The Honor able Joseph M

. Ho od, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0074n.06 F iled: Janu ary 24, 2008 Nos. 06-2315 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

STE P HANIE GAR CIA, JOEL GARC IA, CH RI STIN A SM ITH , & BR IA N SM ITH , P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,

v. KEVI N DY KST RA, PAU L S MUT Z, JASON P A V LIG E, FR UITP ORT CH AR TER

TOW NSH IP , J OA NN A B ETH DY K STR A, ED BOO K ER , J OSH BOOKER, WAYNE K A M P , BRIAN K LIN G EL, RO N M IN OR , & SCO TT WEN ELL, De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE WEST ERN DISTRICT OF MIC HIGAN

Before: CLAY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges, and HOOD, District Judge. * JULIA SMITH G IBBO NS, C ircuit Judge . This is an appea l from the district cour t’s g rant of summary

judgme nt in a civil rig hts a ction broug ht unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleg ed that

sever al pol ice officer s and public off icials wer e complicit in the unlawf ul taking of

cer tain persona l proper ty from their storag e unit. The district court re jected pla intiffs’ claims and g rante d summary2

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f de fe nd ants
. F or the re a so ns se t fo rt h be low , we a ff

ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e in part. I. This case arose out of a dispute betwe en plaintiffs a nd defe ndants o v er t h e owner ship of too ls. On Oc tob e r 1 2, 20 04 , d e fe nd ant K e vin Dy ks tr a and pla int if f S te ph anie Ga

rc ia e nte re d in to a purc hase a g ree ment in which Garcia ag ree d to purcha se Dy kstra’s business, True Cuts L awn Car e, L L C (“Tr ue C uts”). Under the t erms of the ag ree ment, Gar cia a g ree d to a purc hase pr ice of $1.00 fo r t he Tr ue Cut s n a me , b us ine ss g oo dw ill , and a ll c lie nt l ist s a

nd a ssume d th e ri g hts to a ll a c c ounts

rec eivables a

nd cer tain assets. The a g ree ment did not accur ately ref lect the nature of the transac tion, howeve r. F irst, Dy

kstra re ce i v ed $16,500 in cash, not $1.00, for his sale of Tr

ue Cuts. Second, althoug h the purcha se ag ree ment named Stephanie Gar cia as the purcha ser, she was mere ly acting as a pr ox y for he r husband, plaintiff Joel Garc ia, and plaintiff B rian S mith. Shortly afte r the sig ning of the purc hase a g ree ment, J oel Gar cia a nd Br ian S mith took possession of a number of tools from two locations: 2885 Br ooks Road and 2815 Alder, operating on their belief that the tools had bee n tr ans fe rr e d und e r the purc ha se a g re e me nt. Ga rc ia and Smit

h ev e ntu a lly

tr ans fe rr e d th e ma te ri a ls t o a storag e unit at Cloverville Store and L ock, the lea se for which wa s in Sm ith’s name only

. Dy kstra, it a ppear s, took a differ ent view of the meaning of the purcha se ag ree ment he sig ned with Stepha

nie Gar cia. Dy

kstra believed the ag ree ment’s ref ere nce to “ assets” at “sa id location” wa s intended to enc ompass only the pape rwork he ld at his residenc e at 2815 Alder and not the equipment stored at 2885 B rooks Road, what Dy kstra desc ribed a s his “shop.” In Dec emb er 2 004, Dy kstra

re p o rt edt h e t o o l s t ak en b y Ga rc i a a n d

S m i t h fr o m 2 8 8 5 Br o o k s R o adt o b e s t o l e n . Al t h o u gh Dy ks tr a insis te d th a t G arc ia

be arr e ste d f

or the re mov a l of

a sse ts f ro m 28 85 B ro ok s Ro a d, Ga rc iaThe wa rra nt was issued only for Ga

rcia ’s alleg ed re ceipt and c oncea lment of a ra mp trailer. 2 3 claimed that he and Smith had lawfully acc essed the building and that he had paid for the items he

remove d. The prose cutor’s o ff ice infor med Dy kstra that the matter

was c ivil and that criminal char g es would not be broug ht. Although the rec ord is clea r that an e arly

deter mination was made th a t th is d is p u te w a s c iv il in n a tu r e , a w ar r an t f o r G ar c ia ’ s ar

r e s t w a s is s u e d o nMay

20, 2005, containing Dy

kstra’s a lleg ation t hat Gar cia ha d rec eived a nd conce aled stolen prope rty valued at

mor e tha n $ 20 0 b ut l e ss t

ha n $ 10 00 , in

vio la tio n o f M ic h. Co mp . L aws § 7 50 .5 35 (4 )( a ). Th os e 2 char g es we re subse quently dismiss ed. On Saturday , J uly

16, Dy kstra re turned to the storag e site, and with the permission of Jerry Lu n d b er g, t h e o wn er o f t h e S t o re an d L o ck , l ef t h i s t ru ck at t h e s t o ra ge fa ci l i t y i n o rd er t o d i s co u ra ge any one fr om moving the tools out of t he unit over the wee kend. Dy kstra’s wif

e, def endant Joanna Be th Dy kstra, lea sed a stora g e unit at the St o re and L ock to provide a place from which D y

kstra could watc h the unit in which he believe d his property was he ld. By

leasing the unit, the Dy

kstras also wer e g iven the acc ess code for the g ate surr ounding the units at the Store and L ock. Dy kstra and his wife spe nt most of Sunday , J uly 17, conducting“surve illance” at the fa cility

. Ea rl y Mo nd a y mor nin g , July

18 , G arci a and S mith arr ive d at th e Sto re and L oc k, bu t,

acc ording to Dy

kstra, they

did not enter the stora ge unit about which Dy kstra wa s conce rned. Dy ks tr a c la ime d th a t a

po lic e of fi c e r c a me sh or

tly the re a ft e r a

nd inq uir ed into the re a so n f

or his prese nce at the storag e complex

. Dy kstra responded that he had permission from Lundbergto be at the fa cility

an d t h at he was kee ping w atch ove r his tools. The office r informe d Dy kstra that the police had r ece ived a complaint from Gar cia and Smit h reg arding his pr esenc e. Smit h believed that Dy ks tr a wa s st a lki nghim , f

oll ow inghim , a

nd takin g pic tur e s o f h im. He ma de re pe a te d c omp la int s4

to the police conc erningDy kstra’s presenc e near his storag e unit

. After the arrival and departure of

a se c on d o ff

ic e r, Lun db e rg arri ved and tol d D y ks tr a that he c ou ld n o lo ng e r b e on the pr op e rt

y

“ ha ra ssi ng ” Ga

rc ia and Smith a

nd ha d to le a ve . D y

ks tr a c omp lie d b ut l a te r i n th e da y re tur ne d to

an ar ea a djoining L

undberg ’s prope rty
. At some later point on Jul y 18, Dy kstra conta cted Ron Cooper, the Fr uitport Charter To wn sh ip S up e rv iso r. Coo pe r c all ed Pau l Smutz, the c hie f o f p oli c e , a nd a sk e d th a t Smutz c a ll Dyk s t ra to see if he neede d any assistance . Shortly

there afte r, Dy skstra ca lled Smutz . Alt h o u gh Dy kstra and Smutz agr eed that they had more than one c onversation o n J u l y 1 8 , they offe red differ ing te stimony

on the substance of those conve r s a ti o ns. Acc ording to Dy

kstra, af ter he informed Smutz that he discove red t h e re s t o f hi s alleg edly stolen proper

ty , Smutz assure d him that he was g oing to spe ak to the prosec utor’s office to attempt to secur e a “wa rra nt or something” to retrieve the tools. Dy

kstra testified that Smutz t hen told him that there would be no arr est war rants issued if Dy ks tr a we nt t o th e Sto re and

L oc k to col lec t his too ls h ims e lf . Wh e n D y

ks tr a inq uir e d in to wh e the r i t w ou ld t

he re fo re be a

pp ro pr ia te to t a ke ind e pe nd e nt ste ps to re tr ie ve his pr op e rt y , Smutz

re sp on de d: “ Wel l, i t w ou ld b e be tte r w itha wa rr ant, bu t a s lo nga s y ou

have mor e pr oo f t

hat th os e tools are yours than they

have that they ’re theirs, y ou’re all rig ht doing it.” Dy kstra also testified that Smutz encour ag ed him to retain a ssistance in g ett i n g the tools and promised to send F ruitport Township police o ff

i ce rs t o the sce ne. Smutz , by contra st, disputed Dy

kstra’s r epre sentation that Smutz soug ht to obtain a sear ch wa rra nt before Dy

kstra ente red the stor age u nit. He also denie d Dy kstr a ’ s c la im th a t h e a s s u r e d D y k s tr a th a t n o ar

r e s t w ar r an ts w o u ld is s u e f

o r th e e n tr

y in to the Smit h storag e unit.Ka mp t e sti fi e d th a t he dis c ov ered th e key se ve ra l da

y s b e fo re the e ve nts a t is su e in t his 3 litigation, not J uly

18. This disparity

is imm ater ial.

5 A f t e r b e i n g t o l d

b y Lu n d b e r g t h a t h e w a s n o l o n g e r p e r m i t t e d o n S t o r e a

n d L o c k ’ s p r o p e rt y, Dy kstra re turned ther e with at l ea s t o n e other pe rson, def endant Way

ne Kamp. I n the cour se of placinga lock on Dy

kstra’s stora g e unit and inspecting the exterior of Smit h’s unit to ensure nothing ha d b e e n r e mov e d, Ka

mp d isc ov e re d w hat he be li eve d to be a ke y to t he Smith s tor a g e un it. Ac c or din g to K a mp, he ob se rv e d s omethin g sh ini ngand tol d D y ks tr a that “ [i]t lo ok s li ke it c ou ld be a ke y lay ing on the g ro un d, it c ou ld b e .” Dy ks tr a re lay e d th is i nf

or ma tio n to Smu tz, w ho sa id 3 he would look into the matter. I t is undisput ed that on J uly 18, Smutz called D y

kstra to conf

irm that he had discovere d the key at the Store and L ock, used the key to open the Smith unit , looked inside, saw the tools i nside, and sec ured the unit ag ain. Smutz insisted that he did not go to the Store a nd L o c k an d s e a r c h f o r t h e k e y a s a p art i s an i n t h e d i s p u t e b u t t o c o n f i r m t h e v e r a c i t y o f

D yk s t r a ’ s s t o r

y.

On the e ve nin g of

July 18 , 2 00 5, Dy

ks tr a and se ve ra l of his a sso c ia te s— inc lud ingde fe nd a nts Ed Booke r , Jo s h u a

B o o k e r , K a mp , B r ia

nK li n g e l, Ro nM in o r , an d Sc o tt We n e ll

—

me t at 2 8 85 B ro ok s Ro a d. Dy

ks tr a te sti fi e d th a t de fe nd ant Ja so n Pavli g e , o f t he F ru itp or

t Ch art e r Town sh ip Police Depa

rtment, was a lso present, a lthough Pavlige de nied meetingDy kstra ther e. Dur ing a

brief

conver sation following Pavlig e’s a rrival at 2885 Br ooks Road, Dy kstra told the office r that the g roup did not require a ssist an ce i n coll ectingthe tools but P avlig e could wa it by the roa d with Dy

kstra. The off icer led the g roup by car

to the Store and L ock. Dy kstra testified that Ka

mp punched in the pass code to g ain acc ess to the are a wher e the storag e units were loc ated. While the re st of the g roup enter ed the pr operty and loaded the t ools, Dy kstra and Pavlige waited by Pavlige ’s car. W hen EdPlaintiffs also alleg ed a Four teenth Amendment due proc ess violation, but that claim was 4 dismiss ed without objection. 6 Booke r soug ht to confirm that they wer e per mitt ed t o re t ri eve the tools, P avlig e g estured in the aff irmative by nodding. I t is undisputed that Pavlige neither enter ed the g ate nor re ndere d assistance in phy sically

removing the items from the Smith unit. After the t ools wer e loaded, the g roup took them back to 2885 B rooks Road. Upon their discove ry

on J uly 19, 2005, t h at items were remove d from the stora g e unit at Store and L ock, Garcia claimed that he and Smit h attempted to file a police re port, but the offic ers at the sce ne re fused to take a re port and direc ted them to c ontact Smutz

. Smutz informed Dy kstra that pl a int if

fs ha d c omp la ine d th a t th e pa dlo c k o n th e ir sto ra g e un it h a d b e e n r e mov e d a nd a sk e d if Dy kstra’s g roup had use d bolt cutters to remove it. Dy kstra responded they

had not, and whe n he inquired about the r eason f or Smutz ’s co n ce rn, Smutz told him t hat L undg ren w as upset and that Smu tz c ou ld b e bla

me d f or any fa llo ut. Af

te r that e xch ang e , Smutz r e fu se d to c omm un ic a te wi th Dy kstra fur ther a bout the matter. On August 1 0 , 2 0 0 5 , Jo e l G ar c ia , St e p h an ie G ar c ia , B r ia nSm it h , an d h is w if e Ch r is ti na Smit h filed suit in the United States District Cour t fo r t he Western District of Michig an, see king relief under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 for alleg ed viol ations of the F ourth Amendment a nd raising state-law claims for unla

wful conve rsion and civil c onspiracy

. I n an amende d complaint filed De cembe r 15, 4 20 05 , a pp e lla nts pr ov ide d a

mor e de ta ile d f

a c tua l a c c ount o f t

he ba sis fo r t

he ir c la ims . A s to the ir

c ivi l r ig hts c la im, a

pp e lla nts a lle g e d th a t F ru itp or

t T ow ns hi p po li ce of

fi c ia ls a nd Dy ks tr a and his associate s toge ther violated the ir Four th Amendment rig hts to be fre e fr om unrea sonable sea rche s

and se izur e s w he n th e y

re tr ie ve d w hat D y

ks tr a tho ug ht t o b e his too ls fr om the Sto re and L oc k unit

.7

On July 28 , 2 00 6, in re sp on se to an or de r to sh ow c a us e , pla int if

fs a g re e d to the dis mis sa l of the ir claims ag ainst the Fr

uitport Charter Tow nship. On the mot ion

of de fe nd ants F ru itp or

t Ch art e r T ow ns hip , P a

v l i g e , a n d S m utz a nd in r e sp on se to its order to show ca

use, the district cour

t gr anted summ ary judgme nt on plaintiffs’ cla ims. I n an

or de r d a te d A ugus t 23 , 2 00 5, the dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d, a s an in iti a l matte r, that on ly B ri an Sm ith had standing to pursue a F ourth Amendment c laim ag ainst defe ndants bec aus e his name a lone

a pp e are d o n th e Sto re and

L oc k le a se . A s to Pa vli g e and Smu tz, the di st ri ct cou rt r ule d th a t bo th office rs wer e entitled to qualifie d i m m unity from suit. The district cour t likewise dismissed municipal defe ndant Fr

uitport Char

ter Township. Having dismiss ed plaintiffs’ § 1983 ag ainst the police off icer s and the municipality , the di strict court declined t o exercise suppleme ntal jurisdiction over pla intiffs’ state-la

w claims. This timely

appea l followed. II. A. We re vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to g ra nt s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo

. Pagan v. Fruc hey , 49 2 F

. 3 d 7 6 6 , 7 7 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. S u m m ar y j u d g m e n t m ay b e g r an t e d on ly if there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct and one party is entitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law. Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) . The moving party bear s the i nitial burden of demonstrating the abse nce of any g e n u i n e i s s u e o f

m a t e r i a l f

a c t , an d a l l i n f e r e n c e s s h o u l d

b e m a d e i n f

a v o r o f t h e n o n - m o v i n g p a rt y. Ce lot e xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To support its motion, the moving par ty may show “that ther e is an a

bsence of evide nce to support the nonmovingparty ' s case .” Id . at 325. On c e the mov ingpa

rt y satis fi e s it s in iti a l bu

rd e n, the burd e n s hif

ts t o th e no nmo vin g pa

rt y to set forth spec ific fa cts showing a triable issue of mater ial fac t. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.8

Zenith Radio Cor

p. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). “The mere e x istence of a scintilla of evide nce in s u p p o rt o f th e p la in ti f

f ' s p o s it io n w il l b e in s u f

f ic ie n t [t o d e f

e a t a mo ti o nf o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t] ; there must be evidenc e on which the jury could re asonably fi n d fo r t h e plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In revie wing a d i s t ri ct court’s de cision to gr ant

su mma ry jud g me nt, we vie w a ll the fa c ts a nd the inf e re nc e s d ra wn the re fr om i n th e lig ht m os t favor able to the nonmoving party
. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 587. B. i. Standing Citi ngthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on , de fe nd ants c on te nd that only B ri an Smith is p e rm itt e d to pursue a Four th Am en dment claim bec ause the storag e unit in question was lease d in his name. Ho we ve r, the Sup re me Court ha s h e ld “ that c a

pa cit y to c la im the pr ote c tio n o f t he F ourt h Amendment depe nds not upon a proper ty rig ht in the invaded plac e but upon whethe r the pe rson who claims the protec tion of the Amendme n t has a le g itimate expectation of privac y in the invaded place .” Ra k

as v . I lli no is , 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). Def endants do not otherwise cha lleng e plaintiffs’ a ssertion that all four of them stored pr op e rt y in t he S tor e and

L oc k unit , a

nd the re fo re , a ll f

our p la int if

fs may purs ue a

F ourt h Am e ndme nt c ha lle ng e to Smu tz’ s e ntr y int o the un it. Mo re ov e r, the dis tr ic t c ourt wa s in c or re c t in sug g esting that, beca

use plaintiffs may

not have ha d a viable pr operty interest in the tools, they

may not advanc e a F ourth Amendment c laim. “The le g ality of a pe rson’s possession ca nnot be the ly nchpin of their Fourth Ame ndment standing .” United States v. Carnes , 309 F.3d 950, 960 ( 6th Cir. 20 02 ). I n any e ve nt, the re is n o d isp ute that pl a int if fs le g a lly re ta ine d a

n in te re st i n th e sto ra g e un it and could ha

ve re asonably

expected that it woul d n o t b e en t ere d. See id. at 959-60 (r ejec tingThe private def endants a re K evin Dy

kstra, J oanna Be th Dy

kstra, Ed B ooker, Josh Booker , 5 Way ne Ka mp, B ri an K lin g e l, R on

Min or , a nd Sc ott Wen e ll. “The public function test re quires that the pr ivate entity exercises po we rs which ar e 6 traditionally

exclusively

rese rved to the state
. . . . The state c ompulsion t est requir es proof that the state si gnif

ic antl y e nc oura g e d o r s ome ho w c oe rc e d th e pr ivate pa rt y , e ith e r o ve rt ly

or c ov e rt ly , to take a particula

r action so that the choice is r eally that of the state.” Tah fs , 316 F.3d at 591 (quoting 9 g overnme nt’s argument that defe ndant had no expectation in cer tain tapes be cause their conte nt was illega lly obtained wher e “tape s themselves wer e not stolen, nor was the briefc ase in which they wer e found”)

. ii. L iability of Private De fenda

nts Under § 1983 Al tho ug h th e pa

rt ie s and the dis tr ic t c ourt

la rg e ly ig no re d the status of the pr ivate de fe nd a nts 5 fo r t he purp os e s o f p la int if

fs ’ § 19 83 su it, the re is a

n in iti a l qu e sti on

of wh e the r t

he y may be he ld liable under a statute direc ted at constitutional violations at the hands of the g overnme nt. Section 1983 is directed at actions taken pursuant to g overnme ntal authority , and “doe s not, as a g ener al rule, prohibit the con duct of private par ties acting in their individual capa cities.” Lin ds e yv . D e tro it En tm ’t , LLC , 4 8 4 F. 3 d 8 2 4 , 8 2 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. , 4 57 U. S. 92 2, 94 7 ( 19 82 )) ; Tahfs v. Proctor , 31 6 F .3 d 58 4, 59 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 3) . Pr ivate a c tor s ma y be lia ble as ag ents of the g overnme nt when their c onduct is “fa irly attributabl e t o t h e st ate.” Romanski v. De tro it Ent

m’ t, L LC , 4 28 F .3 d 6 29 , 6 36 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) . Pr ivate

c on du c t is a c tio na

ble un de r § 19 83 if it is: (1 ) the e xer c ise of a pu bli c fu nc tio n; ( 2) the re su lt o f s ta te compulsion; or (3) a r esult of a sy mbiotic re lationship or nexus betwee n the g overnme nt and a private pa rty
. See Chapman v. HigbeeCo. , 319 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2003). I n the instant case , the sy mbi oti c re la tio ns hip or

ne xus f ra me wo rk is t he sole fr a me wo rk

po te nti a lly

a pp lic a ble to pla int if fs ’ c la ims

. 6Ellison v. Garbarino , 48 F.3d 192, 195 ( 6th Cir. 1995)). 10 “Unde r the sy

mbiotic [ relationship] or nexus test, a [§] 1983 claimant must demonstrate that there is a sufficie ntly

close ne x us betwee n the g overnme nt and t h e private pa rty ’s conduc t so that the conduc t may

be fa irly attributed to the state itself.” Id. a t 83 4. Th e ne xus tes t “req ui res a sufficie ntly

close re lationship ( i.e. , throug h state re g ulation o r contra ct) be tween the state and the private a ctor so that the action taken may be attributed to the state .” Ellison v. Garbarino , 48 F.3d 19 2, 19 5 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 5) . D y

ks tr a and his a sso c ia te s d o n ot q

ua lif y a s st a te a c tor s und e r t

his definition. Other than the ir status as re sidents of Fr uitport Charter Township, there is no e vidence that the private defe ndants in this c ase ha ve the ty pe of intimate c onnection with the g overnme nt

nece ssary to attribute their actions to the state. Def endants’ conduct was the p ro d u ct o f t he ind e pe nd e nt i nit iativ e of Dy ks tr a and a

bs e nt his a c tio ns a s a c a ta ly st, the c ha lle ng e d a c tiv iti e s w ou ld

no t ha ve oc c ur re d. Thus , p la int if

fs c ann ot d e mon str a te that th e state wa s “ so int imate ly inv olv e d in the cha lleng ed private conduc t” that their actions could be c lassified as state action for the purposes of § 1983. See W

olotsky v. H

uhn , 96 0 F .2 d 13 31 , 13 35 (6 th Cir . 1 99 2) . F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , we a ffirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 c laim as to the private de fenda nts. i i i

. C l ai m s Un d er

§ 1 9 8 3 Aga i n s tS m u t z an d P av l i ge Section 1983 provides a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion for those per sons subject to a depr ivation of the “ ri g hts , p ri vil e g e s o r i mm un iti e s” g ua ra nte e d und e r t

he Con sti tut ion

wh e n th a t de pr ivatio n is eff ecte d by a person operating “under color of any statute, ordinanc e, regulation, custom, or usag e” of a g overnme ntal entity . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[G] overnme nt officials sued in their individ u al

c a pa c iti e s ma

y be he ld lia

ble un de r § 1 98 3 w he n th e y vio la te c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts that are ‘c le a rl yW e lls v . B ro wn , 891 F.2d 591 ( 6th Cir.1989). 7 11 established.’” Mi tc he ll v . M c Ne il , 4 8 7 F. 3 d

3 7 4 , 3 7 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Sa uc ie r v. K atz , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)) .

a. L awsuit Ag ainst Smut z and Pavlige in their I ndividual Capacities Although it ana ly

zed the § 1983 claims ag ainst Offic ers Smutz and Pavlige on the me rits, the d is tr ic t c o u rt a ls o s tate d

th a t S mutz an d

Pav li g e w e r e n o t s ued in their in d iv id u a l c a p a c it ie s . We apply a “c ourse of

proce eding s” test in analy zing w h ether

the def endants re ceive d notice that the plaintiffs intended to subject t hem t o persona l liabilit y . Moore v . City of Harriman , 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) ( en banc ). As the Mo or e en banc court e x plained: T h e “ co u rs e o f p ro ce ed i n gs ” t es tco n s i d er s s u ch fa ct o rs as t h e n at u re o f t h e p l ai n t i ff 's claims, reque sts for compensat o ry o r punitive damag es, and the nature of any defe nses ra ised in response to the c omplaint, particul arly claims of qualifie d immunit y , to determine w hether the def endant had actua l knowledg e of the potential for indivi dual l iability . . . . The test also c onsiders whe ther subseque nt pleading s put the def endant on notice of the c apac ity in which he or s h e i s sued. We are mindful of the timing of

subsequent filing s not, as the offic ers sug g est, bec ause the y must be filed pra ctically

contempora

neous to the opinion, but rather to de termine whether the pa rt ie s are sti ll i n th e e arl y sta g e s o f l iti g a tio n. Th is e ns ur e s b oth fa ir ne ss t o defe ndants, W

e lls ' s fi rs t c on c e rn , a

nd the re so lut ion of any

jur isd ic tio na l pr ob le ms 7 at an e arly

stag e, W e lls ' s second c oncer

n. 272 F.3d at 772 n.1. The c omplaint and amende d comp l ai n t d o not specify in either the c aption or the text that Smu tz and

Pa vli g e a re name d in

the ir ind ivi du a l capaci ties . In th e po rt ion of the c omp la int s de sc ri bin g the pa

rt ie s, the a lle g a tio n is that “ Smu tz and Pa vli g e are Pol ic e Of

fi c e rs of the tow ns hip

a nd a t al l t i m e s m e n t i o n e d i nt h i s C o mp l a i n tw e r e a c t i n g u n d e r c o l o r o f l aw an d c o l o r o f t he ir

a uth or ity a s Polic e Of

fi c e rs of the To wn sh ip. ” Th e a me nd e d co mpl a int , li ke the or ig ina l c omp la int , al l ege s a § 1983 cla im and sever al state c laims ag ainst all defe ndants collec tively and pra y s for12

compensatory

damag es on ea ch cla im ag ainst defe ndants as a g roup without mentioning a ny de fe nd ant by name . Smu tz and Pa vli g e , h ow e ve r, a sse rt

the de fe ns e of

qu a lif ie d im mun ity

in b oth their answe r and the ir amende d answe r. I n Mo or e , wher e our en banc court he ld that the defe ndant police of fice rs wer e on notice the y

wer e beingsued as individuals, the complaint provided some indication that the officers we re sue d in t he ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c ity and th e plai nti ff

’s re sp on se to t

he de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

to d ism iss

“ c lari fi e d an y re ma ini ng a mbi g uit y ” a s it state d the of

fi c e rs we re su e d in

the ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s. 272 F.3d at 773-74. I n contra st, in Shepherd v . W ellman , this court held that the def endant lac ked notice he w as beingsued in his individual capac ity beca use the only

possible i n d i ca t i o n that the defe ndant was be ing sue d in his indi vidual capa city was a reque st for monetar y damag es. 313 F .3d 963, 968-69 (6th Cir. 2002). That Smutz and Pavlig e asse rted a qualified immunity

defe nse in both the answe r and the

a me nd e d a

ns we r d ist inguis he s th is c a se fr om Sh e ph e rd , making it more fac tually simil ar to Moore. The qua lified immunit y

defe nse shows th at t h ey wer e in fa ct on notice of the possibilit y

of an individual capac ity

§ 1983 claim by

the t ime they

filed both the orig inal and the amended a nswer. S ee L i n s d s ay v. B ogle, 92 F. App’x 165, 169 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the asser tion of a qualified-im m u n i t y

defe nse (e ven a c on tin ge nt qualified-immunity defe nse) indicates that the de fe nd ants we re a wa

re the y c ou ld b e he ld p e rs on a lly

lia ble ” ); Bi gg s v. M e ad ows , 66 F .3 d 5 6, 61 (4 th Cir. 1995) (“B eca

use qualified immunit y is a vailable only in a persona l c apac ity suit . . . the a ssertion of that de fe ns e ind ic a te s th a t th e de fe nd ant i nte rp re te d th e pla int if f’ s a c tio n as be inga g a ins t hi m persona lly .”). Thus, the demand f or money damag es, along with something more, here t he qualifie d13

i m m u n i t y d ef en s e a s s er t edi nt h e a n s we r a n d am en d ed an s we r, d em o n s t ra t es t h at S m u t z an d P av l i ge

we re awa re of po te nti a l li a

bil ity in t he ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s. b. Th e § 1 98 3 Cl a im A g a ins t Smutz and Pa vli g e on

the Me ri ts An i mportant preliminary issue is whether Pavlige and Smutz may be held r esponsible for the ac ti o n s o f Dy

kstra and his a ssociates. Sec tion 1983, by its terms, require s that any alleg ed

c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n b e take n und e r c olo r o f s ta te law, e ith e r b y

g ov e rnme nt a c tor s o r p ri vate individuals acting as ag ents of the state

. Gover nment officia ls ty

pically may not be ca lled to answer fo r t h e a ct i o n s o f p ri v at e p ar t i es , an d , t h u s , i nt h e i n s t an tca s e, t h e r el ev an tqu es t i o ni s d i d P av l i ge

and Smu tz “ be c ome so e nta

ng le d in [ Dy

ks tr a ’s ] pr ivate se lf

-h e lp re me dy that the y

may be he ld t o

answe r under

[§] 1983? ” Me

y e rs v . R e dwo od

City , 4 00 F .3 d 76 5, 77 1 (9 th Cir

. 20 05 ). Th e Sixth Circuit “has held that an office r’s mere prese nce at the scene to ke ep the peac e while parties c arr y out their private r epossession re m ed i es d oes not rende r the re possession action that of the state .” Rev is v. Meldrum , 489 F.3d 273, 290 ( 6th C i r. 2007). In United States v. Coleman , 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980), the Six th Circuit ruled that “whe re state involvement in private a ction constitutes no more than acquiesc ence or t acit approval, t he private ac tion is not transfor med into state ac tion

even if the private party would not ha ve acte d without the authorization of state l aw . . . . [ T ] he actions of a

private pa

rty will not be attributed to the state unless the state actua lly compels the action.” Id. at 964. “As a g ener al rule, mere prese nce at the scene of a se arc h, without a showing of direc t responsibility

for the a ction, will not subj ect a n office r to liability .” Ghandi v. Police Dep’ t of D e tro it , 747 F .2 d 3 38 , 3 52 (6 th C ir . 1 98 4) ; se e als o Hall v. Shipley , 932 F.2d 1147, 1154 ( 6th Cir. 1991). i

. P av l i geThe disputed owne rship of the tools does not a ffe ct the analy sis of this iss ue. To the e x tent 8 that Dy kstra incor

rec tly believed that he re tained an ow nership interest in the tools and, thus, had no leg itim at e re possession rig hts, plaintiffs’ ac tion is i n tort, not the fede ral c ivil rights statute. See Barrett v. Harwood , 189 F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir. 1999) (f inding no state action whe re police office r stood by during reposse ssion and stating that “w h ateve r depr ivation of rig hts the [pl aintiffs] may have su ff e re d wh e n the ir tr

uc k wa s re po sse sse d may no t be vin dic a te d in a fe de ra l c ivi l r ig hts su it, but may be asse rted unde r Ne w Yo rk tort law in state c ourt. I f the [plaintiffs] can prove that the 14 Viewingthe fa cts in the l ight most favor able to plaintiffs, ther e is inadequate evidenc e fr om wh ic h to c on c lud e that Pavli g e wa s su ff ic ient ly inv olv e d in

the a c tiv iti e s o f D y

ks tr a and his associate s to make him liable for their activiti es under § 1983. Pavlige ’s undisputed testimony was that he wa s informed by his supervisor, Smutz , that he mig ht rec eive a call via dispatc h conce rning Dy ks tr a ’s sit uatio n a nd that he wo uld

ne e d to re sp on d to that c a ll t o s e rv e a s a pe a c e of fi c e r w hil e Dy ks tr a too k to ols fr om t

he Sto re and

L oc k unit . Pavli g e te sti fi e d th a t hi s r ole , a s h e un de rs too d it based upon his conve rsat i o n wi t h S m u t z, was to act as a n observe r and to e nsure that no disputes bro k e o u t. Even assuming , as Dy kstra testified, that Pavlig e met the de fenda nts at 2885 Br ooks befor e traveling to the Store and L ock, Pavlig e’s pr esenc e, standing alone, doe s not constitute the

so rt of a c t i v e s t a t e i n v o l v e m e n to r c o mp u l s i o nt h a tw o u l d

r e n d e r P a v l i g e l i a

b l e f o r d e f e n d a n t s’

a c tio ns . A t mo st, the re c or d e sta bli sh e s th at P avl ige arr ive d at 28 85 B ro ok s and , a c c or din g to Dy k s t ra , d i s cu s s edwh at wa s go i n g t o h ap p en . No wh er e i s t h er e r el i ab l e e v i d en c e t h at P av l i ge assisted in coordinatingthe ac tiviti es of July 18, t h at h e enc ourag ed def endants’ a ctions in any materia l w ay , o r th a t h e r e n d e r e d a c tu a l a s s is ta n c e in r e mo v in g to o ls f

r o m th e Sm it

h u n it. See Coleman , 628 F.2d at 964 (finding no state ac tion whe re “police ne ither enc ourag ed nor dire cted [the private pa rty ] t o reposse ss the truck in a particula r manner ”; “[t] heir prese nce at the sce ne wa s not an indispensible pre requisite for reposse ssion of the truck” but was “in fur thera nce of their off icial duties”). We affir

m the dismiss al of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim ag ainst Pavlige

. 8ini tia l se izur e of the tr uc k w a s w ro ng fu l, t

he y mig ht b e a

ble to p ur su e an a c tio n f

or dama g e s a g a ins t [defendants] for tortious conver sion and seek a n order requiringits return . . . . ”)

. 15 ii. Smu tz Th e a na ly sis a s to S mu tz is s ome wh a t di ff e re nt, fo r h e too k at le a st t wo ste ps tha

t c ou ld

conce ivably

be dee med s tate action subject t o § 1983. First, accor ding to Dy kstra, Smutz promised him that he wo uld

no t be pr os e c ute d f

or takin g ba ck the too ls a

nd tha t Smutz w ou ld atte mpt

to

secur e a sear ch warra

nt for the Smit h unit. Second, S mutz persona lly trave led to the Store and L ock to c on fi rm

the tr uth of Dy ks tr a ’s c la im that hi s to ols we re loc a te d in a sto ra g e un it the re and

did so by using a key to open the unit and look inside. Smutz ’s promises to Dy

kstra likely

do not r ise to the level of a ctive state involveme nt that would cre ate liability

under § 1983 f

or the same rea sons that Pavlige’ s prese nce at the Store a nd L ock could not make him responsible for the actions of the private defe ndants. Even a ssuming the truth of Dy

kstra’s acc ount, that Smutz g uara nteed him leg al protec tion a nd that Dy

kstra would not have taken the steps h e d i d wi t h o u t police protec tion, there is no evidenc e of the sort of g ov e rnme nta l enc oura g e me nt or c omp uls ion that wou ld oth e rw ise imp lic a te state a c tor s in a pr ivate reposse ssion effor

t. See Colem an , 628 F.2d at 964. We affir m the dismiss al of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim as it relates to Smut z’s passive involvement in the private de fenda nts’ remova l of items from the Store and L ock. When Smut z traveled to the Store an d L ock and ope ned the stora g e unit to observe the contents, howe ver, he operated in an ac tive, not passive, capac ity and took those steps in his positi on

as a g overnme ntal officia l. Thus, the opening of the unit wa s state action, and that prere quisite for § 198 3 l i a

b i l i t y i s s a t i s f i e d

. S m u t z m ay

n e v e rt h e l e s s b e e n t i t l e d

t o qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y

f r o m su itDe fe n d an t s ar gu e t h at p l ai n t i ff s re t ai n ed n o re as o n ab l e ex p ec t at i o no f p ri v ac y i nt h e s t o ra ge 9 u nit because the key

to the unit was “a

bandoned.” First, the e vidence in the rec ord provides no e xplanatio n f

or the ke y ’s loc a tio n o n th e g ro un d, and , thu s, no su pp or t fo r de fe nd ants ’ c la im that it 16 “insofar as [his] conduct [did] not violate clea rly established statutory

or constit u t i o n al ri g hts of which a rea sonable person would have know n.” Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A cour t determining whether

a def endant is entitled to qualified immunity must eng ag e in a two- step

ana ly sis . T he c ourt

mus t f ir st c on sid e r w heth e r “ [t]ak e n in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he pa rt y

a s s e rt i n g t h e i n

j u r y , d o t h e f a c t s a l l e g e d s h o w t h e o f

f i c e r ’ s c o n d

u c t v i o l a t e d a

c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t ?” Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 5 3 3 U

. S

. 1 9 4 , 2 0 1 ( 2 0 0 1 )

. If n o v i o l a t i o no c c u r

r e d , n o f u rt h e r i n qu i r y i s n e c e s s a r

y. Id. Howeve r, should the cour t find evidenc e of a

constitutional v i o l at i o n , i t must t hen dete rmine whether the rig ht at issue was “ clea rly established.” Id. A pl aintiff bea rs the burde n of proving that a g overnme ntal defe nd an t i s n o t entitled to qualified immunit y . Garretson v. City of Madison He igh ts , 407 F.3d 789, 798 ( 6th Cir. 2005). De fe nd ants argue that Smutz’ s c on du c t di d n ot cons ti tu te a se arc h und e r t

he F ourt h Amendment, and, the ref

ore, pla intiffs are unable to satisfy the necessar y first prong of the qua lified immunit y test. Whether an office r’s conduct qualifies as a search f or F ourth Amendment purpose s turns on a two-pr ong ed inquiry : (1) has the individual “manifested a subjective e x pectation of privac y in the object of the challeng ed s ear ch? ”; and ( 2) “is socie ty willing to re cog nize that expectation as re asonable ? ” Cal ifo rn ia v . Ci ra olo , 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). I t is , f ir st, c le ar that pla int if

fs de mon str a te d a su

bje c tiv e e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y in t he ite ms containe d i n the locked stora g e unit. By placingthe tools inside the storag e unit and sec uring the unit with a padlock, plaintiffs de monstrated an intent t o k eep the contents of the unit “f ree from public view.” United States v. Lyons , 898 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990). The re maining que stion 9wa s a

ba nd on e d r a the r t

ha n s imp ly dr op pe d in a dv e rt e ntl y . Pl a int if fs ’ o bv iou s u se of

the sto ra g e un it strong ly sug g ests that this is a more likely rea son for the ke y ’s pre sence on the g round. Second, e ven i f the key was “ abandone d” for

Four th Amendment purposes, this has little, if any , eff ect on the plaintiffs’ expectation of pr ivacy in the locked stora g e unit that was indisputably not abandone d. 17 is, thus, whether plaintiffs’ expectation was objec tively rea sonable. In assessing this question, the district court re lied upon the Six th Circuit’s holding in United St ates v. Salgado , 25 0 F .3 d 4 38 (6 th Cir. 2001), to reje ct plaintiffs’ claim. There , a police office discovere d a key in a ca r par ked outside of an a partment c omplex

. Id. at 455. B elieving that it might be a ke y to a suspect’ s apar

tment, the office r proc eede d to the door of a n apar tment and place d the key in the l ock to deter mine whether the key would unlock the door. Id. The ke y worke d, but the office r neither o p en ed the door nor enter ed the a

partment. Id. Adopting the district court’s c onclusion that no sear ch had oc curr ed, the

c ourt of a pp e a ls s ta te d th a t “ the me re in ser ti on of a ke y int o a loc k, by an o ff ic e r w ho lawf

ull y possesses the ke y

and is in a location where he h as a ri gh t to be, to deter mine whether

the key operates the lock is not a sea rch.” Id. at 4 5 6 (c i t i n g United States v. De Bardelebe n , 740 F.2d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 1984)). Salgado , while helpful, is not dispositi ve o f t h e i n s t ant case. He re, the uncontested e vidence establishes that Smutz did not mere ly use the ke y

to ensure that it would open t h e l o c k o n t h e s t o r a g e u n i t
. R a t h e r , S m u t z a l s o o p e n e d t h e s t o r a g e u n i t an d l o o k e d ins ide to

e xami ne the c on te nts . T his is a dis tin c tio n o f s ig nif

ic anc e . A lth ou g h a

n in div idu a l ma

y no t ma int a in

a le g iti ma te e xpe c ta tio n of pr iva c y in the loc k on a doo r on the the or y that a loc k expo se d to a

pu bli c h al l way is available to testing by any one, see id. a t 4 5 6

- 5 7 , h e ma y r e a s o n a b ly e xp e ct that the

c on te nts of

a c los e d, loc ke d s tor a g e un it w ith in a g a te d s tor a g e c omp le x will re ma in fr e e fr om p ub lic inspection. I n opening and v i s u al l y examining the conte nts of the storag e unit, Smutz enter ed aSmutz had a c onversation with Garcia ear lier in the day

in whi ch Gar cia told him that 10 Dy ks tr a wa s tr y ingto t a ke pr op e rt

y fr om G arc ia ’s sto ra g e un it.

18 sphere in which plaintiffs maintained a rea sonab l e ex pectation of privacy and, thus, perf

ormed a

sear ch. B e c a us e Smu tz’ s a c tio ns c on sti tut e d a se arc h, the y fa ll un de r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt r

ub ri c go ve rn ingins pe c tio ns by the po lic e . Se arc he s e ff e c te d w ith ou t a

wa rr ant a re pr e su mpt ive ly

un re a so na

ble and vio la tiv e of

t h e F o ur th A me ndme nt’ s ma

nd a te that a ll g ov e rnme nta l se arc he s mu st be re asonable

. See, e .g. , United States v. Hudson , 405 F.3d 425, 441 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ). W h ere an individual c onsents to a sea rch, how ever , a wa

rra nt is unnecessa

ry . See Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U. S. 1 03 , 1 09 (2 00 6) ; Hudson , 405 F.3d at 441 (noting that an office r with consent to sea rch r equire s neither a war rant nor probable cause to c arr y out the sear ch). The consent exception to the war rant require ment extends “even to e ntries an d s earche s with the permission of a [co-owne r] whom the police re asonably , but errone ously , believe to possess share d authority . . . .” Randolph , 547 U.S. at 109. I n d e f

e n s e o f Smu tz ’ s a c ti o n s , d e f e n d an ts ar g u e th a t Smu tz p o s s e s s e d “ n u me r o u s in d ic ia of Dy kstra’s c ommon owne rship” upon which he “ objectively relied . . . in c oncluding that Dy kstra had authority to give his consent to a ‘se ar ch.’” Def endants have the bur den of de monstrating the

rea sonablene ss of S mutz ’s belief that Dy kstra possessed appar ent authority to consent to a sea rch. Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). The re cord doe s not support defe ndants’ claim that Sm utz reasonably believed that Dy

kstra had author ity

to permit a sea

rch of the storag e unit. Dy

kstra informe d Smutz on J uly 18 that he had found his missing tools in a storag e unit at the Store a nd L ock. The rec ord conta ins no mention by Dy kstra to Smutz that he had a ny previous conne ction to the unit prior to observing his tools t here

. 1019

When Dy kstra informe d Smutz that “somebody saw a piece of m etal that might possi bly be a ke y ,” Smutz ag ree d to go to the Store and L ock and c onfirm that Kamp had in f act obse rved a

key . Be fore proce eding , Smutz asked Dy kstra, “Well, do y ou know it is a key for that door ? ” Dy

kstra re plied that he had “ no idea.” Although Smutz claimed to have relied upon Dy kstra’s awar eness of the l ocation of the key in concluding that Dy

kstr a co u l d au t h o rize entry into the storag e unit, it is clear f rom Dy kstra’s te sti mony tha t he la c ked the pe rt ine nt i nf or ma tio n r e la tin g to t

he ke y tha t on e wo uld

re a so na bly expect an owne r to possess, including whether or not the key would open a pa rticular door . At the very least, Dy kstra’s a ccount wa s sufficiently questionable to ac tivate Smutz ’s obliga tion to inqui re further befor e proc eedingwith a sea rch ba sed on consent wher e the source of the authority

for that consent is not clea

r. See, e .g. , United States v. W aller , 4 2 6 F

. 3 d 8 3 8 , 8 4 7 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ In addition to the Supreme Court’s indication in Rodriguez , and this court’s holding in [ United States

v. ] McCoy , [Nos. 97-6485, 97-6486, 97-6488, 1999 WL 357749 (6th Cir. May 12, 1999)], a number of other c ourts have a lso recog nized an office r’s duty to inquire in ambig uous situations.”). As the court obser

ved in W aller , The g overnme nt cannot esta blish that it s ag ents rea sonably relied upon a third party ’s appar ent authority

if ag ents, fac ed with a

n ambig uous situation, neverthele ss proce ed without making f

urther inquiry . I f the a g en t s do not learn e noug h, if the circ umstances make it unclear whether the prope rty

about to be sea

rche d is subject to mutual use by

the per son g iving c onsent, then wa rra ntless entry

is unlawful without further inquiry

. Id. at 846 (interna l quotation mar ks omitted). The substanc e of the communcations betwe en Dy kstra and Smutz on J uly

18 constitute “surroundingcirc umstances” that would prompt a r e a s o n a b le per son not to act upon Dy

kstra’s c laims without further inquiry

. Rodriguez , 49 7 U. S. a t 18 8. Ne ve rt he le ss,20

Smutz opened the door to the storag e unit and under took an examination of t he int erior w ithout any express claim from Dy

kstra that he ha d an owne rship interest in t he unit or any information about h o w D yk s t r a

h a p p e n e d t o kn o w a

b o u tt h e l o c a t i o no f

t h e k e y. S m u t z a l s o f

a i l e d t o a s c e rt a i nw h y, if Dy kstra wa s a mutual possessor, he c ould not confirm that the key belong ed to that unit or why Dy kstra would be conce rned about the prese nce of his tools in a unit in which h e h ad a p ar t i al p ro p er t y i n t er es t
. T h u s , d efe nd an t s h av e f ai l edt o s h o w t h at S m u t z ’s wa rr an t l es s s ea rc h o f t h e s t o ra ge unit was excused by the consent of an individual possessing actual or appar ent authority

to empower Smutz to searc h the unit. Be cause Smutz ’s ac tions do not qualify for the c onsent exception to the

war rant re quirement, his sea

rch of the storag e unit was unlaw ful. Smutz is ne v e rth e le s s e n ti tl e d to th e p r o te c ti o no f

qu a li f ie d im mu n it y u n le s s th e r ig h t he violated was c lear ly

established at the time of the violation. The appr opriate inquiry on this iss ue is “whethe r a r easona

ble offic ial in the defe ndant’s position could have believe d that his conduct wa s lawful, judg ed from the perspe ctive of the rea sonable officia l on the scene .” Ga rd e nh irev . S

c hu be rt , 20 5 F .3 d 303 , 311 (6 th Cir . 200 0)

. “ Whe n de te rm ini ng wh e the r a ri g ht i s ‘ c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d, ” thi s Court must l ook “first to dec isions of the Supreme Court, the n to de cisions of this Court and other courts within our circ uit, and finally to decisions of other c ircuits.’” Id. (citi n g Da u g h ert y v. Cam pb e ll , 935 F.2d 780, 784 ( 6th Cir.1991)). The Supre me’s Court dec ision in Brosseau v. Hauge n , 543 U.S. 194, 199-200 (2004), set forth two means by which a § 1983 pla intiff may show that a rig ht

was c lear ly

established. A plaintiff ma y establish that a violation “wa s sufficiently obvious under the g e ne ra l st and ard

of c on sti tut ion a l c are that th e plaint if f need no t sh owa

bo dy of ma te ri a lly simil ar c ase law ” o r p rove that an offic er “ fail[ed] t o adher e to a pa rticularized body

of pre cede nt that square ly g overns the case .” Ly on s v . Ci ty of X e nia , 417 F.3d 565, 579 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citing21

Brosseau , 543 U.S. at 199-200) (interna l quotation marks and br acke ts omit ted). Plaintiffs do not point to any fac tually analog ous case law supporting t heir claim and ins tead r ely heavily upon the well-e stablished tenet of Fourth Amendme nt jurisprudence that a g overnme nt official may not enter the prope rty

of a pr ivate citizen absent a war rant supported by

probable cause . Def

endants re spond that Smutz is entitled to qualified immunit y beca use under Salgado , the me re ins e rt ion of a ke y int o a lock does not qualify as a sear ch, and Smut z could not otherwise have known that his conduct wa s unlawful. Preliminarily , at the time of Smutz ’s ac tions, a sear ch subject to Four th Amendment scrutiny

wa s d e fi ne d as a “the g ov e rnme nt[a l] vi olat[io n o f] a su bje c tiv e e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y that so c ie ty

rec og nizes as re asonable .” Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). I dentifying the activities falling within this cate g ory is not “simple.” See id. at 31. The re asonable ness of a n individual’s

e xpe c ta tio n o f p ri va c y

in a c los e d, loc ke d sto ra g e un it w ith in a g a te d s tor a g e c omp le x, ho we ve r, is not the ty pe of close question that mi g ht y ield itself to an offic er’ s rea sonable misappre hension of cl ea rl y established law. See U nited States v. Bailey , 6 2 8 F

. 2 d 9 3 8 , 9 4 3

- 4 4 ( 6 th Ci r . 1980) (conc luding that se arc h occur red w hen g overnme nt placed be eper inside drum of che micals place d by de fe nd ants, amo ng oth e r p la c e s, in a “ loc ke d s tor a g e c omp artme nt” ); cf. United States v. Jacobse n , 466 U.S. 109, 129 (1984) (White, J ., concur ring ) (“ The Court . . . has made clea r that the F ourt h Am e ndme nt pr ov ide s pr ote c tio n to the ow ne r of e ve ry c on ta ine r that c on c e a ls i ts con tents from plain view a

nd does not othe rwise unmistakably reve al its c ontents.”) (interna l quotation marks omitted). As to Dy kstra’s a uthority to consent, at the t ime of t he events rele vant t o this li tigation, three principles of F ourth Amendment jurisprude nce w ere well-e stablis h ed , either by Supreme Court22

prec edent or

Six th Circuit case la

w. First, a wa

rra ntless searc h is presumptively unrea sonable unde r the Four th Amendment. Kat

z , 3 89 U. S. at 35 7; Hudson , 405 F.3d at 441. Second, the abse nce of

a wa rr ant m ay be e xcu se d in

the pr e se nc e of c on se nt, e ith e r fr om an ind ivi du a l wi th a c tua l a uth or ity to permit a sea

rch or wher e a third party has appar ent authority to consent. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 183-84. F inally , when the police seek to conduct a sear ch on the ba sis of appar ent authority and the surrounding circ umstances make the issue of authority ambig uous, an office r is oblig ated to inquire further rathe r t han procee d with the s ear ch. As the Court e x plained in Rodriguez , “[e]ven when the inv itatio n [to se arc h] is a c c omp anie d b y an e xplic it a sse rt ion

that the p e rs on

[ha s a uth or ity to

c on se nt], the surr ound ingc ir c ums tanc e s c ou ld c on c e iva bly be su c h th a t a

re a so na ble pe rs on

wo uld doubt its t ruth and not ac t upon it without further inquiry .” Id. at 188. I f the fac ts available to the office r would not support the belief “that the consenting party had author ity

over the premises,” then “wa rra ntl e ss entry

without further inquiry

is unlawful unless authority actua lly exis ts.” Id. at 188-89; see also W

aller , 4 2 6 F. 3 d

at 8 4 7 (c i t i n g Rodriguez and collec ting c ases pr edatingthe instant litigation re cog nizi ng a duty to inquire wher e author ity to consent to a sea

rch is uncle ar)

. As pr e vio us ly

dis c us se d, the fa c ts o f w hic h Smutz w a s a wa re wh e n D y

ks tr a inf or me d h im of the sto ra g e un it d id n ot c le arl y con fi rm Dy ks tr a ’s po te nti a l in te re st i n th e Sto re and L oc k unit

. Dy kstra had no inf

ormation about why

the key was located on the g round in front of the unit. He expressed uncertainty about whethe r what Kamp observe d was the ke y to the unit or, indeed, if it was a key at all. Moreove r, Dy

kstra did not clea

rly explain why

he wa s conce rned about the tools being in a sto ra g e un it to wh ic h he ha d la wf ul a c c e ss o r w hy

he re qu ir e d a ssi sta

nc e in r e tr ie vin g the too ls if he ha d acc ess to the unit. I n sum , Dyk s t ra ’s ac count of both his discovery of the tools in the storag e unit and his discover y of the ke y outside the unit should have raised multiple questions about23

his potential interest in the unit and Dy kstra’s a uthority to consent to a sea

rch. Smutz was, theref

ore, under the law applica

ble at the time, oblig ated to eng ag e in furthe r inquiry concerning Dy kstra’s appar ent authority

to consent to a sea

rch. His decision t o conduct the sear ch without this inqui ry was a violation of cle arly

established law. B e caus e th e go ve rn inglaw at th e tim e of the se arc h g a ve Smu tz “ fa ir wa rn ing ” that hi s conduct wa s constitutionally defic ient, see H

ope v. P elzer , 536 U.S. 730, 740-41 (2002), the district court e rre d in gr anting him qualified immunit y on plaintiffs’ F ourth Amendment c laim as it relates to h is e ntr y int o the sto ra g e un it. We af fi rm the dis tr ic t court ’s dis mis sa l of pla int if fs ’ § 19 83 c la im as to Smutz ’s passive involvement in the private def endants’ r emoval of items fr om the Store and L ock and r ever se as it re lates to his entry into the storag e unit. i v . M u n i c i p a l L i a

b i l i t y A municipality

cannot be liable for the consti tutional torts of i ts employ ees on a responde at superior the ory . Mo ne ll v. De p't o f So c . S e rv s. , 43 6 U. S. 65 8, 69 1 ( 19 78 ). A mun ic ipa lity is l ia ble only if the plaintiff e stablishes that the municipality eng ag ed i n a “p o licy

or custom” that wa s the “moving forc e” be hind the deprivation of the pl aintiff' s rig hts. Id . at 69 4; see also Doev. Claiborne Cou nty , 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996) (“U nder Mo ne ll , th e [de fe nd ants ] ca nn ot b e fo un d li a

ble unless the plaintiff ca

n establish that an officially executed poli cy , or the toleration of a custom . . . leads to, ca

uses, or re sults in t he depr ivation of a c onstitut ionally protec ted rig ht.”). The district cour

t dismi s s e d

th e Mo ne ll claim ag ainst Fruitport Char ter Township, e x plaining that no actua l or de fa cto policy “dic t at ed ” t h e ac tions of Office rs Smutz and Pavlig e. Plaintiffs ag ree d to dismi ssal of this defe ndant i n response to an orde r to show ca use issued by

the district court a nd have a bandoned this cla im on appeal. “ I ssues which we re r aised in the district cour t, y et24

n o t r a is e d o na p p e a l, ar e c o n s id e r e d

a b an d o n e d an d n o t r e v ie w a

b le o na p p eal.” R enkel v. United States , 4 5 6 F. 3 d 6 4 0 , 6 4 2 n . 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Robinson v. Jone s , 142 F.3d 905, 906 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). Ac cording ly , we will not addre ss the Mo ne ll c la im o n a pp e a l.

v. State L aw C la ims Plaintiffs contend, finally , that the district c ourt err ed in dismi ssing their rema ining state law claims afte r g ranting summary judgme nt on their § 1 9 8 3 cl ai m. By statute, a district cour

t may de c lin e to e xer c ise su

pp le me nta l juri sd ic tio n und e r 2 8 U. S.C. § 13 67 (a ) wh e re it h a s “ dis mis se d a ll cl a im s o v e r w h ic h it h a s o r ig in a l ju r is d ic ti o n . . . . ” 2 8 U

. S. C. § 1 3 6 7 ( c ) ( 3 )

. “Supplemental jur isd ic tio n is a

do c tr ine of

dis c re tio n, no t of

pla int if f’s ri gh t,” and

the de c isi on

to d ism iss supplemental cla ims is s ubject to re versa l only if the district court abused its discr etion in dismi ssing the claims. Ha bic h v . Ci ty of D e ar bo rn , 331 F.3d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2003) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). The district cour t dismi ssed plainti ff

s’ state lawclaims in light of its dec ision to gra nt summary judgme nt on their § 1983 claim. As we reve rse the dismissal of Smut z as to the § 1983

c la im, we re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l wi tho ut pr e jud ic e of the re ma ini ng state law c la ims

.

III

. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm in part and rever se i n part the judg ment of the district

c ourt . We re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of the § 198 3 cla im ag a ins t Smutz a s it re la te s to his entry into the storag e unit and the dismissal without prejudice of the re maining state law c laims and

re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.