United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

FORCE STRUCTURE

DOD Needs to 

Integrate Data into Its 

Force Identification 

Process and Examine 

Options to Meet 

Requirements for 

High-Demand Support 

Forces 

September 2006 

GAO-06-962 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

FORCE STRUCTURE

DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its 

Force Identification Process and Examine 

Options to Meet Requirements for HighDemand Support Forces 

Highlights of GAO-06-962, a report to 

congressional committees 

Since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the war on

terrorism has dominated the global 

security environment. Ongoing 

overseas operations and heavy 

reliance on reservists have raised 

concerns about how the 

Department of Defense (DOD) will 

continue to meet its requirements 

using an all-volunteer force. The

Army, in particular, has faced 

continuing demand for large

numbers of forces, especially for 

forces with support skills. 

GAO was mandated to examine the 

extent of DOD’s reliance on

personnel with high-demand skills 

and its efforts to reduce or

eliminate reliance on these 

personnel. Accordingly, GAO 

assessed (1) the combat support 

and combat service support skills 

that are in high demand and the

extent to which DOD officials have

visibility over personnel who are

available for future deployment and

(2) the extent to which DOD has 

conducted a comprehensive, datadriven analysis of alternatives for 

providing needed skills. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Defense (1) integrate

personnel data with the force 

identification process and 

(2) assess options to increase the 

availability of personnel with highdemand skills. DOD agreed with 

the recommendations, though it 

expressed concerns about how 

GAO characterized the current 

force identification process. 

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required large numbers of 

ground forces, creating particularly high demand for certain combat support 

and combat service support skills, such as military police and civil affairs. 

After determining which requirements can be met with contractor personnel, 

DOD then determines how to meet requirements for military personnel. DOD 

officials charged with identifying forces have not had full visibility over the 

pool of skilled personnel available for future deployments. For some skills, 

the combatant commander’s operational requirements have exceeded the 

initial supply of readily available trained military forces. DOD has met 

demands for these skills through strategies such as reassigning or retraining 

personnel. However, many of the skilled personnel in high demand are 

reservists whose involuntary active duty is limited under the current partial 

mobilization authority and DOD and Army policy. To meet requirements, 

officials charged with identifying personnel for future rotations developed an 

inefficient, labor-intensive process to gather information needed for decision 

making because integrated, comprehensive personnel data were not readily 

available. DOD is taking steps to develop comprehensive data that identify 

personnel according to deployment histories and skills; however, until DOD 

systematically integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it 

will continue to make important decisions about personnel for future 

rotations based upon limited information and lack the analytical bases for 

requesting changes in or exceptions to deployment policies. 

 

Although DOD has developed several strategies to meet the combatant 

commander’s requirements for previous rotations, it has not undertaken 

comprehensive, data-driven analysis of options that would make more 

personnel available for future rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A key 

reason why DOD has not conducted comprehensive analyses of options is 

that its process for identifying forces focuses on one rotation at a time and 

does not take a long-term view of potential requirements. Prior GAO work 

has shown that reliable data about current and future workforce 

requirements are essential for effective strategic planning, as is the datadriven analysis of the number of personnel and the skill mix needed to 

support key competencies. With data that link deployment dates and skills, 

DOD could assess options, including using more personnel with support 

skills from the Army and other services, transferring more positions to highdemand areas, and changing deployment lengths. Each of these options has 

both advantages and disadvantages. However, without a comprehensive 

analysis of the options and their related advantages and disadvantages, DOD 

will be challenged to plan effectively for future requirements and to meet 

recruiting goals. Additionally, without linking data and options, the services 

may have difficulty deploying all reservists once before other reservists are 

required to deploy for a second time, which is a key DOD goal. Moreover, the 

Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have complete information with 

which to make decisions about the size and composition of the force, 

mobilization policies, and other issues. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-962

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. For 

more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at

(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 6

Army Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Are in 

Increasingly Short Supply, and Data on Skilled Individuals 

Available for Future Deployments Are Not Integrated into the 

Sourcing Process 10 

DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive, Data-Driven Analysis 

of Options to Enhance the Availability of Personnel with HighDemand Skills for Future Rotations 15 

Conclusions 23

Recommendations for Executive Action 24 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36 

Table 

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces 7 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page i GAO-06-962 Force Structure
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 5, 2006 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Global War on 

Terrorism has required large numbers of active duty and reserve1

 military 

personnel to deploy for overseas missions, including ongoing operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) now faces the 

unprecedented challenge of sustaining large-scale, ongoing operations 

with an all-volunteer military force. As operations have evolved from 

combat to counterinsurgency operations, the dynamic operational 

conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it more difficult for DOD to 

anticipate the number of forces and the specific skills needed in the future. 

Thus far, operations have continued to require large numbers of ground 

forces. The combatant commander of U.S. Central Command is 

responsible for the area of operations that includes Iraq and Afghanistan.

The commanders, Joint Forces Command and Special Operations 

Command, are charged with identifying the forces that can be deployed to

meet the combatant commander’s requirement considering global risks. 

While DOD has contracted with private companies for a significant 

number of support activities, Army forces—particularly those with combat 

 1

 The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National Guard of the 

United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air 

National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. 

Page 1 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
support and combat service support skills,2

 such as military police and 

civil affairs, which reside heavily in its reserve components—continue to 

be in high demand. The high pace of operations and heavy reliance on

reserve forces along with recruiting challenges raise concerns about 

whether the U.S. military will be able to continue to meet operational 

requirements in the future. 

DOD has identified the need to transform into a more flexible and 

responsive force by divesting itself of structure and forces from the Cold 

War era and reorganizing its forces to meet new threats. The 2006

Quadrennial Defense Review Report,3

 which outlines the defense program 

for the future, recognizes that the department needs to rebalance military 

skills between and within the active and reserve components and that the 

reserve components need to be more accessible and ready to meet a range 

of overseas and domestic missions. The report did not provide details on

how it will accomplish this. Further, as we have previously reported, the 

department faces challenges in transforming forces for the future, such as 

meeting increased requirements for high-demand skills. For example, we 

have reported on problems in DOD’s mobilization4

 and demobilization of 

reservists as well as the issues raised by continuing demands for reserve 

personnel to deploy.5

 As we reported in July 2005, the number of Army 

Reserve personnel that can be deployed under current mobilization 

authorities and deployment policies is declining and many personnel have 

been moved among units to tailor forces and fill shortages in those units.6

 2

 Combat support skills, such as military intelligence, provide operational assistance for 

combat forces. Combat service support skills encompass those activities that sustain all 

operating forces on the battlefield, such as transportation. 

3

 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6,

2006). 

4

 Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and equipment, 

activating or federalizing units and members of the National Guard and reserves for active 

duty, and bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness for war or other national 

emergency. Demobilization is the process necessary to release from active duty units and 

members of the National Guard and reserves who were ordered to active duty under 

various legislative authorities. 

5

 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of 

Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003), and

Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and 

Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 15, 2004). 

6

 GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel 

and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Further, we have reported that DOD lacks data that would give it visibility 

over the health status of reserve members.7

 We also reported that while 

DOD intends to move military positions to high-demand skills over time to 

provide more capability, the degree to which this initiative will make more 

military personnel available for operational missions is uncertain.8

Moreover, in November 2005 we reported that the services were facing 

difficulty recruiting and retaining enlisted personnel and that certain 

occupational specialties have been consistently over- or underfilled.9

The House of Representatives report10 accompanying the 

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

200511 directed GAO to examine the extent of DOD’s reliance on personnel 

with high-demand skills and its efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on 

these personnel. This report is an unclassified version of a classified 

report. The classified report contains additional details comparing 

operational requirements to the Army’s supply of trained personnel 

available to deploy and examining DOD’s strategies to meet the 

requirements for skilled forces. Accordingly, this report assesses (1) the 

combat support and combat service support skills that are in high demand 

for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the extent to which DOD has 

visibility over personnel available for future deployment and (2) the extent 

to which the department has conducted a comprehensive, data-driven 

analysis of its alternatives to continue meeting requirements for highdemand forces. We concentrated our analysis on the Army’s combat 

support and combat service support skills because of the continuing high 

demand for those forces and examined DOD’s process to identify forces 

for rotations, referred to as “sourcing.” 

To assess the key skills in high demand, we collected and analyzed data 

provided by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, and the 

 7

 GAO, Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address Longstanding Problems with Determining Medical and Physical Fitness of the Reserve Force,

GAO-06-105 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2005). 

8

 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis of Active 

Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense Strategy, GAO-05-200 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005). 

9

 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel 

Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). 

10 H.R. Rep. No. 108-491 at 305. 

11 Pub. L. No. 108-375 (2004). 

Page 3 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
U.S. Special Operations Command and examined how requirements from 

U.S. Central Command have been met for military operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In addition, we observed Department of the Army and Joint 

Staff conferences to understand how the department made decisions when 

identifying support forces for these operations. To assess what forces 

remain available to meet future requirements, we examined documents 

provided by the Joint Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Army, and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and we discussed with 

responsible officials the challenges they face in identifying forces for 

deployment. To assess the extent to which DOD has analyzed alternatives 

that will allow it to continue to meet requirements for support forces, we 

reviewed our work on human capital management, identified and 

examined DOD’s initiatives to assess alternatives, and held discussions 

with officials responsible for identifying forces. We performed our review 

from February 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. We determined that the data

used were sufficiently reliable for our objectives and in the context in 

which the data are presented. Further information on our scope and 

methodology appears in appendix I. 

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high 

demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills, 

including military police, engineering, and civil affairs, and officials 

charged with sourcing future rotations have a limited view of what 

personnel remain available for future rotations. Many of the high demand 

skills reside heavily in the reserve component. However, the partial 

mobilization authority and DOD and Army policy limit reservists’ 

involuntary active duty service duration and eligibility to deploy. As a 

result, the pool of potentially deployable reserve personnel is decreasing 

as operations continue, and DOD officials charged with identifying forces 

for future rotations are challenged to identify personnel with high-demand 

skills who are eligible to deploy. Facing shortages of available Army 

personnel in some skills, DOD has used strategies such as reassigning and 

retraining Army and other service personnel to meet the combatant 

commander’s requirements. To identify personnel who were available to 

deploy and could be reassigned or retrained, officials charged with 

identifying personnel for future rotations needed information from across 

the services on personnel deployments and skills that was not readily 

available. Lacking integrated, comprehensive personnel data, these 

officials developed a labor-intensive process of holding a series of 

conferences where service representatives and others came together to 

discuss what forces were available to meet operational requirements 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
based on data gathered from various sources. However, our review of this 

process showed that the data used were not comprehensive and did not 

provide a complete picture of what forces were available across the 

services to meet the requirements. For example, while the Army Reserve 

and National Guard had data that identified available units, the data did 

not provide complete information on how many individuals remained 

deployable or had the required skills. While DOD is taking steps to link 

data on individual’s deployments and skill sets in its new defense 

readiness reporting system that could be helpful in making decisions 

about forces for future rotations, these data have not yet been integrated

with DOD’s process for meeting combatant commander requirements. 

Until DOD systematically integrates reliable personnel data into its 

process for identifying forces, it will continue to have limited information 

with which to efficiently match available forces with the combatant 

commander’s requirements and will not have analytical bases for 

requesting changes in or exceptions to deployment policies if needed. 

Although DOD has examined some options for supporting future rotations 

to Iraq and Afghanistan, such as identifying personnel who can be 

retrained in high-demand skills, it has not undertaken a comprehensive, 

data-driven analysis of options based on complete and reliable data. A key 

reason why DOD has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis is that 

DOD’s process for identifying forces was created to meet the combatant 

commander’s specific requirements for the next rotation cycle and does 

not take a long-term view of forces that might be required in the future. 

Our prior work on human capital management demonstrates the need for 

strategic workforce planning, especially when the environment has 

changed significantly.12 The Army’s changing mission from combat to 

counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represents just such 

a change. Further, data-driven analyses of the appropriate number of 

personnel and mix of personnel to support key competencies are critical

components in building a strategic workforce plan. To meet operational 

requirements, DOD has used strategies such as soliciting volunteers and 

retraining personnel; however, with comprehensive data it could assess 

other options, such as transferring more positions to high-demand areas, 

changing deployment lengths, and increasing the size of the force. Each of 

these options has both advantages and disadvantages. However, without 

comprehensive analyses to examine the options and their related 

 12 GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 

Page 5 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
advantages and disadvantages, DOD will be challenged to plan effectively 

for future requirements, while considering global risks and meeting 

recruiting goals. Additionally, without the ability to link personnel data to

options, the services may have difficulty deploying all reservists once 

before other reservists are required to deploy for a second time, which is a 

key goal of OSD officials. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and 

Congress will not have complete information on which to base decisions 

about the size and composition of the force, mobilization policies, and 

other issues, and Congress will not have complete information with which 

to carry out its oversight responsibilities. 

To facilitate decision making on how to meet the combatant commander’s 

requirements for high-demand skills, we are making recommendations to 

the Secretary of Defense to (1) integrate comprehensive data that link 

skills to deployment data in its process for identifying personnel for future 

rotations and (2) conduct comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options 

for meeting potential requirements for future rotations to Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Though the department expressed concern about how we 

characterized the current force identification process, it agreed with our 

recommendations and cited actions it is taking to compile data that could 

provide visibility over personnel and to conduct analyses of options for 

meeting potential requirements for future rotations. DOD’s comments and 

our evaluation are presented in appendix II. 

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD 

has launched two major overseas military operations related to the Global

War on Terrorism: Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing 

military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries, and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in 

Iraq. In both cases, operations quickly evolved from major combat 

operations into ongoing counterinsurgency and stability operations, which 

have continued to require large numbers of forces, ranging from about 

138,000 personnel to about 160,000 personnel from 2004 to the present. 

These operations have required large numbers of forces with support 

skills, such as military police and civil affairs. While some of these skills 

have been in high demand across the Army, some skills, such as civil 

affairs, reside heavily in the Army’s reserve components and sometimes in

small numbers of critical personnel.

Background 

Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of authorities. 

As shown in table 1, two authorities enable the President to involuntarily 

mobilize forces, but with size and time limitations. Full mobilization, 

Page 6 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
which would enable the mobilization of forces for as long as they are 

needed, requires a declaration by Congress. 

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces 

 Statute Provisions

10 U.S.C. 12301(a) 

“Full Mobilization” 

Declared by Congress: 

• In time of war or national emergency 

• No limit on numbers of soldiers called to active duty 

• For duration of war plus 6 months 

10 U.S.C. 12302 

“Partial Mobilization” 

Declared by the President: 

• In time of national emergency

• No more than 1 million reservists can be on active duty 

• No more than 24 consecutive months 

10 U.S.C. 12304 

“Presidential Reserve Callup” 

Determined by the President: 

• To augment the active duty force for operational 

missions 

• No more than 200,000 reservists can be on active duty 

• No more than 270 days 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions. 

On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency 

existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 

and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked the partial 

mobilization authority.13 As table 1 shows, this authority restricts the 

duration of reservists’ active duty to 24 consecutive months. OSD 

implements the activation of reservists for Iraq and Afghanistan under this 

partial mobilization authority. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for providing policy, programs, 

and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization of the reserve 

components. 

On September 20, 2001, OSD issued mobilization guidance that among 

other things directed the services as a matter of policy to specify in initial 

orders to reserve members that the period of active duty service would not 

exceed 12 months. However, the guidance allowed the service secretaries 

to extend orders for an additional 12 months or to remobilize reserve 

 13 Executive Order 13223, September 14, 2001.

Page 7 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
component members as long as an individual member’s cumulative service 

did not exceed 24 months. 

The services implement the authority and guidance according to their 

policies and practices. To meet the continuing demand for ground forces,

in 2004 the Army extended the time that reservists must be deployed for 

missions related to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring 

Freedom. DOD’s and the Army’s current guidance states the goal that 

soldiers should serve 12 months with their “boots-on-the-ground” in the 

theater of operations, not including the time spent in mobilization and 

demobilization activities, which could add several more months to the 

time a reserve member spends on active duty. Further, senior DOD 

officials state that under DOD policy, a reservist may not be involuntarily 

deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan more than once.14

Since September 11, 2001, there have been several rotations of troops to 

support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Currently, DOD refers to troop rotations based on troop deployment dates, 

although deployments overlap calendar years. For example, the rotation of 

troops that deployed or are scheduled to serve from calendar years 2004 

through 2006 is known as the 04-06 rotation. The 05-07 rotation is 

composed of troops expected to deploy and serve from 2005 through 2007. 

DOD recently identified troops to deploy to either theater from 2006 

through 2008 in the 06-08 rotation. DOD recently has started planning for 

the 07-09 rotation to identify forces for deployments from calendar years 

2007 through 2009. 

Identifying Forces for 

Ongoing Operations 

In response to the new security environment, in May 2005 the Secretary of 

Defense approved a new integrated force assignment, apportionment, and 

allocation process, known as Global Force Management. The new process 

is designed to identify capabilities or forces to conduct operational 

missions. The Secretary tasked the Joint Forces Command with 

responsibility for developing global, joint sourcing solutions for 

 14 Active duty personnel are not restricted by mobilization authority, but DOD’s policy is to 

allow active duty personnel to remain at home for at least as long as they were deployed to 

overseas operations. Because the deployment time to Iraq or Afghanistan is 12 months, the

Army’s goal is to allow individuals or units 1 year at their home stations before they deploy

again. 

Page 8 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
conventional forces15 in support of combatant commander requirements. A 

Global Force Management Board, composed of general officer/flag officerlevel representatives from the combatant commands, the services, the

Joint Staff, and OSD, guides the process by reviewing emerging force 

management issues and making risk management recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Under the Global Force Management process, combatant commanders16

determine the capabilities they will need to support ongoing operations, 

including identifying the numbers of personnel and specific skills required 

to generate the capabilities. In generating their operational plans, the 

combatant commanders consider whether private contractors or civilians

rather than military forces could provide any of the desired capabilities. 

For missions that require military forces, the combatant commanders 

request the forces needed to provide the military capabilities from the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, who reviews and validates the

requirements. When the requirements are validated, the Chairman sends 

the requirements for conventional forces to the Commander, Joint Forces

Command,17 and to the Commander, Special Operations Command, for 

special operations forces such as civil affairs and psychological 

operations. The commanders, Joint Forces Command and Special 

Operations Command, are responsible for identifying the forces that can

be deployed to meet the requirement considering global risks. The Army 

Forces Command, which reports to the Joint Forces Command, is charged 

with identifying the Army units and personnel that can be deployed to 

meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Army Special 

Operations Command, which reports to the Special Operations Command, 

is charged with identifying Army units and personnel to be deployed to

support combatant commanders’ requirements. The Secretary of Defense 

reviews the commanders’ force sourcing recommendations and approves 

or disapproves them. 

 15 The U.S. Joint Forces Command was assigned the responsibility for identifying 

conventional forces in 2003. Prior to that time, the Joint Staff performed this activity. 

16 There are currently nine combatant commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central 

Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S.

Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, 

and U.S. Strategic Command. 

17 The U.S. Joint Forces Command does not provide forces for the U.S. Strategic Command

and the U.S. Transportation Command. These commands identify forces for combatant 

commanders. 

Page 9 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high 

demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills, 

including military police, engineering, and civil affairs, and officials 

charged with sourcing future rotations have a limited view of what 

personnel remain available for future rotations. While dynamic operational 

requirements complicate force-planning efforts, the department will be 

increasingly challenged to identify forces for future rotations from a 

diminishing supply of readily available personnel under current 

deployment policies. The supply of personnel already trained in highdemand skills and eligible to deploy has decreased as operations have 

continued because many personnel with these skills are reservists whose

deployments and duration of involuntary active duty service under the 

partial mobilization authority are limited by DOD and Army policy. A 

primary strategy used to meet requirements has been to identify personnel

from other Army skills or from other services that can be reassigned or 

retrained with high-demand skills. However, DOD officials charged with 

identifying forces for future rotations have not had a source of readily 

available, comprehensive personnel data on deployment histories and 

skills across the services. Lacking such information, DOD officials 

developed a labor-intensive process involving a series of conferences with 

service representatives, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Command 

where officials identify actions the services can take to meet the 

combatant commander’s requirements. DOD is taking steps to consolidate 

personnel, deployment, and skill data to support force management 

decisions through a new defense readiness reporting system. Until DOD 

systematically integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it

will continue to use an inefficient process and make important decisions 

about how to meet the combatant commander’s requirements based on 

limited information. Further, without complete, reliable, and accessible 

data that provide greater visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack 

analytical bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to current 

deployment policies when needed. 

Army Combat 

Support and Combat 

Service Support Skills 

Are in Increasingly

Short Supply, and 

Data on Skilled 

Individuals Available 

for Future 

Deployments Are Not 

Integrated into the 

Sourcing Process 

Page 10 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
As operations have evolved from combat to counterinsurgency operations, 

requirements for forces with some high-demand skills—especially combat 

support and combat service support skills—have initially exceeded the 

number of Army personnel trained and available to deploy.18 As a result, 

DOD has relied increasingly on reassigning and retraining personnel to 

meet combatant commander requirements. The skills where requirements 

have initially exceeded the number of trained personnel include 

transportation, engineering, military police, quartermaster, military 

intelligence, civil affairs, signal corps, medical, and psychological 

operations. Many of these high-demand skills reside primarily in the 

Army’s reserve component. Reservists serving in Afghanistan and Iraq 

have been activated under a partial mobilization authority that enables the 

secretary of a military department, in a time of national emergency 

declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law, to 

involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24 consecutive months. DOD 

policy implementing the mobilization authority states that any soldier who 

has served 24 cumulative months during current operations is ineligible 

for any further activation unless the reservist volunteers for additional 

duty. Further, DOD’s policy is that no reservist should be involuntarily 

deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan more than once, according to senior 

DOD officials.19 Consequently, as operations continue and the number of 

reservists who have already deployed increases, it is likely to become 

increasingly difficult for DOD to identify reserve personnel skilled in highdemand areas who are eligible to deploy. 

As the Supply of Available, 

Trained Personnel for 

Some High-Demand 

Combat Support and 

Combat Service Support 

Skills Has Decreased, DOD 

Has Relied Increasingly on 

Reassigning and Retraining 

Personnel to Meet 

Requirements 

One of the primary strategies DOD has used to meet requirements for 

some high-demand skills has been to reassign and retrain Army or other 

service personnel.20 The percentage of requirements that have been filled

by reassigned or retrained Army personnel to some high-demand skills has 

increased as operations have continued. In addition, the combatant 

commander’s requirements for Army skills increasingly have been met by 

retraining personnel from the other services under Army doctrine. The 

 18 This report is an unclassified version of a classified report. The classified report contains

additional details comparing operational requirements to the Army’s supply of trained 

personnel available to deploy and examining DOD’s strategies to meet the requirements for 

skilled forces.

19 The Army’s goal is to provide active duty personnel at least as much time at home as time 

deployed. 

20 In addition, personnel from other federal agencies have filled requirements for some 

skills. 

Page 11 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
strategy of reassigning and retraining available personnel from other 

services to fill combat support and combat service support requirements 

supports the department’s goal of deploying all reservists at least once 

before any are involuntarily activated for a second time. This will likely 

continue to be a primary strategy for providing high-demand forces as 

operations continue and the pool of skilled personnel who have not 

deployed continues to diminish. However, DOD officials charged with 

identifying the personnel who could be reassigned or retrained to meet 

requirements were challenged because they did not have information that 

linked data on personnel who remained eligible to deploy and their skills 

across the services. 

DOD’s Process for 

Identifying Forces Is Labor 

Intensive, and Officials 

Charged with Identifying 

Forces Have Not 

Integrated Comprehensive 

Data into DOD’s Sourcing 

Process 

Officials charged with identifying forces for future rotations did not 

integrate comprehensive data that would allow them to efficiently identify 

what skilled personnel are available to be deployed because such data 

were not readily available when the department began a rotational force 

deployment schedule. Until the need to sustain large numbers of forces for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over a long period emerged, DOD 

officials did not anticipate the need for detailed information on individuals 

to support a rotational force schedule on a long-term basis. While officials

ultimately identified forces to meet the combatant commander’s 

operational requirements, our review of the force identification process 

showed that the data used were not comprehensive and did not give 

officials charged with identifying forces a complete picture of what forces 

remained available across the services to meet the requirements. 

DOD officials involved with the process of identifying forces stated that 

supporting the rotational force schedule has not permitted them the time 

or resources to consolidate the services’ personnel data. In the absence of

such data in the early stages of the ongoing operations, DOD officials 

developed a labor-intensive process that involves conferences on service 

and interservice joint levels21 where officials discuss various strategies to 

assign forces because they do not have data that would provide visibility 

over available forces. For example, while the Army Reserve and National 

Guard had data that identified available units, the data did not provide 

complete information on how many individuals remained deployable or 

had the required skills. Through a series of conferences, officials discussed 

what personnel remained available for future deployments based on data

 21 This process is part of DOD’s overall Global Force Management process.

Page 12 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
they gathered from various sources. While DOD is taking steps to link 

information about personnel and deployment history in its new defense 

readiness reporting system that could be helpful in making decisions 

about forces for future rotations, these data have not yet been integrated

with DOD’s sourcing process. 

The Joint Staff and the services participated in conferences to identify 

forces for the 04-06 rotation in 2004 when identifying skilled personnel 

available for deployment became more difficult because of previous 

deployments, and the Army recognized the need to identify forces as early

as possible so that they could be retrained in high-demand skills. The 

process, managed by the Joint Forces Command, has evolved over time as

operations have continued and now involves months of conferences held

at the service level and across the department where representatives of 

the services, the Joint Forces Command, the combatant commander, and

others discuss strategies for meeting requirements.22

To meet the requirements for which the Army could not initially identify 

available and trained forces, the Joint Forces Command formed working 

groups composed of representatives from the services and Joint Forces 

Command, among others, to identify personnel from any of the other 

services who could be reassigned and retrained according to Army 

doctrine. The work of the joint functional working groups culminated in 

another conference, called the Final Progress Review, hosted by the Joint

Staff at the Pentagon. During the executive sessions of the Final Progress 

Review, senior military leaders made decisions as to how the services, 

including the Army, would fill the remaining requirements. 

The process has enabled the department to fill requirements, but 

efficiency was lost because these officials did not have data that linked 

personnel skills and deployment availability so that trained forces 

remaining available under current policies could be readily identified. As a 

result, conference participants had to defer decisions until they could 

obtain more complete data. Moreover, the process does not provide 

assurance that forces identified are the most appropriate match 

 22 To identify forces to meet civil affairs and psychological operations requirements, the

Special Operations Command conducts a series of meetings separately from the Joint

Forces Command process. However, for the 06-08 rotation, Special Operations Command 

officials also participated in the Joint Forces Command process because requirements for 

civil affairs and psychological operations exceeded the number of available, trained 

personnel. 

Page 13 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
considering both current requirements and future readiness. Moreover, it 

does not provide an ability to make future projections about whether DOD 

will be able to meet future requirements or will need to consider other 

alternatives. While DOD has begun compiling data through its new 

readiness reporting system that links information about personnel 

according to deployment history and skill set to provide better visibility of

available forces, and such data were available beginning in August 2005, 

this information has not been integrated into the existing sourcing 

process. 

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) 

has taken steps to develop a new defense readiness reporting system, the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System,23 that will link data on personnel 

availability and skills, according to a senior agency official. The system, 

which consolidates data from multiple sources, such as the services and 

the department’s manpower data center, is in the early stages of 

implementation and validation. When fully implemented and validated, the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System could provide the integrated data

that sourcing officials need. However, the information has not yet been 

integrated into the sourcing process to identify the most appropriate 

forces to meet current requirements from all the services considering their

other missions. In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD said

that although integrated personnel data were not available during the 

entire 06-08 sourcing process, this system could now provide data and 

analytical support for identifying forces for future rotations. DOD said that 

Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command officials 

responsible for identifying forces should use the system to assist in 

identifying available personnel in the future. Until DOD systematically 

integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will continue 

to use an inefficient process and make important decisions about how to 

meet the combatant commander’s requirements based on limited 

information. Further, without complete, reliable, and accessible data that

provide greater visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack analytical 

bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to current deployment 

policies when needed. 

 23 The Defense Readiness Reporting System is designed to provide data for managing the

global force and assessing readiness for mission performance. According to current plans,

the system will be fully operational in September 2007. We did not assess the capability or 

data reliability of this system. 

Page 14 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Although DOD found ways to meet the combatant commander’s 

requirements for high-demand skills through the 06-08 rotation, it has not 

undertaken a comprehensive analysis of options to support future 

rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan should they continue for a number of 

years. DOD has not undertaken a comprehensive analysis because its 

process for identifying forces was created to meet the specific combatant 

commander’s requirements for the next rotation cycle. Our previous work 

has shown that in the face of a changing environment, such as that of 

evolving military operations, valid and reliable data on the number of 

employees required are critical to prevent shortfalls that threaten the 

ability of an organization to efficiently and effectively perform its 

mission.24 However, without a comprehensive assessment of the most 

efficient and effective way to prepare for future rotations, including 

comprehensive analyses of various options, DOD will not be able to 

demonstrate a convincing business case for maintaining or changing its 

strategies, such as retraining personnel and seeking volunteers, for 

meeting a combatant commander’s requirements. 

In summer 2005, the Secretary of Defense asked the Director, Joint Staff, 

for a briefing on future force structure challenges for the next 2 to 3 years,

although the Secretary did not specify how the review was to be 

conducted. In response to the Secretary’s request, in fall 2005, the Joint 

Staff conducted a study, known as Elaborate Crossbow V, with the 

objectives of predicting shortfalls of skilled personnel for the 07-09 

rotation, recommending options to make personnel available for 

rotations,25 and identifying risks that demonstrated the difficulties officials 

face in identifying forces for future rotations, among other objectives. 

However, the study was limited to units within selected high-demand 

combat support and combat service support skills for operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. In the 2005 assessment, Joint Staff and DOD officials 

assumed that the combat commander’s requirements for support skills for 

the 07-09 rotation would be the same as the requirements for the 06-08 

rotation, and they compared these requirements to estimates of available 

units. 

DOD Has Not 

Conducted a 

Comprehensive, DataDriven Analysis of 

Options to Enhance 

the Availability of 

Personnel with HighDemand Skills for 

Future Rotations 

The Joint Staff’s Limited 

Analyses of Options for the 

07-09 Rotation Quantified 

Shortfalls by Units in Some 

High-Demand Skills 

Joint Staff officials were charged with developing models that would 

assess the number of units that could be made available by using several 

 24 GAO-02-373SP. 

25 The study did not specifically identify units or personnel to meet the requirements. 

Page 15 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
options, including requesting a new partial mobilization authority and 

allowing redeployment of reserve personnel with residual time under 

current mobilization authority. Joint Staff officials requested detailed 

information from the Joint Forces Command and Special Operations 

Command on (1) the total inventory of units in the force structure, (2) the 

units’ arrival and departure dates from theater, (3) the number of days in 

theater for the last rotation for individuals in the units, (4) the amount of 

time individuals spent at home stations, and (5) the remaining time 

available under the partial mobilization authority for reservists. The Joint 

Staff officials planned to use the data in the models to determine if 

changing the underlying assumptions associated with an option would 

make more units available. 

When detailed data were available, Joint Staff officials were able to use 

their models to test how changing policies would affect the availability of

units; however, detailed data were only available for civil affairs units. The 

fact that an official from the Special Operations Command had accurate 

and specific information on the civil affairs specialists’ dates of 

deployments and time remaining under the mobilization authority enabled 

the Joint Staff officials to test how changing policies would change the 

availability of units to meet the estimated requirement. For example, the 

analysis showed that if DOD allowed the redeployment of reserve 

personnel with remaining time under partial mobilization authority, more 

Army reserve civil affairs companies would become available. However, 

according to a Joint Staff official who assisted in developing the models, 

the Joint Staff could not conduct a thorough analysis of other units with 

skills in high demand because it did not have key data. While the Joint 

Staff’s limited review is a first step, it does not represent systematic 

analyses of options for continuing to support operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan beyond the 06-08 rotation. 

Human Capital Best 

Practices Rely on DataDriven Analyses to Guide 

Decision Making 

Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data about the number of 

employees an agency requires are critical if the agency is to spotlight areas

for attention before crises develop, such as human capital shortfalls that 

threaten an agency’s ability to economically, efficiently, and effectively 

perform its missions.26 We have designated human capital management as

a governmentwide high-risk area in which acquiring and developing a staff 

whose size and skills meet agency needs is a particular challenge. To meet 

 26 GAO-02-373SP. 

Page 16 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
this challenge, federal managers need to direct considerable time, energy, 

and targeted investments toward managing human capital strategically, 

focusing on developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and 

retaining a workforce that is clearly linked to achieving the agency’s 

mission and goals. 

The processes that an agency uses to manage its workforce can vary, but 

our prior work has shown that data-driven decision making is one of the 

critical factors in successful strategic workforce management. Highperforming organizations routinely use current, valid, and reliable data to 

inform decisions about current and future workforce needs, including data

on the appropriate number of employees, key competencies, and skills 

mix needed for mission accomplishment and appropriate deployment of 

staff across the organizations. In addition, high-performing organizations 

also stay alert to emerging mission demands and remain open to 

reevaluating their human capital practices. The change in the Army’s 

missions from combat to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan represented a new environment, which provided DOD with 

the opportunity to reevaluate the mix of personnel and skills and its 

deployment policies to determine whether they are consistent with 

strategic objectives. 

Several Options Exist to 

Increase the Army’s and 

Other Services’ Supply of 

Combat Support and 

Combat Service Support 

Skills 

The United States is in its fifth year of fighting the Global War on 

Terrorism, and the operations associated with the war, particularly in Iraq

and Afghanistan, may continue. DOD planners are beginning to identify 

forces for the 07-09 rotation. Based on our review of DOD’s deployment 

policies and our prior work, we identified several options that DOD could 

assess to increase the supply of high-demand skills to support future 

rotations. Each of the proposed options involves both advantages and 

disadvantages, and some options could be implemented in conjunction 

with others. Moreover, some options might be more appropriate for 

certain skill sets than others. However, without key data and analyses, 

such as the amount of time remaining under the partial mobilization 

authority for each reservist, decision makers will have difficulty weighing 

which option(s) would best achieve DOD’s overall goals of supplying 

trained and available forces to meet the combatant commander’s 

requirements while considering risks, future readiness, and recruiting and 

retention. Based on its challenges in providing personnel with highdemand skills in previous rotations, DOD will be faced with difficult 

choices on how to make personnel in high-demand skills available for 

future rotations. Options that could increase the supply of combat support 

Page 17 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
and combat service support skills for future rotations include the 

following: 

• Retraining personnel within the Army and other services in highdemand skills. DOD could consider requiring the Army to reassign and 

retrain more of its personnel as well as relying on the Air Force, the Navy, 

and the Marine Corps to reassign and retrain available personnel for highdemand Army skills. As discussed previously, the Joint Forces Command 

has identified significant numbers of Army and other service personnel 

that the Army could retrain for some high-demand skills. As of February 

2006, the Joint Staff estimated that over 200,000 reservists from all the 

services’ reserve components could be potentially available for 

deployment under current policies and might be retrained for high-demand 

skills, and the services are attempting to verify the actual availability of 

reservists. However it is unclear how many reservists can be reassigned 

and retrained to meet Army requirements for skills and rank. OSD officials 

said the department would consider waiving deployment policies for 

targeted high-demand skill personnel only when the services can provide a 

strong business case for the waiver. Instead, the department intends to 

rely on retraining personnel and seeking volunteers to meet future 

requirements. Joint Staff officials are currently seeking from the services 

more detailed data on potentially available personnel, such as their skills 

and whether they can be assigned and trained for deployment. A key 

advantage of this option is that Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

personnel who have not deployed already have some military skills and 

experience, such as an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 

their senior leaders and knowledge of military roles and missions that 

could be useful in supporting ongoing operations. In some cases, 

experienced personnel from the other services may have specialized skills 

that are similar to the Army skills in high demand; therefore, they would 

need less training than newly recruited Army personnel. A disadvantage to

this option would be that the other service personnel would not be 

available to perform missions in their respective services. Further, 

members of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could potentially miss 

training and other opportunities to enhance their careers in their parent 

services. Moreover, recruiting and retention could be hindered because

potential recruits or experienced personnel may not want to retrain for 

missions and skills other than those they originally planned to perform. 

• Adjusting force structure through increasing the number of Army 

positions in combat support and combat service support by further 

transferring positions from low-demand skills to high-demand 

areas. Another option focuses on shifting positions in low-demand skills 

to high-demand skills, either temporarily or permanently. The Army plans 

Page 18 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
to transfer some low-demand positions to high-demand skills, such as 

military police. In addition, DOD plans to expand psychological operations 

and civil affairs units by 3,700 personnel as a result of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, according to the 2006 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report. However, according to a senior 

Army official, the Army is facing challenges in meeting its current planned 

time frames for reassigning positions because providing forces to meet the 

rotational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan has created delays in 

planned transfers of skills and modular force transformations may require 

permanent changes in the numbers and types of skills needed. The 

advantage of creating more units with high-demand skills is that 

continuing operational requirements could be met with more available, 

trained personnel. Further, if more units with the combat support and 

combat service support skills that are in high demand were in the active 

component, DOD would not face the restrictions that apply to reserve 

personnel. A major disadvantage to using this option is that the Army 

could encounter further delays in providing personnel with high-demand 

skills because, according to some service officials, limitations in the 

availability of training facilities, courses, and instructors may reduce the 

numbers of personnel who can be retrained in the short term.27 Many of 

the Army’s skills in high demand reside primarily in the Army’s reserve 

component. Therefore, if DOD’s deployment policies remain unchanged, 

the Army will continue to face limitations on its use of reservists. 

• Changing the number of days that active duty and reserve Army 

personnel may be in theater for a deployment. OSD could consider 

changing the duration of deployment for Army reservists or active duty 

personnel in theater, known as “boots-on-the-ground,” from the current 12 

months. Current departmental guidance states that Army personnel can 

serve no more than 12 months within the U.S. Central Command’s theater 

of operations, not including the time spent in mobilization and 

demobilization activities.28 However, because mobilization and 

demobilization activities require about 3 months prior to deployment and 3 

months after deployment, reservists deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan 

 27 We did not assess the training requirements and associated costs of this option. 

28 According to a July 30, 2004, OSD memo, “Force Deployment Rules for Operations Iraqi 

Freedom and Enduring Freedom,” Marine Corps units organized below the 

regimental/group level deploy for 7 months and Marine Corps regimental/group 

headquarters deploy for 12 months. The Marine Corps volunteers its forces as a surge 

capability if the on-ground situation requires more forces. Air Force personnel deploy 120 

days in a 20-month cycle, and some Air Force personnel will deploy longer than a 120 days, 

more than once in a 20-month cycle, or both. Navy personnel deploy for 6 months. 

Page 19 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
typically serve about 18 months on active duty. Under DOD’s policy, the 

Army may use reserve members for a total of 24 cumulative months. 

Therefore, by the time reservists are deactivated after 18 months of 

mobilization, they have only 6 months of deployment eligibility remaining 

under DOD’s policy—not enough to remobilize and redeploy for another 

yearlong overseas assignment. If the amount of “boots-on-the-ground” time 

was lengthened, from the current 12 months to 18 months, the Army could 

more fully use reserve personnel under the partial mobilization authority. 

A key advantage of this option would be that a longer deployment period 

would permit forces to be in theater longer and provide more force 

stability and continuity, but individuals could be adversely affected by 

longer tours of duty. In addition, a slower rotational pace would provide 

force planners, such as the Army Forces Command, more time to identify 

available personnel and decide which personnel will best meet 

requirements for the next rotation. However, lengthening “boots-on-theground” time could have negative consequences for individuals. If 

reservists were away from their civilian careers and families for longer 

time frames, individual morale could erode, and DOD could face 

challenges in recruiting and retaining skilled personnel. 

Alternatively, the Army could shorten the “boots-on-the-ground” time and 

involuntarily activate reservists to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan more 

than once. If deployments were shortened, Army reservists would not be 

separated from their civilian careers for long periods, and recruiting and 

retention challenges could lessen. However, a major disadvantage to 

shortening the Army’s deployment lengths to, for example, 6 months is 

that the Army would have to mobilize and demobilize more personnel in a 

given period. According to Army and Army Forces Command officials, if 

reservists’ deployments were shortened without change to the “one 

deployment only” policy, the Army would face critical personnel shortages 

in many skill areas. Any shortages of available reserve personnel would 

likely have to be filled with active duty personnel, increasing stress on the 

active force. Further, less time at home for active forces could disrupt 

training and lower readiness for future missions. 

• Allowing redeployment of reserve personnel with time remaining 

under DOD’s 24 cumulative month deployment policy. DOD’s policy 

is that personnel should not be deployed for more than 24 cumulative 

months under the partial mobilization authority or involuntarily deployed 

overseas a second time, irrespective of the number of months served. 

However, if OSD allowed the redeployment of reserve personnel the 

services could more fully use reservists’ 24 months of involuntary active 

duty. The major advantage to this option is that the Army would have

access to reservists trained in high-demand skills. Further, changing the 

Page 20 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
redeployment policy could enable the Army to decrease its reliance on

retraining its personnel or other service personnel to meet the combatant 

commander’s requirements. If the Army collected detailed data about the 

number of days a reservist served in theater and the remaining time 

available under the partial mobilization authority, it could compile a 

comprehensive list of reservists who could possibly deploy again and 

identify the time frames that they would be available. However, as 

discussed in the previous sections of the report, DOD and the Army do not 

have detailed data about personnel across the services readily available. A 

major disadvantage of this option would be that DOD would involuntarily 

activate large numbers of reserve personnel for multiple deployments. 

Multiple deployments could disrupt a reservist’s civilian career and 

decrease his or her willingness to remain in the military. Another 

disadvantage of redeploying reservists would be that some reservists 

could be deployed more than once in 6 years, which differs from the 

Army’s plan under its force rotation model.29 The Army’s force rotation 

planning model is designed to provide reservists more predictability in 

deployment eligibility. 

• Increasing the Army’s active duty end strength. Congress authorizes 

annually the number of personnel that each service may have at the end of

a given fiscal year. This number is known as authorized end strength. In 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,

30 Congress 

increased the fiscal year 2006 end strength of the Army by 10,000—from 

502,400 to 512,400. Congress also authorized additional authority for 

increases of up to 20,000 active Army personnel for fiscal years 2007 

through 2009 to support ongoing missions and to achieve transformation. 

However, current Army plans project a decrease in personnel to 482,400 

active duty forces by fiscal year 2011. The primary advantage of increasing 

the Army’s end strength and funding associated positions would be that 

the Army could provide more active duty personnel to meet operational 

requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan, to accommodate the requirements 

for the modular force, and to help meet the Army’s rotational force 

planning goal of having active personnel deployed for no more than 1 out 

of every 3 years. Budgetary concerns could be a major drawback to this 

option. Decision makers would have to weigh the increased cost of 

 29 The Army has proposed a rotational model for its forces similar to those of the other 

services with the goal of assuring reservists more predictable deployments of no more than

once in 6 years. See Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005). However, as we have reported, when it will be fully 

implemented is not clear. See GAO-05-660. 

30 Pub. L. No. 109-163 at 401 (2006). 

Page 21 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
permanently increasing the Army’s end strength. According to Army 

personnel and budget officials, in fiscal year 2005, the estimated cost to 

compensate, retain, and train each Army servicemember was over 

$100,000 annually. Further, recruiting personnel to meet the higher end

strength levels may be difficult because of the uncertainty of how long 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may continue and whether new recruits 

could be targeted to high-demand skills. Additionally, the Army would 

require time to organize, train, and equip additional units to be ready to

deploy for overseas operations. 

Using more personnel from the Individual Ready Reserve. Members 

of the Army’s Individual Ready Reserve, which is composed of about 

112,700 members, include individuals who were previously trained during

periods of active service but who have not completed their service 

obligations, individuals who have completed their service obligations and 

voluntarily retain their reserve status, and personnel who have not 

completed basic training. Most of these members are not assigned to an 

organized unit, do not attend weekend or annual training, and do not 

receive pay unless they are called to active duty. Members assigned to the 

Individual Ready Reserve are subject to recall, if needed, and serve a 

maximum of 24 months.31 As of September 2005, of the total Army 

Individual Ready Reserve population of 112,700, about 5,200 personnel had 

been mobilized. An advantage of this option is that it could provide the 

Army with access to personnel who already have some military 

experience. These reservists could be retrained in their active duty skills 

or retrained in different skills. A significant drawback to this option would 

be the time needed to identify, locate, and contact members of the 

Individual Ready Reserve because, as we have reported previously, the 

services lack vital contact information.32 Further, based on the Army’s 

recent experience when these reservists were recalled, exemptions and 

delays were encountered that could limit the services’ ability to use these 

personnel in significant numbers. 

Identifying forces for future rotations is likely to become more difficult for 

DOD without comprehensive analyses of options for meeting potential 

future requirements. Without complete and accurate data that link 

 31 Individual Ready Reserve personnel who have served on active duty up to 24 months, 

under 10 U.S.C. 12302, may be retained on active duty under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d), with their 

consent. 

32 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of 

Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003). 

Page 22 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
deployment information and skill areas for military personnel to assist in 

developing and assessing the options, the department will continue to 

have limited information with which to make decisions about how to fill 

the combatant commander’s requirements. Further, without a systematic 

evaluation of options, the current difficulties in providing personnel with 

the needed skills could worsen and requirements could go unfilled. As the 

Joint Staff’s limited analyses of options showed, having complete and

accurate data enables planners to clearly identify how alternative options

would affect their ability to efficiently identify forces. Additionally, 

without linking data to options, the services may have difficultly deploying 

all reservists at least once before other reservists are required to deploy 

for a second time, which is a key goal of officials in OSD. If DOD had datadriven analyses of options to increase available skilled personnel, DOD 

leaders would have a better basis for considering policy changes and 

congressional decision makers would have more complete information 

with which to carry out their oversight responsibilities with regard to the 

size and composition of the force, mobilization policies, and other issues. 

Although DOD has accommodated the continuing high demands for 

combat support and combat service support skills, primarily through 

retraining and reassigning personnel, the pool of available, trained, and 

deployable reservists is diminishing rapidly and could leave the 

department with significant challenges to identifying personnel for future 

rotations. Until DOD’s planners and senior decision makers integrate in 

the sourcing process comprehensive, reliable data that link personnel by

skills and deployment histories, they will have to continue to use an 

inefficient and time-consuming process to determine which personnel to 

deploy. Moreover, DOD will be limited in its ability to assess whether it 

can meet future requirements and to consider a range of alternatives for

meeting requirements for skills that are in high demand. If DOD had better 

visibility over the personnel who are available to deploy and their skills, 

officials could reduce the amount of time they spend in identifying 

personnel for rotations, provide assurance that personnel identified are 

appropriately matched considering both the requirements and future 

readiness, and better manage the risks associated with moving personnel 

from other skills and missions to support future operations. 

In addition, without an integrated assessment that uses data to examine 

alternative courses of action, DOD planners and senior leaders will not be 

well positioned to make informed decisions on how to meet the 

requirements of future rotations, particularly if rotations continue at 

roughly the same level for the next few years. To meet requirements for 

Conclusions 

Page 23 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
future rotations, the department intends to continue its strategy of 

reassigning any eligible personnel the services can identify until all 

reservists from all services have been deployed at least once. However, 

there are additional options that DOD could consider that might increase 

the supply of personnel for high-demand skills for future rotations, 

although each option could have negative effects as well as positive ones.

Data-driven analysis of options could help DOD senior leaders make 

difficult decisions to balance the advantages and disadvantages for each 

option and to apply the best-suited option to meet the varying 

requirements for the range of high-demand skills. Until DOD 

comprehensively assesses these options using detailed data linked to 

individual skills and deployment histories, DOD officials cannot weigh 

what options would be most advantageous to the combatant commander 

and whether potential negative effects on readiness for future operations 

would be minimized. 

To facilitate DOD’s decision making to meet the demands associated with 

the Global War on Terrorism and to increase the availability of skilled 

personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 

two actions: 

• Integrate comprehensive data that identify active and reserve personnel 

according to deployment history and skill set, including personnel who are 

available to deploy, with DOD’s sourcing process before identifying 

combat support and combat service support personnel for the next 

rotation to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

• Conduct comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options for meeting 

potential requirements for future missions to Iraq and Afghanistan. Such 

analyses should include an assessment of options, such as using more 

personnel with support skills from the Army and other services; 

transferring more positions to high-demand areas; changing deployment 

lengths; and increasing Army end strength, which would increase the 

availability of personnel in high-demand skills. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) provided written 

comments on a draft of the classified version of this unclassified report. 

The department agreed with our recommendations and cited actions it is

taking to implement them. The department’s comments are reprinted in 

appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. In its comments, DOD expressed 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 24 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
concerns that our report (1) does not fully reflect the complicated task of 

providing forces for dynamic operational requirements and (2) subtly 

suggests that DOD’s flexibility in meeting operational requirements is a 

sign of failed force management practices. It also stated that its use of the 

total force, not just the Army, enabled it to meet all combatant 

commanders’ requirements to date. In addition, the department stated that 

our recommendations should more explicitly recognize and support the 

use of the newly developed Defense Readiness Reporting System. It stated 

that the total force visibility our recommendations call for exists in that 

system and that the Joint Forces Command and the Special Operations 

Command should use the detailed, individual-level information in that 

system to support their sourcing processes. 

We agree that the process developed to identify forces is very complex. 

Our report described the process for identifying forces for Army combat 

support and combat service support requirements. Moreover, our report 

discussed how DOD has met the demands and how officials used multiple 

strategies and relied on the total force to meet requirements for highdemand skills. The report does not make a judgment about the 

appropriateness of the outcomes of the sourcing process. Rather, the 

report demonstrates that the lack of data complicated the force 

identification process, and that force planners did not have visibility over 

detailed information on personnel or how current sourcing decisions 

would affect the readiness of the force. However, we have modified our 

report to reflect that DOD’s effort to integrate personnel deployment and 

skill data and readiness information in the new Defense Readiness 

Reporting System represents a positive step toward providing the visibility 

over personnel and deployment histories that would be useful to force 

planners. Although this system has not yet been used to support the 

sourcing process, when it reaches full operational capability at the end of 

fiscal year 2007 and DOD has completed data validation, it could be a 

means to provide visibility over detailed information on personnel to 

improve the sourcing process, thereby fulfilling our recommendation. We 

have not modified our recommendation to require that DOD use the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System in its sourcing process because it is 

still in development. 

With respect to our second recommendation that DOD conduct 

comprehensive, data-driven analyses of options for meeting continuing 

operational requirements, DOD agreed that all options should be 

considered and said it is conducting a variety of data-driven analyses to 

develop clearer options aimed at better positioning forces to meet current 

and future operational requirements. We believe that the department’s 

Page 25 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
approach will satisfy the intent of our recommendation if the department 

bases its assessments on data that provide decision makers complete 

information on the options and related risks. 

We are sending copies to other appropriate congressional committees and 

the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to other 

interested parties upon request. In addition, the report is available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

and Management 

Page 26 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the combat support and combat service support skills that are in 

high demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we collected U.S. 

Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command data 

showing how U.S. Central Command’s requirements were met for two 

rotations—calendar years 05-07 and calendar years 06-08. Using the data, 

we compared the number of requirements from U.S. Central Command to 

the number of requirements that the Army could meet and determined 

whether and to what extent combat support and combat service support 

skills initially experienced shortages for the 05-07 and 06-08 rotations. To 

identify what strategies the Department of Defense (DOD) took to identify

forces in cases where demand exceeded the initial supply, we examined 

the decisions made by officials at the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the 

U.S. Special Operations Command as documented in their data. We also 

compared the U.S. Central Command’s documents, which identified the 

specific capabilities and deployment time frames, to the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command and U.S. Special Operations Command data to identify specific 

instances where the Army reassigned and retrained its personnel or where 

personnel from the other services were reassigned and retrained to 

perform Army requirements. We also reviewed the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 

analyses of the U.S. Central Command’s requirement and the actions taken 

by DOD to meet the requirements for the 04-06, 05-07, and 06-08 rotations. 

Since the U.S. Joint Forces Command did not have complete data on how

the department identified forces for the 04-06 rotation, we attributed the 

04-06 sourcing results to the Joint Staff. We met with an official in the 

Joint Staff Directorate for Operations to discuss our analysis comparing 

the combatant commander’s requirements for the 05-07 rotation to DOD’s 

05-07 sourcing decisions to ensure our methodology was comparable to 

the Joint Staff official’s analysis. We also discussed our methodology of 

analyzing the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s data for the 05-07 and 06-08 

rotations with officials in the command’s Joint Deployment Operations 

Division. To assess the reliability of the 05-07 and 06-08 rotation data, we 

reviewed existing information about the data and the systems that 

produced them, interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data, and 

performed limited electronic testing. When we found missing information 

or discrepancies in the key data elements, we discussed the reasons for 

the missing information and data discrepancies with officials in the Joint 

Deployment Operations Division, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We 

determined that the 05-07 and 06-08 rotation data were sufficiently reliable 

for our purposes. 

In addition, to assess the extent to which DOD has visibility over what 

forces remain available to meet future requirements, we collected and

examined the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and Department of 

Page 27 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

the Army briefings that document the decisions reached to identify the 

combat support and combat service support forces identified for the 05-07 

and 06-08 rotations and held discussions with officials responsible for 

identifying forces at DOD organizations. We also examined DOD 

documents that contained information on deployment policies and the 

partial mobilization authority to understand how they affect the 

availability of active military personnel and reservists for future 

deployments. We discussed the implications of DOD’s deployment policies 

and the status of identifying forces for rotations by obtaining testimonial 

evidence from officials responsible for managing these efforts at DOD 

organizations, including, but not limited to, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Readiness, 

Programming and Assessment), the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for 

Operations, the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations 

Division, the U.S. Special Operations Command Operations Support 

Group, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Plans, the U.S. Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Plans, and the U.S. Army Forces Command Plans Division. 

Because it did not fall within the scope of our review, we did not assess 

how the forces were trained or will be trained and equipped or the effects 

on recruitment and retention as a result of continuing operational needs. 

We also observed the Department of the Army’s conference in April 2005 

and the U.S. Joint Forces Command/Joint Chiefs of Staff conference in 

August 2005 to understand the process used by department officials to 

identify combat support and combat service support for the 06-08 rotation. 

As part of this effort, we observed working group meetings that were 

organized by combat support and combat service support skills to 

understand how department officials discussed and developed approaches 

to meet the combatant commander’s requirements. At these conferences, 

we held discussions with officials to fully understand the challenges they 

face with using the available data to identify personnel. 

To determine what percentage of combat support and combat service 

support skills reside in the Army’s active and reserve components, we 

collected skill set data from the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations and calculated the percentage of positions assigned to 

several support skills for each of the Army’s components in fiscal years 

2005 and 2011. In addition, we analyzed transcripts of public briefings and 

congressional testimony presented by DOD officials. To assess the 

reliability of the fiscal year 2005 and the projected fiscal year 2011 data on

the composition of the Army’s active and reserve components by skills, we 

reviewed existing information about the data and the systems that 

produced them, interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data, and 

Page 28 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

compared our analysis to the Army’s published analysis. We determined 

that the Army’s data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

objectives. 

To assess the extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive, datadriven analysis of its alternatives to continue meeting requirements for 

high-demand forces, we met with officials in the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Readiness, 

Programming and Assessment), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Army’s 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations Division to 

determine whether the department had plans to conduct assessments. We 

held further discussions with officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Directorate for Force Assessment to gain an understanding of the 

departmentwide study led by the Joint Staff. Further, we examined the 

Joint Staff’s briefing documents to increase our understanding of the 

process used to conduct the study, the data and assumptions used during 

the study, and the results of the study. We discussed the status and 

implications of the study with officials who participated in the Joint Staffled study, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness (Readiness, Programming and Assessment) and officials from 

the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations Division. 

To identify other options that DOD should consider to increase the 

availability of personnel with high-demand skills, we examined DOD 

documents containing information on deployment policies and the partial 

mobilization authority, held discussions with knowledgeable officials 

about mobilization authority and deployment rules, reviewed recently 

issued reports from think tanks related to providing forces for rotations, 

and reviewed our prior audit work related to end strength and initiatives 

to make more efficient use of military personnel. We identified criteria for

examining force levels through our reports on strategic human capital

management. Further, we reviewed our prior audit work related to 

recruiting and retention to enhance our understanding of the factors that 

affect the military services’ ability to attract and retain personnel. Our 

work was conducted in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area; Norfolk, 

Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; and Tampa, Florida. We performed our work 

from February 2005 through June 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 29 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

Page 30 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 5. 

Page 31 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

See comment 6. 

See comment 6. 

Page 32 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter. 

1. An objective of the report was to identify high-demand skills, and as 

part of that assessment, we observed and reviewed DOD’s force 

identification process to meet operational requirements for Iraq and 

Afghanistan, including DOD’s current policies and plans. The report 

describes in detail the structures developed to identify forces and 

identifies and assesses major analytical tools used during the process. 

Our report also acknowledges that the department met the combatant 

commander’s requirements for the 04-06, 05-07, and 06-08 rotations. 

However, we believe that the force identification process could 

become more efficient if DOD officials charged with identifying forces 

relied on comprehensive data to inform decision making. 

GAO Comments 

2. We agree with the department that dynamic operational conditions in 

Iraq and Afghanistan have made it more difficult for the department to 

anticipate the number of forces and the specific skills needed in the 

future, and we have added text on pages 1 and 8 to more fully reflect 

this challenge. 

DOD stated that as a result of the dynamic operational conditions, the 

Joint Forces Command—the DOD agent charged with filling 

combatant commanders’ force requirements—used a variety of 

strategies, such as reassigning and retraining personnel to new skill 

areas (both within the Army and across service lines), capitalizing on 

joint solutions in like skill areas. According to DOD’s comments, in 

every case, these forces have deployed only after having been fully 

certified as prepared for their theater missions and have performed 

admirably. Our report extensively described the process for identifying 

forces for Army combat support and combat service support 

requirements and illustrated in detail how DOD officials used multiple 

strategies to meet requirements for high-demand skills. Assessing the 

appropriateness of sourcing outcomes and how the forces were 

trained were outside the scope of this review. 

3. Our review focused on the Army because of the high-demand skills 

that were found predominantly in the Army, such as military police and 

civil affairs. We disagree that our report implies that DOD’s flexibility 

in meeting uncertain operational requirements is a sign of failed force 

management. We point out, however, that as rotations to Iraq and 

Afghanistan have continued to require large numbers of ground forces, 

data demonstrate that the number of available, trained Army personnel 

Page 34 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

has declined. According to DOD officials, strategies to meet combatant 

commander requirements, such as reassigning and retraining 

personnel, present their own challenges, such as costs for new 

training. Further, while our draft report recognizes the overall Global 

Force Management process, it focuses on the part of that process that 

identifies deployable personnel and develops strategies to meet the 

combatant commander’s force requirements using available personnel. 

4. We believe that the Defense Readiness Reporting System could be a 

mechanism to provide force planners the visibility they need when it is 

fully operational. We have updated our report to reflect the status of 

the system; however, we did not assess the data reliability of that 

system. 

5. We do not make a recommendation as to what system DOD could use 

to supply force planners with the data they need for visibility over 

personnel skills and deployment histories. If the department decides to 

use the Defense Readiness Reporting System, it should be integrated 

into the force identification process. 

6. See the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section. 

Page 35 GAO-06-962 Force Structure
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 36 GAO-06-962

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant 

Director; Deborah Colantonio; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms; Whitney 

Havens; Catherine Humphries; James Lawson; David Marroni; Kevin 

O’Neill; Masha Pastuhov-Pastein; Jason Porter; and Rebecca Shea made 

major contributions to this report. 

Force Structure

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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