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TRAVEL VS. TERRORISM: FEDERAL WORKFORCE

ISSUES IN MANAGING AIRPORT SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE

AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 4, 2006

Serial No. 109–176

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Deputy Staff Director

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

EX OFFICIO

HENRY A. WAXMAN, CALIFORNIA

RON MARTINSON, Staff Director

TANIA SHAND, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 4, 2006 ................................................................................ 1

Statement of:

Berrick, Cathleen, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S.

Government Accountability Office; Robert Jamison, Deputy Secretary

for Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration; Kathy

Dillaman, Deputy Associate Director for the Center for Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel Management; and Dawn E.

Lucini, airport security administrator, McCarran International Airport,

Las Vegas, NV, on behalf of the Clark County Department of Aviation,

owner and operator of McCarran International Airport ............................ 13

Berrick, Cathleen ...................................................................................... 13

Dillaman, Kathy ........................................................................................ 63

Jamison, Robert ......................................................................................... 56

Lucini, Dawn E. ......................................................................................... 68

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Berrick, Cathleen, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S.

Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ....................... 16

Davis, Hon. Danny K., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Illinois, prepared statement of ................................................................ 9

Dillaman, Kathy, Deputy Associate Director for the Center for Federal

Investigative Services, Office of Personnel Management, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 65

Jamison, Robert, Deputy Secretary for Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration, prepared statement of ............................. 58

Lucini, Dawn E., airport security administrator, McCarran International

Airport, Las Vegas, NV, on behalf of the Clark County Department

of Aviation, owner and operator of McCarran International Airport,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 70

Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Nevada, prepared statement of .................................................................... 5

(1)

TRAVEL VS. TERRORISM: FEDERAL WORKFORCE ISSUES IN MANAGING AIRPORT SECURITY

TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY

ORGANIZATION,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Porter, Schmidt, Davis of Illinois and

Van Hollen.

Staff present: Ronald Martinson, staff director; Patrick Jennings,

OPM detailee/senior counsel; Alex Cooper, legislative assistant;

Tania Shand, minority professional staff member; and Teresa

Coufal, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. PORTER. I would like to bring the meeting to order, a quorum

being present. Thank you all for being here this afternoon. I know

that we have just filled the room, so that is good. If we need some

more chairs, we will be happy to bring some in a little bit later.

Again, I do appreciate those that have come across the country and

for those that are here today.

Although for the most part, airport security is moving in the

right direction, it is an area that deserves close congressional scrutiny from all relevant congressional committees to ensure that our

airports continue to be safe and secure. The American public deserves nothing less. Federal employees play an integral role in airport security in a variety of ways. The hearing today will examine

that role and address ways to improve upon staffing and human

capital programs within DHS. In addition, I am also interested in

learning more today about the foreign management of some of our

airports.

Recently, the Dubai ports deal was reported by the press, and

people were understandably concerned that the deal would have allowed a foreign company to operate some of the country’s largest

seaports. Not many people know, however, that operations at some

our largest international airports are also operated by foreign

firms. For example, Indianapolis International Airport is managed

by the British Airlines, a subsidiary of British Airports Authority,

BAA USA, to be specific. BAA also manages the concessions in the

passenger terminal at Pittsburgh International Airport. Terminal 4

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at JFK International Airport is operated by a consortium led by a

subsidiary of a company based in the Netherlands. The terminals

at Orlando Sanford International Airport are operated by a Spanish company.

I believe that the issue of who manages and who works at our

airports deserves our attention and certainly out scrutiny. We need

to know who checks the backgrounds of these companies and their

employees. We need to know how these companies and their employees are cleared to operate at our airports across the country.

I has been almost 5 years since the attacks on September 11,

2001. After the attacks, we made many positive steps forward in

Government organization and airport security procedures. In 2001,

Congress established the Transportation Security Administration.

In January 2003, 22 Homeland Security agencies were brought together when the Department of Homeland Security came into existence. In terms of security operations, the baggage screening process

at airports has been placed under Federal control. The number of

air marshals has been increased, and TSA Federal Security Directors have been assigned to the Nation’s more than 440 commercial

airports to lead and coordinate the TSA security activities.

Unfortunately, we still have a long way to go in terms of airport

security. A quick scan of news reports from 2006 alone provides

some examples that illustrate problems within DHS’s control.

On February 27, 2006, a Will Rogers World Airport in Oklahoma

City, authorities found threatening graffiti in the cargo hold of an

airliner. An airport spokeswoman noted that the markings were

found in a place that should only have been accessible by authorized personnel.

On March 6, 2006, at John F. Kennedy International Airport in

New York, an elderly man drove his car through two guard gates

onto the tarmac in the early hours of the morning. The driver entered an area managed by a private contractor. Eventually he

crossed at least one active runway, where an Air France jet was

about to land. About 23 minutes after the incident started, the Port

Authority Police intercepted the man.

That same day at Midway International Airport in Chicago, a

man ran through a gate into a secure area while the gate was

opened for a vehicle. As a result, runway 4 was closed briefly. Out

of the three perimeter gates at Midway, the man apparently got

through the only one without a security camera. In response to this

event, airport authorities said they would retrain 222 aviation security officers and redesign the perimeter gates.

On March 11, 2006, news reports indicated that Federal officials

removed the head of security at Newark Liberty International Airport following 4 years of security breaches and staffing problems.

On March 31, 2006, two baggage screeners at the Honolulu

International Airport pleaded guilty to stealing thousands of dollars in yen from the luggage of Japanese tourists. According to

prosecutors, the two screeners admitted to being among a group of

security screeners who stole money from the baggage of outbound

international travelers and divided the cash.

Despite these reports, I believe that Federal and private security

employees at airports are doing the best they can under some difficult circumstances. However, we need to examine this situation

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from a work force standpoint to ensure that we are doing all we

can to help the people protecting our airports.

The subcommittee will examine the hiring, background screening, training and deployment of Federal and private sector employees working at airports. Airport security is the responsibility of the

Department of Homeland Security. Two components of DHS have

key missions at airports—the Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Protection. DHS deploys and trains

an airport security work force that includes TSA Federal Security

Directors, Transportation Security Officers, known as ‘‘screeners,’’

and CBP inspectors. In addition to security operations, DHS sets

the rules for airport and air carrier security. Specifically, DHS sets

standards for airport perimeter security, access controls and airport

and air carrier security activities, and due to recent legislation, the

TSA is working to implement an identification system for worker

access at seaports and at airports.

The Office of Personnel Management also plays a major role in

airport security. OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division conducts background checks of Federal employee and contractors

working at our airports. OPM is responsible for ensuring Federal

and contract airport employees are investigated thoroughly before

they are hired. OPM accomplishes this by checking job applicants

against fingerprint records, national criminal data bases at the

FBI, and other sources, to ensure that the applicants have no disqualifying factors in their background.

Airport security is of critical importance to the Nation. According

to the Air Transport Association of America, in 2004 the total impact of commercial aviation on the U.S. economy was approximately $1.2 trillion in growth output, $380 million in personal

earnings, and 11.4 million jobs. Approximately 8.8 percent of U.S.

employment is directly or indirectly attributable to the commercial

aviation sector. In my district, where McCarran Airport is located,

which I think is one of the best in country, if not in the world—

I will put in a plug for Las Vegas—we have 44.3 million air travelers that are passing through McCarran each year. Most of these

travelers are tourists. Tourism is by far the most important part

of the Las Vegas economy. Las Vegas and the rest of the country

can’t afford another disruption of air travel like we experienced

after September 11th. We need to find a balance between security

and the need to move air travelers efficiently through our airports.

Our country depends upon air transportation, and air transportation in turn on the airport security personnel. Proper management and security at airports is a matter of national security.

Thats I why the issues we will examine today are vital issues to

be addressed by this subcommittee.

As I mentioned, being from the communities of Nevada and Las

Vegas, I remember quite well, personally, September 11th, because

I had at that time a view of the landing pattern of McCarran International, and I remember that day when there wasn’t a bird in the

sky or a plane in the sky. And it is one of those moments I think

in time, as we look back, whether it be the Kennedy assassination

or whatever, I think we each have these moments of time that we

remember like a photograph. I remember that day when the planes

were not flying and cars were not driving. From that moment on,

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I knew we had to change the way we do business in this country,

and I applaud those folks that have been working very hard to ensure traveler safety, but I still think we have a long way to go.

So today, I have invited witnesses from the GAO, TSA, OPM and

McCarran International Airport to discuss airport work force

issues. As I said, I hope this discussion will reveal areas that need

attention, help clarify some roles of all the employees involved in

airport security, and I look forward to a discussion with all the witnesses that are here this afternoon.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. I would like to now again say welcome to all of you

who are here today, and introduce our ranking minority member,

Mr. Danny Davis, for any opening comments.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

When this subcommittee was considering the legislation that created the Transportation Security Administration [TSA], the Aviation and Transportation Security Act [ATSA], there was much debate about whether airport screeners at the new agency would be

Federal employees or private contractors. It was a very vigorous

debate, and a compromise of sorts was reached. Within 1 year of

being created, TSA was mandated to hire Federal employees to

take over airport screening services at all but five U.S. commercial

airports. Those five airports were permitted to hire private screening companies as part of a pilot program. All other airports were

allowed by the ATSA, after November 19, 2004, the choice of maintaining Federal screeners or opting out and using private contractors.

Both Federal and private airport screeners have been providing

their services long enough for us to know how the two groups performed. Reports by the Government Accountability Office [GAO],

and TSA’s Office of Inspector General have shown little difference

between Federal screeners and private screeners. They both perform in an equally poor manner.

The question that needs to be answered here is why. Do we have

enough Federal screeners? What are the staffing levels? Why is

there a hiring cap of 45,000 screeners? Are Federal screeners adequately trained? Do airports have high-speed Internet access so

that screeners can take advantage of online training? Is TSA taking advantage of aviation security technologies for checkpoint

screenings? All of these questions must be answered and addressed

before any judgment can be made about the effectiveness of Federal screeners. Today’s witnesses, of course, are in a position to

help us address and understand these issues, and I look forward

to their testimony.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, and I

yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Danny K. Davis follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Again, we appreciate you

being here today.

I would like to do some procedural matters. I would like to ask

unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to

submit written statements and questions for the hearing record,

and the answers to written questions provided by the witnesses

also be included in the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other

materials referred to by Members and their witnesses may be included in the hearing record, that all Members will be permitted

to revise and extend their remarks.

Without objection, so ordered.

It is also the practice of this committee to administer the oath

to all witnesses, so if you all would stand for a moment, please, and

raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. PORTER. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Please be seated.

As with most congressional hearings, we will have Members that

will be coming and going throughout the afternoon, but know that

everything that is said today will be included in the record and be

used for our decision process later on. So, again, we appreciate you

being here.

I would like to begin by combining the panels, which we have

done, and let you know that each will have approximately 5 minutes and then we will be asking questions. Some of the questions

will be asked in writing, so you will have some time to submit the

answers.

First I would like to welcome today our Director of Homeland Security at the Government Accountability Office. That is Ms. Cathleen Berrick, and we appreciate you being here. So, please, open

your testimony.

STATEMENTS OF CATHLEEN BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ROBERT JAMISON, DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; KATHY DILLAMAN, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR THE CENTER FOR FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT;

AND DAWN E. LUCINI, AIRPORT SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR,

MCCARRAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, LAS VEGAS, NV, ON

BEHALF OF THE CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, OWNER AND OPERATOR OF MCCARRAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN BERRICK

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Davis, for inviting me to discuss the progress TSA has made and the challenges

it faces in managing a Federal work force to support aviation security. My testimony today focuses on the management, deployment

and training of a Federalized security work force with operational

responsibility for passenger and checked baggage screening, any acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:35 Dec 15, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\29848.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tions TSA has taken, and the challenges it faces to provide regulatory oversight of other airport security activities.

Regarding TSA’s efforts to manage, deploy and train a Federal

security work force, TSA has made significant progress in these

areas but continues to face staffing and training challenges.

Regarding security leadership, the TSA Federal Security Director

is the ranking Federal authority responsible for security at commercial airports. We found that despite initial difficulties, Federal

Security Directors have since formed effective partnerships with

key airport stakeholders, and have improved coordination efforts to

address airport security needs. However, we found that TSA had

not clearly delineated the Security Director’s authority related to

other airport stakeholders, which sometimes resulted in confusion

when a security incident arose.

Federal Security Directors are also responsible for overseeing airport, passenger and checked baggage screening operations performed by about 40,000 Transportation Security Officers [TSOs].

We found that TSA has taken a number of steps to improve the

training and performance of the TSO work force, although areas for

improvement exist.

For example, TSA has significantly increased the amount of

training available to TSOs and have made changes to training programs based on identified vulnerabilities. However, insufficient

staffing has made it difficult for all TSOs to have the time needed

to take required training. We found that Federal Security Directors

at about half of the 263 airports we surveyed reported there was

not sufficient time for TSOs to receive required training within regular work hours.

In addition, a lack of high-speed Internet capability at about half

of the Nation’s airports have prevented many TSOs at these airports from fully utilizing TSA’s online learning center.

TSA has also developed a staffing allocation model to identify

needed TSO staff allocations at airports. However, TSA has had

difficulty attracting and retaining a part-time TSO work force

needed to address staffing needs. Some screeners are used to performing administrative duties at airports due to a lack of administrative staff.

In addition to having operational responsibility for passenger and

checked baggage screening, TSA also has oversight responsibility

for air cargo security and the security of airport perimeters and restricted areas. We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections it

conducted of air carriers and freight forwarders or entities that

consolidate cargo for transportation to the airport. However, we

found that TSA did not determine to what extent air carriers and

freight forwarders were complying with existing security requirements, and had not analyzed the results of its inspections to target

future areas of highest risk.

TSA also established a requirement for the random inspection of

air cargo, a reflection of the agency’s position that inspecting 100

percent of air cargo is not feasible. We found that TSA established

exemptions that allow certain cargo to go uninspected, which if become known to shippers and could potentially cause security weaknesses.

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Related to airport perimeter security and access controls, we

found that TSA had begun conducting compliance inspections of

airport operators, and had conducted covert testing of selected security procedures. We also found that TSA required background

checks for most airport workers, required by legislation.

Regarding measuring the effectiveness of its screening systems,

TSA has made significant progress in testing the screening components, including establishing an annual recertification program for

TSOs. However, despite these efforts, testing has shown that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in the screening system.

In conclusion, TSA has made significant progress in managing

and deploying a Federal work force to conduct and oversee security

activities at the Nation’s airports, including hiring, deploying and

training a work force of over 40,000 Transportation Security Officers. However, as TSA moves forward, opportunities for further

strengthening Federal security efforts exist.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much.

Next we have Mr. Robert Jamison, the Deputy Secretary of Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration. Before

you begin, I would like to comment from a Las Vegas perspective

that although we still have our challenges, TSA has worked very

closely with McCarran International in being a destination airport,

unlike the Atlantas of the world, or my colleague from Chicago,

O’Hare, with folks that are passing through. But work very closely,

especially in the early days we had some challenges, right, Jim?

We had a few challenges because of our visitor volume, and with

the times or whatever, the electronic convention, or what type of

show was in town, we learned together. And I would like to compliment TSA again. I have my areas where I can be critical, and

will at some point, but I think there has been a lot of cooperation,

and appreciate what you have done.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT JAMISON

Mr. JAMISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know Jim thanks you,

as well as Jose in Las Vegas.

Good afternoon, Chairman Porter, Ranking Member Davis and

members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to

discuss TSA’s role in enhancing aviation security. I will focus my

remarks today on TSA’s role in vetting workers at our Nation’s airports and controlling access to secured areas of the airport.

As you know, there are numerous independent layers of security

aimed at protecting America’s transportation systems, and in particular our aviation system. These include intelligence gathering

and analysis, checking passenger manifests against watch lists,

physical screening of passenger and carry-on bags and checked baggage, the presence of Federal air marshals, TSA-authorized Federal

flight deck officers, reinforced cockpit doors, and systems for vetting TSA employees, airline employees, and airport workers who

have access to the secure areas of our airports.

All TSA Transportation Security Officers undergo a comprehensive two-part background investigation process. The first is the preemployment background investigation that is conducted by OPM,

and includes a fingerprint-based criminal history records check

processed through the FBI, as well as a name-based check by TSA

against approximately 10 different terrorism wants and warrants

and immigration data bases. If pre-employment screening is favorable, further background checks are conducted through OPM’s Access National Agency Check with Inquiries. The TSO is permitted

to begin employment while the second interview is under way. This

vetting of TSOs is the equivalent of the secret level clearance

check.

Non-Federal employees and contractors who seek employment at

our Nation’s airports are also subject to vetting. They too are the

subject of an FBI fingerprint-based criminal history records check

prior to employment. Simultaneous with the FBI’s check, TSA conducts the first of what will be a perpetual name-based security

threat assessment of the name against its terrorist and other data

bases. Any name that is a possible match to a data base is referred

to appropriate law enforcement or intelligence agencies to determine whether the individual’s identity can be verified and whether

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the individual poses a threat to aviation. TSA informs airlines or

airports if an individual’s access to secure areas must be denied or

rescinded.

Generally, in order to access sterile secured areas, anyone who

has not been issued a SIDA badge for a particular airport, including airport and airline personnel, vendors and contractors, and

even other TSA employees, must pass through a TSA security

screening checkpoint and submit to the same physical screening

process that passengers must pass through before boarding an aircraft.

Airport operators are responsible for developing and implementing TSA-approved airport security programs and procedures and

processes to control the sterile, secure and SIDA access areas.

These programs include badging, a challenge program, and a compliance regimen. All entrances must be secured, which is generally

accomplished by guards by electronically controlled locks. Nearly

1,000 TSA aviation security inspectors ensure that airports and air

carriers comply with the regulatory requirements.

Mr. Chairman, each of the many aviation security layers we have

in place is by itself capable of stopping a terrorist attack. We recognize that despite our efforts to make each one as strong as we can,

it is still possible to devise ways to beat any one of the individual

layers. But there is a tremendous power in layers. Truly, the whole

is greater than the sum of the parts, and together they are formidable.

Today we are in a transition point at TSA. We are moving from

a startup mode. Large-scale acquisitions and centralized hiring and

rigid standardized operating procedures were required to quickly

stand up the agency to becoming a more dynamic, flexible agency

that can respond to changing conditions and threats. By building

unpredictability into our screening and oversight operations, deploying new technology as it becomes available, and utilizing all of

our resources more flexibly, we can continue to improve the formidable system of layered security that now exists.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I would be

happy to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much. I would like to also recognize

that the Customs and Border Protection were not able to be with

us today, but they are submitting information and a statement for

the record.

I would next like to introduce Kathy Dillaman, Deputy Associate

Director, Center for Federal Investigative Services, Office of Personnel Management. Welcome, Kathy.

STATEMENT OF KATHY DILLAMAN

Mr. DILLAMAN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Davis, thank you

for the opportunity to testify before you today on the process used

by the Office of Personnel Management to conduct background investigations for personnel at the Transportation Security Administration. OPM’s mission is to ensure the Federal Government has an

effective civilian work force. Having an effective work force means

having a work force made up of people with varying degrees of responsibility, therefore requiring varying degrees of background investigations to ensure they meet the Government’s suitability requirements.

At OPM we are responsible for investigating every type of position in the Government, from low-risk public trust positions like

mail clerks and customer service reps, to high-risk public trust or

national security positions like auditors, nuclear material handlers,

and baggage screeners.

At OPM, the division responsible for handling these cases is our

Federal Investigative Services Division, headquartered in Boyers,

PA. This division supports hundred of Federal agency security offices worldwide. Its automated processing systems and vast network of field investigators handle a high-volume of investigations.

In fact, we processed 1.4 million investigations last year.

In the last few years, as investigations have become an even

more significant aspect of our mission, the number of OPM employees and contractors working on them has risen dramatically. In

2005, the Department of Defense transferred responsibility for its

personnel security investigations program, including 1,800 investigative staff, from DOD to OPM. This move consolidated the vast

majority of background investigations for the Federal Government

with OPM. OPM conducts investigations for TSA on Federal and

contract airport screeners. In conducting background investigations

on these positions, we work closely with TSA personnel.

On the other hand, TSA conducts background checks for specific

categories of workers, including those needing unescorted access to

what is referred to as the Security Identification Display Area of

an airport. Currently, TSA submits fingerprints to OPM for airport

screener applicants, as an initial screening tool prior to the initiation of the full background investigation. TSA then request that

OPM conduct the Access National Agency Check and Inquiries investigation on the airport screeners. This type of investigation includes a search of national record repositories, such as the FBI fingerprint and investigative records, and DOD’s investigative index,

a credit check, a search of military records, birth verification, and

a check of Immigration and Naturalization records when appropriate.

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Additionally, OPM sends letters of inquiries to employers, local

police departments, schools and personal references to confirm the

subject’s background claims, and to obtain information about their

basic suitability for employment. Field investigators are sent to

conduct local criminal history inspections of the subject if no response is received to the written inquiries from police departments

where the subject lived, worked or went to school.

Between 2003 and 2006, OPM scheduled over 76,000 ANACI investigations on airport screeners, of which over 1,700 were closed

with major issues, and were referred to TSA for adjudication.

As part of the Government’s effort to secure our Nation, the Office of Personnel Management’s role is critical. We take this responsibility seriously, and are committed to ensuring the Federal

Government has an effective work force.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I am happy to answer

any questions you or other members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dillaman follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much.

Next, I would like to introduce Dawn Lucini, who is from

McCarran International, actually from southern Maryland originally, now with McCarran International in Las Vegas. Again,

Dawn, I appreciate you being here, and to Jose and the staff of

McCarran. We appreciate what you are doing, so welcome.

STATEMENT OF DAWN E. LUCINI

Ms. LUCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to share with the subcommittee the views of the Clark

County Department of Aviation, owner and operator of the Las

Vegas McCarran International Airport, on how we are managing

security while ensuring travel and tourism. Today, I will focus on

procedures in place for employee background checks, including TSA

requirements and how the Department interacts with Federal

agencies charged with airport security oversight.

Please accept our appreciation to you, Chairman Porter, and to

the subcommittee for the continued attention Congress is devoting

to aviation security.

The role of the airport operator is critical to ensuring the safety

and security of the national civil aviation system, while also ensuring that tourism and commerce is not impeded. In 2005, as the

chairman mentioned, McCarran International Airport was the

gateway to Las Vegas for over 44 million passengers, and we are

on track to exceed that number in 2006. Currently, we are the fifth

busiest U.S. airport by passenger volume. Las Vegas processes

more passengers through security checkpoints than any other airport in the Nation except for Los Angeles.

As the Airport Security Administrator, I am responsible for ensuring the security and safety of the passengers, employees and the

physical structure which is McCarran. As such, the Department

must conduct criminal history records checks for all individuals

prior to their commencing work at McCarran. As of today, we have

over 18,000 individuals who have successfully passed these background checks. The individuals are employees of the Department of

Aviation, airlines, ground handlers, concessionaires, food purveyors

and many Federal agencies, including the TSA, U.S. Customs and

Border Protection, the Federal Aviation Administration, the FBI,

the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Postal Service.

The TSA is responsible for ensuring that all U.S. commercial airports are in compliance with security regulations. These regulations clearly outline airport and airport user requirements for conducting criminal history record checks for all individuals seeking

unescorted access within Security Identification Display Areas,

commonly referred to as the SIDA at all airports. All individuals

must undergo fingerprint base checks to identify whether or not

they have committed one or more of the 37 disqualifying crimes

listed within the regulation. Airport employees collect the fingerprints while the FBI compares the prints to its extensive data base,

and OPM then transmits the results back to the airport.

If an individual is found to have been convicted of a disqualifying

crime, the individual must provide the airport with proof of adjudication. If the individual cannot comply, she will not be granted

unescorted access authority. In addition, airport employees, like

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passengers, are regularly vetted against the TSA watch list. If an

employee name is matched, the Department of Aviation works in

coordination with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,

METRO, the TSA and the FBI to remove the individual from the

facility and allow the Federal agencies to take appropriate actions.

The subcommittee should appreciate that the procedures outlined

above are the minimum TSA requirements. Beyond the Federal

regulation, airports may have additional local and State regulations to which they must adhere, or may voluntarily establish additional employee vetting processes. The Department of Aviation first

requires individuals to submit to a local traffic wants and warrants

check and a check for the National NCIC data base. As employee

badges expire and must be renewed, we again require individuals

to submit to these checks. These processes promote the Department’s philosophy, which is a layered approach to ensuring the integrity of our security program. Further, even if an individual is

not seeking employment within McCarran’s SIDA or sterile areas,

rather only public areas, the Department still requires them to undergo the same fingerprint based criminal history records check.

At McCarran, we understand that we are an entry point into the

national civil aviation system, while also a first line of defense. Accordingly, TSA readily approves our security policies and procedures, as they are developed in concert with our acting TSA Federal Security Director, Mr. Jose Ralls, and his staff.

The Department of Aviation does not act alone in promoting

aviation security at McCarran. We do so in the spirit of communication, coordination and cooperation with the TSA and METRO.

The key is, when it comes to security, none of the local parties acts

alone. All decisions are made collectively and no protocols are implemented prior to all parties being consulted, thereby leading to

consensus.

While the Department knows what options and plans are most

effective for McCarran’s users and facilities, enough attention cannot be paid to how critical the local security and law enforcement

relationship is between the parties.

Mr. Chairman, in the almost 5 years after September 11, 2001,

we have seen significant improvements to aviation security. We

should not forget that aviation security is a matter of national security, and that individuals, businesses, local and State governments, and the Federal Government, must all continue to work in

partnership to protect our citizens and visitors from acts of terrorism.

Again, we appreciate the leadership of this subcommittee and the

opportunity to testify today. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lucini follows:]

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Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Dawn, but you forgot something. What

happens in Vegas stays in Vegas. [Laughter.]

You just shared a lot of successes that we weren’t supposed to

tell anybody about, right?

Ms. LUCINI. We like to brag about those types of things, sir.

Mr. PORTER. As you should. Thank you very much.

Ms. LUCINI. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. I would like to spend a little bit of time, Cathleen,

with you for a moment. First, in reading the report, page 28, referring to background checks, I thought I heard most everyone say

this afternoon that we are checking everyone. But according to

your report, we are really not. Can you talk about that a little bit?

Ms. BERRICK. Right. The Aviation and Transportation Security

Act requires all airport workers to undergo a background investigation. When we did our work—and it was done at the end of 2004—

we found that workers that had escorted access into the restricted

or the SIDA airport areas, the secure airport areas, were not undergoing a background investigation. Now, mind you, they were

being escorted by persons that had those badges and had the background investigations conducted, but that was a requirement of the

Aviation and Transportation Security Act that wasn’t being implemented. I am not certain whether or not that is still the case today.

Maybe we could get an update, but that is what we identified in

our work.

Mr. PORTER. So the individuals that have access without a background check are having someone with them. Can you give me an

example of what that would be?

Ms. BERRICK. Right. It would be, for example, a construction

worker that’s doing some construction in the secure airport areas

that would have an airport employee that had undergone the background investigation, would escort them back to that area, and

would be with them while they performed their construction work,

would be an example.

Mr. PORTER. You also mentioned some perimeter problems. Can

you talk about that a little bit more specifically?

Ms. BERRICK. When we had done the work, and still today, TSA

had paid a lot of attention to passenger and checked baggage

screening, and to a lesser degree they were focused on airport perimeter security and access controls. And since then they have

taken a lot of action. They had done some vulnerability assessments of airport perimeters and access controls. They hadn’t completed all of them when we had done our work. They also had

started doing inspections of airport security programs to make sure

airports were complying with security requirements since TSA

oversees that process.

We also found that TSA was doing covert testing of airport perimeter security in restricted areas. For example, they would go

through a door into a secure airport area and see if they were challenged if they didn’t have a badge.

So essentially, our message was that they were starting to take

actions in all these areas, but had previously been focused on passenger and baggage screening due to many congressional mandates

related to hiring a Federal work force and deploying explosive deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:35 Dec 15, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\29848.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tection equipment, but they had taken action, and since then have

taken more action to secure those areas.

Mr. PORTER. You had also pointed out some areas with inspecting cargo.

Ms. BERRICK. Right. We had issued a report in October 2005 on

TSA’s role in overseeing our cargo security, and again, the air carriers and the freight forwarders, the organizations that transport

cargo to the airport to load onto the aircraft have direct operational

responsibility for securing cargo. TSA oversees that process.

Essentially what we found was that TSA was doing inspections

of these air carriers and freight forwarders, but they weren’t really

using the results of those inspections to identify where the weaknesses were in order to target future inspections. They had difficulty identifying to us all the different air carriers and freight forwarders that they had inspected, and mind you, there’s thousands

of freight forwarders.

We also found that TSA had established exemptions. First of all,

they established a random inspection program for air cargo because

they have the position that it is not feasible to inspect 100 percent

of air cargo because it would impede the flow of commerce, and also

the technology wasn’t where it needs to be. So they established a

random inspection program. They did identify some exemptions of

cargo that could go uninspected. The problem that we identified

with that was that a lot of shippers knew what those exemptions

were, so they would package their cargo in a manner that would

bypass inspection.

So one of the related recommendations we made in the report

were that TSA reevaluate these exemptions that they created to

see to what extent they created security weaknesses, and TSA

agreed with that recommendation.

We had also recommended, related to TSA’s inspection program,

that they use the results of their inspections to target areas that

should require greater scrutiny, and TSA also agreed with that.

Mr. PORTER. And back again to screening of employees. I think

you noted in the report that some vendors are not being checked.

TSA has not addressed the provision that calls for the agency to

require the airport vendors with direct access to the airfield—so a

vendor, to me, would be a McDonald’s or some business or other

folks other than just construction workers. So what the report is

saying is not just construction workers, there are vendors that are

not being checked that are there on a daily basis?

Ms. BERRICK. Right. There’s really two restricted areas of the airports that we’re talking about. One is the sterile area which is behind the checkpoint inside the airport, and the other is the secure

area which is out by the aircraft. There are about 900,000 workers

that have access to the secure area, and about 100,000 that have

access to the sterile area within the airport.

TSA physically screens those vendors and other employees that

are going into the sterile area of the airport. They would go

through the checkpoint just as passengers would do. They are not

physically screening those workers that go into the secure airport

area, those 900,000 workers. TSA’s rationale is that they are conducting background investigations on these employees that have

unescorted access. If someone is going back there that has escorted

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access, they’re being escorted by someone who has undergone a

background check.

An impediment that TSA has identified related to physically

screening all those workers is the time and resources that would

be required to do that. And then also some of these workers are

carrying tools and instruments that would set off an alarm and

make it difficult to physically screen them. So those people aren’t

physically screened, but again, they’re getting background

investigations——

Mr. PORTER. Excuse me a second. So if you work at a food vendor

through the security gate, is there a background check done on a

food vendor or a bookstore employee?

Ms. BERRICK. Yes, they do.

Mr. PORTER. And if they are outside of that area?

Ms. BERRICK. The employees and the vendors that work in the

sterile airport area, which is inside the airport past the checkpoint,

undergo a background investigation. They are also physically

screened through the checkpoint.

Mr. PORTER. So it is two fold. Every day they are screened, but

also the background check is done.

Ms. BERRICK. That’s correct.

Mr. PORTER. I have some more questions.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Berrick, does TSA have sufficient resources to staff all of the

checkpoints in our airports?

Ms. BERRICK. As you know, there’s a congressionally mandated

cap of 45,000 screeners, and I believe TSA has about 42,000 right

now. TSA has had some challenges with hiring and retaining

screeners, and especially a part-time screener or Transportation

Security Officer work force. Their attrition rate right now overall

is about 23 percent for Transportation Security Officers. It’s about

50 percent for part-time Transportation Security Officers, so it’s

been difficult. Part of that has to do with circumstance. It’s difficult

to attract a part-time work force because of the pay and the benefits and the hours.

TSA is doing things to improve that. For example, when TSA

first hired over 50,000 Transportation Security Officers, they had

a very centralized hiring process that wasn’t real responsive, to

bring people on quickly when they were needed, and that was done

because they had to hire a lot of workers in a short amount of time.

Since that time, TSA has given a lot of more flexibility to the airports related to hiring. They’ve created regional hiring centers, so

in the past where Federal Security Directors have complained a lot

about not being able to bring people on quickly, TSA is making

some changes to address those issues, but TSA is still having the

challenge of retaining people.

I’ll also say that TSA recently—well, about a year ago, developed

a model to try to determine the appropriate allocations among the

airports, to make sure that they’re staffing appropriately. We have

an ongoing review right now that’s looking at the assumptions that

are used in that model.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Do you think that training is associated

with some of the attrition problems that TSA is experiencing?

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Ms. BERRICK. TSA has significantly increased the amount of

training that it gives screeners. The problem that we have identified—and it is almost a cause from some of the attrition problems,

is with screeners. Federal security directors are identifying that

screeners or transportation security officers don’t have the time

available to take the screening that is required, because they are

busy manning the checkpoints. We surveyed about 263 airports,

and about half of the Federal Security Directors at those airports

were saying basically that their Transportation Security Officers

didn’t have enough time within a regular work day to take training. So it’s really another cause when you don’t have adequate

numbers, potentially don’t have adequate numbers at the checkpoints, training could suffer as a result of that.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. So the training is being improved. Would

you say that they are being trained and certified in the latest technologies?

Ms. BERRICK. I think—and I’m sure TSA can speak to this as

well. I think their training program is very robust. They just completed a really intensive explosive training where they went out

and trained over 20,000 Transportation Security Officers on different components of explosives to learn to detect those. And I do

think it is robust to have a basic screener training program of 40

hours classroom, 60 hours on-the-job training. They have a recurrent training requirement of 3 hours a week averaged over a quarter. They also have a remedial training program. If a screener fails

a covert test, they are required to go through remedial training,

and they have so many attempts to pass that. So I would say the

training is pretty rigorous.

TSA also has an online learning center where they offer online

courses for Transportation Security Officers to take. There is a

problem with that in that not all airports have high-speed Internet

connectivity, but that is a resource that TSA provides the work

force.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. How do the performance of Federal

screeners compare with those of private screeners?

Ms. BERRICK. We did an analysis of TSA’s covert testing data.

TSA has an office that does inspections of checkpoints to see to

what extent they can get prohibited items through. And we looked

at the period from June 2002 to June 2004, and what I can say in

a public forum is that they identified witnesses at airports of all

sizes and all locations and airports with Federal and private sector

screeners.

I will say that we found a slight difference. Airports that had private sector screeners performed slightly better on these covert testing results, but I would caution that is really just an indicator of

performance, and it really can’t be used to draw overall conclusions

about which work force is performing better, but the test results

were slightly better.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Were the sizes of the airports compared

essentially the same?

Ms. BERRICK. There are five airports that have private sector

screeners, and they’re at the different category level, so it’s a much

smaller universe that have private sector screeners and that’s one

of the weakness of the comparison. But there is, for example, San

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Francisco is a Category X large airport that has private sector

screeners, so there’s one large Category X airport that’s included

there.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. I would like to talk about the foreign management,

whether by private companies or by government owned companies.

Mr. Jamison, do you know how many of our airports are managed

either by private investment or a foreign government?

Mr. JAMISON. It’s well less than 1 percent. We have seven airports that have some form of foreign ownership overseeing some of

the operations, but there’s only one large airport, one Cat 1 airport

that has that, the overall operations managed by a foreign entity.

Mr. PORTER. I know the Clark County aviation system, and it is

operated by the county and a board of directors. These other airports, the seven or more that you are talking about, are their contracts then with local government or with the Federal Government?

Who do they contract with?

Mr. JAMISON. They are contracted with the airport owner.

Mr. PORTER. The airport owner.

Mr. JAMISON. The airport owner in most cases, or they subcontract to another company that’s managing the airport.

Mr. PORTER. What about the background checks of these individuals that are foreign owned; how are they handled?

Mr. JAMISON. They’re actually regulated and treated the same

way as all other airport operators, so all of their employees that

have access to the secured area or have any control in issuing that

access have to go through the same vetting process from a background check standpoint as well as a criminal history records check

and being bounced up against terrorist data base.

Mr. PORTER. If they are an employee, then they follow the same

steps is what you are saying.

Mr. JAMISON. Exactly.

Mr. PORTER. So of the seven, are any owned by the governments

themselves or are they all private?

Mr. JAMISON. I believe they’re all private. I believe they’re all

large European companies for the most part.

Mr. PORTER. When it comes to airports—I know there are thousands of them around the country and many are not under the control of TSA or the Federal Government—is it based upon receiving

Federal funds whether there is TSA or DHS oversight, or how does

that work?

Mr. JAMISON. Actually, it’s not based off the TSA fund. We have

the ability to so-called Federalize an airport and determine whether or not there will be Federal screening regulations put in place,

and whether or not it will have a Federal screening work force or

under TSA purview. And that’s largely decided based off risk and

the size of the airport. So some smaller airports that have very,

very few flights may not have Federal screeners or be under TSA

controls.

Mr. PORTER. So if you had an airport in the middle of Iowa or

middle of Nevada that may not have been inventoried by the Federal Government and may be operating without any type of controls, correct?

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Mr. JAMISON. Well, they have the controls of the general aviation

controls and the recommendations of the guidelines and the rules

that are in place for general aviation, but we constantly do a risk

assessment, evaluate which airport that we bring into that process,

and before they can enter into the other aviation system, they have

to undergo certain requirements. So if they’re flying to another airport that enters into the Federal system, they would have to go

through screening and have all the passengers rescreened prior to

entering that airport instead of making their connection to another

flight.

Mr. PORTER. I guess this is more a question for Dawn. Again,

McCarran is an airport that I know well. I spend every weekend

at McCarran, and I think that as a rule that it basically knows its

customer base very well, and that’s, I think, been part of the success for McCarran working with TSA. We know when people are

going to arrive, and we know who they are, because we do a lot

of those market surveys. But also having traveled, again, through

airports every weekend, every airport does things a little bit differently. Is there some advice that you would give these other airports to help streamline their process?

Ms. LUCINI. I would, again, advocate what I provided in my testimony earlier. It’s really about local cooperation. The success we’ve

enjoyed has been done with the TSA and the METRO. Again, we

are completely dependent on the tourism industry in Las vegas, so

we have made every effort to assist the TSA in the security process. We are one of nine letter-of-intent airports in the country to

provide our airport with an in-line EDS screening solution, which

will create greater efficiencies for the TSA in baggage screening. In

addition, at the screening checkpoint we have hired contractors—

they’re called divestors—that help the passengers at the front of

the checkpoint prior to going through the screening process, to

speed up, expedite that process and keep the queues moving

through when we have those large shows that you mentioned earlier.

It’s really local partnership. Every airport is unique, and you

probably heard that many times. It’s incumbent upon the local entities to work together to decide what will work best for that airport.

Mr. PORTER. You know, there are those that say the economy is

not thriving, but airports would be an example that the economy

is coming back stronger than ever. Every airport that I have been

through is at capacity. What is it that Las Vegas—you mentioned

the partnership—what are some of the specific things that they

have done in guiding the movement of tourists through the airport?

Ms. LUCINI. Well, again, we have put together a pre-screening series we call TIPS, which are video montages, if you will, that help

passengers get ready for the screening process prior to entering the

checkpoint. The foundation of that was laid before I arrived. I believe Mr. Blair, who’s with us today, was key to that as well, in

partnership with our director and deputy director of the airport,

and we worked with the local convention authority to produce those

videos to help passengers prepare.

Mr. PORTER. If I may interrupt, for the audience, share what

some of those are.

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Ms. LUCINI. Well, for example, we’ll have Carrot Top, the comedian, go through with the oversize bag through the magnetometer,

and he falls backward, too heavy of a bag and it’s oversize, can’t

get through. We have a lot of travelers that don’t fly but once a

year, and that’s to Las Vegas and out of Las Vegas, and they like

to go shopping. So that’s one example, and we also have some other

local celebrities that give key travel tips, you know, don’t wrap

your gifts at the holiday season and bring them through the checkpoints, just to make it a smoother process for everybody.

Another thing that also helps is, as you know, today before our

system goes in-line for our EDS baggage screening system, the

EDS machines are currently in front of the ticketing counters.

Something that we’ve worked to expand in recent years are the use

of self-serve kiosks. It’s a common use platform so you can go to

one of these kiosks, and all of our airlines are currently on that

kiosk, and if you’re not checking baggage you can use that kiosk.

And it’s not in the ticketing counter, it’s up at the checkpoint level

throughout the facility, so it reduces those queues so we don’t have

long lines out to the departures curb, the arrivals curb, and we

really help with crowd control and keep the flow through the airport so we protect everybody, because there are security concerns

in front of the checkpoint as well as beyond.

Mr. PORTER. What would the average wait time be at McCarran

to get through security?

Ms. LUCINI. The average wait time, well, we can go from, you

know, 5 minutes depending if you’re at one checkpoint, and we like

to at our busiest times to say you’re going to get through in around

15 minutes. We always hope for 10 minutes, but we work very well

with the TSA—we know that there’s a long line at ticketing, and

we call the TSA and they make best efforts to open additional lanes

to get through. So we know when those big shows and conventions

are coming, and the Department of Aviation actually brings on

staff to help with crowd control and line monitoring, plus our

divestors, and the TSA will reallocate their shifts and the staffing

per shift to accommodate those crowds when we know they’re coming.

And we provide monthly the list of conventions and shows coming so we’re all planned and staffed accordingly in advance.

Mr. PORTER. I recall one time that McCarran was considering designing your own baskets for travelers to put items in a basket. Are

you still working on that?

Ms. LUCINI. That may have been the case, sir, that was before

I came to McCarran, which was in June of last year. I think right

now we are pleased overall with the current system, but we refine

it as necessary and from time to time.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you for letting me put you on the spot.

Ms. LUCINI. That’s OK.

Mr. PORTER. Congresswoman, comments?

Ms. SCHMIDT. I have first a question regarding going through security. In the case of women sometimes, we are wearing apparel

that doesn’t allow us to take off our jackets, and yet sometimes

they are very insistent that we do take off our jackets, and put us

into a holding place for a more intensive search. What is the importance of having to take—I mean, for instance, I could not take off

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this jacket to go through a metal detector. What is the importance

of that? Shouldn’t the metal detector pick up anything that would

be suspicious on us?

Ms. LUCINI. I’ve enjoyed that same experience myself, and I’ll

ask Mr. Jamison to answer that question.

Mr. JAMISON. Sure, I’ll be happy to reply. It is an SOP put in

place strictly for detection of explosives, so it’s another layer of security to make sure you’re not concealing something on your body

that is not detectible through the metal detector that might be an

explosive.

Ms. SCHMIDT. May I have a followup? The problem is that I could

have something under my blouse as well. I think that—I am not

talking a coat. I am talking the outfit that I am wearing now, and

if I were to have flown in today I would not have worn this outfit

because I couldn’t have taken the jacket off. All I am saying is I

think you need to look at your guidelines a little bit more as to appropriate apparel and the robing and disrobing for individuals.

Mr. JAMISON. I absolutely agree with you, and, actually, we are

undergoing currently an SOP review, that whereas we can give better direction to our TSOs to—given a situation just as you described, where it’s not one-size-fits-all that you have to take off

every outer garment, and that really, the intent is to try to get the

detection of explosives. In those cases where you don’t need to remove the garment to do that, we may be able to implement different standard operating practices. So we’re looking at that very

carefully, and hope to roll something out very quickly.

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jamison, once a screener has been hired, how long does the

training process take?

Mr. JAMISON. Depending on where they’re going to work, it varies in length of time. They have about 50 hours of training, general

training. Then they get specific training in either the checkpoint or

the baggage area or both, and the training varies depending on

where you’re at between, I think, a total of 120 hours to 200 hours.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. The cost for the training would be about

what?

Mr. JAMISON. I don’t have that figure. I’d be happy to get it back

to you per employee for the record. I don’t have the exact figure

for that.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. There has been concerns over the sufficiency of our airport security systems, and some people think that

they would lead to the Federalization of airport screeners. What assurances do we have that a return to private screeners will provide

any increase safety or better security?

Mr. JAMISON. I agree with Ms. Berrick’s testimony earlier about

it’s sort of hard to draw conclusions between those two. However,

I think it’s very important from us as the TSA management standpoint to look at both the privatized screening work force, as well

as the Federalized screening work force and look at best practices

to pull out to improve the overall level of screening. The mission

is the same whether or not it’s public or private, is to provide world

class security to the aviation system, and that’s what we’re about.

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Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Ms. Dillaman, when we do background

checks, what are we looking for?

Ms. DILLAMAN. You’re looking for record information about the

individual’s conduct or other elements that might make the individual susceptible to blackmail, coercion.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Of course, criminal background would be

a part of that. What other kinds of things besides——

Ms. DILLAMAN. Criminal background? Violent disruptive behavior, issues of extended debt that might make the individual susceptible to coercion, fraud in the qualifications process.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Do we have information or data relative

to what percentage of the people who apply get screened out or who

don’t pass the background check?

Ms. DILLAMAN. OPM has information in terms of how many of

the investigations develop issue information for consideration. But

the actual screening out of the applicant is done by TSA, and so

they would be in a better position to report on how many individuals fail because of the background check. But I can tell you that,

for example, approximately 11 percent of those we screened have

criminal history records at the FBI.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Mr. Jamison, do you have any

further——

Mr. JAMISON. No, that’s why I want to put the focus on what

we’ve done to improve that, that process. So over the last year, in

addition to the process that we go through for FBI checks and the

OPM checks for employment, we have put in place the ability to

perpetuate that data base against terrorist watch lists and other

types of data bases, so we are getting a consistent perpetual vetting process of all our employees plus employees that have access

to the SIDA.

We also put in place improved processes where we’re periodically

going back and doing a fingerprint-based criminal history records

check on our TSO employees.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Ms. Lucini, would you say that the best

practices that you all have been able to develop could just about

fit any normalized airport?

Ms. LUCINI. I hate to say the cliche, sir, that every airport is

unique, but as a baseline the partnership and that relationship you

develop will allow improvements in your procedures and processes

at the airport. So there’s a lot of best practices we’ve established

that we gladly share with our fellow airports across the country.

And some of them have adopted it with great success, others have

tweaked it a bit and it’s worked better for them that way.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. I have a question about the high speed Internet

connectivity at some airports. What is the problem? That seems

like something we could resolve fairly easily. Is it a cost factor, or

what is the problem?

Mr. JAMISON. There’s been numerous problems. I think budget is

just one of them, the capability of the contractors and others. But

I agree with you, it’s been a long time coming, but I can tell you

we’re on course to have every airport with Hi-SOC capability and

high-speed Internet capability by the end of the year.

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We’re also making sure that we strive to give the capability for

extending the online training center opportunities. It’s web-based

and you can get to that online training center. It’s very important

for us to get the Hi-SOC to all of the airports, because it not only

gives us capability for training, but also gives us ability to pull information back into our national data bases.

Mr. PORTER. I would just think that airports would have some

of the latest technology available if they are of the size that you

are referring to that would need TSA. I am amazed that it is not

available. It sounds to me like it hasn’t been a priority but it needs

to be. So you think by the end of the year?

Mr. JAMISON. By the end of the year——

Mr. PORTER. Of this year?

Mr. JAMISON. By the end of this year, quite hopefully by the end

of this fiscal year, we’re going to have—I know we’re going to have

the majority of airports, if not all of them, done. It is a priority.

There’s a lot of issues of making sure that system is secure and

they have enough protocols that you need to put it in place, were

some of the challenges, but we’re addressing those, and I agree

with you it’s a top priority.

Mr. PORTER. Because I understand that even checking passports

and visa can be a problem because of the lack of technology and

transmitting information back and forth, so I will look forward to

that being corrected.

With workers compensation, and I don’t remember the numbers,

but we were having a number of employees that were turning in

workers compensation claims. What’s happening there and what is

the status?

Mr. JAMISON. We still have a very high claims rate. It has come

down. We have put a lot of focus on this, establishing a war room

effort in national headquarters to really address the injury issue.

I feel like it’s a combination of a lot of issues. It’s a combination

of work setup in some airports, it’s a combination of training and

accountability, but we’ve got focused programs everywhere from

nurse care management to address people that are on workers compensation to get them back to work, to analyzing the worker setup,

to looking at the training that we’re doing and really trying to

track the data and try to get that issue under control.

It’s a big issue for us, as Ms. Berrick pointed out, work force

management, hiring, retention, huge issue. We know we got to get

our work force stable. Injuries are a huge piece of that, and we’ve

got a lot of focus on it.

Mr. PORTER. What percentage of your work force is out at one

time on their workers compensation claim?

Mr. JAMISON. The number is highly variable depending on airport, and it’s something that allows us to focus on that. I don’t have

the exact number. We would be happy to get it back for you for the

record.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you. And then regarding the explosive detection systems and the explosive trace detection, baggage screening

systems, which of course, improve safety, but also achieve some

cost savings, and there are a lot of large airports that don’t have

plans. Is it because of the lack of space, lack of facilities? Why isn’t

it that a lot of airports are moving forward with that?

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Mr. JAMISON. It’s a combination of several things actually, and

as my boss testified earlier today, it’s like a complicated math problem, depending on the funding issues, but also the layout of the

airports, whether or not they’ve got the space, the throughput of

the machines that are available and the requirements. So there’s

a lot of things that go into that equation.

We’re scheduled this year in 2006 to deploy 116 EDSs, and we’re

scheduled to do 90 for 2007.

Mr. PORTER. OK, thank you.

Mr. Van Hollen, do you have any questions or comments today?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Just a few questions, if I could, Mr. Chairman.

And we have two hearings going on at the same time, so I apologize for being late.

But I did have a question regarding the watch list process, and

what mechanism someone can go through if their name is inadvertently put on the watch list. We heard a number of stories sometime

ago about various individuals, and Senator Kennedy, I think, was

detained, as was Congressman John Lewis. There have been a

number of others, and the two I mentioned are people in positions

of influence, and even they seemed to have some difficulty just

going through the process of getting this name off this list for a period of time.

We get people, who obviously, are not in that kind of position,

and you can imagine what they feel they have to go through if they

are wrongfully put on a list. What do you do if you are put on the

list and there has been a mistake? What process do you go

through? And has it been effective because my impression is, anyway, that we are still not at a place where there is a very clear

mechanism for removing someone’s name.

Mr. JAMISON. We do have a formal redress process, and you can

access our redress office by an 800 number and/or the Web site,

TSA Web site. The data will show you that we have made a lot of

progress. While the size of the terrorist watch list is ramped up,

the issues and redress issues are starting to come down, but it’s a

big focus of ours to make sure we clean up the list, and that we

actively manage the list.

TSA is in charge of managing the list. We’re not really in charge

of nominating the people that are on the list. It’s a big focus for

us, and secure flight implementation of automating that at a Federal level which we’re moving forward rapidly with, will help alleviate a lot of the administration problems with it.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. You, as you said, you sort of are responsible

for keeping the list, but you don’t put the people on the watch list,

is that right?

Mr. JAMISON. That’s correct.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. So to get somebody off the watch list if they

have been wrongfully put there, do you have to go back to the

agency that put them on, is that right?

Mr. JAMISON. We request that the Terrorist Screening Center or

the nominating agency that has put that on the list. And when we

have issues or incidents where we think that there may be a problem with that, we frequently ask them whether or not the derogatory information that goes into that process is still valid and

whether or not they should remain on the list.

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Have the agencies been cooperating with you

in that process?

Mr. JAMISON. They have, absolutely, absolutely, and the process

gets better every day.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Congresswoman, additional questions?

Ms. SCHMIDT. I believe this is to Mr. Jamison, and I apologize

if I missed anything, but I had another meeting. In 2004 TSA

began to work on the Transportation Worker Identification Credential [TWIC], an identification card embedded with fingerprints or

other biometric information to prevent unauthorized access to secured airport areas. The idea is that workers in airports, seaports,

and other transportation sectors could use a single identification

card to access secure areas. TWIC was originally conceived as a

TSA-run program. However, reports I have received indicate that

the TWIC program has encountered delays, and contract cost increases.

My question is this: what are the next steps for the program?

And I understand that TWIC is an entirely fee-funded enterprise

this year and next. If this is correct, will this funding approach

delay implementation? And finally, how soon can we expect it to be

implemented? So a three-part question.

Mr. JAMISON. First of all, I agree TWIC has been too long in coming. We’ve got a committed focused effort for accelerating deployment of the Transportation Worker ID Card. We’re currently approaching an accelerated parallel rulemaking program, a rulemaking with the Coast Guard and with TSA, which a primary component of it addresses your question and gives us the ability the

charge fees in order to fund the program. We reached a milestone

last week that shows you the commitment to accelerating this program. We put out a request for qualifications for contractors to

help us deploy the long-term implementation for TWIC, and we anticipate there will be a lot more announcements, but we’re committed to accelerating the deployment and getting out there as quickly

as possible.

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Just one additional question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jamison, does TSA have any notion or idea or feel for how

many airports might want to go private with screeners?

Mr. JAMISON. To answer your question, no, I don’t have a formal

survey, and I don’t have an indication of that. There have been a

few rumblings from the field that there’s an interest in more airports moving to that model, but we have nothing formal in place,

and that’s really all we have.

Mr. BERRICK. If I could add, Mr. Davis, GAO has done work looking at a TSA screening partnership program where you have private sector screeners at airports. And we surveyed about 25 airports and generally the interest doesn’t seem to be out there at this

point in time, based on the airports we spoke with, and they cited

a couple of issues.

One was they wanted to wait and see how this worked out for

the airports that were using private screeners, kind of a wait and

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see attitude. Also, some of them identify concerns with liability, if

there was a terrorist incident, how would that affect them.

Now, the Department of Homeland Security is granting Safety

Act coverage to immune contractors from liability and the appropriations law last year protects airports from liability, so I think

airports are hoping that problem has been solved, but based on

what we’ve heard it’s basically they want to wait and see how it

works out for the next year.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Van Hollen, any additional questions?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I didn’t know if anyone else had a comment

on the watch list issue. I don’t know if the GAO—I know it is not

part of the scope of this report, but I know you have looked into

it in the past.

Mr. BERRICK. Right. We have. We actually have an ongoing review looking at the quality—actually, a process for names getting

on and off the watch list. As you know, the Department of Justice

Inspector General had done a pretty comprehensive review of the

Terrorist Screening Center and their watch list. We’re going to be

focusing more on the process for getting on and off. Also the redress process you were talking about, that work is going to be completed in August of this year. So we would be happy to brief you

on that when that’s completed.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Good, thank you.

Mr. PORTER. I am actually going to conclude with a couple of

questions but first I have a little levity. When my colleague, Mr.

Davis, mentioned going private, I have never seen so many heads

turn and look at each partner sitting next to each other at one

time. [Laughter.]

It was kind of interesting. If you could see it from this angle, it

was one of those moments that I talked about earlier, where there

is a picture in time. Well, everyone kind of went—[laughter]—you

certainly asked a very good question and I appreciate you asking

it.

One of two final questions. Are you all satisfied with the inspection of our foreign partners that are managing our airports? Is

there something else we should be doing? Do you feel confident

that we are checking as much as we should in light of the current

situation in the world? Is there something else we should be doing?

Mr. BERRICK. In terms of GAO, we haven’t specifically looked at

that issue, so I don’t have anything to add to that.

Mr. JAMISON. I think from TSA’s perspective, it’s like all of the

other issues that we need to constantly look at, we need to constantly evaluate the risk, and it’s more of evaluating the risk

across the different levels of security in the aviation system or at

an airport, so evaluating SIDA access, evaluating perimeter security, continuing to look at the risk, continuing to provide unpredictability, and looking at the ownership and the operation and compliance of that is just one element of that we need to continue to look

at.

Mr. PORTER. Is there anything else that we can do to empower

you to do additional background if necessary; anything we can do

to help you?

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Mr. JAMISON. I think we have the authority that we need.

Mr. PORTER. OK. What do you think from McCarran’s perspective?

Ms. LUCINI. Well, I had a list here of—I do have a list of entities

on airport that are U.S. corporations, majority foreign owned,

which I believe you have been provided with a copy of that list

prior, Mr. Chairman.

But they are, again, subject to the same employee background

checks that I mentioned in my testimony, and again, there’s been

some references to perimeter security at McCarran. We are working locally with the TSA on regular assessments of our perimeter

and our security program there. Locally we have decided the Department of Aviation specifically has decided to make some further

enhancements to our infrastructure on our perimeter. So taking additional steps in advance of any mandates or requirements.

And our current access control system, which is, you know, the

badges are issued to the people that have successfully passed these

background checks. We are going to be introducing biometrics into

our access control system. It’s probably going to be about 3 to 5

years from now, but the tentative foundation is now being laid for

us to go forward with that program.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you. I firmly believe that we are safer today

than we were yesterday, and that we are going to be safer tomorrow than we are today. I think we still have a long ways to go.

But I would like to give you one last opportunity, I guess, as a

subcommittee. Normally we ask you a lot of questions, but I would

like to know if there are any other things that we should be doing

as a Congress to help make our travelers safer. This is an opportunity if you have any thoughts for us, we will pass onto our colleagues. Anything you think in your investigation, Cathleen?

Mr. BERRICK. I think based on the work that GAO has done, I

would just stress the importance of using risk-based decisionmaking, knowing that it’s impossible to secure everything in commercial aviation, really stressing that TSA needs to consider threat

vulnerability and consequence in making decisions, not just within

aviation but across all modes of transportation for which they’re responsible, and we’ve reported that TSA has done this to a great extent. We think there is room for further improvement in that area.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Ms. Dillaman.

Ms. DILLAMAN. No, sir. I think OPM and TSA have an excellent

relationship, and we’ve worked hard to develop a system that crosschecks and makes sure that people don’t fall through the cracks.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Jamison.

Mr. JAMISON. Actually, again, I would concur with Ms. Berrick,

that I believe that—the focus on being risk-based. It’s something

that we’re really trying to do, make all of our decisions based off

of risk, and our prohibited items decisions have been driven by

that.

So continued recognition of that and focus on that is a huge issue

for us at TSA, so we appreciate the committee’s interest in that

and cooperation.

Mr. PORTER. Anything else?

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Ms. LUCINI. I echo Ms. Berrick’s comments and add that TSA,

from the headquarters level, I would promote that they continue

even more local autonomy be given to the Federal Security Directors to work with the airport operator and other agencies locally to

develop the best solution for that airport.

Mr. PORTER. Based upon the current structure of management,

let’s just say there was a crisis today at one of our airports or

somewhere in the country. Is there a clear, defined management

role of different agencies, who is in charge of what? We are comfortable with that?

Ms. LUCINI. Yes, sir. We have an airport security program, which

is a requirement as we operate under a TSA regulation that clearly

identifies procedures we take for our security program, as well as

an airport emergency program, which is in compliance with the

Federal Aviation Administration regulation, which also outlines a

chain of command, if you will, incident command, and the other

agencies we work with in the event of an emergency of security

event.

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Jamison, you feel the same, that there is a clear

and defined role for all of these agencies?

Mr. JAMISON. Well, I mean, there is, and I think that Federal Security Directors play a key role in the monitoring of compliance

with that airport security plan, as you pointed out, and also plays

a key role as a principal Federal official for transportation security

at the local level, so coordination and making sure that everybody’s

involved and knows their roles and response is a key role that we

probably take on.

Mr. PORTER. Ms. Dillaman.

Ms. DILLAMAN. I believe our roles and responsibilities are clear.

At the same time, I think we’re flexible enough that should a new

need arise, we can respond to it.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you. Ms. Berrick.

Mr. BERRICK. GAO actually did a study of this as well, Federal

Security Directors’ roles and authorities at airports. And we found

that the partnerships were generally working very well despite

some additional difficulties, and FSDs were doing a very good job

establishing partnerships with key airport stakeholders including

local law enforcement and the airport authority.

We did identify one area for improvement, that TSA could help

the process by clarifying the FSD’s authority related to other stakeholders. We did hear from some airports that in the event of a security incident, sometimes there was confusion regarding the FSD’s

authority, and TSA agree with that recommendation and was making some changes to try to communicate that to stakeholders. But

overall it was very positive in terms of the Federal Security Director’s relationship with other airport stakeholders.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you.

Any additional questions from the panel?

[No response.]

Mr. PORTER. Appreciate you all being here today, and know that

Members have additional questions possibly. They will submit

them and will be entered for the record. I just want to make sure

that when we wake up tomorrow that there is not a crisis someplace and it is something we have missed. So keep that in mind,

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and I know you do. But also I have learned that many of the best

ideas come outside of the box, so don’t hesitate to give us some

ideas.

Thank you all for being here, and we will adjourn the meeting.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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