Filed 2/6/14 In re Alisha A. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO
In re ALISHA A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B246561 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ51041)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
ALISHA A.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Cynthia Loo, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. Torres & Torres and Steven A. Torres, un der appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorneys General, and Victoria B. Wilson, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Minor and appellant Alisha A. (minor) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court entered after the court sustained a petiti on filed pursuant to We lfare and Institutions
Code section 602 1 (petition or section 6 02 petition). Minor contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to dete rmine whether she would be be tter served in dependency proceedings under sect ion 300, or by remaining in delin quency proceedings under section 602. Minor also contends that the juvenile court erred in denyin g her motion to exclude evidence on the grou nd that she was a victim of human trafficking. Finding no merit in minor’s contentions, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND The section 602 petition alleged that minor had solicited anothe r to engage in prostitution, in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (b), a misdemeanor. Minor denied the allegation and filed a pr eadjudication motion to exclude evidence relating to the solicitation allegation under Ev idence Code section 1161, on the ground that she was a victim of human trafficking. Prior to the hearing a probation report was filed informing the juvenile court that minor was a runaway from an Ar izona group home for prostitutes, her mother and sisters lived in Arizona, and she had no family in California. The probation officer contacted the child protective services agency in Maricopa County, Arizona, and learned that in
November 2012 minor had been made a ward of the court there, “because the mother ‘refused to parent her.’” Minor’s testimony during the evidentiary he aring on the motion was limited to the
issue of whether she had been a victim of hum an trafficking. She testified that she was 17 years old and that “Tootie” was her pimp. Tootie required her to work for him, told her what to do, and threatened to hit her if she did not co mply. He hit her hard on the right cheek the day she was a rrested, but left no visible marks or swelling. Minor testified that prior to her arrest Tootie woul d tell her where to stand and what to do, and he took any money she earned. In exchange , he provided her with a place to live, but

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.3 gave her no money. Tootie would drop minor off at the chosen location and watch her from his car, a late-model black Infiniti.
Minor testified she met Tootie soon after she arrived in Calif ornia, having been introduced to him by her friend Champaign, with whom she had voluntarily absconded from her Arizona group home. Minor did not kn ow Tootie’s real name or his age, but she described him as dark-complected, six-f oot one-inch tall, with dimples and some
tattoos. Tootie lived rent free with his aunt in her house and minor lived with them. No
one else lived there. Minor did not know the address or wh ere the house was located, but
claimed it was about an hour’s drive from Los Angeles. During the two months minor
lived with Tootie she gave him all her money and he paid for her food, clothing, and cell phone. Minor did not consider Tootie to be her boyfriend.
Minor claimed she was not free to leave Tootie’s house because he was always
with her and would beat her if she tried. He never left her alone an d always took her with
him whenever he left the house. Minor also testified that she did not consider herself to be Tootie’s captive, she never tried to contact the police or anyone else for help, and it
did not occur to her to ask To otie’s aunt for help. Minor’s friend Champaign disappeared after introducing minor to Tootie. Thereafter her cell phone became inactive. Minor had no contact number for her mother or other family members. Minor had Tootie’s telephone number in he r cell phone when she was arrested and
could have contacted him. Instead she did not give this information to the police or mention that she had a pimp. Minor saw no point in telling the police anything because she knew she would just be returned to Arizon a, which was all she wanted. This was her second AWOL from her group home -- she returned voluntarily the first time. Minor left simply because she wanted to get out of Arizona. The adjudication hearing was conducte d prior to a ruling on the motion. Los Angeles Police Officer Steven Torres tes tified that while working undercover with a vice team on January 5, 2013, he observed minor standing on a street corner at 2:30 a.m., looking in various directions in the manner commonly used by prostitutes to look for a lone male motorist or pedestrian. Officer Torres approached minor, invited her into the4 car, and struck up a conversatio n with her. He said he was looking for a “good time” and asked what she was “good at.” Minor rep lied she had a tongue ring and was “good at giving oral” which was a common phrase for oral copulation. Officer Torres replied “Okay” or “Good” and asked what he needed to get that. Minor said $100 and he verified the offer with, “So $ 100 for oral?” When she said yes, Officer Torres signaled
uniformed officers who then arrested minor. The juvenile court denied the preadjudi cation motion, finding that minor had not met her burden to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding she was a victim of human trafficking. The juvenile court then sustained the 602 petition. On the same day, the juvenile court considered a petition pursua nt to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles,
Welfare and Institutions Code section 1400 (section 1400 petition) wh ich had been filed on behalf of child protective services in Mari copa County, Arizona, seeking return of the minor to its jurisdiction. After minor signed a voluntary return co nsent form, and finding
it was in minor’s best interest to be returned to Arizona, the juvenile court granted the section 1400 petition, ordered minor to be returned to Arizona, calendared a nonappearance review for the following mont h, and without entering a disposition,
indicated that it would dismiss the section 602 petition upon verifica tion that minor had been transported to Arizona. The next day the juvenile court reconsider ed its order and entered a disposition. The court placed minor on proba tion under specific terms a nd conditions, but without the supervision of the probation department, pur suant to section 727, subdivision (a). The court noted it would consider dismissing th e section 602 petition in the future, upon
verification that minor had arrived in Ariz ona and was “doing well” in the Arizona program. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION I. Section 241.1 report Minor contends that the juvenile court was required to obtain a joint report as described in section 241.1, subdivision (a), and to make a determination whether she5 would be better served unde r section 300 dependency proc eedings or in delinquency proceedings. Section 241.1, subdivision (a), provides: “Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300 and Section 6 01 or 602, the county pr obation department and the child welfare services department shall, pursuant to a jointly developed written protocol described in subdi vision (b), initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both depart ments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor.” 2

Minor argues because she was a ward of the court in Arizona due to parental neglect, and since neglect is a basis for depe ndency jurisdiction, she “appears to come within the description of bo th Section 300 and Section . . . 602.” She concludes that because the juvenile court failed to obtain the joint report and make that determination, the judgment must be reversed. We find no merit in minor’s argument. There was no reason to prepare a section 241.1 report in this case. “In California, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a minor can be invoked in two ways: (1 ) by a dependency petitio n (§ 300), which alleges the child’s home is unfit due to parental abuse or neglect; or (2) by a delinquency petition, which
accuses the child of either disobedience or trua ncy (§ 601) or the violation of a law that defines a crime (§ 602).” ( In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 42.) “In the broadest sense, adjudications under section 300 are ‘depende ncy’ proceedings, a nd adjudications under sections 601 and 602 are ‘delinquency’ proceedings.” ( Id . at p. 43.) In general, California law prohibits a minor from simultaneously being declared both a dependent child and a delinquent ward. ( In re W.B., supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 46; In
re Marcus G. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1012.) “Section 241 .1, subdivisions (a)

2 Minor does not state which child we lfare services department should be a coparticipant in the joint re port, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services or an equivale nt agency in Arizona. As re spondent points out, minor has cited no authority that would require an Ariz ona agency to comply with the statutory directive to participate in the preparation of a joint report.6 through (g), state that when a minor appear s to come within the description of both section 300 (dependency) and section 602 or 602 (delinquency), th e county probation department and child welfare agency must c onsult with each other and jointly determine
which status will best serve the interests of the minor and the protection of society. Based on this joint assessment, the juvenile court decides whether the child should be treated as a dependent child or a delinquent ward. [Citations.]” ( In re W.B., supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 46.)
In In re W.B. , the California Supreme Court explained that our state Legislature
added section 241. 1 in response to In re Donald S. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 134, a case that outlined potential proble ms with allowing concurrent delinquency a nd dependency jurisdiction over a minor. ( In re W.B., supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 46.) Minor was not a dependent in California. Section 241.1 does not apply because our state Legislature cannot direct the child welfare services department in Maricopa County, Arizona, to prepare a joint report with the probati on department in Los Angeles County. Plainly, the statute is meant to gove rn the county agencies of this state only. (See § 241.1, subd. (c).) Also, th e potential problems identified in In re Donald S. are not present in this case. The juvenile court did no t declare minor to be a ward of the court. Instead, it placed her on probation, without th e supervision of the probation department, suggesting that minor should fo llow the instructions of her so cial worker in Arizona, and
ordered her returned to Arizona pursuant to The Interstate Compact on Juveniles. Thus, there was no danger of duplicative services bei ng provided to minor or that she would be subjected to conflicting orders. (See D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123-1124.) No section 241.1 report was required in this case, howev er even assuming a joint report was required, minor’s argument also fa ils for several reasons. Initially, minor has forfeited her claim of error by her failure to object. (See, e.g., In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502.) Moreover, minor’s argument fails on its me rits. The record in this case amply reflects that the Los Angeles probation depart ment conferred with child welfare services7 in Maricopa County, Arizona, regarding the relevant circum stances and, ultimately, the best interests of the minor. Indeed the pr obation department s ubmitted a section 1400 petition to the juvenile court which indicated that minor was a runaway who was being sought by Maricopa County child services . Minor, who signed the voluntary return consent form was then ordered by the juvenile court to be returned to Arizona as it was in
her best interest to be near her mother. We conclude that the juvenile court correctly exercised its jurisdiction. II. Human trafficking Minor contends that the juvenile cour t erred in denying her motion to exclude evidence, and in finding she failed to meet he r burden to show that she was a victim of human trafficking. Evidence Code section 1161, subdivision (a) provides: “Evidence that a victim of human trafficking, as defined in Section 2 36.1 of the Penal Code , has engaged in any commercial sexual act as a result of being a vi ctim of human trafficking is inadmissible to prove the victim’s criminal lia bility for the commercial sexual act.” As relevant here, Penal Code section 236.1 defines human trafficking as depriving or violating the personal liberty of anothe r, or causing, inducing, or persuading, or attempting to cause, induce, or persuade, a minor to engage in a commercial sex act, with
the intent to effect or maintain a viola tion of Penal Code section 266i, among others, pandering with a minor. Neither party has provided a dditional authority elaborating on the type of evidence required or the standard of review. Resp ondent contends that the provision is inapplicable here, where minor did not seek to exclude evidence of a criminal sex act, but merely the solicitation of a sex act. Libera lly construing the statute to promote its purpose of protecting victims of human traffick ing, the juvenile court held it applicable here. We need not review that ruling as we conclude minor did no t meet her burden of proof. When the existence of a preliminary fact necessary to cause the exclusion of evidence is disputed, the trial court must indicate which party has the burden of8 producing evidence and the burd en of proof on the issue. (Evid. Code, § 405.) The juvenile court indicated that minor had both burdens, and neither party disputes that ruling. A preliminary fact is generally subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 2 86; see Evid. Code, § 115.) In reviewing an order or judgment for s ubstantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and disr egard the contrary showing, resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent. ( In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527 ( I.W. ).) In a case such as this, where mi nor is not challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the judgment, but contends that the evidence supported a contrary finding, “the question for a revi ewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant ’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and we ight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. 1528.) “Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burd en to affirmatively demonstrate error. [Citation.]” ( People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) Minor has not met her burden. She has simply pointed to her testimony which, if believed by the juvenile cour t, would have been suffici ent to permit the reasonable
inference that she was the victim of human trafficking. As th e trier of fact, the juvenile court was the exclusive judge of minor’s credibility and was entitled to reject her testimony as unworthy of credence, ev en though it was uncontradicted. ( I.W., supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Moreover, the juvenile court could reasonably disbelieve that Tootie, if he existed, was a pimp or that minor was controlled by him. Minor had contact information for Tootie but never mentioned him to the police or told them that she had a pimp. She
claimed he hit her hard in the face on the da y of her arrest, but had no mark. She never tried to escape from him or appeal to his aunt for help. She claimed to not know his real name or the name of the city or neighborho od in which he lived. Finally, she had a cell9 phone but never used it to call law enforcement, relatives, or her group home in Arizona. In sum, minor has failed to show that her testimony was “‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a j udicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ [Citation.]” ( I.W., supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)
DISPOSITION The judgment of the juve nile court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_______ _______________ ______, J. CHAVEZ

We concur:

_____________ _____________, P. J. BOREN

___________________ _______, J.* FERNS

___________________ __________________ __________________ _________________ * Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chie f Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.