### The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals 

### FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2858

___________ Shirley Curd, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Eastern v. * District of Arkansas. * City Court of Judsonia, * Arkansas; Don Raney, * Honorable Judsonia City * Judge; Judsonia Police * Department, * * Defendants, * * Jess Odom, White County * Sheriff; City of Judsonia, * Arkansas; * * Defendants-Appellees, * * State of Arkansas; City * of Searcy, Arkansas, * * Defendants. *

___________ Submitted: January 15, 1998 Filed: April 6, 1998

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circui t Judge and SACHS, District Judge. 1

___________

### The State of Arkansas, the City of Searcy, Arkansas, an d 2 

### Judsonia Municipal Judge Don Raney were also named as defend ants in this action. The trial court granted these defendants' motions to dismiss, and the dismissals are not at issue in this appeal.

The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States Distric t 3 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
The standar d procedure at the detention center is to conduct 4 

### an inventory search of items belonging to arrestees. No writte n inventory of the purse's contents was taken by Chief Hale.
-2- SACHS, District Judge.
Shirley Curd brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Cit y of Jud sonia, Arkansas ("the City"), and White County, Arkansas, Sherif f Jess Odom. Curd sought damages for alleged excessive force in effecting

2 her arrest, unreasonable search and seizure of f ingerprint evidence during the booking process, and unreasonable search of her purse at the station house foll owing her arrest. The district court granted summary judgment 3 in favor of defendants and Curd appeals. We affirm.

I. Armed wi th an arrest warrant, City police officers Bobby Hale, th e Chief of Police, and Darren Kee went to Curd's residence to arrest her on misd emeanor charges of battery and disorderly conduct. As they wer e escorting Curd out of the house, the officers in itially told Curd that she would b e able to drive her own car to the White County detention cente r (the City does not ha ve a jail), and that she would be allowed to go next doo r to her office to get bail money. When Curd began to go next door , however , Chief Hale seized her arm, spun her around and told her to ge t into the police car. She complied.

At the ti me of Curd's arrest, the officers took her purse. Afte r arriving at the detention center, Curd's purse w as removed from her sight. When Curd asked for her purse to be placed in view, Chief Hale, som e fifteen minutes after Curd's arrest, searched it. Curd describes th e 4 search as taking a couple of

### -3-

minutes and as involving "pull[ing] several things out," "rummag[ing ] around with the stuff in the bottom and then . . . put[ting the] stuff bac k in."

Durin g the booking process, Curd was fingerprinted three separat e times. Curd expresses uncertainty about whether Chief Hale was involved in the fingerprinting. Chief Hale denied any involvement by himself or an y member of the City po lice force, stating that the fingerprinting was done by a m ember of the Sheriff's department. Defendants do not offer a n explanation for the repeated fingerprinting; Cur d contends that harassment motivated the officers.

Curd's son posted bail and, following booking, Curd was released

. Twentydays later, on September 5, 1996, Curd filed this action alleging violation of Federal constitutional rights.

II. We re view the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same standards as the district cour t. Mayard v. Hopwood , 105 F.3d 1226, 1227 (8th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate when , viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "th ere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movin g party is ent itled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P

. 56(c).

A. Excessive Force Claim Curd firs t claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgm ent on her excessive force claim. We disagree. Fourth Amendmen t
excess ive force claims are evaluated under a standard of "objectiv e reasonableness." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Greiner v. City of Champlain , 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994). Even if seizin g Curd's arm and turning her body was unnecessary to effect the arrest, we can not conclude that this

### We assume, without deciding, that Chief Hale was a 5 

### policymaker for the defendant City.

The Court declines the City's invitation to resolve th e 6 

### questi on of whether a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive forc e requi res a showing of some minimum level of injury. See, e.g. , Ik erd v. Blair , 101 F.3d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1996). As we did i n Dawkin s , we reserve that question. Dawkins , 50 F.3d at 535. W e hold m erely that the absence of injury to Curd is a factor that , along with the minimum amount of force applied by the officers , undermines Curd's excessive fo rce claim. See , Greiner , 27 F.3d at 1355.
-4- limited amount of force was objective ly unreasonable. See, e.g. , Joos v. 5 Ratli ff , 97 F.3d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ("de minimis "
amoun t of force in effecting an arrest would be insufficient to creat e constitutional issue). "The right to make an arrest . . . necessaril y carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion" and thu s "not eve ry push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in th e peace of a judge's chambers violates the fourth amendment." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396. See also Haberthur v. City of Raymore , 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8t h Cir. 1997) ("Section 1983 is intended to remedy egregious conduct, and not every as sault or battery . . . will create liability under it."). Ou r conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Curd does not allege, and there is no evidence, that she was injured or experienced physical pain as a result of Hale's acti ons. See, e.g. , Dawkins v. Graham , 50 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1995) (arrestee demonstrated actual injury). The conduct o f 6 Chief Hale in arresting Curd was not so egregious that we can find a constitutional violation.

### -5- B. Multiple Fingerprinting Claim Curd nex t claims that the district court erred in granting summar y judgment on her claim that fingerprinting her three times constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. We again disagree. The custodia l fingerprinting of Curd during the booking proces s was routine; a complaint regarding multiple prints (like a complaint regarding several allegedl y unnecessary photographs) following a valid arres t is also simply too minor to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g. , Unite d States v . Weir , 657 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1983) (nonconsensua l custodial clipping of hair "so minor . . . [that] fourth amendment rights

were not implicated"); United States v. Williams , 902 F.2d 678, 680-81 (8t h Cir. 1990) (suggesting that fingerprinting of suspect arrested upo n probable cause does not constitute a search; even an ultraviolet ligh t examin ation is not a search). Moreover, Curd expresses considerabl e uncertainty as to whether the City's officers conducted the fingerprinting , and Chief Hale expressly denies that any member of the City polic e department was involved.

We are aw are of a remark in Davis v. Mississippi , 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969), that "the police need only one set of ea ch person's prints." Even if the comment could pose a limitation on law enforcement rights when ther e is simpl y a "fingerprint detention," as discussed in Davis , we ar e satisfied that the ruling does not mean that an arrestee's Fourth Amendmen t rights are violated by taking several sets of fingerprints.

C. Purse Search Curd finally claims that the district court erred in granting s ummary judgment on her claim that defendants unconstitutionally searched her purs e aft er she asked that the purse be placed where she could see it. Th e distri ct court concluded that the search constituted a valid inventor y search. We need not decide whether

### Altho ugh we find it unnecessary to reach it here, there i s 7 

### some question as to whether the search of Curd's purse could b e justified as a valid inventory search. United States v. Johnson , 834 F.2d 1191, 1198 (5th Cir. 1987) (jailing, rather than mer e booking, justifies inventory search), withdrawn on other grounds , 846 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1988).

The right to conduct a warrantless search incident to a 8 

### lawful arrest exists whether o r not the officer has probable cause to believe that he is exposed to danger or that the defendant has acc ess to destructible evidence. United States v. Chadwick , 43 3 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977). It matters not whether Curd was capable o f reaching the purse 9 

### at the time of the search. See New York v. Belton , 453 U.S. 454, 461-62 n. 5 (1981); Morales , 923 F.2d at 626 ("'accessibility, as a prac tical matter, is not the benchmark'" for assessing th e search) (quoting United States v. Palumbo , 735 F.2d 1095, 10 97 (8th Cir. 1984) ); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure , § 5.3(a) at 11 1 (1996) ("the scope of the search at the station is not limited to items then in the 'immediate control' of the defendant; it i s suff icient that the items were on his person at the time o f arrest.") (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
-6- this conclusion was correct, because we conclude that the sear ch was valid 7 incident to Curd's arrest. See Cooksey v. Delo , 94 F.3d 1214, 1218 (8th Cir. 1996) (appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by th e record), cert. denied, U.S. , 118 S.Ct. 624 (1997). We also find nothing in the separate claim against Sheriff Od om that merits discussion.

Wa rrantless searches incident to a custodial arrest are "justifie d by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfull y detained." United St ates v. Edwards , 415 U.S. 800, 802-03 (1974) (citing Unit ed States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). The search must be o f 8 objects within the arrestee's area of "immediate control" and must b e "contemporaneous" with the arrest. United States v. Morales , 923 F.2d 621 , 627 (8th Cir. 1991). Curd's purse qualified as an object within her area of "immediate control." 9

### -7- The timeliness requirement is also s atisfied. The search took place at the station house about fifteen minutes after Curd was arrested. This delay could be fatal if, for example, a large pi ece of luggage were opened and inspected without a warrant. See United States v. Chadwick , 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (station house search of two-hundre d pound footlocker over an hour after arrest too remote in time and place for warrantless searc h incident to arrest); United States v. $639,558 In U.S. Currency , 955 F.2d 712, 715-16 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (luggage search hal f an hour after arrest not conte mporaneous). The timeliness requirement for "luggage or othe r person al property not immediately associated with the person of th e arrestee" is, in othe r words, constitutionally fairly strict. See, e.g. , Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 15.

On the ot her hand, searches of the person and articles "immediately associated with the person of the arrestee," are measured with a different , more flexible constitutional time clock. Compare Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 15 , and United States v. Schleis , 582 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc ) (search of briefcase at station house not valid search incident to arrest) ; with Edwards , 415 U.S . at 803 (search of clothing after an overnight stay in jail i s a valid search incident to arrest), and United States v

. Phillip s , 607 F.2d 808, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1979) (search of defendant' s wallet at station house a "substantial period of time" after his arres t valid sea rch incident to arrest). Searches of the person and thos e articles "immediately associated" with the person may be made either at th e tim e of arrest or when the accused arrives at the place of detention

. Edwards , 415 U.S. at 803. Unlike luggage, court s considering the question hav e generally concluded that a purse, like a wallet, is an objec t "immediatelyassociated" with the person. See, e.g. , United States v

. Berry , 56 0 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds , 57 1 F.2d 2 (1978); United States v. Venizelos , 495 F.Supp. 1277, 1281-8 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); and State court cases within the Circuit-- Sumlin v. State , 587 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Ark. 1979) (en banc); State

### State court decisions on Federal constitutional questions may 10 

### be usefully considered, particularly when Federal cases on th e particular point are sparse. Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 493-4, n. 35 (1976). We are not troubled by the Grahamcourt's tacitly accepting 1 1 

### and distinguishing an Illinois case that rejected a station-house sea rch allegedly undertaken incident to an arrest. The Illinoi s case d oes not take into account the 1981 decision in New York v

. Belton , 453 U.S. 454. The Ill inois courts are currently ruling as we do here. See, e.g. , People v. Mannozzi , 632 N.E.2d 627, 632-34 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994).
-8- v. Woods , 637 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Hershey , 371 N.W.2d 1 90, 192 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). But see United States v

. 10 Monclavo-Cruz , 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981) (purse like suitcase an d brief case, not clothing; search of purse at station house not valid a s incident to arrest). In United States v. Graham , 638 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit went a step further, holding that a purse was part of the defendant's person and that, accordingly, a search warran t autho rizing a search of the person covered the officer's search of th e purse: The human anatomy does n ot naturally contain external pockets, pou ches, or other places in which personal objects can b e conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficienc y clothing contains pockets. In addition, many indiv iduals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body , are so closely associated with the person that they ar e id entified with and included within the concept of one' s person. To hold differe ntly would be to narrow the scope of a search of one's person to a point at which it wouldhave little meaning.
Id. at 1114. 11

We agree with the general view of this issue. The search of Curd's purse at t he station house fifteen minutes after her arrest fell wel l within the constitutionally acceptable time zone for searches of persons and objects "immediately associated" with them incident to arrest. See, e.g. , Phillips , 607 F.2d at 809-10; State

### -9-

v. Wade , 573 N.W.2d 228 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Mannozzi , 63 2 N.E.2d 627, 632-4 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (reviewin g authorities); Woods , 637 S.W.2d at 116; Sumlin , 587 S.W.2d at 577.

Moreove r, before placing the purse in view of, or returning it to , Curd , who was charged with assault, it was objectively reasonable t o examine the purse for items that could be danger ous. See, e.g. , Wade , 573 N.W.2d at 231 ("Not only was it reasonable for the officer to search the contents of her purse before giving it back to her . . ., we think it woul d be unreasonable for arrestees to expect that they can get back a purs e without examination while they are still in custody at a police station.")

. Curd's privacy rights in the purse, greatly diminished by the arrest and for a reasonable time thereafter, yield to police interest in weapons and evidence. See Edward s , 415 U.S. at 808-09 ("'While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does -- for at least a reasonable time and to a reasonable exte nt -- take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence.'") (quoting United States v. DeLeo , 422 F.2d 487, 49 3 (1st Cir. 1970)).

Although it could be argued that a brief examination of the purs e should suffice, rathe r than the intrusive and leisurely study of contents typical of an inventory search, we hesitate to endorse further complications in the law, requiring difficult case-by-case application. Se e Chadwick , 433 U.S. at 22 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Havin g determined that there was objective reasonableness, we are also precluded from putting law enforcement personnel to a further test of subjective goo d faith. Even assuming a possible improper motive, including simpl e harassment, current Fourth Amendment law shields law enforcement personnel fromjudicial sanction. See Graham , 490 U.S. at 397 ("An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectivel y reasonable" act); Blue v. Koren , 72 F.3d 1075, 1081 (2d

### -10-

Cir. 1995) ("motive is irrelevant, because a Fourth Amendment claim must be based on a showing that the search in question was objectivel y unreasonable.").

For the reasons indicated, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.