F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
S A M U EL D A V IS , Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-10584

D.C. No. 2:09-cr- 00078- J CM-RJ J -1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Neva da J ames C. Maha

n, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 12 —Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia
Filed F ebrua

ry 1, 2013
Be fore : J . Clifford Wallace, Sidney R. Thomas, and Mars ha S. B e rzo n, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Wallace ; Concurre nce by

J udg e B erzonU NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Crim inal L aw The pa nel af firmed the district court’s order re quiring the defe ndant, who was convicted of conspirac y an dmoney launder ing, to f

orfe it $1.29 million and to pay about $95,000 in restit u t i o n to the FB Ifor f unds expended in the operation that le d to the de fe nd ant’ s arr e st. The pa nel re jected the defe ndant’s ar g ument that the forf eiture a mount should be offset by his restitution amount to avoid a double r ecove ry by t h e go v ernment. The pane l he ld t hat e ve n if

the same g ov e rnme nt e nti ty wi ll r e c e ive bo th fo rf e iture and re sti tut ion , th e re is no do ub le re c ov e ry be c a us e the two pay

ments repr esent diff

ere nt ty pes of f unds: puniti ve and compe nsatory

. Con c ur ri ng , Jud g e B e rzo n (

joi ne d b y

Judg e Th oma s) wrote se parately

to note the nar

rowne ss of t he holding . She wrote that the panel c an leave for another day

the unra ised question whether

a def endant wh o essentially

is paid a commission on other people’s mone y he handle s as par

t of an illega l scheme c an be ma de to “f orfe it” funds that passed throug h his hands but were never his.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 3
CO UN SEL
To dd M. L e ve nth a l ( argue d) , L e ve nth a l and As so c iate s, PL L C, L a s V e g a s, Ne va da , f or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.
Robert L. Ell man, Danie l D. Hollingswor th (argued), Assistant United States At torney s, L as Ve g as, Ne vada, f or Plaintiff-Appellee

.

OP IN ION
WAL L ACE, Senior Circuit J udg e: Davis appe als from the por tio n o f his sentenc e that imposes forfe iture and r estitution. Davis plea ded g uilty to one c ount o f c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it m on e y

la un de ri ng and

thi rt y counts of money

launder ing unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) a nd aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (3)( A). He was order ed to forf

eit $1.29 milli on and also to pay about $95,000 in restitution to t he F eder al Bur eau of Investig ation (F BI ) for funds expended in the oper ation that led to h is arre st. On appea l, he ar g ues that re quiring him to pay both restitution and for feiture will result i n an impermissible double re cover y for the g overnme nt. He ther efor e re quests that his forfe iture amount be off

set by h is restitution amount. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we a ffirm.
I.
Under cover

FB I ag ents asked Davis to help them launde r mon e y , w hic h th e y

re pr e se nte d w a s st ol en f ro m Wa c ho via Ba nk. Davis re ceive d the mon ey an d eng ag ed in var ious fin an cial transactions intended to conc eal the nature a ndU NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 4

source of the “ stole n money .” He took a pe rce ntag e of the funds as c ompensation. After working alone for seve ral months, he enlisted the aid of his co-de fenda nt, Shawn Rice. By the time of the filingo f t h e Indictment, ag ents had pr ov ide d D avis and

Ric e wi th a tot a l of

$1 ,2 93 ,7 82 . D avis had take n $73,782 fo r his work, a nd Davis and Rice had tr ans fe rr e d $ 1, 19 8, 00 0 b a c k to the a g e nts

. The g overnme nt sought a criminal in persona m forfe iture jud g me nt o f $ 1, 29 0, 00 0 a g a ins t D avis purs ua nt t o 18 U. S.C. § 981, 28 U.S.C. § 2641, and 18 U.S.C. § 982. T h e d i s t ri ct court initially

d en i ed the in persona

m amount, but did order fo rf e iture of $2 ,5 97 .5 0 s eiz ed f

ro m tw o b ank

a c c ounts in Da vis ’s name . D avis w a s a lso or de re d to pa y $9 5, 78 2 in restitution to the FB I . After we deci d ed United States v. Newman , 6 59 F .3 d 1 23 5 ( 9th Cir . 201 1) , whic h h e ld t hat a dis tr ic t judg e do e s not h ave dis c re tio n to re du c e or e lim inate a cr iminal forfe iture unless re quired by s t at u t e or the Constit ution, id. at 1240, the g overnmen t fi led a Rule 35 motion reque sting amendment to the forf eiture judg ment. On the same da

y the motion was filed, the district cour t revised its forfeiture order

to include the re quest ed in per sonam jud g me nt.
II.
Dav i s ’s only

argument on appea l is that his forfeiture amount should be offse t by his restitution amount to avoid a double re cover

y by the g overnme nt. We observe at the outset that t h e parties disag ree over whether we should apply

a de novo or plain err or standard of revie w to this claim. Howe ver, we n ee d not decide which position is correc t beca use we would aff irm under either standa

rd, as e x plained below. SeeU NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 5
United States v. Upshaw , 226 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (“G iven the basis for our re solution of this appea l, we nee d not de cide what standard of revie w applies. Unde r e i ther standard, w e af

firm the district cour

t”).
III
. Davis ar g ues that, beca

use the FB Iis essentially

a par t of the Depa rtment of J u s t ice ( DOJ), the two entities are functionally

the same. Thus, he argues, re quiring him to pay fo rf e iture to the DO J and re sti tut ion to the F B Iwi ll r e su lt i n an impe rm iss ibl e do ub le re c ov e ry fo r t he g ov e rnme nt. Da

vis h a s n o tr a i s e d

th e i s s u e o f

w h e t h e rth e F B I i s p r o p e r l y a “victim” under

the restitution statute, and we there fore do not consider that question. See U nited States v. Salce do-Lopez , 907 F.2d 97, 98 ( 9th Cir. 1990).
As we re c og nize d in

Newman , forf

eiture an drestitution serve differ ent purposes or g oals. 659 F.3d at 1241. Forf eiture is imposed as punishment for a c rime; re s tituti on makes the victim whole ag ain. Id . We a g re e d with the Court of Ap pe a ls for the T enth C i rc u it that “‘[c]rimi nal forf eiture a nd restitution are se parate re medies w it h differ ent purposes.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Un ite d Sta te

s v . M c Gi nty , 6 10 F .3 d 1 24 2, 12 47 (1 0th Cir. 2010)). Thus, we stated that requiring a def endant to pay bo th fo rf e iture and re sti tut ion

wo uld no t, o n it s o wn , r e su lt i n double re cover

y
. Howeve r, because the victims of the c rimes in t h at case wer e private financ ial instit utions, we did not addre ss the issue of whe ther pa y ment of both forf

eiture a nd restitution to the gove rnment c re ate d a n imp e rm iss ibl e do ub le rec overy
. Id. at 1242 n.6. We now addr ess that question.
Othe r c ir c uit s h ave c on sid e re d w he the r a n o ff se t is war rante d to avoid double re cover y when g overnme nt entitiesU NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 6
will rece ive both forf

eiture a nd restitution. See U

nited States v. Taylor , 582 F.3d 558 ( 5th Cir. 2009); Un ite d S tates v . R uff

, 420 F.3d 772 ( 8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Eme rson , 128 F .3 d 5 57 (7 th C ir . 1 99 7). Thos e c ourt s h ave fo c us e d th e ir anal y sis on whether the two g overnme nt rec ipients were

“ d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s ” i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e th e r a

do ub le rec overy would occur

. See Taylor , 582 F.3d at 566 (considering whether

the Fe dera l Emerg ency

Manag ement Ag e nc y and the DO J ar e dis tin c t) ; Ru ff , 420 F.3d a t 775–76 (c on sid e ri ngwh e the r a

state na rc oti c s ta sk

fo rc e and the state narc otics division are distinct); Emerson , 128 F.3d at 567–68 (consider ing whether the United States Postal Servic e and the DOJ are distinct). These case s hold or imply that if two entities are related closely enoug h, restituti o n or for feiture should be reduc ed. We disag ree with this approach.
Ev e n if the same g ov e rnme nt e nti ty wi ll receiv e bo th f o r f e i tur e an d r e s t i tu t i o n , th e r e s i mp l y i s n o d o u b l e r e c o v e r

y. The two pa

y ments repr esent diff

ere nt ty pes of funds: puniti ve and compe nsatory . They are differ ent in n at ure, kind, a nd purpose. Mone y

levied as a

punitive f

i ne does not “ double” the money intended to c ompensate a loss a ny more th an the addition of apples to one’ s st ore double s the orang e stock. Nor is the collection of forf eiture and restitution based on the same crime an impermissible doubling insofar a s a def endant is conce rned. Newman , 6 5 9 F. 3d at 1241. I t is therefor e irrele vant to what extent the FBI and the DO J are distinct e nti tie s, and

the dis tr ic t c ourt

di d no t c le arl y

e rr wh e n it did no t of fs e t D avis ’s fo rf

e iture amou

nt.
Our conclusion finds further support in t h e st atutes g ov e rn ingresti tut ion

a nd fo rf e iture . A s Newman held, fo rf e iture is m and ator

y un de r 1 8 U.S. C. § 98 2 a

nd 18 U. S.C. § 2461(c) . 659 F.3d a

t 1240. T he statutory

scheme , whichU NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 7

rec og nizes that the go vernme nt can be a “vic tim” for purposes of r estitution, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), expressly allows offse ts ag ainst forfe iture or r estitution i n some situations. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 981( a)( 2)(C) pr ovides: “In case s involving fr aud in the process of obt aining a loan or extension of cr edit, the cour

t shall allow the claimant a deduction fr om the forf eiture to t h e extent that the loan was r epaid, or the debt was satisfied, without any financi al loss to the victim.” L ikewise, unde r 18 U.S.C. § 366 4 (j )( 2), any amount the victim of a cr ime rec eives fr om a re stitut ion order w ill be reduc ed by

“any amount later r ecove red a s compensator y dama g e s f

or the same los s b y

the vic tim .” Ho we ve r, the re is no provision that authorizes an o ff s et solely beca use the g overnme nt will rece ive b o t h restitution and forf eiture. B e c a us e Con g re ss c le arl y

kn e w h owto p ro vide f

or of fs e t in other situations, we c onclude it did not intend it here.
We t he re fo re ho ld that Da

vis wa s no t e nti tle d to an o ff se t, reg ardle ss of the re lationship between t he for feiture and restitution recipients. The district court committed n o err or, plain or otherw ise.
AF F IRM ED

.

B ERZ ON , Ci rc uit

Judg e , w ithwh om T HO MA S, Ci rc uit J u d ge, j o i n s , co n cu rr i n g:
Ic on c ur in t he c ourt ’s op ini on . I

wr ite se pa

ra te ly to n ote th e n arro wn es s o f o ur h o l d i n g.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 8
Th e purp os e of

c ri min a l f

or fe iture is t o f

or c e g uil ty defe ndants to “disg org e their ill -g otten g ains.” United States v. Newman , 659 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2011) (interna l quotation marks omitted). To that end, Cong ress ha s articulated a br oad conce ption of what “g ains” may be subjec t to a cour t’s forf eiture o rder. See, e .g. , 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (def ining “ [p] roper

ty subject to criminal for feiture ” as “ (1) any proper ty constituting, or de rived fr om , any proce eds the person obtaine d, direc tly

or i n direc tly , as the re sult of such violation,” or “( 2) any

of th e p er s o n’s prope rty used, or int e nd e d to be us e d, in a

ny mann e r o r p art , to c omm it, or to fa c ili tate the c omm iss ion of , s uc h v iol atio n. ”); 18 U. S.C. § 9 81 (a )( 1) (d e fi nin g pr op e rt y “ su bje c t to fo rf

e iture ” to include “[a]ny

proper ty . . . involved in a transa ction or attempted tra

nsaction in violation of section 1956

. . . or any proper ty trac eable to such property ,” and “ [a] ny proper ty

. . . wh ic h c on sti tut e s o r i s d e ri ve d f ro m pr oceeds tr a c e a

ble to [suc h o ff e ns e ]”) ; id. § 982(a) (1) (re quiring courts to order persons c onvic te d o f m on e y la un de ri ngun de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 1956 to “forf

eit to the United States any prop er t y , rea l or pe rs on a l, i nv olv e d in

su c h o ff e ns e , or any

pr op e rt y tr a c e a ble to such proper

ty ”).
In interpre ting those statutes, w e have simil arly expressed
an expansive view of forf

eitable pr operty

. See, e .g. , Newman , 659 F.3d at 1243 (“‘Re quiring imposit ion of a money jud g me nt o n a

de fe nd ant who c ur

re ntl y po sse sses no a sse ts further s the rem ed i al purposes of the forf eiture statute by ensuringthat all elig ible cri m i n al def endants re ceive the mandatory

forf eit ure sa nction Congr ess intended a nd disgor g e their ill-g otten g ains , even those alre ady spent.’”)U NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 9 (q u o t i n g United States v. Casey , 4 44 F .3 d 1 07 1, 10 74 (9 th Cir. 2006)).
Notwithstan d ing our

broad unde rstandingof what p r o p e rty c o urt s m ay o r d e rt o b e f o r f e i t e d , f un d am e n t a l l y, forf eiture is about losingor g iving up tha t proper ty

. See Webster’s Colleg iate Di ctionary 491 (11th ed. 2003) (def ining “ forf

ei t ure” as “the loss of proper ty or money”); Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

(def ining “ forf

eiture” as “dive stiture of pro p e rty

w it h o u t c o mp e n s ati o n ” )

. A n d , it w o u ld seem axiom atic that one must g ain or possess proper ty befor e one can lose it. Put simply , by definition one cannot “for feit” that which he ne ver ha d in the first place

. He re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt or de re d Davis to fo rf e it $1,290,000. This amount repre sented ne arly the total amount of m on ey Dav is andRi ce l aun dere d fo r un d e r cov er FBI a g e nt s betw e e n M arc h 2 00 8 a nd Marc h 2 00 9. I t is un dis pute d th a t D avis ke pt f or him se lf a s c omm iss ion

on ly $73,782 of the a

pproxi mately

$1.29 milli on in l aunder ed funds. Davis ha s not challeng ed the dist rict cour t’s order on the g rounds that forf

eiture of the full $ 1

. 29 milli on was improper be cause he only took a perce ntag e of that amount as compensation. Our opinion (cor

rec tly ) d oes not addre ss that issue; we ho ld on ly that Da

vis wa s no t e nti tle d to an offset of his forf eiture amount . Iam somewhat dubious that the $1.29 milli on of other pe ople’s mone y t h at Davis launde red is an appropr iate mea sure of

the am o unt that could be for feited. But as the i ssue has not been raised, we can leave to another da y the qu e sti on wh e the r a de fe nd ant wh o e sse nti a lly is p a idU NI TED S T A T ES V

. D A V IS 10 a commission on other people ’s money he handle s as par

t of an illeg al s cheme can be m ade to “for feit” funds that passed throug h his hands but, it appear s, were never his.