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; Bates no. WHK-08489.

23 Andrew Akers, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:47 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 15894 through 15937. Th e other addresses of the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, 

Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard 

Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, 

Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC HSIN. 

24 Th e White House lauded the President’s issuance of the emergency declarations as “extremely rare, and indicative 

of the recognition that Katrina had the potential to be particularly devastating.” Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: 

Lessons Learned, p. 27.

25 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 33; White House Briefi ng to Committee, conducted by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Dec. 13, 2005.

26 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Document and Information Request dated October 7, 2005, and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Governor Kathleen 

Babineaux Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 6 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline]. (Stating that she received the call from the President “just before she 

walks into the news conference,” at which she announced with Mayor Nagin the mandatory evacuation of New Orleans).

27 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

28 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006.

29 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/print/20050831-3.html. Accessed on Mar. 29, 2006. 

30 Spencer Hsu and Amy Goldstein, “Administration Faulted on Katrina,” Washington Post, Feb. 2, 2006, p. A5.

31 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhome, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane 

Katrina, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 3. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

32 Daniel Kaniewski, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OVP 004795. Th e other addressees are Todd Beyer, Bill Burck, Trent Duff y, Joseph Hagin, Brian Hook, Brett 

Kavanaugh, Emily Kropp, William McGurn, Stephen McMillin, Harriet Miers, Bruce Miller, Susan Ralston, Kenneth 

Rapuano, Scott Sforza, Kristen Silverberg, Heidi Smith, Frances Townsend, and copied to Steven Atkiss, Jessica Bennett, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

695

Stephen Black, Jamie Brown, John Burke, Shannon Burkhart, John Currin, Robert DeServi, DL-HSC-BTS, DL-HSCCHEM-BIO, DL-HSCEXECSEC, DL-HSC-Front, DL-HSC-PPR, DL-NSC-WHSR, Lindsey Drouin, Debbie Fiddelke, 

Erin Healy, Taylor Hughes, Lauren Kane, Karyn Richman Kendall, Matthew Kirk, Ross Kyle, Jeannie Mamo, Christopher Michel, Alexander Mistri, John Mitnick, Derrick Morgan, Erin Nagle, Neil Patel, Dana Perino, Douglas Pitkin, 

Heather Roebke, Daniel Wilmot, Candace Wysocki, DeWitt Zemp. (“Flooding signifi cant throughout the region and 

a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the 

city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping 

station, causing fl ooding. HSOC reports that due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and 

on their roofs.”). Th e President’s knowledge of when New Orleans’ levees breached has been the subject of much media 

attention. In the week aft er landfall, the President himself made statements regarding the levee breaches. For instance, 

on Friday, September 2, 2005, during a press conference in Biloxi, Mississippi, the President stated: “Th e levees broke 

on Tuesday in New Orleans. On Wednesday, we – and Th ursday we started evacuating people. A lot of people have left 

that city. A lot of people have been pulled out on buses. It’s – I am satisfi ed with the response. I’m not satisfi ed with all 

the results. Th ey started pulling people off roofs immediately. Th ey started rallying – we started rallying choppers to get 

people off rooft ops, started savings lives. I mean, thousands of peoples’ lives have been saved immediately, and that’s 

good news. Th is is one of the worst storms in our nation’s history. New Orleans got hit by two storms, one the hurricane, 

and then the fl ood. And it’s going to take a monumental eff ort to continue moving forward, but we will.” Th e White 

House, “President Tours Biloxi, Mississippi, Hurricane Damaged Neighborhoods,” press release, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01656, 01658. As set forth herein, the President’s statements contradict the reality of the situation as several pieces of evidence show the levees breached on Monday.

33 Insung Lee, e-mail to Kirstjen Nielsen, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:16 a.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 

16111. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Interagency Incident Management Group, and Homeland Security Operations Center-All-Desks. 

34 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:32 a.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 11923. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR; Bethany 

Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, 

Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail 

Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN.

35 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:32 a.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 11923. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR; Bethany 

Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, 

Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail 

Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN.

36 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript p. 24. Provided to Committee. 

37 On the noon video teleconference, Brown said he spoke with President Bush at least twice on the day of landfall, likely 

prior to noon. Brown stated: “I talked to the President twice today, once in Crawford and then again on Air Force One.” 

Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript p. 14. Provided to Committee. Brown also 

testifi ed that he spoke to White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin on at least two occasions on the day of landfall. 

Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Andrew 

Card, e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee (showing that Brown spoke with 

Hagin on August 29 to provide updates of the situation in New Orleans.). Interestingly, when asked whether he spoke 

directly to the President on the night of landfall concerning Bahamonde’s over fl ight, Brown said he could not recall if he 

spoke to the President then. Brown stated: “I really don’t recall if the President got – normally during my conversations 

with Deputy Chief of Staff Hag[i]n, sometimes the President would get on the phone for a few minutes, sometimes he 

wouldn’t, and I don’t recall specifi cally that night whether he did or not.” Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. 

38 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 23-25 (“Question: Is there any reason for us to doubt that aft er you 

talked to Joe Hagin 5 or 6 o’clock on Monday evening, August 29th, that he then knew from you that the 17th Street Canal 

levee had broke and the city was fl ooding? Answer: I don’t think there is any reason for any of us to doubt that they knew 

that. Question: Okay. And that they knew that at least in part from your phone conversation with Joe Hagin, correct? 

Answer: Th at’s correct.”). Th e substance of the Brown’s reports to the White House on August 29 concerned the situation 

on the ground in New Orleans, including the early reports from Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA Public Aff airs offi cial and the 

only FEMA offi cial on the ground in New Orleans the day of landfall. More specifi cally, Brown said he spoke with Hagin 

on Monday evening to discuss Bahamonde’s report of his New Orleans fl yover over New Orleans, but could not recall 

whether he specifi cally told Hagin in that call that the levees had broken. Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 21 

(“I think I used the phrase to Joe that, you know, our – the worst nightmare is occurring. ... I can’t recall all of the words I 

used other than, this is, you know, our worst – this is the worst scenario; this is, you know my worst fears are coming true. 

You know, I used the phrase, you know we have breaches of the canals.”); Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006 (“I think I told him that we were realizing our worst 

nightmare, that everything we had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years was 

coming true.”). Brown said he told Hagin or White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card about the levee breaches late in the 

aft ernoon on Monday because he recalled they were “debating” at the state Emergency Operations Center whether the 

levees were breached or overtopped. Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Com-
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696

mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16; Deposition of Michael Brown, before the House 

Katrina Select Committee Staff , Feb. 11, 2006, p. 114. Brown also received an e-mail from White House Chief of Staff 

Andrew Card at 9:51 p.m., Monday, in which Card acknowledged Brown’s continued contact with White House Deputy 

Chief of Staff Joe Hagin and said: “Joe Hagin has kept me well-informed of your reports.” Andrew Card, e-mail to Michael 

Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee. Brown responded and stated: “Th anks for writing, Andy. Th is is 

a bad one.” Michael Brown, e-mail to Andrew Card, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee.

39 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. 

40 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

41 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 34-36.

42 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2005/08/print/20050829-5.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006; Th e White House, “President 

Discusses Medicare, New Prescription Drug Benefi ts,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/print/20050829-11.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006; Th e White House, “Recent Photo Essay,” Aug. 29, 

2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/images/20050829-5_p082905pm-0125-515h.html. Accessed on 

Apr. 26, 2006 (including a picture of the President with Senator McCain holding a birthday cake and the caption, “President George W. Bush joins Arizona Senator John McCain in a small celebration of McCain’s 69th birthday.”).

43 Th e White House, “President Discusses Medicare, New Prescription Drug Benefi ts,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-11.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

44 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-5.html Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

45 HSOC Spot Report #13: Th e Report further stated: “Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but 

cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.” Th e White House received this report at 12:02 a.m., 

Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005. Michael Izner, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center – Homeland Security Information Network and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:02 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 07158 through 

07160. Th e other addressees for the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, the National Interagency Coordination Center, as well 

as the following offi cials, Bethany Nichol, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John 

Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulish, Tom Parr, Michael Jackson, and John Wood. 

46 Michael Izner, e-mail to DL-NSC-WHSR, Aug. 30, 2005, 6:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 

06264. Th e other addresses of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth 

Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, 

Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John 

Wood, (COS), NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.SWO. 

47 E-mail from Insung Lee to DL-NSC-WHSR and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:23 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. WHK 07910. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, 

Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, John Wood, 

(COS), NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff ; HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.SWO, HSOC.FEMA, HSOC.DOD, HSOC.State&Local.

48 Th e White House, “President Commemorates 60th Anniversary of V-J Day,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/images/20050830-1.html. Accessed on Mar. 11, 2005.

49 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 89-90; Deposition of Michael Brown before the House Katrina Select 

Committee, Feb. 11, 2006, pp. 111-112 (warning the President, Vice President, Secretary Chertoff , and Deputy Chief 

of Staff Karl Rove that “probably 90 percent of the population of New Orleans had been displaced, that we had a true 

catastrophic disaster on our hands, that this was probably one of the most serious things that the country had faced; that 

it was. We needed to be doing everything possible.”).

50 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 89-90. 

51 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 97-98.

52 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 97-98.

53 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 89-91.

54 Th e White House. “Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan, Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California,” press 

release, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01632 through 01633. (“QUESTION: Th is is 

more – this is more symbolic. Cutting short his vacation is more symbolic because he can do all this from the ranch, 

right? McCLELLAN: No, I think – no, I disagree. Like I said, this is one of the most devastating storms in our nation’s 

history, and the President, aft er receiving a further update this morning, made the decision that he wanted to get back to 

D.C. and oversee the response eff orts from there.”).

55 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01636 through 01637.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

697

56 Committee staff interview with Laurence Broun, Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of the Interior, conducted 

on Mar. 21, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16.

57 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center, Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 31, 2005, 12:41 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 12588 through 12598. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are DL-NSCWHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, 

Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward 

McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John Wood, (COS), NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , 

HSOC.HSIN, IMD.

58 Th e White House, “President’s Remarks to the Travel Pool in Louisiana,” press release, Sept. 20, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050920-2.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. 

59 Remarks by President George W. Bush to the travel pool in Louisiana. White House Regular Briefi ng, Sept. 20, 2005; 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050920-3.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

60 Th e White House, “Press Briefi ng by Scott McClellan,” press release, Sept. 22, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2005/print/20050922-2.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. 

61 Th e White House, “President Briefed on Hurricane Rita Preparations at FEMA,” press release, Sept. 23, 2005. http://

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050923.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. 

62 White House Press Gaggle (as released by the White House), Sept. 24, 2005 aboard Air Force One en route to Austin, 

Texas http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050924-8.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.

63 President George W. Bush, Good Morning America, ABC, “President George W. Bush Exclusive Interview,” Sept. 1, 

2005. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

64 Th e White House. “President, Lieutenant General Honoré Discuss Hurricane Relief in Louisiana,” press release, Sept. 

12, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 01723.

65 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhume, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane 

Katrina, Dec. 20, 2005, p.9. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov\pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006. 

(“Th e surge overtopped large sections of the levees during the morning of 29 August east of New Orleans, in Orleans 

Parish and St. Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the Intracoastal Waterway and into the Industrial Canal. 

Th e water rise in Lake Pontchartrain strained the fl oodwalls along the canals adjacent to its southern shore, including 

the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal. Breaches along both the Industrial Canal east of downtown New 

Orleans and the 17th Street Canal northwest of downtown appear to have occurred during the early morning on 29 

August, possibly even before the eye made initial landfall in Louisiana. Breaches along the London Avenue Canal north 

of downtown appear to have occurred later that night.”).

66 Daniel J. Kaniewski, Director of Response and Recovery Homeland Security Council, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and 

others. Th e White House, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m., p.1. Provided to Committee. Filed as Bates no. WHK 004795. 

(“Currently Katrina has 127 mph sustained winds, making it a Category 3 storm. Katrina is moving northward, located 

22 miles to the east of New Orleans. Flooding is signifi cant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the Governor, water is 

rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing fl ooding. HSOC 

reports that due to the rising water in the 9th ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.”)

67 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, prepared by U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, and National Weather Service, 1994, p. 5–2 (“Although designed to provide substantial levels 

of protection, these levees and fl oodwalls are subject to overtopping during catastrophic events. Th e surge inundation maps show that for slow moving category 3, category 4, or category 5 storms, only those reaches of St. Tammany 

Parish located north of I-12 would be outside of the potential limits of storm surge.”); Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, “Background Information to Accompany Region VI Hurricane Plan For New Orleans, Corps of Engineers 

Analysis of the Flood Problem in New Orleans,” p. 1 (“Th e most dangerous storm would be a slow-moving category 

3 or stronger hurricane on a path that carries it northward 20 to 30 miles west of and parallel to the Mississippi River 

until it is near New Orleans. Th e worst case would be if a storm on that path then re-curved to the north and continued 

inland. ... Th ere could be extensive and severe erosion of levees and perhaps complete breaches. ... Each of the aff ected 

parishes has a series of one or more levees which normally form a protective ring around the inhabited area, although, 

if a severe hurricane produces fl ooding higher than the levees are designed for, the surge could overtop the levees and 

cause massive fl ooding. Storm surge, rain water, and natural run-off can fi ll these bowl-shaped areas aft er a hurricane. 

Some areas do not have hurricane protection levees, and in those areas, storm surge can rise and recede quickly. But 

when a hurricane storm surge overtops ring-levees and fi lls the bowl, the protective levees may actually trap fl ood-water, 

prevent it from draining out, and prolong the fl ooding.”); in Sherry Wainwright, FEMA Region VI, “Hurricane Plan for 

Louisiana, Attachment to the Regional Supplement to the Federal Response Plan,” May 2002. Provided to the Committee; Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, Jan. 2000, p. II-1 (“... worst case Category 3, 4 or 

5 Hurricane Scenario for the Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area, as determined by the National Weather Service 

(NWS) Sea, Lake, and Overland Surge from Hurricanes (SLOSH) Model, could cause a maximum inundation of 20 feet 

above sea level in some of the parishes in the Region, not including tidal eff ects, wind waves and storm rainfall.”); State 

of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Strategy – Volume I State of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Plan, Apr. 15, 2005, p. I-46 

(“In Louisiana, storm surges are large waves of Gulf waters that sweep across coastlines where a tropical storm makes 

landfall. Generally the more intense the storm, the greater the height of the storm surge; the higher the storm surge, the 

greater the damage to the coastline. ... Shallow coastal bathymetry increases the magnitude of a storm surge. Th e coastal 
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698

bathymetry of southeastern Louisiana, with its low, fl at topography and land surface elevations that in many places dip 

below sea level, can experience storm surges up to 100 miles inland. Category 3 storms can bring depths up to 24 feet 

as far north as the City of New Orleans. Category 5 storms can produce depths as high as 36 feet. Furthermore, lakes 

along the coast, namely, Lake Maurepas, Lake Borgne, and Lake Pontchartrain, exacerbate the eff ects of coastal fl ooding 

because of wave eff ects that can regenerate over inland lakes.”).

68 Committee staff interview with Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., National Weather Service, conducted on Feb. 24, 2006, transcript p. 56 (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surge from Hurricane (SLOSH) storm surge studies in New Orleans reported to 

emergency preparedness offi cials in 2004 and 2005, stating that “Th e big change that we saw was that we were going to 

start seeing some fl ooding now with a few category 2 hurricanes,” without any mention of levee breaches); “Hurricanes: 

Nature’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” presentation by Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., National Weather Service to the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association, June 1, 2005 (including a computer projection showing extensive overtopping 

of New Orleans levees from composite of Category 3 hurricanes, as well as a slide entitled, “Louisiana’s Vulnerability to 

Hurricane Storm Surge”); Brett Herr, e-mail to Jay Baker, Mar. 15, 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0025-0002638 (“New surge inundation maps show signifi cant portions of Orleans and Jeff erson Parish that are 

susceptible to fl ooding from slow-moving Category 2 and fast Category 3 hurricanes. We had previously thought that 

the city would ... fare pretty well for these types of storm. Th e new maps will result in signifi cantly longer [evacuation] 

clearance times for these scenarios.”).

69 President George W. Bush, CNN Live Today, CNN, “President Bush Visits Gulf Coast: Early Warnings – Part 2,” Sept. 

2, 2005, 10 a.m. Transcript, accessed on LexisNexis.

70 White House Briefi ng to Committee, conducted by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Feb. 3, 2006. 

71 Speech of President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, Louisiana, Sept. 15, 2005.

72 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

73 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on “Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Andrew Card, e-mail to 

Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee.

74 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Brown interview, Feb. 23, 

2006, transcript p. 21.

75 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 24-25. Th e following exchange occurred: Question: Is there any reason 

for us to doubt that aft er you talked to Joe Hagin 5 or 6 o’clock on Monday evening, August 29th, that he then knew 

from you that the 17th Street Canal levee had broke and the city was fl ooding? Answer: I don’t think there is any reason 

for any of us to doubt that they knew that. Question: Okay. And that they knew that at least in part from your phone 

conversation with Joe Hagin, correct? Answer: Th at’s correct.

76 Andrew H. Card, Jr., e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to the Committee; Michael Brown, 

e-mail to Andrew Card, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to the Committee.

77 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

78 Senator Lieberman stated: At the time, I did not seek a subpoena to the Offi ce of the Vice President (OVP), to which 

the Committee sent a separate request letter, because that Offi ce provided, in some respects, more responsive and useful 

material than did the rest of the White House. Th e OVP produced to the Committee a variety of material referencing 

or originating with its high-level staff , and it did not seek to assert the absolutist position put forth by the White House 

Counsel’s offi ce on behalf of the rest of the White House. While I am skeptical that we received a full production from 

the OVP and believe that the Committee should have pushed harder for a larger production, I nonetheless did not 

include the OVP in my subpoena request because I did not conclude that its response reached the level of egregiousness 

demonstrated by the rest of the White House. Ranking Member Lieberman, letter to Chairman Collins, Mar. 15, 2006.

79 Congressional Research Service, Memorandum to Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, 

Nov. 29, 2005, p. 13.

80 Congressional Research Service, Memorandum to Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, 

Feb. 9, 2006, p. 3. (Emphasis added.)

81 Congressional Record, Dec. 20, 1995 p. S18972. (Emphasis added).

82 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on “Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

83 Chairman Collins, letter to Ranking Member Lieberman, Mar. 15, 2006, p. 1.

84 True, the General Accountability Offi ce and some agency Inspectors General have conducted their own investigations, but none, to our knowledge, are as comprehensive as the Committee’s, nor have any received greater cooperation 

from the White House (to the extent that they have even asked for it).

85 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

699

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005 (“it is important as we go forward that we learn lessons, even 

painful lessons, from past experiences, things that worked well and things that didn’t work well.”).

86 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 33.

87 Because only individuals at DHS know if they have produced to us all the responsive documents they have, it can be 

diffi cult for a requestor to state defi nitively whether a request has been fully complied with. However, there are areas 

where the nonresponsiveness is obvious – for instance, in the case of information requests that there has been no attempt to answer or in requests, such as that for Secretary Chertoff ’s schedule or documents in his possession, for which 

clearly no material has been produced. In other cases, a small fraction of the material requested may have been produced 

but the request has nonetheless clearly not been complied with. Th us, for example, in a January 30, 2006 letter to the majority staff director, which was shared with Senator Lieberman’s staff , Gus Coldebella, Deputy General Counsel of DHS 

attached a table purporting to show the extent of DHS’s compliance with the priority document requests included in 

the Committee’s December 30, 2005 letter. A cursory look at the table might suggest that most of the requests have been 

complied with, but in fact any such suggestion would be highly misleading. For example, the December 30 letter asked 

for all documents related to the Federal Protective Service’s preparation for or response to Hurricane Katrina, including 

any actions taken at the Superdome and the Convention Center; what Coldebella’s letter lists as produced in response 

comprises simply the e-mails for a single individual, the head of the Federal Protective Service. Gus P. Coldebella, letter 

to Michael Bopp, Senate Committee staff member, Jan. 30, 2006. 

88 Committee staff agreed to forego interviewing the remaining individual on the list.

89 Th e Committee was permitted to interview only two individuals who were not on the December 30, 2005, priority 

list: the Director of the Federal Protective Service and the Chief of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Division of the 

National Communications System – both in preparation for a hearing focused on law enforcement and communications 

issues, respectively.

90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, SITREP #7, Aug. 29, 2005, 6 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS 0001181.

91 Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 

27, 2006, transcript p. 38.

92 Committee staff interview of William E. King, Branch Chief, Region V, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, Technical Services Branch, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript pp. 178-179.

93 Th e only exceptions to this were Matthew Broderick, Director of the HSOC, whose interview lasted for approximately 

a total of six hours over the course of two sessions in a single day, and Wendell Shingler, Director of the Federal Protective Service, who was interviewed in a second session lasting less than 40 minutes two weeks aft er his initial interview, in 

order to clarify a particular issue.

94 Specifi cally, at the end of the session with Robert Stephan, the General Counsel for the Minority stated: “If I may, and 

I don’t mean this in any way – there are a whole lot of – we are sort of circumscribed by time here, and I must tell you, 

you have been most informative, extremely insightful in a lot of ways. But it doesn’t begin to get to a whole lot of other 

issues that we want to spend time with, with somebody who is so central to so many aspects of DHS in connection with 

a catastrophe. I would like to meet with you again. I would like to ask that this be continued. I would like to get documents, particularly e-mails, from you. And that’s central to any good investigation. So while we may fi nish here today, it’s 

a very strong position of the minority that we really do have to speak with you again, and we need to have documents that 

are central to what you were doing, particularly the e-mails. And I would like to have this session be continued on that 

basis.” Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 148-149. Stephan’s interview represented a convergence of 

a number of DHS’s uncooperative practices. In addition to unreasonably limiting the time of the interview, DHS counsel 

also produced Stephan several hours before he had been scheduled to appear and in lieu of another witness who had been 

scheduled for that time. Moreover, none of Stephan’s e-mails had been produced before his appearance for the interview. 

95 Although DHS eventually made the then-Chief Financial Offi cer, Andrew Maner, available for an interview on February 2, 2006, the virtual absence of any budget-related documents signifi cantly limited the eff ectiveness of any questioning 

Committee staff could pursue.

96 Subsequently, DHS also produced to the Committee documents that were posted on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) portal.

97 Lt. Robert Walls, e-mail to LANTMHLS Watch, RCCAlameda, CommandCenPAC, Command Center - D1, CC1, 

Command Center - LANTD5, D7CommandCenter, D8 Command Center, Ninth District Command Center, CommandCenD11, D13(cc), D14ccDutyOffi cer, D17-PF-Jun-Command Center, hsoc.uscg@dhs.gov, fl dr-NRC, D05-SMBD5MHLSWatch, D05-SMB-LANTCmdCtr, D05-SMB-LANTMHLSWatch, D8IMTWatch, tsoc.st@dhs.gov, est-mccdot@dhs.gov, CMC-01@rspa.dot.gov, cmc-02@dot.gov, uscg.iimg@dhs.gov, Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to the Committee.

98 Th e Committee recently received information in answer to this specifi c question only by including it, in a modifi ed 

form, in a question for the record to Secretary Chertoff aft er his appearance before the Committee. Questions for the 

Record of Sec. Chertoff , Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 33-41. Other questions remain unanswered, however.

99 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. FBI 000000003.
700

100 Committee staff interview of William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 29-30 (“But I guess if the question is how did the requests come in, let me 

turn to those. Because that’s a very signifi cant part of the Federal statute here. In Title 42 – and I think the provision is 

42 U.S.C. § 10501 – a governor, not a state attorney general, not a mayor – a governor can ask the Attorney General of 

the United States to deploy Federal law enforcement resources if the governor makes a proff er saying, ‘We can’t meet the 

responsibilities that we need to carry out for public safety, and I request that you deploy Federal resources to assist.’ And 

we got a letter from Governor Barbour on Saturday the 3rd. And we responded that same day. It was faxed in on the 

3rd, we met with the Attorney General on Saturday. He issued the order on Saturday. . . . And Governor Blanco faxed us 

a letter the next day.”). Mr. Mercer also said that the Offi ce of the Deputy Attorney General did not receive “any direct 

requests from a state or local offi cial until [it] got the letter from Governor Barbour on the 3rd of September.” Mercer 

interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 24. Apparently, Mercer also did not consider a request addressed to the head of the FBI to be 

a “direct request” to the appropriate offi ce. Mercer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 30-31.

101 Mercer, when asked whether anyone from DOJ had spoken with the governor’s offi ce about the requirement of a 

gubernatorial request, responded that he did not know. Mercer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 44-45.

102 See, e.g., William Mercer, e-mail to Ted Ulloyt, Kyle Sampson, and Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 1:30 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000064 (forwarding a memorandum written by Mercer that has never been 

produced. In the transmittal e-mail, Mercer off ers to put the information into bullet points and notes that “there are 

some important things to pass along to the AG” concerning Mercer’s discussions with the U.S. Attorneys from Baton 

Rouge and New Orleans).

103 See, e.g., James McAtamney, Senior Counsel for National Security Aff airs, Transmittal slip with cover notes and 

ESF-13 excerpt to Ted Ullyot and Bill Mercer. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000100 through 

000000106. Th e Committee does not have McAtamney’s e-mails except to the extent they were produced as part of 

Mercer’s fi les.

104 See, e.g., Matthew Broderick, e-mail to John Clark, Sept. 4, 2005, 4:23 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-HSOC-0004-0006525. (“Th e dispute is whether FBI or ICE is the lead. I believe we have designated the ICE SAC as 

the lead. DHS and DOJ co-share this ESF and usually (terrorist related) FBI is lead. Th is is a good chance for us to be.”). 

105 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (“Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Program”). 

106 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Response to the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Questions regarding Katrina,” undated, received by the Committee on Feb. 24, 2006.

107 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for Public Health and 

Medical Emergencies,” Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as OPHEP 16285 through OPHEP 16315.

108 Chairman Collins and Sen. Lieberman, letter to Sec. Michael Leavitt, Jan. 13, 2006.

109 Committee staff interview of William M. Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 75-76.

110 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 192-193. At the time Katrina hit, FEMA had not yet produced an Incident Management Handbook to adapt ICS to FEMA operations. Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 194. See FEMA ERT-N Draft 

Concept of Operations (6-6-05). Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0115-0000010. 

111 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 191. William Carwile III, the FCO for Mississippi, also complained about the lack 

of training dollars for ERT-N teams. Committee staff interview of William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 22-23, 43. 

112 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 47.

113 King interview, Jan. 17, 2006, p. 28.

114 Committee staff interview of Tony Robinson, Director, Response and Recovery Division, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 40.

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