The Honor able Ka rl S. Fore ster, Senior United States District Judge for the E astern * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. 1 NO T RE CO M M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0798n.06 F iled: October 27, 2006 No. 05-4476 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT CROWN EQUIP MENT CORP ORATION, P etitioner -Appellant,

v. TO YO TA MAT ER IA L H AND LI NG, U.S.A., INC., Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE N OR THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Before: G IBBO NS and MCK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; F OREST ER, DistrictJudge

. * JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Plai n tiff-a ppellant Crown Equipment Corp. (“Crown”), a

n Ohio corporat i o n eng ag ed in the business of makinglift trucks (for klifts), sued defe ndant-a

ppellee Toy ota Materia l H andling , U.S.A., Inc. (“TMH U”) , a California c orporation and competitor in the lift truck business, in the Unit ed S tates Dist rict C ourt for the N orthern D istrict of Oh io. Cr ow n a lle g e d th a t T MH U t or tio us ly int e rf e re d with Cr ow n’ s c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns hip wi th Florida L ift, one of its F lorida deale rs. The court g rante d summary judgme nt f or TMHU, holding that Crown fa iled to produce evidenc e showing t hat TMHU had any specific knowledg e of Crown’s2

contra ct w it

h F lo r id a L if

t w h e n T M H U e n te r e d into it s c o n tr a c t w it h F lo r id a L if

t o r tha t TMHU int e nti on a lly

ind uc e d F lor ida

L if t to br e a c h it s con tr act wi th C ro wn . T he c ourt fu rt he r h e ld t hat,

even if TMHUdid

kn owof and int e nti on a lly

int e rf e re wi th C ro wn ’s c on tr a c t w ithF lor ida L if t, TM HU ’s int e rf

e re nc e wa s n ot i mpr op e r. F or the re a so ns be low , w e a ff ir m. I. Crown sells lift trucks throug h a networ k of dea lers. In 1997, Cro wn and Florida L ift neg otiated a De aler

Ag ree ment for F lorida L ift to sell Crown lift trucks in the Tampa, F lorida marke t. This ag ree ment was renewe d ever y two y ear s, with the last rene wal ef fec tive until Februa

ry 28, 2005. Section 3(bb) of the Dea ler Agree ment limit ed F lorida L ift’s ability to act a s a dea ler for any of Crown’s c ompetitors. I t rea d: Dea ler [Florida L ift] s hall . . . ref rain fr om (i) ac ting a s a dea ler or a g ent for a ny manufa cture r or distributor of lift trucks, other than those relationships ex isting as of the ef fec tive date of

this Agr eeme nt or (ii) expanding or adding to the ty pes or lines of lift trucks ca

rried by the deale r or ag ent as of the eff ective date of this ag ree ment into ty pes or lines that c om p et e, i n Crown’s sole judg ment, with the ty pes or lines sold by Crown, without the prior written approva l of Crown, which sha ll be provided only in the event that Crown, at its sol e discre tion, determines that the addition of su c h o the r r e latio ns hip s, lin e s, or ty pe s o f lif t tr uc ks sh a ll n ot i n a

ny wa y a dv e rs e ly a ff e c t D e a le r’ s a

bil ity to fulf ill its ob lig a tio ns un de r t his Agre e me nt o r o the rw ise imp e de or de tr a c t f ro m th e sa le and

se rv ic e of

Cr ow n e qu ipm e nt. J A 63. The A g ree ment further provided for

termination of t h e co ntrac t by Florida L ift or Crown,

a lbe it o n d if

fe re nt t e rm s. Whil e the Agre e me nt a llo we d F lor ida L if t to te rm inate “ a t any

tim e , w ith

or wi tho ut c a

us e , b y g ivi ngwr itt e n n oti c e of su c h te rm inatio n to Cr ow n, ” JA 68 , Cr ow n c ou ld terminate only

under c erta in conditions, including “f ailure by Dea ler to honor a

n y p ro m i s e on Dea ler’s pa

rt contained in this agr eeme nt or to perf orm satisfac torily

any of the func tions, duti es, or obligations im posed on De aler there by . . . afte r De aler

shall have be en notified by Crown of such3

f a i l u r e an d i nC r o w n ’ s u n r e s t r i c t e d

j u d g m e n ts h a l l h av e f

a i l e d t o c o r r e c tth e s am e w i th i n6 0 d ays afte r re ceipt of suc h notice.” Id. I n Dec ember

2003, TMHU’s Tampa deale r decla red bankruptc y

afte r beingunable to satisfy a debt to a T MHU customer . TMHU decided to approa ch Florida L ift as a pote ntial second de aler in the Tampa r eg ion. Florida L ift had bee n operating as a joint Crown/TMHU dea ler in the Or lando

re g ion , a nd Jef f F isc he r, F lor ida

L if t’ s CE O, ha d p re vio us ly

e xpre sse d interest in expa nd ingits repr esentat i o n of TMHU in the Ta mpa marke t. Crown’s senior vice president, Jim Moran, ha d notified Fische r, howe ver, that it was “very u n l i k ely ” Crown would a g ree to a Crown/TMHU deale rship arr ang ement in the Tampa ar ea. On Dec ember

12, 2003, Fische r met with Ronald Roensch, TMHU’s g ener al counse l, and Jose phKa ste lic , T MH U’ s n a tio na l de a le r d e ve lop me nt m ana g e r, to d i s c us s an a g re e me nt f or the sa le by Florida L ift of TMHU’s lift truc ks. Awar e that Fische r would be contac ting Crown reg ardingthe proposal, Ka stelic provided F ischer w ith a list o f e xistingCrown/Toy ota joint dealer ships in the hope it might allay

any possible conce rns on Crown’s pa rt. Althoug h Fische r attempted to contact Crown prior to sig ning a

n ag ree ment with TMHU, he did not re ceive an immediate re sponse, and on D e c e mb e r 1 6 , 2 0 0 3 , F lo r id a L if t e n te r e d into a d e a le r a g r e e me n t w it h T M H U h av in g n ot y et consulted with Crown. Upon re ceivingnotice of the Florida L ift-T M HU agreement, John Max a, Crown’ s vice president a

nd gen er al counsel, transmitted a letter to F ischer, dated J anuar y 12, 2004, notifying Fische r that Crown intended to te rminate the Crown-F lorida L ift ag ree ment if Florida L ift did not te rm inate its re latio ns hip wi th T MH U w ith in 6 0 d ay s. On Janu ary 13 , 200 4, Cr ow n fil e d a

laws uit in the United States Di s t ri ct Court for the Souther n District of Ohio, see king to e nforc e the4

arbitration clause in its agr eeme nt with Florida L ift. Crown Equip. Corp. v

. Fla. Lift Sys., Inc

. , No. 3:04-cv-0007- WHR (S.D. Ohio 2004). On Janu ary 23 , 2 00 4, F isc he r m e t with Mo ra n an d an oth e r Cro wn re pr e se ntativ e to d isc us s the TM HUa g re e me nt, the pe nd inglaws uit , a nd the po ssi bil ity

of F lor ida L if t’ s c on tin uin g its repr esentation of Crown. Moran presented Fische r wit h three options: (1) abandoningthe TMHU ag ree ment and re turn to the pre- ag ree ment Crown-only deale rship arr ang ement; (2) selling F lorida L ift to Crown; or (3) a llowing Crown to terminate the a g ree ment. Fische r then met with Roensch and Dr

. S h ankar Ba su, TMHU’s pre sident, in California on Monday , J anuar y 26, 2004. Fische r expressed his view that F lorida L ift neede d to repre sent both Crown and TMHU in order to ensure its fi na nc ia l st a bil ity and de c lin e d T MH U’ s o ff

e r t o r e s c ind

the F lor ida

L if t- TM HUa g re e me nt. B a su the n o ff e re d to fu nd F lor ida L if t’ s li tig a tio n e xpe ns e s so th at Flo ri da L if t c ou ld atte mpt

to r e ta in Cr ow n a s a su

pp lie r. As a re su lt of the se dis c us sio ns , TM HUfu nd e d F lor ida

L if t’ s d e fe ns e a g a ins t the Cr ow n a c tio n f

or te rm inatio n a

nd br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. Cr own and F lorida L ift proce eded to a rbitration followinga dete rmination by the district court that the a

rbitration clause in the Florida L ift-Crown ag ree ment was enfor cea ble. The a rbitrator fo un d th a t F lor ida

L if t br e a c he d it s a g re e me nt w ith Cr own by e nte ri ngint o a

n a g re e me nt w ith TMHU and d e c la

r e d th a t Cr o w n ’ s te r

mi n a ti o n o f th e a g r e e me n t w a s ju s ti f ie d

. T h e d is tr ic t c ourt confirme d the ar

bitrator’s a

war d. Crown then filed the instant suit ag ainst TMHU in the United States District Court for the Norther n District of Ohio, alleg ing in its second a mended c omplaint a single claim for tor tious interfe renc e with a c ontrac tual relationship. After discover y , the par ties fi l ed cr o ss-motions for summary judgme nt. The cour

t denied Crown’ s motion but g rante d TMHU’s motion, deter mining5

that Crown had f

ailed to pre sent ev i d en ce creatinga g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to sever al elements of tor

tious int erf

ere nce. II. We re vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of summa

ry jud g me nt de novo

. W

ill iam s v. M

e hra , 186 F.3d 685, 689 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Summary judgme nt is proper “ if the plea dings, de positions, answers t o i n t er ro gat ories, and a dmissions on file, tog ether with affidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any

materia l fac t and that the moving party is e ntitled to a judgment a s a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A “ materia l” fa ct is one “that might af fec t the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 4 77 U. S. 2 42 , 2 48 (1 98 6) . We vie w the e vid e nc e and dr aw a ll

rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the non-movingparty

. Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I nd us . Co. v. Ze nit

h R ad io Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). III . I n order to pr evail on a cla im for tortious interfer ence with a contra ctual re lationship in Ohio, a plai n ti f f mu s t p r o v e th a t: 1 ) a

c o n tr a c t e xis te d ; 2 ) th e d e f e n d an t k n e w o f th e c o n tr a c t; 3 ) the de fe nd ant i nte nti on a lly

pr oc ur e d th e br e a c h o f t he c on tr a c t; 4 ) t

he de fe nd ant w a s n ot j us tified in procur ing the brea ch of contra ct; and 5) da mag es re sulted from the bre ach. Kenty v. Transamerica Premium I

ns. Co. , 650 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio 1995) (adoptingRestatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 766 (1 9 7 9 ))

. T h e ex i s t en ce o f a co n t ra ct i n th i s ca s e is un d i s p u t ed , b ut th e e x t en to f T M HU ’s kn o wl ed ge of the c on tr a c tua l re latio ns hip and int e nt t o p ro c ur e the br e a c h o f t hat c on tr a c t are in d isp ute , a s is TMHU’s justification for

interfe ring with the contra ct. As explained below, our analy sis be g ins and

e nd s w iththe kn ow le dg e pr on g of the tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e te st. The pa rties do not dispute that TMHU knew, or at least cor rec tly assumed, that Crown ha dTM HUc on c e de s th a t it ne e d n ot h ave kn ow n th e e xac t te rm s o r w or din g of the c on tr a c t; 1 rathe r, its c la im i s me re ly tha t it ne e de d to kn owthat Cr ow n’ s c on tr a c t c on ta ine d a n e xclu siv ity provision. 6 a de a le rs hip a g re e me nt wi th F lor ida L if t. T MH U a

rgue s, ho we ve r, that me re kn ow le dg e that a

c on tr a c t e xists is n ot e no ug h to satis fy the kn ow le dg e pr on g . Rathe r, it a sse rt s th a t Cr ow n mu st

s h o w t h at T M HU kn ew t h at t h e c o n t ra ct wa s ex cl u s i v e i no rd er t o s at i s fy th e s ec o n d

p ro n g. 1 The Ohio courts have not c larified the deg ree of knowledg e nec essar y to satisfy the sec ond pr on g of the tor tio us int e rf

e ren c e te st. Un de r S e c tio n 7 67 of the Re state me nt, wh ic h O hio c ourt s have a dopted, for a

n alleg ed tortfe asor “ [t ]o be s u b j ec t t o l i abil ity

. . . , the ac tor must have knowledg e of the contra ct wit h which he is interfe ring and of the fac t that he is interfe ring with the perf ormanc e of the contra ct.” Restate ment (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt. i (1979). We assume that the kn ow le dg e pr on g un de r thi s fo rm ulatio n re qu ir e s o nly

kn ow le dg e of

the c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns hip sufficie nt to put the defenda nt on notice that its actions could interfe re w ith an exis ting c ontrac t. Cr ow n’ s c la im is ba se d on TM HU ’s a lle g e d kn ow le dg e ov e r the c ours e of tw o d ist inc t ti me frames: the period pr ece ding January 2 6 , 2 004, befor e F lorida L ift informed TMHUof the nature of its c on tr a c tua l r e latio ns hip wi th Crow n, a nd the pe ri od

fo llo wi ngJanu ary

26 , w he n it

is undisputed TMHU knewof t he ex clusivity provision in the Crown-F lorida L ift Ag ree ment. Crown argues that, duringthe initial period, TMHU ha d constructive notice of the e x clusivity prov i s ion. As to the second time f

rame , t he par

ties ag ree that TMHU knew that the Crown-F lorida L ift ag ree ment was e x clusive af te r the mee ting be tween B asu, Roensch, a nd Fische r on January

26, 2004. Cr ow n a sse rt s th a t TM HU ’s c on tin ue d re latio ns hip wi th F lor ida L if t a ft e r l e arn ing

of the e xclu siv ity provision constituted a knowing , continuous interfe renc e with Crown’s c ontrac tual relationship. As to the initial period, Crown ar g ues TMHU posse ssed co n structive knowledg e of theOhio law does not re cog nize the tort of neg lige nt interfer ence with a contra ctual 2 relationship. Bauer v. Comm ercial Aluminum Cookware Co. , 7 46 N. E. 2d 11 73 , 1 17 8 ( Oh io C t. App. 2000). Other c ourts have r ejec ted the ar g ument offe red by TMHU and he ld that constructive 3 knowledg e is sufficie nt to establish the knowledg e re quirement for tortious interfer ence of contra ct liability

. See I

ndy Lube Inv

s, L.L .C. v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 199 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 11 24 (D . K an. 20 02 ); Tele-Port, Inc . v. Ame ritech Mobile Commc ’ns, Inc

. , 49 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (noting that constructive know ledg e of the fac ts that would lead a rea sonable pe rson to discover the nature of the re lationship is s ufficie nt for liability to attach) ; D 56, Inc. v . Berry’

s, Inc. , 955 F. Supp. 908, 916 (N.D . I ll. 1997). These c ases a pply the tort law of other states, a

re not binding on this court, and we decline to a dopt their rea soning. Ray mond is now owned by

Toy ota’s par ent cor

poration, but there is appare ntly no direc t 4 corpor ate r elationship betwee n it and TMHU. 7 exclusivi ty

ag ree ment and that satisfies the know ledg e prong . TMHU re spo n d s t hat construc tive kn ow le dg e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt b e c a

us e it i mpr op e rl y

inc or po ra tes a neg lig e nc e sta

nd ard int o th is intentional tort. TMHU is corr ect that Crown’s argument that it must show only that TMHU knew

or should ha

ve known of the exclusivit y provision wrong ly

imports a neg lige nce sta

ndard into the

ana ly sis ; e ve n if

TM HU we re ne g lig e nt i n n ot i nv e sti g a tin g the c on tr a c t de ta ils , it c ann ot b e lia

ble for intentionally int e rf

e ri ngwi th t

hat c on tr a c t. Th is i s n ot t o s ay , h owever, th at Crow n c an o nly

2 preva il on summ ary

judgme nt if it proves by

direc t evidence that TMHU knew that Crown’s contr act wi th F lor ida

L if t w a s e xclu siv e . Rathe r, Cr ow n n e e d o nly pr ov ide su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt a “re asonable infere nce” that TMHU knew the nature of the re lationship – i.e., that Crown’s contra ct

was e x clusive. Interroyal Corp. v. Sponseller , 889 F.2d 108, 111 ( 6th Cir. 1989). 3 C ro wn co n t ends t hat a jury could infer

TMHU’s knowle dg e on the ba sis of both ge nera l industry prac tice and the b eh avior of the parties dur ing the course of the F lorida L ift-TMHU neg otiations. Crown points out t h at TMHU knew that Yale Materials Ha

ndling Corpor ation and Ray mond Corporation, two other li ft truck companies, utiliz ed exclusivity ag ree ments. In addition,

4At or a l argume nt, c ouns e l f

or Cr ow n p ointe d o ut t

hat, a lth ou g h Cr ow n h a d a llo we d it s 5 deale rs to enter

into dist ribution ag ree ments with other manufa cture rs in the past, it had cha ng ed its poli cy . Counsel provided no explanation of how TMHU w ould have be en aw are of the chang e in Crown policy

. 8 Roensch attende d a mee t ing of the Industrial Truck A ssociation in fall 2003 wher e Ray mond’s exclusivi ty

arr ang ement wa s among the meetingtopics. Crown also see ks to demonstrate that TMHU knew

of the re striction on multi ple dea ler a g ree ments by offe ring evidenc e that TMHU w as

awa re of Crown’s likely

rea ction to learningof a possible T MHU-F lorida L ift deal. Crown identifies a letter from F ischer to TMHU’s par ent stating that Crown was “ anxious ” about F lorida L ift’s joint

re pr e se ntatio n o f C ro wn

and TM HU in Or land o. TM HUanti c ipate d th a t F isc he r’ s d isc us sio n w ith Crown would be “pric kly ” and pr ovided “ammuniti on” in the for m of a listing of

exis ting Cr ow n/T MH U a

rr ang e me nts in o the r m ark e ts. Mo re ov e r, TM HU agreed not to pu bli c ize its ag ree ment with Florida L ift until after F ischer spoke to J im Moran at Crown. This evidence is insufficient to show that TMHU kne w prior to January 26, 2004 that Crown had an e x clusivity

provision in its contra ct wit h Florida L ift. There is absolutely no evidenc e that Florida L ift or Crown dire ctly

notified TMHU of the exclusivit y provision. As to TMHU’s indirec t kn ow le dg e , w hate ve r TMH U ha d he ard a bo ut oth e r manu fa c tur e rs , the re is nothin g in t he re c or d to ind ic a te that T MH U kne w Cro wn ha d ad op te d a pra c tic e of re str ic tin g its de a le rs to C ro wn pr od uc ts. I n fac t, in the Tampa mar ket, Flor ida L ift sold K omatsu, Dae woo, and L inde lift trucks in addition to those manufac tured by Crown. L ikewise, in Orla ndo, Florida

L ift sold both TMHU and Crown lift trucks, and the O rlando bra nch of F lorida L ift is one of seve ral de aler ships selling joint Crown

and TM HU

. F ina lly , F isc he r ha d re pr e se nte d to TM HU a s late a s June 20 02 that F lor ida L if t c ou ld 5 and wished to sell Toyota produc ts in Tampa.Crown insists t hat a district cour t has reje cted TMHU ’s explanation of its understanding 6 of why F lor ida L if t ne e de d to c on su lt w ithCr ow n p ri or to e nte ri ngint o a

n a g re e me nt w ith TMHU. This is not entirely acc urate . A district court judg e did dismiss as an “af ter the f act ratio na lizatio n, ” JA 63 5, F lor ida L if t’ s atte mpt

to m ini mize its ow n c ulp a bil ity by arguin g that it did not believe it require d Crown’s per mission t o enter

into other dea lership ag ree ments and n o ti f ie d Cr o w no u t o f

c o u rte s y . T h e d is tr ic t c o urt j u d g e ma d e th a t d e te r mi n a ti o nin

th e c o n te xt of an a pp lic a tio n f

or a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n in

a se pa ra te pr oc e e din g ini tiate d b y Cr ow n a g a ins t F lor ida L if t. Afi nd ingthat F lor ida

L if t un de rs too d it s o bli g a tio n to inf or m Cr ow n is ir

re le va nt, howeve r, to the issue of TMHU ’s knowledg e of that obligation unless F lorida L ift communicated that information to TMHU. The re is no evide nce of that. 9 Cr ow n’ s argume nt a s to TM HU ’s anti c ipatio n of a n e g a tiv e re a c tio n f ro m Cr ow n is sim ila

rl y unavailing

. The re cord e stablishes that Roensch knewFische r wished to spea k with Crown prior to enteringinto an ag ree ment with TMH U an dthat Fische r and Roensc h expected re sistance or dissatisfaction from Crown. N othing in the r ecor d tends to prove, howe ver, that TMHU had r eason to understand that F lorida L ift’s nee d to notify Crown was a

ny thing more than an e x erc ise of busin es s co u rt esy or that Crown’s c oncer ns were born of a

ny thing other

than g ener alized market 6 competitiveness. We conclude t hat C rown has failed to demonstrate the exis tence of a g enuine issue of mate ri a l f

a c t a s to TM HU ’s kn ow le dg e , d ir e c t or ind ir e c t, o f t

he e xclu siv ity

pr ov isi on

pr ior to J anuar y 26, 2004. Crown offe rs a se cond ar g ument, howeve r, conc erningTMHU’s a cti ons after J anuar y 26, 20 04 , w he n it

be c ame awa

re of the e xclu siv ity pr ov isi on . Cro wn c on te nd s th a t T MH U’ s f

a ilure to withdraw f

rom its relationship with Florida L if t a f te r le a r ning of the exclusivit y

provision constituted continuing inter fer ence with the Crown-F lorida L ift relationship. Evidenc e of post-br eac h behavior is certa inly

rele vant in intentional interfe rence c laims insofar as it provides insig ht into the defe ndant’s pre- brea ch knowledg e or state of mind. Howeve r, evidenc e that a defe ndant l ea rned materia l fac ts after

the bre ach occ u rred is not probative of the de fenda nt’s knowledg e or state ofMoreove r, TMHU’ s asserte d continuing br eac h argument ignor es the fa ct that Flor ida 7 L ift was justified in pursuing its trial strateg y , particula rly in light of pre cede nt ag ainst Yale a nd Ray mond that held exclusivi ty ag ree ments unenfor cea

ble. B eca use F lorida L ift’s defe nse ca nnot be construe d as any

thing but prote ction of F lorida L ift’s rig ht to judicial process, ne ither ca n TM HU ’s pa

rt ic ipatio n in

that de fe ns e be c ounte na nc e d a s le g a l in te rf

e re nc e wi th c on tr a c t. Fur ther, ther e is no evidenc e that the de cisions as to the litigation we re ma de by TMHU rather tha n F lor ida L if t. T he re c or d in dic a te s th a t T MH U’ s f un din g of F lor ida L if t’ s d e fe ns e wa s a leg itimate business strateg y based on TMH U’s desire to ensure the financ ial stability of its new deale r, not a plot to forc e Crown to dea l with its intransig ent dea ler. As the district c ourt noted, TMHU off

ere d to relea se F lorida L ift from its contrac tual obligations to TMHU. Florida L ift declined a

nd chose to proc eed w ith its defe nse. 10 mind at the time of brea ch. Thus, the f act that TMHUlear

ned in J anuar

y 2 0 0 4 , that the CrownFlorida L ift contrac t was ex cl u s i ve does not suff ice to prove that TMHU knew the nature of the Cr own -Flo ri da L if

t r ela ti on sh ip in Decem ber 2 00 3, whe n Fl ori da L if t b reach e d t h e con tr act . By J anuar y 26, 2004 the date on which TMHU learne d of the e x clusivity provision, any

interfe renc e had been f ully acc omplished. Cr ow n f ur ther argue s th a t T MH U’ s d e fe ns e of F lor ida L if t du ri nglit ig a tio n w a s to rt iou s, constituting par

t of a plot to forc e Crown to c ontinue dealing with F lorida L ift during the course of the litigation in order to switch Crown customers to Toyota produc ts. This theory cannot suc cee d. TMHU’s post-ne g otiation conduct was not a new breac h but rathe r constit uted the dete rmination of the leg al conse quence s of that bre ach. 7 We find that Crown has fa iled to present e vidence cre ating a g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to TMHU’s know ledg e of the exclusivi ty provision gove rning the relationship of Florida L ift and Crown. This conclusion is dispositi ve of Crown’s claim, and w e nee d not consider the othe r elements of the tortious interfer ence test. IV. F or the re a so ns a

bo ve , w e AF F I RM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

.