# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**
MEMORANDUM OPINION
N o. 04

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- CV Billy STONE dba Stobil Enterprise and All Occupants, Appellant s

v. K CLARK PROPERTY MAN AGEMENT LLC , Appellee From the County Court a t Law No. 10 , Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020CV00366 Honorable J

. Frank Davis , Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Delivered and Filed: May 6, 2020 MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION This is an appeal in a forcible detainer action in which the county court awarded possession of a premis es to appellee K Clark Property Management LLC on February 7, 2020. After the Bexar County Sheriff ’ s Office executed the writ of possession , K Clark filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction . Because it appeared appellants Billy Ston e 1 dba Stobil Enterprise and all occupants no longer had possession of the premises , we issued an order requiring Stone to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot . Stone filed a timely

1 It appears the correct name of the appellant is Billie Stone.04

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- response. After reviewing the motion to dismiss an d response, we conclude Stone ’ s appeal is
moot , grant K Clark ’ s motion, and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
B ACKGROUND K Clark filed a forcible detainer action in a Bexar County Justice of the Peace Court seeking to evict Stone from a property it leased to him

. The j ustice c ourt entered a judgment of eviction awarding possession of the premises to K Clark and setting an appeal bond at $500 . Stone posted the bond and appealed to the county court at l aw
. After a bench trial at which both parties appeared , the county court signed a judgment of eviction on February 7, 2020, awarding K Clark possession of the premises and grant ing it a writ of possession

. On February 12, 2020, Stone filed : an “A ffidavit of I nability to A fford Payment of Bond ” stating he could not post a supersedeas bond from the county court’s judgment ; a m otion for n ew t rial alleging he was not properly served with notice of the trial setting ; and an application for an emergency temporary restraining order and temporary injunction seeking to enjoin the execution of the writ of possession. That same day, the county court set a February 20, 2020 hearing on the motion for new trial and temporary restraining order. On February 20 , 2020 , the county court heard the matter and denied Stone ’ s motion for new trial and request for an emergency temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. At no point did Stone request a hearing to set a supersedeas bond to stay the writ of posses sion. On February 25, 2020, Stone filed a notice of appeal and emergency motion requesting that we stay the execution of the writ of possession pending appeal. After confirming with the county clerk that Stone did not file a supersedeas bond in an amount set by the county court, we denied
Stone ’ s request for a stay pursuant to section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code

. On February 27, 2020, the Bexar County Sheriff ’ s Department executed the writ of possession , evicting Stone.04

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- After the sheriff ex ecuted the writ of possession, K Clark filed a motion to dismiss in this
court

. In its motion, K Clark argues that the only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession, and because Stone no longer possesses the premises , the appe al is moot. We issued a n order requiring Stone to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. Stone filed a response alleging the county court judge committed a “judicial wrongdoing” by allowing the bench trial to proceed on February 7, 2 020 even though he was not properly served with notice of that setting . Stone further asserts that “[d]uring the unfair trial hearing,” the judge retaliated by denying his appeal and granting a writ of possession in favor of K Clark. Stone admits the sheriff executed the writ of possession on February 27, 2020 and states t his appeal is not moot because this is “not an appeal of a writ of possession, but, rather an appeal of an eviction that was wrongfully executed against [him].” His county court pleadings do not contain a wrongful eviction c ause of action

. A NALYSIS Applicable Law The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the property.
See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 510.3(e); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006); see also T EX
. P ROP

. C ODE A NN . §§ 24.001

– .002. A judgment of possession in such an action determines only the right to immediate possession and is not a final determination of whether an eviction is wrongful. Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 787. When an appellant fails to file

a su persedeas bond in the amount set by the county court, the judgment may be enforced and a writ of possession may be executed, evicting the defendant from the property. See T EX
. P ROP

. C ODE A NN
. § 24.007; T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 510.13; Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 786. F ailure to supersede the judgment does not automatically divest a defendant of his right to appeal

. Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 786

– 87 . However, the Texas Supreme Court has held that if a defendant in a forcible04

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- detainer action is no longer in possession of the premises, then an appeal from a forcible detainer action is moot unless the defendant asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the [premises].” Id. at 787. Appli cation Stone admits the sheriff executed the writ of possession on February 27, 2020 , but claims this is “not an appeal of a writ of possession but, rather an appeal of an eviction that was wrongfully executed against [him]

. ” He argues that he was wrongfu lly evicted out of retaliation and therefore seeks to appeal the judgment of eviction . Stone ’ s arguments lose sight of the fact that his appeal arises out of a forcible detainer action, an action that is intended to be a simple, speedy, and inexpensive wa y f or a landlord to obtain immediate possession of property. See id . As pointed out above, t he judgment in such an action is not a final determination as to whether the eviction is wrongful. Id

. (emphasis added). It is a determination only of the right to immediate possession. Id. “No other issues, controversies or rights of the parties related to the property

. . . can be adjudicated in a detainer suit

. ” AAA Free Move Ministorage, LLC v. OIS Invs., Inc. , 419 S.W .3d 522, 526 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). That judgment, however, does not bar a tenant from later filing a suit against the landlord for wrongful eviction. 2 See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 787; AAA Free Move Ministorage, LLC , 419 S.W.3d at 529

. To determine whether this appeal is moot, we must decide whether S tone has asserted “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the [premises].” See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 786

– 8 7 . Stone ’ s assertion s that he was wrongfu lly evicted are not arguments that would, if successful, entitle him to immediate possession

. Because Stone is no

2 Because the county court’s February 7, 2020 judgment of eviction was not a final determination as to whether Stone’s eviction was wrongful, his assertions that the eviction was wrongful are not before us and may later be raised in a subsequent suit by Stone against K Clark for wrongful eviction. See Marshall , 198 S.W.3 d at 787; AAA Free Move Ministorage, LLC , 419 S.W.3d at 529.04

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- longer in possession of the p roperty and because he does not assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the premises , we conclude Stone ’ s appeal is moot. See id

. We therefore grant K Clark ’ s motion to dismiss and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. We also order no costs be assessed against Stone because t he y qualify as indigent.
PER CURIAM