Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the

Andean Region

July 1993

OTA-F-556

NTIS order #PB93-218899

GPO stock #052-003-01329-1
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Alternative Coca

Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region, OTA-F-556 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993).
Foreword

c

ocaine trafficking and abuse are formidable problems that disrupt social,

economic, and political systems. Stopping the flow of cocaine through

international black markets has proven impossible despite national

commitments and international treaties. Strong demand continues to promote

coca production and cocaine processing in supplying nations. This Report identifies

opportunities for and constraints to reducing Andean coca production through: 1)

improving U.S. alternative development efforts and 2) applying biological control

technology (biocontrol) to eradicate illegally produced coca.

Coca has been important in South America for nearly 4,000 years and remains a

critical element in traditional Andean culture. Today, coca dominates Andean

economies, in part due to long-term social inequities and political and economic unrest.

The ecological and cultural complexity of the Andean region precludes simple

alternative development or coca eradication approaches. In this unsettled milieu,

development assistance activities have promoted alternative agricultural systems

incorporating high-value or multipurpose crops. Other interests have proposed that coca

eradication is a necessary precursor to successful development. Although biocontrol

may yield an undefined level of coca reduction, the technology is unlikely to result in

coca eradication.

Several study conclusions have clear policy implications. First, developmentoriented strategies for supply reduction have promise, but are unlikely to solve the

cocaine problem without concomitant demand reduction efforts. Second, the extent and

importance of the coca economy mean that single-sector development alone is

insufficient to unseat Andean economic dependence on coca. Finally, the impact of a

single organization on coca reduction is likely to be small, thus, coordination of the

numerous bilateral and multilateral groups is a critical need.

The following congressional committees requested the Office of Technology

Assessment to undertake a study of the potential for improving U.S. efforts to reduce

coca production through development activities and biological control methods: the

Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse

and Control; Senator Orrin G. Hatch requested OTA to examine coca eradication by

biocontrol. In addition, the House Committee on Agriculture endorsed the study.

OTA greatly appreciates the contributions of the workshop participants and authors

of commissioned papers. We are especially grateful for the time and effort donated by

numerous contributors who served as reviewers and as liaisons with the many groups

and organizations involved in this issue. The information and assistance provided by

those individuals proved invaluable to the completion of the assessment. As with all

OTA studies, the content of the Report is the sole responsibility of OTA.

Roger C. Herdman, Director

iii
Walter E. Parham Patricia J. Durana

Program Manager Project Director

Food and Renewable Resources

Program Elizabeth Turner

Analystl

Catherine M. Torres

Research Analyst2

Jessica Wolin

Research Assistant3

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

N. Ellis Lewis

Office Administrator

Nellie Hammond

Administrative Secretary

Carolyn Swarm

PC Specialist

Project Staff

Thomas Adamczyk

Detailee4

Karen Marston

Interns

Susan J. Wunder

Contract Editor

I From Feb~ 1991 through September 1991.

2From J~e 1!)91 to present.

3Fmm J~e1990~ou@August 1990 and from June 1991 ~ugh JUIY 1992.

4Fmm J~y 1991 to September IW1

5Fmm J~n~ 1!)91 to WY 1991.

iv
1 Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy

Options, 1

Introduction, 1

Creating National Incentives for Coca Reduction, 10

Information Needed to Support Alternative Development

Projects, 13

Donor Coordination, 16

Integrated National Development, 17

Improving Crop Substitution Efforts, 18

Biological Control of Coca, 28

References, 32

2 Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives, 35

Geoecology of the Northern and Central Andes, 35

Traditional Roles and Uses of Coca Leaf, 44

Social, Economic, and Political Aspects of Coca Cultivation, 50

The Coca Economy, 68

Conclusion, 71

References, 72

contents

3 History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction

Efforts, 81

Introduction, 81

Opium-Reduction Activities, 83

Coca Reduction Efforts: The Andean Strategy, 84

Concision, 96

References, 97

.-

4 Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca

Production, 99

Introduction, 99

Agricultural Resources, 101

Forest Resources, 115

Wildlife and Wildland Resources, 122

Aquatic Resources, 128

Strategies to Enhance Coca Substitution Efforts, 133

References, 142

v
5 Technologies to Support Alternative Crop

Production, 149

Introduction, 149

Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems, 150

Infrastructure to Support Agricultural Production and

Marketing, 180

Agricultural Trade Policies, 171

Strategies to Support Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives

to Coca, 177

References, 180

6 Coca Biological Control Issues, 183

Introduction, 183

Manual Coca Control, 184

Chemical Coca Control, 184

Biological Control, 188

Development Needs for Biocontrol of Coca 199

Summary and Conclusions, 199

References, 201

APPENDIXES

A Workshop Participants, 205

B List of Acronyms, 207

C List of Contractor Reports, 209

INDEX, 211

vi
Summary,

Issues, and

Congressional

Policy

Options

F

or at least 80 years, control and abuse of imported

narcotic substances, in general, have been public policy

concerns. International treaties have been largely ineffective in controlling production and trafficking of

illegal drugs. The human “search for the high” fuels demand,

and supply control has been nearly impossible. Cocaine abuse

and its social and economic consequences have followed this

legacy and reached disturbing proportions in the last decade.

1

INTRODUCTION

Narcotics control strategies commonly are divided into

demand- and supply-reduction programs. Although controversy

exists over which of the two is the most critical, a comprehensive

narcotics control strategy includes education, treatment and

rehabilitation, development assistance, interdiction, and enforcement components (figure l-l). No single approach wilI solve the

international narcotics problem, yet the proper mix of supply-and

demand-control programs has yet to be identified.

Although most coca currently is produced in the Andean

region of Peru and Bolivia (87 percent) and Colombia (13

percent) (59), it also has been produced in other South American

countries (e.g., Ecuador, Brazil) and Central America. If coca

production is reduced in the Andean region, new production

areas would likely arise as long as cocaine and its derivatives

remain attractive narcotics. Nonetheless, supply reduction could

have a valuable role in an overall narcotics control strategy. The

temporary disruption of supply could increase street prices and

reduce accessibility. The time investment to re-establish a

production and cartel system is likely to be large and could have

a debilitating effect on the overall industry (10).

1
2 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Figure l-l—Components of a Comprehensive International Drug Control Strategy

International Drug Control Policy

Education 1

Enforcement 1

Treatment) Rehabilitatlon

Development Aid

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

One potential strategy for reducing the flow of

cocaine into the United States is to identify and

support the development of alternative economic

options for Andean producers of coca leaves and

illegal coca-leaf products. This developmentoriented strategy for supply reduction shows

promise, but is unlikely to solve the cocaine

problem without concomitant efforts in other

areas such as drug law enforcement, interdiction,

and education and rehabilitation of drug users.

Methods for coca eradication also are of

interest in supply reduction strategies. Although

eradication technologies focus on herbicide use,

there is increasing interest in applying biological

control methods to narcotic crop control. Some

experts believe eradication must precede alternative development in the Andean nations. Others

view coca eradication as futile and a threat to the

culture and traditions of native Andean populations. Although key requirements, host country

consent and cooperation currently are unlikely

(57,58).

The economic, environmental, and sociocultura1 features of coca-producing countries profoundly influence supply reduction efforts. Developing suitable and effective approaches will

require significant cooperative and coordinated

effort among all concerned parties.

I Cultural Context

Coca is a traditional Andean crop, with evidence of cultural significance dating from 2100

B.C. (11). Different coca-leaf varieties and associated chewing paraphernalia from succeeding

centuries have been excavated in such varied

areas as northern Chile and Costa Rica (40). Coca

leaves are a critical element in the traditional

Andean patterns of production and exchange

between highlands and lowlands. Community

and political solidarity were long maintained

through these exchanges.

Chewing coca leaves has been practiced for

thousands of years in the Andes and is still a

pervasive cultural activity. Coca leaves are used

to relieve fatigue, hunger, and a variety of human

ailments (e.g., 87 percent of Bolivia’s small town

and rural population use coca leaf for health

reasons (28)). Coca leaves figure symbolically in

cultural and religious rituals and are an integral

part of many daily social routines.

Today, transformation of this resource into a

high-profit cash crop and its resulting steep price

constitute a cultural threat and personal hardship

for many indigenous Andeans. This situation may

be exacerbated if coca eradication or substitution

programs further restrict the availability of coca

leaf for traditional use. Coca reduction efforts,

thus, will involve providing for traditional needs,

while precluding illegal use (43).
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 3

The Andean nations are increasingly concerned over the adverse impacts of cocaine on

their societies. Pasta básica—an intermediate

product of cocaine processing-generates effects

similar to ‘‘crack’ and consumption increases

have been noted in some Andean countries.

Further, pasta básica contains significant impurities (e.g., lead, sulfuric acid, kerosene) compounding adverse effects on users. In 1987,

Colombia’s Health Ministry estimated that 2

percent of the population were regular users and

a United Nations report estimated Colombia may

have one of the world’s worst drug problems (14).

Recent surveys indicate similar figures may apply

to Bolivia. Within this heightened awareness of

the adverse effects of illegal narcotics, alternative

development may find greater acceptance.

1 Environmental Context

The Andean region is complex in terms of its

geology, ecology, and cultural history. This

complexity precludes simple or broadly applicable coca substitution or eradication approaches.

The natural environmental diversity results largely

ii-em abrupt aptitudinal changes common in the

Andes. The region consists of a vertical succession of ecozones, ranging from rainforest and

desert at the lowest levels to mountain tundra,

snow, and ice at the highest. The Andes enormous

latitudinal and longitudinal range also makes for

considerable variations in climate, soil, vegetation, and landuse (l).

The primary zones of illegal coca cultivation

include the Chapare in Bolivia, the Alto Huallaga

in Peru, and a variety of areas around the Cauca

Valley in Colombia (figure 1-2). These areas are

characterized by high rainfall, acidic soils, and

altitudes ranging between 200 and 1,500 meters

above sea level (masl). Many of these areas are

inappropriate for agriculture, much less for characteristic coca cultivation (22). There are a

number of environmental concerns arising from

coca production: deforestation to establish coca

fields, soil erosion and associated fertility losses,

Steep topography characteristic of the Andes gives rise

to significant climatic variations over short distances.

heavy pesticide use, and subsequent movement of

these chemicals to soil and surface and groundwater resources (3,22,29).

Chemical wastes from cocaine processing (e.g.,

kerosene, sulfuric acid, lime, calcium carbide,

acetone, toluene, ethyl ether, and hydrochloric

acid) also may impair terrestrial and riverine

systems. These wastes can increase water pH,

reduce oxygen availability, and lead to acute and

chronic poisoning of fish (e.g., liver, heart,

kidney, and brain lesions, and possible genetic

mutations). An estimated 150 Peruvian streams

and rivers have pollution levels exceeding the

safety standards set by the World Health Organization (32).

Proposals for coca eradication using herbicides

have been criticized for environmental reasons.

Environmental reviews elaborating the potential

environmental effects of chemicals have been

prepared for specific herbicides identified as

effective at eradicating coca species. However,

the process has been less rigorous than that

required for domestic activities under the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA). Substantial Peruvian opposition to the use of herbicides in

the Amazon Basin resulted in cessation of U. S.-

sponsored herbicide testing and data gathering in

Peru (45). As a result, a complete analysis of the
4 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Figure l-2—Primary Coca-Producing Zones in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia

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UYw

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a

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x

1-

U

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(nLLl

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$

(J

—

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Guajira Region —

Cartagena ~

Region

&-&-., y [

B

Region

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 5

potential impacts of herbicide use on future land

and aquatic productivity is not available.

Biological control (biocontrol) has been identified as an alternative to chemical control of coca.

The United Nations International Drug Control

Programme identified biocontrol as a possible

eradication method for narcotic crops nearly a

decade ago, and interest continues in investigating the potential for this technology to control a

variety of narcotic crops (54). Biocontrol relies on

the use of biological agents to prey on an

identified target and reduce its prevalence in the

treatment area. However, some disagree about the

potential for biocontrol techniques to achieve

eradication. Biocontrol may provide an environmentally benign way to reduce coca cultivation,

yet there are considerable social and political

constraints to its implementation.

B Social, Political, and Economic Context

Long-term social inequities and political and

economic unrest contribute to coca’s dominant

role in the economies of Bolivia and Peru, the

world’s leading producers of coca leaf. Colombia,

where a large cocaine trafficking industry has

emerged, also exhibits extreme social and political instability. It is in this unsettled milieu that

coca-dominated economies have flowered. However, each country has a unique set of contributing

circumstances.

The cocaine economy—including production,

processing, and transport-is extensive in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. The continuum from

coca production to cocaine marketing involves

different actors, with different values; their commonality is that each finds coca a ready cash

source (35). Individuals deriving the greatest

economic benefits from coca production (i.e.,

narcotics traffickers) have gained political power

through a variety of mechanisms (e.g., bribery,

land acquisition, farmer/cattlemen associations,

assassinations) (14). The strong presence of

numerous insurgency and terrorist groups compounds the difficulties Peruvian and Colombian

national governments face in drug crop control

efforts. As one analyst suggests:

. . .[the U.S. is] asking a country [Peru] that’s

fighting the Civil War and going through the

Great Depression at the same time to suddenly

take on Prohibition as well (4).

BOLIVIA

The progressive impoverishment of Bolivia’s

rural upland population, dating from the colonial

period, was accelerated in the 1980s by severe

drought and by agricultural and trade policies

unfavorable to subsistence farmers. Many peasants were forced to migrate to other areas,

including the Chapare--a center for coca cultivation. This influx of labor, and a general economic

decline, affecting even middle-class Bolivians,

helped spur a surge in coca-leaf production and

processing as the only economic alternative for

many financially-desperate Bolivians.

However, estimates of the population involved

in the coca trade vary widely. For example, 20

percent of the Bolivian workforce was estimated

to be involved in the coca economy in the late

1980s (24) whereas a 1990 report estimates only

7 percent (19). Nevertheless, the Bolivian coca

economy annually generates as much foreign

exchange (roughly U.S. $600 million) as all other

exports combined (5).

Social and political inequities persist in Bolivia, such that peasant populations have meager

educational and development opportunities, while

an agrarian elite wields considerable political

power and monopolizes the country’s financial

resources. This situation seriously constrains

possibilities for the country’s broad-based socioeconomic development (27,30).

Although Bolivia operates under a democratically elected civilian rule, and is somewhat more

stable politically than Peru or Colombia, the

political situation is tenuous. Many national

institutions, including judicial and law enforcement agencies, are weak, and the government has

not been able to lift the majority of Bolivians out

of poverty.
6 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

PERU

Recent peasant migrations from the Peruvian

highlands to the coca-growing Alto Huallaga is

the latest chapter in a long history of economicallyinduced migrations. Land shortages and/or lack

of work in the highlands, as well as rapid

population growth (beginning in the 1940s), have

fueled the latest population movements into the

eastern valley systems.

Coca cultivation has expanded in the Alto

Huallaga, in part as a result of these migrations

and in part due to the country’s failing economy

and severe international debt crisis. Coca production expanded considerably as economic conditions worsened in the late 1980s, softening the

most profound economic and employment crisis

in the republic’s history. The coca economy

continues to increase proportionally to the decline

of the nation’s legal economy (31).

Attempts at economic reform by the Fujimori

Administration are undermined by pervasive

political unrest, poverty, and an uncertain business environment. Alberto Fujimori ended 12

years of democratic rule in Peru when, supported

by the army and police, he seized political power

in a “pseudo-coup’ (23). Peru’s current state of

extreme economic and political instability constitutes a domestic crisis that overshadows the

importance of counternarcotic efforts in the

minds of most Peruvians. Moreover, strong guerrilla movements in Peru’s coca-producing areas

make any counternarcotics initiatives extremely

hazardous. In recent years, 10 workers for the

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)

have been killed here (34).

COLOMBIA

Coca production has not been as widespread in

Colombia as in Peru and Bolivia. Coca production, banned in 1947 after lengthy public debate,

has re-emerged, however, paralleling the development of a large and lucrative criminal-run

cocaine manufacturing industry, with exports

netting close to U.S. $3 billion a year. The illegal

because State presence traditionally has been

weak; guerrilla movements are strong, and political “clientelism” rampant, with increasing concentration of land, capital, and credit in the hands

of an elite minority. As the gap between rich and

poor has widened, so has that between written law

and the economic behavior of the underground

cocaine economy. Drug-related violence and

corruption have undermined the country’s courts,

and police and customs service, as well as the

military (8).

Colombia has enjoyed positive economic

growth overall in the past four decades, but drug

money now spreads corruption throughout the

country’s economy. Real estate and construction

have been particularly heavily infiltrated by

narcotics investors, who have had technologically

modernizing g but socially regressive impacts. For

example, although they have introduced and

financed new technologies for increasing economic productivity, they have also established

paramilitary groups, discouraged peasant participation in the political process, concentrated land

ownership, and laundered capital in investments

with fast turnover rather than higher long-term

yields (51).

Colombia’s growth record was much better in

the pre-cocaine era than it has been in the

post-cocaine era. The trend today is toward

declining economic productivity and reduced

growth. Domestic drug violence and terrorism

further undermine the country politically and

economically. Today, Colombia is one of the

most violent countries in the hemisphere. Strengthening and redefining the role of the State in

Colombian society is central to the success of any

drug-control policy.

I Development Assistance and

Coca Reduction

Development assistance seeks to create and

extend alternative livelihoods, build local institutions, provide education and training, promote

drug industry has flourished in Colombia in part infrastructure improvements, and provide social
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 7

services. The development goal in coca substitution programs is to assist countries dependent on

a black-market economy to move toward legitimate markets. In the coca-producing countries,

the focus largely has been on developing alternative agricultural systems incorporating highvalue or multipurpose crops. However, existing

national agricultural policies do not favor smallholders—those most commonly involved in coca

production.

1 Fiscal realities result in focusing

resources on areas of high population density.

Conversely, coca-producing regions tend to be

remote and sparsely populated and, within this

environment, few opportunities exist for smallholders to be profitable in the legitimate agricultural market (2,27,34).

Early U.S. coca substitution efforts focused on

producing regions in the Andean countries (i.e.,

Alto Huallaga in Peru, Chapare in Bolivia). Initial

substitution efforts in Bolivia concentrated solely

on farmers in the Chapare region through the

Agricultural Development in the Coca Zones

Project (ADCZP) and later under the Chapare

Regional Development Project (CRDP). However, it became apparent the combination of an

easily produced crop, stable market and marketing charnels, and an abundant labor supply as a

result of population migration were all fundamental to the increase of Chapare coca production.

Thus, the CRDP was redesigned to include

development in emigration zones through the

Associated High Valleys component. This effort

has been expanded further to encompass integrated regional development under the Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP) (figure 1-3). Similarly broad development

efforts are likely to be needed in other cocaproducing areas as well.

Numerous national and international organizations have been actively involved in coca substitution projects in South America. Their activities

include basic and applied research on potential

Small, remote landholdings characterize many cocagrowing areas. Production units often are less than 2

hectares in size, such as this minifundia.

alternative crops, demonstration and extension of

promising technologies to farmers, agroprocessing, and infrastructure development. Crop substitution approaches sponsored through the United

Nations International Drug Control Programme

are built on the concept of rural development that

complements substitution efforts. While crop

diversification alone may provide greater security

for farmers compared with drug-crop monoculture, the transition to legal crops also requires

concerted efforts in development of production

practices, infrastructure, and markets (36).

The economics of coca is often seen as the

primary constraint to widespread adoption of

alternative crops. Coca profits are nearly twice

that of identified high-value crops (e.g., peach

palm) and at least four times greater than other

traditional crops such as pineapple or citrus (61).

However, declining prices at the producer level

suggest coca may no longer be the most lucrative

crop (18). Furthermore, such comparisons may be

meaningless: the nature of coca production defies

traditional methods of estimating profitability

1 There are exceptions to this statement, most notably the long-range Colombian coffee policy designed to stabilize the national production

system in light of the effects of the international market on prices and thus on producer earnings (18).
8 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Figure 1-3-Evolution of the Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)

Bolivia

Santa

Cruz

~

\’0’0’’l=2-bwJi-‘‘ - ‘‘ -~

Areas with coca n

Cochabamba Department

Punata

Areas covered under

the Chapare Regional

Development Project

(CRDP)

In

~Arani / Carrasco I

(Bolivar’ ~.

.Capinota

Areas covered under ~ Additional areas to be

the High Valley Component covered under the

of the CRDP Cochabamba Regional

Development Project

(CORDEP)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment adapted from Development 

on certain commodities and tariff reductions on

(CORDEP)--Bolivia, technical proposal (Bethesda, MD: DAI, 1992).

because of its dependence on unpaid family labor

(38).

A combination of legitimate crops suitable to

the environmental and sociocultural features of

the production region, market assurance, access

to affordable credit, and a suite of social/human

services (e.g., rural justice, school systems, health

care) could be sufficient incentives for coca

producers to adopt alternative systems (box l-A).

Removal of U.S. trade barriers for certain South

American exports, for example, could promote

crop substitution and development of value-

-added industry (9,3). To some extent, this has

been accomplished under the recent Andean

Trade Initiative (ATI). Revision of import quotas

Alternatives, Inc., Cochabamba Regional Development Project

value-added products could complement the goal

of the ATI.

In the past few years, crop substitution has

become a subset of alternative development in the

Andean countries as attention to industrial and

marketing aspects has increased. Nevertheless,

the focus remains on agriculture and related

industries. The alternative development problem

is complex, requiring attention to numerous

variables, and not adequately addressed by any

single approach. Long-term programs are needed

that provide a range of options for potential

participants.
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options 19

Box I-A=High-Value Legal Alternatives to Coca: Sericulture in Colombia

The economics of coca prochtion has been perhap6 the single most widely articulated obstacle to successful

crop substitution efforts. However, some disagree over the need for a doiiar-for-ddiar equivalent to coca or if an

integrated alternative development package based on legitimate crops, deveiopmentofproduction and marketing

infrastructure, and social service amenities is sufficient, However, combining a high-value, iow-voiume crop with

dear market potential into an integrated development package may offer the greatest benefits.

Sencuiture (siikproduction) in Cofombiagrew in 1970 as part ofadiversification program sponsored by the

Colombian Coffee Grwers Federation (FEDERCAFE). By 1987, siik production was in progress in the

Departments of Caidas, Risarak@ Vafie, and Cauq with a totai production area of 124 hectares. A piiot plant

was established in Timbio (Cauca) to process highquaiity -ns into export products, however, the piant

subsequently dosed due to technical difficulties (15).

The Colombian sericuiture activities have been sponsored through a blend of national and international

funding sources, primarifythe Colombian Government and private sources and Korean investors. Currently, five

siik-producing ventures exist in Colombia (i.e., COSEDA and COKOSiLK, joint ventures between Colombia and

Korea; COSiLK, 100-percent Korean investment; and CAPULLOS and PROSEDA, 100-percent Colombian

investrmnt). The Colombian Government promotes sericuiture by finandng aii technical assistance and providing

credit opportunities at 28 percent interest. in addition, credit is avaiiabie through FEDERCAFE and the Export

Promotion Fund (PROEXPO) at 18 and 32 percent interest respectively (15). The availability of sericuiture

technologies, technicai assistance, credit, and markets suggests siik production couid become an attractive

alternative crop for some areas (15, 41).

A prqect currently underway in Colombia’s Cauca Department is attempting to promote sericuiture as an

alternative to coca production for nearly 300 farm famiiies in two smafi towns (Pan de Azucar and Santa Cruz).

The project~iikfor Life-is sponsored by the Wisconsin Farmers Foundation, inc. and works with iocai farmers

and siik weaving grwps and a weaving cooperative in Miiwaukee, Wisconsin. The project site is characterized

by smafi farms (about 8 hectares) and a iack of transportation and electrification systems. For at ieast a decade,

coca has been incorporated in farmer’s prtiuction schemes as a cash source. Nevertheless, today 40 piiot siik

farms are operating under the Siik for Life prqect (16).

The prqect approach is based on basic rural economic development with goals of reducing coca production

in the region and reviving the associated rurai communities. The Siik for Life project offers a blend of technicai

assistance, credit and marketing opportunities to support the producers:

●

●

●

●

Trah@-Two modei farms exist in the are% one in Timbio and one in Santa Cruz, to demonstrate

sericuiture techniques for potentiai adopters.

Technology-Technical assistance is offered in basic sericuitureteohniques, energy systems, and organic

farming.

&farkef@-Centrai marketing is organized for iocaiiy-produced cocoons.

Credi+tdateriais for sericuiture startup are avaiiabie thrwgh the project on a ‘barter’ basis whereby the

borrower repays the ioan with cocoons after production has begun.

in addition to focusing on an economically attractive crop, this project has blended a variety of additional

features into a singie package to promote sericuiture in Pan de Azucar and Santa Cruz, Cauca. The package

indudes generating support from iocai community ieaders and incorporating community development features

(e.g., electrification, transportation) that may have benefits beyond sericuiture (16).

SOURCE: office of Technology Aseeeement, 1993.
10 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Opportunities exist to promote alternative development in the Andean region. Many of these

are technically based, as in developing sustainable forestry practices suitable to current coca

production regions. However, broad opportunities also exist for influencing the viability of coca

reduction efforts more generally. These overarching issues include creating national incentives for

participation in alternative development, gathering and making available information needed to

support alternative development, coordinating

donor activities, and pursuing integrated national

development.

CREATING NATIONAL INCENTIVES

FOR COCA REDUCTION

Technical feasibility alone will not guarantee

success for coca reduction efforts. The political

will of Andean nations is critical, as is the

acceptance and support of Andean peoples. The

Andean nations (Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia)

operate with differing political agendas, and

driving social, cultural, and economic forces.

Also complicating substitution efforts is the fact

that coca cultivation has enormous cultural and

economic significance for Andeans. The chewing

of coca leaves for social, medicinal, and religious/

spiritual purposes is an important and longstanding tradition that may inhibit acceptance of

coca substitution programs.

Existing economic conditions in the Andean

countries profoundly influence national ability to

undertake coca reduction programs, including

crop substitution and eradication components.

Coca production contributes heavily to the national economies-in most cases comprising the

greatest share of export income. Developing

mechanisms to improve national economies could

contribute to greater ability to enter into coca

reduction programs. Such an effort is likely to

require short-term economic relief and long-term

economic development (58).

Another constraint to reduction efforts is the

lack of governmental presence in rural areas,

Coca retains its cultural and social significance for

many Andeans today. Here, coca leaf (hoja de coca) is

being prepared for transport to legitimate markets to

be sold for traditional use.

including provision of basic human services, rural

justice, and other needed institutions. Local

governments with leaders elected directly and

held accountable by rural constituents could

increase rural participation in the political process. Such efforts could reduce the environment

where insurgency and lawlessness flourish.

Local grassroots organizations have played a

large role in rural politics, particularly in Bolivia

where local unions--sindicatos-have provided

a means for rural inhabitants to voice their

concerns and desires to a centralist national

government. Nevertheless, assistance activities

often do not make use of these local avenues of

leadership and community cooperation. Acceptance of programs to reduce coca production

could be enhanced through efforts to incorporate

local groups in planning and implementation

(27).

Support for U.S.-bilateral efforts in the Andean

region is poor. Many Andeans perceive U.S.

activities as heavy-handed attempts to solve our

domestic narcotics problem on foreign soil. A key

concern is that without commensurate demand

reduction efforts, supply reduction merely increases costs to the Andean countries. Yet, U.S.
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 11

Table l-l—Federal Drug Control Budget Authority

(billions of dollars)

Percent demand

Supply Demand of total

1981 . . . . . . . . . $ 800 $ 350 30 %

1983. . . . . . . . . 1,250 350 22.6

1985 . . . . . . . . . 1,700 400 19

1987. , ... , . . . 2,900 900 24

1989 . . . . . . . . . 4,000 1,600 29

SOURCE: M. Collett, “The Cocaine Connection: Drug Trafficking and

Inter-American Relations,” Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, No. 290, Fall, 1989.

Federal expenditures focus on supply reduction

(table l-l). Analysts suggest that under these

circumstances, multilateral activities are more

likely to be publicly acceptable. In addition,

public outreach and education efforts and greater

coordination and cooperation with host countries

could support these activities (57,58).

Issue: Lack of economic incentives at the

national level hinders active participation in

coca reduction programs.

The ability to carry out programs is inextricably linked to economic conditions. Some poorly

paid public officials can be bribed to ignore

illegal activities, poorly supported research and

extension systems are unable to provide highquality technical assistance to producers, and

scarce alternative employment opportunities lead

to participation in the coca trade. The level of

bilateral debt owed by the Andean countries to the

United States alone is significant and far outstrips

their annual gross national products (GNPs)

(table 1-2). Debt servicing hinders national government investment in needed development activities.

Generating political will to undertake coca

reduction might be enhanced by providing general economic incentives to national governments. The current political and economic conditions of the Andean countries significantly reduce

the ability of national governments to undertake

coca reduction programs. Yet, without national

commitment to improving opportunities for rural

communities in general, and coca farmers specifically, potential for effective alternative development programs is greatly reduced (57,58).

Option: Congress could create “debt-for-drugs”

swap opportunities for the Andean countries.

Providing bilateral debt relief in exchange for

coca reduction achievements—“debt-for-drugs’

swaps—has been suggested as an opportunity for

improving supply reduction efforts, yet specific

legislative action has not been taken. Examples of

successful debt swaps suggest similar actions

could be useful for coca reduction. The United

States recently eliminated $371 million of Bolivian debt under the Enterprise for the Americas

Initiative (EAI) (25). The EAI debt reduction

component could serve as a model to develop

“debt-for-drugs” swaps. National policy actions

promoting preconditions for successful alternative development could serve as “collateral” for

debt relief.

Conversely, if lessons from related activities

involving national economic incentives are reviewed, possibilities for dramatic results from a

“debt-for-drugs” program may seem less likely.

For example, certification for U.S. development

assistance funding has been used as a mechanism

to motivate compliance with coca reduction goals

and although it has elicited short-term reduction

efforts, it has yielded little in overall supply

reduction. Nevertheless, debt relief could provide

a double service by increasing political will to

undertake supply reduction and improving the

fiscal ability of national governments to finance

needed national projects.

Issue: Andean eligibility for U.S. development

assistance is closely linked to coca reduction.

Eligibility for development aid is in part based

on narcotics reduction achievements. Thus, at the

national government level, the development goal

may become secondary to a counternarcotics

agenda-i. e., success may be measured by hectares of coca reduced rather than hectares of

legitimate crops produced. Further complicating
12 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 1-2—Andean Bilateral Debt With the United States

(In millions of dollars, as of 9/30/90)

Debt:GNP

GNP ratio AID PL-480 c c c EXIM Total

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . $46. 0 11:1 $ 331 $141 $ 0 $33 $ 505

Colombia . . . . . . . . 354.0 3:1 499 2 0 497 998

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . 189.0 4:1 318 221 95 54 688

Totals . . . . . . . . . 1,149 95 2,191

AlD-U.S. Agency for International Development

PL-480-Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as Amended, “Food aid”

CCC--Commodity Credit Corporation

EXIM--Export-lmport Bank

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Enterprise for the Americas Fact Sheet,” Washington, DC, September 30, 1990.

this situation is the reliance on narcotics data of

questionable accuracy to support reduction

claims.

Option: Congress could refocus certification

requirements for development funding to include specific development objectives in addition to satisfying “coca clauses.”

The basis of alternative development is to

assist recipient nations to enter the international

legitimate economy. Preconditions for achieving

this goal have been identified and are part of many

donor activities. However, some conditions can

only partly be fulfilled by donors and require the

firm commitment of host countries. For example,

increasing local government presence, promoting

rural justice, and providing social services for

rural populations will depend largely on national

government efforts, yet are critical for improving

development opportunities. Refocusing assistance certification criteria on the achievement of

these development goals could increase interest

on the part of the host country.

However, placing additional burdens on national governments to achieve development goals

to qualify for U.S. assistance might be unrealistic

given economic and political conditions in the

Andean region. Conversely, certification could

highlight development objectives to the exclusion

of coca reduction. Such an act is likely to require

a significant increase in U.S. domestic enforcement, interdiction, and education to prevent

increased narcotics abuse in the short term.

Issue: Lack of rural governmental presence

hinders adoption of coca reduction programs.

Government presence generally is weak in

rural Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. National

governments could choose to address this condition through policies that establish effective local

governments and state control within the framework of the legitimate judicial system. An improved judicial system could facilitate development activities and offer increased human rights

protection.

Rural government presence encompasses accountability to local political authorities by police

and security forces, legitimizes support of the

democratic process, and strengthens the judicial

system. Administration of rural justice and control of national territory are critical for implementing development programs and development

of popular support for substitution efforts. Common development assistance goals-institution

building, providing social services, and improving

standards of living-may contribute to increasing

security in rural areas.

The U.S. Department of Justice and AID offer

assistance to judicial institutions in the Andean

countries through several programs intended to

improve the administration, operation, and effectiveness of the country’s judicial system. However, this assistance is a small part of the overall

assistance budget.
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 13

Option: Congress could direct AID to increase its

support to judicial institutions in the Andean

nations through Justice Sector and Strengthening Democracy projects.

Greater presence of rural justice in current

coca-producing areas could yield benefits in

increasing stability by assuring those breaking

laws would be properly adjudicated in an established legal system. AID justice-sector programs

have been implemented since the mid- to late

1980s in Bolivia and Peru.

Achieving increased rural justice in the current

social and political climates of the Andean region

is likely to be difficult. A concerted effort is likely

to require additional fiscal resources, and in areas

where violence is significant, security needs

would be paramount. Increasing military and

police presence in some areas may not be

perceived as a benefit at a time when militarization components of the “drug war” are unpopular.

Alternative Option: Congress couId direct AID to

increase the level of coordination/cooperation

with local grassroots organizations.

Local community groups have and continue to

play an important role in Andean rural politics.

Grassroots organizations typically have strong

support from local populations and understand

local cultures, aspirations, and priorities. Groups

such as the Bolivian sindicatos provide a mobilizing force for rural change and expression of

concerns to the national governments.

Incorporating existing community groups and

other grassroots organizations in planning and

implementing alternative development programs

could yield benefits in adoption rates. Bolivian

crop substitution programs might work cooperatively with sindicatos to promote peaceful crop

substitution and alternative development efforts.

Such cooperative efforts would ensure local

concerns were identified in project planning and

encourage local understanding of the project

process.

Coca farmers receive the lowest percentage of profit

in the cocaine industry-perhaps as little as 1 percent.

Here, a coca farmer in the Chapare is spreading the

harvested leaves to dry them in preparation for sale.

However, diverse political parties may influence grassroot organization activities, and political conflicts between the state and these organizations may create difficulties for the organizations

as development vectors. These features should be

considered in project plarming and approaches to

deal with them identified to reduce any potential

adverse impact on project effectiveness.

INFORMATION NEEDED TO SUPPORT

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Setting realistic goals for coca reduction programs will depend, in part, on availability and

accuracy of basic information on coca farmers

and others linked to the cocaine economy. Identification of key targets for alternative development

activities will be integral to increased effectiveness of U.S. development assistance. Several

initial questions need to be addressed: What is the

current and potential areal extent of coca production? Who and where are the populations economically linked to production? What are the

appropriate levels of development (e.g., subsistence, semi-commercial, commercial) for these

areas and populations? Additional decisions might

further refine target groups (e.g., identifying what
14 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

economic population should receive priority—

poorest, borderline, or entrepreneurial). Information needed to support alternative development/

coca reduction programs includes:

● Extent of the coca economy (including direct

and indirect participants),

. Comparison of coca and alternatives, and

. Centralized and easily accessed source of

information related to ongoing activities.

Issue: Inadequate information on the true

extent of the coca economy hinders development of programs to reduce dependence.

Studies of the extent of the coca/cocaine

economy are lacking and likely to be difficult to

conduct. While estimates of the relative size and

importance of coca to national economies exists,

little information is available that identifies the

subsectors dependent on coca/cocaine production, nor their level of dependence. Yet, such

information could provide insights for development projects and improve opportunities for

integrated development.

Collecting information that accurately identifies populations involved directly in coca production (through production, labor, transport), including the extent of dependence (i.e., part-time,

seasonal, full-time), and survival strategies during low coca prices, is likely to be difficult.

Existing information sources might provide an

alternative to new information-gathering activities. Information on coca farmers in the Chapare

exists through the Cooperative Agreement on

Human Settlements and Natural Research System

Analysis (SARSA). Although somewhat dated,

similar information exists for farmers in the Alto

Huallaga. This resource could be reviewed and

evaluated within the context of improving identification of target populations for alternative

development programs.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, and AID, cooperatively, to develop

comprehensive coca industry profiles that

identify populations and economic sectors

directly and indirectly linked to coca production and their relative level of dependence and

use this information to direct development

projects to high priority targets.

Profiles could be developed using existing

information gathered through activities of both

agencies. AID and its contractors have accumulated a wide array of information on coca producers and farm laborers. The U.S. Department of

State has focused more on those involved in the

additional aspects of transport, processing, providing precursor chemicals, etc. This information

could be pulled together to create a comprehensive profile of the breadth of the coca economy

and provide an outline of key populations/sectors

that ultimately will be affected by coca reduction

programs. Such an outline could provide an

agenda for future international development planning as well as a resource for a national development strategy.

Additional funding could be made available to

allow profile development without adding the

burden on agency staff. In addition, some activities and populations may be more transient than

can be incorporated readily into such analysis.

The segments of the coca trade that are likely to

be excluded or insufficiently described also could

be identified in the overall effort. Mechanisms to

assure the profile information is used in future

project plarming also would be needed.

Issue: Lack of accurate economic studies comparing coca with other potential alternatives hinder efforts to promote adoption of

renewable resource-based alternatives to

coca.

Coca is a traditional Andean crop, relatively

easy to produce and sell, and provides a good

return on investment. Although coca prices fluctuate, traditional economic analyses suggest they

are high relative to legitimate agricultural commodities that are more visibly affected by global

markets. These conditions make identifying and

promoting alternative crops difficult.
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 15

Although alternative crops, products, and activities exist, information on the market potential

of many of them is lacking. However, such

information could facilitate identifying priorities

for alternative development efforts. Additionally,

economic analyses of other alternatives such as

forest products, wildlife, and fisheries as compared with coca and alternative crops could be

used to identify additional opportunities for

specific regions.

Option: Congress could direct AID, cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Economic Research Service, to undertake economic studies of renewable resource-based

alternatives environmentally suitable to cocaproducing areas that have not been evaluated

economically to date.

Alternatives to be evaluated economically

(e.g., agroforestry, forestry, extractive reserves,

alternative crop plants, animals, etc.) could be

identified by AID, along with regional characterizations describing existing production opportunities and constraints. For example, if tropical

hardwood production provides an environmentally suitable and high-value opportunity in certain regions, but is constrained by lack of

processing or harvest mechanisms, these features

could then become development priorities.

Studies would be prepared and filed with

AID’s Office of Evaluation, Center for Develop

ment Information and Evaluation (CDIE) and

available to prioritize activities in the Andean

region. The information could be made freely

available to international development assistance

groups and used to promote adoption and assist in

developing appropriate incentives for adopters.

However, the fluctuation of global markets

may complicate such analyses. Thus, opportunities and analyses may only be accurate for short

periods, making rapid turnaround a high priority.

Additional pressures on staff time could result in

reduced attention to ongoing priorities.

Issue: Lack of a centralized information

source on alternative development activities

hinders improved project planning and

implementation.

A lack of institutional memory within AID, and

other bureaucratic constraints, work against incorporating lessons learned from past activities into

new project plans. The AID project approach

incorporates numerous technical and contract

groups and information gathered by these groups

may or may not reach CDIE files. Thus, potential

lessons learned from early activities may not be

used to improve current projects or the design of

future projects. Stringent requirements for filing

project studies and reviews along with improved

training of AID personnel, emphasizing area

history, could promote use of “lessons learned”

materials. Additional requirements for contractors to generate logs of activities and results from

their efforts could be useful in future program

planning. AID could strengthen its requirements

for filing contractor reports and other projectrelated information with CDIE to assure that this

resource is easily available for future project

development.

Option: Congress could direct AID to establish

and maintain an interpretive database on

institutional experiences and development

project evaluations in the Andean region.

A large body of information exists on development in the Andean region, but much of this

information is “gray literature” and can be

difficult to access. AID currently is developing a

management information system (MIS) database

on AID alternative development projects in the

Andean region to improve its ability to measure

the impact of these efforts. The system will be

updated semi-annually and will include a variety

of economic and project data. This effort could be

expanded to incorporate the activities of other

donor groups operating in the Andean region,

thereby supporting improved donor coordination.

Once established, project planning could require

a database search to identify potential cooperative

opportunities.
16 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

However, by incorporating the broad array of

activities, database development and maintenance tasks would be increased dramatically.

Additional financial resources might be needed

and without additional appropriations could come

at the expense of more applied activities. In

addition, the ongoing United Nations effort to

develop a Sustainable Development Network

(SDN) could complement AID’s MIS effort. The

SDN effort is intended to assist less developed

countries to develop and maintain data on domestic development activities with an ultimate goal of

developing a global network.

DONOR COORDINATION

The narcotics problem is immense, and the

impact of one donor is likely to be small. Many

bilateral and multilateral groups are actively

working toward a variety of development and

coca control goals. Coordination of the numerous

organizations involved in the Andean countries

poses a difficult problem, yet it could yield large

benefits in achieving comprehensive counternarcotic and development goals. The Organization of

American States identified the need for a coordinating body for early development efforts in the

Chapare to coordinate the activities of nearly 54

donor organizations. The need for such coordination throughout the Andean region remains.

Issue: Lack of donor coordination has reduced

the effectiveness of rural development and

crop substitution efforts in Andean drugproducing nations.

Uncoordinated donor activities can result in

duplicative or counterproductive efforts. Development funds may be spent on similar projects

without incorporation of ‘lessons learned. ’ Similarly, lack of coordination can reduce opportunities for efforts aimed at solving mutually identified problems and preclude potential for expanded efforts or building on current activities.

‘‘Reinventing the wheel’ may have high costs in

overall terms of donor funding.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Department of State to establish a coordinating

committee comprised of U.S. development

agencies, those receiving U. S. funds for development activities, and national government

counterparts to improve coordination of development programs.

A variety of U.S. agencies and international

institutions, and multilateral banks receive U.S.

funding for development activities in the Andean

region (e.g., AID, InterAmerican Foundation,

World Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank,

United Nations). A committee composed of

representatives of these organizations could be

created to develop a unified alternative development approach for the United States and ensure

that activities complement one another or at least

do not work against each other. Such a committee

could be responsible for setting a development

agenda, prioritizing needs, and linking similar

activities among cooperating groups.

However, coordination by committee can be

time-consumin g. Scheduling meetings and preparing committee reports would add to staff

duties. Further, authority would be needed to

ensure committee findings and recommendations

were adequately considered by individual implementing agencies. Such additional bureaucratic

processes are unlikely to be popular among

implementing agencies.

Issue: Coordination between enforcement and

development activities is inadequate.

Diverse or conflicting goals and operations of

the numerous agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of

State, Drug Enforcement Administration) active

in the Andean nations have adversely affected

local response to development activities. For

example, nondevelopment operations have led to

some distrust of development personnel in certain

locales. Thus, coordination of all agency activities may be required to improve acceptance of

U.S. development groups. Enforcement typically

is dependent on maintaining a certain level of

secrecy and, possibly, coordination with develop-
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 17

ment activities would be seen as potential ‘leaks. ’ fulfill a broad number of needs concomitantly.

Nevertheless, these two activities necessarily For example, whereas the crop substitution efforts

complement one another and, without coordina- in the Chapare region concentrated on identifying

tion, have the potential to detract from each high-value crops, little effort was invested in

other’s effectiveness. Coordination of enforce- developing processing, transport, and marketing

ment and development activities should occur at mechanisms. This has changed under the current

high levels, with clear separation at the field project (i.e., CORDEP), however, and a regional

application level. development approach has been embraced.

Option: Congress could create an interagency

coordinating body composed of representatives of the agencies involved in development

and enforcement in the Andean countries (e.g.,

AID, InterAmerican Foundation, U.S. Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration).

A coordinating group with representatives

from the agencies involved in development and

supply control activities in the Andean region

could promote unified direction for U.S. efforts.

Congress could choose to create a separate task

force or place the responsibility under an existing

agency. The Office of National Drug Control

Policy currently coordinates agency activities

related to international and domestic demand

control, interdiction, and financial systems, and

thus may be an appropriate entity to coordinate

the broader picture of narcotics-related activities.

However, as an executive branch office, congressional investigation and oversight of committee

activities could be curtailed.

INTEGRATED NATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

Alternative development programs could be

enhanced further through integrated development

strategies that expand options for those involved

in the coca economy. Development, agricultural

or otherwise, in the Andean countries might best

be approached in terms of economic diversification. Diversification of local and regional economies could include agricultural options, light

industry, and service operations.

Should efforts continue to focus on narrowly

circumscribed regions and solely agricultural

opportunities, the chances for coca reduction

success will be similarly narrow and circumscribed. Rural development alone may be insufficient to extricate these countries from their

economic dependence on coca production. Increasingly, urban poor have become involved in

the coca economy as farmworkers, processors,

and transporters.

Issue: Short-term project cycles reduce the

potential for effective, integrated alternative

development efforts.

Alternative development is not a short-term

problem nor likely to be solved with short-term

solutions. The transition time from coca to

The extent and importance of the coca econ- alternative production systems is likely to be

omy in the Andean nations strongly influences lengthy and programs or projects must consider

the ability of narrowly focused, short-term efforts

to achieve promising results in coca substitution.

Development groups have identified a variety of

goals ranging from the highly specific (e.g.,

building agroprocessing plants) to more general

(e.g., increasing rural incomes), but all are based

on general rural development. Achieving this

goal, however, requires development activities to

this investment time. Moreover, incremental substitution programs are likely to be more attractive

to potential participants. Efforts likely will need

to be long-term irrespective of the approach taken

to promote alternative crops or livelihoods. Nevertheless, short-term project cycles are standard in

U.S. development activities, in part, driven by

financial management requirements.
18 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Option: Congress could expressly identify “no

year’ funding status for AID crop substitution

projects to remove the current constraints

associated with fiscal year spending and

short-term project deadlines.

Long-term project cycles could contribute to a

sense of continuity for program participants and

recipient countries. Such stability could contribute to reducing the perceived risks associated with

adoption of alternative systems. Long-term project cycles could also assure efforts are not

redirected based on political changes.

However, cross-year funding could complicate

bureaucratic requirements and increase budgeting

difficulties. Such a change would also require

concomitant changes in project reporting, evaluation, and review to ensure that despite longer

timeframes, project difficulties are noted and

resolved expeditiously.

Issue: Development activities designed to reduce coca production have been created

with insufficient understanding of the existing sociopolitical, economic, and environmental conditions of recipient countries.

Alternative development programs largely have

been developed by U.S. agency personnel. Yet,

the existing sociopolitical, economic, and environmental conditions of the Andean countries

significantly influence whether or not these programs will succeed. Program components may be

based on counternarcotics goals, rather than the

underlying development needs to shift blackmarket economies to legitimate markets. In large

part, this might be addressed by increasing the

level of host nation participation in program

development.

Option: Congress could create an International

Andean Commission responsible for developing an integrated strategy to reduce economic

dependence on coca.

This commission would be interdisciplinary,

composed of technical experts from the United

States, Andean, and other concerned foreign

nations. The group would serve as a long-term

inclusive coordinating organization unencumbered by U.S. programs, but including NGOS,

private-sector, and grassroots and stakeholder

organimations to oversee long-term development

programs. The commission could address practical technical needs for successful development

and be responsible for oversight of impacts of

development activities.

Congress could create a similar commission

composed of domestic agencies and U.S. representatives of the Multilateral Development Banks

(i.e., InterAmerican Development Bank, World

Bank, etc.). However, such a commission may

appear strictly bilateral, which is already unpopular in host countries. Further, it may be no more

able to solve development problems without a

significant Andean presence.

IMPROVING CROP SUBSTITUTION

EFFORTS

The importance of coca in the national economies of the Andean countries suggests development efforts narrowly focused on improving

agricultural opportunities alone are unlikely to

achieve broad coca reduction goals. The Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP) has expanded crop substitution efforts in

the Chapare region to diversified agricultural

development throughout the Cochabamba Department. However, the current effort does not

adequately address alternative development for

participants in the coca trade in nearby departments also involved through cocaine elaboration

and as migrant workers.

Existing information on the extent of the

economy, populations, and sectors dependent on

coca indicate it is broadly distributed. Over the

long term, single-sector development is unlikely

to create stable national development of the kind

needed to shift economies to legitimate enterprises nor fulfill the economic diversification goal

of alternative development. Thus, alternative
1--Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options 119

Developing value-added industries, such as this textile

factory in Meellín, is one mechanism to diversify

economies and increase the value of locally produced

raw materials.

development efforts for Andean countries need to

incorporate options for nonagriculturists as well.

This thinkm“ g has already been articulated in

AID documents (55), although not yet demonstrated through implementation. Opportunities

may exist in developing mineral resources, light

industry, etc. to diversify economies, particularly

for the urban populations currently involved in

the coca chain. This issue is beyond the scope of

the present study, yet is likely to be critical for

achieving coca reduction goals. This might be

addressed in part by expanding the range of

resource-based alternatives and undertaking actions to ease the transition from coca-based to

legal livelihoods.

M Expanding the Range of Alternatives

The Andean countries have a wide range of

renewable resources that could be developed to

increase economic opportunities for producers.

Indeed, many coca-growing areas are more suitable to some of these options than traditional

agriculture. For example, in the Alto Huallaga,

most coca is produced on steep slopes where

agriculture is environmentally, if not economically, unsuitable. In the Chapare region of

Bolivia, logging was the primary economic activity until the mid-1970s when coca expansion

eclipsed the industry (39). However, the existing

development thrust is largely agricultural. Projects that focus on forest, wildlife, and aquatic

resources, integrated resource use, and related

industries are likely to require an expertisebuilding period prior to implementation.

Issue: Agricultural alternatives have focused

on export markets to the exclusion of domestic market opportunities.

The value of smallholder agricultural production in the Andean countries is low relative to

other sectors. To some degree this is the result of

national food policies that maintain low-cost food

for urban areas (6). In addition, some analysts

suggest competition with P.L. 480 (The Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act of 1954, as

amended) food imports may also contribute to

this condition (26,58). Increasing the value of

domestic agriculture through domestic policy

adjustment could have larger beneficial effects on

national agriculture generally and rural economies and crop substitution specifically.

Import substitution may offer an opportunity to

diversify markets for some producers involved in

substitution programs and contribute to increasing national food supply. This approach has

generated some success in a cooperative project

among the Food and Agriculture Organization,

the United Nations International Drug Control

Programme, and the Pakistani Government in

developing alternative employment for opium

cultivators. Similar activities could be undertaken

in the Andean region with long-term goals of

increasing the value of agriculture domestically

as well as internationally.

Option: Congress could direct AID to increase

attention to import substitution opportunities
20 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

in crop substitution to meet local and national

market needs.

Although cropping systems incorporating staple crops exist, most effort seems to be placed on

developing export agriculture. International agricultural research centers (IARCS) in the Andean

region (Centro International de la Papa, Centro

de Investigación y Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo,

Centro de Investigación de Agricultural Tropical)

have developed improved cultivars and production practices for several staple crops (e.g., potato,

corn, rice) and could provide a valuable technical

resource for development activities.

However, increased attention to local and

national markets could come at the expense of

attention to possibly higher-priced export markets, if an appropriate balance is not defined.

Further, without concomitant agricultural policy

reforms that increase the value of domestic

agriculture, available national markets may be

inadequate incentive for producers to shift to

legitimate crops.

Issue: Greater investment in Andean agricultural research and extension is needed.

Enhancing agricultural profitability in the Andean nations will require a continuing and significant investment in research and extension to

develop alternatives and demonstrate techniques

and technologies to potential adopters (12). Research and extension activities were large components of early crop substitution efforts in Bolivia

and led to numerous alternatives for coca farmers.

However, this effort has declined and continued

devotion of funding to long-term research and

extension activities is hampered by pressure to

produce immediate results. Small-scale farms are

largely the rule in coca-producing zones and

opportunities to intensify their production are

needed.

Although several IARCS conduct research on

crop improvements directly applicable to the

Andean region, there are no similar institutions

focusing on integrated farming systems such as

polyculture and tree crop research (agroforestry)

Access to external markets is highly dependent

on adequate transport infrastructure. Largely,

agricultural commodities produced in coca-growing

regions are sold at the farm gate or in local markets

such as this one in Peru.

(33). One Consultative Group on International

Agricultural Research institute focuses primarily

on agroforestry--the International Council for

Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF), however, it is

located in Kenya, hundreds of kilometers distant

from tropical wet forests ecologically similar to

those of the eastern Andean foothills. Agroforestry research previously carried out in Peru by

North Carolina State University largely was an

offshoot of traditional agricultural research, yet

highlighted the importance of perennial tree crops

in tropical agriculture. These efforts have ceased,

however; largely due to violence in the area.

Option: Congress could authorize funding

through AID for development of an integrated

farming system research center (IFSRC) in the

Andean region.

An IFSRC could support efforts to develop

improved traditional agriculture systems. Several

IARCS in Latin America could provide a valuable

resource in development of an IFSRC in the

Andean region. IFSRC research could focus on

highly productive crop combinations, improved

water and nutrient management, cultivar improvements, and agronomic research to identify
1--Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 21

appropriate production practices to assure quality

products to meet market requirements.

Research and extension activities could emphasize the local and national research centers to

promote institution building and skill development, thereby improving the potential for activities to continue after direct assistance is withdrawn. Agronomic management research could

be oriented to on-farm, farmer-participation production trials, involving the local farm population

in direct participatory research. Extension activities could emphasize on-farm demonstration and

farming systems to maximize the diffusion of new

technologies and practices to rural adopting

populations.

Development of a full-scale research center is

likely to be costly. Yet opportunities to pool

resources of many donors could alleviate the

financial burden and contribute to a larger effort

and wider use and acceptance of the institution.

Alternatively, financia1 investment in the Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología AgropecuarioChapare (IBTA-Chapare) could be increased.

This institution has undertaken alternative crop

research for nearly a decade and already contains

substantial expertise. However, since IBTAChapare is a Bolivian institution, it may be

difficult for practioners in other areas to access.

Issue: Insufficient attention has been placed on

developing forest resource exploitation options.

The importance of sustaining tropical forest

resources has been highlighted in the last two

decades and recently was underscored by the

United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru have

substantial areas of remaining natural forests with

potential for biodiversity conservation and forest

management (33). For example, the value of

forest products (e.g., nuts, fruits, latex) harvested

from an extractive reserve can be longer-term and

significantly higher than that offered by one-time

logging operations or conversion to agricultural

production (48). Opportunities also exist for

“chemical prospecting’ in tropical forests to

identify compounds with commercial potential.

Sustainable timber exploitation technologies also

exist and have been demonstrated in the Palcazu

Valley in Peru. Such innovative operations could

be tested and adapted to other forest areas.

Despite these potential opportunities, efforts will

be needed to increase the understanding of

tropical forest management, specifically in the

Andean region (33).

Forestry opportunities have now taken a more

prominent position in U.S. alternative development efforts in Bolivia (21) and would be

appropriate for other coca-producing areas as

well. Full-scale research centers in relevant Andean forests are needed, however, to promote

forestry activities. Initial activities could focus on

existing forest management technologies that

seem successful, such as those at the experimental

level in the Palcazu Valley, Peru (52). Such an

effort, however, would require significant financial investment over a 10-to 20-year period.

Option: Congress could authorize finding

through AID to establish a full-scale, state-ofthe-art, tropical forest research experiment

station in the Andean countries.

While a number of tropical forest research

stations exist worldwide, none are in the humid

tropical Andean region. Given increasing concern

over conservation of the Amazonian rainforest,

this would seem to be an appropriate site. A major

tropical forest research center could be located in

a humid tropical Andean region and several

sub-centers could be located in other places to

conduct site specific activities and adaptation of

identified technologies. These experiment stations could concentrate on conservation and

forest management technologies that use forests

and species native to the coca-producing regions.

The U.S. Forest Service, Institute for Tropical

Forestry in Puerto Rico could provide a valuable

resource for research station development.

Concomitant with on-site research efforts,

education and training opportunities could be
22 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

made available for conservation, forest, and

protected area scientists from tropical countries.

Professionals trained at those stations could fulfill

necessary roles in development and extension of

forest management systems to local populations.

Issue: Insufficient attention has been placed on

examining potential wildlife and wildland

resource use options.

Wildlife-centered economic development has

become more acceptable and research efforts are

being undertaken to determine sustainable yields

and appropriate husbandry practices. Techniques

for raising/producing certain wildlife species

have been developed and are easily incorporated

in rural communities with little capital investment. For example, experimental programs for

ranching of green iguanas have now spread from

Panama to other neotropical countries (7,62).

Licensing and protection mechanisms that make

farming and ranching of wildlife more profitable

than taking from the wild are being implemented

in the region (46). The International Union for the

Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

and other international resource organizations are

working to create viable legal markets for wildlife

and wildlife products in conjunction with protecting habitats and wild populations.

Wildlife-based tourism has grown at least 20

percent annually since 1980 (58,99), and has been

described as a reasonable approach for sustainable wildland development. Tourism offers an

opportunity to earn foreign exchange and provide

employment for local communities. Where tourism is developed properly, it may have a greater

potential for generating local income than most

traditional farming or ranching activities.

Option: Congress could direct AID to provide

assistance for wildlife industry development in

the Andean countries.

Efforts could include extension of production

techniques, development of educational materials, and programs on potential benefits from

farming or ranching and the needs for resource

conservation to support such development. Market identification and logistical needs to meet

markets will be critical for industry development.

Existing programs have tended to be productionoriented, as were the initial crop substitution

efforts.

Coordination with other donors in the Andean

region could contribute to developing an adequate

support structure to handle transport and marketing opportunities for producers. Further, areas

suitable for wildlife production may lie outside

the current region of AID focus, yet are of interest

to other donors.

Option: Congress could direct the US. General

Accounting Office to review current U.S. trade

regulations affecting wildlife and wildlife product imports in light of changing production

methods.

Current regulations on wildlife imports have

been based primarily on wild-gathering as opposed to established ranching and farming systems. Size and quantity restrictions suitable under

these conditions may not be appropriate when

trade is not affecting wild populations. A review

of existing trade regulations on wildlife and

wildlife products could evaluate potential adverse

effects of existing regulations on developing

wildlife industries.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Park

Service, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service to give priority to Andean

participants in their respective international

nature tourism training programs.

Training programs offered by the U.S. Park

Service and the U.S. Forest Service to foreign

government officials currently focus on cultural

and nature-based tourism and buffer zone management. Programs might be expanded to include

training opportunities for professional guides,

operators, and protected area staff to promote

sustainable development of wildlands. Training

should include land-use planning, environmental

impact analysis, and tourism monitoring system
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 23

development to improve the abilities of national

governments to determine optimum tourism

growth and sustainable tourism industries. Without these capabilities, the tourism industry is

likely to be short-lived or encounter significant

problems (7).

Issue: Aquatic resource development has received little attention in development efforts.

Potential exists to expand fishery production in

the Andean region to offer an alternative to coca

production and provide additional protein sources

for national populations. The numerous lake and

river systems contain a variety of harvestable

organisms and, with application of appropriate

technology, their productivity could be enhanced

(47). Past fishery development projects have

focused on high-value species and have for the

most part been unsuccessful (37). Efforts to

promote subsistence aquiculture in Bolivia were

similarly unsuccessful. Nevertheless, international

efforts could focus on artisanal fishermen to

maximize occupational opportunities. Although

fisheries may not be significant in some coca

production regions, they could increase in importance within the context of national development.

Constraints to developing Andean fisheries are

largely due to a lack of information on the extent

and quality of the various resource systems, level

of resource extraction, and fishermen themselves.

Significant postharvest losses characterize existing artisanal fisheries due to shortfalls in handling, processing, and storage technologies and

transport infrastructure (47).

Option: Congress could direct AID to conduct an

aquatic resource inventory for the Andean

countries to complement ongoing alternative

development programs.

An aquatic resource inventory was contracted

by AID in 1983. Although the survey focused on

the Chapare region, it could be updated within the

context of alternative development opportunities

in general and similar efforts could be undertaken

for other coca-producing zones. A cooperative

effort involving AID, the U.S. National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration, International

Sea-Grant Program, and the Andean countries

could inventory existing aquatic resources and

identify potential for improving production and

harvest opportunities.

Alternatively, the Andean countries could take

advantage of existing international expertise in

aquatic resource management and development.

International research organizations, such as the

International Center for Living Aquatic Resource

Management (ICLARM) that conducts research

on tropical fishery management and production,

could be tapped to assist in fishery development.

Congress could promote such support through

funding to ICLARM and increased collaboration

with U.S. and Andean universities to conduct

applied research on aquiculture development

appropriate to the Andean countries.

I Easing Transition to

Alternative Livelihoods

Strategies to enhance coca-substitution efforts

must address a wide variety of constraints from

production to marketing. Producers are unlikely

to cease coca production in favor of alternative

crops or activities if they cannot be assured that a

market exists and that the mechanisms for production, harvest, processing, and transport are in

place. Nevertheless, the current support structure

to sustain alternative livelihoods is lacking or

inadequate in several areas: insufficient technology and technology transfer, lack of markets and

marketing assistance, unavailable or unaffordable

credit, and inadequate agroprocessing facilities

and transportation systems (20,49).

A guaranteed sufficient quantity and quality of

product must be available to interest international

markets. This has been a difficulty to date,

although efforts to expand production areas and

increase use of modern production technology are

underway. Promoting producer organizations offers an opportunity for smallholders to combine
24 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

products to reach the necessary threshold level repayment schedules seem unrealistic for resourceand, thereby, enter a market. Contract farming poor farmers. Credit availability and affordability

may provide a long-range prospect for assuring could be further attenuated under alternative

sufficient product quantity. While this approach development programs that expand the range of

can be very successful, it requires firm commit- resources exploited, processed, and marketed.

ment on the part of agroprocessors and advanced

agronomic understanding of crop requirements to

achieve standard product quality.

Revision of credit programs could improve the

opportunities for smallholders to obtain financing

for entering legitimate production systems. Credit

revisions could mimic current U.S. subsidy programs, providing loans to farmers at lower rates

than those currently available in the Andean

countries. Such an effort, with planned obsolescence as a goal, could be relatively short term,

provide appropriate grace periods prior to repayment (i.e., allow for real production to occur), and

perhaps augment or replace current coca eradication payments as a method of inducing change.

Issue: Existing terms for agricultural credit

reduce its availability and discourage farmer

investment in improved legitimate systems.

There are a number of disincentives to investment in agricultural production improvements in

the Andean region; these stem largely from

national economic and political conditions (e.g.,

rural poverty, risks to personal security). Yet, one

mechanism open to U.S. and multilateral organizations to improve investment opportunities is to

increase the availability and affordability of

agricultural credit. Coca farmers tend to be

smallholders, often without land title, few personal capital resources and, thus, little access to

normal routes of credit. Recent actions by national governments have improved the outlook

for gaining land title, but, bureaucratic constraints

make the process slow.

Within the context of coca-substitution programs, opportunities for credit exist; however,

evidence suggests insufficient attention has been

paid to developing appropriate credit packages

for coca farmers. Loan rates are high, in some

cases collateral terms are difficult to meet, and

Option: Congress could direct AID to amend the

current credit Grant Agreement process to

require the private voluntary organization

(PVO) selected to include host country participation in developing credit terms.

Credit components of development projects are

intended to improve opportunities for the target

population to participate in the planned intervention. However, in some cases, credit terms restrict

the ability of individuals to participate. For

example, existing credit under CORDEP is made

available through a grant agreement between AID

and a private voluntary organization. However,

the terms of credit are so high that credit is

essentially unavailable for most smallholders

(49). The existing Grant Agreement process used

by AID could be amended to ensure host countries are adequately involved in development of

credit eligibility requirements, loan rates, and

repayment schedules.

Credit could be made available on a “suspensory loan’ basis. This would allow a proportion

of the capital sum normally repayable to be

written off over 5 years, or some other term

depending on the activity. The scheme could

replace the current ‘‘payment” for coca eradication in the production phase and might also

promote full private-sector involvement in the

region’s development. The cost to AID or national governments would be unchanged, but

funds would be guaranteed to go into productive

development, which is not assured under the

present system (49).

Issue: Additional effort is needed to promote

private investment in value-added processing.

Increased agricultural productivity is likely to

do little for producers’ economic well-being if
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 25

they cannot effectively and efficiently apply

postharvest technologies. Such applications will

be necessary for alternative crops to become

significant in terms of total agricultural exports.

Success, in part, depends on establishing costeffective postharvest processing, enhancing producer efficiency through reduced production costs

and increased yields, and improving access to

markets. The United States has provided support

for processing facilities with respect to crop

substitution efforts (table 1-3). Creating incentives for marketing these products could complement this investment. Loans to the private sector

at realistic interest rates could promote entrepreneurial activity, and ultimately replace the need

for AID and other contributing institutions to

maintain the present high level of investment in

infrastructure and agroindustry.

Option: Congress could direct the Overseas

Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to

make the Andean region a priority.

OPIC promotes U.S. investment in developing

countries by providing insurance against numerous risks, financing investment projects, and

providing investment counseling. OPIC could

develop a portfolio of opportunities in the Andean

region to make available during counseling to

encourage investment in the Andean region.

Increased investment could expand the array of

employment opportunities in the Andean countries. However, if approached without sufficient

planning, it could lead to haphazard growth and

potentially complicate national economic development. Mechanisms for coordinating investment

and development efforts could address this potential problem. For example, investments for agroprocessing of alternative crops could be coordinated with AID and national governments to

ensure the production, processing, and transportation components are synchronized.

Option: Congress could reduce tariffs on value-

-added products from the Andean countries for

10 years to promote development of the processing industry.

Raw materials tend to be less valuable than

processed materials, and processing activities can

increase national employment opportunities. Typically, tariffs increase as products move through

the processing chain (i.e., raw materials generally

are subject to lower tariffs whereas processed

items have higher tariffs). This aspect of U.S.

trade policy has been suggested to reduce incentive for development of value-added industry in

exporting nations. An examination of tariff policies on value-added products that might be

exported by the Andean Nations is needed to

determine if this policy adversely affects development of processing industries.

Value-added processing provides a multiplier

opportunity for economic improvement. The

United States could foster development of such

industries by providing preferential treatment for

value-added products associated with alternative

development programs under the authority of the

Andean Trade Preference Act. Such an action

could be given a specified lifetime, long enough

to allow industrial development and stabilization.

As capability increases with experience, opportunities for Andean extension into other national

and international markets could improve. Other

countries that currently participate in alternative

development might be induced to provide similar

preferential opportunities.

Issue: Lack of infrastructure hinders success

of alternative development efforts.

Inadequate infrastructure exists to support

alternative development (e.g., paved roads, postharvest handling, storage facilities, agroprocessing

plants). Yet, infrastructure development tends to

be approached slowly because of the potential

benefits that might accrue to coca transporters

(i.e., roads are seen as potential landing strips for

narcotics traffickers). Despite the fact that infrastructure development might initially contribute

to the coca economy, alternative development

and production cannot occur without the availability of adequate transportation and marketing

routes.
26 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 1-3--Value-Added Processing Investment in the Chapare Region

Industry Source of finance Dollar value capital Comment

Coffee pre-processing. . . . . . . . .

Latex pre-processing . . . . . . . . .

Tea processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Glucose plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vinegar plant . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . .

Yuca and banana drying . . . . . . .

Banana and kudzu drying . . . . . .

Mint oil extraction . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lemon balm plant . . . . . . . . . . . .

Milk plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AID Project 412

INC - AID

China -1984

AID Project 412

Universidad Mayor de

San Simon/UNDCP

Universidad Mayor de

San Simon/UNDCP

AID Project 412

Universidad Mayor de

San Simon

AID Project 412

AID Project 412

Public Law 480

UNDCP

$ 73,835

32,900

108,000

166,728

307,174

175,298

73,897

105,572

103,200

3,200,000

Started in 1980;

Project 412 in 1990.

Started in 1970;

Project 412 in 1990.

In production.

installation now underway.

Installation now underway.

Not yet in operation.

Starting production.

Starting production.

Working; low oil return per

hectare.

Project incorporates health

aspects.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office of

Technology Assessment, May 1992.

However, significant fault has been linked to

the methods and approaches used by U.S. and

multinational development groups to develop

land transportation routes in the tropics. Adverse

environmental impacts associated with roadbuilding in South America are highly visible (e.g.,

increased erosion, forest loss, poaching). Increased attention to developing mechanisms to

mitigate such impacts should be included in

project design and planning.

Option: Congress could direct AID to increase

support for improving rural-urban trade networks, including roads, trucking, communications,

and postharvest handling facilities.

Primary constraints to marketing alternative

crops and products largely are linked to inadequacy or lack of infrastructure. Increasing capability to handle, process, and transport products to

domestic and international markets could improve the ability of alternative resource exploitation activities to compete with coca. Increased

attention would be needed to address the potential

environmental impacts of infrastructure development, particularly road systems.

This is likely to be a long-term and costly

endeavor, requiring a substantial increase in

financial resources for assistance projects. Additional burdens on staff time could reduce efforts

on production-related activities. Nevertheless,

without ability to move products effectively and

economically, alternative products are likely to

remain at a disadvantage relative to coca.

Issue: Meeting food quality and safety requirements for agricultural exports can pose

difficulties for some alternative crop producers.

Increased share in the international market can

contribute to improving the economies of the

Andean countries. Although crop substitution

components of alternative development programs

have focused on export markets, additional effort

is needed to assist producers and processes to

meet the quality and safety criteria required in the

international marketplace (53).

The United States maintains a broad range of

trade policies, ranging from import quotas and

tariffs to complex food safety, sanitary, and

phytosanitary requirements. Meeting these re-
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 27

quirements is often difficult for developing nations. Assistance in developing capacity for

meeting these standards could contribute to

increased competiveness of Andean products.

Assisting the Andean countries in improving their

competitiveness in international markets could

yield additional benefits by increasing their range

of trading partners, encouraging foreign investment, and improving national food systems.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health

Inspection Service (APHIS) and Food Safety

Inspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and

Drug Administration (FDA) to assist the Andean countries to improve the quality and

safety of agricultural export products.

Authority for entering into international cooperative work exists primarily for APHIS, although

FDA and FSIS possess limited authority for

providing assistance. Current APHIS cooperative

efforts are designed to assist developing countries

meet U.S. inspection standards and quality requirements and thereby facilitate imports to the

United States. Similar activities among FDA,

FSIS, and the Andean countries could address

other processing and marketing areas.

However, increasing agency responsibility without a commensurate increase in fiscal resources

could come at the expense of the primary mission.

Funding and responsibilities could be increased

for a specified period to provide training and

development of expertise in the Andean countries

with periodic reports to Congress that evaluate the

program’s progress.

Issue: Lack of product quantity hinders smallholders from entering large, high-value

agricultural markets.

Despite the existence of alternative crops,

production remains at low levels that inhibits

entrance into lucrative markets. Opportunities are

needed to expand the production base to increase

product availability or aggregate the production

!2

Steep topography and difficult road conditions in

many rural areas may hinder expanded production of

renewable resource products by limiting easy access

to inputs and markets.

of numerous smallholders. Strong producer organizations could overcome the problem small

individual producers have in negotiating just

prices for their product.

Option: Congress could direct AID to increase

efforts to encourage producer organizations in

the Andean region in order to reach product

quantity thresholds for international marketing.

Lack of sufficient product quantity has constrained international marketing of some products

of ongoing substitution programs. Producer organizations can provide an opportunity for groups

of smallholders to consolidate production quantity to meet the needs of larger markets. For

example, cocoa cooperatively produced and processed in the Alto Beni, Bolivia has been successful in competing in the international cocoa

market. Ongoing alternative development efforts

could be required to increase the focus on

supporting producer groups for other alternative

crops as well. However, increasing product quan331-054 - 93 - 2
28 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

tity must be accompanied by ability to move these

products quickly and efficiently to markets to

realize benefits from such an effort.

Alternative Option: Congress could increase

funding for the InterAmerican Foundation to

expand efforts in grassroots development in

the Andean region.

The InterAmerican Foundation (IAF) has extensive experience in grassroots development in

South America and many of its projects have

demonstrated success (e.g., El Ceibo, see chapter

4). IAF has provided assistance for a broad range

of cooperative activities including agricultural,

textile, and handicrafts and such economic diversification could generate benefits beyond increasing

product quantity for outside markets.

BIOLOGICAL CONTROL OF COCA

Coca eradication is seen by some as a necessary

precursor to successful alternative development

(57), whereas others view it as a futile attempt to

curtail cultivation of illegal narcotic crops. Regardless, quantitative goals of a coca eradication

strategy in the Andean region do not exist. It has

not been determined what level of coca removal

is required to achieve domestic supply-reduction

goals.

Interest in the potential benefits of a biological

control (biocontrol) approach to coca reduction is

evident. Biocontrol may offer the least environmentally damaging and lengest-term means of

reduction, although the current state of the

technology suggests likely levels of reduction

will be difficult to determine. Predation levels

evident in laboratory experiments do not necessarily translate into similar effects in the field.

Thus, biocontrol cannot guarantee specific results

(47, 57). Further, as long as coca remains an

attractive crop, it is likely farmers would take

measures to protect their investment.

U.S. activities abroad that involve a regulated

substance, such as herbicides or biocontrol agents,

require an environmental analysis under Executive Order 12114--either an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a less rigorous Concise

Environmental Review (CER). However, the

choice of document is at the agency’s discretion.

Experience with herbicide testing in Peru suggests significant sociopolitical constraints will be

difficult to overcome without increased attention

to rigorous testing and safety features for candidate coca control agents (13).

Several key technology factors hinder development of biocontrol agents: lack of inventories of

potential agents, incomplete understanding of the

efficacy of biocontrol (i.e., what level of reduction might be achieved through deployment of an

agent), lack of understanding of what level of

control is required to achieve ‘success,’ and lack

of containment mechanisms. These needs could

be addressed through a highly focused research

and development effort, but, such an effort would

be conditional on host country cooperation.

I Coordination and Cooperation

Coordination and cooperation among donor

and host countries will be critical elements for

effective research and development of a coca

biocontrol program. Traditional biocontrol development methodology includes search and identification of existing predators, screening for hostspecificity, and testing. The search activities

could be undertaken in the target range and other

locations; however, efficacy testing needs to be

conducted in the implementation site or sites with

similar environmental characteristics.

Issue: Insufficient coordination and cooperation with potential host countries in planning and design of eradication programs

reduces support for implementation.

Experience with herbicide testing in Peru

suggests significant government and public participation will be necessary for a successful coca

eradication effort (56). Incorporating public review and comment periods, broad dissemination

of environmental impact reviews and methodologies, and coordination and cooperative efforts

with national groups will be key.
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 29

The United Nations International Drug Control

Programm e (UNDCP) investigations into potential narcotic crop control opportunities highlight

host country involvement and agreement. Currently, UNDCP is evaluating biocontrol potential

through expert group meetings. Any activities

that might result from these investigations will be

conditional on host country agreement and cooperation in all phases (50). The U.S. Department of

State notes similar agreements would be sought

for U.S. bilateral eradication activities in the

Andean region but currently little likelihood

exists for obtaining them (57).

Option: Congress could create a multinational

commission, with representatives from donor

and host countries, that would manage the

research and development of a biocontrol

agent for coca and the implementation of any

coca reduction program.

Creation of a multinational commission could

provide for substantial host country involvement

in developing a biocontrol program and perhaps

overcome public resistance that was evident in the

earlier chemical control research. Such a commission could be composed of U. S., Andean, and

other interested country scientists and narcotics

control policymakers. The commission could be

responsible for overseeing the development and

implementation of a coca biocontrol program,

including determining acceptable levels of risk,

desirable levels of control, and necessary testing

and screening precautions. Such an international

commission would serve to improve the coordination and cooperation of the various donor and

host countries.

However, developing a commission could be a

lengthy process. Competing agendas among participants could make agreement and direction

difficult. Setting a lead country or chairman could

alleviate some difficulties, yet, it could also give

the commission an appearance of being dominated by single-member concerns or motivations.

Nonetheless, without such cooperation and coordination, research and testing of potential agents

is also likely to be slow. Further, without host

country agreement for implementation, any research runs the risk of being moot even before it

is completed.

1 Information Needs for Decisionmaking

Information to support wise decisionmaking is

fundamental to undertake a biocontrol program.

Basic informational needs include identification

of:

. The level of reduction necessary to fulfill

supply reduction goals,

. The role of coca in the Andean ecosystem,

and

. Potential environmental impacts of a biocontrol program.

Issue: Lack of understanding of the level of

reduction necessary to achieve supply reduction goals hinders establishment of clear

target levels for eradication efforts.

The extent of coca reduction necessary to

achieve supply reduction goals in the United

States has not been identified and, given the

questionable accuracy of historical data on coca

production, it is likely to be difficult to derive.

Nonetheless, setting goals and identifying mechanisms for reduction programs may require this

type of information. For example, biological

control of coca, while suggested as an environmentally benign alternative to chemicals, may

only achieve low coca reduction in the short term.

Information on how this level of reduction would

affect overall cocaine availability could be used to

determine feasibility of such an approach.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Department of Energy, through its National Laboratory System, to conduct a supply/demand

analysis to identify the relative level of coca

reduction required to achieve domestic supply

reduction goals.

The National Laboratory System has substantial resources for computer modeling and could be

directed to create an integrated computer model to
30 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

simulate the effects of several reduction scenarios

on U.S. cocaine supply. Although numerous

variables confound precision of such a model,

resulting information could identify high-low

scenarios to provide bounds for coca reduction

objectives.

However, such a model would likely be based

on existing narcotics data, the accuracy of which

is questionable. Data on coca and cocaine are

notoriously suspect, leading to widely varying

estimates of the area under production, area

eradicated and newly planted, potential leaf

yields, and conversion rates from leaf to paste and

cocaine hydrochloride. Thus, existing data used

in such an analysis could lead to a “garbage

in-garbage out” product yielding little new insight. Improved data collection could address this

problem, although it would likely be a lengthy

process. Alternatively, in the near term results

could be given a “percent confidence” rating

while new data-gathering activities were undertaken.

Issue: Little is known of the role of coca in the

Andean ecology. Thus, determining potential adverse impacts of coca eradication is

difficult.

Generating support for biocontrol efforts will

require placing adequate attention on addressing

the concerns of the potential host countries.

Environmental concerns have been highlighted in

previous activities and are likely to continue to

play an important role. Information on the role of

coca in the complex Andean environment would

be important in determining the feasibility and

appropriateness of a biocontrol program. This

information could provide needed background

information to help national government decisionmakim g on the biocontrol of coca.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service to

conduct ecological studies of coca’s role in the

Andean environment cooperatively with host

country counterparts.

Some fungi and lichens are natural coca pests that

may significantly reduce the plants’ productive life.

Here, lichen covers the stem of a coca shrub.

Financial and technical support could be provided for a comprehensive study of coca in the

Andean environment. Cooperative efforts among

U.S. and Andean scientists could identify the

range of coca species of interest and the role wild

counterpart plays in local ecology. This information would be a logical counterpart to potential

host screening studies on candidate agents and

could further be used to determine potential areas

of concern with biocontrol activities. However,

such a study would require site visits in hazardous

areas (e.g., Alto Huallaga) for observing and

characterizing g coca ecology. Substantial efforts

would be required, in some cases, to assure

participant safety in such a study.

Issue: The current environmental assessment

process applied to U.S. activities in foreign

countries is inadequate to identify the broad

range of potential environmental impacts

that might be associated with biocontrol

efforts.

Despite government agreements during the

1987 herbicide testing in Peru, local populations

and environmental groups felt inadequate oppor-
l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 31

tunity existed for their input and discussion (56).

The resulting public outcry over the potential

adverse environmental effects of the tested herbicides was significant. Similar situations are likely

to occur with a biocontrol program if inadequate

attention is given to local participation in the

environmental impact review process.

Determining g potential environmental impacts

of a biocontrol program will require a rigorous

assessment effort. The instrument under which

these environmental reviews currently are required (Executive Order 12114) allows agency

discretion to undertake a Concise Environmental

Review rather than a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement is as required under

National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) for

domestic actions (13).

The legal status of NEPA with respect to the

extraterritorial environmental impacts of Federal

programs remains in doubt. However, it is clear

Federal agencies involved in the proposed coca

eradication program will be required to prepare

some kind of environmental evaluation, either

under NEPA or Executive Order 12114. Experience demonstrates the value of this environmental

analysis can be enhanced if the relatively rigorous

procedural requirements of NEPA are followed.

In particular, the agency should ensure full public

participation throughout the assessment process,

environmental assessment early in the decisionmaking process, full discussion of alternatives

and mitigation techniques, consultation with experts within and outside of government, and that

the results of the assessment are meaningfully

considered by involved decisionmakers.

Option: Congress could choose to expand the

authority of the National Environment Policy

Act to include U.S. coca control activities in

foreign countries.

A rigorous environmental review process could

alleviate some of the public resistance to coca

control efforts. The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process required domestically could

be an appropriate process for examining the full

array of potential impacts of a coca eradication

method. However, expanding the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s responsibility to

include international EISS, would increase agency

workloads substantially and would likely require

a concomitant increase in staff and financial

resources. Further, technical expertise for outlining requirements and reviewing EIS’S would be

needed and could create a lengthier process.

Changes in the process may be necessary to

account for environmental differences between

U.S. and Andean environments.

1 Technological Feasibility

Biocontrol methodologies exist, but there are

considerable technological constraints to rapid

implementation. Investigations into possible herbicides continue to be the primary focus at the

Federal research and development level (45).

Thus, if a biocontrol program is to be pursued, an

extensive research and development period could

be needed. Ongoing research is classified and

conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Agricultural Research Service and cooperating

agencies.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture to balance finding resources for crop control research between

herbicides and biocontrol.

Currently, biocontrol research is treated as part

of an overall eradication method research program. Division of funds and activities are agencydiscretionary and largely focused on chemical

research. Nevertheless, balanced attention to both

opportunities could be undertaken to assure

neither development is disadvantaged if host

country agreement is forthcoming.

Alternative Option: Congress could place responsibility for coordinating a broad-based

national research and development program

for biocontrol with the Office of National Drug

Control Policy, Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (ONDCP/CTAC).
32 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

There are numerous public and private research

resources that could be appropriate to undertake

or participate in biocontrol research. Currently,

responsibility for development, oversight, and

coordination lies with the U.S. Department of

Agriculture. Responsibility for a broad-based

research and development effort could be placed

with ONDCP/CTAC, which holds responsibility

for counternarcotic enforcement research of which

eradication is one aspect. Coordination with the

numerous Federal agencies appropriate to the

preconditions for development (e.g., USDA, DOE,

DOS) could be undertaken by ONDCP/CTAC to

expedite efforts. However, recent Administration

actions have downsized ONDCP significantly

and without concomitant efforts to rebuild the

Office, such a task might not be feasible.

Alternatively, Congress could choose to halt

new programs for coca biocontrol research and

continue existing programs under maintenance

budgets conditional on the outcome of the UNDCP

efforts in biocontrol. U.S. intellectual and financial resources could be directed to assist the

United Nations effort if host country agreement

were obtained. Such an approach would ensure

the program was multilateral and assure the

Andean countries of an international forum within

which their concerns or grievances over biocontrol or coca eradication in general could be heard.

CHAPTER 1 REFERENCES

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3.

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Chavez, A., “Andean Agricultural Research and

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Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombi~ and

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l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options 33

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Cuellar, F. H., “Incidencia del cultivo de coca en

la economia Colombian y comparaci6n con 10S

cases de Peru y Bolivia, ’ Instituto Interamericano

de Cooperaci6n para la Agricultural, Santafe de

Bogota, Colombia, 1991.

DeFranco, M. and R. Godoy, “Economic Consequences of Cocaine Production in Bolivia: Historical, Imcal, and Macroeconomic Perspectives.

(Boston, MA: Harvard University, 1990).

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contractor paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December 1991.

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Regional Development Project (CORDEP) Bolivia: Technical Proposal,” Submitted to AID

under RFP No. Bolivia 92-001, Bethesda, MD,

January 21, 1992.

Dourojeanni, M. J., “The Environmental Impact

of Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in the

Peruvian Amazon Basin,’ paper presented at the

Congressional Research Service Panel on Cocaine

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TheEconomist, “GettingAwaywithI t,” 323(755):44,

April 18, 1992.

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America’s Killing Fields,” October 8, 1988, pp.

21-24.

Hatlleld, L.Z., “Bolivia’s New Legislation Attracts Foreign Investment,” Business America

March 23, 1992, pp. 19-20.

Healy, K., I.nterAmencan Foundation, Rosslyn,

VA, personal communication, September 1992.

Healy, K., “Opportunities and Constraints to

Source Reduction of Coca in Bolivia: The Political Context, ” contractor paper prepared for the

Office of Technology Assessment, March 1992.

Healy, K., “The Boom Within the Crisis: Some

Effects of Foreign Cocaine Markets on Bolivian

Rural Society and Economy,” D. Pacini and C.

Franquemont (eds.), Coca and Cocaine: E@ects

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of Poisons,” Newsweek, December 1988, p. 62.

Kraljevic, I., ‘‘Migration, Social Change, and the

Coca/Cocaine Economy in Bolivia,” contractor

paper prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, February 1992.

Larrain, F,, and Sachs, J. D., ‘International Financial Relations, ’ Paredes, C. and J. Sachs (eds.),

Peru’ sPath to Recovery (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991) In: Alvarez, 1992.

Mardon, M., “The Big Push,” Sierra, November/

December 1988, pp. 66-75.

McCaffiey, D., “Biodiversity Conservation and

Forest Management as Alternatives to Coca Production in Andean Countries,” contractor paper

prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1991.

McClintock, C., “Opportunities and Constraints

to Source Reduction of Coca in Peru: The Political

Context,” contract paper prepared for the Office

of Technology Assessment, September 1991.

Morales, E., “Coca and Cocaine Economy and

Social Change in the Andes of Peru,” Economic

Development and Cultural Change 35(1):143-

161, October 1986.

O’Carroll, P., “Crop Substitution,’ International

Drug Report, United Nations, Geneva, February,

1978, p. 4.

Orlove, B., and hVieil, D., ‘Some Doubts About

Trout: Fisheries Development Projects in Lake

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(wk.), State, Capital, and Rural Society: Anthropological Perspectives on Political Economy in

h4em”co and the Andes (Boulder CO: Westview

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Painter, M., Institute for Development Anthropology, personal communication, August 1992.

Painter, M., and Bedoya-Garland, E., “Institutional Analysis of the Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP) and the Upper Huallaga

Special Project (PEAH),” contractor papr prepared for the ~lce of Technology Assessment,

July 1991.

Plowman, T., “Coca Chewing and the Botanical

Origins of Coca (ErythroxyZum spp.) in South

America,’ In: D. Pacini and C. Franquemont
34

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(eds.), Coca and Cocaine :E#ects on People and

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July 1991.

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Coca,’ contractor paper prepared for the Office of

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Agricultural Research Service, personal communication, August 1992.

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Ashton, 1991.

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Bolivi~ Colombia, and Peru: Production Systems

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Week, May 11, 1992, pp. 66-75.

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to Improve Agricultural Profitability,’ contractor

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1992.

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Factors

Influencing

Coca

Reduction

Initiatives 2

T

he Andean region is complex in its geology, ecology, and

cultural history. This complexity precludes simple or

broadly applicable coca substitution strategies. Successful, cooperative, counternarcotics efforts among the

United States and Andean countries require careful consideration

of all of these factors. This chapter examines the biophysical,

cultural, socio-political, and economic conditions that may affect

the success of efforts to reduce coca cultivation in Bolivia, Peru,

and Colombia.

GEOECOLOGY OF THE NORTHERN

AND CENTRAL ANDES

Clear understanding of the biological and physical environments in the Andean region is critical for appropriate design of

projects to eradicate or offer alternatives to coca. The natural

environmental diversity of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia results

largely from the abrupt altitude changes in the Andes mountain

system (2). There is a vertical succession of ecozones, ranging

from rainforest and desert at the lowest levels to mountain tundra,

snow, and ice at the highest (104). The enormous latitudinal span

(approximately from 10 degrees north to 40 degrees south along

the western edge of South America) and longitudinal breadth

(approximately between 80 degrees west and 60 degrees west)

also make for considerable variations in climate, soil, vegetation,

and land-use (104). Thus, the local and regional diversity of

biophysical environments requires that any project be sitespecific (2).

35
36 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

I Andean Geography and Geology

The Andean cordillera (mountain range) divides the South American continent into Atlantic

and Pacific drainage systems and is part of a great

band of active crustal uplift that circles the Pacific

Ocean. The Andes are among the youngest

mountains on Earth, and consequently, soils are

generally shallow, stony, and undifferentiated

(104). Extensive volcanic and earthquake activity

has characterized the region’s geologic history,

and this activity continues today (84). Any

technologies dependent on the land’s surficial

characteristics---g. g., road-building or soil identification and use-must deal with the geologic

variability, as well as the instability of the area

due to ongoing mountain-building (2).

The Andean cordillera is made up of many

interwoven ranges, which include high intermontane plateaus, basins, and valleys. Colombia,

Peru, and Bolivia are located within the Northern

and Central Andean ranges (figure 2-l).

The Northern Andes extend from coastal Venezuela and Colombia to northern Peru and contain

several broad ecosystems falling into four altitudinal belts, the highest and coldest of which rises

to 4,500 meters above sea level (masl). The

Northern Andes subregion is distinguished from

the rest of the region by higher relative humidity

and greater climatic symmetry between the eastern and western flanks of the range (2).

The three main warm ecosystems of the Northern subregion are the upper montaña (mountain)

slopes, the intermediate-level coffee belt, and the

foothills. The upper montaña slopes, with their

vast, dense forests, have experienced little adverse human impact. However, in some areas,

deforestation may have contributed to increased

stream flow and erosion. Precipitation is heavy,

averaging 4,000 mm per year, and physical and

chemical weathering and erosion can be intense.

The coffee belt, immediately below the upper

montaña, has been profoundly modified by coffee

plantation agriculture. The best coffee soils are

developed on volcanic ash, which is sensitive to

erosion. The low Andean foothills are relatively

humid with annual rainfall of at least 2,000 mm

and a mean annual temperature of at least 24

degrees C. Low-productivity, lateritic soil covers

much of the area, particularly in cleared fields

where maize, manioc (yuca), plantain, and cocoa

are cultivated.

The Central Andes extend from northern Peru

to the Antofagasta Province in Chile and Catamarca Province in Argentina. They are characterized by a succession of agricultural zones with

varied climatic conditions along the mountains’

flanks and by large, high-altitude plateaus above

3,500 masl, which do not occur in the Northern

Andes. Variously called puna or altiplano, these

plateaus, separated and surrounded by higher

mountains, were the heartland of the preColumbian Andean empire (2).

The soil fertility of the northern altiplano

generally is good (147). The western Central

Andean ranges are relatively arid with desert-like

soils, whereas the eastern ranges are more humid

and have more diverse soils (26). The eastern

slopes of the Central Andes in many ways are

similar to the wet forests of the Northern Andes.

Unlike the Northern Andes, however, these

slopes have a dry season (2).

The altiplano and páramo (heathland) are

broken by river valleys. Cutting deep into the

lofty plateaus, these valleys descend 2,000 to

3,000 meters, often in a few tens of kilometers,

and create areas of highly distinctive relief,

climate, habitat, and agricultural uses. The upper

ends of the valleys merge with the high plateaus.

Their middle slopes and alluvial plains are

temperate, referred to as kichwa by indigenous

Andean peoples. Lower parts of the valleys, the
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives

@w I

n

z

< I

Figure 2-l-Generalized Geographic Map of Andean Coca-Producing Countries

.

(nw

n

z

<

2

m

1-

E

c1

Guajira Regio n

@

-fl Cartagena &

W / ~ Magdalena River

Cauca River ,

Region

.*..

f“i’:

. .l . . W?+’--

Region

<>

\

Orinoco

COLOMBIA River K

Vaup&

Region

$ EQUATOR

River

Alto

\’

Huallaga -- ‘”~;WX#o, ,

Region L

:’:::’>??~-; ;,

+lW%q .,,

. ,? ~ . . .

,..:.:.+; ..:?

Lim

~d

~~• ...$&#l?#$-$

,“ BOLIVIA

. ~. Cuzco – ‘- “’:, - .:-%.; .:

/. ,

Chapare Region

“’i N-’i=7

Yungas

137

Region

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
38 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

yungas, can be wet or hot and dry as a result of

rain-shadow.l

Unlike regions of gentle topography (e.g., the

central United States or Amazon basin), where

regional climatic variation can be determined

from a few widely spaced measurements, regions

with extreme topographic and climatic features

(e.g., the Andean cordillera) make regional projections difficult (2). For example, while air

temperature generally decreases with increasing

altitude, variability of mountain topography can

produce much lower-than-expected air temperatures at any altitude.

Some general climatic patterns, however, are

discernible in the Andes. For example, with

increasing distance south of the equator the

seasonality of precipitation increases, whereas

the total annual amount generally decreases.

Humidity commonly increases with increasing

altitude, but only to some intermediate altitude

(e.g., approximately 1,000 masl on the eastern

slope of the Ecuadoran Andes at the equator)

above which it declines (92). The variability of

mountain terrain also affects precipitation, such

that conditions of extreme wetness and aridity

may exist in close proximity. Annual temperatures in upper reaches of many Andean valleys

may average 8 degrees C with frequent nocturnal

frosts, whereas lower levels may average as high

as 24 degrees C, with no frost. Related to this

temperature gradient is a pattern of greater

rainfall at the valley heads, and less rain at lower

altitudes, resulting in part from mountain rainshadow effect (2).

The weather patterns of the Andean cordillera

and Amazon basin in general reflect movements

of high and low-pressure “cells’ associated with

the Intertropical Convergence Zone, a lowpressure trough that moves further north and

south on a seasonal basis. Precipitation is high

throughout the year in the highlands and on the

coast in the Northern Andes. South of central

Ecuador, at about the latitude of Guayaquil,

coastal aridity increases, culminating in the Atacama desert of northern Chile. In the Central

Andes, highland precipitation is seasonal, and

amounts are approximately one-half those measured in the northern Andes. The aridity of the

Central Andean coastal zone is the result of the

drying effect of the cold Pacific Humboldt

current, and the southern Pacific high-pressure

cell (59). Much of the southern portion of the

Central Andes in Bolivia is also arid. The dry

season causes soil moisture deficits and diminished stream flow for a part of each year.

9 Andean Agroecosystems2

At the regional or macroscale level, vegetation

patterns in the Northern and Central Andes tend

to reflect climatic zones determined by latitude

and altitude. At the local or mesoscale level,

however, this correspondence becomes less precise, as local variations in soil type, slope,

drainage, climate, and human intervention come

into play.

Most of the Northern Andes can support lush

vegetation because of the high humidity and

relatively high temperatures. Tropical rainforests

and other types of evergreen and deciduous

forests dominate this subregion, with considerable symmetry of vegetation types on the eastern

and western flanks of the mountains. The lowest

slopes support agriculture year-round, producing,

for example, bananas, yuca, and cocoa.

Aridity reduces vegetation growth and agricultural options in some areas of the Central Andes.

The Atacama desert region of the coastal plain,

for example, is one of the driest places on Earth.

However, the lower valley floors of the Central

Andean western ranges, and the lands at the foot

1 Rain-shadow occurs when moist easterly winds lose their moisture as they pass over the him cool peaks and plateaus. & the air descends

from the punu orpdranw, the temperature rises and its moisture-bearing capacity increases, resulting in a desert condition below 1,500 masl

in most interior valleys of the Andes (2).

z Agmecosystem is a term used to describe mtural ecosystems modifkd by human agricultural activities (2).
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 39

of the mountain slopes, along the coast, are

densely populated and support intensive, highyield cultivation of cash crops including maize,

rice, cotton, tobacco, garden vegetables, peppers,

sugar cane, and fruit trees. Irrigation water is

provided by the numerous streams that drain the

western slopes. The eastern slopes of the central

Andes have vegetation types similar to that of the

northern Andes (2).

A significant portion of the Andean population

lives within the Central Andes’ eastern valley

systems and altiplano. Settlements and farming

are concentrated toward the upper end of the

inter-Andean valleys for several reasons: the

primary subsistence crops are acclimatized to

these altitudes; drought and frost are less common

than in the lower and upper aptitudinal extremes;

and access to the grazing lands of the puna and

páramo is relatively easy (31).

ANDEAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Humans first altered the Andean landscape

some 12,000 to 15,000 years ago as hunters and

gatherers (146). By 3,000 to 4,000 years ago, the

original nomadic, hunting and gathering way of

life had been supplanted by a village-based

agro-pastoral economy (95). Pre-Columbian agricultural productivity was achieved largely

through specialized adaptation of food crops to

the myriad of local microenvironment. Indigenous farmers planted numerous varieties of each

crop in a single field, or in neighboring fields, so

that if one variety performed poorly, several

others might provide an adequate yield (42).

Virtually all productive land was used for crop

production. These two strategies led to a sufficiency of food supplies throughout the Andean

highlands.

From the onset of human occupation, the

varied Andean environments led to vertical arrangements of settlements, production regimes,

migrations, and political organizations. Patterns

of verticality derive from the classiffication of

different agricultural zones, based on their climatic conditions (31,32,107,145). For example,

the inhabitants of the Uchucmarca valley in

Northern Peru recognize seven agro-climatic

units that are distinguished according to altitude,

moisture, temperature, vegetation, land tenure,

crop assemblages, and agricultural technologies

(31,32).

The Spanish conquest of the Andean region

produced severe dislocations in the indigenous

pattern of resource exploitation. The arriving

Spanish found a highland Andean agricultural

complex that focused on the intensive hoe cultivation of maize, squash, beans, and hot peppers

(chiles). Fiber was secured from the cabuya,

cultivated on the drier leeward sides of the

mountain valleys, and from American cotton,

cultivated in the lowlands, along with coca and

sweet manioc (21). The principal root crop was

the small Andean potato.

The Spanish developed urban centers and

introduced exotic plants and animals in the

Northern and Central Andes. Forced clustering of

the semi-dispersed indigenous settlement patterns, exploitation of the large resident labor

force, and establishment of the Iberian grazing

ethic also followed. Large landed estates (haciendas) were developed in the altiplano belt for

animal husbandry. In the hot, humid yungas, land

clearing was facilitated by the introduction of iron

tools, and maize, sugar-cane, and pigs were raised

for urban markets (2).

Displacement of indigenous people to marginal lands that began in the colonial period

continued under subsequent regimes. Invariably,

the best lands of the region (e.g., flat, fertile valley

bottomlands) were claimed by the existent rulers,

and often were designated pasture for livestock.

Many indigenous people who had lived on these

lands were forced to move to remote, inhospitable, forested slopes. Others were reduced to

landless laborers, or colonas, on the haciendas.

Thus, throughout the Northern Andes, the logical

spatial relationships of agricultural production

were reversed. The broad, level bottom lands so

suitable to the cultivation of staple foodstuffs

were given over to pasture and meat production,
40 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

or commercial crops such as sugar cane destined

for foreign markets. Highland plots, more suitable

as pasture or forest, were cultivated, with consequential damage to the natural vegetation. Harvests were meager and had to be transported, on

the back of either man or beast, to distant urban

markets (43).

Competition for land between haciendas and

peasant communities became a common and

sometimes violent feature of rural society in the

Central Andes. The concentration of land ownership, uneven population distribution and landuse, feudal subjugation of many peasants, and rise

of a large pool of displaced, landless peasants

created a legacy of inequality that still prevails in

the region (19,61,141). The dichotomy between

the urban dweller, or civil servant of Spanish

descent, and the rural Indian peasant-between

the lowland centers of power and the powerless

inhabitants of the eastern Andean slopes—

persists, with significant implications for any

attempts to alter agricultural practices in cocaproducing regions (2).

In more recent times, the so-called “green

revolution” has had mixed blessings. For instance, production of some crops (e.g., banana,

rice, and maize) and of poultry has increased

dramatically in the Andean region (16,78,82).

However, this increased agricultural production

occurred among the large landowners of the

region, with few benefits accruing to the impoverished subsistence sector (43).

A significant modern-era land-use change has

been the opening of eastern lowland regions in the

Northern Andes for agricultural use. For centuries, fear of disease and reluctance to leave the

secure highland social structure deterred highlander settlement of lowlands. With their worsening economic plight in modern times, however, an

ever-increasing number of highland Indians are

moving eastward along every major river valley

(46). In spite of endemic shortages of good roads,

legally recognized land titles, credit, education,

electricity, and modern health and sanitation

services, highlander colonization of the Orinoco

and Amazon basins serves the interests of the

individuals and nations involved and can be

expected to continue (43).

Today, the basic pattern of Pre-Columbian land

use and agricultural practices, as modified by the

Spanish, remains more or less intact in the Central

Andes. Commercial agriculture tends to be concentrated in flat, lowland areas, at least in part due

to high transportation costs and difficulties applying mechanization to farmin g on valley and

mountain slopes. This mitigates in favor of

mountain crops that are hand-cultivated, easily

harvested, and easily transported with low spoilage, one example being coca.

COCA-PRODUCING ECOSYSTEMS

Potentially, 10 to 20 percent of the Andes

mountain range (7,250 kilometers in length) is

suitable for coca production, and these areas are

concentrated in an aptitudinal belt from sea level

to about 2,000 mad, extending from Colombia to

Bolivia. Coca grows best at temperatures averaging above 15 degrees C, with high precipitation,

but does not require evenly distributed rainfall.

Coca can be grown in a wide variety of soils, but

is sensitive to poor drainage and intolerant of frost

or drought. In addition, a wide range of soil pH

levels can be tolerated by coca (i.e., E.coca var.

coca, the most important source of cocaine, will

tolerate pH levels as low as 4.3 and as high as 8.0

(54)).

Coca cultivation is concentrated in and along

deep valleys that cut into the eastern slopes of the

Northern and Central Andes, and coca is the most

important agricultural product of the hot, often

dry lower reaches of the yungas (31). Other warm

ecosystems with a potential for coca growth are

found between sea level and 2,200 masl in the

northern Andes, which are characterized by a

sub-Andean or tropical montaña at higher limits

and wet forest at lower levels. These regions are

heavily populated, particularly in the “coffee

belt” (2).

Coca bushes are stripped of their leaves up to

six times a year, and the leaves are then dried and
transported to the highlands by porters, pack

animals, or trucks. Some highland communities

control territory in the coca-producing valleys,

and may establish satellite communities there.

Several times each year, they journey to these

fields to tend their coca, or to work as laborers in

the fields of relatives and fellow villagers (107).

Much of the land involved in coca production

is sloping, and its suitability for other agricultural

uses will depend on factors such as slope steepness, soil type, and water availability. Water

quality problems now exist in some Andean

watersheds, largely as a result of discharges

associated with mining and agricultural activities,

and high rates of natural erosion from the region’s

geologic Instability and climatic variability (102,114).

The extent to which new agricultural practices

may contribute to these water quality problems

can only be determined by basin-specific monitoring programs in the affected watersheds (2).

9 Environmental Impacts of

Coca Cultivation and Processing

The adverse environmental consequences of

coca cultivation and processing often are cited as

a problem in the Andean nations (14,53). Because

most data are anecdotal, and on-site research is

problematic, the degree of environmental damage

that directly or indirectly can be attributed to coca

cultivation and cocaine processing remains undetermined. However, the few available information sources point to significant differences between damage from coca cultivation and cocaine

processing.

COCA CULTIVATION

Little is known about the role of coca in the

ecology of the Andean rainforest, or about the

environmental impacts of coca cultivation. Impacts are likely to differ from one growing area to

another, given variations in ecology, culture, and

cultivation practices. Today, no formal comparative study exists of even the most notable

coca-growing regions (i.e., the Alto Huallaga of

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 41

x

Terracing is a traditional, more environmentally

benign means of growing coca still practiced most

notably in the Bolivian Yungas.

Peru and the Chapare of Bolivia). Despite this

lack of information, three factors seem key to

determining g coca cultivation’s environmental impact: geographic area, types of external inputs and

frequency and intensity of their use, and cultivation practices.

Experts argue that deforestation is the most

visible damage caused by coca cultivation. Some

older coca production regions (e.g., the Yungas,

Bolivia) continue to produce coca along wellconstructed terraces that reduce soil erosion

potential. However, these practices are not employed in the newer coca-growing regions. In

many areas coca is grown on unterraced plots

with no barrier to soil loss from heavy rains.

Migrants to these regions may use slash-and-burn

practices to clear forested areas. Between the

early 1970s and the late 1980s, an estimated

700,000 hectares (about 2,700 square miles) of

Amazon rainforest were deforested as a director

indirect result of coca cultivation (53).

The potential consequences of deforestation

associated with coca cultivation are numerous.

Habitat loss and decreased species diversity are

often a direct result of destruction of tropical
42 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

forest. In addition, the rise in soil temperatures

and decrease in organic matter and soil nutrients,

resulting from slash-and-burn practices, can make

the area hostile to revegetation. In the Alto

Huallaga in Peru, tropical forest burning causes

extensive air pollution, and smoke layers have

been observed covering the valley in August and

September (14).

The most devastating effect of deforestation in

the Andean region maybe extensive soil erosion.

Clearing tropical forest areas for agricultural

expansion without investing in soil conservation

can severely disrupt biological productivity and

start a self-reinforcing cycle of degradation. For

example, soil erosion reduces soil fertility, which

in turn can reduce growth of cover plants, leading

to more soil erosion and to rapid depletion of

diversity as the site becomes suitable for fewer

species.

The cultivation practices, tillage and weed

control, can increase the potential for soil erosion.

Tillage loosens the soil and leads easily to

erosion. Whether coca seeds or seedlings are

planted, the soil remains largely unprotected from

heavy rains. Furthermore, the soil around the coca

plants is weeded regularly to reduce competition

for the minimal nutrients available. These practices leave the soil in coca plots almost continually bare during the production years, and the

results are increased soil temperatures, reduced

development of soil microbial populations, and

long-term exposure of the soil to wind and rain

erosion. Finally, the leaves of the coca plant are

stripped periodically (e.g., three to six times per

year), thereby removing whatever protection the

canopy might offer.

As a result of soil erosion, sediment-laden

runoff may flood lowlands, overcome the nutrient

trapping capability of wetlands, and damage

associated aquatic systems by smothering bottom

communities and decreasing oxygen availability

to other organisms. Floods, avalanches, and

landslides have been attributed to the increased

soil erosion found in the coca-growing areas of

the Andean foothills. Exceptionally heavy rainTable 2-1—Pesticides Commonly Used in

Coca Production

Common name Trade name Percent used

Carbaryl . . . . . . . . . . . Sevin 70%

Metamidophos . . . . . . Monitor 15

Decamitrina. . . . . . . . . Decls 10

Monocrotophos . . . . . . Azodrin 5

SOURCE: J. Antognini, Research Leader, Tropical science and Research Lab, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Remarks,” U.S. Library of

Congress, Congressional Research Service, Cocaine Pruduction,

Eradication and the Environment: Policy, Impact and Options Hearing,

February 14,1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1990), p. 3.

Table 2-2—Dimensions of Pollution from Coca

Processing in the Alto Huallaga Valleya

Quantity

Material (in millions)

Acetone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 I

Carbide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 kg

Kerosene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 I

Quicklime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 kg

Sulphuric Add . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 1

Toilet paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 kg

Toluene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 I

a Based on estimated quantities of these substances in Alto Huallaga

Valley rivers and streams in 1986.

SOURCE: M. Buenaventura, “Victims of the Drug Trade,” U.S. Library

of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Cocaine Production, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, and Options,

February 14, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,

1990), pp. 143-146.

fall in November 1987 caused devastating landslides killing animals and people as well as

ruining roads, villages, and productive land throughout coca-growing regions (14).

Pesticides and fertilizers used in coca cultivation may cause environmental and health problems as well. Synthetic pyrethroids, carbaryl, and

paraquat area few of the pesticides used to control

insects and weeds in coca fields (135) (table 2-l).

Some of these chemicals are known to be mobile

in soils, thus increasing the potential for contamination of groundwater resources. Pesticides adsorbed on soil particles may be carried to nearby

aquatic systems during heavy rains common in

many production regions. Similarly, nitrate from

fertilizers is highly mobile in the soil and that not
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 43

Table 2-3--Cocaine Processing Chemicals and Potential Environmental Effects

Chemicals Characteristics

Carbide compounds b

Kerosene ●

●

Sulphuric acid (H2SO4) ●

●

●

●

Toluene (C7H8) ●

●

Highly toxic to organic tissue, can raise water’s pH to toxic levels.

Oily liquid, pungent odor.

Only moderately toxic to living organisms, but if present in surface water for a

long time can produce chronic adverse effects in amphibians and fish.

Problems may arise from inhalation or ingestion.

Reduces dissolved oxygen levels in the water.

Highly corrosive, toxic, oily liquid.

Extremely harmful to organic tissue.

Dissolves easily in water.

Fish and plants may suffer from acute sulfuric acid poisoning.

Highly soluble in water and very toxic.

Harmful to fish and amphibians.

SOURCE: M. Buenaventura, “Victims of the Drug Trade,” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Cocaine Production,

Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, and Options Hearing, Feb. 14, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990),

pp. 143-148.

taken up by vegetation may leach to groundwater

or be transported to nearby surface waters much

the same as pesticides. Agrichemical contamination of water resources can lead to adverse effects

on human, plant, and animal health (136).

Evidence suggests that coca production can

lead to serious erosion problems and reduce land

productivity. However, data comparing the environmental impacts of coca production with those

of other crops are lacking. The environments in

which coca is produced may be just as easily

damaged, or perhaps more so, from legitimate

agricultural activities that are as likely to involve

deforestation, heavy tillage, and extensive agrichemical inputs (135). Coca is a perennial shrub and

once planted can provide some soil stabilization

during its productive life (10 to 18 years), annual

grains on the other hand would result in tillage

and harvest once a year. In this comparison, coca

may be more conserving of resources.

COCA PROCESSING

Although little concrete data exist illustrating

the damage caused by coca processing, it is clear

that the chemicals used to process coca leaves

into coca paste and, later, cocaine can have

considerable adverse impacts on the Andean

environment. Data gathering alone poses some

problem because some of the items used in

processing also have legitimate uses (e.g., kerosene, toilet paper, lime) (table 2-2). Estimates

may be based on overall consumption under the

assumption that the items are purchased for illegal

purposes although clearly for some items this may

not be the case. In any case, coca and cocaine

processing methods employ a variety of toxic

chemicals (e.g., toluene, sulfuric acid) that, if

released in sufficient quantities, could harm the

immediate surroundings and ecosystems far removed from the processing site (table 2-3).

In the first phase of coca processing, the dried

leaves are soaked in a solution of sulfuric acid and

water. The resulting acid fluid, which now

contains the alkaloids (one of which is cocaine)

from the leaves, is decanted and mixed with a

chemical base (e.g., lime or sodium carbonate) to

neutralize the acid, and finally with an organic

solvent (kerosene). The mixing is repeated, as

needed, until the solutions have yielded an

expected amount of coca paste. In the process,

thousands of gallons of polluted water may be

dumped onto the land or into nearby rivers and

streams (105). Thus, primary processing chemicals may contaminate soil and ground- and

surface water supplies (53). Such contamination

also has taken place in the course of enforcement
44 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 2-4--lnputs Required to Prepare

a Kilogram of Coca Paste

Material Quantity Price ($U.S.)

Coca leaves . . . . . . . . . . . 150-170 kg $100.00

Kerosene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.5 I 7.00

Lime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 kg 1.50

Sodium carbonate . . . . . . 1 kg 4.00

Sulfuric acid . . . . . . . . . . . 5 kg 10.00

Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300 I —

Total cost . . . . . . . . . . . 122.50

SOURCE: R. Henkel, “The Cocaine problem,” Bolivia After Hyper

Inflation: The Restructuring of the Bolivian Economy (Tempe, AZ:

Arizona State University, Center for Latin American Studies, 1990).

Author's note: Data provided by informants familiar with the cocaine

industry in the Chapare region, August 1989.

efforts, when coca processing chemicals sometimes have been dumped on the ground and into

nearby waterways.

Although there is no accurate account of the

amount of dumping, estimates have been made

based on the amount of chemicals needed to

process a kilogram of coca paste (table 2-4).

Further estimates have been made for the amount

of chemicals used throughout the processing

chain to transform coca leaf into cocaine hydrochloride (table 2-5). While these figures are not

likely to illustrate the degree of the problem

adequately, they help to identify areas of concern.

CONCLUSION

Although little documentation of environmental

degradation caused by coca cultivation and processing exists, it is clear that these activities have

significant potential to damage the Andean environment. Deforestation and soil erosion are two of

the most notable effects of coca cultivation,

whereas chemical contamination of soils and

surface and groundwater seem likely results of

coca-processing. Human and wildlife populations

in coca growing and processing areas may suffer

the consequences of these environmental impacts.

Concrete data on the degree of contamination

from processing activities is needed to determine

the level of risk to human and wildlife populations. A comprehensive assessment of the environmental damage caused by coca cultivation and

processing in the Andean countries could identify

the relative environmental risks from both activities. Although recent efforts in Bolivia have

sought to identify the impacts of processing

activities on terrestrial resources (largely soils),

additional effort is needed to quantify overall

ecological impacts. National support for coca

reduction might increase if coca cultivation and

processing-related activities are shown to be

adversely affecting the Andean resources and

thus reducing alternative development options.

When compared with the destructive practices

of some other agricultural and nonagricultural

industries in the Andes, however, the potential

quantity of land degradation and pollution attributable cocaine industry becomes somewhat less

striking. The destructive land-use practices observed among coca growers could occur in the

case of any other “booming” export crop, and

likely stem more so from the social and economic

marginalization of coca growers than the illegal

status of their livelihood (108).

TRADITIONAL ROLES AND

USES OF COCA LEAF

Ritual importance of coca leaf in traditional

religious and social activities, and traditional and

mainstream medical and therapeutic applications

are concerns of some sectors of the Andean

population. Chewing unprocessed coca leaves

has long been a pervasive Andean cultural tradition. Generally, a dry leaf of cultivated coca

contains less than one percent of the alkaloid

cocaine. 3 Thus, although related, cocaine hydrochloride and raw coca leaf are unique substances

whose pharmacological and cultural uses differ

significantly.

3 Amazonian coca contains less than 0.5 percent of the alkaloid cocaine; chemical analysis showed the cocaine conkmt in “HuAnaco’ or

“Bolivian” COCA the principle source of the world’s cocaine, to vary from 0.23 to 0.93 percent (1 12).
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 45

Table 2-5-Estimated Quantity of Chemicals Used to Process Coca Leaf Into

Cocaine Hydrochloride in 1990

Low/High

Processing stage Inputs (in millions) Regionwide Bolivia Colombia Peru

Coca leaf to coca paste Kerosene (/) 567/776 108/31 7 --/45.8 —/41 3

Sodium bicarbonate (kg) 1.2/1 .64 0.23/0.67 -/0.1 o —/0.87

Ammonia (/) 5.56/7.62 1 ,06/3.12 -/0.45 —/4.05

Coca paste to coca base Sulfuric acid (/) 9.94/13.6 1 .90/5 .57 -/0.80 —/7.24

Potassium permanganate (kg) 0.24/0.32 0.05/0/13 -/0.02 —/0.1 7

Coca base to cocaine HCI Ethyl ether (/) 15.8/21 .7 1.06/3.1 2 13.6/1 7.4 —/1 .16

Acetone (l) 7.89/10,8 0.53/1 .56 6.78/8.69 —/0.01

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Narcotics: The Environmental Consequences (Washington, DC:

Department of State, 1991).

Many indigenous Andeans chew coca on a

daily basis as a mild stimulant to allay fatigue and

hunger, and coca leaves are used by indigenous

and non-indigenous people for medicinal purposes. Coca leaves are also an important part of

offerings made in cultural and religious rituals

and are a critical element of traditional Andean

patterns of production and exchange between

highlands and lowlands. Community and political

solidarity were long maintained through these

exchanges.

The desire for products of the montaña,

particularly coca, is a longstanding, basic part of

Andean culture, and so the commercial ties

survived the fall of empires (1 15).

I History of Coca Leaf in Andean Society

The earliest archaeological evidence of coca

use, found in southwestern Ecuador, dates from

about 2100 BC (uncorrected radiocarbon dating)

(112). Different coca leaf varieties and associate

chewing paraphernalia from succeeding centuries

have been excavated in such widely spread areas

as Northern Chile and Costa Rica (112). Prior to

European settlement, major areas in Peru, from

the north coastal subtropical desert zone to the

southern coca-producing areas of Sonqo, were

coca production zones for the Inca state (30, 107).

In Inca times, coca was a sacred plant. The Inca

symbolically associated coca with the color

green, itself evocative of the rainy season, spirits

of the dead, love amulets, and in general, with

supernatural forces (151). This symbolic context

of fertility, outside forces, and the divine realm

continues to have significance in contemporary

ritual coca use (116).

Although initially opposed by colonial clergy,

coca chewing in the indigenous population spread

even further during the first years of Spanish

occupation (125,126). Wherever coca production

brought significant revenue, as in Bolivia and

Peru, attempts at suppression gradually were

abandoned (22). Evidence suggests coca consumption was encouraged by mining interests to

help miners withstand harsh working conditions

in high-altitude silver and tin mines (101, 116).

The transformation of coca into a commodity

during the colonial period represented a clear

break with the indigenous pattern, and has parallels with the current crisis (116).

9 Ritual and Medicinal Uses

Traditional coca chewing is not an isolated or

relic phenomenon (table 2-6). Coca is the focal

element in all traditional religious rituals surrounding interaction between human s and supernatural forces, such as supplication and divination. It is employed for religious purposes by the

Quechua-speaking peoples of the Peruvian Andes

and the Aymara of Bolivia, as well as the
46 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

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2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 47

Traditional coca use by Andean miners has persisted

since colonial times. Here, a Bolivian miner chews

coca, indicated by the bulge in her cheek, while

working,

Tukanoans of the Colombian Amazon, who

inhabit the Vaupés, Caquetá, and Paraná river

regions (1 16). Even those who do not chew coca

on a daily basis use it periodically in rituals. For

instance, most native Andeans believe that certain

activities, such as sowing and harvesting, require

ritual offerings of coca be made to those lending

their labor (122).

Apart from its religious significance, coca is

almost universally regarded by indigenous peoples as a food, and native explanations of the

coca’s value are grounded in physiological rather

than cultural factors (97). The persistence of the

coca habit can be understood if it has been critical

for the adaptation and survival of native Andeans

under high altitude conditions (29). When Western scientists began studying coca at the turn of

the century, they focused on cocaine hydrochloride. The applicability of unprocessed coca leaf as

a modern pharmaceutical product was not pursued and, following the abolition of cocaine, coca

leaf was not available for scientific investigation

in the United States and Europe (112). Nevertheless, the utility of traditional coca consumption

for Andean populations cannot be ignored. Three

physiological benefits of coca use (for relief from

altitude sickness, as a remedy to vitamin deficiencies, and in conserving body heat), are specifically appropriate to Andeans who must endure the

stresses of high-altitude labor and a low-protein

diet (29,64,101). Evidence does not support

claims that long-term traditional use is harmful

(86). Rather, the multiple advantages of coca use

indicate that it has a strong positive role in

Andean health (box 6-A) (1 12,116).

A much higher percentage of the Bolivian

population regularly consumes the unprocessed

coca leaf for daily sustenance than is involved in

the illegal production, transport, marketing, processing, and trafficking of the coca leaf and its

derivatives. Coca leaf is used by eighty-seven

percent of the inhabitants in the small towns and

rural communities of Bolivia for some 40 different health remedies (76). Between 11/2 and 2

rnillion people chew coca in Bolivia alone (34,76).

Similar, or greater figures also apply to Peru.4

1 Traditional Patterns of Coca Leaf

Production and Distribution

In traditional Andean society, coca is critical to

the smooth functioning of daily interaction and

ritual affirmation of kin group exchanges. Most

coca chewing takes place within the daily routine

and is carried out according to a specific ritual

pattern (3,125). A coca exchange will seal a social

contract, whether it be an agreement to share labor

(anyi), a marriage contract, or acceptance of a

political office (3,22). Coca also is used as wages

or payment for services outside of anyi in place of

less stable Andean currencies (23,35).

Production of coca is intricately linked to the

wider pattern of Andean agricultural subsistence

that depends on interregional trade networks that

4 There is comparatively less available information on the extent of contemporary use of coca leaf among Andean peoples of Colombia

and the Amazonian regions (1 16).
48 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Ritual

●

●

●

Box 2-A–Traditional Use of Coca Leaf

Religious and Medicinal Importance

Divirwtjom As part of the oomplex of beliefs surrounding its power to see and communicate with the

supernatural, and its association with the realms of ancestral and spiritual forces, oocais used by diviners

to M“ng divine knowledge to the oornnwnities they serve. Throughout the Andes today, coca cmtinues to

be a major rrwdium for divination, sought by indigens and non-indigens.

Su@&WorE Cooais used asanofferingtopropitiate supernatural foroes, andtoensure agricultural and

animal fertility and personal well-being; it is also ritually offered during marriage negotiations, and to the

dead at burial.

Tradltiomdmedkina Coca use is integral to practices of traditional healers and herbalists throughout the

Artdean and Amazonian regions. Though they praotioe nonconventional (non-Vktern) medicine,

traditional heaJers and herbalists do not operate within the indigenous sphere alone.

Widespread Therapeutic Importance

●

●

●

●

A)esfhetidanfkepfkz Indigens and non%digens apply oooatopicalfy asalocal anesthetic; oooaalso has

antiseptic quatities. The cocaine alkaloid has been shown to exert a powerful bactericidal aotion on

gram-negative and coccus organisms.

CumWe/’pmverXatlve reme@ Coca tea consurrwd by indigenous and non-indigenous Andean people,

alleviates the symptoms of altitude sickness; combats the effects of hypoglycemia; and helps prevent

various lung aknents (an attribute of particular significance to the mining population). For example,

chewing coca leaves is believed to limit inhalation of silioates that cause silicosis.

MXary s@ement Coca leaves contain vitamin A and significant amounts of B1, B2, and C; they also

contain calaum, iron, and phosphows, in either the leaves or the calcium oarbonate customdytaken with

the leaves. Leaf chewing helps alleviate nutritional deficiencies ofadiet consisting principdlyofpotatoes.

Stimulant Coca gives energy for W* reduces physical discomfort and fatigue, alleviates hunger,

sharpens mental prooesses, and, at high altitudes, helps the chewer keep warm.

SOURCE: Adapted from M.E. Reeve, ‘Wditionai Rolea and Uses of Coca L@ in Andearr Sooidy,” contractor report prepared for the

Office of Tochnoiogy /k%saasrno@ Jdy 1991.

move food and coca between distinct ecological involved inmost of the Peruvian market economy

zones. Exploitation of distinct zones, called

‘‘verticality, “ is a critical concept symbolically

and in terms of subsistence strategies (107). From

prehistoric times, coca has been the major crop

grown by Andean peoples in the lowest of the

principle ecological zones, and trade of coca for

highland goods has bound communities and kin

groups across the zones. Studies of modem

Andean subsistence strategies demonstrate that

this pattern has been preserved.

The exchange of coca and food is an ancient

strategy and coca traders were a nexus of the

regional integration promoted by this lowland/

highland exchange (35,38). Even prior to the

cocaine boom, coca was the largest trade item

(125). Peoples participated in this market if for no

other reason than for the coca needed to obtain

agricultural labor. Additionally, outside of the

markets, an active trade in coca has traditionally

been part of the household activity of temporary

migrants to the lowlands. Highland Quechua and

Aymara households each year traveled to the

lowlands with their products (meat, livestock,

cereals, and produce) and traded them for coca

and other tropical products. The informal market

sector traditionally has been of significance in

terms of promoting regional integration and in

stimulating small-scale production of an agricultural SU@US (72,99).
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 49

However, operation within this traditional

pattern is now a risky business largely because of

the emergence of a black market for coca leaves,

with which traditional users must compete (3). In

Peru, for instance, coca transported in greater

quantity than is necessary for immediate personal

use is subject to confiscation. As the number of

traditional commercial traders has Dimininished,

subsistence agriculturalists have increased their

trips, perhaps to move smaller quantities of coca

leaves at a time or to take advantage of the

opportunities for wage labor (105). Other traditional users find they must make do with fewer

supplies of coca leaf, and use substitutes, making

proper performance of ritual obligations more

difficult (1 16).

1 Cultural Ramifications of

Illegal Coca Trade

The persistence of coca chewing in Andean

Bolivia and Peru is linked most closely to cultural

continuity, and follows the linguistic patterns of

Quechua and Aymara (30). However, as economic pressures have provoked increased fragmentation of land holdings, temporary or permanent migration to coastal and tropical forest areas,

and delocalization of food production and distribution, individuals are cut off from the traditional

work and life patterns of their natal community

(ayllu) and face a “crisis of the traditional

ideology” (116). While poverty and migration

likely will continue to disrupt rural, indigenous

Andean communities, the international cocaine

industry has been instrumental in corrupting the

traditional role of coca.

In the cocaine trade, wage laborers are paid

more often in pasta básica (coca paste) than

money or unprocessed leaf. Pasta básica is an

intermediate, unrefined coca derivative that is

highly addictive. It contains numerous chemical

impurities accumulated during cultivation and

processing (e.g., pesticides, kerosene, sulphuric

acid), and is presumed to have serious health

effects (75). The practice of smoking pitillos,

More than just impure cocaine, pasta básica de cocaína

is cheap, widely available, and highly addictive,

attributes which underscore its potential to be a

significant public health problem in coca-producing

countries,

coca paste mixed into tobacco cigarettes, has

spread among urban and rural youth, and across

economic boundaries (85,86,94). Another health

risk of the cocaine trade, which has affected poor,

teenage male peasants in particular, is caused by

the process of making pasta básica. Thousands of

unemployed youth seek work as pisadores, those

who stomp the coca leaves in a chemical soup.

Exposure to pasta básica processing chemicals

over the numerous hours required for pastemaking causes damage to pisadores’ feet and may

pose other, as yet unknown, health risks (75).

1 Cultural and Economic Implications

for Coca Reduction

A recent study in Bolivia found that among

traditional agriculturalists and miners, 13 percent

said their productivity would decrease without

coca, and 16 percent said they would fall ill (39).

Laboratory testing of the effect of coca chewing

on individuals indicate that there is no significant

difference in actual work efficiency, but that it

may slightly increase endurance in work performance, acting much like caffeine and amphetamines to produce central body stimulation (72).

Still, further restrictions on the availability of

coca leaf for traditional use could, at the very

least, increase the difficulty of traditional Andean
50 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

cultures to fulfill ritual religious and social

activities. Furthermore, 40 percent of the Bolivians studied believed that “people would rebel in

some way or another” (39).

Indeed, coca leaf has become an important

focal symbol in the indigenous struggle for

self-determination, a significant political movement already active in Bolivia. The ongoing effort

for cultural equity by indigenous Bolivians often

includes support for or approval of traditional use

of coca leaf; concurrently, the Bolivian peasantry

have used what political power and organization

they have as a means of fighting coca eradication

efforts and bans on coca cultivation (76).

In addition to cultural factors, economic and

political factors need to be carefully considered in

evaluation of any action which would alter the

current situation. Unless illegal demand is removed, regulation of legal coca cultivation and

trade likely will be too great a challenge for the

Andean countries. Restrictions on all coca-related

activity then will likely continue, to the detriment

of traditional users (116).

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL

ASPECTS OF COCA CULTIVATION

Bolivia and Peru share the distinction of being

the world’s leading producers of coca leaf, a

condition spurred in both countries by long-term

social inequality, and political and economic

unrest. Over time, the appeal of coca leaf cultivation was heightened by national agricultural

policies that promoted agricultural production for

often unstable international markets while discouraging production for domestic markets. Small

farmers in Bolivia and Peru, who grow the bulk of

nationally consumed food products, were particularly hurt by agricultural and rural development

policies.

In contrast, Colombia’s involvement in the

cocaine industry mostly has been confined to

cocaine processing and international trafficking.

Numerous aspects of Colombia’s history contributed to creating an enormous advantage for

enterprising Colombian criminals in these activities, and Colombia’s narcotics traffickers remain

the industry’s chief beneficiaries.

How all these problems are linked might best

be understood by briefly examining some of the

social, political, and economic developments in

Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia that have motivated

involvement in the cocaine industry most directly. For Bolivia and Peru these developments

will be discussed mainly in the context of

settlement in the Chapare and the Alto Huallaga

regions.

E Bolivia

The development of coca activity is very much

within the framework of the political and economic history of Bolivia (5). Stagnation of

Cochabamba’s upland valley agricultural economy is a development problem and periodic

source of crisis that dates from Bolivia’s colonial

period.

Within the colonial economy, agricultural areas

supplied mining and administrative centers with

food and fiber (109). Then, as now, smallholding

farmers frequently undercut large estates, because

they did not attach a value to their own labor, and

could sell their produce at prices the large estates

could not match profitably. In fact, large estates

could only count on making money in drought

years, when smallholders were obliged to consume most of what they grew. Because their

landholdings were small and located in the least

favorable areas for agriculture, many smallholders could not support themselves from farming,

despite the fact that they dominated the markets

for agricultural products in most years. As a

result, smallholding farmers became heavily dependent on off-farm sources of income early in

Bolivian history (91).

This social context effectively discouraged

investment in agriculture and contributed to

worsening imbalance between the agricultural
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 51

and mining sectors of the economy. 5 For large

landowners, their estates were essentially collateral for investment in other economic activities.

For smallholders, revenues not immediately consumed were also invested in off-farm activities.

Economic opportunities were not plentiful, however, and worried government officials constantly

sought ways to bring new life to the agricultural

economy through development schemes.

The imbalance between the agricultural and

mining sectors was exacerbated by several events

during the 20th century. With completion of the

railroad linking Cochabamba with ports on the

Pacific coast in 1917, centers of craft production

could no longer compete with manufactured

imports, and many had to seek employment in the

mines. Large estates contracted labor on behalf of

mines, frequently obliging part of their resident

peasant population to work there. The relationship with the mines was strongly influenced by

international ore prices. During periods of high

ore prices, the agricultural areas of central Bolivia

exported large numbers of people to the mining

centers, and then reabsorbed many of them when

ore prices declined (48,73).

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY AFTER 1952

The problems faced by agricultural areas deepened in 1953 when the Movimiento Nacionalista

Revolucionario government enacted agrarian reforms that substantially redistributed land in the

upland areas and released peasants from the

political domination of large estates. The reforms

did not address productivity of peasant labor; in

fact, although more rural people had land, the

conditions for earning a living on that land were

as unfavorable as before, owing to the absence of

government policies to assist smallholders.

Conversely, land concentration reoccurred as a

consequence of economic growth in the new

export agricultural sector (140). Larger land

holders in the eastern lowland areas of Bolivia,

such as the Santa Cruz department, were encouraged and financed to expand and modernize a

commercial and largely export agriculture industry. Bolivia was the world’s largest recipient of

U.S. foreign assistance under the Point Four

program during the 1950s (77). Economic development policy focused on expanding the export

enclave and landowners in lowland areas were

provided with large amounts of foreign assistance

for transforming their estates into modern commercial agricultural enterprises. Much of the

economic growth experienced in the lowlands

following the agrarian reform was based on the

availability of migrant labor from upland areas

(109).

The impact of the growing commercial agricultural export sector on rural smallholders in areas

such as the Cochabamba department was to

recreate the economic imbalance that had characterized their relationship with the mining industry. Agrarian reform and the growth of the

commercial agricultural export sector did little to

improve livelihoods for small farmers and resulted in large numbers of people migrating to

seek employment in cities. This movement continues to swell Bolivia’s urban population (87,1 11).

CAUSES OF EXPANDING COCA

PRODUCTION IN BOLIVIA

By the mid-1970s, but before the rapid expansion of coca production, at least 90 percent of

rural families in areas of central and southern

Bolivia earned at least half of their income from

off-farm sources (120). Peasant families, from

their bases in rural upland areas, maintained

contacts in multiple migratory destinations, and

rapidly changed their migration patterns in response to changing opportunities and risks (87,109).

s This discussion refers generically to the mining economy or the nu”ning sector. From the beginning of the colonial period through most

of the 19th century the mining industry revolved around silver, but beginning in the last quarter of the 19th century, tin grew in importance

and became Bolivia’s major mineral expofl. Tin dominated the mining industry until 1985, with the crash in international tin prices and the

bankruptcy of the London Metal Exchange (1 10).
52 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

In 1974, international cotton prices collapsed,

and cotton producers, who had received substantial national and international assistance in preceding years, found themselves overcommitted to

a failing venture. Some continued to be recipients

of national support for alternate crops, and some

apparently became involved in coca leaf production (20). International financial connections,

physical infrastructure, and access to national and

international agricultural development assistance

facilitated involvement in narcotics by some

members of the agricultural elite at this time (76).

Following investment by members of the national

entrepreneurial classes, coca leaf production increased exponentially, with most of the growth

taking place in the Chapare area of the Cochabamba department (109).

When a series of natural and economic disasters dramatically worsened the conditions of rural

life during the 1980s, and coca-leaf production

rose in response to increasing international demand for cocaine, the nearby Chapare area was

incorporated into the migratory strategies of

many rural families (table 2-7). Three factors

brought about a dramatic deterioration in the

living conditions of rural families during the

1980s:

●

●

A severe drought began in 1983 and continued through the 1980s in much of central and

southern Bolivia, pushing thousands of smallholders “over the edge” in terms of their

ability to earn a living through agriculture.

Thousands of families left their homes

permanently, and thousands more have either begun to migrate seasonally or have had

to increase the amount of time they must

spend away from home to provide for family

needs. Impoverished rural people in the

semiarid upland valleys of the Cochabamba

department migrated to the nearby Chapare

region and became involved in coca growing.

International tin prices collapsed in 1985

when the London Metal Exchange stopped

Table 2-7—Reasons for Migration

Cited by Chapare Farmers

Reason cited Number of Percent

respondents of total

Lack of land . . . . . . . . . . . 74 42%

Seeking employment . . . . 39 22

Increase income . . . . . . . . 33 19

Traveled with family. . . . . 17 10

Other reasons . . . . . . . . . 13 7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 100

SOURCE: M. Painter and E. Badoya, Socioeconomic Issues in Agricultural Settlement andf Production in Bolivia’s Chapare Region, Working

Paper No. 70 (Binghamton, NY: Institute for Development Anthropology, 1991 b).

●

trading. Some 27,000 mine workers lost

their jobs between August 1985 and August

1986. The Banco Central de Bolivia estimated the unemployment rate to be 20

percent by the end of 1985, largely because

of the layoff of mine workers. According to

the Central Obrera Boliviana, the national

trade union movement, the figure approached

30 percent by the end of 1986 (45). The

impact of the mining collapse on families

not directly employed by the mining industry but dependent on it has not been measured. Many families migrated to urban areas,

particularly Cochabamba and La Paz. From

Cochabamba, many, unable to find work in

the city, went to the Chapare.

Finally, this was a time of general financial

collapse. Since the 1970s, different government administrations had relied on external

loans and expanding export production, to

finance domestic budget deficits and unproductive government spending (134,149). Ultimately, Bolivia was unable to make payments on its substantial foreign debt. In

addition, in 1983, the government unlinked

the exchange rate of the Bolivian peso from

the U.S. dollar. The effects of this dezdolarización on the already weakened Bolivian

economy were disastrous; the annual inflation rate exceeded 14,000 percent at its peak

in 1984. Since only those with access to U.S.
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 53

dollars enjoyed any financial protection,

many people turned to producing or processing coca leaf as a way to earn hard currency

(109).

Official estimates of coca leaf production show

a gradual increase from 1963, when production

was approximately 4,800 metric tons, and 1975,

when it reached 11,800 metric tons. By 1988,

coca leaf production was officially estimated at

147,608.3 metric tons (51).

CURRENT MACROECONOMIC TRENDS

Bolivia has a primary export-oriented economy

that currently is following a fairly coherent set of

economic rules (5). The severe political and

economic instability experienced by Bolivia from

1978 to 1985 led to rethikn ing of the overall

economic strategy (44). A drastic stabilization

program, implemented by the newly inaugurated

Paz Estensoro administration in August of 1985,

reduced inflation to 60 percent, limited public

spending, increased tax revenues, and brought the

fiscal deficit under control (134,149).

Gross domestic product (GDP) growth remained slow throughout the 1980s vis-a-vis

population growth, with negative GDP rates

occurring between 1980 and 1986, and very slow

growth to date. Inflation averaged about 18

percent from 1987 to 1990 (144,149). Furthermore, increasing absolute poverty and sluggish

private investment growth continue to plague the

economy, although the Bolivian Government has

taken some recent policy steps to promote foreign

investment (5).

Bolivia has been negotiating its debt since

1986, and had managed to reduce its level of

outstanding debt to about 79 percent of GDP (or

$3,504 million) by the end of 1990 (149). It has

managed to retire most of its commercial debt,

and newly contracted debt is being held by

bilateral and multilateral official creditors under

concessionary terms. Thus, the maturity profile of

Bolivia’s external debt has improved significantly (149). Despite these considerable improvements, Bolivia’s debt burden remains high relative to GDP and exports, and the country has

almost no prospects of becoming credit worthy

for commercial bank lending for some time to

come (5).

CURRENT SOCIOPOLITICAL CLIMATE

Despite severe economic problems, Bolivians

have enjoyed uninterrupted, democratic, civilian

government rule for the last 10 years. Amongst

stronger political candidates, a trend toward

coalition building and negotiations has emerged

in response to the repeated need for run-offs in

past elections. Thus, Bolivia is governed most

recently, by a coalition government comprising

the centrist and conservative parties (Movimiento

de la Izquierda Revolucionaria and Acción Democratica Nacional, respectively) through an

arrangement called the ‘‘Acuerdo Patriotic”

(74).

Nevertheless, Bolivia holds the world record

for most government turnovers via coup d’etat

(76). The recent transition to democratically

elected civilian rule was slow, and remains

tenuous in spite of the smooth succession of

elections in the 1980s. Prolonged economic

instability has weakened government institutions

like the judiciary and law enforcement agencies,

opening the way for corruption by narcotics

interests. Moreover, there have been disturbing

signs of decay. At least half of the eligible

electorate is turning away from participation at

the ballot box, perhaps due to disillusionment

with the regressive impact of public policies.

Some 80 percent of the population is below the

poverty line (74). And, although Bolivia has had

a relatively strong human rights record since

1982, there have been moments when the system

seems to revert back to military repression (143).

Even under democratic rule, the military continues to wield influence and protect its relative

privileges. One legacy of the most recent era of

military rule, lasting from 1964 to 1977, is the

often drug-related corruption and fraud found

throughout the armed forces. Repressive state
54 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

behavior, coupled with the military’s record of

political intervention, suggests the potential for

subverting democracy via the ‘militarization’ of

U.S. counternarcotics policy in the Andes (74).

Some argue that the Bolivian political system

lacks the institutional ability to develop effective

links between public and private sectors, and that

party activists and government officials divert

scarce resources and benefits to themselves,

friends, and associates (96). In addition, social

class and ethnic discrimination place serious

constraints on possibilities for broad-based socioeconomic development (74,87).

Close to 50 percent of Bolivia’s population

continues to reside in rural areas, and to derive

significant income and food from agriculture

(87,1 13). The peasant sector is responsible for 70

percent of Bolivia’s national agricultural production, despite adverse and discriminatory public

policies for marketing, credit, investment, transport, export, and rural education (87,103). In

exchange for providing cheap food, tax revenues,

and a significant part of the labor for lowland

commercial agriculture, construction, trade, and

commerce, peasant families receive poor housing, negligible health services, meager educational opportunities, rustic transport infrastructure, and almost no effective state assistance for

improving their farm operations. Indigenous leader

Victor Hugo Cardenas called this structural inequality “internal colonialism” (74).

The social and political inequities in Bolivia

create inherent difficulties for state-led rural

development. For example, elite groups whose

influence often extends to banks, public officials,

political parties, foreign aid support, and the

media, may monopolize public and private resources earmarked for agricultural production

(60). Thus, in the inter-class competition between

rural large- and smallholders for resources, the

rural elite tend to have the advantage irrespective

of the apparent orientation of the national political regime (74).

An elite minority has also benefited disproportionately from public investments in rural infrastructure, agroindustry, technological improvements,

and farm price subsidies (150). Figures for the

1970s show that only 5 percent of the subsistence

peasant population had access to formal agricultural credit (63). A 1990 Ministry of Agriculture

and Peasant Affairs report implied the peasantry

had access to only 4 percent of the formal

institutional credit available for agricultural production (103).

BOLIVIA’S RURAL SINDICATOS

The rural peasant labor unions, or sindicatos

have waged the only serious challenge against the

prevailing policy environment and entrenched

national and regional power structure. The sindicatos were organized after the takeover and

transfer of lands following the 1952 agrarian

reforms (1,49). Subsequently, they have functioned as community development organizations

with local, sub-regional (centrales), regional

(federaciones), and national levels with offices

and elected leaders (74).

The peasant sindicato movement has obliged

the government and international interests to take

coca-leaf growers concerns into account. Because

they have been represented through the union

movement, coca growers in Bolivia have repeatedly rejected efforts to organize insurgences in

the Chapare. This situation contrasts sharply with

that of Peru’s Alto Huallaga coca-growing region,

where violence is much more prevalent (74,109).

The implication of the contrast between Peru

and Bolivia in this regard is, whether motivated

by neo-liberal economic ideology or concerns

about the political orientation of the sindicato

movement, efforts to repress the unions or find

ways around their participation in development

planning and implementation are badly misplaced. They have been shown to be attuned to the

needs of coca producers and, indeed, they have

proposed alternative development programs (74).

It is misleading, however, to assume that

sindicatos are a completely sufficient substitute

for true political empowerment. Without locally

elected, controlled, and accountable central gov-
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 55

Bolivian sindicatos help organize rural communities

and voice peasants’ political and economic concerns

at local, regional, and national levels. This banner

from a Cochabarnba peasant federation depicts a

farmer chained to a coca bush.

ernment institutions, the Bolivian peasant population will continue to be dependent on grassroot

and nongoverment organizations for their political voice, and will remain locked out of the

central government power structure (87). Opportunities exist for including grassroots social and

political organizations in development projects

(109). Such involvement likely would strengthen

the political and institutional influence of rural

dwellers and would further their efforts to secure

the political and social justice, equality, and

stability they need to overcome the historic,

economic roots of involvement in the narcotics

industry.

I Peru

Recent migration to the Alto Huallaga is only

a chapter in a long history of economically

induced migrations by Peru’s rural peasants.

Colonization of the Peruvian Amazon basin

began in the 19th century, spumed by increasing

rubber exploitation (105). Air transportation to

jungle cities, and inland road construction were

major contributing factors in the 20th century.

Meanwhile, expansion of the hacienda system

concentrated land ownership, consigning peasants to more marginal lands (9). The upper jungle

areas of the Peruvian Andes, such as the Alto

Huallaga, were almost exclusively the property of

descendants of Spanish settlers, and not until late

in the 20th century would social and demographic

transformations push the peasant population into

these areas (105).

MIGRATION AND ALTO HUALLAGA SETTLEMENT

The economic need to migrate was caused

primarily by rapid population growth beginning

in the 1940s. When a road through Huánuco,

Tingo María, and Pucallpa was opened the same

decade, migration increased from the central

highlands to the Huallaga area (109). Some

commercial estates, including large tea and coffee

plantations, were established in the Alto Huallaga, and the central highland departments of

Huánuco and Junín became regular suppliers of

cheap, seasonal wage labor. Labor-force size

depended on foreign exchange earnings: when

international prices rose, plantation managers

contracted a large number of wage earners; when

prices fell, they did not (24). In spite of these early

developments, however, most rainforest areas on

the Andes’ eastern slopes would remain only

sparsely populated until the 1970s (105).

The combined effects of high population

growth rates throughout Peru, and long-standing

political and economic marginalization of the

highlands, also led to surges in urban migration.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the highland population

increased by 20 percent (from 5 to 6 million) and
56 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

the coastal population increased by 120 percent

(from 3,859,000 to 8,513,000). Peruvian peasant

farmers, often dependent on outside income for

subsistence needs, migrated to the coast to

supplement income between growing and harvest

seasons. It was in response to the unprecedented

burden on coastal city resources that the Peruvian

Government introduced policies to redirect migration to the less populous Eastern Andean range

(105).

The military regime that took power in 1968

(1968-75) restructured property ownership in

most economic and social sectors (100). It also

launched radical agrarian reforms, including

planned settlement campaigns (25,37,98) and

agricultural production cooperatives, some involving the country’s most productive land.

Nevertheless, reform did not increase most of the

rural population’s standard of living substantially

and, in not incorporating producers outside the

boundaries of project areas, it excluded many

migrants (25). In the end, even more landless rural

residents migrated to urban areas, and by 1972,45

percent of Lima’s population consisted of migrants (105).

A 1973 study of agriculturalists settled in Alto

Huallaga from upland areas in the Tingo Maria,

Tocache, and Campanilla regions found that 42

percent had migrated because of acute shortages

of land at home, whereas another 26 percent had

moved because of the lack of work. Thus, 68

percent of migrants to the region relocated

because they could not earn a living at home (40).

However, expectations that frontier colonization

could solve urban economic and social problems

were dashed by the lack of long-term funding,

management and guidance, and rampant resource

destruction (105). Funds were spent primarily on

nonagricultural development, such as urbanization and service sector activity. Most migrants

were unfamiliar with the local ecology, appropriate crops, and farming methods, and were left to

The shortage of transport infrastructure in most rural

Andean and tropical forest regions mitigates in favor

of low-tech, low-weight, high-value crops like coca,

Local transport of goods still is largely by porters or

beasts of burden.

market expansion, or irrigation and farming

techniques improvement.

Settlers were economically debilitated by underdevelopment and underproduction. The Alto

Huallaga continued to be characterized by low

productivity of food crops and minimal use of

modern inputs such as fertilizers (109). This

placed farmers at a disadvantage relative to those

from other tropical valleys. New roads were

needed, not to export a bounty of new agricultural

products to the rest of the country, but to import

food (105).

The profitability of legal crops declined throughout Peru in the 1970s. Agricultural trade was

increasingly unfavorable, in part due to internadepend on advice of equally inexperienced au- tional lending policies (e.g., removal of subsidies

thorities (105). Finally, little money went into allowing markets to reflect real demand and

addressing key agricultural problems such as supply)(7). Most significantly, production input
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 57

costs for agricultural crops severely outweighed

their market value. Government-instituted cooperatives in the Alto Huallaga, such as the tea and

coffee plantations, began disbanding as participants took up coca cultivation. The resulting labor

shortage for legitimate agriculture further debilitated the cooperatives and their regions, assuring

their demise (109).

The democratic era succeeding the military

regimes was based on a new constitution drafted

by a constituent assembly popularly elected in

1978. Illiterates (about 40 percent of the population in 1960) were granted voting rights for the

first time in 1980. Unfortunately, the 1980s were

also marked by the inability of Peru’s leaders to

cope with the international debt crisis, resulting in

the nation’s economy spiraling downward.

Under the democratic administration, frontier

settlement and tropical forest agricultural production continued to receive the most attention, to the

neglect of resource distribution and agrarian

development in other regions of the country.6 A

conservative alliance in the Peruvian Congress

blocked all reformist measures for the rural

highlands proposed in the legislative chamber

(109). Longstanding economic policies that did

not favor small farmers (e.g., subsidized food

imports, maintaining low urban food prices)

continued, while the economic crises of 1981 and

1983 increased disparities between agricultural

prices and input costs (127). Agricultural policies

in the last decade were oriented toward supplying

urban areas and have led to deteriorating terms of

trade (6). For example, overall production costs

increased 2.7 times more than agricultural prices

in the Alto Huallaga (10). It was also a period of

increasing indebtedness.

Loans from the World Bank, InterAmerican

Development Bank, and the U.S. Agency for

International Development (AID) financed roads

and provided credit for tenant farmers. However,

while the government sought a road system that

would open the maximum amount of land to

settlement (27,109), road construction was not

accompanied by economic measures or agricultural policies favoring small producers (142).

Economic constraints continue to pose fundamental obstacles to Peru’s agricultural development. Long-term economic investments in Peru

remain extremely rare, and most come in the form

of high interest loans. Without adequate and

accessible markets, legal agricultural production

is poorly rewarded, particularly in a coca-industry

inflated economy. Local banks impose high

interest rates that can easily place farmers in debt,

forcing them to sell their land and join the migrant

labor and squatter populations. Inability to invest

in production improvement (e.g., agrichemicals,

irrigation) feeds the cycle of economic decline for

most farmers of legal crops, further aggravating

their debtor status (105).

Economic Developments of the Late-1980s

Peru’s GDP per capita declined throughout the

1980s, with an increasing number of Peruvians

living in absolute poverty. An unconventional

economic strategy was undertaken by the Peruvian Government, between 1985 and 1990, to

redistribute income to poorer segments of the

population. The Garcia Administration attempted

to implement recovery by expanding aggregate

demand, instituting price controls, increasing the

budget deficit, and deferring external debt service. Domestic supply was expected to expand,

while consumption would be fueled by increasing

real wages, direct subsidy programs, temporary

employment-generating public works in marginal

areas, and transfer of disposable income from the

public to the private sector. The latter was

expected to be accomplished through tax reduc6 Resettlement of poor peasants in remote tropical areas of Third World countries often seems to be politically preferable to redistribution

of existing agricultural lands. This is because such colonization programs do not threaten politically powerful landowners or other rural elites.

It gives the false impression of a “positive sum game. ” To the exteng nevertheless, that the cleared tropical land ultimately cannot sustain the

colonist population this positive “sum” is a politicaI illusion (93).
58 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

tion and freezing public sector prices and tariffs,

and deferring external debt payments. Use of

slack capacity would be guaranteed by closing the

domestic market to imported competing goods

(88).

The experiment resulted in the most severe

economic crisis ever experienced in Peruvian

history (5). Peru began to accumulate debt arrears

with multilateral financial institutions, and in

1989 its total external debt was about 104 percent

of GDP (or $19,156 million) (88,90). The accrued

interest obligations on public foreign debt represented about 8 percent of GDP, which was more

than tax revenues in 1989 (5.2 percent) (90).

Coca production expanded considerably amid

worsening economic conditions in the 1980s. In

fact, the coca economy softened the most profound economic and employment crisis in the

nation’s republican history (109). Coca dollars

provide hard currency to finance desperately

needed imports and as foreign exchange reserves

have been depleted major banks have adopted a

tolerant attitude toward coca dollars. The coca

economy continues to increase in direct proportion to the decline of the legal economy (90).

Current Macroeconomic Trends

The Fujimori Administration (1990-) has

used various strategies to stabilize the Peruvian

economy following the years of hyperinflation,

real income declines, and budget deficit increases. New legislation has fostered private

investment in different economic sectors and the

basic economic agenda of the Fujimori Administration has been a return to orthodox economic

management and full participation in the world

financial community. A‘ ‘shock treatment’ stabilization program and several other policy measures were launched to fulfill these goals, the

immediate objective being to stop inflation (5).

Although hyperinflation indeed was halted, a

second result has been further, severe deterioration of Peruvian standard of living (83). The

economic crisis has also taken a heavy social toll

on Peru, sharpening perceptions of ethnic and

regional discrimination in an already divided

nation, and weakening institutional performance.

When President Fujimori took office, at least

two-thirds of the foreign debt was in arrears (5).

The stabilization programs and the various reforms implemented to reorder the country’s

financia1 situation allowed Peru to start servicing

its debt to the multilateral organizations (83).

During most of 1990-91, these payments were in

the range of U.S. $40 to $60 million a month

(loo).

The Fujimori Administration slashed government expenditures to gain resources for debt

payments. For example, large government outlays for subsidies were halted, freeing prices on

foods, medicine, and other staples. In early 1991,

Fujimori’s finance minister launched a wider

array of free-market measures. These included

privatization plans for about 30 state companies;

the application of free-market rules to the reformed sector of Peruvian agriculture; the adoption of a unified, floating exchange rate; the

reduction of import tariffs to an average of 17

percent; and the removal of most nontariff trade

barriers (100).

Fujimori’s stabilization program exacted a

heavy toll on the majority of Peru’s already

struggling citizens, and no major social emergency programs to ameliorate the harmful economic and social consequences were applied.

Social costs of “Fujishock,” as the program was

called, included increases in the already significant numbers of citizens suffering from critical

poverty (specified as a per capita income below

$15.50/men@ and chronic malnourishment (36).

In light of Peru’s historically violent and

unstable political situation, private investment in

Peru has grown slowly (71,128). A Special Senate

Committee report estimated that losses of freed

capital and physical infrastructure related to

violence during the period 1980-88 totaled about

U.S. $45 billion (67). Although investment has

not stopped altogether, its focus has changed in

ways that are not conducive to strong economic

development. Current investment projects con-
centrate on: 1) risk-averse activities, such as real

estate investments, which have partly replaced

investments in transportation equipment and industrial machinery, and 2) new investments in

micro-level enterprises, or in small-scale informal

sector operations, where overhead costs are low

(68).

In practice, Fujimori’s economic policies are

still undermined by continuing poverty, political

concerns, and an uncertain business environment.

Even the most adventurous entrepreneurs have

had good reason not to undertake productive

investment in Peru. Economic balance and

growth simply may not be achievable in the

medium term if the country’s political situation

does not stabilize.

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives

CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

Much of the Peruvian populace has been

skeptical as to the importance of counternarcotics

efforts relative to other domestic crises. In giving

precedence to domestic concerns other than the

coca industry, the Peruvian Government long has

abided with the public sentiment. In opinion

polls, the economy consistently is cited as the

number one problem, and subversion historically

has been the second; drugs were cited as a

principal problem by no more than 5 percent of a

1990 Lima sample. Most Peruvians do not

consider the drug industry politically advantageous for Peru; however, while the majority

support the principle of fighting drugs, few

believe that Peru should assume major costs in the

effort. Those groups that would be affected most

by counternarcotics initiatives hold similar beliefs (100).

Peru’s peasant coca producers naturally are

leery of counternarcotics efforts. Many peasant

leaders have criticized the Fujimori government

for failing to consult them on past bilateral

counternarcotics agreements, and for bypassing

Peru’s regional governments, institutions in which

producer organizations would have official participation (100). The coca producers contend that

they have resorted to coca cultivation only

Peru’s security forces, like its civilians, are more

concerned with chronic political and economic woes

than with the drug war. Often poorly paid, security

personnel in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia also are

particularly vulnerable to corruption by narcotics

dollars.

because no market exists for other crops, and

repeatedly stress that their existence is due to

demand for cocaine by consuming countries.

Guerrilla movements have had an especially

strong presence in Peru’s coca-producing areas,

primarily the Alto Huallaga Valley. Sendero

Luminoso historically has been active in the

southern sector of the Valley, while the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Arnuru (Tupac Amaru

Revolutionary Movement, MRTA) has been vigorous to the north. Sendero is said to have

received an estimated $20 to $100 million annually in fees (cupos) levied on peasant coca

producers and drug traffickers (69). Both guerrilla

organizations remained powerful in these areas

during 1991, thus making on-the-ground counternarcotics initiatives extremely hazardous (e.g., in

recent years, 10 workers on the AID/Alto Huallaga Development Project have been killed)

(100). No coca was eradicated in Peru in 1990 or

1991, and U.S. and Peruvian efforts at alternative

development were not initiated in 1991. Despite

the recent capture of numerous Sendero a nd

MRTA leaders, the extensive war chest and

331-054 - 93 - 3
60 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 2-B–The Fujimori Presidency and the April 1992 Coup

Peru’s political history is characterized by successions of constitutional and de facforegimes (alternating rule

about every 5 to 12 years). Historians tell us, however, that the differences among past regimes are nominal; both

have been dominated by oligarchical families whose primary concern was exclusion of competitors and

disadvantaged sectors from political and economic power. By his actions in April of 1992, Alberto Fujimori seems

to have futfilled a pattern prescribed by history. After more than a decade of democracy, which included hiselection

as president in 1990, Fujimori has instated a government of his own design.

The openness and competitiveness displayed sometimes in Peru’s political system were evident in the 1990

election to the presidency of Fujimori, a political unknown until a mere 2 months before balloting. Despite winning

the presidency in good part through denouncement of the opposition’s proposed economic “shock treatme~”

Fujimori immediately implemented what many analysts consider an equally draconian economic stabilization

program. Fujimori shifted toward a more radical program upon recognizing the need to restore good relations with

the international finandal community, whom his predecessor had alienated. To open negotiations with the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Wxld Bank Peru had to begin to repay its outstanding debt.

Fujimori’s economic reforms ended hyperinflation and renewed prospects for Peru’s economic recovery, but

also resulted in a severe recession. Given this trade-off, a key concern was the length of time Peruvians would

grant Fujimori to achieve economic revival. Critics believe he sought to ensure his government’s survival through

courting the military, in particular the army, the service that traditionally launches coups in Peru. Upon his

inauguration, for example, Fujim” had named an active-duty army general as minister of the interior, and restored

army power over the national police. This military alliance was cemented when Fujimori took control of Peru, on

April 6,1992, by dissolving the Peruvian Congress and suspending the Constitution. His pledge to reinstate full

democracy after the constitutional reforms-to be arrived at some future date-was approved by popular vote.

Democratic leaders in this hemisphere, and elsewhere, decried the act as an aufoga’pe(self coup). Ensuing

events received extensive and negative coverage from the international media: arrests of opposition leaders and

journalists, resignations of key Cabinet members, censorship of radio and press reports, and placement of troops

throughout Lima. The United States, Germany, Spain and, eventually Canada and Japan, suspended most aid

to the Peruvian Government, and the Organization of American States (OAS) issued a stern statement of

disapproval.

armaments believed to held by the Sendero widespread. Salaries in the Peruvian military

Luminoso in particular, could continue to hamper

development efforts in the Huallaga for years to

come.

For various reasons, Peru’s security forces

historically have been unenthusiastic about counternarcotics initiatives. Military officers argue

that such initiatives impede their more pressing

counterinsurgency demands. Many claim that

resentful coca-growers likely would side with

insurgents, as would the drug tmfllckers, thus

creating three enemies (100). Finally, in the

context of dire fiscal conditions, tolerance of and

participation in drug-related corruption have been

often are extremely low and, thus, drug money is

tempting. According to some estimates, the majority of drug-trafficking flights depart horn

official aiports. Not only have security forces

failed to obstruct traffickers-in some cases they

actively have obstructed counternarcotics efforts.

Military personnel have shot at helicopters on

anti-drug missions, and some believe that government authorities were behind the assassination of

Walter Tocas, one of the few coca-growers’

leaders to support the May 1991 Anti-Narcotics

Agreement (100).
———.

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives 161

However, from the outset of his takeover, Fujimori argued the necessity. In misaddress to the Peruvian public

April 5,1992, he claimed that thus far in his term as President, his efforts to revive the economy and to fight Senderu

Lurninoso and the drug trade had been repeatedly undermined by the courts and Peruvian Congress, and that

corruption throughout the judiaal and political system was to blame. The poor performance of Fujimori’s Carnbio

7990 party in the congressional elections had left him with Iittte party support in the Peruvian legislature. The

president was put at odds with the congressional representation from his primary opponents, the APRA and

FREDEMO parties, whom he blamed thereafter for policy deadlocks.

Although the future of democracy in Peru remains uncertain, the status of Fujimori’sgovernment has evolved

considerably. Initially, Fujimori would not set dates for presentation of political reforms to Peruvian voters, but

increasing international pressure prompted him to accelerate his schedule for the reinstitution of democracy.

Instead of first holding a vote on public opinion of his rule by decree, he announced that a plebisate on creation

of a constituent assembly would be held. The elected “Democratic Constituent Congress,” of which Fujimori’s

supporters now hold 43 of 80 seats, is tasked with reforming Peru’s now-defunct 1979 constitution.

Fujimori’s rapid restoration of some democratic processes has been attributed to concerns about the

economic consequences of losing international approval. With much of the government’s economic assistance

initially cut off, Peru’s ability to secure future ioans from the Wrld Bank, the IMF, or the Inter-American

Development Bank was questionable. Not only would this loss of support jeopardize Peru’s present and future

programs for debt payme~ but would delay indefinitely Peru’s economic revival.

At any rate, the capture of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman in September 1992, the election of the

constituent assembly in November 1992, and continued support from Peru’s populace seem to have earned

Fujimori tolerance from the international community. Despite concern amongst human rights officials that the

leadership of Fujimori’s security forces will become abusive in their zeal to root wt Sendero corroborators (e.g.,

since April 1992, disappearances and paramilitary actitity have increased), the OAS has reestablished relations

with the Fujimori government, as have the United States and other foreign countries.

SOURCES: Adapted from C.J. Doherty, “Lawmakers Support Decision to Halt Funding for Peru,” Congress/ona/ C)uarter/y, 50(15)961,

1992; “Peru and its Neighbors,” The I%mon@ 323~60):44, 1992; “Getting &vay with It” The Economk?? 323(7755):44, 1992;

Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 77M Serrdem File (Washington, D.C.: FAS Fund’s Project for Peru, 1992); G. Gorritl, “Mouse

Trap,” The New Republic, 206(18):14-15, 1992; L. Hockstader, “Peruvian President Takes Case to OAS,” The Washh?gtorr Poet May 18,

1992, p. A12; C. McClintock “Opportunities and Constrainta to Source Reduction of Coca: the Peruvian Sodopofitical Conte~” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Ttinology Assessme~ Aprfl 1992; Reuters News Service, ‘Troop Surround Congress and Lima,” Zhe

New York firms, April 7,1992, p. Al; Reuters Newa Servke, “Peruvian President Schedules New Vote,” The Washington Posfj July 29,

1992, p. A24; L. Robinson, “No Holds Barred,” US. News and 146ddl?eporfj 113(12):49-50, 1992.

CONCLUSION with similar urgency to the cocaine industry’s

In 1992, Peru experienced tremendous changes

in its social and political situation (see box 2-B).

In April 1992, President Alberto Fujimori, with

support of the army and police, suspended the

Peruvian Constitution and disbanded the Congress in a “psuedo-coup.” Additionally, on

September 12, 1992, Peruvian Police captured the

Sendero Luminoso’s founder and leader Abimael

Guzman. With Guzman’s imprisonment, Fujimori

may succeed in ending what was believed to be an

unstoppable campaign for control of Peru. Whether

or not the new Fujimori government will respond

equally threatening advance, remains to be seen.

9 Colombia

Coca leaf production and consumption in

Colombia has not been widespread. Historically,

coca use was confined to traditional leaf chewing,

mostly by Inca-descended peasants of the southern region, where it was produced 1egaUy until

1947 (12). Coca production was banned following lengthy public debate about coca’s alleged

long-term negative health effects and the role it

played in promoting exploitation of Indians by
62 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

landlords. Coca production was not a public issue

again until the late 1970s, when it reappeared in

significant quantities, only after development of

a cocaine manufacturing industry based on coca

leaf imported from Peru and Bolivia (129).

Now, however, Colombian criminal organizations are involved in virtually every aspect of the

narcotics trade, from drug plantations and laboratories in Colombia and other South American

countries, to smuggling operations and distribution networks at wholesale and street levels in the

United States, Canada, and Europe. The entire

spectrum of drug exports (marijuana, cocaine,

quaaludes, opium) brings nearly U.S. $2.5 to $3

billion a year in profits to Colombia; drugs now

rank along with coffee ($2 to $2.5 billion) as the

country’s principle foreign exchange earner (18).

The Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organizations (“cartels”) control the bulk of the Andean

region’s cocaine traffic. They have used their

wealth since the mid-1970s to organize private

militias, purchase sophisticated weapons, and

bribe, intimidate, and terrorize the Colombian

justice and political systems. Their money, firepower, and influence have enabled them to

seriously impede the evolution of the Colombian

government’s counternarcotics program in the

last decade.

GROWTH OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG INDUSTRY

Developing appropriate counternarcotics policy in Colombia requires an understanding of why

cocaine manufacturing, and the illegal drug

industry in general, has developed there. While

not a completely sufficient explanation, an important factor behind Colombia’s “international

advantage” in the illegal narcotics industry is that

state presence traditionally has been weak. The

Colombian Government at times has been unable

to control significant areas of the country or

enforce its laws, and has been vulnerable to

manipulation by interest groups (129).

Like those of its Andean neighbors, Colombia’s history is fraught with social and political

inequality and instability. Agrarian reform failed

in the early 1970s, largely due to the undermining

influence of powerful landed and agro-export

interests. Urban reform failed because of the

intense opposition of real estate, urban construction, and financial interests. The upper ranks of

the educational system remained essentially

closed and elitist despite repeated “reforms”

during the 1960s and 1970s. As land, capital, and

credit became more concentrated, and the gap

between the rich and poor grew larger, so did the

gap between written laws and socially acceptable

behavior (17).

Outward signs of Colombia’s weakening state

were numerous, evidenced by the growing informal economy, and widespread predatory economic behavior and violence. As its economy

grew more complex and segmented, the Colombian state took up an increasing number of

functions that it performed less and less effectively. Many laws were disregarded, government

bureaucracies became inefficient and increasingly unaccountable and unresponsive to the

citizenry, and private and public sector corruption

grew. As the underground economy expanded,

the legitimacy of the regime declined. Drugrelated violence and corruption have further

undermined the integrity of already weak institutions such as the court system, the police, the

customs service, and the military (129).

CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATE

The Colombian Government has maintained a

resilient and stable economy despite numerous

difficulties. Urbanization and income diversification have increased. Colombia did not borrow

heavily during the 1970s and, thus, avoided the

debt crises that plagued the rest of Latin America

(129). With annual GDP growth averaging 3.3

percent from 1981 to 1991, Colombia was also

the only country in the region that did not have a

year of declining GDP during the 1980s (148).

Inflation climbed to 28 percent in 1988 (up from

20 percent in 1984), but dropped to 26 percent in

1990 (47).
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 63

Despite positive growth overall, social indicators point to a continuing problem of poverty and

lack of opportunity for a large part of the

population (47). Colombia’s economy is characterized by a high concentration of income and

wealth, associated primarily with political privilege and power, and foreign sector booms.

Neither innovative entrepreneurship nor accumulation of savings are associated with most private

wealth, and property rights are weak (131).

THE COLOMBIAN COCAINE ECONOMY

Drug money’s presence and corrupting influence reverberates through the Colombian economy. To estimate the economic impact of the

cocaine industry on Colombia and the possibilities for substitution, it is necessary first to

determine the order of magnitude of the industry.

This requires estimation of domestic consumption and prices, prices of the imported coca paste

and chemical products needed to refine cocaine,

wholesale export prices, the amounts of the

product which are lost to interdiction, and other

related factors. The estimation of the Colombian

GDP generated by the industry is even more

complex because it requires information about

value added, and about the income generated

outside the country by the Colombian illegal

enterprises. While the data to make these estimates can be found, a consensus exists amongst

Andean and U.S. experts that they are often

extremely weak and inaccurate (129).

Cocaine Economy Data

Although estimates of the size of the cocaine

economy vary widely, some trends are apparent.

The U.S. wholesale price of cocaine is declining,

and the amount produced is increasing. This trend

persisted in spite of interdiction and eradication

efforts undertaken during the 1980s. In the early

1980s the price of cocaine was high relative to

risks involved in the business, so that the incentives to increase output were strong even as prices

declined. In this sense, the cocaine output expansion of the 1980s was demand driven (129).

The estimated value of cocaine exports, range

between approximately U.S. $1.2 billion to $5

billion depending on the year or source of the

estimate. Since Colombian official non-factor

service exports fluctuated between the U.S. $4 to

$5 billion range, cocaine exports were obviously

“large” relative to legitimate exports. However,

this does not necessarily mean that the cocaine

revenues are brought back to the Colombian

economy, and it does not measure the impact of

the cocaine industry on the economy (129).

Rather, cocaine revenue commonly is invested

outside of Colombia, enters the black market, or

is invested in domestic ventures that provide little

benefit to the Colombian people (66).

Consequences of Drug Industry Growth

While the cocaine industry’s impact on Colombia’s formal economy cannot be measured accurately, the cocaine industry has had a negative

impact on the country's welfare, as well as on its

economic growth (129).7

First, the cocaine boom of the 1980s has made

it increasingly difficult to maintain macroeconomic stability. The drug industry acted as a

catalyst to growth of the underground economy,

which has become relatively large and impossible

to track (132). As the government loses information about real exports and imports, capital flows,

and investment, the planning and implementation

of economic policies becomes formidable (129).

Second, Colombia’s growth record was sign&

cantly better in the pre-cocaine era than it is in the

post-cocaine era. Investment has been distorted as

narcotics businessmen choose investments that

7 Colombia may have escaped the debt crisis because of the revenues from cocaine exports. However, the history of the rest of Latin America

shows that no relationship exists between a primary resource export boom and the ability to avoid a foreign sector crisis. For instance, all the

countries of the region that experienced the oil boom during the 1970s also experienced a debt crisis in the 1980s, in spite of the fact that the

oil boom was larger relative to the size of their economies tban the illegal drug boom experienced by Colombia during the same period (129).
64 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

can be used to launder capital and that have a fast

turnover, over those that can produce high,

long-term yields (132). The increased violence

that accompanies the drug industry also imposes

a burden on the rest of the economy as security

expenses increase in other business activities,

lowering their overall productivity.

Third, the large size of the drug industry has

produced a struggle for the control of the country,

between old monied elite and the newly emerging

drug capitalists. Many elite, though attracted by

the capital and foreign exchange that drugs

generate, nevertheless do not accept drug businessmen as peers (11,124). This conflict also has

been at the core of drug-related violence, and is

reflected in government policies that have been

predominantly reactive-responding to either external forces (U.S. pressure) or to the assassination of national political figures by the drug

groups (129).

Fourth, direct employment in coca growing

and cocaine production has been unimportant

relative to the size of the labor force of the country

and, thus, employment is not among the main

impacts studied. Instead, most employment generated is believed to be in the “security” branch

(e.g., bodyguards, paid assassins, paramilitary),

which if anything, has a negative contribution to

GDP (129).

Real Estate Construction and

Rural Land Investment

Two areas of the domestic economy heavily

infiltrated by narcotics investors are real estate

and construction. Few sources of nonhousing

mortgage funds exist in Colombia; therefore, a

substantial proportion of commercial and industrial construction is financed by the informal

capital market, short-term bank loans, or personal

resources. In recent years, particularly from 1985

on, the amount of new construction financed by

mortgage institutions, and the amount of new

construction measured by the amount of area for

which building permits were issued have deviated

markedly. In the absence of formal funding, much

The climate for foreign and domestic investment in

Colombia is severely undermined by drug- and guerillarelated violence. The personnel and property of

important state and private industries increasingly

have been targets of political terrorism.

of the new construction in Colombia is attributed

to narcotics businessmen, whose investments are

estimated at approximately $1 billion a year (65).

Narcotics businessmen have invested heavily

in urban real estate and construction and real

estate and cattle holdings in certain rural areas of

Colombia, particularly in the middle Magdalena

valley, the Urabá area in Antioquia and the

neighboring Córdoba department, and in the

eastern piedmont and prairies. These regions have

been settled recently, and frequently have land

property rights that are still in question (119).

Furthermore, they were regions of significant

guerrilla activity before narcotics investors moved

in (123). Narcotics investors have appropriated

their own dairy and cattle plantations, as well as

private paramilitary security forces which compete with local guerrilla forces for the rights to

“protect” area estates (131).
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 65

The involvement of narcotics businessmen in

these regions has had a technologically modernizing but socially backward effect (129). Their

resources have allowed them to increase the

capital intensity of production processes, and

introduce new technologies for increasing productivity in beef and dairy. Simultaneously, the

paramilitary groups have discouraged political

participation among local peasants. Violent land

counter-reform has led to increased land concentration, even in areas chosen for official land

reform programs. Ironically, rural wages have

increased in those areas, perhaps as a result of the

higher productivity, and the emigration of rural

workers pressed by the increased violence (123).

INCREASING NARCOTICS-RELATED

VIOLENCE IN THE 1980s

The narcotics trafficking organizations brought

urban and rural violence in Colombia to new

heights in the late 1970s and throughout the

1980s, in the form of brutal assaults on the state,

guerrilla action, and conflicts between rival drug

org anizations. Authorities responded with steppedup military and police repression, which often

served only to intensify the country’s spiralling

violence, multiply human rights abuses, and

threaten further the stability of Colombia’s democratic regime. In the ensuing cycles of government crack-downs, narcotics-related terrorist retaliations, and uneasy truces, Colombian leadership repeatedly nurtured and then abdicated their

country’s role as the frontline in Washington’s

‘‘war’ on drugs.

Included in the U.S.-supported counternarcotics effort, along with militarization and eradication (see Chapter 3), was a bilateral treaty for

extradition of nationals directly between Colombia and the United States. The rationale was that

such a treaty would deter drug lords, reduce

narcotics trafficking, improve bilateraI relations,

and alleviate the Colombian legal process from

the burden of mounting drug-related offenses.

Implicit in the agreement, however, was the U.S.

Government’s lack of confidence in the Colombian justice system. Nevertheless, the Treaty of

Extradition was sanctioned in Colombia in November 1980, and ratified by the United States in

late 1981 (17).

When the Betancur Administration took office

in 1982, it refused to honor the extradition treaty,

preferring to try Colombian traffickers in Colombian courts (41). Nevertheless, when successful

police interdiction efforts against the Medellin

“cartel’ prompted the assassination of Betancur’s Justice Minister in April 1984, the President

signed an extradition order for Medellin leader,

Carlos Lehder (17).

Betancur further invoked state-of-siege powers

in 1984, announcing a ‘‘war without quarter,’

which led to an unprecedented number of arrests,

raids, and seizures. The success of these preliminary efforts, however, seemed to confirm U.S.

Government officials’ suspicions that Colombian

authorities had more information about drug

smugglers’ operations than they routinely acted

upon (17). Major “cartel’ figures avoided the

crackdown by fleeing Colombia. Several subsequently offered to negotiate a truce with the

Colombian Government, conditional upon their

exemption from extradition. Rather than bargain,

President Betancur escalated the war. With U.S.

Government backing, the Colombian Government extradited 10 Colombians, stepped up

eradication programs, and seized more illegal

drugs than all previous administrations combined

(41).

The campaign was costly, however, for continuing violence between 1981 and 1986, resulted in

the murder of more than 50 Colombian judges. It

is widely believed in Colombia that the Medellin

“cartel” paid guerrillas to seize the Palace of

Justice in November 1985. The struggle ended in

the deaths of 17 Colombian Supreme Court

justices, all the guerrillas involved, and numerous

military and police personnel (41).

Not long after President Barco took office, in

1986, a massive wave of army and police raids

yielded almost 800 arrests, including three traffickers targeted for extradition. In February 1987,
66 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

the government captured and extradited Medellin

kingpin Carlos Lehder. Despite the fanfare surrounding Ledher’s capture and extradition, the

flow of cocaine from Colombia and the wave of

drug-related violence in the country were not

stemmed. Furthermore, during the same period,

eight of nine Colombian guerrilla groups broke

the truces they had negotiated with the preceding

administration, and, thus, began a new cycle of

violent retaliation from the guerrilla and drug

organizations (17,41).

The “cartels” mounted an all-out war against

extradition, in which they aimed at government

officials and judges, in particular. After Medellin

assassins killed the Colombian Attorney General,

in 1988, the Colombian President instituted

state-of-siege measures, built up police forces,

and appointed 5,000 new judges and assistants.

More violence followed, including the assassination, in 1989, of Liberal politician and 1990

presidential candidate Senator Carlos Galán. Between August 1989 and January 1990,263 bombs

were set off throughout Colombia, killing 209

people, and in late 1989 and early 1990, the

Medellin ‘‘cartel” began a kidnapping campaign

aimed at the Colombian elite. Most of the 420

police deaths in 1991 were related to counternarcotics efforts or narcotics-related terrorism (17).

These nationwide terrorist attacks made apparent the narcotics traffickers’ ability to disrupt

normal life throughout the country. In midDecember, members of the Colombian Congress

attached a proposal for a national referendum on

extradition to the Barco Administration’s constitutional reform bill. President Barco ultimately

withdrew the constitutional reform package altogether, but continued to face pressure to end the

violence through talks with drug ‘‘cartel’ members. Barco denied involvement in any such

negotiations and, in January 1990, ordered the

extradition of another Colombian trafficker. However, after January 1990, extradition efforts were

reduced, and narcotics-related terrorism subsided

noticeably (17).

Colombia’s public infrastructure serves a greater

portion of its population than does Peru’s or Bolivia ’s.

Recently, however, these services have been

threatened by mismanagement and neglect: droughtinduced electricity shortages in 1992 wreaked havoc

throughout Colombia and heightened political

tensions.

The extradition policy dilemma faced in the

1980s is illustrative of two distinct facets comprising Colombia’s narcotics problem: domestic

violence and terrorism on the one hand, and

international trafficking on the other. The security

of the Colombian state most directly is threatened

by narcotics-related terrorism, not drug trafficking (17). Barco’s forceful reaction to the wave of

violence that led to the murder of Senator Galán

was motivated by the need to defend state security

from a clear and present danger. Narcotics-related

terrorism was viewed as an urgent Colombian

problem that required an immediate response by

the government. The international narcotics business, in contrast, was seen as a broader and more

complicated problem that could not be solved

quickly nor unilaterally by Colombian authorities

and policy actions (17). Under the current admin-
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 67

istration a new constitution, ratified in 1991,

again halted extraditions.

CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE

Strengthening and redefining the role of the

state in Colombian society is a prerequisite for

success of any narcotics-control policy. One

significant step begun by the previous administration (Barco 1986-1990) and continued by the

current one, was the institution of constitutional

reform, which included strengthening the judiciary system and reforming the legal system. The

Gaviria Administration also focused its efforts on

accelerating the opening of the economy to

foreign trade and investment, and broadening the

political legitimacy and popular support of the

state. In August 1991, the maximum tariff for

most imports was reduced to 23 percent. On many

other items, tariffs were reduced to zero, severely

undermining g Colombia’s once thriving contraband trade (17).

However, the economic aperatura (opening)

has not been problem-free: interest rates have

stayed high and the process has encouraged the

re-entry of drug money. Another tax reform,

granting amnesty to those who had illegally

acquired assets and who had income abroad, was

implemented in late 1991, to complement the

elimination of the exchange control system (129).

Foreign exchange reserves in 1991 alone grew by

almost U.S. $2 billion, of which 60 percent is

believed to be drug money (17).

Since the Gaviria Administration took office in

August 1990, the dynamics of the drug problem

in Colombia once more have come full circle. For

a time, the narcotics-related terrorism of the late

1980s subsided, and many major figures of the

Medellin “cartel” were in jail. Of the country’s

principle guerrilla groups, all but two had negotiated peace treaties with the government and were

actively engaged in legal political activities.

However, in mid-1992, widespread guerrilla and

narcotics-related violence resumed. To the chagrin of the Colombian government, their most

prominent state prisoner, Medellin drug leader

Pablo Escobar, escaped. Terrorist attacks in rural

and urban areas by Colombian guerrilla groups

had been on the rise, and Escobar’s escape

coincided with a resurgence of narcotics-related

terrorism. In November, 1992, the Colombian

Government instituted a W-day state of emergency (55).

CONCLUSION

The Colombian President proposed steps at the

Cartagena II Drug Summit, held in San Antonio

in early 1992, to improve international cooperation to halt the flow of precursor chemicals for

cocaine processing, control arms trafficking, curb

international money laundering of drug profits,

and improve judicial and law enforcement cooperation in the area of counternarcotics intelligence

gathering and evidence sharing. Additionally, the

Colombian Government has made efforts to democratize, and in general, to promote an economy

in which profits are not associated with privilege

and predatory capitalism. Unfortunately, reforms

of this nature bear fruits in the medium and long

term, and face many obstacles in the short run. As

in Bolivia, entrenched economic and political

groups that benefit from the current conditions

will oppose any significant changes. Cooperation

in foreign trade, economic assistance, and several

types of technical assistance are needed (17).

Many Colombians believe that the influence of

Colombia’s drug “cartels” has continued to

spread through the economic and political systems; and recent events like Escobar’s escape

suggest that drug trafficking activities continue

largely unchecked in Colombia. When these

problems are set in the context of Colombia’s

reduced economic growth, trend toward declining

economic productivity, continuing widespread

rural poverty, and infrastructural bottlenecks to

the expansion of legal export agriculture, it is

clear the Colombian Government and citizens

face serious threats to social and political stability

in the 1990s. Colombia remains one of the most

violent countries in the hemisphere (e.g., murder

is the leading cause of death in males aged 15 to
68 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

44, and overall second leading cause for all

Colombians) and there has been no overall

reduction in the number of Colombians killed in

political and criminal violence (17,18).

Finally, the illegal drug industry in Colombia

has continued to diversify. Although illegal drug

cultivation in Colombia is not an especially

profitable business, social and political factors,

not economic imperatives, constitute the main

impediments to the implementation of governmentsponsored alternative development strategies. The

conditions in some areas, such as the impoverished and badly neglected Southern Cauca regions, where marijuana is grown, add increasing

urgency to the search for alternative development

options for Colombia’s rural poor.

Until viable economic alternatives are created

for the poorer peasantry in rural areas, coca

cultivation and, now, the opium poppy trade are

likely to spread, bringing with them increasing

levels of violence and corruption. Furthermore,

most of the opium fields are believed to be in

areas under the influence of the guerrillas groups

with which the government has yet to negotiate

peace. Partly because of the growing heroin

industry, many observers doubt that peace talks

will be successful soon. Even if a peace treaty is

negotiated, a high risk exists that many factions of

the two rebel groups could continue fighting as

bandits or terrorists, using funds derived from

their links in the heroin trade (17).

THE COCA ECONOMY

Nowhere, perhaps, is the social and economic

importance of the coca industry more significant

than at the local supply, or micro-level. Smallscale coca growers and coca-leaf processors and

traffickers are the trade’s principal dependents.

Predictably, they remain at the bottom of the

illegal industry’s pay scale, and they are the least

well represented actors in supply reduction efforts. Many international narcotics policymakers

suggest that if the monetary value of coca could

be sufficiently diminished, coca growers would

voluntarily leave the coca trade for alternative

crops (135). This overlooks many, less-direct

circumstances that are promoting and perpetuating coca cultivation. The size and importance of the coca economy among small-scale industry-related producers, processors, and transporters clearly determine opportunities and constraints to source reduction at the microeconomic

level.

# Difficulties Establishing the

Size of the Coca Economy

Gathering agricultural data for any crop in the

Andean region is difficult for a variety of reasons,

including: 1) diversified geography and topography, 2) variation in types of agricultural units,

agricultural farming systems, and productivity

levels, 3) wide dispersion of agricultural units,

and 4) inadequate funding and personnel to

develop official agricultural data. The remote

nature of production regions, their inaccessibility,

and dangerous trafficker or guerrilla presence

further compound data gathering problems (5).

Establishing annual coca industry price estimates is hampered by frequent market price

adjustments at the macro-economic level, and

because the coca industry is so segmented, price

variation often can be traced to a regional level as

well. Variation may depend on a industry participants’ “business connections.” For example,

growers, processors, or transporters from unconnected or unestablished regions likely will receive lower prices.8 Thus, to arrive at a reasonably

accurate price estimate, researchers would be

required first to pool the prices posted from

innumerable markets, and then to adjust these

prices relative to the size of each particular market

segment (131).

s An example of region- ar4 even, individual-spezific price variation found in Perw results from Sendero Lti”noso’s use of quotas. me

Sendero charges quotas from transporters and peasant growem according to various criteria. The quotas in Sendero<ontrolled regions, have

a direct adverse impact on the incomes of local producers, as well as an adverse, albeit indirect impact on load market prices (15).
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 69

Estimates of the size of the coca economy also

vary with different assumptions regarding yield,

geographical scope, number of hectares involved,

different prices at different stages and, in particular, overall inaccurate knowledge about the underground “industry.” This latter factor forces

analysts to make arbitrary assumptions which

may or may not reflect the changing reality of the

cocaine industry (5). Researchers have labored

since the early 1980s to calculate and report the

size of the population employed and/or estimate

the value of coca earnings by participants in the

various stages of its cultivation and transformation. These numbers vary over years and across

surveys. It is enormously difficult to collect

accurate information for such figures.

1 Importance of Coca Production at

the Macroeconomic Level

A former Finance Minister of Bolivia stated

that if the narcotics industry were to disappear

overnight, the result would be rampant violence

and unemployment. Indeed, as a relatively stable

source of income and employment, the cocaine

industry has cushioned the blow of poverty for

many in the Andes. The cocaine industry provided work for between 750,000 and 1.1 million

people in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia according

to some 1988 employment estimates (58).

The cocaine industry comprises a large assortment of workers, who have assumed a variety of

occupational and socio-economic niches. The

three principal categories of the locally employed

are:

●

●

Those involved in coca cultivation, whether

as plantation and land owners, farmers and

their families, migrant laborers, or fertilizer

and pesticide merchants;

Those involved in coca paste and cocaine

processing, such as laboratory owners, their

hired “chemists,” pit laborers, and armed

guards, and those who trade in leafprocessing and paste-processing materials

and chemical ingredients;

Table 2-8-Percentage of the Mid-1990 Wholesale

Value of a Kilogram of Cocaine Received

at Successive Stages of Activity

Stage Bolivia Colombia Peru

Coca leaf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43%0

NAa

1.80%

Coca paste . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.12 NA 2.01

Cocaine base . . . . . . . . . . 3.29 3.29 2.53

Cocaine hydrochloride .. .10.70 5.80 19.50

Miami wholesale level

cocaine hydrochloride

{U.S. $20,500/kg) . . . . . . . 100% 1 00% 100%

a Colombian organizations or cooperative ventures process coca

leaves directly into cocaine base. Leaves are not usually sold

separately.

SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, “From the Source to the Street: Mid-1990 Prices

for Cannabis, Cocaine, and Heroin--Special Report,” Intelligence

Trends (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1990).

● Participants in the transport of coca, processing ingredients, and paste and cocaine,

including local manufacturers, suppliers,

traders, and haulers, international dealers

and associated transport vehicle and small

aircraft owners and operators, airfield security guards, bribed government abettors, and

directly and indirectly employed legal and

financial advisers (75).

No more than 1 or 2 percent of the fina1 coca

revenue is enjoyed by coca growers. Instead,

coca-product prices increase substantially at each

marketing stage, with value added more so for the

risk involved than for actual processing or transportation costs (131). In producing the smallest

proportion of raw coca, but refining and transporting the highest proportion of cocaine bound for

the United States and elsewhere, Colombians

historically have obtained the lion’s share of the

illegal drug profits (table 2-8) (129).

Some trafficker networks establish close ties

with coca growers in specific regions, and provide

them with seeds, tools, suppliers’ credits, and

other forms of assistance that obligate the farmers

to sell their crops exclusively to the traffickers

sponsoring them. The traffickers use these patronclient relations to wield considerable social and
70 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

political control in some coca-growing regions.

Like the insurgent groups with whom they may

compete in Colombia and Peru, traffickers are

able to limit the state’s ability to execute alternative development projects in coca growing areas.

The traffickers have brought jobs and higher

income to otherwise impoverished zones of some

Colombian and Peruvian rural communities longneglected by the government. As a result, traffickers in some of these areas commonly are sheltered

and protected from police and other authorities

(17).

SIZE OF THE COCA-COCAINE INDUSTRY

Conservative employment estimates in early

1990 for Peru’s illegal coca industry (based on a

survey of 60,000 families) suggested that 200,000

people, or 3 percent of the total population of

Peru, may be directly employed by coca activities

(50). The figure would be higher if indirect

employment were considered (6). In Bolivia, an

estimated 120,000 people labored in the drug

industry in 1990, or about 1.7 percent of the total

population (50). However, a wide range of

estimates are available concerning most aspects

of the coca economy’s size and value (table 2-9).

Given Peru’s and Bolivia’s cocaine industry

employment estimates, the number of Colombian’s employed is negligible, an arbitrary estimate being about 50,000, or no more than 0.2

percent of Colombia’s total population (130).

Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State estimates suggest that there were 40,100 hectares of

coca in Colombia in 1990; this represents 18.8

percent of the total area cultivated in the Andean

countries. Colombia produces about 13.7 percent

of the coca leaf volume, a share that has been

increasing continuously during the last decade

(129).

EARNINGS AT THE MICRO-ECONOMIC LEVEL

Although information on coca farmers’ earnings are scattered and commonly anecdotal, the

contrasts between annual income from illegal

coca production and any other source of income

Table 2-9--Range of Estimates of the Importance of

Coca in Bolivia (1989) and Peru (1988)

Bolivia Peru

Coca production value

(millions $U.S.) . . . . . . . . . 313-2,300 869-3,000

Coca exports

(millions $U.S.) . . . . . . . . . 132-850 688-2,100

Total income

(millions $U.S.) . . . . . . . . . 246-442 743-1,200

Total employment

(thousands) . . . . . . . . . . . . 207-463 145-700

Area of coca production

(hectares) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,000-55,400 115,530-166,500

Share of coca economy relative to legitimate’ (percent)

GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19% 2-11%

Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-98 14-78

External debt ., . . . . . . . . 7-25 3-18

a For Bolivia: totals for 1989 were GDP, U. S.$4,494 million; exports,

U. S.$868 million (includes goods and services); and total external

debt, U. S.$3,420.2 million. For Peru: totals for 1988 were GDP, U.S.

$28,200 million; exports, U.S.$16,494 million; and external debt,

U. S.$2,691 million.

SOURCES: Adapted from E. Alvarez, “Opportunities and Constraints

to Reduce Coca Production: The Macroeconomic Context in Bolivia

and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, March 1992; R. Henkel, “The Cocaine Problem,” Bolivia

After Hyper Inflation: The Restructuring of the Bolivian Economy

(Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, Canter for Latin American

Studies, 1990); R. Henkel, “Coca Cultivation, Cocaine Production, and

Peasants in Bolivia,” presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Anthropologist, Washington, DC, November 1989;

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters,

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC: U.S.

Department of State, 1991).

are marked. AID estimated in 1989 that $375

million in coca profits went to small-scale cultivators, paste producers, and wage laborers, whereas

legal crops brought in no more than $50 million

(89). U.S. Government sources report that cocaleaf prices remained fairly stable, at an average of

$3 to $4/kilogram, throughout the 1980s (89).

While an average Bolivian worker’s income was

approximately U.S. $600 a year, a Chapare coca

farmer’s earnings were up to U.S. $5,500 a year

(28).

The earning opportunities for migrant and day

laborers are also impressive. For example, in Peru

migrant farmers were earning U.S. $16 a day

picking coca, whereas rice field laborers collected

only $3 a day (133). Similar disparities also occur
2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 71

in urban wages. For instance, in 1986, a seasonal

coca plantation worker in Monson or Uchiza,

Peru, might earn a daily minimum wage of U.S.

$2 or $3, respectively, in addition to room and

board. These wages were significantly higher

than the U.S.$1.60 daily minimum wage paid to

the unskilled industrial laborers in Lima (106).

Figures in 1989 were reported as follows: day

laborers could expect about U.S. $12 a day

($3,600/year); and cultivators/owners a gross of

U.S. $3900/hectare a year. On average, coca

laborers could earn from 2.5 to 8 times more than

other laborers; and coca farmers and coca field

owners, from 3 to 11 times more than their law

abiding counterparts (89). Although coca production employs a predominantly unskilled class of

laborers, they may receive 20 times more than

public employees, and 3 to 5 times what they

would earn in their home departments (50).

Information on wages is sketchier for smalltime participants in other sectors of the coca and

coca-product industry. Nevertheless, the following breakdown of the highly lucrative kerosene

trade in Bolivia illustrates the increase of value as

it enters the black market. In 1985, a 5-liter daily

ration of kerosene was routinely resold on the

black market for about 20 times its original value.

In the Chapare, its black market price could again

double or triple (75). Meanwhile, the salary for

paste transport was usually U.S. $2.00 per arroba

(approximately 11 1/2 kilograms), resulting in an

average day’s earnings of about U.S. $8, an

amount 500 percent greater than the average

$1.60 minimum wage for a Lima laborer (106).

CONCLUSION

As sociocultural, political, and economic circumstances in the Andean region suggest, differing U.S. and Andean interests that have long

hindered cooperation on the drug front are not

likely to be resolved soon. Bilateral cooperation

on anti-drug policies is hinged less on straightforward agreement than on rhetoric, tension, and

protracted negotiation (100).

Coca generates high incomes because it is

illegal, (i.e., the market has to pay a premium to

the producers involved for the risk associated

with it). Coca-leaf products, in addition, are high

value/low volume commodities that cover high

transportation costs particularly where transportation is primitive. Legal crops cannot command

a comparable premium under these conditions.

Thus, coca has been incorporated as part of a

portfolio of crops, in which it is the chief cash

crop (5).

Because of the coca economy’s size, it may not

be realistic to believe that alternative crops will be

enough to substitute for coca in the short or even

the medium run. Coca remains the best alternative

for many farmers and, if its price declines,

growers always have the option of simply leaving

the leaves on the bush until the price improves.

Interdiction activities have helped lower the price

of coca in the past, but without adequate demand

control, industry participants are assured that

higher prices eventually will return (4).

Other important considerations for long-term

coca substitution include:

●

●

Creating secure economic opportunities—

Growers already obtain the smallest piece of

the cocaine industry pie. While artificially

created coca-price declines such as those

created by interdiction activities cause some

growers to find other sources of income to

offset their losses (coca paste and base

processing, in some cases), they do not

provide long term solutions. The need to

diversify agricultural activity is recognized

by growers (5). Crop substitution and alternative development may not have to replace

coca income on a dollar-for-dollar basis, if

they create a safer and more stable social and

economic environment.

Diminishing comparative advantage—The

Bolivian, or Huánuco, variety of coca has a

high cocaine alkaloid content and grows

successfully in the Chapare and Alto Huallaga. However, features that further contrib-
72 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

In a seemingly timeless tradition, young, unemployed

men migrate to the Bolivian Chapare to find work in

the coca trade.

●

ute to the ‘‘comparative advantage’ of

producing coca in these areas are twofold: 1)

their ecological conditions, and 2) their

remoteness. The latter, creates difficulties

first for policing illegal activity and second

for profitability of other livelihoods. Although it would be undeniably useful to drug

traffickers, developing and improving transportation infrastructure in the Chapare and

Alto Huallaga areas would, in particular,

improve the profit potential of alternative

crops and resources vis-á-vis coca by facilitating their internal and external movement

and marketability.

Reinforcing the role of the state—In general,

strengthening the state’s presence and role in

producing public goods and services would

contribute to alternative development. There

are a number of things the Andean countries

can do to increase the standard of living of

agricultural producers that the coca industry

does not. The national government, through

help from the international community, could

●

provide potable water, access to basic health

care, electricity, and better schools. These

are basic preconditions for almost any type

of successful economic development.

Fostering equity and political stability--

Alternative development strategies that target populations at the bottom of the scale of

income distribution need to be applied to the

agricultural sectors of Bolivia, Peru, and

Colombia. The neglected rural peasant populations long have been a major target group

for the guerrilla organizations’ membership

expansion, as well as being primary illegal

drug cultivators. Increased stability in the

Andean states likely will require improvements in the standard of living of rural

populations.

The U.S. and Andean Governments have

differed with respect to the correct ratio of

“sticks” (repression of drug production and

trafficking) to “carrots’ (economic support and

development assistance). Drug policymakers across

the board have thus far been unable to fashion a

realistic, consensus-based, multilateral, longterm approach to address demand and supply

sides of the drug equation effectively. Although

difficult, no other approach is likely to offer

anything but temporary and partial victories on

specific battle fronts in an overall failing effort.

Profound changes are probably needed in the

economic and social structure and public policy

of the United States and Latin America, yet these

changes are unlikely to be achieved quickly and

cheaply, and certainly not by law enforcement

and military tactics alone (17).

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Willey, G.R., An Introduction to Amen”ca Archeology, Vol. 2 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice

Hall, 1971), In: Alford, 1991.

Winterhalder, B. P., and Thomas, B. P., GeoecoZogy of Southern Highland Peru: a Human

Aaizptation Perspective, Occasional Paper No.

27 (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, 1978), In:

Alford, 1991.

World Bank, World Tables 1992 (Baltimore,

MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

World Bank, “Bolivia from Stabilization to

Sustained Growth,” Draft (Washington, DC:

World Bank, 1991), In: Alvarez, 1992.

World Bank, Country Study: Bolivia, Agricultural Pricing and Investment Policies, 1984

(Washington, DC: World Bank+ 1984), In: Healy,

1992.

Zuidema, T., “The Lion in the City: Royal

Symbols of Transition in Cuzco, ” G. Urton

(cd.), Animal Myths and Metaphors in South

America (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah

Press, 1985), In: Reeve, 1991.
History

of Selected i

I

I

Narcotics

Supply-Reduction

Efforts 3

T

he majority of coca leaf used to produce cocaine and other

coca derivatives is grown in Peru and Bolivia (i.e., nearly

90 percent), whereas Colombian involvement largely

centers on cocaine trafficking. Difficulty with controlling

U.S. demand has fueled interest in reducing foreign production

of narcotic crops such as coca. An examination of past opium

poppy reduction efforts may provide some insights into ongoing

coca supply reduction activities in the Andean nations.

INTRODUCTION

Institutions involved in the narcotics supply-reduction effort

include: the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters (INM) and Agency for International Development (AID); the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA); the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD),

and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme

(UNDCP), which includes what was once the United Nations

Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). These organizations

and agencies use a variety of strategies to reduce or stop

cultivation of illegal crops, including identifying viable substitute crops, providing training and assistance for national military

enforcement and interdiction, and offering economic incentives

for eradication.

International treaties and agreements developed over the past

80 years concentrated on identifying the narcotics abuse problem

and encouraging controls by consuming countries. Later treaties

integrated supply and demand control efforts (box 3-A). However, effectiveness of recent treaties is not clear, and one reason

is the inadequacy of narcotics data for assessing narcotics control

measures. Irrespective of data shortcomings, narcotics traffick81
82 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 3-A-Selected Narcotics Control Treaties and Isgislation

The Hague Opium Convention of 1912

The Hague Convention of 1912 was the first attempt at international oversight of narcotics production and

trade (3). Treaty members outiined a system of production and trade regulations designed to curtaii abuse of

opium, its derivatives, and cocaine. Key points included farm-ievei production controls, processing controls, and

internationai-trade controls (6). However, disputes over target narcotics and producing countries, and

implementation mechanisms plagued the Convention resuiting in a fairiy ineffectual and narrow final text.

Uitimateiy, the treaty required aii parties to enact legislation aiiowing oniy medical use of opium, its derivatives,

and cocaine.

l%e Harrison Act of 1914

The Harrison Act of 1914 marked the first attempt to regulate the distribution of narcotics in the United States

and establish nationai narcotics record keeping. The Act included taxes and accounting of narcoticexhining

“medicines.” it had a profound effect on pharmaceutical and medical professions in the United States and spurred

a reduction in the psychotropic drug content of “over-the-cwnter” medicines. The ac~s impact was further

underscored by the emergence of black markets and higher prices for narcotics.

The Geneva Opium Convention of 1925

The bague of Nations organized the Geneva @’urn Convention of 1925 to discuss the regulation of

international drug trade. This Convention addressed an earlier proposal that crop substitution programs be

deveioped for opium-producing countries in order to heip them iimit production to iegitirnate needs (14). The

resuiting treaty required aii raw materials and finished products in international trade to be iicensed, but did not

address production ieveis (6).

The Geneva Convention to Limit the Manufacture and Reguiate

the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931

This Convention iimited any country’s abiiity to manufacture narcotic drugs beyond the ieveis adequate to

suppiy international medicai needs as established by an international board. Consequently, many factories

involved in opiate manufacture were ciosed. Analysts of the Convention suggest that this act ied traffickers to

establish their own laboratories.

Conference for the Suppression of the Iiiegai Traff ic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936

in an effort to increase the effectiveness of interdiction activities, thetreatycailed forinternationai cooperation

of member countries in curtailing trafficking, and providing evidence and information ieading to narcotics seizures.

The Opium Protocoi of 1953

The 1953 Opium Protocol iimited the number of countries that couid iegaiiy produce opium poppies, created

government iicensing of poppy cultivation, and established government monopolies over aii opium purchases. it

made no reference to cocaine.

The Singie Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961

in 1961, aii of the international drug treatieshxmventions since the Geneva Convention of 1925 were

combined into the Singie Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Whereas previous treaties deait almost exclusively with

the production and distribution of opium, the Singie Convention extended the cultivation and iicensing provisions

of the 1953 Opium Protocol to coca and marijuana. it also included a specific provision requiring participating

countries to phase out the practice of coca-ieaf chewing by 1969,25 years from the treaty’s effective date. The

United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Controi (UNFDAC) was established to repiace the bague of Nations as the

body responsible for oversight and enforcement of international narcotics regulation.t

1 The UNFDAC isnowintegrated with the formedyseparate International Narcotics Control Board and Divislonof

Narcotic Drugs into a single organization-the United Nations International Drug Control Programme,
3-- History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts 183

ing and abuse laws continue to be the primary

counternarcotics approaches based on the assumption that they are a clear deterrent to present

and potential drug traffickers and users. The focus

of international narcotics control remains on how

to improve enforcement of international and

domestic regulations.

The United States has worked with security

forces in the Andean region to reduce coca

production. However, the public and the media

have often viewed the efforts as heavy-handed

and intrusive. The Bolivian response to U.S.

military intervention, for example, has been no

more favorable than their view of developmentrelated eradication. One expert in Bolivia goes so

far as to assert the “DEA has replaced the CIA

[Central Intelligence Agency] in unpopularity”

(10). Despite coordination efforts, conflicting

goals of development and narcotics control have

created difficulties for development personnel.

OPIUM-REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

Aggressive international drug control policies

began in the early 1970s with the establishment of

Inter-Agency Task Force One charged with identifying targets for supply-reduction efforts. Mexico was a key target because of opium poppy (the

source of heroin) and marijuana production.

Search-and-seizure border operations were undertaken, yet quickly abandoned for political reasons

(i.e., contradicting the “good neighbor policy”)

(9). Heroin abuse subsequently was elevated to a

national security problem, and the U.S. Government began investigating potential heroin supplyreduction tactics.

Turkey was identified as the most politically

advantageous country for heroin supplyreduction efforts, The proximity of the country to

European smuggling routes and laboratories convinced U.S. officials that Turkey was a key player

in the heroin problem, despite the fact that only 4

percent of U.S. supply came from Turkey (31).

U.S. supply-reduction goals were embraced by

the Turkish military regime that gained power in

,

*

* ‘

A disproportionate number of those arrested and

imprisoned for illegal, coca-related activities are

peasants. Eradication and crop substitution policies

further heighten distress and conflict in coca-growing

communities by forcing those least able to control the

circumstances of their coca-trade dependency to risk

impoverishment or imprisonment or both.

1971 (26). A ban on opium poppy cultivation was

announced in 1971, declaring that all poppy

production would be forbidden by 1972 (31). This

move was followed by U.S. technical and monetary assistance to promote alternative production

systems.

The Turkish program was deemed a success by

the U.S. Government and the American public,

and the heroin problem was briefly reduced.

However, supplies from Mexicoj Southeast Asia’s

Golden Triangle, Afghanistan, and Pakistan quickly

filled the gap (15).

Within 2 years, the Turkish Opium Ban was

revoked for several reasons. The Turkish population felt that undue control was being exerted and

insufficient compensation offered for the adverse

effects of opium reduction on the Turkish economy and populace. Contributing to this sentiment

was U.S. purchase of opium derivatives from

other countries. Dwindling political support led

Turkish politicians to pledge their allegiance to

poppy growers and this quickly became a major

theme in the 1973 election (30). The U.S.

Government responded by cutting off monetary

assistance (23,28).
84 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Pakistan became a primary opium supplier in

the 1970s, complete with clandestine laboratories

and trafficking organizations (29). The government of Pakistan complied with international

drug treaties because of internal concerns over

increasing addiction problems. Having met with

little success in their own programs, the Pakistanis were willing to accept and support U.S.

supply-reduction efforts.

Four major U.S.-supported projects were attempted in Pakistan, including:

●

●

●

●

The Buner Agricultural Development Project, 1976-Crop substitution in key poppy

production areas combined with eradication

(26), sponsored by the U.N. Fund for Drug

Abuse Control;

Malakand Area Development Project, 1981—

Incorporated economic assistance for narcotics control organizations and enforced

eradication (26), sponsored by the U.S.

Department of State, Bureau of International

Narcotic Matters;

Tribal Areas Development Project, 1982—

Focused on infrastructure development, education, and voluntary eradication (27), sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International

Development; and

Northwest Frontier Area Development Project, 1983 (ongoing)-Combined eradication and development; components included

introducing various high-yield crops, providing short-term relief, improving irrigation, and teaching farmers about long-term

agricultural options (26). Vocational training is provided for those wishing to leave

agricultural livelihoods, sponsored by the

U.S. Agency for International Development.

Although enforcement of opium poppy eradication is considered a critical aspect of the opium

supply-reduction policy, AID acknowledged that

its most successful projects were those that

combined development with enforcement, and

permitted eradication to occur gradually and in

conjunction with the emergence of new income

opportunities. This method offered the local

leadership and citizenry a greater role in assuring

their financial security (26).

COCA REDUCTION EFFORTS:

THE ANDEAN STRATEGY

Coca has been cultivated in the Andes for

centuries, and the plant has traditional cultural

significance. Although the governments of Bolivia and Peru allow some legal production of

coca for traditional use, they have attempted to

support U.S. efforts to eliminate all production

above traditional and medical needs.

The governments of Bolivia, Colombia, and

Peru have worked to reduce their supply of coca

and cocaine using differing methods, according to

specific regional problems and anticipated outcomes. Projects undertaken in Colombia, for

instance, largely focus on interdiction because of

Colombia’s cocaine trafficking role. Conversely,

approaches in Bolivia and Peru (the major leaf

producers) incorporate development as well as

enforcement approaches. Past mandatory eradication efforts in Bolivia and Peru have been

suspended, in favor of encouraging voluntary

eradication and identifying alternative crops for

coca cultivators. Bolivia, and the Chapare region

in particular, has been the primary focus in recent

years as security declined in Peruvian cocaproducing regions.

9 Bolivia and Coca Substitution Projects

Initial AID development efforts took the form

of the Agricultural Development in the Coca

Zones Project (ADCZP) (1975). ADCZP sought

to identify alternative crops and evaluate them for

production and marketing feasibility. However,

viable alternatives were slow coming, and the

project reached its deadline with its goal unfulfilled. Bolivia’s economic concerns and coca’s

heritage presented some barriers to acceptance of

the AID project (26).
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts 1 8 5

The Department of Regional Development of

the Organization of American States (OAS)

worked with the Bolivian government between

1978 and 1980, to formulate an ambitious development strategy for the Chapare that included

identifyng investment opportunities for immediate implementation. First and foremost, the strategy provided a framework for coordinating the

activities of some 54 international, national,

regional, and private institutions promoting development in the Chapare at the time (17). The

OAS plan remains the standard from which all

subsequent Chapare development activities have

been drawn, and included seven areas: 1) technology transfer; 2) provision of agricultural credit; 3)

promotion of agroindustry; 4) zonal market development; 5) secondary road construction; 6)

electrification; and 7) installation of potable

water systems (19).

OAS foresaw a controversy that would characterize much of the discussion surrounding the

Chapare and other coca-growing regions in the

decade to come: that development would promote

the production of coca leaf along with other

economic activities. Recognizing farmer interest

in coca leaf was in large measure the due to lack

of other economic options, OAS acknowledged

that coca leaf production might expand in response to development investment over the shortto-medium term. However, it felt that only as

economic development opened opportunities to

earn a reliable income through other activities,

would the importance of coca leaf and cocaine

diminish (19).

The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of

International Narcotic Matters (INM) funded the

first effort specifically intended to reduce coca

cultivation in Bolivia. The project, Proyecto de

Desarrollo y Sustitución? (Development and Substitution Project, PRODES), was to investigate

the feasibility of crop substitution and produce a

project proposal for implementing crop substitution through AID. The 1980 Bolivian coup halted

PRODES activities and U.S. assistance was

suspended (26). Drug related activities escalated

?

2—

.

Many coca-growing regions lack sufficient

infrastructure (e.g., roads, electricity, irrigation)

for alternative development. How to improve

infrastructure without unduly benefiting local

narcotics traffickers presents a policy dilemma.

under the military regime. When democratic

control was restored in 1982, the new government

was unable to assert authority in the Chapare.

ORIGIN OF THE CHAPARE REGIONAL

DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Chapare Regional Development Project

(CRDP) was initiated in August 1983 as an

agreement between the Bolivian Government and

AID. New development efforts began in 1984 as

control was regained in the region. It quickly

became apparent that the CRDP effort could not

proceed under its original design (21). Two

practical problems confronted the CRDP and

catalyzed the redesign effort:

●

●

State control over the Chapare was and

remains tenuous. Bolivian government presence in the Chapare is limited to a small

group of development specialists and to a

repressive police force, both funded largely

by the United States. Effective efforts would

require a continuous development presence

in the Chapare.

The overall production systems of Chapare

farmers, and the relationships of those sys-
86 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

terns to the physical capacity of different

parts of the Chapare to support sustained

agricultural production were largely neglected. This problem had two dimensions.

The one most fully appreciated before the

redesign was that the cropping systems

being promoted probably would not be

sustainable in most parts of the Chapare.

This raised the specter that, should crop

substitution be successful, it could be the

cause of an environmental disaster. The

second dimension, was that potential alternate crops to coca leaf were assessed primarily in terms of the technical feasibility of

cultivating them in the Chapare. Little attention was paid to where and if farmers would

be able to sell their new crops (19).

A strategy to improve economic conditions in

upland areas-the origin of most Chapare settlers

and coca laborers-was developed by AID. The

redesign was formalized in 1987 and incorporated

the framework that continues expanding today—

a combination of crop substitution in the Chapare

and improving resource management activities in

the Associated High Valleys (AHV) (cf: 17,19).

The amendment recognized that the solution to

the problem of widespread involvement in the

production of coca leaf in the Chapare was not to

be found exclusively in the tropical lowland

valley itself (figure 3-l).

Migration created chronic labor scarcity in

highland areas, and affected family capacity to

manage on-farm resources effectively. Consequently, long-term agricultural production and

livestock management strategies were neglected

in favor of short-term gains. The resulting decline

in agricultural productivity progressively intensified migratory pressures (19).

The Campero and Mizque provinces of southern Cochabamba Department were selected as the

areas in which the AHV component would be

implemented initially, based on a study by the

Corporación de Desarrollo de Cochabamba (Regional Development Corporation of Cochabamba,

CORDECO). The study suggested the areas had

potential to become a center of economic growth

and a secondary area of population attraction (1 3).

Through this effort, AID/Bolivia and Bolivian

implementing agencies expected to gain experience relevant to an expanded AHV component.

THE REDESIGNED CHAPARE REGIONAL

DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The redesigned CRDP suffered from political

and institutional difficulties that diffused development efforts. Fighting political and institutional

brushfires consumed a great amount of development personnel time. The link with narcotics

control created a dual goal for development

personnel, drawing resources toward nondevelopment activities. Similar difficulties were faced

by the Bolivian institutions involved in the

CRDP--the Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternative y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca (Subsecretariat for Alternative Development and Coca

Substitution, SUBDESAL), the Programa de

Desarrollo Alternative Regional (Regional Program for Alternative Development, PDAR), and

the Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology, IBTA). Lack of staff continuity impeded CRDP progress in the late 1980s.

These problems and others resulted in ineffectual

implementation of CRDP activities (12,18,20).

The CRDP likewise suffered criticism in Campero and Mizque because it had created expectations that were not being fulfilled, and results in

the Chapare were equally modest. Activities

largely concentrated on continuing agricultural

research programs, although this research was

frequently criticized in government circles and

among unions representing coca growers as

having little impact on Chapare farmers (18,22).

AlD/Bolivia

The AID/Bolivia has been criticized as an

overly passive manager, potentially unable t o

obtain the respect due the entity that finances

existence of the two Bolivian institutions respon-
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 87

sible for the CRDP. Problems that have limited ●

the effectiveness of the CRDP, include unnecessary bureaucratic awkwardness among participating institutions, a lack of connection between the

objectives of individual CRDP activities and

overall project goals, and use of CRDP resources ●

to respond to parochial political party interests

inconsistent with project goals (19).

AID officials suggest that several factors have

hindered their ability to solve management prob- ●

lems confronting the CRDP:

Staffing and other resources are inadequate

to participate in day-to-day project management. This is exacerbated by the complexity

of CRDP and associated bureaucratic procedures.

The project is highly visible because of its

link to narcotics, resulting in AID/Bolivia

officials spending large amounts of time on

nondevelopment related activities.

Avenues exist to “bypass” the AID/Bolivia

management structure with little avenue for

v

Pando

L

)

Bent ,

●

1-. ) ‘

d 

- \-77

Santa

— ChapareA

Punata

SOURCE: Adapted from Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI),

Proposal (Bethesda, MD: DAI, 1992).
88 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternative y

Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca

The SUBDESAL was responsible for direction

of the CRDP, and it had authority to change

fundamental directions in the project without

approval or coordination with implementing institutions. Directional changes made by SUBDESAL have been criticized for complicating implementation. In addition, the SUBDESAL heads up

the council charged with coordinating the participation of international assistance organizations.1

The SUBDESAL is the principal source of

information for the ministers comprising the

council, and primary interpreter of their wishes

regarding implementation of drug policy. However, specific lines of authority and responsibility

were not defined, sometimes leading to arbitrary

and internally contradictory uses of power that

prejudiced implementation of the redesigned

CRDP (19).

Programa de Desarrollo Alternative Regional

The PDAR has major responsibility for implementing development projects in the Chapare,

like the CRDP, and coordinating the activities of

state agencies and nongovernrnental organizations (NGOS) that would be responsible for the

bulk of implementation activities in the AHV.2

The PDAR would provide resources and administrative support to the state agencies and

NGOS already involved in development activities

to provide alternatives to migrating to the

Chapare. The coordinating role was assigned for

several reasons, including: 1) the substantial

burden that its implementing role in the Chapare

was expected to entail; 2) the large number of

state agencies and NGOS involved in rural

development activities in upland Cochabamba

(4); 3) the desire to maximize the immediate

impacts of the AHV by tapping into existing

efforts; and 4) the desire to promote participation

in activities that supported the CRDP by as wide

a range of Bolivian institutions as possible (19).

However, despite its strong technical abilities,

PDAR has not been effective at planning, implementing, and evaluating individual projects in

light of overall CRDP goals. This reflects the

scarcity of skilled planners in Bolivia, and a

reluctance to engage in this type of planning and

implementation because of its potential to remove

some flexibility for executive auspices. Consequently, while PDAR carries out a number of

activities, the contribution of these activities to

the goals of CRDP is insufficient. It has been

suggested that the lack of AID/Bolivia authority

may foster such poor administrative practices

(19).

Instituto Boliviano de

Tecnología Agropecuaria

Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuaria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology, IBTA) is the inheritor of

agricultural research begun under PRODES, and,

thus, has acquired long-term tropical agriculture

research experience. It has assembled what is

widely regarded as an excellent team of agricultural scientists and technicians, and has conducted important research on a wide range of

crops in the Chapare that might provide farmers

with alternatives to coca-leaf production. However, research has focused primarily on technical

feasibility and yield maximization, rather than

product marketability. The IBTA-Chapare long

1 Additi~~ co~slon Ww ~~oduced when SuBDES~ ~W tie Utited Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) ifltO the

midst of the AID-funded institutions with no clarification of what their respective roles were to be (19).

2 pDAR ~s ~dergone sever~ mec~nges. At me time of tie r~esign of the CRDP, in 1987, the entity was called the hbsecrefarfa

paru elDesarroZlo def Tr6pico Boliviano (Secretariat for Development of the Bolivian Tropics, SDTB) under the Ministry of Planning and

Coordination. In July 1987, SDTB was placed under SUBDESAL authority and renamed the Programu de Desarrollo A/ternufivo de

Cochaburnbu (Cochabamba Program for Altermtive Development PDAC). In January 1990, this was changed to the Program de Desarrollo

Alternutivo Regional, reflecting concern with regional development problems that extended beyond the boundaries of Cochabamba department

(19).
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 89

The poor, unemployed, and landless from neighboring

communities often migrate to centers of coca-related

activity. Thus, counter narcotics projects must also

target areas of out-migration to reduce the lure of

coca-related income. Here, vehicles pass a checkpoint

before entering the Bolivian Chapare.

maintained that marketing issues were outside of

their purview and that PDAR should be responsible for addressing these.3 However, past PDAR

efforts on market issues had been inadequate ( 19).

THE CHAPARE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT SINCE 1989

Significant improvements were made in this

bleak picture in mid-1989. PDAR staff and

technical abilities increased during this period. A

new government assumed power in August 1989,

and with it came increased commitment to CRDP

activities (18). PDAR initiated 29 ‘‘immediate

impact projects’ in the Campero and Mizque

provinces, which engendered considerable enthusiasm and participation by rural communities.

During 1990, the number of projects carried out

in the AHV increased to at least 40, and additional

increases were projected for 1991. Institutional

arrangements and responsibilities were defined

(19).

Since 1989, SUBDESAL also has undergone

several changes that improved the ability of the

CRDP to implement projects (18). SUBDESAL

was placed in a chain of command with the

Minister of Peasant Affairs and Agriculture

clearly at the top, and a clear relationship between

national policy objectives and the planning and

implementation of local activities was established

(25). Furthermore, some redefinition of the division of labor between SUBDESAL and PDAR

occurred.

Increased attention also has been placed on

marketing aspects in the CRDP (24), Technical

assistance to PDAR and producer groups is now

being strengthened, particularly in marketing.

Irrespective of where market issues are addressed,

an integrated production-to-market approach is

needed for crop substitution efforts in the Chapare

to be successful. Research might be prioritized by

market availability for potential alternative crops.

Thus, market identification and research would be

closely integrated with agricultural research and

extension.

Still, the CRDP was criticized for being unable

to: address the development issues underlying

participation of rural populations in coca production, conduct the necessary planning and coordination to repeat past successes and reduce or

eliminate failures, or develop individual activities

to reinforce one another to produce the multiplier

effect needed for results to be long-term and

significant beyond the local level. Problems

continued to confront the major institutions

involved in the CRDP (cf: 12,17,19). The CRDP

was recently replaced by CORDEP (Cochabamba

Regional Development Project), and CORDEP’S

relationships with Bolivian Government agencies

have been modified or redefined (figures 3-1 and

3-2), in part to address the kinds of problems

referred to above.

9 Peru and Coca Substitution Projects

In the early eighties, the Peruvian Government,

in cooperation with the United States, created

3 Nevertheless, IBTA<hapare has, on the other hand, on several occasions invited input from internatiord advisors on marketing issues,

and is taking a larger role in this matter under CORDEP (19).
90 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Figure 3-2—Cochabamba Regional Development Project Organizational Structure

AID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

La Paz MACA

I

AID

Cochabamba ‘

---- -

”

---- -

” ------ - SUBDESAL

T =:

PDAR

I

CREDIT

AGRICAPITAL ‘

-

“‘L:~~a’ 1

‘?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

,[:=9”3‘E a

\-- /

I

IBTA/Chapare

.[+G:I

— Reporting 1

-- Coordination Iinks

> Targeted Impact

AID = Agency for International Development.

CORDEP. Cochabamba Regional Development Project.

IBTA = Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology).

MACA - Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultural (Ministry of Agriculture and Campesino Affairs).

NGO - Nongovernmental organization.

PDAR = Programa de Desarrollo Alternative Regional (Regional Program for Alternative Development).

SNC = Servicio Nacional de Camines (National Road Service).

SUBDESAL - Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternative y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca (Subsecretariat for Alternative Development and Crop

Substitution for Coca).

SOURCE: Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI), Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)-80/ivia, Technical Proposal (Bethesda,

MD: DAI, 1992).
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 91

several special projects to develop the upper

jungle, among them, the Proyecto Especial Alto

Huallaga (Alto Huallaga Special Project, PEAH)

(figure 3-3). The general objectives of this set of

projects were to:

●

●

●

●

Increase regional agricultural productivity;

Occupy upper and lower jungle areas;

Economically matriculate the region by means

of the Marginal Highway; and

Maintain regional ecological equilibrium,

rational exploitation of natural resources,

and improvement in the living standards of

the population (8).

PROYECTO ESPECIAL ALTO HUALLAGA

PEAH had peculiar characteristics that distinguished it from the other projects because of the

need to address the problem of coca expansion.

The Peruvian Government and AID/Peru designed a Project Paper for the execution of PEAH.

The project design included research, extension,

and training components; highway maintenance;

and credit development components (19).

The Project Paper incorporated control and

development strategies. It proposed massive coca

eradication under direction of the Proyecto de

Control y Reducción de los Cultivos de Coca en

el Alto Huallaga (Project for the Control and

Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga, CORAH) and a development plan to increase legal agricultural production in the region

under the responsibility of PEAH. The second

objective, however, was subordinate to the former

(8). While the development objective is considered in some sections of the Project Paper as

an independent one, in reality, both objectives

were interrelated and even explicitly articulated.4

PEAH management assumed that eradication

would oblige farmers to turn to legal production,

irrespective of the economic and historical processes that gave coca production in the Alto

Huallaga its importance (19).

Several features of a national social, political,

and economic nature were neglected and contributed to the failure of CORAH and PEAH. Some

more notable of these include:

●

●

●

●

●

The narrowly defined project area that excluded producers outside identified boundaries;

The assumption that producers inside boundaries would remain after eradication irrespective of economic dysfunctions associated with legitimate agricultural production

in the region;

Failure to anticipate a violent reaction to

eradication by the population, and subsequent expansion of subversive violence;

Lack of development components appropriate to the producing areas (e.g., despite the

suitability of the region for tropical forest

production, a forestry component was lacking); and

Failure to recognize the historical labor

scarcity problem (8).

Labor shortages are one of the worst consequences of coca expansion in Alto Huallaga, and

constitute an authentic bottleneck for the promotion of technical assistance and the extension of

areas under legal crops (19). Those farmers who

originally were unwilling to enter into coca

production finally did so in the face of the

pressure from increased production costs.

The Project Paper was amended in 1986 to

emphasize agricultural extension above research

and training, and also include a community

development component. The principal objective

of the extension component was to increase the

4 For example, the Project Paper said that regional development should minimize the negative social effects of coca eradication and that

eradication and economic development formed two sides of the same co~ with eeonomic development efforts depending on progress in

eradication. The paper did not treat regional development as an end in itself and did not formulate significant proposals for an integrated program

of economic development to include dl farmers in the region, not just coca producers (8). AIso, it did not consider how coca eradication might

negatively affect possibilities for development.

331-054 - 93 - 4
92 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Figure 3-3-Location of Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga

.-

---

..L!L”!) \

w“’”’”> )

Ancash’

- c

[

[<’ Marginal \ Huancavellca ‘\lca ~ IL/

\ \*& H’ghwa’

Alto

\

(

I

I

t

I Moquegua

t

I

I

1

I

t

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

f

I

1

(Lima,
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 93

rate of adoption of new production technologies

developed through agricultural research. The lack

of a relatively stable market for most legal crops

hindered extension efforts and made it difficult

for legal crops to be as attractive to farmers as

coca. In light of the importance of family labor, a

stable market has always been important in

making a legal crop an attractive alternative to

coca. Family labor reduces price sensitivity and

increases incentives to distribute labor inputs

over longer periods (19).

The introduction of the community development subcomponent was a positive decision,

resulting in a qualitative change in attitude among

the farmers affected by the actions implemented

by social promoters. Agricultural clubs and women’s

clubs, established and supported by the component, were capable of managing new cultivated

plots and proved efficient in installing nurseries

for cocoa and citrus plants and in rearing small

livestock. Similarly, the community development

subcomponent successfully carried out a range of

activities including road construction, park beautification, and latrine construction. The community development operations were placed in the

context of regional agricultural development that

took into account the most important problems of

coca expansion. Even though it was a positive

step, community development was not placed

within the principal objective of stimulating legal

agriculture in the Alto Huallaga (19).

1 Colombian Narcotics Control and

Eradication Projects

Only a small amount of coca is produced in

Colombia (i.e., roughly 13 percent); its clandestine laboratories and an efficient trafficking

network pose greater concerns. Therefore, narcotics control policies have focused on disruption

and deterrence of drug processing and trafficking,

often by military and police countermeasures.

Furthermore, because relatively few Colombians

grow coca, U.S.-assisted eradication programs

have a narrower social and economic impact and,

thus, have been more politically feasible than is

the case in Bolivia or Peru.

1978-1982

Early Colombian counternarcotics efforts began in the 1970s, aimed at marijuana trade on the

Atlantic Coast. The marijuana industry permeated the economic and political fabric of the

Guajira region, and with corruption and violence

reaching anarchic proportions, the government

feared loss of control in the area ( 1). Then, as now,

the Colombian Government was under pressure

to adopt U.S. counternarcotics policies in return

for assistance. Two policies of fundamental

importance in Colombian supply-reduction efforts were interdiction and eradication (1), (See

also Extradition, in chapter 2.)

In November 1978, Colombia’s President responded by instituting a National Security Statute, authorizing military participation in national

governance and law enforcement. The Colombian

Government then initiated Operación Fulminante, a U.S.-assisted, militarization- and manual

eradication-based effort to curb the marijuana

trade and regain control of the Guajira. Approximately 10,000 troops were deployed. Results of

that campaign were mixed, and did not suggest

success (1,2). For example:

●

●

●

●

●

Although marijuana trade was reduced, it

was not halted.

To the extent that enforcement efforts were

successful, they tended merely to displace

production and trade activities to other parts

of the country (the ‘‘balloon effect’ ‘), rather

than eliminate them.

The Colombian military was susceptible to

corruption.

Traffickers proved able to reestablish activities quickly as military presence withdrew.

Supply-sided eradication and interdiction

campaigns were not coupled with parallel

demand-reduction programs, thus reducing

prospects of disrupting narcotics trafficking.
94 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

● The costs to the local population were high

and deeply resented, and lacking rapid headway, the general public quickly concluded

that repressive counternarcotics measures

were not in Colombia’s best interest, despite

U.S. Government praise for the operation.

From the Colombian military’s perspective,

the guerrilla challenge was more important, and

from the civilian perspective, increasing political

violence and social unrest were of greater concern

(2). In March 1980, the Colombian army announced that it was abandoning its anti-marijuana

efforts in the Guajira region.

During this period, the Colombian Government

commissioned a study on using herbicides to

eradicate marijuana. However, Colombia’s National Council of Dangerous Drugs (Consejo

Nacional de Estupificantes) determined by consensus not to apply herbicides (l).

1982-1986

A new narcotics directive was established

under President Betancur: no extradition on

nationalist grounds, no militarization because of

domestic considerations, and no herbicidal eradication for environmental reasons. Yet, despite its

seemingly unaggressive agenda, the new administration quickly initiated an ambitious, DEAbacked interdiction effort. Furthermore, when

narcotics traffickers retaliated by assassinating

the Justice Minister, the new government promptly

reversed its no-extradition and no-herbicide policies (1,5).

As had occurred with anti-marijuana operations, the narcotics trafficker’s quickly adopted

new tactics for evading interdiction. Processing

was reverted to mobile, small-scale operations,

and the powerful cartel bosses negotiated new

trade routes and alliances through other countries.

They also increased their use of bribery, murder,

kidnapping, and other terrorist activities to protect themselves, and assure the loyalty of their

employees (2).

Betancur initiated programs for herbicidal

eradication of marijuana in 1984, and coca in

1985. Both programs were protested by the

public, and neither achieved long-term success.

Marijuana production declined only temporarily,

and, again, many growers responded to the threat

of eradication by reducing their plots, moving

operations to less air-accessible canyons, and

growing marijuana alongside legal crops (l).

1986-1990

In the mid-1980s, the Colombian Government

faced conflicting images: though praised for

cracking down on narcotics trafficking, it did not

seem to have restricted the flow of cocaine.

Moreover, the Colombian justice system had

been decimated by drug-related violence, and the

new administration faced the same daunting

panorama of threats (e.g., guerrilla insurgences,

drug-related corruption and killing, and rampant

human rights abuses).

Marijuana and coca eradication programs continued, but the returns on these efforts, particularly for marijuana, began to decline relative to

increases in the number of hectares under cultivation. Explanations for the declining rates included: 1) shifting of marijuana cultivation to

other regions; 2) increasing profitability of other

illegal drug markets, such as hashish and poppies;

3) declines in U.S. Government assistance; and 4)

diverted government effort to militarization and

extradition aspects of narcotics policy, as well as

ongoing counter-insurgency concerns (l).

1990-PRESENT

Although production of narcotic plants has

never weighed heavily in Colombia’s involvement in narcotics industry, evidence indicates

expansion of these activities. A January 1992

Departamento Administrative de Seguridad report stated that Colombia had some 25,000

hectares of opium poppies under cultivation,

while the U.S. Government estimated 10,000

hectares (16). The Colombian Government began

eradicating opium poppy fields with glyphosate
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 95

in 1992, despite protests from the peasant population (16).

Coca eradication as a Colombian narcotics

control policy has had short-term effects, although little chance to have a large impact.

Growth of coca cultivation came after Colombians were deeply involved in the cocaine

trade and, thus, the supply of coca leaves in the

country grew in response to the growth of the

cocaine industry. Most of the income obtained by

Colombians from the coca and cocaine trade

comes from the manufacturing and international

distribution of cocaine and the drug “cartels”

have already large investments in and out of the

country. Thus, policies to disrupt illegal drug

manufacturing and marketing, and to make it

more difficult to use the capital accumulated, are

likely to have a greater overall impact on the

Colombian cocaine industry than eradication

programs (l).

1 National Narcotics Enforcement and

Effects on Development

In addition to the inherent difficulties faced by

development projects in Bolivia and Peru, enforcement practices in both countries sometimes

have compounded the task of generating local

support for activities. Rather than fostering alternative means of livelihood, even limited eradication has notably impeded execution of some

agricultural extension and community development efforts (8). Some experts suggest that

competing goals of narcotics control and development generally contribute to this situation. Repressive actions on the part of some U. S.-

sponsored institutions may be the single largest

constraint on the success of U.S.-sponsored

developments efforts (19).

Unidad Móvil de Patrulla Rural (Mobile Rural

Patrol Unit, UMOPAR) has primary responsibility for narcotics control activities in Bolivia. The

organization has been accused of brutality against

peasants involved in coca production as well as

providing protection for narcotics traffickers on

occasion (1 1). Analysts suggest that increasing

militarization of the “drug war” generally and

U.S. sponsorship of UMOPAR particularly may

constitute the largest constraints on success of

U.S.-sponsored development efforts in Bolivia.

Partly as a response to the problems with

UMOPAR, the Bolivian Government, with U.S.

sponsorship, has created a new counternarcotics

force, the Fuerza Especial en la Lucha Contra el

Narcotráfico (Special Force in the Struggle

Against Drug Trafficking, FELCN), which began

operations in late June 1991. Because of the

corruption problems associated with UMOPAR,

plans call for the FELCNtobe‘‘insulated’ from

the rest of the Bolivian police force. How this

insulation is to be accomplished remains unclear.

It is also unclear how the addition of a second

counternarcotics unit will address the problems of

abusive and violent behavior on the part of police

that have unclermined development efforts (19).

The effectiveness of Peru’s PEAH in working

with coca farmers also was hampered by its

association with repressive police action. This

situation was provoked by the fact that CORAH

received logistic support from the Unidad Móvil

de Patrullaje Rural de la Guardia Civil del Perú

(Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Peruvian Civil Guard,

UMOPAR of Peru). The coercive method used by

the CORAH with the support of UMOPAR

produced resistance by the affected coca farmers

(8). The process of eradication also caused an

important sector of rural and urban populations to

fail to discriminate or distinguish between these

three different institutions. Drug dealers and the

Sendero Luminoso have taken advantage of this

fact to distort the program of PEAH. This problem

should also be analyzed in terms of the PEAH

concept and its relation to the eradication process

implemented by CORAH. While it is true that

PEAH was designed to promote regional legal

agricultural development, the emphasis on the

need to assist former coca farmers constituted a

risk inherent in the institutional life of the project.

The violent image of CORAH and UMOPAR of

Peru evidently affected PEAH’s image not only
96 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

The conflicting militarization and development assistance objectives of past counternarcotics programs have

undermined their effectiveness and often generated lasting resentment among target populations. Here,

demonstrators in Cochabamba, Bolivia, carry a poster that reads, ‘ ‘No to militarization! Yes to development!’

among coca producers, but also among other

economic sectors, increasing the resentment of

the farmers against CORAH as well as PEAH

(19).

CONCLUSION

Crop substitution and eradication efforts are

inherently slow. Coordination among development and enforcement organizations is critical;

coordination can help ensure that they will not

adversely affect one another in pursuit of their

individual goals. In the past, they have worked in

different areas with varied degrees of success.

Development groups generally work to improve

the region’s standard of living, whereas enforcement agencies work to impede production of

illegal crops and their derivatives.

Colombia poses an interesting political problem because it is not a major coca producer and

does not depend on U.S. development assistance.

It is possible that Colombia’s involvement will

change if supply is reduced, but concomitant

demand reduction will be necessary to avoid the

“balloon effect.’

Development organizations can maintain their

original philosophies while working with enforcement agencies. ‘‘Phased eradication” has

been most successful for crop substitution and

eradication projects in the past, and existing U.S.

organizations are well-equipped to adopt such a

strategy.

AID and INM [Bureau of International Narcotics Matters] have fundamental differences in their
3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 97

bureaucratic ethos and staff orientation. The

former is essentially a development agency and

its staff has expertise in overseas development.

AID personnel tend to view the problem of

narcotics control from a long-term development

perspective and give priority to economic and

social factors that affect coca production. INM

has a narcotics control orientation and its staff is

experienced in enforcement work. They tend to

have a short-term perspective and believe enforcement must begin early in the project. These

different attitudes can sometimes create barriers

to cooperation and coordination efforts (26).

A proper blend of development assistance and

enforcement and domestic and international agencies is needed. However, separation of enforcement and assistance activities should be clear at

all levels. Determining the relative importance of

each of these components, however, is problematic. Trust and education will probably prove to be

the most important factors for success.

Ideally, public pressure for elimination of the

drug problem should not be met with fewer

options. Rather the effective translation of knowledge, scientific and historical, should enable the

public to avoid over-simplification, and to exert

influence based on more rational understanding

(26).

CHAPTER 3 REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4,

Bagley, B., ‘‘Coca Eradication and Crop Substitution in Colombia, ” contractor report prepared for

the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.

Bagley, B., “Colombia and the War on Drugs,”

Foreign Affairs, fall 1988, pp. 70-92.

Brunn, K., Pan, L,, and Rexed, I., The Gent[ernen’s

Club---lnternational Control of Drugs and Alcohol (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,

1975).

Carafa, Y., Arellano, S., and Uribe, M., Tratamiento de la Temdtica & la Mujer en 10S Vanes del

Sur de Cochabamba (La Paz, Bolivia: U.S.

Agency for International Development, 1987), In:

Painter and Bedoya, 1991.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

Claudio, A., “United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty: Failure of a Security Strategy, ”

Military Review, 71:69-77, 1991.

Cusack, J.T, “The International Narcotics Control System: Coca and Cocaine,” D. Pacini and C.

Franquemont (eds.), Coca and Cocaine: Effects

on People and Policy in Latin America, Cultural

Survival Report #23 (Peterborough, NH: Transcript Printing Company, 1986), pp. 65-71.

Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), Cochabarnba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)

-Bolivia, Technical Proposal (Bethesda, MD:

DAI, 1992).

ECONSULT, Final Report on the Evaluation of

AID Project No. 527-0240evelopment of the

Alto Huallaga Area (Lima, Peru: ECONSWT

S.A., 1987).

Epstein, E.J., Agency of Fear (New York, NY:

G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977).

Healy, K., “Coca, the State, and the Peasantxy in

Bolivia, 1982 -1988,” Journal of Interamerican

Studies and World Ajj4airs, 30:105-127, 1988.

Jones, J. C., Farmer Perspectives on the Economics and Sociology of Coca Production, IDA

Working Paper No. 77 (Binghamton, NY: Institute for Development Anthropology, 1990).

Jones, J. C., Institutional Analysis of the Programa

de DesarolloAlternativo Regionul (PDAR), Working Paper (Binghamton, NY: Institute for Development Anthropology, 1991), In: Painter and

Bedoya, 1991.

Kent, R., Regional Planning and the Subsecretariat for the Development of the Bolivian Tropics

(La Paz, Bolivia: U.S. Agency for International

Development, 1987).

McNicoll, A., Drug Trafich”ng: A North-South

Perspective (Washington, DC: North-South Institute, 1983).

Musto, D.F., The American Disease: Origins of

Narcotics Control (New Haven, CR Yale University Press, 1987).

“Many in Colombia Resisting Use of a Strong

Herbicide on Poppies,’ New York Times, Feb. 17,

1992, A5,

Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs, integrated

Regional Development Planning: Guidelines and

Case Studies from the OAS Experience, Depart-
98

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in

ment of Regional Development (Washington,

DC: OAS, 1984), In: Painter and Bedoya, 1991.

Painter, M., Institutional Analysis of the Chapare

Regional Development Project (CRDP), Working

Paper No. 59 (Binghamton, NY: Institute for

Development Anthropology, 1990), In: Painter

and Bedoya, 1991.

Painter, M., and Bedoya, E., ‘Institutional Analysis of the Chapare Regional Development Project

(CRDP) and the Upper Huallaga Special Project

(PEAH),” contractor report prepared for the

Office of Technology Assessment, July 1991.

Painter, M., and Rasnake, R. N., “Human Dimensions of the War on Drugs,” IDA: Development

Anthropology Network 7(2):8-16, 1989, In: Painter

and Bedoya, 1991.

Pool, D. J., Adams, C., Boonstra, C., and Morris,

G. L., Evaluation of the Chapare Regional Development Project (Gainesville, FL: Tropical Research and Development, Inc., 1986), In: Painter

and Bedoya, 1991.

Rasnake, R. N., and Painter, M., Rural Development and Crop Substitution in Bolivia: USAID

and the Chupare Regional Development Project,

Working Paper No. 45 (Binghamton, NY: Institute for Development Anthropology, 1989), In:

Painter and Bedoya, 1991.

Spain, J. W., “The United States, Tbrkey, and the

Poppy,” Middle East Journal, summer 1975, pp.

295-301.

Stevenson, B., “Post-Harvest Technologies to

Improve Agricultural Profitability in Bolivia and

the Andean Region,’ contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, May

1992.

Subsecretm’a de Desarrollo Alternative y Sustituci6n de Cultivos de Coca (SUBDESAL), Marco

the Andean Region

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

Institutional Para Desarrollo Alternative y Susti -

tuci6n de Cultivos de Coca (La Paz, Bolivia:

SUBDESAL, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos

y Agricukura, 1990), In: Painter and Bedoya,

1991.

U.S. Agency for International Development, A

Review of AID’s Narcotics Control Development

Assistance Program, AID Evaluation Special

Study No. 29 (Washington, DC: Agency for

International Development, 1986).

U.S. Agency for International Development, Tribal

Areas Development Project, Special Second Evaluation, PD-AAZ-101 (Washington, DC: USAID,

1988).

U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Rescission of the Opium Growing Ban by Turkey,

Report to the Congress B-173123 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, Sept. 9,

1974).

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters (INM), In~ernational Narcotics

Control Strategy Report 1985 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Ad Hoc Subcommittee on International Narcotics Problems,

Politics of the Poppy, Report of a Special Study

Mission to Tbrkey: March 14-16, 1974, House of

Representatives Print 93-n.a. (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974),

Zentner, J. L., “The 1972 lhrkish Opium Ban:

Needle in the Haystack Diplomacy?” World

Afiairs 136(1):36-40, 1973.
Renewable

Resource-Based

Alternatives to

Coca Production 4

T

he geography and topography of the Andean region

provide diverse ecological settings with a broad range of

natural renewable resources. Developing and implementing sustainable management of these renewable resources could help improve food and fiber production for

national consumption and for export markets. Today, agricultural, forest, wildland and wildlife, and aquatic resources are all

exploited to some extent. However, use of improved production

and management technologies could expand these activities and

generate increased economic benefits. In terms of coca substitution programs, greatest attention has been given to agriculture

and some promising crops and cropping systems.

INTRODUCTION

Agroecosystems in the Andean coca-producing regions differ

markedly from the highly mechanized lowland agriculture practiced, for example, on the great plains of North America. Rather,

agriculture tends to be small-scale and distant from markets or

political or financial support, and extremes of topography

preclude extensive mechanization in most cases. The small

returns for most farmers impede acceptance of new and potentially risky technology. High-input approaches to farming, characterized by the green revolution, are less applicable in these

settings.

Moreover, the diversity of Andean environments does not

favor regional agricultural and agronomic planning. For example, almost 50 percent of Bolivian and Peruvian land area is steep

slopes and highlands. Only about 10 percent of the total surface

area of each country is suitable for row crop agriculture. Frequent

floods, droughts, and severe soil erosion make agricultural

production difficult in many areas.

99
100 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

The most fertile agricultural soils are alluvial

deposits in the valleys. Physical environmental

features (e.g., soils, slope, erosion potential) can

change character markedly over short distances.

Climatic features (e.g., precipitation patterns,

winds, temperature) may vary with distances

(especially altitudes) and time (season). This

variability means that a site-specific approach

must be applied to defining realistic technical

solutions for coca substitution. Unfortunately,

little site-specific information exists on climate,

soils, or topography for some parts of the Andes

and the prospects are minimal for gaining this

information in certain coca producing areas (e.g.,

Alto Huallaga).

Intricate patterns of land uses and land tenure

have evolved over the years as a result of

disparate cultural forces. Current agriculture in

the region is a mixture of pre-Columbian, Spanish, and contemporary practices, many of which

are incompatible with one another. This situation

further complicates development of alternative

crops and cropping systems. Nevertheless, significant efforts have been invested in identifying

crops and crop combinations that might improve

the value of agricultural activities in the Andean

region. Largely, these efforts have focused on

export agriculture rather than enhancement of the

domestic food supply system. Difficulties in

moving these commodities to the international

market, as well as in providing sufficient quantity

and quality of product, have constrained alternative crop efforts to date.

In addition to agricultural resources, forest,

aquatic, and wildlife resource exploitation could

offer alternative livelihoods. Tropical forest resources have received increased global attention

over the last several decades. Tropical timber

exports were key in national economies in the

mid- 1900s and continue to command high prices

in the international market. Constraints to continued or increased exploitation largely arise from

concerns over conservation of biological diversity and potential adverse global environmental

effects. Indeed, consumer boycotts of tropical

Simple processing and storage requirements make

cocoa (Theobroma cacao) an attractive alternative in

remote areas. Shown here is cocoa production in the

Alto Beni, Bolivia.

hardwoods for these reasons are becoming more

common. Nevertheless, there are opportunities

for sustainable timber production and forest conservation and protection in the Andean region (71).

Tropical wildlife has been an important domestic and export resource in South America for at

least 400 years (70,72) and has been economically

important. Unsustainable exploitation, however,

increased concerns over species loss and led to

international treaties and trade agreements to

protect rare, threatened, and endangered species

(i.e., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species). More recently, international conservation organizations have focused on sustainable development of wildlife resources. Potential

markets include hides and fibers, pet, meat, and

other animal products (e.g., bone), and technologies exist for managing a variety of amphibians,

reptiles, fishes, birds, and mammals to provide

these commodities. Nature-based tourism associated with protection and conservation of wildlife

and wildland resources offers another opportunity

for increasing economic returns from conservation activities (6).

Freshwater aquatic resources, largely fisheries

in lakes, rivers, and streams, currently occupy a

small share of national food production systems.
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 101

Estimates suggest that current harvest is far below

optimum sustainable yield for many species. A

paucity of data on the extent of Andean freshwater resources hinders analysis of the potential

contribution they could make to national food

production and economies. Yet, use of improved

postharvest handling, storage, and transportation

of fishery products alone could increase their

contribution. Additional opportunities lie in implementation of improved capture, resource restoration, and aquiculture technologies (101).

Opportunities exist for improving crop substitution programs and increasing their acceptability

to local populations. Some crops, production and

processing technologies, and markets are available. New crops that might improve the economics of agricultural production have been identified. However, further research will be needed to

identify appropriate cultivars, production techniques, and market potential. If substitution

programs expand the range of resources exploited, sustainable development technologies for

forest, wildland and wildlife, and aquatic resources will be needed.

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

Coca is grown mostly in the humid tropic

regions of the Andean countries of Bolivia, Peru,

and Colombia. While little variation in temperature is evident among the coca growing zones,

precipitation variation is obvious (table 4- 1). The

difficulties faced by agriculture in such areas are

well known (49,55,98). Many problems are related directly to high rainfall and temperature

regimes that promote nutrient leaching, poor soil

Table 4-l-Temperature and Rainfall of

Major Coca Production Zones

Mean annual Rainfall

temperature (C) (mm)

Bolivia

Chapare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

Colombia

Amazona 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-26

coffee belt . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-24

Peru

Alto Huallaga . . . . . . . . . 22-26

Central Hullaga . . . . . . . 21-25

Central Urubamba..... 21-25

Ene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

Gran Pajonal . . . . . . . . . 21-25

La Convention . . . . . . . . 22-24

Mayo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-25

Pachitea a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

Palcazua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

Pichisa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

Tambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

Yurimaguasa . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

2,500-5,000

2,500-5,000

1,000-1,900

2,500-3,500

1,400-1,900

2,000-2,500

1,700-1,900

1,700-1,900

n.d.

n.d.

2,000-3,500

4,000-8,000

2,500-3,500

1,700-1,900

2,000-2,500

a Little diurnal temperature variation.

n.d. = no data.

SOURCE: H. Villachica, C. Lescano, J. Lazarte, and V. Chumbe,

“Estudio de oportunidades de inversion en desarrollo e industrializacion de cultivos tropicales en Pucallpa,” Perfil de proyecto

para Ia planta de coloantes naturales yu para la planta de conservas de

palmito, Convenio FUNDEAGRO, Region Ucayali, Lima Peru, 1992.

composition, low fertility, and rapid growth of

pest problems. All of these features can lead to

increasing dependence on external inputs (e.g.,

pesticides, fertilizers, fuels) and affect the types

of agricultural opportunities available to farmers.

Distinct changes in the agricultural sector

resulting from the expansion of the cocaine

economy complicate efforts to improve agricultural profitability. As production of coca leaf

became agronomically and economically attrac1 This section was drawn largely from the following contracted background papers:

H. Villachic& “Crop Diversification in Bolivia Colombi% and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production, ” contractor report

prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.

S. Gliessmam “Diversification and Multiple Cropping as a Basis for Agricultural Alternatives in Coca Producing Regions, ” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1992.

B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Hamest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the OffIce of

Technology Assessment, March 1992.

A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systcms and Technology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms To Enhance

Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, ” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December

1991.
102 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

tive, many farmers abandoned livestock raising

and other crop production systems. Some local

traditional agriculture systems were abandoned as

well. Larger areas were deforested, more coca

planted, and less time and energy were invested in

traditional agriculture. This increasingly affluent

agricultural sector developed a dependence on

imported purchased food and experienced a shift

in aspirations.

While the agricultural sectors in Bolivia, Peru,

and Colombia are diverse, some similarities

among producers and farm size are evident in

primary coca producing regions. Producers tend

to be semi-commercial (i.e., producing subsistence crops along with some cash crops including

coca), production units are small (e.g., 20 hectare

units or less are common); and production systems tend to be labor intensive. The remote nature

of the producing zones means that inputs maybe

costly and difficult to obtain and markets (other

than at the “farm-gate”) are difficult to reach.

Coca plays a key role in farm income.

Crop substitution strategies must work on two

fronts. Development of new production options

for the coca producing regions must be complemented by development in areas from which

migrant coca growers and laborers come. National and international assistance and research

organizations support efforts to identify and

expand opportunities for new crops that can

replace coca in the agricultural economy (105).

Primary categories through which agricultural

profitability might be increased in the coca

growing regions of the Andean nations include:

Diversifying production,

Intensifying production,

Improving production efficiency, and

Increasing the value of products through

processing (chapter 5).

Current crop substitution efforts focus on diversifying production by incorporating high value

crops. However, attention is being given increasingly to the latter categories.

Despite the potential for improving production

through innovative cropping systems, the acceptability to producers comprises an important

concern. Social and economic advantages must

accompany improved systems. Crop diversification,

increased market options, reductions in direct

costs and risks, and increased opportunities for

involvement for all members of the family or

community become critical components of acceptable alternative systems.

1 Diversifying Agricultural Production

Diversifying agricultural production by incorporating high-value crops into production systems offers one approach to expand alternatives

for agricultural populations and allows an incremental evolution from a coca-based production

system to one based on legitimate markets.

Indeed, this approach is the basis of traditional

crop substitution efforts, and ongoing research

focuses on identifyng high-value traditional and

nontraditional crops suitable to local agricultural

production systems.

Inherent in the diversification strategy is the

ability of farmers to continue to provide for their

basic needs during the development stage of the

new production system. For example, many

cropping systems require 3 to 5 years of effort

prior to realization of profit (105,122). Coca

could be maintained as a cash source during this

period although it seems counter to substitution

program goals. However, such an approach could

offer an alternative to costly agricultural subsidies.

Research has focused on a variety of crops that

could be suitable for local, regional, national, and

international markets. Largely this research is

market driven and focuses on grains, industrial

crops, fruits and nuts, and spices. Blending of

these crops into traditional food production systems is another important feature of these efforts.

In this way, producers continue to provide for

basic food and fiber needs while developing

opportunities to generate cash through marketing.
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 103

Table 4-2—Cropping Patterns of the

Chapare, Bolivia

Hectares Percent

Crop (thousands) Percent of total

Annuals

Corn . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 9.00/0 2.7%

Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 54.3 16.8

Yuca . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 36.1 11.2

Perennials

Banana . . . . . . . . . . . 19.8 24.0 16.6

Citrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 7.9 5.46

Coca . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 67.8 46.9

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 2.5

SOURCE: Development Alternatives, Inc., “Environmental Assessment of the Chapare Regional Development Project, Bolivia, ” DAI,

Bethesda, MD, 1990, In: Stevenson, 1992.

The range of potential commodities that could

offer agricultural alternatives is restricted to a

certain extent by the environmental features of

coca growing areas. Box 4-A describes some

crops identified as potential alternatives. Although the list is not exhaustive, it illustrates the

range of crop types that might be considered and

blended into existing production systems,

Most crop substitution strategies in the

Chapare region of Bolivia involve some combination of soil-conserving perennial crops and annual

cash crops for immediate returns (table 4-2).

Research in annual crops concentrates on maize,

rice, beans, and yuca; the perennials program is

focused on citrus, coffee, cocoa, and pepper.

Other research deals with production and management of cattle, pigs, and poultry.

Efforts are also underway to examine essential

oils (e.g., eucalyptus, pyrethrum oils); natural

plant chemicals (e.g., xanthophyll); spices (e.g.,

piper nigrum); tropical fruits (e.g., pineapple,

passionfruit, bananas, carambola); and nuts (e.g.,

macadamia). Pineapples and bananas seem to be

promising in terms of fresh export and there has

been some success with shipments to Argentina

and northern Chile. Nontraditional crops of turmeric (Curcuma domestica) and ginger (Zingiber

officinale) demonstrate export potential and production is underway at a trial level. Several other

Pineapple is being produced as an alternative crop in

the Chapare, Bolivia. Private sector investment in a

local processing facility for Chapare and Santa Cruz

pineapples may promote the value of production.

crops from the areas may have potential for

increased profitability, including garlic, onions,

peanuts, anise, cumin, and perennial fruit crops.

Although export potential for many of these crops

is low, improved postharvest practices could

contribute to higher quality and greater economic

returns.

A number of agricultural products are being

industrialized, including: tea, banana, kudzu, yuca,

mint, and lemon grass. In addition, a coffee

production and processing industry is being

developed in the Chapare. The scale of existing

production and the 5-year potential for production

increases for these crops are shown in table 4-3.

Achieving this potential will require investment

in producing plant material, promoting the crops
104 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 4-A–Alternative Crops

Alternative crop research poses an immense problem because of the numerous, and sometimes competing,

requirements associated with identifying legitimate crops that can compete with a “black madcet’ activity. Not only

must crops be suitable to agroecoiogical conditions, they must possess quaiities that make them socioculturaliy

acceptable and economically attractive. This is a tail order for any research activity. Research in the Andean

countries has focused on annual grain crops, industrial crops, commercial fruits, nuts, and specialty crops (e.g.,

spices, fibers, dyes). The foilowing briefly describes some of these crops.

Annatto (f3hcawe//ana): Annatto (also Achiote) isa native plant from the Amazon region. The plant chemical

bixin is extracted from the seeds and has commercial value as a naturai dye. Peru currently suppiies 40 percent

of the international bixin market. Substitution efforts in Bolivia have begun to work on increasing Annatto

production. Primary production concerns include the highly variabie yields and bixin content of seeds (2.5 to 3

percent), appropriate pianting densities, difficulties in biending annatto with other crops because of its fast-growing

nature (although some success has been noted in annattokowpea combinations), and high hand iabor

requirements. Piant breeding efforts are focusing on increasing yields and the bixin content of seeds (up to 4

percent) and developing cultivars suitabie to iow-fertility, acid soiis. High hand labor requirements might be

addressed through harvest and threshing mechanization. Improved processing technques could provide products

with higher bixin content (increasing from 30 to 35 percent to 90 to95 percent). The trend toward natural dyes may

increase market opportunities for annatto production. Annatto seems to be relatively free of pests and disease

problems.

Araza (Hqw?ia stlplfafa): Arazaisatropical fruit tree native to the Amazon region, aithough it is not yet widely

cultivated. Whiie the tree is tolerant of acid, iow-fertility soiis, best production is observed in well-managed and

property fertilized fields. Primary production concerns include the relative lack of agronomic technology for

cultivation, ptanting densities and field management to obtain optimum production, and fertilizer requirements.

Improved production techniques, inciuding promising ecotypes and associated nursery and fieid management

needs, are current research areas. Fruit production begins 1 year after transplanting with finai height reached by

6to 7 years, aithoughthis is affected bysoilfertility. Araza’s slow growth rate allows intercropping with crops such

as cassava or turmeric, thereby generating benefits during the field development stage. However, there is no

international market for araza currently. The high acid content precludes fresh consumption but it can be used for

juice, dried fruit, and ice cream flavoring.

Bananas (lWsa sp.): Bananas currentiy are produced in coca-growing zones and some success with export

has been noted in Boiivia Banana is a traditional wop in the Andean region and thus adoption is nota key concern.

Further, since farmers already are familiar with banana production they could be more responsive to extension

efforts to improve production. Primary production concerns include need for eveniy distributed rainfall, high

sunlight requirements, fertilizer requirements, need for iow wind conditions, and soil condition (deep with high

organic matter content). Research is needed on improved varieties to enter export markets, appropriate planting

densities, improved propagule selection, carefui field management (e.g., weeding and thinning) to sustain

production, and postharvest technologies. A number of pests and diseases affect bananas; however, chemicai

and management techniques exist to controi the most devastating of these.

Black Pepper (F@ern@m): Black pepper is being cultivated to some extent in or near coca-growing regions

in the Andean countries. Pepper is a climbing shrub and requires a support to grow on. Either posts or trees may

be used as supports and production techniques exist for both systems. National research institutes are working

to improve production technology, and potential exists for technology transfer from current producing countries.

Key needs include improved cultivars (for increased yield and pest resistance), propagation, and seedling

management. Production concerns include field preparation, soii condition (e.g., well-drained, aerated, high
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 105

organic matter content), fertilizer needs, and high labor requirements during establishment and harvest phases.

Systems have been developed that intercrop pepper with ginger or cassava during the early growth stages, and

additional work in China indicates potential for pepper, rubber, and tea systems. Primary pests include fungi and

nematodes and while chemical controts are available, they are costly. Despite high Iabr requirements for

production, primary processing is relatively simple and generally involves sundrying and threshing.

Brazii nut (Bertho#elia excekw): Brazii nut trees are not found in most coca-growing zones and a somewhat

iengthydeveiopment period may hinder plantation development. Under cuitivatedconditions, nut production may

begin in 8 to 10 years after planting or if trees are grafted this may be shortened to6 years. Production concerns

Iargeiy center on the need for weii-drained soiis and the iengthy period from initialization to production. Braziiian

researchers have developed techniques for brazii nut production and cro~”ng systems. Further work conducted

in Peru indicates some potentiai for mixed systems of brazii nut, cassava, rice, and tahiti lime. in fact, intercropping

with other fruit trees may increase nut production by maintaining pollinator populations during the time the nut tree

is not fiowering. Testing is still in initiai stages and there are no accurate estimations of potential income. Areas

where the tree currently exkts and coca is expanding, or areas where it is iikeiy to expand, may provide the best

possibilities for introducing this type of production system.

Cardamom (Hettaria cadamonwrrt): Cardamom, a high-vaiue spice, is not native to the Andean region,

although it has been identified as a potential alternative crop. Shade is important for cardamom growth but the piant

wili produce in poorly drained soii. This combination may offer an opportunity for farmers to crop some of their iower

quality production areas. Propagation by rhizome aiiowscardamom production within 3 years, butthe susceptibility

of rhizomes to mosdc virus detracts from this approach. Seed is being used increasingly, however, development

time increases to 5 years and seeds iose their viability quickly. Cardamom has been incorporated in some

Coiombian cropping systems in an effort to diversify coffee and it is being introduced in Bolivia and Peru.

Constraints to expansion inciude the lack of a Iocai market and that the international market currentiy is satisfied

by Asian and Central American production.

Citrus (Orange, Mandarin, Tangelos): Citrus production requires rather specific soil andciimaticconditions.

However, it is suitabie for the Chapare, Aito Hualiaga, Upper Mayo, and Coiombianpiedmont. Orange production

iargely wouid be directed to the juice market whiie mandarin and tangeio production have potential for fresh

markets. intercropping systems incorporating citrus are used wideiy in current production areas. Primary

production concerns include soii conditions (e.g., well-aerated, deep soiis), market size, and processing options

for smali communities. Pests and diseases are weli known+Ms, aphids, fruit fries, root rq triste~ and exocortis.

Tolerant varieties are available and other management methods exist to prevent virai infections.

Cocoa (Theobr’oma cacao): Cocoa k cultivated in coca-growing areas of Peru and, to a iesser extent, in

Coiombia and Bolivia. Research undertaken in Coiombia, Brazii, Ecuador, and Costa Rica has focused on

improved cultivars, nursery management, planting densities, cropping systems, agrichemicai needs, and

postharvest processing. Additional research needs include: matching varieties to ecological zones, seed

production and availability, shade management for new fieids, and intercropping systems for cocoa and other

subsistence or economic crops. Eveniy distributed rainfaii and soii pti factors are primary production concerns for

cocoa. Coma is affected by severai disease~”tches broom, biack pod, and moniiia. Cultivation and harvest

practices can combat witches broom and black pod infestation (i.e., tree pruning, frequent harvest), while monilia

currentiy is oniy controlled through pesticide applications.

Coffee (Coffea arabica): Coffee seems toofferthe ciosest economic aiternativetococain some regions and

production methods and cuitivars exist for shade and sun coffee. However, cocagrowing regions that do not

experience sufficient cfiurnai temperature variation may not tM suitable since coffee requires such shifts for

ripening. Primary production concerns inciude soii drainage, nursery management, and pest- and temperatureresistant cultivars. Coffee is affected by a number of pests and diseases (e.g., insects, nematodes, fungi), although

(conthwd on next page)
106 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 4-A-Continued

the cherry borer and yellow rust pose the prhnary problems. Pestiddes and tolerant varieties are available to

reduce the adverse impact of pest infestations on productkm. Research supported by the Colombian National

Coffee Growers Association (NCGA) has contributed significantly to salving a number of productkM problems.

Macadamia (hfac@m hintegrfibilaand MacadarrI& tetraphyk): Macadam iaproduction ty@cal& requires

well-drained fertile SW with high organic matter content. Low temperatures can reduce nut production and the

tree is very susceptible to freezing. This aspect may pose some difficulty for expansion in the Chapare, where

seasonal winds can bring temperatures as low as 6 degrees C. Production concerns focus on the need for

appropriate fertilizer regimes to sustain pnxluction. Current iow grafting success (i.e., only 15 to 20 percent) has

hhxteredexpansionin Bdiviaand Peru, although efforts areongdngtoprornote macadamlaproductbn. The tree

is suitable forinterplanting with annual crops or coffee orottwrtrees during eariy years and thus could be integrated

inexistingproduction systems. Pests anddiseasesthat attack macadamiahwktethebladc bee, ants, nut borers,

rats, root diseases, and fungi; yet controt measures are available, atthough in some cases expensive. Interest in

production is increasing because ofongdng substitution programs. However, market is largely internatkmal and

thus will require concomitant infrastructure development

Passion fruit (I%ssha eduh): Passion fruit is a fast growing tropical vine andfmit production may begin

as early as 8 to 10 months after transplanting from the nursery. While two varieties exist the fladcwpavariety

seems to be more suitable to the temperature conditions of the Andean region. Seed production is prdificand thus

does not pose aconstraint to increased production. The fast grwth rate, however, affects passion fruit’s suitability

for h?tercropping systems, although it may be assodated with short-season ~turmek Phwappie, or as

a nurse species for estabhhing another crop. Primary production concerns include high cost of posts to allow the

vine to climb, pruning and fertilizing to sustain production, and need for hand labor. Insects and worms are the

primary pests although control measures have been identified. Fungal pathogens can becontrolledbyappropdate

field management that ensures good soil drainage. Although internal and external market conditions are good,

improved fiefd management techniques and harvest andprocesdng opportunities coukf increase the profitability

of passion fruit production.

Peach palm (6actrk@ws@aes): Peach palm is native in many of the coca-growing regions of the Andean

countries. The tree iscultivatedfor fruit and palm heart with the latter being more economically attractive. Prfrnary

production concerns include need for wail-distributed rainfall and dry periods, fertilizers, and near access to

processing fa”lities. Harvests can be made within 18 to 20 months after planting. The patm has a high rate of

sucker production allowing for3t04 harvests per year. Instituto Nacional de lnvestigack5nAgrariay Agrolndustrial

(INIM) in Peru has been working on production technology since 1985, inctuding seedling types, transplanting

techniques, and appropriate p!antingdensities. Peach Palmcanbeintegrated with other cropsat tower densities,

but shading by the palm may preclude certain spedes;cassavacan be planted prior to the palm to provide shade

and income until the palm outshades it. Few problems with pests or diseases are noted and currently most can

becontrolledthrough good field management efforts (e.g., cultivation). Peach palm has been identified asoneof

the most promising alternative crops. However, efforts would be needed toexpandthe cwre~ small wcrld market

for palm hearts.

Pineapple (Ananas comosus): Traditional pineapple production is largely dependent on hand iabor and

although traditional varieties tend to have low yietds, fields may produce for6to 10 years. Improved yield cultivars

have been developed, however the production per-d length is shortened significantly (Le., 11/2 to 3 years).

Production concerns include improved cultivars (smooth cayenne), planting densities, fertilizer programs, soil

preparation, and flower induction to increase yield and speed time to first harvest The shattow rooting system

makes pineapple extremely susceptible to competition and higher planting densities make it difficultto intercrop

successfully. Numerous pests and diseases affect pineapple production, although chemical and cultural controls

exist. Some of these problems maybe reduced by using traditional varieties resistant to fungi although there is

a trade-off with yields.
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 107

Rice (Oryza sativa): Increased rice production opportunities Iargelylie in import substitution. Research has

identified high-yielding cultivars for certain production systems (e.g., alluvial and flooded systems), although

varieties appropriate to upland coca zones are scarce. Primary production oonoerns indude agrichemical

requirements, field preparation (e.g., land bevelling which is costly and if done improperly can pose problems for

water management), improved water management, and equipment. Fungal diseases pose the largest pest

problems for rice production, and fungicides to treat these diseases are costly. Development ofdisease-resistant

varieties could improve opportunities for expanded rioe production.

Silk: Mulberry/silk production systems are being promotedin Colombia asanalternative toeoca. Production

technologies are well-known and easily available and technical assistance and credit opportunities exist for silk

production in Colombia. Primary production concerns indude the susceptibility of silkworms to agrichemicals

requiring an organic production approach, establishment of “casetas” to house the silkworms, and availability of

transportation to processing sites. Silk markets are well-established and, with quality cocoons, should be open to

Andean production.

SOURCE: H. Villachiea, “Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agrfodtural ProductIon,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992. P. Oonway, “Silk For Liffiroject Proposal,” Silk for Lifa, Madison,

Wwxmsin, January 1991.

through extension programs, establishing post- Considerable agricultural research has been

harvest and marketing infrastructure, increasing conducted in Peru’s Arnazonia, covering agroavailability of credit and private investment, and ecological conditions horn the tropical highlands

expanding market opportunities through product to the lowlands. Research programs and projects

promotion in local and foreign markets (105). have addressed production problems in a variety

InstitutoBoliviano de Tecrwlog{aAgropecuaria- of crops (e.g., rice, maize, grain-legumes, oilChapare (IBTA-Chapare) research focuses on seeds, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, tropical fruits, and

identifying profitable agricultural options suita- palrns) as well as tropical soils management,

ble to the producers and markets in the Chapare. tropical pastures, livestock production systems,

These efforts indicate that a variety of agroecol- and forestry. Research programs conducted in the

ogically suitable production options are available. 1980s increased yields and reduced production

Yet, factors such as credit and market availability costs for rice, maize, potatoes, and beans, thus

seem to detetie the acceptability of identifkd opening new technology options for the average

options. Thus, setting speciilc research priorities producer in Peru. These programs yielded a

will continue to be difficult until marketing substantial number of new varieties and cultivars

studies are completed for some of the identifkd adapted to diverse agroecological conditions and

alternatives (e.g., perennial tree crops). Lack of cropping techniques (79).

farmer representation in the project and lack of Several research centers located in the Amatransition production systems2 further constrain zonian and Orinoquian regions of Colombia have

setting realistic research and extension priorities been active in developing high-yielding cultivars,

(22). Nevertheless, on-farm research and the and applying improved technology and manageproduction systems approach are valuable meth- ment practices to support agricultural expansion.

orological tools arising from the Chapare project For example, high-yielding soybean varieties led

(box 4-B). to a 5-fold production area increase since 1985

2 Transition systems are based on gradual reduction of coca cultivation and involve development of production schemes that integrate coca

with legitimate crops. This approach offers security to risk-averse farmers during the lag time between planting alternative crops and receiving

economic benefits.
Table 4-3-Current Production and Potential Increase of Some Alternative Crops in the Chapare, Bolivia

Value of

Mature crop Total production Value of product Potential Potential (5 yr) increased production

Current planted production average in the region (FOB Chapare) developed areas increase in total area (U.S.$)

Crop area (ha) (m f/ha) (ret) (U.S.$)

Achiote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(ha) (ha) (1991 prices)

135 1.00 20.0 20,000 23,200 1,000 1,000,000

Bananas-Total . . . . . . . . . . 14,000 13.00 2,000.0 160,000 28,000 1,000

Export . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000 500 727,000

National. . . . . . . . . . 12,000 174,000.0 3,300,000 500 142,000

Industry . . . . . . . . . 40,000.0

Citrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000 40.00 800,000.0 12,000,000 27,000 1,000 600,000

Coffee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 0.80 59.2 17,500 6,750 200 47,000

Ginger ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13.00 106.0 42,000 2,000 50 264,000

Passion Fruit . . . . . . . . . . . 5,620

Export . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.00 15.0 4,000 300 810,000

National. . . . . . . . . . 75.0 2,100 100 270,000

Industry . . . . . . . . . 120.0 32,500

Pepper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 0.80 4.0 4,000 5,070 100 80,000

Pineapple-Total . . . . . . . . . 274 13.50 582.0 3,100 500 891,000

Export . . . . . . . . . . . 150 128,000

National. . . . . . . . . . 978.0 110,000 500 2,700,000

Industry/losses . . . . 1,082.0 146,000

Tea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.50 302.5 49,000 7,500 200 178,000

Turmeric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.00 120.0 12,229 1,500 500 510,000

Yuca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000 19.00 95,000.0 4,400,000 1,000 873,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,779 20,446,229 109,740 7,450 9,092,000

KEY: FOB = Freight on board/shipping point; mt = metric ton.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, March 1992.
--

4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 109

Box 4-B—Examples of Successful Bolivian Research and Extension Efforts

The most dynamic agricultural region in Bolivia is the eastern plains, with 50 percent of national agricultural

land. Only 20 percent of the population, concentrated mostly around Santa Cruz, occupy this region. This area

is likely to provide the most immediate agricultural expansion in Bolivia, and some successes can already be cited.

Soybean production, for example, has jumped from 67,000 hectares in 1965 to almost 150,000 hectares in 1966,

accompanied by an average productivity increase of 20 percent. A new high-yielding cultivar (Totai) developed

by Centro de Investigack$n Agrkxla Tropical (CIAT) has been instrumental to this development. ClAT’s work on

other aspects of soybean production is outlined in a manual w“dely distributed among extension workers. CIAT

soybean recommendations are based on field trials and open discussion of results.

Bolivia’spositive experience with soybean improvements can be attributed to several factors: Bolivia took full

advantage of foreign technical development (in this case, genetic material and agronomic practices from Brazil)

and the active involvement of private interests and collective action. CIAT used practical and effective methods

of technical diffusion; and extensionists from private entities were trained and backed by CIAT to solve specific

technical problems and to reach farmers with sound technical recommendations.

Another example of effective research and extension work in the Santa Cruz area is seen in CIAT and the

Asociaci6n de Productores de Oleaginosas y Trigo (ANAPO) 5-year plan for expanding wheat production to

reduce wheat imports. ~is plan is supported by the recent removal of wheat import subsidies and P.L. 460 wheat

sales. The Bolivian Government also will allocate revenues from P.L. 480 wheat imports to support research and

extension and to finance seed production and marketing. An agreement between ANAPO and Santa Cruz’s mill

industry guarantees a minimum price for local wheat.

First year production under the plan (40,000 metric tons) was double the plan goal for that year, and saved

the Bolivian economy an estimated $6 million in wheat imports. Bolivia’s success with wheat, as with soybeans,

can be attributed in part to technology and experience borrowed from neighboring countries. The specific wheat

variety used (Cordilleraz) came from Paraguay; ANAPO traded soybean seed for wheat seed of this variety. For

its part, CIAT has developed a comprehensive technology package for wheat production and is training

extensionists.

Another success story is that of the Instituto Boliviano de Technologia Agropecuario (IBTA) research in

quinoa. New varieties with low saponin content have led to a wider consumption of this traditional product. IBTA

also has produced barley varieties widely adopted in highland production areas. These and other of IBTA’s

research successes are in the form of specific projects financed by external sources. As such, they have been

isolated from IBTA’s financial and institutional instability.

Finally, a long-term joint effort by the Bolivian Government, Cooperaci6n T6cnica Suiza (COTESU), and

Centro lnternacional de la Papa (CIP) to increase potato production throughout Bolivia with high-quality seed has

been reaping results. Proyecto de lnvestigaci6n de la Papa (PROIMPA) takes a multidisaplinary approach to this

goal. Specific project areas include plant genetics, entomology, phytopathofogy, hematology, postharvest

physiology, seed production technology, and socioeconomic. A complementary Dutch-supported project,

Proyecto de SemiHa de Papa (PROSEMPA), is aimed at strengthening local and regional capacities to produce

commerical high-quality potato seed. PROSEMPA is basically a technology transfer/extension effort directly

relevant to producers’ problems and market realities.

SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems and Technology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms

to Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,

December 1991.
110 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

and yield increases. Other crops being examined

for expansion include rice, oil palm, mace,

sorghum, cassava, and tropical fruits. In addition,

research on tropical pasture and soil management

is performed at the Macagual Regional Research

Center in the Amazonian region. Results from the

Orinoquia could be transferred to other areas of

the Colombian Amazon, although such an effort

would require greater investment in extension

activities (22).

I Intensifying Agricultural Production

Diverse, multiple cropping3 systems have a

history in the Andean coca growing regions and

thus provide a likely starting point for intensifying agricultural production (46). Sustainable

systems that preserve the natural renewable

resource base and provide long-term environmental and economic benefits to farmers are

needed (box 4-C).

MULTIPLE CROPPING

Traditional multiple cropping systems make

use of locally available resources and provide for

local consumption needs while also contributing

to regional or national markets. The key feature of

multiple cropping systems is the intensification of

production to include temporal and spatial dimensions (box 4-D). Production focuses on long-term

sustainability of the system. The continued productivity of traditional multiple cropping systems

provides the kind of social and ecological stability that modern monoculture systems have not

achieved.

Multiple cropping can have a definite advantage over monoculture systems (46,40,57,128)

(e.g., total crop yield can be greater than that

achieved in monoculture systems). In some cases,

the yield of one crop may be lower than under

monoculture, but the yield of the companion crop

is sufficiently greater to offset any loss. Land

Equivalent Ratios-the amount of land needed in

monoculture to produce a yield equal to that

achieved through intercropping of two or more

crops-developed for a number of common

tropical crops indicate that greater production

may be achieved through intercropping compared

to monoculture (57,111) (figure 4-l). Of course,

crop complementarily and proper crop mixtures

must be determined to achieve such results.

Multiple cropping systems mimic the energy

and nutrient cycling processes of natural ecosystems. Characteristics common to natural and

multiple cropping systems include:

. Return of organic matter to the soils (enhancing nutrient cycling, improving fertility, and

reducing needs for external inputs);

3 Multiple cropping, nuked cropping, andpolyculture are terms used to describe agricultural systems that incorporate spatial and temporaI

dimensions in production. For the purposes of this discussion, such systems will be referred to as multiple cropping.

4 Sustainable refers to the ability of an agroecosystem to improve or maintain production over many generations despite long-term

ecologicxd constraints and disturbances or social and economic pressures (3).
— .-

4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 111

Box 4-D-Classification of Types of Multiple-Cropping Systems

Multiple cropping is the intensification of cropping intimeand space dimensions generally defined by growing

of two crops in the same field within the same year. This type of cropping maybe further defined as intercropping

or sequential cropping.

Intercropping: Growing of two or more crops simultaneously in the same field. Crop intensification is in time

and space dimensions. However, under this system, potential for competition and growth interference exists during

all or part of the growth period. Thus, crop complementarily is a key concern in developing production systems.

Varieties of intercropping include:

. Mixed intercrqoping-growing two or more crops simultaneously with no distinct row arrangement,

. Row intercropph?~rowing two or more crops simultaneously with one or more crops planted in rows,

. Strip inter’croppi~lanting crops in strips wide enough to permit independent cultivation but close

enough for them to interact agronomically, and

● F/e/ayintercfoppin~rowing crops simultaneously for some part of each others life cycle. Typically, the

second crop is planted after the first has reached a certain growth stage but before the first crop is ready

for harvest.

Sequential cropping: growing two or more crops in sequence on the same field each year. The succeeding

crop is planted after the first crop has been harvested. There is only temporal intensification and no intercrop

interference or interaction. Sequential cropping maybe further defined based on the number of crops incorporated

in the crop year (e.g., double, triple, quadruple, and ratoon cropping).

SOURCE: S. Gliessman, “Diversification and Multiple Cropping as a Basis for Agricultural Altemativee in Coca Producing Regions,”

contractor reporl prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1992.

. Soil conditioning (e.g., improving soil mois- focused on the potential for beneficial associature storage, increasing soil biota populations, soil stabilization);

. Plant diversity;

● Suitability to varied soil, topographic, and

altitude conditions; and

● Efficient resource capture due to the varied

rooting geometies, canopy patterns, and

beneficial associations with other ecosystem

components (e.g., nitrogen fining soil bacteria).

Under the moist tropical conditions of most

tions among early planted crops and later crops.

These early crops improve microcli.matic conditions so that growth of later, often more economically important, crop species is enhanced (122).

Such advantage reaches its greatest point when

mutualistic or symbiotic relationships occur that

permit plants in mixtures to do better than when

planted alone (45). The ideal mixture provides

income and food for the family.

Largely, coca farmers are smallholders and

produce a composite of subsistence crops and

coca. Risk aversion is a kev feature of these

coca production zones, farmers produce a variety production systems. There are-numerous socioecof crops per year under a sequential cropping onomic advantages of multiple cropping systems

system. This requires timely harvests, appropriate commired with monocukure svstems for the

cultiva.rs, and proper sequencing to minimize

.

h~d tropic regions, including:

potential negative interactions. It can be expanded to forma continuum from strict sequential o Reduced risk from market changes, pest

cropping to relay intercropping for additional infestation, and climatic variability;

beneficial effects. Indeed, much of the agronomic . Greater energy cycling (reducing the need

research conducted in the Andean nations has for costly external inputs);
112 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

1.0

0.71

2

lu

8 0.5

Figure 4-l—Land Equivalent Ratios

●

●

●

Harvest periods throughout the year (providing better annual distribution of income and

farm labor needs/opportunities);

Faster returns (earnings) from combining

short-, medium- and long-term crops; and

A diversity of products (reducing the need

for purchased supplies such as fuelwood and

construction materials).

Multiple cropping systems are more complex

than monoculture systems, having greater agronomic and biological diversity and a greater need

for hand labor. In coca zones where labor is

expensive, therefore, these systems might be

economically handicapped. Improved yields are

highly dependent on appropriate system structure. A large body of traditional knowledge of

multiple cropping systems remains in the Andean

countries and could provide a research and

extension resource for improving multiple cropping systems.

AGROFORESTRY

Incorporating trees in multiple cropping systems—agroforestry--is a traditional tropical and

subtropical agricultural practice. The objective of

most agroforestry systems is to generate diverse

products, reduce external input requirements, and

sustain resource productivity (44).

Agroforestry systems may be designed to

produce trees with crops, trees with livestock, or

trees with crops and livestock. The level of

complexity increases along the continuum. Generally, little soil disturbance is involved once the

agroforestry system is developed. The environmental benefits of agroforestry are well-identified

and the principal limitations to widespread use

are largely economic, social, and technological.

Home gardens have the greatest complexity

but also offer the greatest product diversity. A

widely used agroforestry system in tropical areas,

home gardens are broadly defined as a piece of

land with definite boundaries usually near a

house, occupying an area generally between 0.5

and 2.0 hectares (2,21 ,78). They are an integrated

system of humans, plants, animals, soils and

water, with trees playing key roles in ecology and

management. Home gardens tend to be rich in

plant species, usually dominated by woody perennials, and generally have multistoried canopies

(1,23). A mixture of annuals and perennials of

different heights form layers of vegetation resembling a natural forest structure. The high diversity

of species permits year-round harvesting of food,

fuelwood, medicinal plants, spices, and ornarnental plants (24,47,48).
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 113

Home gardens are a common feature of tropical

agriculture. This diversified home garden agroforestry

system in Costa Rica generates multiple products

including banana, papaya, and pineapple.

Much of the coca production region is characterized by brush fallow and poor second-growth

forest that could be used for agroforestry. The

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)

sponsored research in the Chapare region suggests that many of the promising agricultural

alternatives to coca are nontraditional tree crops,

such as macadamia and peach palm and longcycle perennials such as passion fruit and black

pepper (4). Incorporating these economic crops

into an agroforestry system could provide increased economic and environmental benefits for

producers.

Agroforestry systems are being developed by

Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agraria y

Agroindustrial (INIAA) in Peru incorporating

cassava or beans, fruit trees, and timber species

(Schizolobiurn amazonicum or Guazuma crinita).

This combination allows producers to use their

low fertility soils unsuitable to production of

other crops. Although the income generation

capability of this system is low in the initial years,

when the timber species becomes harvestable (6

to 8 years) it could generate as much as U.S.

$1,500/ha with harvests being made every 3 years

(122). Hand labor and investment requirements

for this system are low. However, potential for

pest infestations is likely to be higher in the

mature timber monoculture and could create

additional maintenance costs.

Potential also exists for interplanting timber

species in coca fields to diversify production.

While coca cultivation would benefit timber

growth, it also would provide a source of income

for the farmer until the trees are harvestable.

Ultimately, the trees will shade out the coca and

reduce production. Such a ‘‘natural’ eradication

scheme initially may need to be coupled with

other incentives (e.g., subsidies to maintain the

forest until maturity) to encourage adoption.

Despite the apparent benefits of multiple cropping systems, little research has focused on

optimizing plant densities. Incomplete understanding of the ecological processes of these

systems complicates identifying ideal combinations and patterns. Applied research on crop

combinations, patterns, and planting densities

could be promoted under existing alternative

cropping research, for example, through IBTAChapare. Demonstration activities could be undertaken to provide examples for local farmers

and perhaps increase system adoption. In addition, research at each demonstration site could

identify specific environmental differences among

production zones and promote adaptive work to

optimize production systems.

1 Improving Production Efficiency

Improving production efficiency, by reducing

costs of required inputs or increasing output, can

increase economic returns to producers. Production efficiency can be improved through use of

proper fertilizer regimes, pest control systems,

improved soil and water management practices,

and improved cultivars. However, inadequate

infrastructure, extension and technology transfer,

and agricultural credit constrain use of improved

practices.

Lack of infrastructure causes production inputs

to be costly and difficult to obtain. Many cropping

systems previously described focus on reducing

needs for external inputs; nonetheless, some
114 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

inputs are needed to sustain agricultural land use.

The infrastructure problem is being addressed by

a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies in

the forms of road development, irrigation projects, and energy production systems. However,

lag time between project initiation and realization

of benefits is likely to be lengthy.

Extension of improved production practices

(e.g., Integrated Pest Management, cropping system management) is hindered further by inadequately developed national agricultural systems

and concerns over personal security. While extension occurs, it is small scale relative to the overall

need (see chapter 5).

NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT

Addition of nutrients to a cropping system is an

accepted axiom of agricultural production. Agricultural products, whether plant or animal, remove nutrients from the land on which they are

produced. Even well-maintained organic farms

that carefully collect and return crop residues and

livestock wastes to the soil only replace part of the

soil nutrients extracted. The other available nutrient sources internal to the agroecosystem (e.g.,

rock weathering, soil minerals, soil animals) are

unlikely to make up this deficit. Fertilizer costs in

most coca producing regions are high (U.S. $300

to 400/mt vs. U.S. $ 220/mt on the international

market (122)), indicating a need for efficient

fertilizer programs and use of alternative nutrient

sources (e.g., green manure, nitrogen-fixing

plants).

PEST CONTROL

Agricultural losses to pests significantly reduce production each year and costs for pest

control place added burdens on producers. It is

possible to optimize pest control and reduce

pesticide needs using a variety of methods,

including crop rotation, crop monitoring, pestresistant cultivars, timing of planting and harvest,

and biological controls.

Pest control may be initiated based on pest

scouting-monitoring to determine a pest problem. Depending on the type of pest identified, the

organization of the production system, and the

extent of infestation, various control approaches

may be used. Crop rotation and manipulation of

planting and harvesting dates can break the life

cycles of many pest species. Cultural controls

such as tillage and water management can render

the crop environment less favorable for pest

populations.

Integrated Pest Management (IPM) blends the

suite of pest control technologies into a single

system designed to benefit (economically and

environmentally) the user and society. IPM programs attempt to restructure an ecosystem to

minimize the likelihood of pest damage. Programs are meant to be adaptive with an objective

of improving program efficacy over time. The

ultimate goal is to maintain pest populations at

near-harmless levels.

SOIL AND WATER MANAGEMENT

Management of the soil and water environment

for crop production requires understanding the

interaction of these cropping-system components, and the suitability of the chosen crop(s) for

the agroecosystem. Production of crops ill-suited

to a given region may require more intensive

external inputs, such as pesticides and fertilizers,

to overcome the associated plant stress responses

and to achieve acceptable yield levels (16).

Use of soil- and water-management techniques

can adjust or modify the agroecosystem to

enhance crop production and thus affect the

requirements for external inputs. For example,

soil-management practices designed to improve

the friability and moisture-holding capacity of

soils can facilitate crop root development. This in

turn may improve the plants’ nutrient extraction

capability, thereby reducing the need for external

nutrient inputs.

CROP MANAGEMENT

Crop management refers to the numerous

decisions that most directly relate to the crop,

including cropping pattern (e.g., rotation, inter-
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 115

cropping) and crop or cultivar choice. Certain

crop-management alternatives and techniques

may complement or enhance nutrient and agrichemical management activities. Crop-management

decisions may have direct impacts on agrichemical use and on how such compounds will behave

and move through the agroecosystem. Crop

choice alone has instant implications for the

pesticide and fertilization regime a producer will

use. Similarly, certain cropping patterns, such as

legume-based crop rotations, may supply plant

nutrients and break pest cycles for a subsequent

crop and thus reduce agrichemical requirements.

1 Conclusion

Alternative crops must compete with the lowrisk economic scenario associated with coca

production. Although scattered economic data on

potential alternative crops suggest that there are

no legitimate economic equivalents to coca 5

(table 4-4), this could change if benefits of

legitimate agricultural activities increased. Without improved production techniques, technical

assistance, and other associated services, however, the chances are slim that substantial numbers of farmers will voluntarily adopt alternative

systems. Despite some encouraging signs that

coca profitability is decreasing, alternatives will

still need to be economically attractive. Development of systems that allow incremental diversification of coca cropping with a goal of replacement may hold promise.

Constraints to crop diversification fall largely

in the areas of support systems. While improved

cultivars, cropping combinations, and production

technology are available, extension of these to

producers is hindered by inadequate extension

and technology transfer systems (chapter 5).

Primary constraints include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Input availability and costs (agricultural

chemicals, machinery),

Labor availability and costs,

Credit availability and terms,

Land tenure systems,

Market availability (domestic and international), and

Security risks.

Irrespective of the identified difficulties, legitimate agricultural production in the Andean nations could be enhanced. Some crops, production

and processing technologies, and markets are

available. Although new crops that might improve the economics of agricultural production

have been identified, further research is needed to

identify appropriate cultivars, production techniques, and market potential. Understanding that

crop diversification is as important as interdiction

has reached high political levels in the Andean

nations and leaders have identified the need for

concomitant efforts on these fronts.

FOREST RESOURCES6

Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia have substantial

areas of remaining natural forests with potential

for biodiversity conservation and forest management. These tropical wet forests and tropical

pre-montane rainforests contain large numbers of

tree species, epiphytic plants, lianas, and vertebrate and invertebrate animals (50). For example,

the Palcazu Valley in east-central Peru contains at

least 30 species of fish, primarily food fish (10);

at least 50 mammalian species, at least 400 bird

species, and numerous reptiles and amphibians

(17); and between 5,000 and 10,000 vascular

plant species. Almost one-half of the nearly 30

mammal species that could be of economic

importance are rare or very rare and require

protection to ensure their survival (33). Early

5 While coca appears to be more profitable than suggested alternatives, this has not been proven. Classical benefit/cost analyses may not

be an appropriate method for such economic analysis because of the illegal nature of the coca economy.

s This section was drawn largely from: D. McCaffrey, “Biodiversity Conservation and Forest Management as Altermtives to Coca

Production in Andean Countries, ’ contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment August 1991.
116 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 4-4-internal Rate of Return (net cash flow/costs) for Some Alternative Crops

Internal rate Year at positive

Crop of return Data area Data year cash flow

Coca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Annatto (Achiote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Araza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Banana (export) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Black pepper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Macadamia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Orange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Passion fruit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Peach Palm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pineapple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

165.4

20.0

20.2

53.8

22.9

54.0

29.0

41.9

82.2

40.3

22.3

Pucallpa, Peru

Pucallpa, Peru

Colombia

Pucallpa, Peru

Colombia

Pucallpa, Peru

Peru

Ucalyi, Peru

Pucallpa, Peru

Tarapoto, Peru

January 1992

November 1991

January 1991

February 1992

March 1992

January 1992

January 1992

March1992

2

4

6

2

5

5

5

4

2

2

1

SOURCES: H. Villachica, Lescano, C., Lazarte, J., Chumbe, V., “Estudio de oportunidades de inversión en desarrollo e industrialización de

cultivos tropicales en Pucallpa,” Perfil de proyecto para la planta de coloantes naturales y para la planta de conservas de palmito, Convenio

FUNDEAGRO, Región Ucayali, Lima Peru, 1992.

Coca-H. Villachica, “Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production,” contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.

Banana--J. Arbeiaez, “El Cultivo de Plátano en Zona Cafetera, Federación Nacional de Cafeteros,” Bogota, Colombia, p. 40, 1991.

Macadamia-O. Rincon, “El cultivo de Macadamia, Federación Nacional da Cafeteros,” Bogota, Colombia, p. 29, 1990.

estimates suggested that between 100 to 1,000

species could become extinct if this forest area

was removed (39). Based on ecological similarities, it may be assumed that equivalent levels of

biodiversity exist throughout the coca-producing

regions in South America.

Deforestation occurs in all parts of each country (table 4-5) and in large part is correlated with

coca production. Currently, deforestation affects

large areas in the eastern Andean foothills and the

Upper Amazonian lowlands of each country.

Despite this, promoting protected areas and forest

management in these zones could provide conservation benefits and alternative livelihoods for

existing populations.

It has been suggested that many areas now

supporting subsistence farming, including the

production of coca for cocaine manufacture,

might best be returned to long-term forestry

development as the most ecologically sound land

use. Considerable effort and state support would

be needed to promote such a program although

significant employment and economic benefits

could arise from sustainable forest management

approaches. However, the intensive subdivision

of the land makes this a very difficult proposal to

implement (105).

~ Protected Areas

Protected areas include conventional protected

areas (e.g., national parks, forest reserves) and

more recently biosphere and extractive reserves.

However, some disagree as to how well extractive

reserves function as mechanisms of forest/

diversity conservation (19). Lands set aside for

indigenous peoples also may serve as protected

areas. Ownership and management commonly is

public although some areas are privately owned.

Use restrictions control the level of access and

nature of extractive activities in protected areas.

Protected area management typically requires

identification of suitable sites based on conservation criteria and formal establishment within the

national system of protected areas. Although the

size and extent vary among the protected area

systems in the Andean countries (table 4-6), the

necessary institutional framework exists.

Protected areas also provide indigenous peoples a method to gain or maintain access to

culturally important wild resources. For example,
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 117

Table 4-5—Forest Areas and Deforestation Rates in Andean Countries, 1980s

Forest area Deforestation rate Deforestation rate

Country (sq km) (sq km/yr) annual percentage

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 668,000 870 0.2

Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517,000 8,900 1.7

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706,000 2,700 0.4

SOURCE: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-1991: A Guide to the Global Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990),

table 19.1 In: McCaffrey, 1991.

Table 4-6—Protected Areas in Andean Countries, 1985

Number of Total area protected Percent national

Country protected areas (sq km) territory protected

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 47,076 4.3

Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 39,588 3.5

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 24,076 1.9

SOURCE: World Resources Institute, International Institute for Environment and Development, World Resources 1986: An Assessment of the

Resource Base that Supports the Globa/ Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), table 19.1 In: McCaffrey, 1991,

16 Yanesha Native Communities occupy 580

square kilometers of forest and agricultural land

in the lower Palcazu Valley (1 14), The national

park and protected forest provide for conservation, research, and tourism, and the communal

reserve provides for traditional uses by the

Yanesha people. Ultimately, greater economic

benefits (in terms of tourism dollars) could arise

from the maintenance of these wild areas, as is

evidenced through expanding ecotourism markets worldwide (15).

However, national governments do not provide

adequate legal backing, sufficient staffing, and

financial support for protected areas (18). Thus,

protected areas frequently cannot meet desired

conservation goals and often exist as ‘‘paper

parks’ ‘ that do not fulfill their mandate. The

Isiboro-Secure National Park in Bolivia possesses

many of the qualities that identify a highly

appropriate protected area and also provides for

the needs of the Yuracare and Mojenio native

peoples. However, the park is located in an active

area of coca cultivation. Its boundaries are

breached increasingly by coca cultivators, loggers, and hunters (88,89), and enforcement is

inadequate to control poaching.

9 Forest Management

Forest management describes the use of technical practices designed to increase the flow of

benefits from forest resources. Management may

be strictly for sustainable yield of forest products

like timber and wildlife and may provide indirect

benefits like erosion control over the long term.

Benefits may be harvested or generated continuously or cyclically. Multiple-use management

programs seek to provide numerous, often diverse, benefits from forests. Some spatial and

temporal separation of benefits maybe associated

with multiple-use systems since uses may not be

compatible (e.g., forest preservation and lumber

operations).

Forest management can be applied to primary,

secondary, and heavily disturbed natural forest

systems. Practices vary depending on the level of

disturbance and the desired benefits from management. All of these forest types as well as some
118 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Slash-and-burn forest clearing commonly is used to access agricultural lands, but land productivity tends to be

short-lived. Evidence suggests that maintaining forests for sustainable timber operations and extractive reserves

may offer longer term economic benefits.

small areas of planted forest are found in the

coca-producing regions.

Forest management in the coca-producing

regions could offer significant environmental and

economic benefits to local populations. Forest

systems offer a mechanism to reduce soil erosion,

increase soil fertility, sustain biological diversity,

and manage water resources. An economic dimension can be added to the environmental

benefits by careful and systematic selection of

forest trees for economic benefits. Selective

removal of undesired species and regeneration of

desired species can maintain the basic character

of the forest while increasing the flow of economic benefits. Similar principles could be applied to other economically important forest

plants and wildlife.

Potential also exists for managing traditional

subsistence swidden-fallow agriculture to increase the abundance of economically important

plants. Typically, the fallow period of agricultural

lands involves allowing regrowth of naturally

occurring plants for later removal once soil

productivity has been enhanced. Selective removal of plants as opposed to slash-and-burn

practices can contribute to maintaining a seed

source for desired species. Ultimately the composition of plants can be shifted toward more

economic forest species (117).

1 Technical Considerations in

Forest Management

Forest characteristics (e.g., species composition, age), site environmental features (e.g., slope,
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 119

climate), and external factors (e.g., roads, processing facilities) are important considerations in

developing forest management and extraction

plans (53). There is protocol to manage tropical

timber forests based on natural regeneration of

harvested tracts (108,1 10) (box 4-E). Selective

cutting, enrichment planting, or plantation establishment regimes may be used to manage and

exploit secondary growth and disturbed forests

(75).

Incorporating the participation of the local

population and providing them with tangible

economic benefits can improve the success of

forest management efforts (90). Reconciliation of

local interests with national policies and identification and quantification of environmental benefits and potential beneficiaries are also necessary

for forest management to be effective (80).

Ideally, forest management pays for itself by

generating high-value products in the short term.

Alternatively, external economic incentives may

be required to support such management (73).

Pilot forest management activities in undisturbed and secondary growth forests are ongoing

in the American tropics. Largely these activities

have concentrated on timber production, although

some effort has been placed on extractive reserves

(90). Funding for these activities has come from

private and public sources. The key lesson from

these pilot activities is the lack of a single formula

for successful forest management in wet tropical

environments. Plan development requires careful

examination and incorporation of environmental,

sociocultural, infrastructural, and political features of a site.

1 Constraints to Forest Management

Opportunities to manage forests sustainably

are constrained by a variety of factors, including:

. High demands placed on forest areas for land

and forest products (e.g., conversion of

forestland for agricultural purposes and exploitation of existing forest resources),

Potential for long lag-time between plan

implementation and realization of benefits

for production systems in disturbed forests,

Low value placed on forests and the view of

forests as an obstacle to development (92),

and

Conventional economic analyses that ignore

the value of future forest (76)

Forestry institutions have not grown to meet

the additional challenges arising from increasing

global concern over tropical deforestation (129).

Several features of tropical forests complicate

management efforts, including forest complexity,

distance from urban centers, and widely varied

values placed on forests by various sectors of

society (90). The inherent difficulties with forest

management are heightened in coca-producing

regions that also must cope with economic

distortions and environmental difficulties associated with coca production and processing practices (32).

I Conclusion

A number of forest management approaches

are applicable to the Andean countries. Local

commitment and participation are key elements

of all of these approaches. Efforts range from

largely communal to commercial efforts, yet are

based on a fundamental goal of enhancing forest

production (table 4-7).

Some private organizations are promoting

sustainable logging through negotiations directly

with forest communities. This approach allows

for gradual exploitation and gives local inhabitants incentive to protect forest to maximize

economic benefits over the long term. Selective

cutting techniques are used to remove high

quality wood for high value markets. Resource

sustainability and social equity are criteria for

acceptability of potential agreements. Development of such sustainable harvest methods may

provide an opportunity to maintain the tropical

hardwood market in the face of increasing con-
120 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 4-EAustainable Forest Exploitation:

Case Example in the Palcazu Valley of Peru

Sustainable exploitation of forest resources in tropical areas commonly is viewed as having little potential

because of the complexity of managing diverse, old-growth stands. In fact, estimates suggest that less than 1

percent of tropical forests currently are being managed sustainably. However, an innovative forest production

system in operation in the Pabazu Valley of Peru is demonstrating that sustainable forest exploitation in tropical

humid forests may be possible. The project emerged from an AlD-sponsored subproject (the Pabazu Valley

Development Project-PVDP) of Peru’s Pichis-Pabazu Special Project (Proyecto Especiat Pichis-PalcazuPEPP). PEPP was promulgated by road development (Carretera Marginal de la Selva) along the base of the

Peruvian Andes in the early 1980s and was intended to promote agricultural colonization in the region. The AID

subproject was to maintain a part of the highway leading to the Pabazu Valley and provide rural devebpment

assistance.

Theenvironmentai assessment conducted by AID for the PVDP, however, indbatedthe agricultural potential

for the valley was low and the region was environmentally unsuitable for a large-scale colonization scheme.

Recommendations for low-impact development were made in the piansforAID’s ~tiral~lva~atuml~soums

Management Prqiect, including a widespread production system for pnlnary forest areas. The Tropical Science

Center of Costa Rica deveioped an integrated forest production system based on interspersed, narrow strip

clear-cuts in high, primary forest; a 40-year rotation; family or exchanged labor; complete use of all wood in the

cut area; and animal traction for removal of products to roadside landings. Trees w@Jld not be planted in the

clear-cut strips; natural regeneration from bordering high forest trees and stump sprouting would serve to maintain

the forest and its species diversity. Production tracts would border primary or secondary roads to faalitate the

transport of forest products to nearby processing plants and only processed products would be marketed.

However, PEPP focus remained on agricultural development in the region and land was titled to resident

cattlemen for livestock production. The only remaining forested land had been titled to 12 communities of native,

forest-dwelling Amuesha (Yanesha) Indians, several of which showed interest in the forestry proposal. Thus, the

original forest management scheme was redesigned to fit the Amuesha Although scaled-down in she and funding,

the development of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative emerged from these efforts in 1985. The techniques

envisioned for the larger project (e.g., labor intensive, animal traction, small-sized harvest equipment) were

adapted for the Amuesha, including vertical integration, with the forest operators collectively owning the

production, processing, and marketing operations.

Despite difficulties encountered by the Cooperative (e.g., an uncompleted processing pla~ inadequate

transport and road maintenance machinery, Iackof working cap/tal, andthethreat ofviolencefrom insurgentsartd

narcotics traffickers), it has managed to move ahead slowly. Tday, the Cooperative product mix includes finished

lumber, treated poles and posts, charcoal, and manufactured products. Although some difficulties have arisen in

securing national markets for certain products, this may be a result of the existing economic situation in Peru.

Nevertheless, shipments have been made to U.S. and European buyers at premium prices and sawn timber has

effectively entered local markets. Evidence to date suggests that the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative is a

sustainable forest production system.

SOURCES: J.A. Tosi, Jr., “Integrated Sustained Meld Management of Primary Tropical Wet Forest A Hot Project In the Peruvian

Amazon,” Tropical Soience @nter, Costa Riw 1991, In: McOaffrey, 1991. M.A. Perl, MJ. Kiernan, D. McCaffrey, RJ. f3uschbaoher, and

GJ. Satmanian, “Views for the Forest: Natural Forest Management Initiatives in Latin Amerfoa,” Wrfd Wildlife Fund, VWshingtorr, DC,

1991, In: McCaffrey, 1991.
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 121

sumer boycotts of tropical wood products for

environmental concerns (133).

In addition to sustainable logging opportunities, economic benefits are becoming apparent

from extractive reserves. For example, some

estimates suggest that while converting forests to

pastureland can produce about 220 pounds of

meat per acre each year, leaving them standing

could produce 2,750 pounds of food. Further, the

value of the forest products (nuts, fruits, other)

can reach twice the one-time logging revenue.

Similarly, review of non-timber forest product

value on two sites in Belize suggest that rainforest

use as extractive reserves seems economically

justifiable based on current market data and

currency values (54). Recently, Colombia and

Brazil ceded control of certain forests to native

Indian populations for extractive reserves. Expanding on this trend will require developing

local economies with an interest in conserving

and maintaining the forests and demonstration

that these activities can be economically attractive. Some current activities that might assist in

highlighting the value of forests include efforts in

Costa Rica, where forest samples are being

collected and investigated for potential commercial value (104). If such ‘‘prospecting’ assures

economic benefits for native communities, it

could be incentive for conservation and maintenance of existing forests.

Interest is increasing in forest-related activities

(e.g., extractive reserves, logging, nature tourism)

in the Andean region. Research in the Chapare

region suggests that many of the promising

agricultural alternatives to coca are nontraditional

tree crops, such as macadamia and peach palm

and long-cycle perennials such as passion fruit

and black pepper (4). In fact, the Chapare is

ideally suited for a land use system based largely

on forestry and to a much smaller extent on

agriculture (109).

The importance of incorporating forest resource opportunities in substitution programs is

clear. For example, according to several estimates, between 66 and 80 percent of coca

producers in the Alto Huallaga were settled on

Table 4-7—Forest Management Approaches To Promote Sustainable Resource Exploitation

Project Type Location Activity Goal

Yanesha

Cooperative

Portico

Boscosa

Plan Piloto

Extractive

Reserves

ANAI

Cooperative

Commercial

Public/

private

Public/

private

Community

Public

private

Palcazu Valley, Peru

Costa Rica

Costa Rica

Quintana Roo,

Mexico

Brazil

Costa Rica

Harvest of undisturbed natural

forest using strip clearcutting.

Harvest of single tree species from

swamp forests.

Reclamation of cut-over and

secondary growth forests,

management plans for

sustainable use.

Rehabilitation of degraded forest,

increase numbers of economic

species through regulated

harvest, natural regeneration,

and enrichment plantings.

Formalizing lands as extractive

reserves through petition to

national government.

Works with small farmers to

protect and manage local

forest.

Produce lumber, chemically

treated poles and posts,

charcoal, and firewood.

Produce high-quality doors for

international market.

Harvest of economic tree

species.

Harvest of forest reserves (e.g.,

rubber, brazil nuts).

Integrated land use.

SOURCE: D. McCaffrey, “Biodiversity Conservation and Forest Management as Alternatives to Coca Production in Andean Countries,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1991.
122 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

steep slopes when the Proyecto Especial Alto

Huallaga (PEAH) was developed (11,34). Despite this knowledge, the project excluded land in

steeply sloping areas-areas classified as suitable

only for forestry or protected forest—and focused

on areas suitable for agriculture or livestock

production. Since the project addressed only the

flat areas, the impact on coca producers was

limited from the outset. Likewise, a development

factor that should have been of major importance,

a forestry component, was not even considered.

This is a serious shortcoming given circumstances where lands classified as suitable for

forestry use constitute a considerable part of the

region (12). However, forestry and agroforestry,

although promising, should be viewed as components of an overall package of land use practices

that could provide stable incomes and improved

environmental conditions for populations in the

coca-producing regions.

WILDLIFE AND

WILDLAND RESOURCES

Wildlife and wildland resources could provide

an opportunity to expand renewable resource

based development. Andean ecosystems support

a broad variety of wildlife species that are, or

might be, managed to offer alternative livelihoods

for local populations. Potential wildlife markets

include hides and fibers, pet, meat, and other

animal products (e.g., bone). Techniques exist for

managing a variety of amphibians, reptiles, fishes,

birds, and mammals to provide these commodities.

Nature-based tourism depends on maintaining

certain valued ecosystems to attract foreign exchange. Considerable efforts are being made to

incorporate local communities in nature tourism

development (e.g., Monte Verde) (7). Wildlife

development, and particularly tourism, is likely to

be curtailed by social, political, and economic

pressures in target areas.

Development of wildlife resources for the

national and international markets in wildlife and

wildlife products may provide more immediate

returns than tourism and may also provide abase

for developing tourism industries. Ranching,

farming, and collection of wildlife are dependent

on maintenance of wild populations and critical

habitats. Although farming and ranching may

require greater capital investment than hunting,

they also offer greater security in terms of supply

consistency. Market demand for neotropical wildlife and wildlife products has been increasing

steadily and exhibits sufficient profit margins to

entice international investors (13,27).

South American wildlife products remain important traditional protein and fiber sources and

have been exported for nearly 400 years (70,72).

International conservation organizations have focused on sustainable development of wildlife

resources, and international wildlife conservation

treaties (e.g., CITES, Migratory Bird Treaty) have

led to some control over the exploitation and

international marketing of wildlife products. Despite these actions, considerable amounts of

illegal hides flow from the region.

Wildlife-centered economic development has

become more acceptable and research efforts are

being undertaken to determine sustainable yields

and appropriate husbandry practices. Techniques

for raising certain wildlife species with little

capital investment have been developed and are

easily incorporated in rural communities. For

example, experimental programs for ranching of

green iguanas have spread from Panama to other

neotropical countries (6,127). Licensing and protection policies are being implemented in the

region that are making farming and ranching of

wildlife more profitable than taking from the wild

(97).

7 This section was drawn largely from: R.E, Ashton, Jr., ‘‘Potential Use of Neotropical Wildlife in Sustaimdde Developmen~” contractor

report prepared for the OffIce of Technology Assessmen~ December 1991.
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 123

1 Wildlife Farming and Ranching

Farming and ranching of reptiles and amphibians have been successful in several countries,

including Bolivia. These operations provide hides,

meat, and live animals for the international

market. Animals tend to be superior to those

collected from the wild since they are healthier,

accustomed to captivity, and generally parasite

and disease-free, A select review of live animal

importers showed that 100 percent prefer farmed

or ranched animals for these reasons (6),

Wildlife ranching and farming appear to be on

the threshold of becoming a major industry in

some areas. Only within the last year have South

American iguanas and caiman reached the pet

markets in the United States. Table 4-8 shows

some species that retailers and researchers suggest as having the possibility for sales volumes

sufficient to sustain an industry. Underlying

research needs include information on sustainable

yield levels, life history, and husbandry techniques.

Wildlife farming involves collecting enough

stock from the wild to have a viable breeding base

to sustain a captive population and produce a

marketable commodity. Once the stock is collected, the captive population is sustained through

breeding and recruitment from the wild is not

required. Although farming may offer an opportunity to propagate rare species without harming

wild populations (102), it may also result in little

concern for sustaining the wild populations or

their habitat since the economic value lies with

the farmed populations. Farming may also be

used to conceal wildlife harvests, as has been

suggested to have occurred in Colombia under

some of the recent captive propagation programs

(35). Nevertheless, well-organized and managed

wildlife farming programs can promote monitoring of exports and provide revenue for enforcement activities and local communities. Constraints to this approach include potentially high

startup and operation costs to sustain the captive

population.

Wildlife ranching is based on capturing wild

stock and raising it to marketable size and quality

and requires continuous replenishment from wild

populations. While this form of wildlife production is preferred for species with large wild

populations, it can affect the viability of those

populations if management is inadequate. Indiscriminate collection of wildlife can lead to

extinction (102). By necessity, wildlife ranching

depends on the maintenance of wild populations

and their habitats and thus may yield conservation

benefits. Revenues generated through taxes on

ranching systems could support enforcement and

protection of the resource.

Local communities that may not be able to

finance a full-scale ranching system may still

participate and receive economic benefits through

collection of stock for ranching activities. Cultures that retain strong hunting and gathering

systems may then supplement their incomes

through supplying ranching needs.

Sustainable harvest from wild populations

requires understanding population dynamics. Although such information generally is lacking for

many exploitable neotropical wildlife, there are

options for developing sustainable harvest programs in situ. Harvest levels can be based on

empirical evidence during the period that population dynamics data are collected (13) (box 4-F).

EXOTIC SPECIES

The introduction of exotic species for farming

or ranching activities is controversial. Concerns

center largely on the potential for escape and

ensuing displacement of native species and ecosystem disruption, disease transmission to wild

populations, and economic consequences resulting from predation of exotic species on native

biological resources.

If introduced species are excellent competitors

or predators, native species maybe displaced and

ecosystems disrupted. Displacement may take the

form of population decline or range limitations. In

either case, if the native species is desirable, or

economically important, the adverse impact is

331-054 - 93 - 5
124 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 4-8—A Partial List of South American Wildlife Species

With Potential for Sustainable Development

Current Potential Current Potential

Species status status Market Species status status Market

Invertebrates

Butterflies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Beetles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Spiders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tropical fish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Amphibians

Treefrogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Dendrobatids . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bufonids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Salamanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Crocodilians

Crocodylus intermedius . . . .

Crocodylus acutus . . . . . . . . .

Crocodylus moreleti . . . . . . .

Caiman crocodilus . . . . . . . . .

Caiman latirostris . . . . . . . . . .

Melanosuchus niger . . . . . . .

Paleochuchus

palpebrosus . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Paleochuchus trigonatus . . .

Turtles

Geochelone denticulata . . . .

Geochelone carbonaria . . . .

Aquatic turtles . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G,F

G

G

F,G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G,R

G,R

G,R

G,R

G

G

G

G

G

F,R

G,R

G,F

G,F,R

G,R

R

G,R

G

R

R

R

G,R

G,R

R

G,R

G,R

F,R

F,R

R

H

H

P

P

P

P

P

H

H

H

H

H

H

P

P

P

P

P

Lizards

Enyalioides laticeps . . . . . . .

iguana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ctenosaura pectinata . . . . . .

Basiliscus sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tubinambis sp. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Snakes

Boa constrictor . . . . . . . . . . . .

Corallus sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Epicrates sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Eunectes sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Drymarchon corias . . . . . . . .

Lampropeltis sp... . . . . . . . . .

Spilotes pullatus . . . . . . . . . . .

Lachesis muta . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bothrops sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Crotalus durissus . . . . . . . . . .

Birds

Amazona sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ara sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Psittacines . . . . . . . . . .

Mammas

Tayassu pecari . . . . . . . . . . . .

Felis pardalis. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Panthera onca. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lutra iongicaudis . . . . . . . . . .

Hydrocherus hydrocherus . .

Agouti paca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vicugna vicugna . . . . . . . . . . .

G

G,F,R

G

G

G,R

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G

G,R

G,R

G,R

G

G

G

G

G,R

G,R

G,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

F,R

G

F,R

FIR

R,F

R,F

G,R,F

R

F

F

F

R

F

R

P

H,P

H,P

P

H,P

H,P

P

P

H,P

P

P

P

P

H,P

H,P

P

H,P

P

H

H,P

H,P

H,P

H,P

HIP

H

KEY: G = Hunted or collected.

R = Ranched or potential for ranching.

F = Farmed or potential for farming.

H = Animal products industry (e.g., hide, meat, feathers, bone).

P = Live animal trade.

SOURCE: R. E. Ashton, Handbook on Central American Tourism and Wildlands Protection, Paseo Pantera Ecotourism Project, Wildlife Conservation

International, 1991, In: Ashton, 1991.

quickly apparent. In cases where the species is

less obvious or desirable, the impact also maybe

serious since the ecological balance will have

been disrupted. Similarly, when introduced species prey on economic biological resources (e.g.,

crops, trees, fish), economic disruptions occur in

the form of reduced yields, and increasing costs of

control measures and management effort.

Nevertheless, species introductions are underway for potential economic gain. Nile crocodiles

have been introduced on an Amazonian crocodile

farm because of their higher quality hide compared with the native species. Accidental release

of this prolific and potentially dangerous species

into the Amazon basin could have serious consequences (97).

Asian and African big game have been introduced into some private game hunting ranches in

savanna areas in Central and South America.

Cattle associations in affected areas have re-
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 125

●

●

●

●

●

●

Box 4-F–lnformation Needs

for Developing Sustainable

Harvest Practices

Population size and range.

Habitat requirements.

Resilience to human disturbance.

Mortality and productivity rates.

Key factors regulating populations and their tendency to increase or decrease.

Effects of environmental variation (e.g., effects of

climatic cycles) on productivity.

SOURCE: S.T. Beissinger and E.H. Bucher, “Can Parrots Be

Conserved Through Sustainable l-harvesting? Bioscience 42(3):164-

172, March 1992.

sponded with demands for strict control of these

imports due to the potential for transmission of

ungulate diseases to their stock.

INFORMATION NEEDS TO SUPPORT

WILDLIFE PRODUCTION

Despite available technologies for wildlife

production, species specific information is needed

to support a viable wildlife production industry,

Some of this type of research currently is underway for caiman and birds in South America.

Biological studies are needed that characterize the

extent of the resource and identify likely impacts

of increased wildlife production and marketing.

Member countries of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild

Fauna and Flora (CITES) are required to provide

a management plan based on recent surveys and

studies on listed8 species population dynamics

and other key aspects affecting their viability. If

it is determined that the species can be harvested,

limits on the take are set to provide for the

population to sustain or increase its numbers.

Allowable take limits must be based on solid

scientific information regarding population size,

dynamics, reproductive behavior, and current

status. Species’ feasibility for captive propagation is determined by behavioral, reproductive,

and husbandry needs as well as economic value.

Most species are not suitable for captive propagation (106) and comprehensive planning is necessary to avoid failure. For example, the United

Nations, Man and the Biosphere and the United

Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization 1970s project with tortoises failed to

account for the time required to raise tortoises to

market size for food. A component directed to the

demand for hatchling tortoises in the

might have been more appropriate.

H Protection and Enforcement

Enforcement of wildlife protection

pet trade

and management regulations is a primary requirement for

developing a sustainable wildlife exploitation

program. Game laws typically have been difficult

to enforce, and regulations have not been well

supported since wildlife is considered part of the

public domain (102). Most efforts at protection

have been directed by international laws and

treaties such as CITES. However, funding for

much needed enforcement and education programs typically has been low.

Political will and increased revenues will be

necessary to support sustainable development of

wildlife resources. Economic pressures from

conservation groups and the international market

could provide incentive for producing nations to

adopt or enforce protection programs. Revenue

from legitimate business could help in providing

the capital necessary for implementing these

programs. The American alligator harvesting

program and the International Union for the

Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

(IUCN) Crocodile Specialist Group are examples

of programs to promote protection, enforcement,

and licensing and to facilitate marketing wildlife

products.

8 Li~fe~ ~cfers t. ~e identification of a sp~ies as rae or protected under CITES.
126 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies

S Economics of Wildlife Opportunities

Economic concerns include startup costs, technology costs, logistics, cost/benefit ratio, and

marketing (127). Although there are no data

showing that sustainable development of wildlife

resources could protect natural ecosystems or

become the dominant method for economic

development for small rural communities, indications are that well-managed sustainable wildlife

industry development can be economically attractive. For example the demand for natural leathers

has remained stable and has prompted some to

investigate producing leathers from nontraditional sources such as frogs and toads (97). Prices

for hides or animal fibers (e.g., vicuna wool) vary

and high-quality products may bring significant

earnings. For example, high-quality crocodilian

hides may bring as much as U.S. $100 for an

average caiman or crocodile.

The exotic animal pet trade has grown, mainly

over the last decade. Tropical fish exports from

several neotropic locations comprise a flourishing

multimillion dollar business. Conditions that

have led to the popularity increase of exotic pets

include:

●

●

●

●

Expanding awareness of rainforest biodiversity and intrigue with associated wildlife,

Affluent populations in urban areas that view

exotic pets as status symbols and as being

easier to care for (27,51,97),

Increasing accessibility and availability of

exotic pets, and

Increasing availability of captive care and

maintenance techniques and trained exotic

pet care experts.

Nearly all species of birds common to the pet

trade are being raised in captivity, perhaps as

much as 75 to 90 percent of the demand. Farmed

or ranched birds could pose an alternative to

captive raised animals if accompanied by attractive prices. Costs of transporting live birds and the

quarantine requirements may pose major constraints to entrance into this market (6). In

in the Andean Region

addition, competition from illegal imports may

hurt the exotic bird market. For example, it has

been estimated that nearly 150,000 birds from

various countries were imported illegally each

year through Mexico, totaling roughly U.S. $1

million in receipts for bird trade (107). As Mexico

has become a member of CITES, this situation is

expected to change. Considerable research would

be required to develop systems appropriate to the

raising of mammals for the exotic pet trade. High

investment costs and the extensive care requirements are key considerations.

Few areas within Bolivia, Peru, or Colombia

have adequate infrastructure to enter the live

animal export market. In addition, the current

market structure is weighted toward enriching the

middleman rather than the supplier. Prices paid to

villagers are about 10 percent of the wholesale

price. For example, a boa constrictor that might

fetch U.S. $250 results in an earning of U.S. $0.50

to $5.00 for the individual capturing the boa.

Clearly, market access must be improved to

increase economic benefits to the supplier.

Significant concern exists over the importation

of disease with live animal trade. Despite mandatory health certificates, quarantine, and other

importation restrictions under the Animal Quarantine Regulations administered by the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA), illegal imports have spread some diseases.

Quarantine and certification of health requirements will need review if the spectrum of

imported wildlife increases. As the agency responsible for quarantine and health certification

of imported birds and mammals, USDA must be

adequately equipped to handle these tasks at ports

of entry. Even today, some importers indicate that

the current status of bird and mammal quarantine

and staff training for these duties is inadequate

and responsible for some wildlife losses.

Regulations regarding importation of wildlife

to the United States may need to be reviewed as

wildlife production becomes more controlled.

Regulations established to curtail overexploitation or illegal takings of wildlife will be inappro-
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 127

priate for farmed or ranched species. For example,

under the Public Health Service Act only 4

hatchling to 4-inch carapace turtles or tortoises

may enter the United States in a single shipment

and they cannot be sold except for scientific or

educational use. Clearly, this regulation would

pose a considerable obstacle for imports of

captive raised turtles or tortoises.

1 Wildlife- and Wildland-Based Tourism

Wildlife-based tourism has grown at least 20

percent annually since 1980 (58,99), and has been

described as a reasonable approach for sustainable wildland development. Tourism offers an

opportunity to earn foreign exchange and provide

employment for local communities, Where tourism is developed properly, it has a greater

potential for generating local income than most

traditional farming or ranching activities (68).

Nature-based tourism could provide economic

opportunities for the Andean countries. However,

it should be noted that poorly developed tourism

industries all too commonly degrade natural

resources and ultimately may reduce development options. There are examples of wellplanned, appropriately designed nature tourism

attractions that could serve as models for similar

development in the Andean countries. Ecotourism is gaining interest globally and expertise in

developing these resources is expanding.

Game tourism has not reached the levels of big

game hunting in Africa and Southeast Asia,

although jaguar, tapir, peccary, white-tailed deer,

and birds have been hunted in South America.

Fishing in the Amazon has been popular for at

least 20 years and has focused on such exotic

species as peacock bass and giant catfish. Some

game tourism is seasonaI in nature due to the

migratory behavior of target species (e.g., ducks)

and provides only short-term employment for

local populations. Sustainable management of

game resources will require development and

enforcement of optimum harvest limits.

While studies have been conducted on the

contributions of nature-based tourism to local

cultures, they lack data on the level of economic

contribution and volume. In fact, data on naturebased tourism’s actual importance to local and

national economies are lacking. There are no

standard data collection methods by tourism

officials or international organizations and researchers’ poor knowledge of nature tourism

(58,99) has led to ineffective study methods and

erroneous conclusions.

Appropriate planning and management of

wildland tourism areas must incorporate the

needs of the local communities, fair user fees, and

equitable distribution and use of revenue to

maintain the attractions that sustain the industry.

Where nature tourism has been developed, primary criticisms relate to failing to fulfill these

needs. Tourism developed around indigenous

cultures and wild areas may also offer an opportunity to preserve traditional cultures, skills, and

knowledge. Also important is the investment of

tourism revenue into the local society in terms of

improving quality of life by providing employment, training, and education. Such revenue has

been shown to contribute significantly to economic growth (8) and increase support for parks

by local communities (62).

Developing successful tourism programs that

support local communities should include:

●

●

●

●

Written working agreement with communities or local people outlining the use of lands,

jobs, interactions with tourists, wildlife protection and associated compensation for

undertaking such activities, tr aining, and

advancement potential;

Agreement describing operators efforts to

support the local community;

Agreement to the privacy rights of tourists

and local populations; and

Agreement on marketing goods produced by

the local community that assures fair compensation and precludes overharvest of local

resources upon which the industry depends.
128 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

If nature tourism increases in importance in

the Andean countries, mechanisms will be needed

to protect wild resources supporting the industry.

However, competing demands for resources can

pose a constraint to development and implementation of such regulations. For example, the

Isiboro-Secure National Park in Bolivia provides

a highly diverse forest system that could be of

interest to nature tourism, but encroachment on

park lands by squatters producing coca has

adversely affected its tourism potential.

S Conclusion

International and domestic markets for wildlife, wildlife products, and nature tourism exist.

Developing these resources could contribute to

overall economic improvements in the Andean

region. Farming and ranching of wildlife species

and protecting and preserving of habitats are

techniques that could promote development of

these sectors,

Revenues from sustainable development and

exploitation of wildlife resources can support

conservation efforts critical to sustaining the

industry. Governments must set appropriate user

fees and allocate revenue for habitat protection,

monitoring programs, research and education

programs, and maintenance of necessary infrastructure. Models of successful efforts (e.g.,

crocodilian programs) could provide the basis for

developing rational revenue allocation schemes.

AQUATIC RESOURCES9

Abundant freshwater aquatic systems (e.g.,

lakes, reservoirs, rivers, and streams) in the

Andean nations provide opportunity for sustainable exploitation of endemic and introduced

fishes, other vertebrates and invertebrates, and

plants. However, little development effort has

been placed on improving existing commercial

and artisanal fisheries.

Comparisons of estimated productivity and

actual harvest suggest that a higher level of

sustainable exploitation of Andean aquatic resources is possible. Use of better management,

production, and postharvest technologies could

increase fishery production. Well-designed management systems that include size, season, and

gear restrictions can influence aquatic community

composition and sustain high-value fisheries and

protect the resource base. Such systems, however,

need to be suitable to the local community and

local input in developing management plans

should be an integral part of such activities.

Use of improved capture technologies can

allow more precise exploitation of aquatic communities and greater benefit per fishing trip.

Aquiculture technologies offer an opportunity to

increase food production through intensive fish

farming through stocking to maintain commercial

fisheries. Perhaps, the key need for improving the

potential contribution of aquatic resources to the

Andean countries will be efforts to reduce postharvest losses of aquatic products by improving

processing, handling, and storage methods. Infrastructure development could assist in marketing,

reduce product cost, and potentially increase

economic benefits.

In some regions, coca production and processing have adversely affected aquatic systems and

reduced their potential productivity. Aquatic

remediation technologies could be applied, although clear definition of the problem will be

necessary before undertaking reclamation activities.

W Existing Fisheries

Commercial and artisanal freshwater fisheries

in the Andean countries have not been a focus of

development activities. Some commercial fisheries have been developed around introduced highvalue species. For example, rainbow trout and

pejerry introduced into Bolivian and Peruvian

9 This section was drawn largely from: R. Schroeder, “Fishery/Aquatic Resourees in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Production Systems

and Potential as Alternative Livelihoods, ” contractor report prepared for the Offke of Technology Assessmen6 October 1991.
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 129

lakes supported a commercial trout fishery until

severe overfishing caused a significant stock

decline (36,1 19). Pejerry is now the most abundant fish in these lakes and supports a major

fishery in Bolivia. Pejerry is also cultured in

lagoons and lakes at Cuzco and Apurimac in Peru

(31). In addition to lake fisheries, river basins

support active fisheries, including the Magdalena,

Pilcomayo, Amazon, and Orinoco Basins.

Other aquatic animals and plants may have

some potential as food and fiber resources.

Amphibians, birds, mollusks, and crustaceans are

found in the Titicaca Basin (42,120,121). Economically valuable plants (e.g., bullrush, algae,

Elodea, Myriophyllum, and Potamogeton) are

found in lakes and streams and rivers. These plant

materials can be used for human and livestock

food, construction materials, crop fertilizers, paper

production, and medicines (69). Estimates suggest that sustainable totora—Scirpus tatora o r

bullrush--production in Lake Titicaca could feed

265,000 head of livestock. Development of these

resources will require strategies to protect against

overharvest and to enhance their growth (e.g.,

cultivation through careful cutting can enhance

bed productivity and density).

Aquatic vegetation also provides nursery habitat for economically important fish and invertebrates, feeding areas for birds, and shoreline

protection (65). Littoral swamps may extract

contaminants from terrestrial runoff. Thus, maintaining or enhancing these resources could provide conservation and economic benefits for local

communities.

Fishing communities of the Andean region

typically are small and dispersed, with fisheries

being largely artisanal and labor intensive. Artisanal fisheries are characterized by lowtechnology, high effort with seasonal fluctuation,

limited fishing range, and landing of small

quantities at scattered sites. Fishermen typically

are low income, have few opportunities for

alternative employment, and wield little political

influence (74). Fishing tends to be a part-time

occupation due to the seasonal nature of fisheries

and migratory behavior of many economic species; full-time fishermen must migrate along

riverine systems to follow stock (124). Fishing

trips typically are short (e.g., several hours), and

most fishermen are also involved in crop or

livestock agriculture. Rapid development of largescale fisheries could result in resource overexploitation to the detriment of these artisanal

fishermen (82). Lack of formal training opportunities in fishing skills also poses a constraint to

expansion of fishery development (63).

Fishing craft, gear, and methods vary widely

depending on target species, whether the fishery

type is artisanal or commercial, and whether the

exploited aquatic system is a river, stream, lake,

or reservoir. Boats range from paddled dugout

canoes to small powerboats. Some traditional

fishing gear (e.g., reed rafts, nets of llama wool,

traps, and spears) is being replaced by more

modern technology.

Marketing typically is dependent on fish traders and some traders may even provide small

loans to fishermen (74). Although some products

now reach distant markets, difficulties remain for

long-distance marketing (81,82). Existing production and market system features reduce the

potential for increasing fisher-y value in domestic

markets. In the Lake Titicaca Basin, for example,

export of high-value fish is controlled by middlemen and import of frozen marine products has

undercut the price of native fish, which make up

the greatest part of poor fishermen’s catch (9).

Thus, annual earnings for fishermen providing for

local markets averaged one-half that of exportoriented fishermen (i.e., U.S. $1,200 vs. $2,400)

(82).

~ Management of Aquatic Resources

Fishery legislation typically has been difficult

to enforce largely due to lack of public acceptability and the remote nature of many of the region’s

fisheries. A variety of regulatory measures may

be needed to promote and sustain fishery development. These can include restrictions on total
130 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

fishing effort, resource restoration, habitat enhancement, pollution controls, and selective removal of competitive species. Restriction on

effort can include catch limits, licensing quotas,

gear limitations, closed seasons and areas, and

zoning guidelines for waterside development

(124).

Ad hoc resource management is accomplished

in some areas through community-controlled

fishing territories-Territorial Use Rights Fishing (TURFS), whereby aquatic resources are

defended from exploitation by outsiders. TURFS

may extend from a few hundred meters to several

kilometers from shore (64). Although the TURF

system is not recognized legally, this informal

management system may also function to sustain

fisheries by preventing overexploitation. Conflicts between commercial and artisanal fishermen may be promulgated by fishery development

since the latter primarily depend on higher

yield/lower catch per unit effort fishes while the

former depend on larger, high-value species.

TURFS may function to defend harvest zones

from commercial efforts.

Generally, fishery development focuses on

high-value species and seeks to manage the entire

system with respect to sustainable yield for these

products. Without careful management, overfishing for high-value fish may result in community

dominance by short-lived species that support

greater sustainable populations. It may be possible to develop a balanced system for producing

high- and low-value species, but management

requirements are likely to be even greater. Elimination of competitors through a variety of methods (e.g., selective application of electrofishing or

ichthyocides) can reduce pressure on desired

fishery species. Understanding life history and

basic biology of fishes can be used to develop

harvest measures specific to certain life stages or

species.

Effective management and compliance with

fishery regulations also require an understanding

of the importance of such measures at the

community level. Active fisheries extension servFishing gear vessels typically range from dugout

canoes to small motor-powered boats, A dugout canoe

allows these two Colombian fishermen to extend the

area they can exploit with a castnet.

ices can facilitate understanding of requirements,

and community level organizations (e.g., TURFS)

might offer opportunities to distribute information. Active local participation in the development of fishery management plans can also

promote acceptability and compliance with these

efforts. Management planning for the Titicaca

Basin, for example, could incorporate the traditional TURF system with more formal management strategies and stress cooperation between

the various stakeholders (63)

9 Increasing Fishery

Production Potential

Methods to increase or improve fishery production at the commercial and artisanal levels,

include use of improved harvest technologies,

habitat improvement, and aquiculture. Aquatic

systems are subject to numerous and competing

demands from other activities (e.g., agriculture,

urbanization, recreation). A primary consideration prior to fishery development or enhancement

will be the additional surrounding activities that

may have an impact on the aquatic system and

strategies to integrate such competing needs with

fishery development.
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 131

HARVEST TECHNOLOGIES

Improved fishing gear and methods could

increase production in artisanal and commercial

fisheries. Gear/method combinations vary depending on the target species, location, and water

system; artisanal fishermen tend to employ a

variety of nets, seining, and fishpots. These

technologies are simple to implement and provide

relatively inexpensive harvest methods. While

previously constructed from local materials, nets

and lines of more modern materials are now being

used. However, boats are used infrequently,

restricting the range of exploitation to nearshore

environments. Dugout canoes that are handpaddled maybe used by some fishermen, but size and

storage abilities also create harvest restrictions.

Wider use of improved materials in traditional

fishing gear and boats with greater capacity for

proper catch storage could contribute to improved

catch per unit effort in artisanal fisheries. Commercial fishermen also use a variety of nets for

capture. Although some commercial efforts on

Lake Titicaca focus on nearshore activities (i.e.,

beach seining for catfish), higher value species

are captured from boats by pelagic gillnetting or

trawling. Vessels commonly are equipped to store

catch on ice to decrease postharvest losses.

HABITAT ENHANCEMENT

Actions that reduce habitat complexity threaten

the diversity of fish populations. Variations in

stream flow, siltation, and chemical inputs all

may result in physical or chemical changes in

aquatic ecology. Such effects are common in

coca-producing and cocaine-processing areas where

erosion from cultivation can contribute large

amounts of sediment to nearby riverine systems

and periodic dumping of processing chemicals

into rivers and streams may change the water’s

pH balance temporarily.

Resource enhancement can be accomplished

through physical (e.g., artificial reefs, fish ladders, current generation) and biological (e.g.,

stocking, selective exploitation) means. Artificial

reefs have been used successfully in temperate

lakes to increase abundance of economic fishes

and might hold promise for high altitude lakes in

the Andean region. Increasing exploitation pressure on competitive species can also improve

productivity of desired species. Sufficient natural

reproduction and recruitment to maintain a fishery require optimum conditions (e.g., water temperature, flow, clarity, substrate type, complexity) and, most often, regular stocking.

AQUACULTURE

Several organisms have culture potential for

high-altitude tropical aquatic systems. Tilapia is

the most popular freshwater fish cultured in

tropical and subtropical regions. However, early

efforts to promote small-pond culture of tilapia in

certain regions of the Andes were unsuccessful.

The program failed largely because plans lacked

a strategy for the local population to produce fish

food cheaply and easily (84). An integrated,

farming systems approach could have addressed

this need.

In Rwanda, small fishponds (0.8 ha) at altitudes

of 1,300 to 2,500 meters have been found to be

economically viable with production levels averaging 400 kg/ha/yr. Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) was found to be the most suitable species for

this type of culture. Andean river shrimp have

commercial aquiculture potential (120,121) and

native freshwater prawns in mountain streams

and lakes may have similar potential (67). Techniques for shrimp and prawn culture have been

used successfully in tropical areas (115).

Aquiculture also can be used to complement

capture fisheries by providing fingerlings for

stocking. Characterization of the aquatic ecosystem is necessary, since artificial enhancements

can alter interspecific competition (41,77). Increasing nutrient and organic content of natural

systems and temperature elevations may cause

undesirable shifts in natural aquatic communities

(28). Algae also may be “stocked” to provide a

supplemental food source for fish and be harvested as livestock feed, fertilizer, or for human

consumption (135).
132 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Floodplains may provide an area for expanded

aquiculture activities by blocking small channels

or depressions and constructing drain-in ponds

and refuge traps. Annual production can average

several hundred to a thousand kilograms of fish

per hectare (124). Successful examples of transforming waterlogged soils in tropical floodplains

into productive aquiculture/agriculture systems

are evident in the Peoples Republic of China.

Traditional dike-pond agriculture and aquiculture systems on the Pearl River Delta have been

operating for at least 400 yearn. Fish, livestock,

and agricultural crops are produced and material

cycling contributes to reduced production costs

(box 4-G).

HANDLING, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORT

Infrastructure development has lagged in providing the facilities necessary to promote fisheries in many areas. Indeed, key constraints to

greater economic benefits from fishery production in Bolivia seem to center on inadequate

infrastructure for processing, handling and storage, and lack of equipment to exploit the resource

adequately. These difficulties translate into low

prices for the fishermen and high prices for

consumers. For example, in 1987 fresh fish prices

were nearly three times greater in La Paz (market)

than in Trinidad (production center) and only 25

percent of the price was retained by the fisherman

(87). Development of roads, ice plants, marketing

channels, and credit systems could support increased fishery development (126).

I Conclusion

Aquatic resource systems of the Andean region

harbor significant potential for enhanced production. The numerous lakes and river systems

include a variety of harvestable species that could

support artisanal and commercial fisheries under

good management conditions and application of

appropriate technology. Some systems clearly are

underexploited and could provide significant

increases in domestic food production.

om

Productivity estimates for Luke Titicaca, shared by

Bolivia and Peru and covering 8,135 square

kilometers range from 50,000 to 250,000 metric

tons--far above actual yield estimates.

Despite the availability of resource assessment

technologies, little information on aquatic resources has been gathered. Fishery research

activities that demand the highest priority are

stock assessment, aquiculture, fishery expansion,

resource administration and management, handling and processing, and technical training to

support enhanced fishery production. Assistance

of an applied nature designed to address immediate problems could provide rapid results and the

basis for demonstration and diffusion of n e w

technologies and approaches to fishery production (14).

Quantitative and qualitative field assessments

on the extent of aquatic resources are necessary to

develop rational resource management plans.

Information on species composition, recruitment,

and life history help to establish sustainable

harvest parameters. A variety of methods are

available for gathering such information, some

highly technical and others based on surveys at

landing sites and local fish markets (125).
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 133

Box 4-G–Dike-Pond Aquiculture Systems

Blending of aquiculture and agriculture systems may hold promise for increasing productivity of floodplains

or waterlogged soils. A notable example is the dike-pond system that has been used in the Pearl River Delta for

at least 400 years. The system is composed of land and water subsystems Iinked through agriculture and livestock

components. Byproducts from one subsystem become inputs for the other (29).

A diversity of fish are cultured in ponds (bottom, mid-level, and surface dwellers) and sugarcane, fruit trees,

mulberry, forage crops, vegetables, and flowers are produced on the dikes. Poultry and livestock are raised near

the ponds and silkworms are raised on the mulberry trees. The forage crops produced on the dikes are fed to

Iivestockand fish. The Iivestockexcrement is used to fertilize ponds and pond mud piledon dikes to fertilize crops.

Despite the antiquity of the Chinese system, scientific procedures for quantifying analyzing and

experimenting with these farming systems are sparse. The International Center for Living Aquatic Resource

Management (lClARM) is actively researching combined agriculture and aquiculture systems in India and

Malawi. These efforts closely resemble those of the Chinese systems. As in agricultural crop substitution

approaches, a key need identified through the ICLARM effort is mass farmer participation in the adaptive research

and development process (66),

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

Models to predict the potential catch produc- status of a wide variety of parameters, including:

tivity of river fisheries can be based on character- . ●

istics such as channel length or drainage basin

●

area; correlations with environmental parameters;

●

or habitat variables (124,125). For example,

●

standing stock may show a high correlation with

stream width, width-to-depth ratio, extent of

●

ripa.rian vegetation, and dry-season stream flow

(59). Primary productivity estimates-requiring

examination of morphological, physical, chemical, and biological features of the resource-are

also necessary in developing management plans

(20).

Some work has been done on quanti&ng

production potential of the riverine systems of the

Altiplano (the large, high-altitude inland drainage

plateau of Bolivia and Peru) (86) and the Magdalena

River Basin of Colombia (52,1 18). The aquatic

systems of the eastern and western cordillera of

the Andes have yet unquantified production

potential, although these resources could contibute to national protein production (132).

Development of sustainable resource management plans requires information on the current

Resource production and potential,

Fishing activity,

Environmental health,

Historical trends to identify critical variables, and

Spatial and temporal variations in conditions.

Once this information is available, opportunities

for developing sustainable exploitation strategies

may improve. Such management strategies

should contain at least the following components:

resource enhancement/regeneration plans, financial support, regulation and enforcement measures, development of local organizational capacity and coordination, and training and extension.

STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE COCA

SUBSTITUTION EFFORTS1°

Development of the alternative economy being

promoted in Andean countries to reduce dependence on cocaine is at a critical stage. Some

promising alternative crops have been identifkd

10 me ba~i~ for ~ssection was developed l~gely from: U.S. Congress, Office of TechnoIou Assessment, Crop substitution wor~hoPI

September 3@October 1, 1991, Washingto~ DC.
134 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

and efforts continue to improve adoption and

productivity of these systems. Largely the focus

has been on agricultural crops as opposed to the

broad range of renewable resource uses that might

offer alternatives to coca production. Indeed,

some coca production areas are identified as

inappropriate for agriculture, yet suitable for

forest management and production. Improving

coca substitution programs in the Andean countries might be approached through:

. Diversifying agriculture systems,

. Intensifying agricultural production, and

. Expanding the range of resources exploited.

Some key principles unique to the Andean crop

substitution effort create the framework within

which improved substitution programs might be

developed. First, the degree of economic and

traditional dependence of Andean peoples on

coca hinder acceptance of coca substitution programs linked to complete eradication of the crop.

Coca is a traditional crop in Andean agriculture

with a high degree of symbolism; further, it

provides the largest share of export earnings for

the Andean countries. Programs that approach

crop substitution incrementally, therefore, may

find greater acceptance than replacement strategies. Transition time from producing coca to

producing alternative crops may be lengthy.

Programs or projects must consider investment

time for producers to make the transition to

alternative livelihoods. Programs might focus on

creating preconditions necessary to implement

crop substitution programs, identifying how these

programs fit with existing policies, and assisting

in marketing and developing other support structures necessary for success of a substitution

program.

Secondly, coca farmers tend to be smallholders, yet national agricultural policies (e.g., landtenure, agricultural pricing and structure) seem to

work against development of smallholder agriculture. Investment in improved agricultural production systems require access to affordable credit—

a feature largely lacking for smallholders, particularly in coca production regions. Nevertheless,

increasing profitability of national agricultural

production is likely to depend on intensifying

smallholder production systems. Progress toward

the transition to alternative cropping systems in

the coca-growing regions will depend on availability of improved technology and techniques,

practices and cropping combinations, and a supportive policy environment at the local, regional,

national, and international levels.

Finally, the extent of the cocaine economy in

Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia highlights the size of

the crop substitution task. If substitution programs focus on current coca-producing regions,

environmental features will constrain the breadth

of alternative crop choices. Coca grows on poor

soils with low pH, high aluminum content, and

low cation exchange--conditions few other crops

will tolerate. Because of coca’s value, carrying

capacity of coca-producing regions exceeds that

allowed through production of legal crops. Substitution efforts that seek to expand the range of

resources exploited may be more successful than

those that focus solely on a single resource

alternative (i.e., regional economic development

vs. alternative crops). Sustainable exploitation is

key in such goals in order to maintain benefits in

the long term. However, sustainable-use systems

require development to support such resource use,

and economic and sociocultural constraints must

be addressed (e.g., market availability, practitioner skill). These features are important considerations and underscore the need for a flexible

approach to developing alternative livelihoods for

Andeans involved in coca/cocaine production.

H Strategy: Diversify

Agriculture Systems

Diversification of agricultural systems by incorporating high-value crops is the driving force

behind current crop substitution efforts in the

Andean countries. High-value agricultural exports offer potential to generate foreign exchange
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 135

Box 4-H–Estimated Economics of Intercropping Coffee with Annual,

Semi-perennial Crops, and Shade Trees

The following table illustrates potential earnings from establishing a coffee, shade tree, semi-perennial,

annual cropping system under good soil conditions. During the first 2 to 3 years of the system, annuals and

semi-perennials are interplanted with the coffee to provide income (e.g., corn, cassava, bananas). Corn maybe

planted in October/November followed by bananas in November/December. The coffee seedlings are planted in

January/February, and the established corn crop provides shade to promote coffee seedling development. After

the corn crop is harvested, legume tree seedlings are transplanted. At this point the banana development is

sufficient to provide shade for coffee, and annual crops such as cassava may be interplanted for harvest in 8 to

10 months. Bananas produce 14 months after transplanting and can be harvested for 3 to 4 years. Banana tree

density is reduced 30 to 40 percent annually until it reaches 10 percent of its initial planting density. By years 4

to 5 coffee is in full production and legume tree cover is sufficient to provide shade.

Year after Yield Income

planting Crop (kg/ha) (U.S.$/tta)

1 Corn 1,500 180

2 Banana 5,000 500

3 Banana 2,000 200

3 Coffee 275 210

4 Banana 1,500 150

4 Coffee 440 335

5 Banana 500 50

5 Coffee 660 503

6 Coffee 990 754

7 Coffee 1,175 880

8 Coffee 1,375 1,048

SOURCE: H. Villachica, “Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.

earnings and thereby increase the attractiveness provide a basis for agricultural diversification and

of legitimate agriculture. For example, tropical

hits and nuts, coffee, and spices are impressive

in terms of potential income per hectare produced

because of their value in European, Asian, and

U.S. markets. Although still lower returns than

that generated by coca production, these commodities are viewed as having the greatest potential

for competing with coca. Yet, at the same time,

existing infiastructural constraints to moving

these products to market can reduce their value at

the producer level and create a disincentive to

participate in substitution programs. Integrated

systems of high-value and staple crops could

increase agricultural profitability (box 4-H).

The Andean countries remain net food importers currently because cheap food imports are more

cost effective than internal movement of foodstuff from production site to urban markets. Prices

for traditional agricultural products are adversely

affected by present agricultural structure and

pricing policies. Nonetheless, crop diversification

strategies could be approached in an incremental

fashion with an initial focus on increasing production of traditional food products for local and

regional markets and phasing in of high-value

export commodities. Developing systems that

integrate legitimate crops with coca offers an
136 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Irrigation networks can increase agricultural

production, particularly in areas subject to

seasonal rainfall. Here, farmers harvest green

peppers on an irrigated cooperative farm.

option to reduce the perceived risk of transition to

alternative systems for some coca producers.

Coordinated effort could be placed on developing

necessary infrastructure to support an agricultural

export industry along with value-added processing to increase the economic benefits for local

communities.

OPPORTUNITY: INCREASE

IMPORT SUBSTITUTION

Diversion of land from legitimate agricultural

production to coca production is suggested to

have increased the Andean nations’ dependence

on foreign food imports. Production of typical

Andean crops has declined; however, to what

degree this may be attributed to expanding coca

cultivation or to changes in food consumption

patterns is unclear. Although increasing agricultural productivity of the Andean peasant economy

through application of selective technological

packages is now viewed more optimistically,

such approaches may require redesign of certain

rural strategies (e.g., Peru’s Agrarian Reform) and

significant infrastructure development and technical assistance (115).

While the economic conditions of the Andean

countries imply that internal markets will not be

high-priced, ability to market maybe increased if

products and markets are in close proximity (e.g.,

a producer in the Chapare may stand a better

chance of getting grain to La Paz than bananas to

Chile). Price differentials, however, will constrain this approach and may result in a need for

additional economic incentives associated with

substitution programs.

Lessons from activities to convert opium cultivators to legal crops in Pakistan could be applicable

to the situation in the Andean countries. The Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has been

assisting the Pakistani Government for the past 10

years to develop alternative employment for

opium cultivators with a focus on increasing production of food crops for national markets. Project funds have been provided by the United

Nations International Drug Control Programme

and the Government of Pakistan. Production of

legal crops in the region (wheat, maize, and

pulses) has been increased through the application of improved cultural practices and increased

inputs. Cash crops (sugar cane, tobacco, horticultural products, and fodder) were introduced as

well, largely through development of irrigation

technologies, and the livestock sector was strengthened. A major factor in the success of these efforts

was the strengthening of supporting infrastructure, including potable water-supply systems,

irrigation networks, and gravel and tarmac roads

(38) (chapter 3).

OPPORTUNITY: INCREASE THE VALUE OF

AGRICULTURE IN DOMESTIC MARKETS

The value of smallholder agricultural production in the Andean countries is low relative to
4--Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 137

other sectors. To some degree, this is the result of

national food policies that maintain low-cost food

for urban areas. In addition, international programs may have adversely affected the prices

producers can command in local, regional, and

national markets. Food assistance under the P.L.

480 program (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended)

provides low-cost food imports to the Andean

countries, largely staple crops produced in excess

in the United States. Competition with these

cheap commodities may have contributed to

reduced value of Andean agriculture in the

domestic market.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP

TRANSITIONAL SYSTEMS

Transitional systems that allow coca producers

to shift their production systems gradually to

legitimate crops may offer an opportunity to ease

risk-averse farmers into legitimate agricultural

productions systems. While participants in current substitution programs continue to produce

some amount of coca, focus remains on coca

replacement systems rather than integrated systems. This may have several effects. First, farmers

may maintain separate fields for coca and substitution crops, dividing time and effort and potentially reducing yields of the legitimate crops.

Secondly, with coca being the “cash crop,”

farmers are more likely to weight their attention

toward the “sure thing’ as opposed to the

alternative, particularly in times of adversity

when yields of both maybe threatened. Lastly, the

replacement approach may discourage participation by risk-averse farmers who are unwilling to

eliminate coca or by those who do not have

sufficient land or labor to tend separate plots.

Alternatively, integrated systems that incorporate

alternative crops in coca production could provide source reduction benefits as well as improved agronomic attention to legitimate production by the farmer.

Increasing markets for legal coca products (e.g., coca

tea or rnaté de coca) may reduce the hardship for

producers adopting alternative crop systems.

OPPORTUNITY: EXPAND MARKETS FOR

LEGITIMATE COCA PRODUCTS

Mechanisms to absorb program participants’

coca during the transition phase and channel it

into legitimate markets offer an opportunity to

reduce the coca supply for cocaine production.

Options might include expanding the international market for legitimate coca products (e.g.,

coca tea, pharmaceuticals). However, the large

amounts of coca produced are likely to overflow

existing legitimate markets.

Alternatively, developing new products from

coca may have some merit (61). Potential medicinal and therapeutic applications of coca include:

1) treatment for spasmodic conditions of the

gastrointestinal tract, motion sickness, toothache

and other mouth sores; 2) caffeine substitute; 3)

antidepressant; and 4) adjunct to weight reduction

and physical fitness (91). Examination of the

other alkaloids found in coca might yield additional industrial possibilities. Although the research and development time required to bring

new products to market may reduce the shortterm utility of this approach, it could be a useful
138 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

component in an overall package of efforts to

reduce illicit coca production.

I Strategy: Intensify Agricultural

Product ion

Intensifying agricultural production for domestic and international markets will be necessary for

the Andean countries to reduce food imports and

produce sufficient quantities of products to interest international markets. This might be done

through improving traditional agricultural production systems, facilitating input availability,

and reducing disincentives to investment in

improved production practices. At least four

International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCS)

conduct research on crop improvements directly

applicable to the Andean region. In fact, many of

the advances in staple crop production in the

Andean nations have arisen from IARC research

efforts (e.g., recent increases in rice and maize

yields and production expansion in Peru).

Highly productive forms of agriculture in

tropical regions generally focus on some form of

polyculture. Improvements in productivity can be

generated through carefully planned crop combinations, agroecological suitability, and effective

nutrient and energy cycling systems. Integrated

systems can be developed that efficiently recycle

subsystem by-products through other subsystems, such that the waste from one activity

becomes the input to another.

OPPORTUNITY: IMPROVE TRADITIONAL

AGRICULTURE SYSTEMS

Traditional production practices developed in

the Andean countries could be improved to offer

expanded economic benefits for producers. Examination of how these practices promote productivity and sustainability could be used to

identify where research and development effort

could best be placed. Agroforestry, polyculture,

and integrating livestock with agricultural production systems may offer particularly promising

opportunities.

Multiple cropping systems have a long history

in the Andean region and are ideally suited to the

humid tropical zones where crop substitution

activities are underway. Agroforestry is of particular interest in substitution programs as many of

the alternatives identified are long-cycle tree

crops (e.g., tropical fruit trees, nut trees). Currently, only one Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) institute

focuses primarily on agroforestry-the International Council for Research on Agroforestry

(ICRAF). ICRAF is located in Kenya, hundreds

of kilometers distant from tropical wet forests

ecologically similar to those of the eastern

Andean foothills and thus these efforts are unlikely to be easily transferred to the Andean

countries. Additional agroforestry research was

carried out by North Carolina State University at

Yurimaguas, Peru. This effort was largely an

offshoot of traditional agricultural research, yet it

highlighted the importance of perennial tree crops

in tropical agriculture. These efforts have ceased,

however, largely due to violence in the area.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SMALLHOLDER

AGRICULTURE

Small-scale farms are essentially the rule in

coca-producing zones and opportunities to intensify their production are needed. Farming systems

could be intensified through the application of

modern technology adapted to suit local agroecological conditions. Increasing the availability of

agricultural inputs and improving delivery methods may offer an opportunity to intensify agricultural production. Increased productivity at the

subsistence level would likely lead to surpluses

that could be marketed. Technical assistance

exists for many crops and additional work on

improved cultivars could increase yields. Assisting smallholders to intensify production may

allow them to move gradually to semi-commercial and commercial production. Concomitant

with this effort would be strengthening local

markets, perhaps to redirect from imports to

locally produced commodities.
4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 139

OPPORTUNITY: ASSIST WOMEN

AGRICULTURALISTS

In many regions, women contribute the largest

amount of farm work. Yet most efforts to assist

farmers have been aimed at men. Traditionally,

Latin American women in rural areas have been

neglected by development projects (112). Women

participate in agriculture in a number of ways,

including crop and livestock selection, cultivation, harvest, postharvest handling, and marketing. Significantly, in areas where migration for

seasonal labor is common (e.g., High Valleys),

women stay at home to care for the crops and

livestock. Recently, greater effort has been placed

on the role of women in agricultural development,

yet, increased efforts could improve the contribution of women farmers in crop substitution

programs.

OPPORTUNITY: REMOVE DISINCENTIVES

TO INVESTMENT IN IMPROVED SYSTEMS

There are a number of disincentives to investment in agricultural production improvements in

the Andean region. These largely stem from

national economic and political conditions (e.g.,

rural poverty, risks to personal security), and most

will need to be addressed by national governments. One mechanism open to U.S. and multilateral organizations to improve investment opportunities is to increase the availability and affordability of agricultural credit. Agricultural credit is

a key need to improve opportunities for producers

to invest in production and land improvements

necessary for alternative systems. Coca farmers

tend to be small-holders, often without land title,

personal capital resources, or access to normal

routes of credit. Recent actions on the parts of

national governments have improved the outlook

for gaining land title, although bureaucratic

constraints slow the process.

Within the context of coca substitution programs, opportunities for credit exist. Evidence

suggests, however, that insufficient attention has

been paid to developing appropriate credit packages for coca farmers. For example, agricultural

credit is available to farmers in the Chapare,

Bolivia, through an AID grant and is administered

through a local private voluntary organization.

However, the terms of credit are so high as to

make it essentially unavailable for most farmers.

Further, in Bolivia credit is conditional on removal of the coca crop, often the sole incomegenerating activity of the family. Although assistance is provided to develop an alternative production system, income is generally not established

until the third year after planting. Yet, repayments

for interest are due in year 1 of the loan. Under this

scenario it is simple to understand the reluctance

to give up coca in exchange for legitimate crops.

Much the same situation exists in Peru where

collateral terms are significant (e.g., urban homes)

and interest rates vary depending on the credit

currency (i.e., 18 percent per year in U.S. dollars

and 8 percent per month in Peruvian soles) (122).

Although Colombia also lacks agricultural credit

for crop diversification for coca, it does provide

credit for diversfying coffee. Coffee farmers may

receive up to 80 percent of the cost of developing

new production sites at 20 percent interest per

year. Loan repayment begins with the first harvest

and must be completed in 10 years. Delayed

payment schedules such as this could likely be

appropriate for crop diversification credit.

Issues of credit availability and affordability

may increase in importance if substitution becomes more broad-based in order to expand the

range of resources exploited. In this case, credit

opportunities will be needed for forest, wildlife

and wildland, and aquatic resource exploitation—

additional activities where producers are likely to

be handicapped in meeting existing credit eligibility requirements.

1 Strategy: Increase the Range of Exploited

Renewable Resources

The Andean countries have a wide range of

renewable resources that could be developed to

increase economic opportunities for producers.

While much attention has been placed on nar-
140 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

rowly defined agricultural opportunities, less

emphasis has been directed toward the potential

for expanding sustainable exploitation of other

resources such as forests, fisheries, wildlife, or

wildlands. Indeed, many coca-growing areas are

more suitable to some of these options than

traditional agriculture. For example, in the Alto

Huallaga, where most coca is produced on steep

slopes, agriculture is an environmentally, if not

economically, unsuitable alternative. In the

Chapare, Bolivia, timber operations were the

primary economic activity until the mid-1970s

when coca expansion eclipsed the industry (85).

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SUSTAINABLE

FORESTRY SYSTEMS

Considerable potential exists to manage Andean forests to increase the flow of benefits to

smallholders, and even though deforestation affects an increasing area of these forests, substantial areas of natural forest remain. Efforts to

promote protected areas and forest management

offer alternative livelihoods and environmental

benefits. Opportunities include:

● Conserving biological resources,

● Developing extractive reserves, and

. Developing sustainable timber operations.

The importance of sustaining tropical biological resources has been highlighted in the last

two decades and recently was underscored by the

United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development. One mechanism of conservation

has been to cede certain forest areas to indigenous

populations to sustain their traditional lifestyles

while offering conservation benefits. Similarly,

extractive reserves offer economic and conservation opportunities. The value of forest products

(nuts, fruits, etc.) harvested from an extractive

reserve can be longer-term and significantly

higher than that offered by one-time logging

operations or conversion to agricultural production (104). Opportunities also exist for ‘chemical

prospecting” in tropical forests to identify compounds with commercial potential. Sustainable

timber exploitation technologies have been demonstrated in the Palcazu Valley in Peru. Such

innovative operations could be tested and adapted

to other forest areas in the Andean countries.

Despite these potential opportunities, efforts will

be needed to increase the understanding of

tropical forest management, specifically in the

Andean region.

Recently, a cooperative effort between the

Nature Conservancy and AID has provided funding (Parks in Peril Project) to ensure protection

for threatened national parks in areas of concern.

As part of this effort, on-site management will be

established in Amboro National Park and Noel

Kempff Mercado National Park in Bolivia, La

Paya National Park in Colombia, and Pampas del

Heath National Sanctuary in Peru. Efforts will

include surveying protected area boundaries,

recruiting, training, and educating rangers and

local communities about park protection, developing park infrastructure, and promoting local

community participation (1 13). The AID Environmental Support Project that supports cooperative efforts between foreign organizations and

Latin American countries is active in Bolivian

forests in conducting botanical inventories (Amboro and Noel Kempff) and developing sustainable harvest for economic tree species. These and

similar efforts can contribute to developing national expertise and highlighting opportunities in

forest management in the Andean nations.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SUSTAINABLE

WILDLIFE AND WILDLAND MANAGEMENT

SYSTEMS

The Andean region has a diverse range of

ecosystems supporting a broad variety of wildlife

species that are, or might be, managed to offer

alternative livelihoods for local populations. Further, wildland management to sustain wildlife

populations may offer an additional opportunity

to enhance nature-based tourism industries. Development of wildlife resources for national and

international markets in wildlife and wildlife

products may provide more immediate returns
4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 141

than tourism but could also provide a base for

tourism markets.

Wildlife-centered economic development has

become more acceptable, and research efforts are

being undertaken to determine sustainable yields

and appropriate husbandry practices. Some techniques for raising/producing certain wildlife species have been developed and are easily incorporated in rural communities with little capital

investment. For example, experimental programs

for ranching of green iguanas have now spread

from Panama to other neotropical countries (6,127).

Licensing and protection mechanisms implemented in the region are making farming and

ranching of wildlife more profitable than taking

from the wild (97).

The International Union for the Conservation

of Nature and Natural Resources and other

international resource organizations are working

to create viable legal markets for wildlife and

wildlife products in conjunction with protecting

habitats and wild populations. Congress could

support these efforts by providing funding to

these organizations to assist the Andean countries

to develop wildlife industries. Coordination with

AID, UNDCP, and other donors would be necessary to ensure that an adequate support structure

was available to handle transport and marketing

opportunities for producers.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SUSTAINABLE

FISHERY PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

The numerous Andean lakes and rivers contain

a variety of harvestable organisms and, with

application of appropriate technology, their productivity could be enhanced. For example, recent

fish production in Colombia’s Guajira reservoir

was 82/kg/ha/yr, whereas sustainable production

has been estimated at 103 to 256 kg/ha/yr (134).

Similarly, estimates on the productivity potential

for the total fishery of Lake Titicaca range from

50,000 to 250,000 metric tons (maximum sustainable yield)--far above current actual yield estimates. Based on a conservative estimate of U.S.

$0.50/kg, the fishery resources of Lake Titicaca

could realize an annual earning potential of U.S.

$25 million (56,60,82,94).

Constraints to developing Andean fisheries

include a lack of information on the extent and

quality of the various resource systems, level of

resource extraction, and fishermen themselves;

and shortfalls in handling, processing, and storage

technologies and transport infrastructure. Current

fishery production is characterized by significant

postharvest losses that could be reduced through

attention to these needs. For example, postharvest losses from the Pilcomayo fishery are

relatively low (9.4 percent) compared with those

in the Bolivian highlands (30 percent). The

primary difference between these examples is the

use of ice in transport from the Pilcomayo fishery

(87). Poor handling can reduce the value of

fishery products and increase losses to spoilage.

Technical assistance to promote enhanced

productivity of existing fisheries will be needed.

Introduction of efficient gear and harvest technologies and aquiculture practices to support stocking efforts, training in processing techniques for

postharvest handlers, and strengthening of administrative and management protocol for fishery

offices are a few of the key needs. Training

programs similar to those developed for trout

hatcheries in rural communities of Maucana,

Peru, could improve local economies through

fishery enhancement of lakes and streams (96).

Currently, AID does not identify fishery production as a priority for resource development in the

Andean region and there is only one fisheries

specialist (on loan from National Marine Fisheries Service) in AID (103). AID could increase its

effort toward fishery development and establish

technical assistance as a priority. A development

project costing one to several million dollars

could produce a 10-fold increase in total local

earning for inhabitants of Lake Titicaca (93).

Alternatively, the Andean countries could take

advantage of existing international expertise in

aquatic resource management and development.

International research organizations, such as the

International Center for Living Aquatic Resource
142 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Management (ICLARM), Peace Corps, and other

institutions (e.g., International Center for Aquaculture at Auburn University) could be tapped to

assist in fishery development or enhancement.

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Technologies

To Support

Alternative

Crop

Production 5

whatever the product, supporting technologies are needed

to enable producers to compete in global markets. Key

M needs in the Andean region, include:

●

●

●

Research, extension, and access to technologies that can

improve production of commodities;

Processing, transport, handling, storage, and communication

infrastructure; and

Improvements in product quantity and quality and trade

programs to increase competitiveness of Andean products.

Meeting these needs is the ultimate challenge facing national and

international development organizations.

INTRODUCTION

Research and extension plays an enormous role in providing

alternative livelihoods for coca producers and promoting their

adoption. Development of suitable technology packages for coca

farmers will depend in large part on the ability of research and

extension specialists to conduct interdisciplinary and adaptive

work. Existing research and extension systems are not wellequipped to fulfill this role and economic disparities and political

conditions restrict the level of national funding for these efforts.

Technology transfer can provide assistance in this arena, but

improvements are needed.

Adequate infrastructure (including processing and storage

facilities, tyransportation pathways and vehicles, and communication pathways) is critical in supporting production and marketing

of Andean products. Ability to move necessary inputs into

producing regions and raw or processed materials out to wider

149
150 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

markets depends on effective, affordable transportation. Information on markets and prices is

necessary for practitioners to make production

decisions. Currently, agricultural marketing is

hindered by the lack of: specialized packing

facilities; cooling facilities; airport-based cool

storage; ability to load refrigerated shipping

containers at product source; and specialized

processing installations nearby production areas.

Private-sector investment in supporting production and marketing is hindered by the lack of

affordable credit, and government inability to

service international loans hinders national investment in comprehensive roads and other services or in sizable construction projects.

Infrastructure development—particularly

transportation systems—is controversial. Some

argue such development will assist narcotics

traffickers and others cite the disastrous environmental consequences of some early road-building

projects in the Amazon region. Nevertheless,

while it is possible that improved infrastructure

would benefit narcotics traffickers, it is certain

that producers of legitimate products are handicapped by its absence.

Production of alternative crops is not yet at a

level where Andean producers can enter international markets effectively—small production units

make product quantity a key constraint to effective competition. There is a need for importers

willing to accept small shipments with a vision

towards expansion as producer capability and

production area increase. Marketing agricultural

products also can be complicated by the strict

product quality and safety requirements of importing nations. Such restrictions can be difficult

for developing countries to meet without proper

training and assistance programs. Trade programs

that stimulate Andean exports to the United States

and other countries can complement alternative

development efforts. For example, the Andean

Reliable roads are essential for profitable agriculture

in the Andean region. Here, heavy rains have washed

out a road in the Chapare, Bolivia, disrupting farmer

access to agricultural inputs, markets, and

agricultural extension.

Trade Initiative (ATI) offers specialized trade

arrangements for the Andean nations with the

United States. This action addresses the need in

part, but greater effort is likely to be necessary.

ANDEAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH

AND EXTENSION SYSTEMS

Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia possess the essential institutional foundations to develop effective

national research and extension systems. However, each country has a unique situation and must

overcome certain problems evident in existing

systems. Proper action to improve the functioning

of research and extension is a basic condition for

future agricultural success. All three countries

require foreign financial aid and/or specialized

technical assistance. Peru requires financial aid

urgently to rebuild its system. In Bolivia, the need

for technical assistance probably is more acute.

Whatever the amount and quality of technical

and financial assistance granted to the affected

1 The infomnation contained in this section was drawn largely from A. Chavez, “AndeanAgricultural Research and Extension Systems and

Technology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms To Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia Colombia, and Peru,” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December 1991.
5-Technologies to

countries, its usefulness will depend on actual

measures taken by governments to secure permanency and progress for research and extension

agencies and their programs. A real and effective

political commitment to technical innovation and

modernization of agriculture must be made,

particularly in Bolivia and Peru, including adequate funding for research and extension activities, respectable salaries for personnel, and appropriate regard for the entities in charge of these

activities.

Agricultural research and extension systems

vary significantly among Bolivia, Peru, and

Colombia. Funding levels, staff size and capability, and institutional arrangements comprise key

differences. Government instability has constrained

agricultural modernization in Bolivia and Peru

where the research and extension systems are

under central government control. Colombia’s

system has been participatory and stable, with an

obvious direction toward modern agriculture.

Agricultural research and extension systems

typically are based on national research organizations, agricultural colleges, and private nongovernmental organizations. Regional political

pressures in Bolivia and a strong private sector in

Colombia influenced diversification of their respective research systems, while the Peruvian

system has remained unchanged. A review of

institutional frameworks and resources highlights

the importance of foreign assistance and international cooperation in promoting Andean research

and extension systems.

9 Bolivia

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Bolivia’s agricultural research system has four

main components established in the 1970s that

conduct basic and applied research and provide

extension services to most agricultural producers:

. Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology (Instituto Boliviano de

Tecnologla Agropecuaria (IBTA))--IBTA

Support Alternative Crop Production I 151

●

●

●

is the leading national research institute, and

its subcomponent the IBTA-Chapare, is the

main research and extension agency for

Bolivia’s coca substitution program.

Tropical Agriculture Research Center (Centro de Investigación Agrícola Tropical (CIAT))

--CIAT is a regional research agency for

Santa Cruz, the country’s most dynamic

agricultural sector.

Pairumani Plant Genetics Research Center

(Centro de Investigaciones Fitogenéticas de

Pairumani (Santa Cruz) (CIFP))-CIFP is a

technical branch of the Patino foundations,

Bolivian Institute of Science and Nuclear

Technology (Instituto Boliviano de Ciencia

y Tecnología Nuclear (IBTN))--IBTN focuses on chemical analysis and tissue culture.

In addition to these organizations, several Department development corporations (Corporaciones

Departmentales de Desarrollo), universities, and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) perform

agricultural research on short-term, specific problems for local clientele. However, little coordination exists among the formal research and extension system and these groups,

IBTA direction is determined by the Ministry

of Agriculture (MACA--an organizational structure that has created substantial difficulties for

IBTA. Politically-oriented changes in Directors

and research priorities have fragmented IBTA’s

meager financial resources. The Government of

Bolivia’s investment in agricultural research

through IBTA has declined, resulting in manpower reduction policies and complete reliance

on foreign assistance.

IBTA research is commodity-oriented and

geographically restricted to the Altiplano and

Valley areas. IBTA operates three experiment

stations, three substations, and two germplasm

centers, all poorly equipped and staffed. Research

conducted by IBTA will continue to focus on

genetic improvement and field management of

commodities in the Altiplano and Valley regions.
152 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

IBTA was responsible for Bolivia’s extension

service, operating seven regional offices with a

total of 80 extension posts. The national extension

system failed, however, due to poor coordination

with other research agencies, poorly paid and

inadequately trained staff, and lack of wellestablished extension methodologies and monitoring and evaluation methods.

IBTA-Chapare operates under the Regional

Alternative Development Project (Proyecto de

Desarrollo Alternative Regional (PDAR)), and

carries out research and extension activities for

Bolivia’s coca substitution program. IBTAChapare operates two experiment stations: La

Jota—for research on crops, soils, and pest

control; and Chipiriri--for research on livestock

and poultry. In addition, IBTA-Chapare undertakes many studies, and extension2 and promotional activities through NGOS and other regional

entities. It also maintains close technical relationships with several national and international

research entities.

Centro de Investigació Agrícola Tropical has

a regional research focus on production systems

in Santa Cruz emphasizing grains, tree crops, and

livestock. CIAT also performs research in rhizobiology, fertilizer management, and postharvest

problems. Research programs of the Universidad

Autónoma “Gabriel Rene Moreno,” which concentrate on beans, corn, and cassava, complement

CIAT activities. Additional activities include

horticulture research at the Okinawa Experiment

Station and sugarcane research at the Sugarcane

Producers Association Experiment Station.

CIAT receives national and international funding to carry out its research and extension

activities. Domestic funding ($1.6 million annually) primarily comes from regional public entities and local producer associations. External

financial assistance comes from seven international donors. CIAT is managed by a Board 01

Directors under an Executive Director appointed

by the Minister of Agriculture for a 5-year term.

Irrigation networks can be important supporting

infrastructure for regions experiencing a dry season.

IBTA-Chapare research on improving agricultural

production in the High Valleys includes an irrigation

component.

A Regional Research Council meets twice a year

to coordinate research activities in Santa Cruz.

The Centro de Investigaciones Fitogenéticas

de Pairumani focuses its research efforts on

developing new varieties of grain legumes, maize,

and wheat. Most of its research is done in

Cochabamba. Although CIFP has a significantly

smaller annual budget than some of the other

institutions, it has been successful in genetic

improvement of maize for silage, and development of some new maize varieties for human

consumption.

The Instituto Boliviano de Ciencia y Tecnolo -

gía Nuclear recently began to address agricultural

matters in its chemical analysis and tissue culture

work. These areas of expertise allow IBTN to

complement IBTA research in soil-water relationships, soil fertility, and high-altitude cropping

systems.

RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PRIORITIES

Bolivian near-term agricultural policy goals

include: 1) improving rural economies, 2) increasing food production, 3) integrating the

z Extension activities include 87 demonstration production units reaching more than 7,000 producers.
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production ! 153

agricultural economy with international markets,

4) promoting agricultural exports with competitive advantages, 5) developing and implementing

sustainable agricultural systems, and 6) improving crop substitution activities (18). A national

council (Consejo Nacional de Investigación y

Extensión Agropecuaria---CNIEA) directs Bolivian research and extension activities to achieve

national agricultural goals. CNIEA is headed by

the Deputy Secretary of Agricultural Production

and includes representatives from major public

and private entities that conduct research and

extension. Although all agencies involved in

research and extension continue to pursue individual agendas, CNIEA can play a critical coordination role in Bolivian agriculture.

A major priority is to rebuild a national

extension service. This has been accomplished

partially through regional and local systems and

international donors through their agricultural

development projects (e.g., Cochabamba Regional Development Project). An estimated 130

NGOS are active in extension and reach between

100,000 and 150,000 small farmers-roughly

one-third of the national farm population (37).

Some Department development corporations also

provide extension services through regional or

local agricultural projects. Finally, a growing

number of farmer cooperatives and commercial

firms provide extension assistance and information to farmers.

Ideally, research priorities are set according to

local or regional conditions and actual production

problems and patterns. Involving farmers and

producer organizations can be key in setting

realistic research and extension priorities. These

groups can assist in identifying primary production problems. For example, CIAT research

priorities closely reflect local agricultural problems in Santa Cruz. The close relationship between CIAT and local farmer associations and

extension specialists fosters such applied priority

setting. Conversely, lack of farmer representation

in IBTA-Chapare and lack of transitional production systems may have constrained priority

setting in connection with coca substitution

activities.

IMPROVING EXISTING RESEARCH

AND EXTENSION SYSTEMS

Agriculture is beginning to be revitalized to

supply domestic markets at reasonable prices and

expand and diversify exports. Accordingly, much

attention is focused on Bolivia’s agricultural

research and extension system. International financial and technical support, and specific commodity projects by different research and extension agencies represent important contributions

to Bolivian agricultural development.

A need exists for enhanced coordination among

institutions within the system such that national

and regional research priorities can be established

and institutional research plans harmonized. An

improved relationship between research and extension is also needed to enhance technical

assistance to farmers and to keep research relevant to their needs. Also necessary are attention to

agricultural regions that lack research and extension services and comprehensive training in the

skills and expertise needed to modernize Bolivian

agriculture.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Agricultural research and extension activities

in Peru have been provided almost exclusively by

central government institutions. Accordingly, these

institutions have been characterized by instability. Over the last two decades, institutional

structures and responsibilities for research and

extension have changed frequently due largely to

political changes. The current political flux of

Peru may result in further alterations of the

existing research and extension systems.

National crop, forestry, livestock, and agroindustry research are the responsibility of the

National Institute for Agrarian and Agroindustry

Research (Instituto Nacional de Investigación

Agraria y Agroindustria! (INIAA)) established in
154 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

1987, while extension activities have been placed

under regional governments. Most of these units

are ill-equipped for extension activities and currently the system barely operates. Another reorganization is planned to give extension responsibilities

to the INIAA.

Peruvian universities rarely are involved in

providing research for government or private

institutions; most university research activity is

confined to student thesis work. Exceptions to

this situation are the National University of San

Marcos Graduate School (Universidad Nacional

Mayor de San Marcos (UNMSM)) and the

National Agrarian University (Universidad Nacional Agraria (UNA)) at Lima. UNMSM has

made major contributions related to animal health

and livestock production systems. UNA, the most

important academic center for agricultural and

biological sciences in Peru, has managed to

develop and maintain a highly qualified cadre of

agricultural professionals since the 1960s. Foreign investment and institution-building efforts

have fostered UNA’S position as a key contributor

to agricultural development.

General financial and political crises that have

ravaged the university system since the 1970s

have adversely affected UNA, however, and its

academic quality and research potential have

declined. Tropical forestry research on species

inventory and on tropical woods characterization

for industrial uses is one of the few research fields

that UNA has pursued continuously. Four universities at Tingo Maria, Tarapoto, Iquitos, and

Pucallpa, cover Amazonian ecosystems, but their

research capabilities are very limited.

The Peruvian Amazon Research Institute (lnstituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonía Peruana (IIAP)) was created to promote and coordinate research in the Amazon region. IIAP has few

technical and financial resources, however, and

thus its activity and power fall far short of its

chartered mandate. Currently, the only vehicle for

research coordination in Peru is the Peruvian

Amazon Research Network (Red de Investigación

de la Amazonía Peruana (REPAP)), an International Research Center for Development (Centro

International de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo (CIID))-funded research network established in 1989 to develop sustainable production

systems for the Amazon region.

Research and extension funding has diminished significantly over the last 5 years and recent

budgets have provided only for payroll and not

operating expenses. Thus, most technical personnel sit idle; the few ongoing research activities are

totally dependent on foreign interests and funding. The public extension system has declined in

importance as nonpublic organizations (e.g., national and local commodity organizations, universities and technical institutes, and the commercial sector) began to provide extension services.

However, these services tend to address specific

needs in the most favored agricultural areas rather

than possessing a broader national agricultural

agenda. The government has not made any

systematic effort to organize or extend these

alternative extension services nationally. Thus,

most Peruvian farmers lack systematic and permanent technical support.

Institutional instability, unrealistic salary policies, and political maneuvering have constrained

attempts to establish permanent professional research and extension teams in Peru. In fact,

government actions have reduced the number of

public research and extension personnel. INIAA’s

professional staff has been reduced already by 40

percent (around 200 positions).

PRIORITIES FOR AGRICULTURAL

RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Research and extension were neglected during

the late 1960s and throughout the 1970’s (16) as

resources were directed to irrigation projects and

land reform. During the 1980s, government

interest and investment in research and extension

improved substantially with financing from the

World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). Even then, total public

investment in agricultural technical change re-
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 155

mained small. Today, Peru’s agricultural structure is based on minifundia-small landholdings—

with 72 percent of units smaller than 5 hectares

(approximately 12.5 acres). Undoubtedly, this

will present great challenges to research and

extension.

Economic policies promoting low-priced basic

food imports since the 1960s have adversely

affected domestic food production. A widening

gap between domestic supply of and demand for

basic foods led to prioritization of research

programs on rice, maize, potatoes, grain legumes,

and wheat. During the second half of the 1980’s,

the number of research programs expanded as

demand for work on other products grew. Research in oilseeds, horticulture, fruits, soil and

water management, forestry, and agroindustry

were added to the agenda. However, increases in

funding did not accompany the expanded agenda

of research and extension institutions. In recent

years, agricultural priorities have shifted from

domestic to export markets.

Extension priority was given to the northern

coast and the most important Andean valleys. In

the Amazon region, only the big valleys of the

northeast received some support. The Andean

highlands, with the largest and poorest peasant

population, and new agricultural areas in the

Amazonian region, remained almost unattended,

IMPROVING RESEARCH AND

EXTENSION SYSTEMS

The key constraints to improving the agricultural research system in Peru revolve around the

lack of a functional national extension service,

poor coordination of activities, and low funding

levels. The impulse given to agricultural research

and extension during the first half of the 1980s

lost steam as economic and political difficulties

increased. The number of international donors

decreased, which in turn has resulted in redistribution of existing outside funding. The sectoral

project supported by IDB came to an end in 1986

and the World Bank stopped disbursing in 1987.

AID’s financial support continued, but had to be

redistributed among a growing number of research programs and to all experiment stations.

The situation continues to decline with most

experiment stations being transferred to regional

governments or the private sector, The majority of

these organizations do not have the financial

means or the technical expertise to manage

research.

~ Colombia

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

International assistance has been very important to the Colombian research and extension

systems. During the 1960s, most foreign assistance was from the United States, and focused on

institution building. In 1963, the Ford, Rockefeller, and Kellogg Foundations played critical

roles in the organization and implementation of

research and extension programs. By the end of

the 1960s, 18 international agencies were cooperating with the Colombian Agricultural Institute

(Instituto Colombian Agropecuario (ICA))----

the most important agricultural research institution in Colombia. ICA was created in 1962 as part

of the government restructuring of the public

agricultural sector and has been the most important source of technical and financial assistance to

agricultural producers. The Institute maintains a

large, highly trained staff to provide a broad and

diverse human-resource base for agricultural

research and extension. This may be the most

important single factor contributing to modernization of Colombian agriculture. Key factors in

ICA’S success were government financial and

political commitment to research and extension,

and the involvement of the private sector and key

public agencies (13).

ICA has been instrumental in promoting the

use of modern agricultural techniques in Colombia. Improved cultivars and practices are now

used on nearly 40 percent of Colombian cropland.

The Institute supplies most of the basic seed used

for agricultural production and is active in devel331-054 - 93 - 6
156 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

oping improved varieties. For example, ICA

released 236 new varieties and cultivars of the

country’s most important crops, 34 of them

between 1986 and 1990.

ICA’S institutional framework for research and

extension includes 4 national research centers, 12

regional research centers, 7 experiment stations,

29 diagnostic centers for animal health, and a network of 66 regional centers for extension, training, and technology dissemination. Training is a

high priority for ICA. Between 1986 and 1990,

ICA spent $7.7 million, or 6 percent of its total

budget, for training. About 35 percent of ICA’S

budget supports direct research and extension

activities (15 and 20 percent, respectively) (14).

Government support for research and extension has accounted for 55 to 75 percent of ICA’S

budget. Government contributions grew steadily

between 1964 and 1990, but currently are decreasing. With fewer financial resources and

numerous loan repayment obligations, ICA is

looking for avenues to increase income. Possibilities include increasing competition with the

private sector.

Colombia also has a complex network of

private institutions in the agricultural sector. The

private sector has expanded its role in genetic and

agronomic research as well as in certified seed

production. In the 1980s, significant private

research effort was placed on sugar cane and

coffee. Oil-palm producers recently have organized a research center (CENIPALMA), and flower and banana producers are planning their own

research centers. Benefits for producers could be

achieved through a vigorous coordination effort

among the numerous private and public research

and extension institutions.

Private-sector support of university research

has improved capabilities of the Agronomy Department and the Graduate School of Colombia’s

National University. However, the majority of

Colombia’s universities do not play important

roles in agricultural research or extension. Despite Colombia’s strong institutional framework

for agricultural research and extension, productivity improvements are hampered by financial

instability for exports (due to an overvalued

Colombian peso), lack of security in many

agricultural regions, institutional confusion, and

lack of coordination.

Colombia is now in the process of decentralizing public functions and responsibilities. Agricultural extension will become the responsibility

of Municipal Units of Technical Assistance

(Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica

Agropecuaria (UMATAS)). Tax revenues will be

transferred to the UMATAS for rural development. The Integrated Rural Development Fund

(Fondo de Desarrollo Rural Integrado (DRI)) is

implementing a strategy for local agricultural

development working through the UMATAS. At

the same time, a compromise between centralized

and decentralized approaches to extension is

emerging in the National System of Technical

Assistance for Small Producers (Sistema Nacional

de Transferencia de Technología Agropecuaria

(SINTAP)). SINTAP will focus on small producers and development of local production options.

Local extension priorities will be set by the

UMATAS. Finally, ICA is preparing a set of local,

regional and national agricultural projects.

PRIORITIES FOR AGRICULTURAL

RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

The Alta and the Media Guajira (1.7 million

hectares), and parts of the Orinoquia region (2.1

million hectares farmland and 13 million hectares

grassland) have been identfied as high productivity zones, which should be prioritized for research. Research priorities by topic include:

. Agricultural production in acid soils,

. Low-cost production systems for Andean

valleys, and

. Biotechnology.

Production option priorities are not clear and, in

general, insufficient attention is given to prioritizing the research use of public resources. ICA,

perhaps due to its large size, is finding it difficult

to focus on research subjects consistent with the
&Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production ! 157

Box 5-A–Necessary Conditions for Successful Technology Transfer

1. Technology should fitthe Iod biophysical and socioeconomic environment of the adopters and should have

proven successful elsewhere under similar conditions, at least on a pilot scale.

2. Technology is transferred most effectively by direct people-to-peopie actions involving individuals with

experience in applying the technology. Media presentations (e.g., pamphlets, books, radio) may assist, but

personal interactions are necessary.

3. Technology transfer agents must be well-qualified and experienced in applying the technology and able to

communicate effectively to potential adopters. Development of expertise in local organizations is necessary

to continue technology transfer beyond the bounds of development assistance projects and time frames.

4. Facilitators or middlemen are needed in addition to transfer agents and capable adopters to help new

technologies compete with established resource use methods.

5. Adopters andtransferagents should beinvolvedinchoosing, planning, andimplementing technology transfer

so that it will meet actual needs and is appropriate to the setting in which it will be implemented.

6. Interests of all parties involved intechnology transfer should be identified and addressed inthetechnology

transfer effort; all must see how the technology will benefit them.

7. Early definition of participant roles is needed so that all are aware of the subsequent steps in the transfer

process and the relationship between their actions and those steps.

8. Demonstrations of the technology should take place under environmental, economic, and sociocultural

conditions similar to those where it will ultimately be implemented.

9. Commitment of financial resources should be sufficient to carry out the technology transfer until it is

self-supporting.

10. The transfer process must indude mechanisms through which all participants can contribute effectively to

interim evaluations and adaptations.

SOURCE: Derived from a Technology Transfer Workshop held for the Office of Technology Assessment study of 7&#vm/o@es to Sustain

Tropical Forest Resounxis, OTA-F-214 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1984).

regionalization process. Demands fi-om the local funds dwindle and local, regional, and privateextension systems and the growing involvement

of the private sector in research further complicate this task. Several observers and public

officials propose focusing ICA research on basic

crops, small-farming production systems, and

natural resource management.

IMPROVING RESEARCH AND

EXTENSION SYSTEMS

Colombia’s political and economic system is in

flux. The new constitutional rules and the macroeconomic policies of the Colombian aperatura

may create opportunities for social and economic

development. However, institutional adjustment

to these new conditions could be difficult. The

size and role of national research and extension

institutions are likely to change as fiscal support

sector entities begin to replace them. ICA in

particular has had difficulties prioritizing effectively in light of expanding responsibilities.

Reduced government financial contributions and

debt repayment obligations may exacerbate these

difficulties. Conversely, extension funding does

not seem to be a probIem, The SINTAP project

alone is likely to provide a significant amount to

extension (nearly $130 million). The central

government is providing value-added tax revenues for extension activities through the UMATAs. Private-sector institutions can and are willing to play an important role in promoting

technical innovation in agriculture, in some cases

through research contracts with universities. The

government then could concentrate its efforts on

small producers and improving rural economies.
158 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 5-B-Horizontal Cooperation for Agricultural Research and Extension

Technology transfer among Latin American countries can link regions with similar environmental conditions

and promote research and development of suitable technologies. For example, PROCITROPICOS, a cooperative

agreement recentty signed by a number of national agencies for agricultural research (NAARs) of Latin American

countries, is focusing on cooperative or joint research programs, scientific and technical information exchange,

and technology transfer. Efforts will be devoted to three main tropical ecosystems (i.e., humid-tropic, tropical

savanna, and Amazon highlands) common to Bolivia Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela

The PROCITROPICOS will be supported by the Inter-American Institution for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)

of the Organization of American States. Programs and activities of PROCITROPICOS should contribute to policy

formulation and determination of production options conducive to sustainable development in the tropics.

Sustainability criteria for the Latin American tropics and practical measures and actions for achieving sustainable

production systems will be a main research focus (PROCITROPKXX Agreerrwnt, 1990).

Another cooperative program for research and technology transfer among Andean countries, PROCIANDINO, was initiated in 1985 by IICA and the InterAmerican Development Bank. The participant NAARs are

from Bolivia, Colombi% Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and the program is governed by a council of NAAR

directors. The program includes two major activities: joint research bytwoor more participantson specific probtems

that affect production of selected commodities; and horizontal technology transfer through atraining program and

experts consultation. PROCIANDINO initially focused on potatoes, maize, grain-legumes, and extension methods,

and recently has expanded to include crop and livestock production problems in the Andean region.

PROCIANDINO generally is praised as an effective mechanism for horizontal cooperation although delays in

financing operating expenses and equipment purchases have hampered the research component. Through this

project, scores of techniaans and professionals from the NAARs have been able to experience and observe

different ways of soiving common problems.

SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems and Twhnology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms

to Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in 6olivia, Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,

December 1991.

1 Agricultural Technology Transfer ties in this way increases the potential for

Technology transfer is a temporary activity and

provides a mechanism to build local expertise

throughout the technology development and diffusion process (box 5-A). Activities that are

conceptualized and implemented such that a

long-term professional partnership is established

between native and foreign experts may be most

successful. Project cycles of at least 10 years

probably are necessary to produce relevant results

spanning technology generation to technology

adoption by the average producer. Examples

include the joint programs established by International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCS)

and specitlc financing sources (e.g., the TropSoils and the Small-Ruminants programs in Peru)

or bilateral assistance groups (e.g., AID Seed

program in Bolivia). Development of local abilicontinuation of efforts after foreign assistance has

ended. Regional technology transfer activities

also have proven to be very useful. Collaborative

research programs among Latin American countries (box 5-B) could be enhanced organizationally and financially and used more intensively.

In the early 1970s, key Bolivian national

research groups (e.g., IBTA and CIAT) were

created under U.S. technology transfer programs.

Today, a number of bilateral and multilateral

assistance organizations provide a wide array of

technical expertise. CIAT in Santa Cruz is working with British, Japanese, and Dutch donors, and

foreign consultants comprise a large part of

CIAT’S technicians (box 5-C). While some difficulties exist with donor coordination, this may be

addressed with the establishment of CNIEA to
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 159

facilitate and coordinate national planning for

development. World Bank projects to integrate

public and private-sector development efforts

could increase professional and economic security in the research system. These stabilization

measures are likely to improve the effectiveness

of technology transfer activities and increase their

long-term contribution to Bolivian agriculture.

In Peru, technology transfer activities contributed heavily to establishing the research and

extension programs and helping to train Peruvian

researchers that became the technical core of

INIAA’s resewch programs. Responsibility for

technology transfer currently is being shifted

from central government institutions to regional

governments. Privatization of public functions

and activities is gaining momentum, but where

this trend will take Peru’s technology transfer

system is unclear. Peru has developed a relatively

extended and well-qualified human-resource base

through cooperation with international donors

(box 5-D). However, institutional instability and

erratic salary policies have eroded this base

considerably and security problems reduce Peru’s

ability to receive and handle technology transfer

projects effectively. These difficulties must be

addressed to improve training efforts, consolidate

key institutions, and maximize technology transfer benefits.

Technology transfer and financial assistance

have been integral parts of the Colombian research system. Technology transfer contributed

significantly to improved product quality control

when the Colombian private sector initiated a

strong drive to increase agricultural exports in the

1970s (primarily coffee, cut flowers, and bananas). Financial assistance in connection with

technology transfer activities similarly has been

important for national institutions. From 1979 to

1984, technology transfer projects brought approximately $5 million in grant money to the ICA

and in 1986, ICA held nearly 200 technology

transfer agreements with 30 different foreign

entities (14) (box 5-E). Technology transfer has

greatly diversified ICA’S research agenda, alBox 5-C–Bolivian Seeds Project

One of the most fruitful technology transfer experiences in Bolivia, and one that carried important

lessons for other developing countries, was the Seeds

Project (Project T-059), initiated at the end of the

1970s with AID funding. The underlying concept was

that properly organized and trained producers could

succeed. Thus, the m“n project strategies of technical

assistance and financial support for seed production

infrastructure were revised to focus more on producer

organizations and training. Technical support was

given to a public office (MACA—Departmento de

Semillas) and financial support was given to upgrade

public-sector seed plants that were operating at very

low capacities. The project advisor was based in Santa

Cruz instead of La Paz where the project benefited

from liberal ideas of local agricultural leaders and

restricted national government ability to dominate the

project. From Santa Cruz, the project expanded to El

Chaco, Chuquisaca, to part of Tarija.

Producer participation was significant, particularly in

the training activities and several small- to mediumsized seed enterprises were organized. Increasing

numbers of institutions and producers became involved in t he new production and marketing activities.

Forinstance, the experiment stations became specialized producers of foundation seed. The project

triggered a qualitative change in the local farmers’

technical environment and promoted the institutional

structure needed by a modern seed industry. Commercial demand for certified seed experienced tremendous growth, from 200 metric tons in 1970 to more than

10,000 metric tons in 1988 with a continuing growth

trend.

SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems and Technology Transfer Activities: Potential

Mechanisms to Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia,

Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of

Technology Assessment, December 1991.

though there is some indication that this may have

operated to the detriment of the institution (e.g.,

by increasing responsibility beyond institutional

capacity).

Increasing agricultural productivity and profitability will be critical to support crop substitution

approaches as part of a long-term strategy to
160 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 5-D-Collaborative Technology Transfer Efforts in Peru

The Trop-Soils and Small-Ruminants collaborative programs are examples of Iong-termtechnology transfer

activities. The Trop-Soils program, focusing on problems of tropical soils of the Amazon region, involved a team

of Peruvian professionals and technicians working full-time with foreign scientists. The effort has resulted in a

number of important contributions in productive, economically efficient, and ecologically sustainable soil

management technologies. The program also has a successful training component; helping young Peruvian

saentists in graduate studies and providing hands-on training in specialized tasks for laboratory and field

techniaans. The Trop-Soils program has been in operation for nearly 12 years, although security concerns have

had an adverse impact on the level of activities at the Yurimaguas experiment station.

The Small-Ruminants program, focusing on native cameloid stock, is now in its 1 lth year. This effort also

has been an important and useful experience for Peruvian research. In addition to National Institute for Agrarian

and Agroindustry Research (INIAA) and Institute for Tropical and High Altitude Veterinary Research (IVITA), the

leading Peruvian partners, the program involved several regional universities, cameloid production units, and an

array of Peruvian professionals and scientists. The program trained 90 Peruvian professionals seeking advanced

degrees, and generated about 700 publications. These two results are probabty the program’s most useful

contributions to research in this field and to the diffusion of technical knowtedge to producers.

SOURCE: A. Chavez, “An&an Agricultural Reeearch and Extension Systems and Tschnoiogy Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms

to Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of T=hnology Assessment,

December 1991.

reduce coca cultivation. Most coca production nities to improve technology transfer activities. In

occurs in areas characterized by low land- genera.1, greater attention toward natural resource

productivity and poverty. Research, extension, management is needed as well as refocusing crop

and technology transfer efforts can work to research to include cultivation practices, intedevelop packages of practices suitable to these grated management of pests and diseases, and

regions. A comprehensive crop-substitution strat- postharvest problems. A multidisciplinary apegy

●

●

is likely to require: preach and close cooperation with specialized

Enhanced research and extension activities, international programs and research centers will

Financial assistance for research and exten- be needed to achieve these goals.

sion,

Foreign expertise to share professional re- INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT

search and extension responsibilities on a AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

long-term basis, and AND MARKETING

Enhanced cooperation among Latin Ameri- Processing, handling, and storage facilities and

can countries. transportation and communication networks are

Several issues that should be addressed jointly

by research and extension specialists to improve

technology transfer include: improved communication among researchers, extension agents, and

producers; prioritization of technology dissemination efforts; and adaptation of extension methods to local conditions. External reviews and

evaluations have identified research areas deserving of future attention, and point to new opportucritical needs for successful alternative development. Alternative crops must compete with an

easily produced, processed, and transported commodity-coca-with a known and largely stable

market. Producers need information on legitimate

crop markets for production decisions, easily

available and affordable inputs, and scheduled

and reliable transport services. Lack of attention

to transport and communication development
—— — —

5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 161

Box 5-E–The Panela Project

The Dutch-supported Panela project, initiated in 1983 in Colombia, is an excellent example of successful

technology transfer. Panda-cane, a small farmer’s crop, is a popular sugar substitute in many villages and rural

areas, as well as an important ingredient in traditional Latin American dishes, The panda industry provides

employment and a year-round income to many peasant famiiiesthroughout the Coiombian vaiieys and Piedmonte

area

Project goais were to improve paneia-cane varieties and cultivation methods and to improve traditional

paneia processing piants and methods. The instituto Coiombiano Agropecuarii (iCA) established a piiot center

in Santander (Barbosa) to promote adoption of the newtechnoiogies and resuits have been very promising. A new

paneia-cane variety has generated yieid increases by as much as 30 percent.

The prqect aiso has produced technicai recommendations for improving harvest efficiency and transport to

miiis. At the miiis, new mechanical and chemicai methods forcieaning juices were introduced, bringing extraction

effiaency to 70 percen% significant rise for a smaii-scaie industry. Purity of juices aiso has improved. Fhaliy,

the project increased the efficiency of cookers and established the use of miiied cane residuai as fuei.

There are severai important aspects of the Paneia-project that made it a successful technology transfer

experience. it addressed an important sociai and economic sector; changes and innovations in techniques and

equipment were progressive and iocaiiy deveioped; and finaiiy, the project had a iong-term pianning

perspective-basic diagnosis and prioritization of probiems ied to application and extension of soiutions. At

present, iCAisextending the achievements of the Paneiaproject with the involvement of nine Centros Regionaies

de Capacitaci6n, Extensi6n, y Difusi6n de Tecnoiogfa (CRECEDS) and severai nongovernmental organizations.

SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Reeearch and Etieneion Syetems and T6ctmoiogy Transfer ActhMea: Potential Meebanisms

to Enhance Crop Substitution Efforta jn Bolivi% Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Aeseaement,

Decamber 1991.

compounds the comparative disadvantage for less, adequate infrastructure will be necessary to

producers of legitimate crops in remote areas by improve opportunities for coca farmers to underincreasing costs above competitive levels (box take alternative crop production.

5-F).

Despite the clear need for infrastructural sup9 Value-Added Processing Opportunities3

port for alternative crops, constraints to development include: Preservation and processing techniques can

●

●

●

●

increase storage life and quality, minimize wastInsufficient financing and credit mecha- age and spoilage, and facilitate shipping and

nisms, marketing of agricultural products. Processing

Difficult environments for building physical also may increase value for producers and market

infrastructure, demand. Efforts to develop value-added processSmall and dispersed production units com- ing in the Andean region are ongoing, although

plicating facility siting, and they have met with some difficulties. In most

Tenuous security in some production areas. cases appropriate technologies exist, but the

In addition, the potential for efforts to benefit facilities are lacking. In addition, inadequate or

coca production and cocaine trafficking reduces lack of electrical distribution networks in producinterest in infrastructure development. Neverthe- ing areas is another significant problem.

J The information contained in this section was drawn largely from B. McD. Stevenso% “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve

Agricultural Profitability,’ contractw report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessmen~ May 1992.
162 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

&. ,. .

-.

Simple techniques can be usedforprirnary processing

of some tropical food products. Here, cocoa is being

sundried; the intermediate product will be packed and

shipped to another cooperative facility.

An essential part of the analysis of any

value-added proposal is quanti.&ing raw material

availability, processing costs, and current market

prices for the transformed product. The latter

information is more readily available than the

former. International commodity markets are

transparent in the sense that there are many

information systems, including the commodities

exchange reports from major trading countries. It

is important that the Andean counties have

access to this information. Subscription to information services on a regular basis could be a part

of alternative development projects to address

this need.

A variety of Andean tropical food products are

suitable for processing for domestic and international markets. Tropical fruits can be juiced,

aseptically packed, frozen, canned or dried. While

none of these options currently are available in the

Chapare in Bolivia, caming facilities are available in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, and conventional juice extraction plants are also available in

Cochabarnba. Investment in processing opportunities in the production zone could reduce transport costs and improve product competitiveness.

Box !%F-From Production to Market:

Development Dilemma

Although difficult, identifying potential alternative

crops is simpler than developing the industrial base to

make the crop economically sustainable. The problem

can be illustrated using a real example from the

Chapare region. Maracuya (passion fruit) has demonstrated good production characteristics under small

farm conditions. The fruit has been processed 100ally

and international buyers have expressed enthusiasm

for the single strength juice extract, such that an order

was placed for approximately 18 tons of product, to be

shipped in 55 gallon drums, frozen. At present total

production in the Chapare is unlikely to exceed this

quantity per year. However, freezing facilities are not

in place, and due in part to high transport processing,

and handling costs, the product is costing approximately 50 percent more than that from competitive

sources.

Each of these factors can be addressed within the

context of Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP), butrnakhgthetransition from suppiying 100al market to that of exporting will require

investment in plant material, extension effort to expand

the production base, increased effiaency in processing, establishment of frozen goods transport systems,

and reduction of transport costs that currently reflect

the distance of the production area from the nearest

seaport in Arica, northern Chile. Thus, the problem

becomes less one of marketing and more one of

production and infrastructure. This is typical of a

number of products with which ahernative development programs are working. There is insufficient raw

material to begin an agroindustrial operation, except

wit h multilevel investment starting with the expansion

of the production base.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to

Improve Agricultural Profitabilityr” contractor report prepared for

the Offica of T~hnology Assessment May 1992.

Similarly, nut crops can be harvested, shelled,

and packed for transport with a minimum of

infrastructure and can provide good returns despite a somewhat lengthy waiting time before

trees are productive. In addition, many other

value-added products can be derived from the raw
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 163

material. Macadamia production is still developing in the Chapare and private-sector interest in

nut processing is increasing.

Tea and coffee are being produced and achieving quality acceptable to international buyers.

Primary processing is done in the production area

and the resulting product is readily transported

and offers good possibilities for export income.

The small quantity of local production remains in

all cases the biggest deterrent to international

traders who generally require quantities much in

excess of the local production capability. Table

5-1 identifies some specific possibilities for

value-added processing in Bolivia and many of

these crops are also produced in Peru and

Colombia.

INVESTMENT IN AGROINDUSTRY

Investment in processing and storage facilities

is a key need to promote alternative development

in the Andean region. Although international

donors have provided assistance in plant development (table 5-2), the private sector is reluctant to

invest similarly. Nevertheless, there are examples

of successful private sector investment, including

the fruit-juice extraction plant in Cochabamba

and rehabilitation of the Montero canning plant,

which has expanded to process pineapples and

palm hearts from the Chapare and Santa Cruz

regions. In these cases, investors identified sufficient production of raw material to provide abase

from which processing could expand. The citrusjuice processing plant may have a beneficial

impact in import substitution and the pineapple

canning operation may have export potential if

costs can be contained to competitive levels.

The United Nations program has several agroindustrial plants now entering production and is

providing infrastructure complementary to production increases. However, several of these

plants are encountering problems in terms of their

production economics, largely a reflection of the

scale of plants built as pilot operations. For

example, essential oils plants now entering operation in the Chapare highlight the problems. The

Table 5-1—Andean Tropical Fruits and Nuts With

Market Potential

Fruit Processed form

Banana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Papaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Passion fruit (Maracuya) . . .

Pineapple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pulped for industry; dried for

snack food; processed for stock

food.

Processed for pectin extract;

dried.

Juice concentrate (frozen or

aseptically packed); pulp (fullstrength or concentrate; with or

without seeds.

Canned as slices, dices, pulp

or puree; juice concentrate

(frozen or aseptically packed).

Nut Processed form

Castana (Brazils) . . . . . . . . . . Shelled, whole and pieces;

confectionery (chocolatecoated); ground as marzipan.

Macadamia Nuts . . . . . . . . . . In shell; shelled, whole and

pieces; confectionery (chocolatecoated).

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office

of Technology Assessment, May 1992.

lemon-grass oil and mint oil projects are smallscale, and have a design capacity to process raw

material from 120 and 75 hectares, respectively.

Processing costs are high and production is

unlikely to service capital and operating costs.

Additional effort is needed to assist the small

industries and organize growers to support the

activity.

Credit for investment in agriculture typically

has been deficient in the Andean countries.

Largely a result of unfavorable credit terms and

eligibility requirements, this situation has contributed to sluggish adoption of alternative agricultural livelihoods. For example, in Bolivia

loans are being made to small producers at

commercial terms. One concern is that loans are

pegged to the value of the U.S. dollar, and also are

at a commercial interest rate-currently 13 percent per annum. The combined inflation rate of

perhaps 15 percent and the interest rate produce a

real interest rate approaching 30 percent per
164 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 5-2-Value-Added Processing Investment in the Chapare Region

Industry Source of finance Dollar value capital Comment

Coffee pre-processing. . . . . . . . .

Latex pre-processing . . . . . . . . .

Tea processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Glucose plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vinegar plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Yuca and banana drying. . . . . . .

Banana and kudzu drying . . . . . .

Mint oil extraction . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lemon balm plant . . . . . . . . . . . .

Milk plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AID Project 412

INC - AID

China -1984

AID Project 412

Universidad Mayor

de San Simon/UNDCP

Universidad Mayor

de San Simon/UNDCP

AID Project 412

Universidad Mayor

de San Simon

AID Project 412

AID Project 412

P.L. 480

United Nations

$ 73,835

$ 32,900

$ 108,000

$ 166,728

$ 307,174

$ 175,298

$ 73,897

$ 105,572

$ 103,200

$3,200,000

Started in 1980;

Project 412 in 1990.

Started in 1970;

Project 412 in 1990.

In production.

Installation now underway.

Installation now underway.

Not yet in operation.

Starting production.

Starting production.

Working; low oil return per hectare.

Project incorporates health

aspects.

KEY: UNDCP-United Nations International Drug Control Programme.

P.L. 480-Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office of

Technology Assessment, May 1992.

annum. This is not sustainable on many agricultural programs. The loan situation is further

complicated by significant failure rates, in part

due to some borrowers withholding payments in

the expectation that they may be forgiven the

loans, the seasonal nature of cash flow, and the

difficulty in achieving product sales at profitable

levels. The lack of profitability, in turn, is a

function of product quality and lack of infrastructure to reach major markets (28).

Any product-processing will require training

local people to assume responsibility for the

technical standards of the processing phase. This

can be done either through training gained in a

second country already experienced in the particular process, or through technology transfer and

training in the host country. Both systems have

merit, but the failure most commonly seen in

sending people for second country training and

experience is that the training is of a general

nature and is too brief for technical competence to

be achieved. Often the trainee returns and is

diverted to an unrelated activity, or denied the

resources necessary to implement new technology.

Building national capacity to take full and

ongoing responsibility for implementation of new

production systems is a primary goal of development efforts. The economics of bringing a single

expert from overseas to teach groups of local

people are obvious in terms of the multiplier

effect achieved. Training programs could emphasize the use of overseas expertise within the

developing country, rather than the general tour

approach which frequently is seen as an excursion

rather than a learning exercise. It is also important

that invited expertise is of a technical level

sufficient to achieve the desired level of competence in trainees. Frequently, the needed expertise

is at a field practitioner level and not at the level

of the professional consultant. Preparation of

instruction manuals in the language of the recipient country is fundamental, and should form apart

of the brief of any overseas expert engaged.
-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 165

PRODUCT QUANTITY TO SUPPORT

PROCESSING OPPORTUNITIES

AND MARKET PENETRATION

There is a lack of product quantity to maintain

some processing equipment at even pilot levels.

Defining local production costs requires close

liaison with the extension arm of the local

development organization. This can be achieved

through careful analysis of “real costs” incurred

in the field which frequently differ greatly from

the cost structure implied by an experimental or

model evaluation. The theoretical cost of inputs

may be much greater than the costs actually being

incurred by low technology producers. Crop

yields will usually reflect the reduced inputs and

so the real production function must be known to

make realistic crop recommendations. A responsible and adequately equipped field evaluation

group should be an integral part of an extension

effort, and should have input into the marketing

process.

In some cases, the costs of production and

processing can create a disincentive for producers

to expand activities (e.g., Chapare lemon balm

and mint oil plants). An example is the milk

production plant nearing completion in the

Chapare. Efforts are now commencing to increase

the milk production capacity but may be complicated by high dairying costs in the region. Further,

the zone is not a traditional milk-consuming area

and lacks the infrastructure for refrigerated collection facilities and sales points. If the plant is to

succeed, development in all these phases will be

vital.

In areas where production units are small,

contract farming could be developed whereby a

processor contracts with producers to supply a

certain quantity and quality product for processing. Thus, processors are assured of sufficient

product quantity and quality and producers are

assured of a market. However, a highly sophisticated level of agronomic research is required to

support contract farmin g. Technology packages

are needed that can assure a certain product

quality from set production practices—information not currently available for most of the

alternative crops being promoted in the Andean

region.

Emphasis on product quantity and expanding

production areas will be needed to reach volumes

that will allow greater market penetration. Meanwhile, the short-term need is for buyers to accept

small product lines with a view to developing a

relationship with Andean exporters. Tariff incentives within major consumer nations and the

formation of commercial links with developing

countries would complement the donor government investment in regional development.

Producer Organizations

Producer organizations offer an opportunity to

organize and mobilize capital and people in

developing communities where conventional corporations are unable or unwilling to invest

because of inadequate return, high risk, or lack of

capital. These organizations provide an avenue

for bulk purchase of supplies (e.g., seeds, agrichemicals, equipment); processing and marketing of

products; financing; and even in some

research and development of new crops or

ing practices.

cases

farmAdequate storage facilities are critical in supporting

production and marketing of alternative crops. Here,

cocoa is being stored in the El Ceibo cooperative

storage facility in the Alto Beni, Bolivia.
166 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in

Producers organized into cohesive common

interest groups could pool individual production

to meet market product quantity requirements.

The present marketing system relies heavily on

intermediaries who buy products directly from

individual farmers at the farm gate. Development

of producer organizations could offer opportunities for smallholders to increase their bargaining

power and disseminate market information (box

5-G).

In some instances, producer organizations may

collectively purchase and work land, either by

subdividing the land or sharing in the production

of the entire tract. The more highly organized

food producer organizations provide fully integrated programs for their members. Vertical

integration also can offer expanded benefits by

linking production, processing, and marketing.

Although some efforts have been made to accomplish this in Bolivia, local politics have intervened to limit the efficiency and overburden

organizations with administrative costs. Retaining an independent manager could help to avoid

these problems. Involvement by the financing

institution to assure internal factions do not

adversely affect overall operations could be

continued until the unit has attained economic

independence and has demonstrated viability.

A major advantage of producer organizations is

the built-in incentive for members to use services

offered, increasing organization revenue. However, members generally lack incentive to purchase more than one share, limiting organization

capital. There also is a danger of shortsighted

decisions by members with diverse interests or

limited knowledge of market economies. Some

argue that not enough profit motivation exists in

a producer organization to assure sufficient earnings for future growth. Nonetheless, the organization structure and similar constructs seem, in

some cases, to be encouraging successful agriculthe Andean Region

tural production and marketing in some areas of

the Andean region.

Alternative Trade Organizations

Alternative trade organizations (ATOS) seek to

establish an equitable system of trade between

developed and less developed countries (LDCS).

Their mission is to trade with small-scale, democratically organized LDC producers and help

them obtain higher prices and increased control

over the market (9).

The ATOS of the 1990s emerged out of three

different trends in marketing strategies: 1) church

related, 2) development focused, and 3) politically motivated. The groups with a religious base

were formed primarily in the United States, while

the development and politically focused organizations are rooted in Europe. Today, ATOS are

most developed in Europe where they have

significant government and union support. Sales

of the international ATO movement totaled approximately $75 million in 1987, $8 million of which

came from sales in the United States (4).

ATOS focus on returning control and profit to

the peasant producers. However, they have tended

to remain in marginal markets where, although

they may influence conventional business, they

are unlikely to pose a great threat (9). Yet, ATOS

and their products are finding greater acceptance

in the national and international marketplace. As

“green consumerism” has flourished and the

awareness of global interdependence has increased, ATOS have created a niche for themselves in the world economy (box 5-H). Thus,

ATOS may have a unique and potentially important role to play in marketing Andean alternative

crops or products.

9 Transportation

Profitable agricultural production in part depends on access to affordable necessary inputs

and markets. A general lack of transportation

4 The information for this section was drawn largely from J. DeVincenti, “Infrastructural Needs to Support Agricultural Alternatives to

Coca in Bolivia, ” contractor report for the Office of Technology Assessment December 1991.
5--Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 167

Box 5-G-Some Successful Andean Cooperatives

El Ceibo is a federation of 37 producer cooperatives of cocoa beans in the Alto Beni region of Bolivia.

Representing some 900 peasant families, the organization offers its members multifaceted services that include

agroprocessing, transport, marketing, agricultural extension, and diverse training programs in bookkeeping,

accounting, agriculture, and rural development. The federation owns and manages its own industry, producing

cocoa powder, baker’s chocolate, cocoa butter, and chocolate candy. It sells these products nationally and

internationally in wstern Europe and Chile. In 1991, El Ceibo exported W,000 Worth of its products to

alternative trade organizations and networks of health food stores for organic products.

The key to El Ceibo’s success is a dynamic system of self-management that allows members to run their

own business and services and acquire important rural development skills through intensive job training and

experience. The participatory structure fosters abroad distribution of developmental benefits to peasant members

and even non-members in the Alto Beni and high levels of motivation throughout the organization. By processing

and marketing their products themselves, they are able to add value to their cocoa beans and attain the highest

prices available to peasant producers. The positive economic incentives have permitted a continuous growth in

member cooperatives and cocoa bean production over the past 14 years.

Asociaci6n Central de Comunidades Productoras de Caf4 (ACCOPCA) is an “association” of coffee

farmers located in the La Paz department of Bolivia within the Yungas area. The group was originally created by

the Centro de lnvestigaci6n y Promcci6n de! Campesinado, as an alternative to cooperatives, the traditional

method of organizing small farmers in Bolivia. It was hoped that ACCOPCA would be more agile, representative,

dynamic, and functional than a cooperative. Originally, the group reached out to carnpesinos through a radio

program that provided farmers with information about local organizations and marketing power and a bulletin in

the publication KUNATSA. ACCOPCA achieved legal status in 1980 and today there are 732 campesinos

members who live in 23 small communities around the town of Coripata. The association offers a wide variety of

services for its members in an attempt to develop a system based on self-management. They have established

programs that address issues such as crop disease, pest control, crop diversification, and coffee marketing and

export.

ACCOPCA is highly organized and its leadership structure is intact and essential to the successful

management oft he group. The traditional cultural framework for conducting group activities is a fundamental part

of ACCOPCA philosophy. ACCOPCA markets coffee through t he European Alternative Marketing Organization

OS-3, which also works with El Ciebo. In 1987, ACCOPCA was recognized for the quality of its coffee at the

international trade fair in V&t Germany and received the “Premio International de Afimentaci6n” in 1988 in

Barcelona, Spain.

SOURCE: K. Healy, “From Field to Factory: Vertical Integration in Bolivia,” &assroots &WdO~fT7t9flt, VOI. 11, No. 2,1987, pp. 2-11.

infrastructure is apparent in the Andean region Some extensive riverine systems in the Andean

and may be the most limiting factor to improving

agricultural production potential. Scheduled air

service is available to numerous locations, but the

transport hubs where bulk cargo shipments are

possible are far fewer. Airport capacity ranges

from modern international airports with adequate

storage and handling capabilities to those less

able or entirely lacking cargo services. Transport

by water to distant markets can be an important

export/import mechanism for the Andean region.

region are important cargo navigation systems.

For example, Bolivian riverine systems provide

for cargo transport from the Chapare to northern

points and also to the Atlantic Ocean through

Paraguay and Brazil. Rail transport provides

another link for certain areas, but rail networks are

not extensive. For example, systems in Bolivia

serve the east and west of the country and are

linked to other national systems but are not linked

to one another. Further, they can be expensive and

331-054 - 93 - 7
168 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 5+i-Profiles of Two Alternative Trade Organizations

The Max M?velaar /%un@Wor?, founded by two Dutch alternative trade organizations (ATOS) along with

churches and several consumer organizations, is the largest alternative trade effort Inthewodd. The Foundation’s

goal wastomove alternative trade coffee into the mainstream by creating atrademarkopento all roasters meeting

certain purchasing criteria: direct purchase from democratic farmers’ organizations, a minimum purchase price,

a long-term contract with the farmers, and generous credit terms for the farmers. Over a dozen small and

medium-sized Dutch coffee roasters joined the initiative.

The Haveiaar Foundation began its effort in 1966. Within the first year the goal was to capture 2 percent of

the Dutch market. As of December 1990, Havelaar reached 2.25 percent of overall coffee consumption in the

Netherlands. Havelaar now is available inmost Dutch supermarkets and hasten times the market penetration than

either of the founding ATOS alone.

Every year the Foundation purchases approximately 6 million pounds of coffee from peasant farmers. Its

mandated purchase price is nearly 50 percent higher than the world market price. Because the Havelaar program

demands direct payment to the growers’ associations as well as favorable financing, the economic benefits to

farmers may be two or three times those of the conventional coffee system.

Pueb/o to FkP/e, a Texas based ATO is one of the largest in the United States. The non-profit organization

was founded in 1979 to promote marketing outlets and economic support to democratically based grassroots

organizations in Central America. The ATO returns $0.40 to $0.45 of each sales dollar to the producer, while the

difference pays for the organization’soperational expenses. Since the organization was founded in 1979, Pueblo

to People has paid over$4 million topeasantproducers in Latin America Itreportedthat in 1990, $1.3 million was

returned to its Latin American producers and projected that $1.5 million would be returned in 1991 (29).

Tbday, Pueblo to People works with eighty groups from seven different LatinAmericancwntries (29). Pueblo

only works with grwps that meet its social criteria, which are often the least profitable and economically risky

producers. Furthermore, Pueblo looks to work with gr.wps organized for social as well as economic reasons. Its

influence allows peasants to learn organizational skills and democratic methods as well as earn income. Pueblo

to People sells its products in a retail store located in Hwston, Texas, and thrwgh a mail-order catalogue.

A major focus of ATOS is educating consumers about the culture and lifestyle of producers and returning

a fair price to producers. For example, Pueblo to People achieves its education goal through its catalogue that

contains a blend of information about products, producers, and the mission of the organization.

SOURCE: Dicldnson, R., “Alternative Trade Organizations, Peasant Farmers and Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of

Tdnology Assessment January 1992.

do not provide a modern or efficient mode of fertilizer costs in remote areas are nearly twice

transport (23). Currently, Bolivia is investing in

railway expansion in some areas (e.g., northeast

of the Chapare to Trinidad).

ROAD SYSTEMS

Road access in many coca-producing areas is a

function of weather conditions, thus restricting

access for extension workers and producers. The

lack of a comprehensive network of feeder roads

and adequate road maintenance make transport

costs a significant barrier to increased agricultural

production and contribute to high production and

market costs for Andean products. For example,

that of the cost on the international market (34).

Adverse road conditions take a heavy toll on

vehicles adding further costs that are ultimately

reflected in market prices (27).

The existing Peruvian and Bolivian road systems are largely the result of national government

efforts in the 1950s and 1960s. These roads were

constructed to promote colonization of remote

areas of the country and increase production and

availability of agricultural products (e.g., Belaunde Highway, Peru; and LaPaz-Santa Cruz,

Bolivia). Although efforts to improve Bolivian

roads have been made, the situation has not
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 169

improved appreciably. For example, while the

network of Bolivian roads has increased by at

least 100 percent in the last 20 years, only 3.7

percent of the network is paved, 22.6 percent is

gravel, and nearly 74 percent is dirt (22). Poor

drainage conditions of the dirt roads continue to

cause transport interruptions in rainy seasons.

The current condition of Bolivian and Peruvian

road systems is poor and, for a variety of

environmental and security reasons, little ability

exists to maintain or improve conditions.

Colombia placed considerable effort on developing its transportation network; however, transport costs remain high reflecting the difficult

nature of the country, lack of modern transfer and

transport facilities, and the generally low efficiency of operators. Infrastructure for farm-tomarket access and intraregional connections received lower priority than interregional connections and today remain the weak link in the

domestic transport system. Rural road construction and improvement and maintenance of the

existing national highway network have been

started recently to address this situation (38).

The virtual absence of refrigerated transport

vehicles in the Chapare region is a primary

constraint to improving marketing of agricultural

products. Of the handful of refrigerated trucks in

the Chapare, perhaps three are dedicated to the

fresh produce business. Little incentive exists for

private investment in such transport due to the

unreliability of specialized vehicles, high maintenance costs, and low returns in the fresh product

market. The Bolivian bananas arriving by road to

Arica in Chile must compete with the sophisticated Ecuadorean production and transport systems, which achieve a quality product at a lower

price.

Loading and transportation time in addition to

difficult road conditions further affect marketing

potential. At a minimum, the trip from Chimore

in the Chapare, to Arica in northern Chile is a total

of 700 kilometers, taking 3-1/2 days of constant

driving. Although much further, the trip to the

major Argentinean market of Buenos Aires benefits from excellent roads across the frontier.

However, it is still 4 days minimum and involves

transfer of the cargo at the border.

Despite these difficulties, small shipments

have been made to both destinations and products

sold in both markets. In order to assure buyers of

a specific quantity and quality of desired produce

it will be necessary to address infrastructure

problems. For example, although Bolivian exports to northern Chile and Argentina have been

described as success stories, recurring problems

with product quality have created consumer

resistance to the Bolivian product. These problems arose from lack of a well-established cold

chain and transport infrastructure in advance of

opening new markets and further highlight the

danger of entering a new market before the basic

export infrastructure is in place. To date, buyers

have shown perseverance in helping Bolivian

products become established in their markets,

although it is questionable how much longer

buyers will assume abnormal losses as a normal

business hazard (28).

STORAGE, PACKING, HANDLING FACILITIES

Storage infrastructure from production point to

market is insufficient. This situation contributes

to seasonal price fluctuations resulting in low

producer prices during harvest season and high

consumer prices in off seasons with the greatest

benefits accruing to the intermediaries, There are

two cold storage units now approved for construction by AID in the Chapare and the first may be

operational in 1992. Similarly, grain storage

capacity is limited and silo capacity is needed.

In the Chapare, nearly all local market produce

is transported by open truck, without any attempt

at primary processing or packing. Size and

dispersal of production units in the cocaproducing regions complicate efforts to design

packinghouses for fresh products. At present

packing technology in the Chapare region is a

field operation using small, rain-protected packing sheds where fruit is washed and treated with

fungicide dips to extend storage life. The availa-
170 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

El Ceibo, a federation of 37 cocoa producer organizations in the Alto Beni, Bolivia produces cocoa powder,

baker’s chocolate, cocoa butter, and chocolate candy for national and international markets. Exports totaled

U.S. $600,000 in 1991.

bility of a clean water source at the packing site

is paramount to a successful operation. Despite

the region’s high rainfall, this need can be

limiting, often requiring shallow wells adjacent to

packing facilities. In addition, lack of rural

electricity sources requires manual pumping to

fill washing tanks. It is anticipated that electricity

will be available in the next 2 years to much of the

Chapare, facilitating mechanization of crop processing and handling and is a high priority for

improving postharvest handling in the region.

9 Communications

Effective communications systems are critical

to’ producer decisionmaking on crop, market,

processing, and transport opportunities. Currently, communication networks in cocaproducing areas are inadequate. For example, in

the Chapare communications are provided by

Institutional radio and two or three public telephones. The system is inefficient and is a further

deterrent to private-sector involvement. Establishment of communications systems in remote

areas, however, is likely to be subject to the same

constraints as road development. While wireless

communication technologies can reduce the need

for physical structures (e.g., telephone poles,

underground cables), they are costly.

Information availability does not pose a key

constraint in itself since many information systems exist. Moving the information to producers,

however, is a primary need. Development efforts

could include mechanisms to develop local information collection and dissemination for producers of legitimate crops through cooperatives or

other joint activities. Subscriptions to international information services would be needed to

support this activity (27). Producer organizations
5--Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 171

>

~

d

$

W3

8

~

z

k

g

u

a

2

*

Poorly developed and maintained road systems take a

heavy toll on vehicles, particularly in areas with heavy

rains. Little incentive exists for private investment in

transport due to the unreliability of specialized

vehicles and high maintenance costs.

may provide a mechanism to pool producer

resources to invest in communications and disseminate information to members,

Improved communications are nececessary to

assist in promoting export opportunities and

coordinating complex transport interlinking. The

remote nature of producing regions and producer

inability to purchase or maintain communications

systems are areas to be addressed to support

alternative crop production. In large part these

constraints could be addressed through development efforts in coordination with national governments.

Engineering activities in tropical regions frequently are difficult and some past activities have

been linked to significant environmental problems making such development unpopular with

the public at large as well as potential donors.

Financial resources are the limiting factor in

every phase of infrastructure development, followed closely by construction capability. Funding resources alone likely are insufficient to solve

the problem.

Thus, the broad-based infrastructure needs for

improving production and marketing of legitimate crops include: 1) road development and

maintenance; 2) additional and improved vehicles; 3) processing, handling, and storage facilities; 4) reliable energy sources; and 5) information systems via communications networks. Addressing all of these needs is likely to require

significant investment on the parts of national

governments and donor organizations. Without

such investment, however, efforts to develop

alternative crops and livelihoods will continue to

be disadvantaged.

AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES5

The United States is a key trading partner with

many South American countries; U.S. exports

comprise nearly 43 percent of the market share in

Colombia and 20 percent in Bolivia (19,11). U.S.

investment in Latin American and Caribbean

agribusiness has grown significantly since 1987.

Primary targets have been Mexico, Brazil, and, to

a lesser extent, Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia (36). This trend is expected to continue

under new trade initiatives designed to promote

opportunities for U.S. producers and exporters in

conjunction with increasing trade flexibility for

the Andean countries.

The United States enforces a broad range of

trade policies, ranging from import quotas and

tariffs to complex food safety, sanitary, and

phytosanitary requirements to protect domestic

industries and human, plant, and animal health.

While some protectionist policies have been

waived temporarily, 6 meeting food safety and

5 ne infomtion for this section was drawn largely from L. nrner, “Primer on U.S. Agricultural and Trade Policies: Opportunities and

Constraints to Crop Substitution in the Andean Nations, ’ contractor report for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1992.

G The debate over this came to a head in the late 1980s in a dispute between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and AID/Bolivia over U.S.

technical support for Andean soybean producers. Domestic concerns focused on the potential for Bolivian production to adversely affect the

U.S. industry. Dcvclopmcnt groups argued that Ihe Bolivian production was unlikely to even reach 1 percent of the global soybean market.
172 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

quality requirements remains a significant challenge for potential importers. Training and technical assistance can help improve compliance

with regulations and also help build local expertise to address similar problems in domestic food

systems.

1 Trade Policy Initiatives

A number of agreements and initiatives are

intended to promote extra- and intra-Andean

trade. U.S. administrative initiatives include the

Uruguay Round (under the General Agreement on

Trade and Tariffs (GATT)), the Andean Trade

Preference Act (ATPA), and the recently proposed Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI)

(box 5-I). The result of these actions on Andean

economies is not yet clear.

Agriculture emerged as the most contentious

issue in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Developing nations abandoned negotiations

contending that an agricultural commitment was

essential to their continued participation in GATT.

Efforts to increase trade of Andean products will

need to examine potential trade strategies with

respect to GATT rules to avoid challenge and

possible retaliatory action from other GATT

nations.

Emphasis on trade assistance for the Andean

countries has included several commitments: to

expedite Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

review under GATT, to provide technical assistance for the agricultural sector, to explore opportunities for expanded textile trade, and to reestablish an International Coffee Agreement (ICA).

Although some of these areas have been pursued,

restoration of ICA remains elusive although it is

considered critical in the Andean region. International trade in coffee largely has been controlled

by export quotas established under the ICA. The

latest ICA collapsed after contentious debate

leading to a sharp reduction in world coffee

prices. Coffee exports, nevertheless, are substantial for Colombia, and comprise part of Bolivian,

Peruvian, and Ecuadorian income. Colombian

coffee exports accounted for 51 percent of the

country’s 1985 legal export earnings, 7 percent

for Ecuador, 5 percent for Peru, and 1 percent for

Bolivia (34). Current interest in negotiating an

ICA likely will focus on modifying quotas to

reflect demand for different varieties of coffees

and prohibitions on sales to nonmember nations.

1 Trade Preference Programs

Providing preferential trade arrangements with

developing countries is one approach to stimulate

their economic growth and has been included in

GATT in a variety of forms. This approach is

reflected in U.S. trade policy in the GSP, the

Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and most recently the Andean Trade Initiative (ATI). The

latter two are specialized forms of the GSP and

reflect U.S. efforts to provide greater trade

advantages to specific beneficiary countries (table

5-3).

The GSP program promotes economic development by opening trade opportunities for lesser

developed countries by offering zero-or reducedduty on certain imports. The Andean nations are

beneficiary nations individually, and as part of the

Andean Group-an association allowed to be

treated as a single country for purposes of GSP

eligibility. Products that exceed a certain level of

competitiveness may be removed from the U.S.

GSP program, although the President may waive

these limitations. Similarly, countries may be

removed from the GSP program as level of

development increases, market penetration increases, or as a sanction protesting other practices

of the participating country (e.g., trade practices,

worker rights violations).

The GSP program covers raw and processed

products; however, value-added products must

comply with the rules of origin. 7 If the raw

material originates from a non-GSP country, the

7 At least 35 percent of the cost or value of the article must be attributable to direct costs of processing in the beneficiary country.
—

5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 173

Box 544elected Trade Policies Affecting Andean Trade

A number of trade agreements, economic policy reforms, and legislation affect Andean trade. Many have

occurred in t he past several years and how they will affect national economies is not yet dear. The following briefly

summarizes some initiatives likely to play a role in the international trade activities of the Andean region.

Andean Pact

The Pact wasa result of a trade framework established in the 1969 Cartagena Agreement. Members include

Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia Peru, and Ecuador. The goal was to harmonize member trade and investment

regimes through preferential tariff structure for member countries, develop a common external tariff, and develop

agreements on investment and intellectual property rights. Recent activities under the Pact include:

. Subsidy program elimination for intra-Andean trade and agreement to create a common Andean market

by 1996,

. Establishment of free trade between Venezuela, Colombi~ and Bolivia in January 1992 with expected

additions of Peru and Ecuador in July 1992,

. Tentative agreement on common external tariffs for most goods, although the treatment of the agricultural

sector remains unclear,

. Initiation of national treatment of foreign investors, and

● Establishment of minimum standards on patent and trademark protection, allowing individual members to

implement stricter laws (19,20).

Andean Trade Initiative

Authorized through the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991, the Andean Trade Initiative (ATI) establishes

preferential trade arrangements for Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador with the United States. ATI provides

duty-free access for certain Andean exports for a 10-year period pending country-specific determination by the

President. Products excluded from duty-fee status include textiles, footwear, canned tuna, petroleum, rum, and

leather goods. As a result of the ATI a number of Andean exports are expected to increase as well as Andean

demand for U.S. goods and services to support economic expansion (6). Trade has yet to be visibly affected by

the ATI, making projections difficult.

Enterprise for the Americas

This initiative offers market access, financial and technical resources, and debt reduction to countries that

liberalize trade and investment regimes, maintain sound economic @ides that promote investment and

competition, and responsibly manage international debt obligations. The intent is to stimulate economic growth

in the entire M&tern Hemisphere through increased trade and investment and reduction of official debt. Key

components include:

. Trade-hemispheric free trade, an incremental approach beginning with smaller free-trade associations

such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (among the U. S., Canada, and Mexico) and the

Andean Pact;

. /rwestrnent-stimulate investment reform and privatizationthrough the Inter-American Development Bank

programs, Investment Sector ban Program (ISLP), and Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF); and

. Debt+educing debt obligation to the United States through a variety of mechanisms including

congressional reduction of food aid debt and debt-for-nature swaps (26).

Some benefits associated with this initiative have twen visible in Bolivia:

. Development of a bilateral framework agreement establishing the U.S.-Bolivia Trade and Investment

Council,

● Elimination of $371 million in debt to the United States, and

. Grant of an Investment Sector Loan in 1991 (11).

SOURCE: Office of T=hnology Assessment, 1993.
174 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 5-3—Exports Expected to Increase Under t he

Andean Trade Initiative

Country Product

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Colombia. . . . . . . . . . .

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cereals (including rice), cut

flowers, wood products, and

spices.

Cut flowers (particularly roses and

chrysanthemums), fresh tuna

and skipjack, glazed ceramic

products, raspberries, grapes,

tropical fruits, and melons.

Rope, zinc, copper wire, lead,

precious metals, asparagus, seafood (including yellowtail,

mackerel, and sardines),

tomatoes, and dried potatoes.

Cut flowers, fresh tuna and

skipjack, pineapple and grape

juice, iron and steel wire, limes,

tropical fruits, and melons.

SOURCE: E. Turner, “Primer on U.S. Agricultural Trade Policies:

Opportunities and Constraints to Crop Substitution in the Andean

Nations,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology

Assessment, February 1992.

final product must be ‘substantially transformed’

in the beneficiary country. Changes in product

and country coverage are made through general

and annual reviews, and any interested party may

petition for such a change.

~ Tariff and Quota Policies

A variety of restrictions control imports to

levels that will not adversely affect U.S. producers. Largely, these controls take the form of tariffs

and quotas on specific commodities, Tariffs are

the preferred means for restricting imports under

GATT. Although member countries have been

encouraged to maintain tariffs at existing levels,

or not to increase them beyond a specified level,

such a proposal has not been agreed upon.

Tariffs imposed by the United States and other

major importing nations tend to escalate as

products move through the processing chain. This

approach is suggested to have inhibited growth of

processing industries in some developing countries (5). Review and possible revision of tariff

schedules for processed Andean products could

complement crop substitution efforts and contribute to growth of the value-added industries.

Import restrictions may be placed on certain

products that may undermine any USDA domestic commodity program (1). 8 These section 22

fees and quotas are designed to keep product

prices above the government price support level

and to protect U.S. producers by stabilizing

domestic prices, particularly during times when

world prices are low. Such import restrictions

apply to all nations, irrespective of other trading

arrangements with the United States (e.g., CBI,

ATI).

The Sugar Tariff Rate Quota system is designed to protect the domestic price-support

program for sugarcane and sugar beets. Sugar

imports are restricted by a country-by-country

tariff rate quota system in effect since late 1990.9

Imports up to the quota amount are subject to a

small duty and levels above that are dutiable at a

significantly higher rate. This system helps support a U.S. market stabilization price much higher

than the world price (21.5 cents vs. 9.2 cents)

(17). Bolivia recently requested an expansion of

its sugar quota from 16,000 to 100,000 metric

tons to help provide alternatives for some farm

laborers involved in coca production (10). The

request was denied, however, and critics suggested the benefits would accrue to plantation

owners and processors rather than the target

population (24).

Tariffs are also imposed on sugar-derived

products such as alcohol fuels. A schedule of

8 An investigation on the effect of imports on U.S. commodity programs is conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commission

however, ITC’S report is merely advisory and the President may set fees or quotas irrespective of its content.

9 Revised based on a GA’IT ruling that the 1981 absolute quota system was not in conformity with GA’IT IUk. yet, the effect Of the new

program, in terms of restricting sugar imports, was identical to the old quota program.
5--Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 175

tariffs was developed to curb imports of alcohol

fuels in 1980 and protect U.S. corn and ethanol

producers, although ethanol auto fuels remain a

small part of the overall gasoline pool (i.e., less

than 1 percent). Tariffs for ethanol imports

currently run $0.54 cents per gallon (21), Proponents of ethanol fuel suggest the market will

expand in response to environmental concern

over fossil fuel use and carbon dioxide reduction

policies. While ethanol largely is produced from

sugarcane and corn, many plants may be used as

feedstocks. Technology exists to use a variety of

grasses in an ammonium freeze explosion process

to produce ethanol. Tariff reductions for ethanol

could provide incentive for industry development

in the Andean nations. In addition to U.S. imports,

several South American countries are large users

of ethanol auto fuels (e.g., Argentina, Brazil).

Countervailing duty and anti-dumping laws

seek to preclude unfair competitive advantage

importing countries might have over U.S. producers as a result of foreign subsidies or by marketing

products at less than their fair market value.

Imports suspected of violating these conditions

are investigated by the U.S. Department of

Commerce and International Trade Comrnission.10

Additional duties may be imposed on products

determined to violate these laws. Subsidies and

other assistance promoting agricultural development in the Andean nations potentially could be

challenged under U.S. countervailing and antidumping laws (15).

H Food Safety and Quality Requirements

Imports to the United States are subject to

quality and grade standards and requirements

deemed necessary to protect human, animal, and

plant health. The USDA’s Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) are responsible

for phytosanitary and produce quality programs,

respectively. The U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services’ Food and Drug Administration

(FDA), the USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), and the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) are responsible for regulating

health and safety programs. Phytosanitary regulations can pose unique challenges for developing

countries. They can restrict trade if applied in an

arbitrary manner or if compliance assistance is

difficult to obtain. Provision of technical assistance and training could offer benefits for industry

development domestically and internationally.

PHYTOSANITARY REQUIREMENTS

Plant, live animal, and meat product imports

are subject to APHIS inspection and quarantine

requirements, Inspections may be conducted at

port-of-entry or in producing countries. APHIS

personnel are authorized to enter cooperative

programs with counterparts in foreign countries

to control or eradicate pest problems. Such

programs may minimize potential infestations in

the United States as well as provide valuable

training for importing countries that can contribute to improvements in national food systems (2,

3). Currently, APHIS personnel are stationed in

Peru and Colombia to assist in complying with

U.S. phytosanitary requirements; this may expand

as a result of Andean Trade Preference Act.

SANITARY AND FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS

Imported goods (except meat and poultry

products) are subject to FDA inspection for

compliance with health, safety, packaging, and

labeling requirements. Food products that are

unsafe, produced under unsanitary conditions, or

that contain illegal additives or pesticide residues

are prohibited from entry. Imports are subject to

inspection and testing at time of entry, although

it is estimated that no more than 1 percent of

FDA-regulated food imports are actually tested.

10 us, D~~m~~~t ~fcommerce ~vcstiga[ions ex~e whe~crornot subsidi~ we be~g supplied directly or indirectly, or if the product

is being sold in the United States at less than fair value. The International Trade Cornrnission investigations focus on the potential injury to

U.S. producers,
176 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Inspection programs have been criticized for

failing to provide adequate protection.

All domestic and importing commercial processors of heat-processed, low-acid canned foods

and acidified foods and shellfish are required to

register and file processing information with

FDA. Requirements for sanitary food production

facilities are explained in the FDA’s Current

Good Manufacturing Practice Regulations (available only in English). While the FDA does not

have authority to conduct foreign plant inspections, personnel may travel to help solve public

health threats at the request of foreign governments.

Food importers must have access to current

U.S. food and safety labeling regulations to

export effectively. Further, facilities to monitor

compliance with import regulations could assist

in improving the domestic food system and

international marketing of food products. If food

processing is to take a greater role in providing

alternative livelihoods in the Andean countries,

assistance in the form of compliance training is a

key need.

MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION

FSIS is responsible for assuring the safety,

quality, and accurate labeling of meat and poultry

products. Importing countries inspection systems

must be equivalent to the U.S. system and be

evaluated and approved by FSIS. Currently, no

South American countries are authorized to ship

meat and poultry products to the United States

(33). Development of meat or poultry product

industries for export to the United States will

require development of Andean inspection facilities, technical assistance, and training.

MARKETING ORDER REGULATIONS

AMS is responsible for regulating produce

quality standards. Inspections are conducted only

at point-of-entry and costs for this service are

charged to importers. There are 15 marketing

orders that regulate minimum grade, size, and

quality requirements for imports. Although marketing orders apply only to quality of imports,

meeting these requirements may also pose challenges for poorly developed export systems.

Available infrastructure, handling, and shipping

technologies in the Andean nations currently are

inadequate to handle increased export opportunities.

Trade incentives form a principal thrust of the

U.S. strategy for promoting agricultural production in the Andean countries. Recent trade initiatives indicate a U.S. commitment to improving

the ability of these countries to compete in the

international marketplace, Yet, the value of these

trade concessions may be overshadowed by

future agreements with other countries (e.g.,

North American Free Trade Agreement). Nevertheless, complementary efforts are needed to

assist the Andean countries to comply with the

numerous phytosanitary, sanitary, safety, and

quality requirements for imports.

It may be useful to evaluate trade incentives

with respect to their contributions to the overall

Andean economy. This could include promoting

development of related economic sectors rather

than the narrow agricultural focus of current

substitution efforts. It may also be useful to

evaluate the impact of trade incentives in terms of

the global trade environment, recognizing that

development of trade agreements with other

nations could adversely affect U.S. demand for

certain Andean products.

The need for restrictions on agricultural assistance activities should be re-evaluated in relation

to the actual ‘threat’ to U.S. agricultural production. Previous reports suggest the potential effect

of certain increased Andean agricultural imports

on U.S. producers was negligible. Further, in light

of the emphasis on trade liberalization and

reducing subsidies and barriers to trade, these

may become key issues in future GATT negotiations.
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 177

STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT

RENEWABLE RESOURCE-BASED

ALTERNATIVES TO COCA

One way of summing up is to insist that

advising “shock treatment” for countries with

weak or missing market institutions or limited

technical capacity—that they go “cold turkey on

policy reform-must be rejected as little more

than self-indulgent intellectual sloth, It reflects a

lack of willingness to invest the intellectual

energy necessary to understanding the economies

and the societies for which reform prescriptions

are being written (25).

Strategies to enhance coca substitution efforts

must address a wide variety of constraints from

production to marketing. Producers are unlikely

to cease coca production in favor of alternative

crops or activities if they cannot be assured that a

market exists and that the mechanisms are in

place for production, harvest, processing, and

transport. A shift from a production- to marketdriven approach is evident currently in Cochabamba Regional Development Project. Nevertheless, the support structure necessary to sustain

alternative livelihoods is lacking or inadequate.

Recent U.S. policies have been designed t o

increase comparative advantage for certain Andean products (e.g., ATI) in U.S. markets. Revision of credit programs could improve the opportunities for smallholders to obtain financing for

entering legitimate production systems. Credit

revisions could mimic current U.S. subsidy programs, providing loans to farmers at lower rates

than presently exist in the Andean countries. Such

an effort with planned obsolescence as a goal,

could be relatively short-term, provide appropriate grace periods prior to repayment (i.e., allow

for real production to occur), and perhaps augment or replace eradication payments as a method

of inducing change. Further, supporting national

governments in encouraging greater domestic

food production could increase the viability of

Andean agriculture. Such an effort could incorporate financial incentives and loan programs, and

improved export and import policies.

Strategies to improve support for alternatives

to coca in the Andean region will likely require

attention to:

●

●

●

●

National research and extension systems,

Opportunities for value-added processing

and increased product competiveness,

Infrastructure to exploit and export the

product, and

Increased trade opportunities (31)

I Strategy: Support National Research and

Extension Systems

Enhancing agricultural profitability in the Andean nations will require continuing and significant investment in research and extension to

develop alternatives and demonstrate techniques

and technologies to potential adopters. However,

national funding for research and extension activities may be difficult to secure and U.S. international academic research and extension activities

are declining.

While research and extension activities were

large components of early AID crop substitution

efforts in Bolivia, the level of effort has dropped.

Continued devotion of funding and effort to

long-term research and extension activities is

hampered by pressure to produce immediate

results. Research on developing alternatives and

demonstration and extension of this information

to potential adopters are long-term propositions—

conservatively running 10 to 15 years while

standard project lengths are only 5 years (31).

To overcome this situation, emphasis could be

placed on local and national research centers to

promote institution building and skill development, thereby improving the potential for activities to continue after direct assistance is withdrawn. Agronomic management research could

be oriented to on-farm, farmer participation

production trials, involving the local farm population in direct participatory research. Extension

activities could emphasize on-farm demonstra-
178 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

tion and farming systems to maximize the diffusion of new technologies and practices to rural

adopting populations. On-farm trials should be

maintained for sufficient time to demonstrate

effectiveness and promote technology/practice

diffusion (7,27,31).

1 Strategy: Improve Opportunities for

Value-Added Processing

Increased agricultural productivity is likely to

do little for producers’ economic well-being if

producers cannot effectively and efficiently apply

improved postharvest technologies. Such applications will be necessary for alternative crops to

become significant in terms of total agricultural

exports. Current formal exports of some alternative crops (e.g., turmeric, ginger) are at no more

than trial levels. Success will be dependent on the

establishment of cost-effective, postharvest processing, as well as the enhancement of producer

efficiency through reduced production costs and

increased yields (27,31).

For the Andean countries to increase their

agricultural export earnings and reduce agricultural imports, major public and private-sector

investment will be necessary. AID is a major

contributor to Andean country development of

legitimate economies. The channeling of that

contribution is a joint effort between the offices of

the recipient government and the AID coordinating office in the benefiting country. The effectiveness of the AID investment can be enhanced in a

number of ways:

Implement Training Programs-Emphasis could

be placed on specific technical training at the

production technique and processing level, involving the import of short-term expert assistance

with a group training responsibility. Programs

with specific tr aining objectives, directed to

practical-level personnel who can be integrated

into production or processing units such as they

are expected to manage in their home country,

could recieve priority. The need for language

training as part of a training proposal should be

reviewed and adjusted to promote participation in

educational exchanges. Professional training cannot be neglected, but this too must be monitored

carefully to ensure trained people remain in

positions justifyng their preparation and benefiting the AID program (27).

Prioritize AID Investment—Where investigation results have demonstrated agronomic potential of a crop, the processing and marketing

infrastructure should be developed along with the

expansion of production, so that market outlets

for production will be in place when production

goals are realized (27).

Promote Producer Organizations—The development of strong producer organizations that can

aggregate products for sale to processors, intermediaries, or consumers could overcome the problem small individual producers have in negotiating just prices for their product (27). A grassroots

development strategy may be the most appropriate mechanism for assisting rural communities in

processing, storage, marketing, and transport of a

diversity of agricultural commodities. Grassroots

organizations typically have strong support from

local populations and understand local cultures,

aspirations, and priorities. Abundant organizational skills exist within Bolivian grassroots

organizations, sindicatos. These groups have a

long tradition of solving development problems

and promoting rural reform in the Chapare and

elsewhere in Bolivia. Bolivian crop substitution

programs might work cooperatively with sindicatos to promote peaceful crop substitution and

alternative development efforts (31 ). (See chapter

2.)

Promote Private Investment in Processing—

Loans to the private sector at realistic interest

rates could promote entrepreneurial activity, and

ultimately replace the need for AID and other

contributing institutions to maintain the present

high level of investment in infrastructure and

agroindustry. Careful investment evaluations

should be conducted, and full market histories

and the long-term strategy should be a part of the

Project Evaluation (27).
5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 179

S Strategy: Promote

Infrastructure Development

Infrastructure is inadequate to support alternative development (e.g., paved roads, bulking and

storage facilities, agroprocessing plants). The

high cost associated with infrastructure development in remote areas is prohibitive in terms of

normal financial assistance. Economic studies

must explore fully the infrastructure and integrated development of alternatives, and environmental impacts should be identified and mechanisms to mitigate them included in project

design and planning (27).

Infrastructure development is approached slowly,

however, because of the potential benefits that

might accrue to coca transporters (e.g., road

developments are seen as potential landing strips

for narcotics traffickers). Although infrastructure

development might initially contribute to the coca

economy, alternative development and production cannot occur without adequate transportation

and marketing routes. Interdiction, monitoring,

and enforcement of illegal activities also could be

simplified with improved transportation networks

(8).

Investment in transportation infrastructure, accompanied by expanded credit programs in production systems can help coca-dominated economies

move to more profitable, exportable alternatives

(8,27,31). Long-term involvement with this development, and greater emphasis on expanding

legal production rather than eliminating coca,

could ultimately achieve coca reduction goals.

Resources must be channeled in an ordered,

well-planned basis with the knowledge that the

political requirements for short-term, demonstrable achievements will precede the overall success

of the program (27).

~ Strategy: Increase Trade Opportunities

for Andean Products

An increased share in the international market

can contribute to improving the economies of the

Andean countries. Current crop substitution apLocally produced bananas are being prepared for

transport. However, these producers are at a

disadvantage compared with other highly

sophisticated production and marketing systems.

preaches have focused on this approach, largely

through promoting production of high-value crops,

to generate foreign exchange for national governments. However, meeting complex food safety,

sanitary, and phytosanitary requirements is often

difficult for developing nations. There are some

avenues for assistance in developing capacity for

meeting these standards. Additionally, developing national abilities to ensure quality and safety

standards for produce could help in meeting U.S.

import requirements as well as those of other

countries. Compliance with these standards could

contribute to increased competitiveness of Andean products in international markets and could

yield additional benefits by increasing the range

of trading partners, encouraging foreign investment, and improving national food systems (27,30,31).

Improve Ability to Meet Quality and Safety

Standards for International Markets—Increased

exchange among U.S. agencies and potential

Andean exporters could assist in identifying key

needs to facilitate trade. Such exchange would

allow greater insight into the difficulties faced by

foreign producers/exporters and familiarize them

with U.S. requirements for importing products.
180 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Again, technical assistance will be a critical

component (27,30).

Reduce Import Tariffs for Andean Products to

Complement Crop Substitution Programs—

Although the ATI and certain waivers have

reduced import barriers for some Andean products, this effort could be expanded to provide

reduced tariffs for all products linked to alternative development projects. While this may run

counter to some U.S. commodity support regulations, import levels would likely be low, creating

little competition with U.S. producers. Further,

the program could contain a clearly identified

time frame after which review and possible

revision could be undertaken (30,31).

Provide Incentives for Value-Added Processing—

Typically, tariffs increase as products move

through the processing chain, i.e., raw materials

generally are subject to lower tariffs while processed items have higher tariffs. This aspect of

U.S. trade policy has been suggested to reduce

incentive for development of value-added industry in exporting nations. U.S. tariff policies on

value-added products could be reviewed and

modified if they are determined to affect development of processing industries in the Andean

region adversely (27,30).

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Coca

Biological

Control

Issues 6

Biocontrol is something akin to gamblingit works, sometimes (13).

E

radication

l has been a component of U.S. supply

reduction efforts for illegal narcotic crops (e.g., opium

poppies, marijuana, and coca) for nearly two decades.

Some experts believe that eradication must precede

alternative development in the Andean nations. Others view coca

eradication as futile and a threat to the culture and traditions of

native Andean populations. Although key requirements, host

country consent and cooperation are unlikely to be easily

obtained (27,28).

INTRODUCTION

The level of coca reduction necessary to have a clear and

measurable impact on cocaine availability is an unknown.

Further, new processing technologies have changed the relationship between coca leaf production levels and cocaine availability. For example, an intermediate product of cocaine processing,

“agua rica, ’ appears to have excellent storage properties

allowing processors to stockpile supplies. Thus, even with a

reduction in cultivated area, a reduction in cocaine availability

may not occur for years, if at all. Further, current cocaine

extraction techniques are only about 50-percent efficient; improved extraction could yield the same amount of cocaine from

a much reduced leaf production base (28).

1 For tic ~Wo~e~ of ~js djsc~ssion, e~~icafion wi]l refer tO comp]e[c erasure Of d]

traces of coca within a defined area. The area could be defined as small as a single plot

or as kuge as a country.

c

@l

(/)

183

331-054 - 93 - 8
184 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Eradication efforts have included voluntary

and involuntary removal of the target crop.

Although coca eradication programs have relied

solely on manual techniques, possible application

of chemical methods have attracted attention.

Renewed interest in application of biological

control methodology to coca reduction also is

evident. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has

responsibility for research and development of

coca control methods, including research on

chemical control methods and classified research

on biological control.

MANUAL COCA CONTROL

Manual eradication of coca can be dangerous

and inefficient. The Special Project for Control

and Eradication of Coca in the Alto Huallaga,

Projecto de Control y Reducción de los Cultivos

de Coca en el Alto Huallaga (CORAH), in the

mid- 1980s attempted manual coca eradication in

Peru. CORAH workers destroyed 5,000 hectares

of coca in 1985 with ‘‘weed whackers’ and

machetes (15). Although the manual eradication

program had some success, the problems were

extensive. Between 1986 and 1988, 34 CORAH

workers were killed by insurgent groups (31).

CORAH’S association with the Mobil Patrol Unit

of Peru’s Civil Guard, Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje de la Guardia Civil del Peru (UMOPAR), an

organization accused of using repressive and

abusive tactics on local growers, led to great

public resistance to eradication. Manual methods

also can be ineffective. For example, some fields

eradicated manually by coppicing coca shrubs

showed invigorated growth later (10).

CHEMICAL COCA CONTROL

Chemical coca eradication thus became of

greater interest as it was expected to reduce risk,

achieve more uniform results, and increase the

potential treatment area. Nonetheless, proposals

met with some resistance. Largely driven by

political, social, and economic realities in cocaproducing countries (see chapter 2), resistance

Uprooting coca shrubs is one method of manual

eradication, but it can be a difficult and slow process,

Here, workers are uprooting coca in an eradication

program in Bolivia.

has been bolstered by public concern over the

release of chemicals in the environment. Herbicide formulation, chemical properties, and application methods most affect their environmental

fate and thus the potential for creating environmental or human health hazards.

I Formulation

Herbicides are formulated as liquids (aqueous,

oil, emulsifiable concentrates), solids (dust, wettable powders, granules, encapsulated products),

and gases (fumigants). The type of formulation

depends on the chemical nature of the pesticide,

target pest, and other pesticidal properties (29).

Granular and pelletized herbicide formulations

are preferred because the drift and volatilization

concerns are reduced relative to sprays. However,

the density of granular products can affect performance and deposition. Because moisture is

needed to release the active ingredient, release

rates can be highly variable depending on precipitation patterns. Controlled-release formulations

(e.g., starch-encapsulated herbicides, ethylene

vinyl acetate copolymers incorporated with active

ingredients) could contribute to regulated release

(29), particularly under high moisture conditions
6—Coca Biological Control Issues I 185

common in many coca-producing areas. Several

herbicides have been identified as prospective

eradication agents for coca. Public information

about the toxicity and environmental fate of these

herbicides has been derived mainly from tests

conducted in the United States, although the U.S.

Department of State conducted field tests in Peru

in the late 1980s (l).

B Application

Technologically, herbicide application is challenging. Irrespective of formulation, groundbased and aerial methods are the basic mechanisms for delivering an herbicide to its intended

target. Ground-based application offers precision;

however, the inaccessibility of most coca plots,

steep terrain, and bulky, heavy equipment can

make this type of application inefficient. Security

for applicators further constrains potential for

ground-based application.

Aerial application of herbicides may use rotaryor fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopters can treat small

areas surrounded by obstructions, like many coca

plots, and also lower special equipment to avoid

major off-site dispersal problems for liquid formulations (l). Several herbicides screened for

coca eradication (e.g., Imazapyr and Triclopyr)

have restrictive labeling limiting aerial application to helicopters (table 6-l).

Disadvantages of using helicopters include the

complexity and expense of maintenance, low

fuel/distance efficiency, and susceptibility to

hostile ground fire. Thus, helicopter application is

unlikely to fulfill the needs of a broad-range

chemical eradication effort (l). Fixed-wing aircraft are cheaper to maintain than helicopters, can

cover large application areas, and have good

fuel-to-distance efficiency. The faster application

speed of a fixed-wing aircraft also may reduce the

security risks associated with involuntary eradication programs. However, for accurate application, the optimum altitude is 5 to 20 feet above the

target. Higher altitudes result in a wider dispersal

swath and increased likelihood of herbicide loss

due to wind drift, propeller and wing-tip vortices,

and volatilization. Low-altitude application, however, requires clear, unobstructed approaches

with ample space to allow a safe climb at the end

of the run (l), conditions largely lacking in many

coca production zones.

Liquid herbicide application also depends on

mixing and loading sites within a reasonable

distance of the treatment area. Sites require a

water source, containment equipment, equipment
186 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in

for cleaning and decontaminating aircraft, mixing

and pumping gear, and protective clothing for

pilots and ground support personnel. While security concerns would be significant for such

operations near coca production zones, long

ferrying times between loading sites and target

zones reduce application efficiency.

M Herbicide Testing

Testing is a critical step in herbicide evaluation. Thorough testing investigates herbicide

efficacy, environmental fate (e.g., mobility and

persistence), effects on non-target species, and

potential for adverse human health effects. Although a number of candidate herbicides have

been tested, the most extensive testing has been

performed on tebuthiuron (table 6-2). In addition

to tests in the United States, field tests of

tebuthiuron were conducted in Peru in 1987.

Executive Order 12114 requires an analysis of

potential environmental impacts for certain extraterritorial activities that:

●

●

●

May significantly affect the environment of

the global commons outside the jurisdiction

of any nation,

May significantly affect the environment of

an innocent bystander nation, or

Provide a foreign nation with a product

which is prohibited or strictly regulated by

Federal law in the United States (e.g.,

herbicides).

Only actions falling in the first category require

the preparation of an Environmental Impact

Statement (EIS) under the National Environment

Policy Act (NEPA). Second category actions

require preparation of bilateral or multilateral

studies or a Concise Environmental Review

(CER). Final category actions, which would

include coca eradication, require preparation of a

CER. However, Executive Order 12114 also

contains exemptions that might be applicable to

a coca eradication effort. Exempted, for example,

are actions determined not to have a significant

the Andean Region

environmental effect, actions taken by the President of the United States, and actions taken at the

direction of the President or Cabinet in matters of

national interest. Procedures may also be modified to account for unique foreign policy needs,

confidentiality, and national security.

Although similar to an EIS, a CER is less

rigorous and provides little guidance as to the

content of the documents or the procedures by

which those documents should be drafted. For

example, Order 12114 states without elaboration

that a CER may be composed of environmental

assessments, summary environmental analyses,

or other appropriate documents (9). The Department of State guidelines for implementing

Order 12114 require the responsible officer of a

proposed program to determine whether the

action is likely to have a significant extraterritorial environmental impact. If so, the officer may

prepare either an EIS, CER, or cooperative study

to evaluate the effects subject to the requirements

of Order 12114. Of these choices, only the EIS

has specific requirements for document contents

and public and Federal agency involvement (33).

Prior to testing tebuthiuron in Peru, the Department of State conducted a CER. However, the

document was criticized for several reasons:

●

●

●

●

The

Lack of Andean public and expert involvement in the review process,

Reliance on existing data on the effects of

tebuthiuron in temperate rather than tropical

environments,

Lack of discussion of the need for or

alternatives to the proposed action, and

Lack of review of measures for mitigating

the effects of the herbicide.

latter omission is especially important because of the assumption that applicators would

use proper safety equipment and protective clothing, an assumption frequently not borne out in the

developing world (6).

The Peruvian Government’s agreement to the

testing of tebuthiuron in April 1988 provoked
6-Coca Biological Control Issues I 187

Table 6-2—Coca Herbicide Screening Summary

Application rate

Success against targeta

Chemical (lb active ingredient/acre) E. Coca E. Novogranatense

Tebuthiuron b 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tebuthiuron c 

, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hexazinoneb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hexazinonec 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Triclopyr b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Triclopyr c 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cacodylic Acidc

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cacodylic Acidc+ Krenite . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,4-DC 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Glyphosatec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thidiazuronc 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Picloramc ......, a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ethyl metribuzinc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Imazapyr c 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,4,6

1,2,4,8,16

2,4,6

1,3,6

3,6,9

4.5,9,13.5

12

6

1,2,4,8

4,8,16

2

2,4,8

2,4,8

4

s

s

s

s

M

S(13.5)

—

u

M

M

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

s

M

S(13.5)

u

u

M

s

M

s

u

s

aControl Experiments were conducted inthe field and greenhouse. Control codes are: U-Unsuccessful; S-Successful; M=Marginal, in need of

furtherstudy.

bTesting in Kauai, Hawaii

cTesting in Frederick, Maryland

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, 1992.

public outcry from those concerned over such a

large-scale use of an herbicide and the lack of data

on its use in tropical areas. In response, the CER

was redrafted and the State Department consulted

with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and outside

experts. However, environmental advocates and

residents of the Alto Huallaga still were not

incorporated into the process (6,31). Testing

resumed in January 1989, but was quickly halted

when the Peruvian Government withdrew its

support for the project.

Although the new CER described plant recolonization and herbicide residue in the soil it did not

include specific data on colonizing plant species

and their value (e.g., economic, environmental).

Also neglected was examination of the potential

impacts on associated water resources even

though tebuthiuron is known to leach through the

soil profile (table 6-1) (34). The adequacy of the

new CER became academic when the producer of

tebuthiuron refused to sell any more of the

product to the Department of State.

Analysts suggest a process more open to public

participation might have resulted in better execution of the proposed program. Early involvement

of interested parties would have made public the

deep opposition of many Peruvians to herbicide

use and the environmental concerns associated

with large-scale herbicide use in tropical areas,

and, thus, allowed the State Department to

develop strategies to address these concerns and

defuse opposition (6).

Rigorous analysis of the potential environmental and health impacts of the application of

tebuthiuron and other herbicides has yet to be

completed. Some proponents of herbicide-based

coca eradication suggest the candidate herbicides

pose no greater environmental risk than coca

cultivation and processing in the long term.

Critics maintain use of an herbicide designed to

control brush and woody plants in the Andean

region could generate numerous unanticipated

adverse effects. However, such arguments remain

anecdotal at this juncture, with little hard data to

support either side.
188 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

The potential impact of coca control activities on nontarget species is a key concern, particularly since coca

commonly is planted with or near other economic plants. Here is a coca plot with banana, papaya, and pepper

on the back border.

BIOLOGICAL CONTROL

Biological control (biocontrol) uses living

organisms or their byproducts to reduce a target

pest population to a tolerable level. Biocontrol

approaches are categorized by agent source (i.e.,

indigenous vs. exotic) and application criteria.

— l hprimary e categories of biocontrol include:

●

●

Classical—importation of exotic species

and their establishment in a new habitat;

Augmentative--augmentation of established

species through direct manipulation of their

populations or their natural products; and

. Conservative-conservation of established

species through manipulation of the environment (20).

Some experts suggest an augmentative approach

would be more likely to yield rapid short-term

coca reduction, whereas classical or conservative

approaches would be more likely to offer longerlasting results. Further, the latter approaches

would create a gradual target decline and allow a

transition period for producers to adjust to alternative livelihoods (26).
6—Coca Biological Control Issues I 189

Box 6-A—Erythroxylum Species That Are the Primary Sources of Cocaine

Cocaine is derived from certain plants of the genus Eryfhroxylurn(family Erythroxylaceae). The genus name

Erythroxy/wn, derived from the Greek erythros (red) and xylon (wood), denotes the reddish wood of some of the

shrubs and small trees included in the genus. In all, some 250 species of Erythrcu@urn exist in tropical and

subtropical habitats worldwide. Whereas most species grow in the New World, the genus is well known also in

Africa and Asia. Two loosely related South American species of coca (E. coca and E. novogranatense) and

varieties of these species are the primary sources of cocaine. The species differ largely in trunk, branch, and bark

characteristics, whereas the varieties within species differ largely in leaf characteristics.

Although coca was scientifically described some 200 years ago, detailed studies of coca specimens were

conducted only in the last century. They revealed subtte differences in leaf and stem anatomies, growth and

branching habits; and characteristics of bark, stipules, flowers and fruits, breeding relationships, and geographic

distributions. Coca is a perennial shrub ranging between 0.5 and 2.5 meters tall and has a short flowering and

fruiting period.

Erythroxylum cm+The two varieties of this species are E. cocavar. ipaduand E. coca var. coca. The former

has large, elliptical leaves, whereas the latter has smaller, more pointed and broadly lanceolate to elliptic leaves

with two parallel longitudinal lines on their undersides.

E. coca var. coca ● Source of most of the world’s cocaine.

(Bolivian or Huanuco coca) ● Believed to be the ancestral taxon of all cultivated coca.

. Cultivated and found in the wild.

. Restricted arealy to narrow zone of moist tropical forest known as

montafia.

● Little known outside South America.

● Restricted to the western Amazon, and geographically isolated

from other coca varieties.

. Cultivated for its leaves by a few isolated Indian tribes of Brazil,

Peru, and Colombia.

. True cultivar, unknown in the wild.

. Probably a recent derivative of E. cmavar. coca; the two varieties

share many morphological characteristics.

(continued on next page)

E. coca var. ipadu

(Amazonian coca)

By definition, biocontrol is based on a density- biocontrol approach. Information about the lifedependent balance—the control agent abundance cycle, reproduction, and metabolic pathways can

is directly dependent on the availability of the

target (coca). As the target numbers decrease so

does the control agent population. Thus, the

biocontrol methodology is an unlikely eradication technique. It could, however, provide means

to reduce the amount grown in target areas, and

make coca cultivation difficult (20).

Understanding the traits of the various coca

species and varieties is key to selection of a

be used to focus a biocontrol strategy (box 6-A).

For example, the coca (Erythroxylurn) species of

interest have short flowering and iiuiting periods,

propagation depends on seed production, and

seed viability is brief (27). These botanical

features might suggest that a biocontrol agent that

hinders reproduction or seed viability could

reduce opportunities for expanding coca production.
190 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 6-A-Continued

E~hro~/umno~ra~tens~The twovarietiesofthis species are E. nov~rantensevar. novogranatense

and E. novogranafense var. trutillense and both have complex distribution patterns. E. novograr)atense var.

trwdlerwehas narrowly elliptic leaves that tend to be smaller than those of the other varieties whereas the leaves

of E. novogranafense var. novogtandeme are larger and more oblong in shape and have a distinct bright

yellow-green color. Both varieties occur only as cultivated plants and are tolerant of arid conditions, growing where

the E. coca varieties would not survive. Neither variety of E. novogranatense is a major world source of cocaine.

E. novogranatense ●

var. novogranatense

(Colombian coca)

●

●

E. novogranatense

var. truxillense

(Trujillo coca)

c

●

●

Found today as a plantation crop only in Colombia, where it is

cultivated in drier mountain areas by a few isolated Indian tribes

that harvest the leaves for chewing.

Tolerant of diverse ecological conditions.

Figured prominently in world horticultural trade in the eariy 20th

century, and continues to be grown in many tropical countries as

an ornamental piant.

Grows today only in the river valleys of the north coastal Peru and

in the arid upper Rio Mar#ion valley.

baves are highly prized by chewers for their excellent flavor.

Duetodifficultiesof extracting andcrystallizing pure cocaine, it is

a minor contributor to the illicit drug market

Trujillococa is used primarily in the manufacture ofde-cocainized

extracts for soft drink fiavoring.

The ecological conditions under which coca plants are cultivated in part determine their morphological

characteristics, such that a continuum of leaf sizes and shapes exists among the four primary coca varieties. Ptants

grown in full sun develop thicker and smaller leaves, while plants grown in partial shade develop larger, thinner

and more delicate leaves. Humidity and moisture availability also can affect the size, form, and venation of coca

leaves. Because of these variations it is often impossible to identify a coca variety positively from isoiated leaves

or ieaf fragments alone. Integrated data on a number of micromorphological features of leaves and other plant

parts are required, along with information on the geography and ecoiogy of the specimen source.

Coca varieties differ in their physical properties and growth habits, as well as in the biochemical properties

of their leaves. The alkaloid content of coca leaves is of particular concern. Coca leaves contain 13 different

alkaloids, the most concentrated of which is cocaine, first isolated from coca leaves in the mid 19th century. Like

~ many plants contain economically important and naturally occurring alkaloids (e.g. caffeine in coffee, nicotine

in tobacco, morphine in opium poppies, and piperine in black pepper).

Coca Ieaveson average contain about 1 percent cocaine, but typical values range between 1.02 percxmtfor

E. novogranatense var. tnod//ense, and 0.11 to 0.41 percent for Amazonian coca (E. cocavar. @adu). Average

values for E. cocavar. coca and E. novogranatensevar. novogranatense are intermediary (0.23 to 0.93 percent).

The potency of coca leaves with respect to cocaine content also depends on the plant’s growing site. The E. coca

var. coca leaves with the greatest cocaine content were found in Chinchao, in Hu&wo, Peru, among the highest

elevations where coca is grown. Plants grown in the montallas generally are thought to produce more potent

leaves than plants at lower altitudes.

SOURCE: T. Plowman, “Coca Chewing and the Botanical Origins of Coca (HyWmy/urn sep.) in South America,’” D. Padni and C.

Franquemont (eds.), Owe and Cocahe: Efiecte on People and Po/&y in Latin Amedca, Cultural Survivat Report S23 (Peterborough, NH:

Transcript Printing Company, 19S6), pp. 5-S3.
6—Coca Biological Control Issues I 191

1 Agricultural Application of Biocontrol

Ex amining biocontrol of weeds may offer

some insight into the potential of this method for

coca reduction. The first practical attempt at

biocontrol of weeds dates from 1863, when

efforts were made to control the prickly pear

cactus with an insect observed to attack the cactus

in northern India. Based on these observations,

the insect was introduced to southern India and

later to Sri Lanka, where it was successful in

controlling wild populations of prickly pear.

Initially, most of the weed targets for biocontrol

efforts were exotic, terrestrial species, but, increasingly, aquatic and semi-aquatic native and

exotic weeds have been subjects of biocontrol

research.

Biocontrol has experienced a rapid expansion

in the last three decades. By 1985, 214 exotic

natural enemies had been introduced into 53

countries for the control of 89 weeds. Biological

agents, primarily insects and plant pathogens,

have achieved substantial control for many target

weeds (e.g., klamath weed, prickly pear, lantana)

(17), Additional examples of successful development and marketing of weed biocontrol agents

include the use of pathogens to control northern

joint vetch (biocontrol agent Collectotrichum

gloeosporioides) and stranglervine of citrus (biocontrol agent Phytophthora) (29). Insects have

been the most common successful biocontrol

agents to date, yet nematodes, fungi, and mites

have also been used.

To date, 267 biocontrol projects have been

undertaken worldwide and 48 percent have achieved

a measurable degree of success. The majority of

biocontrol projects have relied on importation of

exotic organisms-classical biocontrol--and of

these projects, 45 percent have been rated as

successful. Whereas an introduced organism may

become established, success is measured by the

agents identifiable control effects on the target

pest. Results of introductions tend to be mixed

with only some of the introduced agents becoming established and effective (i.e., 64 percent of

. ~

~-~

sIJ

?

;

*&

Insects are the most widely used biocontrol agents for

agricultural pests, although interest in using other

organisms is increasing. Shown here is a fungal

parasite penetrating the hyphae of its target.

the natural enemies introduced in the biocontrol

projects have become established and 26 percent

of these have been rated effective). Nevertheless,

nearly two-thirds of the target weed species have

been brought under control using biological

methods in at least one project (7).

I Application of Biocontrol to

Narcotic Crop Control

Agricultural biocontrol achievements have occurred under conditions where security risks and

likelihood of countermeasures were not factors.

The potential for achieving similar success within

the framework of a narcotics control program may

be less likely. Clearly, the need for international

coordination and cooperation would be paramount.

Experts indicate development time for a biocontrol program for coca would be strongly

influenced by the outcome of initial search for and

identification of potential agents. Effective, indigenous candidates would be likely to have a

shorter development period than candidates needing enhancement to meet safety and efficacy

requirements. Common protocol for biocontrol

research and development programs includes:
192 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 6-B-Categories of Potential Biocontrol Agents

Numerous arthropod species feed on coca or related plants. Deliberate establishment of an arthropod pest

in coca-growing regions would add to the complex of pests attacking cultivated coca. However, if heavy damage

ensued, countermeasures would likely be undertaken by growers. Insects and mites generally can be controlled

effectively with pesticides, particularly where there are no restrictions on the choice of materials or application

rates. Stem borers and soil-dwelling root borers are more difficult to control, although there are chemical and

cultural means for their control. Pesticide resistance is likely a critical requirement for these types of biocontrol

agents.

Pathogenic fungi are becoming increasingly usefui in ciassicai biocontrol of weeds. However, they aiso can

be controlled with pestiades. Alternatively, they couid be used as mycoherbicides, aithough in this form application

may become problematic.

Nematodes have been iittie used in weed biocontroi to date, aithough some gali- forming varieties have

shown some promise (16). in generai, nematodes are more difficuit to diagnose and controi than arthropods or

fungi. However, iittie is known about nematodes attacking coca so that their use in biocontroi couid require

extensive research.

Viruses may offer the greatest potential because they cannot be controlled chemicaiiy, either before or after

infection. Those transmitted by effective insect vectors can spread rapidiy and are among the most viruient and

devastating disease problems for legitimate agricultural crops. However, there is a generai iack of biocontroi

workers trained in viroiogy and iittie has been done in this area of biocontroi. Further, currently very Iittie is known

about virai diseases of coca, or potentiai vectors.

SOURCE: D. Rosen, “Potential for Biological Control of Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,

November 1991.

● Search and identification of natural enemies, ErylhroxyZum occur in South America and else-

. Enhancement of candidate agents (if needed), where, 24 of them just in Peru, (14,36), and many

. Screening of candidate agents, of the organisms attacking them may prove

. Production of candidate agents, and capable of infesting or infecting coca. Other

. Application. potential agents might be identified through field

surveys reviewing pests and diseases associated

SEARCH AND IDENTIFICATION

with wild and cultivated coca.

Desired characteristics for candidate bioconThe frost step in a biocontrol program for coca trol agents include:

entails international, interdisciplinary research to

ident~ natural coca enemies (box 6-B). Existing ●

literature reveals 44 arthropods, 24 fungi, one

nematode, and one virus recorded from Erythroxylum coca alone (tables 6-3 and 6-4). Numerous

others have been recorded from other Erythrox- ●

ylum species, including some polyphagous (nonhostspecific) and notorious agricultural pests. However, most known natural enemies have been ●

recorded from cultivated coca. No intensive study

of the natural enemies of wild E. coca, E.

novogranatensey and related species has been ●

conducted (20). Approximately 250 species of

Density-dependence-The population density of the natural enemy increases or decreases with the population density of the

target species.

Host spec~icity---Agents should be highly

adapted to the target species and unable to

affect nontarget species adversely.

Searching abiZi~—Mobile agents should

have great capability of finding the target

species.

Reproductive capacity-Agents should be

capable of high levels of reproduction to
6—Coca Biological Control Issues 1193

Table 6-3—insects and Mites Associated With Erythroxylum coca

Order Family Species Activity Known range

Acarina Tetranychidae

Coleoptera Curculionidae

Scolytidae

Diptera Trypetidae

Heteroptera Pentatomidae

Homoptera Asterolecaniidae

Coccidae

Diaspididae

Kermesidae

Pseudococcidae

Hymenopteran Formicidae

Megachilidae

Tefranychus sp.

Conotrachelus sp.

Mecostylus vittaticollis

Pantomorus bondari

Stephanoderes hampei

Xyleborus coffeae

Xyleborus morstatti

Trirhithrum nigerrimum

Rhynchocoris piagiatus

Asterolecanium pustulans

Coccus elongatus

Coccus hesperidum

Lecanium sp.

Saissetia coffeae

Tachardia gemmifera

Tachardia Iacca

Tachardia silvestrii

Aspidiotus sp.

Howardia biclavis

Lepidosaphes sp.

Quadraspidiotus sp.

Selenaspidus articulates

Kermes sp.

Pseudococcus sp.

Acromyrmex hispidus

Atta sexdens

Atta sp.

Megachile opposita

Spider mites attack leaves

and twigs.

In seeds of fruits.

Beetles feed on leaves and

larvae develop as

borers.

Beetles feed on leaves.

Beetles bore fruits for

shelter.

Beetles and larvae tunnel in

bark.

Twig borer.

Larvae infest fruits.

Bugs suck plant sap.

Scale insects suck from

leaves and twigs. This is

the pit scale-a

polyphagous pest of

deciduous fruit trees

and ornamental.

Polyphagous scale insect.

Scale insects suck sap from

leaves and tender tips.

This is the soft brown

scale-a polyphagous

pest of fruit trees and

ornamental.

Scale insect feeds on twigs.

This is the

hemispherical scalea pest of citrus and

coffee.

Scale insect feeds on twigs.

Polyphagous.

This is the rufous scalea major pest of citrus.

Mealy bugs feed on

growing tips, twigs, and

roots.

Leaf-cutting ants damage

young plants.

Leaf-cutting

polyphagous ants.

Leaf-cutting ants.

Leaf-cutting bees.

Peru, Bolivia

Cuba, Trinidad

East Africa

Brazil

Indonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia, Malaysia

Ghana

India, Sri Lanka

Brazil, Cuba

Taiwan

Brazil, Peru, Bolivia

Peru

Peru, Bolivia

Peru

Guiana

India

Peru, Bolivia

Sri Lanka

Peru

Peru

Cuba

Peru

Peru, Bolivia

Peru

Peru, Venezuela

Peru

Indonesia, Malaysia

(continued on next page)
194 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Table 6-3-Continued

Order Family Species Activity Known range

Lepidoptera Arctiidae

Cossidae

Geometridae

Limacodidae

Lymantriidae

Noctuidae

Nymphalidae

Sphingidae

Tineidae

Thysanoptera Thripidae

Rhodogastria atrivena

Rhodogastria bubo

Zuezera coffeae

Boarmia spp.

Hyposidra talaca

Phobetron hipparchia

Eloria noyesi

Eloria sp.

Spodoptera litura

Morpho catenarius

Protambulyx strigilis

Eucleodora cocae

Linoclostis gonatius

Setomorpha rutella

Neosmerinthrothrips xylebori

Selenothrips rubrocinctus

Caterpillars tunnel in twigs

and stems and feed on

leaves,

Caterpillars attack twigs.

Caterpillars feed on leaves.

Caterpillars feed on leaves,

stalks, and tender tips.

Caterpillars feed on leaves

and twigs,

Caterpillars feed on leaves.

Also a pest of Cannabis

and Papaver.

Caterpillars feed on leaves.

Caterpillars feed on leaves.

Caterpillars feed on leaves

and tender tips.

Caterpillars bore in bark.

Caterpillars feed on leaves

and tunnel in dry leaves.

Thrips found in tunnels of

Xyleborus coffeae.

Thrips attack leaves.

Uganda

Uganda

India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia,

Indonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia

Venezuela

Peru

Bolivia

Malaysia, Indonesia

Brazil

Venezuela

Peru

Taiwan

Malaysia, Indonesia

Indonesia

Venezuela, Brazil

SOURCE: D. Rosen, “Potential for Biological Control of Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

●

A

assure sufficient populations to achieve the

desired goal.

Adaptability--Agents should be highly adaptable to the broad range of environmental

conditions in which the target species may

grow (20).

comprehensive field survey team would

require at a minimum, biocontrol experts, botanists, entomologists, and plant pathologists. A

smaller search team might be required to collect

samples from the field and bring them back to a

secure site for comprehensive examination. Field

surveys for potential control agents should include observations on their role in controlling the

abundance and reproduction of coca, and on their

life history (e.g., reproduction, fecundity, dispersal, overwintering, epidemiology, mode of attack,

target plant parts, direct and indirect damage

inflicted, and existence of distinct biotypes) (4,7).

Search efforts should cover at least one season’s

activity of the plant and as much of its distributional range as possible to note variations in

predator/prey relationships and plant vulnerability at different life stages.

Throughout the search and collection of natural

enemies, sound biosystematics—the identification and classification of species and the reconstruction of their evolutionary history-proves

essential. When live natural enemies of a plant are

being sought, or are transferred from one region

to another, correct identification of the plant host

and the natural enemies and recognition of

infraspecific entities may be of utmost importance. Biosystematic study may show a potential

biocontrol agent rejected for its seemingly broad

host range, is a combination of sibling species,

each with a narrow host range and one of which

may be an appropriate biocontrol candidate.

Many serious failures of biocontrol agents have

resulted from inadequate biosystematics (7).
6—Coca Biological Control Issues I 195

Table 6-4—Pathogens Recorded From Erythroxylum coca

Order Species Activity Known range

Fungi Armillanella mellea

Aschersonia turbinata

Aspergillus cinereus

Bubakia erthroxylonis

Cercosporella cocae

Clavulina Ieveillei

Colletotrichum cocae

Corticium invisum

Corticium pervagum

Corticium samonicolor

Fomes noxius

Fusarium Spa

Gloesporium sp.

Hypochnus erythroxyloni

Hypochnus rubrocinctus

Hypocrella palmae

Mycena citricolor

Mycosphaerella erythroxyloni

Pellicularia sasakii

Phyllosticta erythroxylonis

Protomyces cocae

Ravenelula boliviensis

Verticillium sp.

Xylaria apiculata

Nematoda Pratylenchus branchyurus

Viruses Witches’ broom

Broad spectrum; causes damage to peanuts

and sweet potatoes.

Entomopathogenic.

Occurs on poorly dried leaves.

Rust, causing yellowing of leaves premature

defoliation, not a serious threat; also on

other Erythroxylum spp.

Occurs on roots, probably not pathogenic.

Causes black rot, also affects tea.

Thread-blight, kills leaves and twigs.

Causes pink disease on branches, twigs and

leaves; attacks many tropical plants

including rubber.

Ubiquitous in tropics on many hosts; causes

brown root rot.

Soil borne disease.

Attacks seedlings, losses of nearly 50 percent.

Attacks basal parts of young seedlings.

Now considered a lichen.

Entomopathogenic.

Broad spectrum; particularly damages coffee

in South America and West Africa.

Causes banded sclerotial disease on leaves.

Occurs on dead wood.

Black root disease, infecting roots, stem bases;

may cause plant death; also found on

potatoes and other hosts.

Occurs in roots.

Apparently a virus transmitted by an aphid.

South America

Bolivia

Argentina

Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia,

Peru, Ecuador, Panama,

Costa Rica; possibly Brazil,

Venezuela, Cuba, Puerto

Rico

Argentina

Indonesia

Argentina

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka, South America,

Indonesia

Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Taiwan

Peru

South America, Indonesia

Taiwan

Venezuela

Peru

Peru, USSR

Argentina

Japan, India, Indonesia,

Phil ippinesr Taiwan

Peru, Bolivia, Colombia

Argentina

Bolivia

Peru

Brazil, Dominican Republic,

Puerto Rico, China, Sri Lanka,

Indonesia, Zimbabwe

Ivory Coast

Bolivia

a Fusarium oxysporum has been spreading in the Huallaga Valley, Although reports vary, between 10,000 and 15,000 hectares are reported tO

have been affected by the fungus (22).

SOURCE: D. Rosen, “Potential for Biological Control of Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

ENHANCEMENT OF CANDIDATE AGENTS

Enhancement of a natural enemy can improve

its ability to provide the desired control safely and

effectively. Conventional selection techniques

can be used to develop a large, uniform population displaying a desired trait. Alternatively,

genetic manipulation could be used to enhance a

desired trait of a natural enemy. Currently,

conventional selection and mass rearing offer the

greatest possibilities for enhancing the capabilities of a natural enemy.

Arthropods are amenable to enhancement

through conventional selection. Many adaptive

races exist and there usually is considerable

genetic variation in natural populations. Selective

breeding has been used to increase tolerance for
196 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in

climatic extremes, alter host preferences, and

increase pesticide resistance (11,12). Release and

establishment of such a strain, however, could be

considered equivalent to importing an exotic

species (20). Pesticide resistance may be a desired

trait since producers are likely to use chemicals to

control pest infestations. For example, many coca

producers already use insecticides to control such

pests as Eloria noyesi.

Genetic variability is a primary concern to

ensure agent vitality. Stock cultures would need

to be established from abundant material collected at numerous and varied localities to maximize genetic variation. If natural variability is

insufficient, it could be enhanced by irradiation or

mutagenic chemicals, although mutagenesis can

cause random, often deleterious, mutations and

may require large numbers of organisms to be

screened. Following the selection program, the

improved strain should be tested to determine its

ability to survive, as well as the genetic mechanism governing the selected trait (20).

An alternative to this more conventional,

non-invasive method of enhancement of natural

enemies would be to use genetic engineering

technologies used to isolate genes from an

organism, manipulate them in the laboratory, and

insert them stably into another organism. In this

way it may be possible to introduce a desired trait

(e.g., pesticide resistance) into a natural enemy of

coca. Although the technology in this area of

biocontrol is not yet well-developed, significant

advances have been made in recent years and

possibilities for improvement exist (27).

Eventually, genetic engineering through recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques maybe more

efficient than conventional selection. Someday,

desirable genes may be obtained from a given

species, cloned, and inserted into another species.

Some work has been done in this area, particularly

with fruit flies. However, developments in fruit

fly research have not been duplicated with other

insects. With micro-injection techniques for inserting hybrid genes into insect eggs for germ-line

transformation, it is believed methodology for

the Andean Region

genetic engineering of arthropods will be available within 5 or 10 years (35). However, conventional selection and genetic engineering are currently more feasible with plant pathogens than

with arthropod biocontrol agents.

The debate over whether or not genetic engineering should be considered for a biocontrol

program focuses largely on development time.

Detractors suggest the complexity of genetic

engineering would add to research and development time and reduce the potential for near-term

production of a biocontrol agent (27).

SCREENING

Screening of candidate agents is a critical

development step in a biocontrol program to

determine whether a candidate can be released

without the danger that it may also damage

nontarget organisms. The procedure follows several steps, beginning with collection of information about the target plant and associated phytophagous and pathogenic organisms and their

respective host spectra (i.e., if any of them are

already known as pests of desirable plants).

Information also is collected on host records of

organisms closely related to the potential candidate. Only organisms likely to be host specific are

selected for screening tests, beginning with those

causing the greatest damage and possessing

special adaptations likely to restrict host preference (20).

It is likely to be impossible to screen candidate

species on all plants in coca production areas. At

a minimum, potential targets chosen for the

screening process would include:

●

●

●

●

●

Recorded hosts of the candidate agent,

Host plants of species closely related to the

candidate agent,

Desirable plants related to the target plant,

Nonrelated plants having morphological or

biochemical characteristics in common with

the target plant, and

Crop and ornamental plants in the target area

whose pests and diseases have not been
6-Coca Biological Control Issues I 197

identified and have not been exposed to the

candidate biocontrol agent.

The common sequence is first to test the agent

on other forms of the target species, other species

of the same genus, and other members of the same

subfamily, family, and order. However, laboratory tests alone are insufficient, for a broader

range of plants may be accepted by the agent in

the laboratory than in nature. Field tests are

needed to corroborate laboratory data, preferably

in the countries of origin (20).

Once an organism is screened and determined

to be sufficiently host specific to be used as a

biocontrol agent, it may be imported and checked

for contaminants under strict quarantine. Prior to

release, an agent normally is tested in the target

area since climatic and ecological variations

among areas make extrapolation of test results

across target sites inappropriate.

Genetically engineered organisms also must go

through an extensive screening process. Researchers and regulators have established five

criteria for evaluating the potential environmental

impact of a genetically engineered organism:

1.

2.

3.

Potential for negative effects-if it is known

that a recombinant organism will have no

negative effects, there is no cause for

concern. But predicting ecological effects,

their probability, and assessing whether

they are negative or positive is not straightforward.

Survival--If a genetically engineered organism does not survive, it is unlikely to have

any ecological impact. It is also unlikely to

fulfill the purpose for which it was engineered (unless brief survival is all that is

required).

Reproduction-Some applications require

not only the recombinant organism’s survival but also its reproduction and maintenance. Increasing numbers could, in some

settings, increase the possibility of unforeseen consequences.

4.

5.

Transfer of genetic information-Even if

the engineered organism itself dies out, its

environmental effects could continue if the

crucial genetic material was favored by

selection, and transferred to and functioned

in a native species.

Transportation or dissemination of the engineered organism—A recombinant organism that moves into nontarget environments in sufficient numbers could interact

in unforeseen ways with other populations

or members of other communities (30).

PRODUCTION AND STORAGE

Stability, shelf life, and potential for mass

production are key issues in developing a biocontrol agent. Agents often must be reared in a

laboratory or controlled environment. Quality

control is extremely important since inbreeding

can have negative effects, causing future generations to lose vigor and efficacy. Cultures must be

supplemented periodically with material collected from the field (19). Rearing methodologies

for genetically enhanced agents would vary

according to the nature of the agents. Artificial

media are available for many pathogens and

various arthropods, however, it may be better to

rear them on the target plant to reduce the

potential for undesirable adaptations.

Full exploitation of pathogenic agents is likely

to require careful attention to formulation. Temperature, moisture, and growth media requirements are critical for producing and storing live

agents. Formulation techniques can overcome

some of the stresses associated with storage and

application. For example, a well-proportioned

adjuvant or surfactant may overcome certain

environmental stresses, such as reduced moisture

availability, to assist the activity of the agent (3).

APPLICATION

The approach (classical, augmentative, conservative) and the agent selected determine the range

of suitable application technologies. Both factors
198 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

will affect the timing and frequency of application. For example, under an augmentative approach application would be more frequent than

under a classical or conservative approach. The

biological activity of the selected agent may

require that application occur during specific

seasons. For example, some fungi depend on

moisture availability to disperse effectively; thus,

application during wet seasons could be a requirement (3). Other potential application concerns

include photoperiod and dew period length,

temperature, and inoculum concentration.

In general, the same application methods used

for herbicides can be used to apply biocontrol

agents (e.g., spray, broadcast) as well as release of

mobile agents at the target. Thus, the constraints

that apply to herbicide application also apply to

biocontrol application (e.g., difficulty in precision using aerial application techniques). The

formulation of the biocontrol agent (e.g., liquid,

pellets, live insects) will determine the type of

equipment suitable for application. Pathogens

may lend themselves to liquid formulations and

be easily applied using existing spray technology.

For example, a mycoherbicide inoculum can be

applied so every plant is deliberately inoculated

(25). However, for a mycoherbicide to be effective, problems involving production of spores,

efficacy, specificity, genetic variability, and timing of applications would have to be solved

(5,24,25). Pelletized forms may be broadcast

from aerial or ground-based systems.

Potential exists for developing biocontrol complexes using a number of discrete bioforms to

accomplish search and attack of a target pest. For

example, mobile vectors could be inoculated with

a virus that would be introduced into the target as

the mobile vector feeds. The mobile part of the

complex would be selected for its searching

ability, whereas the additional agent would be

selected for its virulence. This technology is not

yet well-developed but it could provide an option

to simplify application. Another possibility may

be combining chemical herbicides and biocontrol

agents.

CONTAINMENT

Ability to contain or restrict movement of

biocontrol agents once released poses a significant problem, yet would be key in addressing

concerns about release of biocontrol agents. If the

release of a biocontrol agent had unanticipated

negative environmental, health, or economic

impacts, containment could reduce the level of

impact. However, only a few methods for eliminating a released agent have been identified,

including applying pesticides, releasing a natural

predator of the agent, and employing genetic

controls (e.g., “suicide genes, ” sterile male

release). A lethal pathogen of at least 40 weeds,

Sclerotinia sclerotiorum, has been manipulated

by deletion mutagenesis to have an absolute

requirement for cytosine to activate its pathogenic

traits. Thus, containment can be achieved by

witholding the activating compound. In another

instance, a pathogen was mutated to create a

lifeform incapable of overwintering or producing

dispersal structures. Thus, the initial population

would die off with cold weather or old age (26).

There are concerns that some containment

mechanisms could compound environmental or

human health problems. Applying pesticides to

destroy a biocontrol agent could have adverse

environmental impacts such as affecting nontarget species and contaminating groundwater

and surface waters. Releasing another enemy to

control the coca agent also could have various

unforeseen environmental consequences. Employing genetic controls would also raise concerns about the release of a genetically manipulated organism in the Andean region.

A containment mechanism, however, could be

a valuable facet of a biocontrol program and could

be an important research component for coca

control. Identifying a natural enemy of coca could

include research on ‘‘suicide genes, ’ susceptibility to pesticides, and identification of natural

predators. Demonstrated ability to contain a

control agent of coca could help achieve host

country consent.
6—Coca Biological Control Issues I 199

DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FOR

BIOCONTROL OF COCA

A biocontrol program will face many obstacles,

the most obvious being sociopolitical and economic constraints. The bulk of experience with

biocontrol efforts has been in the realm of

controlling unwanted pests. Coca is not a weed—

it is a valuable crop and a source of income. Thus,

coca biocontrol programs are likely to meet

resistance from participants in the cocaine economy. Furthermore, biocontrol of coca hinges on

cooperation and coordination with host governments. Implementing a biocontrol program for

domestic marijuana production in the United

States could demonstrate U.S. confidence in this

technology as an eradication method (27). Such

an effort might increase acceptance in potential

host countries as well as highlight unforeseen

pitfalls that might be associated with this technology.

Technologically, biocontrol of coca faces several constraints as well. Several key research and

development priorities are identified in box 6-C.

Whereas there are several possibilities for enhancing an existing enemy (box 6-D), the most

sophisticated type of enhancement—genetic engineering-is not likely to be feasible for nearly

5 years. Moreover, there is no way to determine

the efficacy of any given control agent until it is

actually released into the target area. Levels of

control can only be estimated and there are no

guarantees (20).

The environmental concerns over biocontrol

focus on the potential for effects on nontarget

species and the likelihood of increased use of

pesticides by coca producers. Additional concerns relate to the lack of knowledge of the role of

coca in the Andean ecology and the potential for

adverse effects resulting from its removal. Incomplete knowledge of Andean ecology further

means that comprehensive screening and hostspecificity testing of potential agents are likely to

be difficult.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Eradicating coca across its current range in the

Andean region is most likely an unrealistic goal

given the enormity of the task and the variety of

barriers. The difficult environments of the cocagrowing regions compound the technological

constraints to eradication. Further, the overarching sociopolitical and economic features of the

producing countries suggest that even if some

success is achieved through eradication efforts,

production would likely shift to other areas.

Nevertheless, control efforts could play a role in

overall narcotics reduction by increasing incentives to adopt alternative livelihoods (27,28).

Without clear risks connected to coca production,

little incentive exists for farmers to adopt alternative crops or enter into other livelihoods (27).

Effective production control programs, particularly biocontrol, could increase the hardships

associated with coca cultivation. However, for

such activities to achieve the desired effect (i.e.,

decrease supply) viable, acceptable alternatives

should be available.

Criteria for evaluating the suitability of different coca reduction opportunities include efficacy,

minimal potential environmental and human

health impacts, and current and easily demonstrated technological feasibility. At the moment,

no single eradication method satisfies all of these

criteria. Whereas a biocontrol approach may offer

the least environmentally damaging and longestterm means of coca reduction, reduction levels are

difficult to determine. Experiments measuring

predation levels on targets in the laboratory are

insufficient to extrapolate agent behavior once

released (i.e., a 40-percent efficiency in the

laboratory does not necessarily translate into

40-percent efficiency in the wild). Thus, biocontrol cannot guarantee specific reduction results

(27). As long as coca remains a profitable crop

and conditions promoting entrance into legitimate livelihoods are lacking, it is likely that

producers will increase pesticide use to protect

their investment.
200 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Box 6-C-Priorities for Biocontrol Development

Developing a biocxmtrol agent or complex against coca species in the Andean region would require attention

to a variety of unknowns. The following list summarizes priority areas identified by a panel of experts contributing

to this Office of Technology Assessment study.

1. International, interdisciplinary search to identify natural enemies ofcoca-Wide-scale search for

coca predators on cultivated and wild coca that may have potential as biocontrol agents.

2. National and international recognition of cocaine asa probletiampaignt oincrease awareness

of the adverse effects of cocaine on sodety to increase support for efforts to control cocaine production.

3. Host specificity screening-Rigorous screening tests of candidate species on coca and associated

plants prior to field tests to determine the specificity of the agent and reduce risk.

4. Human and ecological health riskassessment-Environmental assessment of the potential adverse

impacts of a biocontrol program in the Andean region.

5. Genetics, ecology, and biology oftargetpiantand relative%Detailed information oncocaspecies,

reiated species, and plants associated w’th coca to augment screening and search efforts.

6. Efficacy screening ofcandidate specie-creenirtg programs todeterminethelevel ofpredationof

candidate agents on coca and associated plants.

7. Production technologies and quality control—Techniques to produce candidate agent and ensure

quality/conformity suitable to fulfill the goal of a biocontrol program.

8. Education on biocontroi--Educationonthemethodology, development regimes, andsafetymeasures

to contribute to building pubtic support for biocontrol.

9. Field triais-Carefully controlled field experiments to determine the activity of potential agents in the

natural environment and identify potential areas of concern.

10. Environmental damage of coca productionlprocessing-information on the Ievelof environmental

damage from coca production and processing activities to be used as a comparative for assessing the

value of a biocontrol effort.

11. Socioeconomic model--Model to assist in determining potential socioeconomic outcome of potential

policy actions and identify needs to mitigate adverse impacts.

12. Application technology—Technologies to apply a selected biocontrol agent in a safe and efficient

manner.

13. Identification of potential countermeasures-identification of actions that may be undertaken by

grouptindividuals against biocontrol efforts and development of mechanisms to thwart such efforts.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology &seesment, “Biological Control Wrkshop,” Washington, DC, January 23,1992.

The United Nations International Drug Control in all phases (22). The U.S. Department of State

Prograrnm e (UNDCP) investigations into potential narcotic crop control opportunities highlight

host country involvement and agreement. Biocontrol was identiiled as an opportunity for

narcotic crop control in the late 1970s by the

UNDCP, but little research was conducted beyond the initial scoping phase. The UNDCP is

now conducting meetings with experts to determine biocontrol’s potential. Any actions that

might result from these activities will be conditional on host-country agreement and cooperation

notes similar agreements would be sought for

U.S. bilateral eradication activities in the Andean

region, but little likelihood exists for obtaining

them now (27).

The potential for successful biocontrol application in the Andean countries are affected by three

factors:

1. Cooperation and coordination-Cooperation among potential host and donor countries to develop and implement a biocontrol
6—Coca Biological Control Issues 1201

Box 6-D-Examples of Natural Enemies of Coca

One species particularly specific to coca and indigenous to Peru, Eloria noyesi Schaus (kpidoptera:Lymantriidae), could be a possibility y for biocontrol research. The larva of the moth feeds on coca leaves and

is a principal natural pest of coca. With a short Iifecycle (30 days) and repeated breeding throughout the year, larval

populations can be sustained relatively easily. Eloria noyesi was reported to’’swarm” anddestroyalmost 20,000

hectares of coca in Peru, causing losses to drug traffickers estimated to be at least $37 million. Another species

from Peru, Eucleodora cocae Busck (Lepidoptera: Tineidae), could be a possible candidate for biocontrol

research as well (20). Both species meet many of the listed criteria although further screening would be necessary.

More recentiy, outbreaks of Fusarium oxysporum in Peru have increased awareness of the potential impact

fungi can have on coca production. Under normal conditions fungi and lichen infestations of healthy coca shrubs

are key factors in limiting the plant’s productive life (8). The Fusarium fungus has contributed to widespread

destruction of coca plantations near Santa Rosa in the Alto Huallaga (2). Peruvian farmers in the region have

complained that the fungus and the blight it produces have affected legal crops as well as coca (21).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

program effectively is a key need for

success. primary needs include multilateral

agreements to undertake eradication programs and broad-based public participation

in the program assessment process. Experience with herbicide testing in Peru suggests

greater government and public participation

will be necessary (31). Incorporating public

rev iew and comment periods, broad dissemination of environmental impact reviews

and methodologies, and coordinated and

cooperative efforts with national groups

will be critical.

2. Information —Information on the potential

benefits and costs of a biocontrol program

for the Andean countries is needed. Areas

needing investigation include the effects of

coca production and processing on the

Andean environment and the subsequent

effects on future development options, mechanisms to improve environmental assessments of potential impacts of biocontrol

efforts, and the role of coca in Andean

ecology.

3. Technological feasibility—Although biocontrol methodologies exist, technological

constraints to rapid implementation are

overwhelming (21). If a biocontrol program

is determined to be feasible, an extensive

research and development period could be

required. Further, ability to conduct needed

field experiments is hindered by lack of

political agreements, and the technology

does not afford the certainty of a spectilc

reduction level (i.e., in many ways biocontrol may be considered “applied experimentation’ ‘).

Absent the political realities hindering any

coca eradication effort, the current state of biocontrol development does not seem to offer a

timely mechanism for reducing coca production

in the Andean nations. Although opportunities

exist to develop biocontrol, existing information,

cooperation, and coordination needs will continue to have a profound effect on the possibilities

for success.

CHAPTER 6 REFERENCES

1,

2.

3.

Adamczyk, T, “Chemical Eradication of Coca, ’

Contractor report prepared for the Office of

Technology Assessment, December 1991.

Arroyo, A., and Medrano, O., “Hua.llaga in

Flames,” CARETAS, Aug. 13, 1992, pp. 30-37,

in: Joint Publication Research Service, “Peasant

Army Expels Shining Path in Huallaga,” JPRSTOT-92-029-L, Aug. 28, 1992, p.lo.

Bannon, J. S., “CASST Herbicide (Altemaria

cassiae): A Case History of a Mycoherbicide, ’
202 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

American Journal of Alternative Agriculture

3(2&3):73-75.

4. CAB International, Screening Organisms for Biologicai Control of Weeds, CAB International

Institute of Biological Control, Silwood Park,

Ascot, UK, 1986, In: Rosen, 1991.

5. Charudattan, R., “The Mycoherbicide Approach

With Plant Pathogens, “ in Microbial Control of

Weeds, D.O. TeBeest (cd.) 1991, In: Rosen, 1991.

6. Christensen, E., “TheEnvimnmentallmpactA nalysis Process and Coca Eradication programs,’

Contractor report prepared for the Office of

Technology Assessment, August 1991.

7. DeBach, P., and Rosen, D,, Biological Control by

Natural Enemies, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) In: Rosen, 1991.

8. Duke, J. A., Botanist, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Beltsville

Agricultural Research Center, Beltsville, MD,

personal communication, August 1989.

9. Executive Order 12114, “Environmental Effects

Abroad of Major Federal Actions,” vol. 44

Federal Register 1957, Jan. 4, 1979, In: Christenson, 1991.

10. Genter, W., U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Agricultural Research Service, retired, personal

communication, August 1992.

11. Hey, M.A., “Use of Genetic Improvement in

Biological Control,” Agricultural Ecosystems

and Environment 15: 109-119, 1986, In: Rosen,

1991.

12. Hey, M. A., ‘‘Genetic Improvement of Arthropod

Natural Enemies: Becoming a Conventional Tactic?” in New Directions in Biological Control:

Alternatives for Suppressing Agricultural Pests

and Diseases, R.R. Baker and P.E. Dunn (eds.)

(New York: Alan R. Liss, 1990), pp. 405-417, In:

Rosen, 1991.

13. Krebs, C.J., Ecology: The Experimental Analysis

of Distribution and Abundance, (New York, NY:

Harper & Row, 1972).

14. Machado Gazorla, E., “El Genero Erythroxylon

en el Peru. Las Cocas Silvestres y Cultivadas del

Pais,’ ‘ Raymondiana 5:5-101, 1972, In: Rosen,

1991.

15. Mardon, M., “The Big Push,” Sierra, November/

December 1988, p. 75.

16. Parker, P, E., “Nematodes as Biological Control

Agents of Weeds,” In: Microbial Control of

Weeds, D.O. TeBeest (cd.) (New York, NY:

Chapman and Hall, 1991) pp. 58-68, In: Rosen,

1991.

17. Perkins, J. H., Insects, Experts, and the Insecticide

Crisis (New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1982).

18. Plowman, T, “Coca Chewing and the Botanical

Origins of Coca (Erythroxyhm ssp,) in South

America,” D. Pacini and C. Franquemont (eds.),

Coca and Cocaine: Effects on People and Policy

in Latin America, Cultural Survival Report #23

(Peterborough, NH: Transcript Printing Company, 1986), pp. 5-33.

19. Rosen, D,, Vivigani Professor of Agricuhure, The

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot, Israel,

personal communication, February 1992.

20. Rosen, D., “Potential for Biological Control of

Coca,” Contractor report prepared for the OffIce

of Technology Assessment, November 1991.

21. Rosenquist, E., U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Agricultural Research Service, Beltsville, MD,

personal communication, 1991.

22. Stevenson, S., “Peru Farmers Blame U.S. for

Coca-Killing Fungus,” Miami Herald, June 2,

1992, p.A-19.

23. Szendri, K., Director, United Nations Drug Control Programrn e, Vienna, Austria, personal communication, September 1992.

24. TeBeest, D, O., “Conflicts and Strategies for

Future Development of Mycoherbicides,’ in New

Directions in Biological Control: Alternatives for

Suppressing Agricultural Pests and Diseases,

R.R. Baker and P.E. Dunn (eds.) (New York: Alan

R. Liss, 1990), pp. 323-332, In: Rosen, 1991.

25, Templeton, G.E., and Heiny, D,K,, “Mycoherbicides, “ in New Directions in Biological Control:

Alternatives for Suppressing Agricultural Pests

and Diseases, R.R. Baker and P.E. Dunn (eds.)

(New York: Alan R. Liss, 1990), pp. 279-286, In:

Rosen, 1991.

26. United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,

Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Environmentally Safe Methods for the Eradication of

Illicit Narcotic Plants, meeting held in Vienna

December 4-8, 1989, E/CN.7/1990/CRP.7, Dec.

14, 1989.
6-Coca Biological Control Issues I 203

27. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

“Biological Control Workshop,” held in Washington, DC, Jan. 23, 1992.

28. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

“Crop Substitution Workshop,” held in Washington, DC, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1991.

29. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Beneath the Bottom Line: Agricultural Approaches

To Reduce Agrichemical Contamination of Groundwater, OTA-F-418 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1990).

30. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

New Developments in Biotechnology: FieldTesting Engineered Organism&enetic and Ecological Issues, OTA-BA-350 (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp.

16-17.

31. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee

on Investigations, Cocaine Production, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, And

Options, prepared by Congressional Research

Service, IOlst Congress, 2d session, 1990, S. Print

101-110.

32. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural

Research Service, Weed Science Laboratory,

“Coca Herbicide Screening Summary, ’

Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, 1992.

33. U.S. Department of State, Department of State

Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No, 807A, subpart B(2)(c), Sept. 4, 1979, reprinted Federal

Register vol. 44, p. 67004 (Nov. 21, 1979) In:

Christenson, 1991.

34. Weeks, J., “Control of Coca With Herbicides in

Peru” in U.S. Congress, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Cocaine Production, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy,

Impact, And Options, prepared by Congressional

Research Service, IOlst Congress, 2d session,

1990, s. Print 101-110.

35. Whitten, M. J., Commonwealth Science and Information Research Organization, Canberra, Australia, personal communication, 1991 In: Rosen,

1991.

36. Willis, J. C., A Dictionary of Flowering Plants and

Ferns, 7th Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) In: Rosen, 1991.
Appendix A:

Workshop

Participants

9 Crop Substitution Workshop

September 30 and October 1,1991

Elena Alvarez

University Center for Policy

Research

State University of New York

Albany, NY

James Anderson

Weed Science

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Beltsville, MD

Ray Ashton

Water & Air Research, Inc.

Gainesville, FL

Bruce Bagley

University of Miami

Graduate School of International

Studies

Coral Gables, FL

Antonio Chavez

Independent Consultant

Lima, Peru

Howard Clark

U.S. Agency for International

Development

Quito, Ecuador

Lee Darlington

Weed Science

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Beltsville, MD

James A. Duke

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Beltsville, MD

Victoria Greenfield

Natural Resources and Commerce

Division

Congressional Budget Office

Washington, DC

Kevin Healy

InterAmerican Foundation

Rosslyn, VA

Ray Henkel

Department of Geography

Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ

Michael Painter

Institute for Development

Anthropology

Binghamton, NY

Raphael Perl

Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress

Washington, DC

Douglas J. Pool

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Bethesda, MD

Eric Rosenquist

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Beltsville, MD

Robert Schroeder

RDA International

Placerville, CA

Sean Swezey

Agroecology Program

University of California--Santa Cruz

Santa Cruz, CA

Joseph Tosi

Centro Científico Tropical

San Jose, Costa Rica

Hugo Villachica

Independent Consultant

Lima, Peru

Ken Weiss

Chemonics, Inc.

Washington, DC

205
206 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

B Biological Control of Coca Workshop

January 23, 1992

Tom Adamczyk

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

Office of Pesticide Programs

Herbicide-Fungicide Branch

Washington, DC

Joseph Antognini

Weed Science

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Beltsville, MD

Dominic Cataldo

Battelle

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Richland, WA

Larry Christy

Bioherbicide Research

Crop Genetics, Inc.

Columbia, MD

Lee Darlington

Weed Science

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Beltsville, MD

Walt Gentner (retired)

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Agricultural Research Service

Adelphi, MD

Clifford Gerwick

Biological and Biochemical

Research

DowElanco

Greenfield, IN

George Heim

Geodot Associates

Virginia Beach, VA

Dennis Linskey

U.S. Department of State

Bureau of International Narcotics

Matters

Washington, DC

Luis Moreno

U.S. Department of State

Bureau of International Narcotics

Matters

Washington, DC

Peggy Olwell

Center for Plant Conservation

St. Louis, MO

Paul Parker

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Mission Biological Control

Laboratory

Mission, TX

Robert Rose

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

Office of Pesticide Programs

Washington, DC

David Rosen

Faculty of Agriculture

The Hebrew University of

Jerusalem

Rehovot, Israel

Peter Van Voris

Battelle

Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Richland, WA

James L. Walker

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Washington, DC
Appendix B:

List of

ADCZP

AID

AMS

ANAPO

APHIS

ARS

ATI

ATPA

CIA

CIAT

CIFP

CIID

CIP

—Agricultural Development in the Coca

Zones Project

—Associated High Valleys, Asociación

de Vanes Altos

—U.S. Agency for International

Development

—Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S.

Department of Agriculture

—Associate of Wheat and Oil Producers

(Asociación de Productores de

Oleaginosas y Trigo)

—Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service, U.S. Department of

Agriculture

—Agricultural Research Service, U.S.

Department of Agriculture

—Andean Trade Initiative

—Andean Trade Preference Act

—Central Intelligence Agency

—Tropical Agriculture Research Center

(Centro de Investigación Agrícola

Tropical)

—Pairumani Plant Genetics Research

Center (Centro de lnvestigaciones

Fitogeneticas de Pairumani)

—International Research Center for

Development (Centro lnternacional

de lnvestigaciones para el

Desarrollo)

—International Potato Center (Centro

International de la Papa)

CNE

CNIEA

CORAH

CORDECO

CORDEP

COTESU

CRDP

DAS

DEA

DIRECO

DOD

Acronyms

—Colombia National Council of

Dangerous Drugs (Consejo Nacional

de Estupificantes)

—National Counsel on Agricultural

Research and Extension (Consejo

Nacional de Investigación y

Extensión Agropecuaria)

—Project for the Control and Reduction

of Coca Cultivation in the Alto

Huallaga (Proyecto de Control y

Reducción de los Cultivos de Coca en

el Alto Huallaga)

—Development Corporation of

Cochabamba (Corporación de

Desarrollo de Cochabamba)

—Cochabamba Regional Development

Project

—Swiss Technical Cooperation

(Cooperación Técnica Suiza)

—Chapare Regional Development

Project

—Colombia Administrative Security

Department (Departamento

Administrative de Seguridad)

—Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.

Department of Justice

—Bolivian National Agricultural

Reconversion Board (Dirección

Nacional de Reconversión Agrícola)

—U.S. Department of Defense

207
208 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

EAI

EPA

FDA

FELCN

FSIS

GATT

GSP

IARC

IBTA

IBTN

ICA

IIAP

INIAA

INM

IVITA

MACA

NGO

OAS

ONDCP

—Enterprise for the Americas Initiative

—U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

—Food and Drug Administration, U.S.

Department of Health and Human

Services

—Bolivia Special Force in the Struggle

Against Drug Trafficking (Fuerza

Especial en la Lucha Contra el

Narcotráfico)

—Food Safety Inspection Service, U.S.

Department of Agriculture

—General Agreement on Trade and

Tariffs

—Generalized System of Preferences

—International Agricultural Research

Center

—Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and

Livestock Technology (lnstituto

Boliviano de Tecnología

Agropecuaria)

—Bolivian Institute of Science and

Nuclear Technology (Instituto

Boliviano de Ciencia y Tecnología

Nuclear)

—Colombian Agricultural Institute

(Instituto Colombian Agropecuaria)

—Peruvian Amazon Research Institute

(Instituto de Investigaciones de la

Amazonía Peruana)

—National Institute for Agrarian and

Agroindustry Research (lnstituto

Nacional de Investigación Agraria y

Agroindustrial)

—Bureau of International Narcotics

Matters, U.S. Department of State

—Veterinary Institute for Tropical and

Highland Research (Instituto

Veterinario de Investigaciones

Tropicales y de Altura)

—Bolivia Ministry of Campesino

Affairs and Agriculture (Ministerio

de Asuntos Campesinos y

Agricultural)

—Nongovernmental organization

—Organization of American States

—U.S. Office of National Drug Control

Policy

OPIC —Overseas Private Investment

Corporation

PDAR —Bolivia Regional Program for

Alternative Development (Programa

de Desarrollo Alternative Regional)

PEAH —Alto Huallaga Special Project

(Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga)

PRODES —Bolivia Development and

Substitution Project (Proyecto de

Desarrollo y Sustitución)

PROSEMPA —Potato Seed Project (Proyecto de

Semilla de Papa)

PVO —Private voluntary organization

REPAP —Peruvian Amazon Research Network

(Red de Investigación de la Amazonía

Peruana)

SINTAP —National System of Technical

Assistance for Small Producers

(Sistema Nacional de Transferencia

de Tecnología Agropecuaria)

SNC —Bolivia National Road Service

(Servicio Nacional de Caminos)

SUBDESAL —Bolivia Subsecretariat for Alternative

Development and Coca Substitution

(Subsecretaria de Desarrollo

Alternative y Sustitución de Cultivos

de Coca)

UMATAS —Municipal Units of Technical

Assistance (Unidad Municipal de

Asistencia Técnica Agropecuaria)

UMOPAR —Bolivia Mobile Rural Patrol Unit

(Unidad Móvil de Patrulla Rural) or

Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Peruvian

Civil Guard of Peru (Unidad Móvil de

Patrullaje Rural de la Guardia Civil

del Perú)

UNA —National Agrarian University

(Universidad Nacional Agraria)

UNDCP —United Nations International Drug

Control Programme

UNFDAC —United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse

Control

UNMSM —National University of San Marcos

Graduate School (Universidad

Nacional Mayor de San Marcos)

USDA —U.S. Department of Agriculture
Overviews

The Geoecology and Agroecosystems of the Northern

and Central Andes

Donald Alford

GeoResearch, Inc.

Billings, MT

Institutional Analysis of the Chapare Regional

Development Project (CRDP) and the Upper

Huallaga Special Project (PEAH)

Michael Painter

Eduardo Bedoya Garland

Institute for Development Anthropology

Binghamton, NY

Sociopolitical Setting

Opportunities and Constraints to Source Reduction of

Coca in Colombia: The Sociopolitical Context

Bruce M. Bagley

University of Miami

Graduate School of International Studies

Coral Gables, FL

The Bolivian Sociopolitical Context for

Rural Developrnent

Kevin Healy

InterAmerican Foundation

Ballston, VA

Appendix C:

List of

Contractor

Reports

Migration, Social Change, and the Coca/Cocaine

Economy in Bolivia

Ivo Kraljevic

Chemonics, Inc.

Washington, DC

Opportunities and Constraints to Source Reduction of

Coca: The Peruvian Sociopolitical Context

Cynthia McClintock

George Washington University

Washington, DC

Traditional Roles and Uses of Coca Leaf in Andean

Society

Mary-Elizabeth Reeve

University of Illinois-Urbana

Huntington, MD

Economic Setting

Opportunities and Constraints to Reduce Coca

Production: The Macro-Economic Context in

Bolivia and Peru

Elena Alvarez

State University of New York

Albany, NY

Colombia: Opportunities and Constraints to Source

Reduction of Coca and Cocaine

Francisco Thoumi

Independent Consultant

Arlington, VA

209
210 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca

Potential Use of Neotropical Wildlife in Sustainable

Development

Ray E. Ashton, Jr.

Water and Air Research, Inc.

Gainesville, FL

Diversification and Multiple Cropping as a Basis for

Agricultural Alternatives to Coca Production

Stephen Gliessman

University of California

Santa Cruz, CA

Biodiversity Conservation and Forest Management as

an Alternative to Coca Production in the Andean

Countries

Dennis McCaffrey

Independent Consultant

Gaithersburg, MD

Fishery/Aquatic Resources in Bolivia, Colombia, and

Peru: Production Systems and Potential as

Alternative Livelihoods

Robert Schroeder

RDA, International

Placerville, CA

Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru:

Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production

Hugo Villachica

Independent Consultant

Lima, Peru

Supporting Alternative Livelihoods

Agricultural Research, Extension, and Technology

Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms to

Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia,

Colombia, and Peru

Antonio Chavez

Independent Consultant

Lima, Peru

Infrastructural Needs to Support Agricultural

Alternatives to Coca Production

Juan DeVincenti

Architect/Planner

Bethesda, MD

Alternative Trade Organizations, Peasant Farmers,

and Coca

Rink Dickinson

Equal Exchange

Stoughton, MA

Postharvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural

Profitability in Bolivia and Andean Nations

Bill Stevenson

Development Alternatives, Inc.

Cochabamba, Bolivia

Primer on U.S. Agricultural and Trade Policies:

Opportunities and Constraints to Crop Substitution

in the Andean Nations

Elizabeth Turner

Coca Eradication and Control

Chemical Eradication of Coca

Thomas Adamczyk

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Washington, DC

The Environmental Impact Analysis Process and Coca

Eradication Programs

Eric Christensen

Consulting Attorney

Arlington, VA

Potential for Biological Control of Coca

David Rosen

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Rehovot, Israel
Index

Agrarian reform

Bolivia, 51

Colombia, 62

Peru, 6,56

Agriculture

Alternatives to coca. See Alternative crops

Andean agroecosystems. See Andean Cordillera,

agroecosystems

Coca. See Coca production

Cropping systems

Agroforestry. See Forest resources, agroforestry

Home gardens, 112-113

Multiple cropping, 110-112, 138. See also Forest

resources, agroforestry

Development. See Agricultural development

Research and extension. See Agricultural development,

research and extension

Technology transfer. See Agricultural development,

technology transfer

Agricultural development. See also Alternative crops; PEAH

Agricultural credit, 24,54, 139, 150, 163-164, 177, 179

Food quality and safety, 26-28, 149, 150, 171-172,

175-176, 179

Infrastructure and. See Infrastructure

Postharvest storage and handling, 24-25, 149, 160, 165,

169-170

Producer organizations, 165-166, 167, 170, 178

Research and extension, 150-160, 177

Strategies to enhance production, 102-115, 134-139,

159-160, 177-180

Technology transfer, 23, 149, 157-161, 178

Value added processing, 19,24-25,26, 102, 136, 149,

161-166, 167, 178, 180

AID. See U.S. Agency for International Development

Alternative crops. See also Forest resources, agroforestry;

Aquatic resources (freshwater); Wildlife and wildland

resources; Agricultural development, research and

extension

As a coca substitution strategy, 7, 8,9, 13, 17,71,96, 99,

100, 102-110, 115, 134-135, 199

Constraints to developing and marketing, 7,100,101-102,

103, 107,115,134,135, 137,161, 162, 163,167,169,

171, 179. See also Alternative development,

constraints to

Domestic market opportunities, 19-20, 100, 135-137, 163

Economics of, 71, 103, 113, 115, 116, 121, 135

Examples of, 9,20,100,103-110,113, 116,121,161, 162,

163, 170, 174

Export markets, 19-20, 100, 103, 107, 135-136, 150, 163,

174, 179

Prerequisites for developing and marketing, 8,20-28,100,

106-107, 113, 115, 134, 160-161, 163, 165, 169-171,

178

Strategies to promote and support. See Agricultural

development, strategies to enhance production

Transition to, 17-18,23-28, 102, 107, 115, 134, 135-136,

137-138, 179

Alternative development. See also Alternative crops;

Agricultural development; PEAH

As a cocaine control strategy, 2, 8, 71

Assistance for, 1, 2,6-7, 13,67,72,96-97150-151, 155,

163, 171, 172, 176,179-180. See also U.S. Agency for

International Development; Agricultural

development, technology transfer

Cocabamba Regional Development Project, 7, 8, 17, 18,

24,89, 162

Constraints to, 5,6,7,14-16,23-28,57-60, 69-70,95, 151,

165

CRDP, 7,85-87,88,89,90

&otourism, 22-23, 100, 122, 127-128, 140-141

Infrastructure for. See Infrastructure (in support of

alternative agricultural development)

Requirement for long-term commitment to, 17-18, 19,97,

177-178, 179

Andean Cordillera

Agroecosystems, 38-41,68,99-100, 110

Cultural history, 3, 39-40. See afso Bolivia, history;

211
212 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Colombia, history; Peru, history

Geoecology, 3, 35-38,68,99-100, 122

Aquatic resources (freshwater)

Aquiculture, 23, 100, 131-132, 133

As an alternative development base, 99, 100, 141-142

Fisheries, 23, 100-101, 128-133, 141-142

Biological coca control. See Coca supply reduction/

eradication, biological control

Bolivia

Agrarian reform in, 51

Coca substitution and, 84-90

History, 5,50-53

Migration in, 5,51, 52,72, 86, 89

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (U.S. Department

of State). See INM

Chapare Regional Development Project. See CRDP

Chemical coca control. See Coca supply reduction/

eradication, chemical control

Coca

Control of. See Narcotics control; Coca substitution; Coca

supply reduction/eradication; CORAH, interdiction

Legitimate market for, 137-138

Natural enemies, 30, 192-199, 201

Processing. See Coca processing

Production. See Coca production

Species, 189-190

Traditional uses, 2, 10,44-47,48,49, 50,84

Value as a cash crop, 2, 7-8. See also Coca production,

economics of

Coca processing, 3, 6,41,43,44,45,67,69, 93, 128

Coca production

Cultivation practices, 41-43, 188

Economics of, 2,7, 8, 10, 13, 14-15, 18,68-72, 102

Environmental impacts of, 3, 19, 30-31,41-43,44, 102,

128

Inputs, 101, 102

Production zones, 3,4, 7, 37,4041,4748,71-72,

100-101, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117-118, 189-190

Sociopolitical and economic context, 5,6, 18,50-68

Coca substitution. See also Alternative crops; Alternative

development; Coca supply reduction/eradication;

CORDEP; CRDP; IBTA; PRODES; SUBSEDAL

As a supply-reduction strategy, 1,7, 35,83, 133-134,

159-160

Bolivia, 84-90

Colombia. See Coca supply reduction/eradication,

Colombia

Constraints to, 10, 17,23-28, 134

Early efforts, 7, 177

Goals, 7, 17, 102

Peru, 91-93

Strategies to enhance. See Agricultural development,

strategies to enhance

Coca supply reduction/eradication. See also Alternative

crops; Alternative development; Coca substitution;

Interdiction, narcotics control

Agroforestry and, 113

Alternative development and, 11-12,28,95, 183

Biological control, 5, 28-32, 184, 188-201

Bolivia. See Coca substitution, Bolivia

Chemical control, 3,5,94, 184-187

Cocaine availability and, 183

Colombia, 93-95

Constraints and incentives, 10-13, 183,201

Incentives for, 10, 11, 12, 13

Mandatory, 84, 184

Manual, 184

Peru, See Coca substitution, Peru

Phased, 17,96, 177

Voluntary, 84, 184

Cocaine

Abuse, 1

Adverse impacts on society, 3,49,59,63-67. See also

Colombia, drug-related violence and terrorism; Peru,

drug-related violence and terrorism

Economy, 5,6,7,8,62, 63-65,68-72,95, 101-102, 134

Pasta bi%ica, 3,49

Cochabarnba Regional Development Project. See CORDEP

Colombia

Agrarian reform, 62

Agricultural research and extension in, 155-157

Coca production in, 1,6,61-62,68,70,81,94, 95

Coca supply reduction, 93-95

Drug-related violence and terrorism, 6,62,65-66,67,68,

72,93,94

CORAH, 91-93,95-96, 184

CORDEP, 7,8, 17, 18,24,89, 162

CRDP, 7,85-87,88,89,90

DEA, 16, 17, 81,83

Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S. Department of

Justice). See DEA

Extradition, 1,65-66,81,94

Forest resources

Agroforestry, 15,20, 112-113, 122, 135, 138

As an alternative development base, 15,20,21,99, 100,

155-122, 140

Biodiversity, 100, 115-116, 126

Conservation and protected areas, 116-117, 140

Deforestation, 4142, 102, 117, 118

Extractive reserves, 21, 116, 118, 119, 121, 140

Management, 21, 22, 115-122
Index I 213

Timber production, sustainable, 21, 100, 117, 118, 119-

121, 140

IBTA, 88-89, 107, 151-153, 158

IDB, 16, 18,57, 154-155

Infrastructure (in support of alternative agricultural

development), 17,20,25-26,54, 55,56,57,66,72,85,

113-114,119,126,132,135, 136,149-150,152,

160-171

INM,81,85,97

Institute Bolivtinode Tecno[ogla Agropecuaria. SeeIBTA

InterAmerican Development Bank. See IDB

InterAmerican Foundation, 27-28, 167

Interdiction, 1, 2, 81, 84, 93,94, 115, 179

Marijuana, 62,93-94

Migration. See Bolivia, migration in; Colombia, migration

in; Peru, migration in

Narcotics control, 11, 82, 89, 93-97. See also Interdiction

@ium (POPPY, heroin), 19,62,68,81-84,94-95, 136

PDAR, 86,88, 89, 152

PEAH, 91-92,95-96, 121-122

Peru

Agrarian reform in, 6, 56

Agricultural research and extension in, 153-155

Coca production in, 1,6, 57, 58, 59, 81

Coca-related violence and terrorism in, 6,59-60,72

Coca substitution and, 91-93

Migration in, 6,55-56

Programa de Desarrollo Alternative Regional. See PDAR

Proyecto de Control y Reducci6n de [OS Cu[tivos de Coca en

el Alto Iluullaga. See CORAH

Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga. See PEAH

PRODES, 85

Sindicatos, 10, 13,54-55, 178

Subsecretarfa de Desarrollo Alternative y Sustitucidn de

Cu[tivos de Coca. See SUBDESAL

SUBSEDAL, 86,88, 89

Trade, 8, 22,25, 150, 165, 166, 168, 171-177, 179-180

United Nations International Drug Control Programme. See

UNDCP

UNDCP, 7,29,32, 81, 141,200

U.S. Agency for International Development, 12-27, 57, 70,

81, 84, 85, 86-87,91, 113, 139, 140, 141, 154-155,

158, 169, 177, 178

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 26-27, 31-32,

174-176.187

Wildlife and wildland resources, 22-23,99, 100, 117, 118,

121, 122-128, 140-141. See also Forest resources;

Alternative development, ecotourism

World Bank, 16, 18, 57, 159

U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1993 - 331-054

331-054 (220)