United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Environment, Technology, and 

Standards, Committee on Science, 

House of Representatives 

GEOSTATIONARY 

OPERATIONAL 

ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES 

Steps Remain in 

Incorporating Lessons 

Learned from Other 

Satellite Programs 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-993 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

GEOSTATIONARY OPERATIONAL 

ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES 

Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons 

Learned from Other Satellite Programs 

Highlights of GAO-06-993, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Environment, 

Technology, and Standards, Committee 

on Science, House of Representatives 

The National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) plans to procure the next

generation of geostationary 

operational environmental 

satellites, called the Geostationary 

Operational Environmental

Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This 

new series is considered critical to 

the United States’ ability to 

maintain the continuity of data 

required for weather forecasting 

through the year 2028. GAO was 

asked to (1) determine the status of 

and plans for the GOES-R series

procurement, and (2) identify and 

evaluate the actions that the 

program management team is 

taking to ensure that past problems 

experienced in procuring other 

satellite programs are not repeated. 

What GAO Recommends

We are making recommendations 

to the Secretary of Commerce to

direct its NOAA Program

Management Council to establish a 

process for reconciling the

government and independent cost

estimates; perform a 

comprehensive review of a key 

instrument prior to moving it into 

production; and to evaluate the 

appropriate levels of resources

needed at the program office to 

oversee the contractor’s 

performance in meeting cost and

schedule targets. In written 

comments, the Department of

Commerce agreed with the 

recommendations and identified

plans for implementing them. 

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R 

system—which was estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the

first satellite ready for launch in 2012. It expects to award a contract in 

August 2007 to develop this system. However, according to program 

officials, NOAA’s plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the 

near future. Recent analyses of the GOES-R program cost—which in May 

2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion—have led the 

agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite 

series. NOAA officials estimated that a decision on the future scope and 

direction of the program could be made by the end of September 2006. 

NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite 

programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs—including 

a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite series, and 

various military satellite programs—often experienced technical challenges,

cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons from these programs 

include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule estimates,

(2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system’s components prior to 

key decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at government and 

contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to 

ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans to address these 

lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary 

studies of key technologies, placing resident government offices at key 

contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight 

committee. However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons (see

table). Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that 

the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and 

performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. 

Key Lessons Learned and the Activities Taken or Remaining to Fully Address Them 

Lesson learned Actions taken or under way Actions remaining 

Establish realistic cost and 

schedule estimates 

• Obtaining multiple 

independent cost estimates 

• Conducting risk analysis of 

schedule estimates 

• Ensuring objectivity 

when reconciling 

alternative estimates 

Ensure sufficient technical

readiness of the system’s

components prior to critical 

decisions

• Conducted preliminary 

studies of key technologies 

and components 

• Ensuring sufficient 

technical maturity

before proceeding to 

production 

Provide sufficient

management of contractors 

and subcontractors 

• Increased presence at

contractor sites 

• Plan to increase number of 

system engineers 

• Plan to hire three specialists 

in earned value 

• Assessing the number 

of earned value 

specialists needed 

commensurate with

increased acquisition 

activities 

Perform effective executivelevel oversight 

• NOAA’s program 

management council meets 

regularly to oversee project 

Source: GAO analysis. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-993.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Dave Powner 

at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

GOES-R Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System 

Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change 19 

The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Past 

Lessons Learned, but Significant Actions Remain 21 

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 29 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32 

Appendix II Current Shortfalls in Contractor Performance on Key 

Instrument Development 34 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Commerce 37 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41 

Tables 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES 6 

Table 2: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements 8 

Table 3: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006 9 

Table 4: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space

Systems 13

Table 5: Status of GOES-R Program Contracts, as of June 2006 19 

Table 6: GOES-R Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate, as of June

2006 20 

Table 7: GOES-R Program Schedule, as of June 2006 20 

Figures 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage 4 

Page i GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern 6 

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing 11 

Figure 4: Cumulative Cost Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract 

over an 11-month Period 35 

Figure 5: Cumulative Schedule Variance of the ABI Instrument 

Contract over an 11-month Period 36 

Abbreviations 

ABI Advanced Baseline Imager 

AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite System 

DOD Department of Defense 

GOES-R Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R 

 series 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and Information 

 Service 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

 System 

SBIRS-High Space Based Infrared System High Program 

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reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 6, 2006 

The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers 

Chairman 

The Honorable David Wu 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards 

Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers 

Chairman 

The Honorable David Wu 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards 

Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in 

our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are managed by 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—provide 

critical information on atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and solar 

conditions that help meteorologists observe and predict global and local 

weather events. They also provide the best means to identify severe storm 

conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and to track the movement 

and intensity of these storms once they develop.

Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in 

our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are managed by 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—provide 

critical information on atmospheric, oceanic, climatic, and solar 

conditions that help meteorologists observe and predict global and local 

weather events. They also provide the best means to identify severe storm 

conditions, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, and to track the movement 

and intensity of these storms once they develop.

NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), is planning to procure the next generation of geostationary 

satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R

series (GOES-R). The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of 

satellites which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 

approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark the first major 

technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also 

considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity

of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028.

NOAA, with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), is planning to procure the next generation of geostationary 

satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R

series (GOES-R). The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of 

satellites which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 

approximately 2012. This new series is expected to mark the first major 

technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also 

considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity

of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028.

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s management 

of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the 

status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identify 

and evaluate the actions that the program management team is taking to 

ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite 

programs are not repeated. 

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s management 

of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) determine the 

status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, and (2) identify 

and evaluate the actions that the program management team is taking to 

ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite 

programs are not repeated. 

To determine GOES-R status and plans, we reviewed program documents 

on the planned acquisition schedules, cost estimates, and system 

requirements, and interviewed program officials. To assess the program 

office’s actions to address lessons learned from past satellite programs, we 

analyzed lessons learned from past satellite programs—including a prior 

To determine GOES-R status and plans, we reviewed program documents 

on the planned acquisition schedules, cost estimates, and system 

requirements, and interviewed program officials. To assess the program 

office’s actions to address lessons learned from past satellite programs, we 

analyzed lessons learned from past satellite programs—including a prior 

Page 1 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
GOES satellite series (called GOES I-M), the National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), and selected 

military satellite programs. We analyzed program management documents, 

including data on a critical instrument’s development, to determine and 

evaluate plans for addressing past lessons. We also interviewed program 

officials from NOAA and NASA. 

We conducted our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the Washington, 

D.C., metropolitan area between December 2005 and August 2006, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I contains further details on our objectives, scope, and 

methodology. 

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R 

system, which is officially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to 

have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. To date, NOAA has issued 

contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three 

vendors and expects to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 

2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to reduce the risks associated 

with developing new instruments, NOAA has issued contracts for the early

development of one critical instrument and for the preliminary designs of 

four other instruments. The agency plans to turn these instrument 

contracts over to the vendor that is awarded the contract for the overall

GOES-R program. However, according to program officials, NOAA’s plans 

for the GOES-R procurement could change in the near future. Recent

analyses of the GOES-R program cost—which in May 2006 the program 

office estimated could reach $11.4 billion—have led the agency to consider 

reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. NOAA officials 

estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction of the program 

could be made by the end of September 2006. 

Results in Brief 

NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite 

programs, but more remains to be done. Prior satellite programs—

including a prior GOES series, a polar-orbiting environmental satellite 

series, and various military satellite programs—often experience technical

challenges, cost overruns, and schedule delays. Key lessons from these 

programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule 

estimates, (2) ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system’s 

components prior to key decisions, (3) provide sufficient management at

government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior 

executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established 

plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, 

Page 2 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident 

government offices at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior 

executive oversight committee. However, many steps remain to fully 

address these lessons. Specifically, NOAA has not yet developed a process 

to evaluate and reconcile the independent and government cost estimates. 

In addition, NOAA has not yet determined how it will ensure that a 

sufficient level of technical maturity will be achieved in time for an 

upcoming decision milestone, nor has it determined the appropriate level

of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee the program using 

earned value management.1

 Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces 

an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, 

schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past 

procurements. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to direct 

its NOAA Program Management Council to establish a process for 

objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and independent 

life cycle cost estimates once the program requirements are finalized; to 

establish a team of system engineering experts to perform a 

comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager instrument to 

determine the level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument 

before moving it into production; and to seek assistance in determining 

the appropriate levels of resources needed at the program office to 

adequately track and oversee the contractor’s earned value management 

data. 

The Department of Commerce provided written comments on a draft of

this report in which it agreed with our recommendations and identified 

planned steps for implementing them (see app. III). The department also 

provided technical corrections, which we have incorporated in this report 

as appropriate. 

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting environmental satellites 

have been used by the United States to provide meteorological data for 

weather observation, research, and forecasting. NOAA’s National 

Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) is 

responsible for managing the civilian geostationary and polar-orbiting 

Background 

 1

Earned value management is a method that compares the value of work accomplished 

during a given period with that of the work expected in that period. 

Page 3 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
satellite systems as two separate programs, called GOES and the Polar 

Operational Environmental Satellites, respectively. 

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the earth in a 

relatively low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a constant

view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space. NOAA 

operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused on the 

United States (see fig. 1). These satellites are uniquely positioned to 

provide timely environmental data to meteorologists and their audiences 

on the earth’s atmosphere, its surface, cloud cover, and the space 

environment. They also observe the development of hazardous weather, 

such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement 

and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. 

Furthermore, the satellites’ ability to provide broad, continuously updated 

coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and oceans is important to 

NOAA’s weather forecasting operations. 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage 

Sources: NOAA (data), MapArt (map).

GOES-11 GOES-12 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several satellites 

at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites every few years. 

Three satellites—GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13—are currently in orbit. 

Page 4 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational satellites, while GOES-13 is in 

an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the other two satellites should 

they experience any degradation in service. The others in the series, 

GOES-O and GOES-P, are planned for launch over the next few years.2

NOAA is also planning a future generation of satellites, known as the 

GOES-R series, which are planned for launch beginning in 2012. 

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits 

raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are processed 

at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite for broadcast 

to primary weather services both in the United States and around the 

world, including the global research community. Raw and processed data

are also distributed to users via ground stations through other 

communication channels, such as dedicated private communication lines 

and the Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from the 

geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial terminals. 

 2

Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet when they are on the ground 

and by numbers once they are in orbit. 

Page 5 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

Ground station

GOES satellite

Raw environmental data

sent to ground station

Processed environmental 

data sent back to GOES

Processed environmental 

data broadcast to users

User

User

Communications link

A Brief History of Prior 

GOES Series 

To date, NOAA has procured three series of GOES satellites and is in the 

planning stages to acquire a fourth one (see table 1). 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES 

Series name Procurement durationaSatellites 

Original GOESb1970–1987 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 

GOES I-M 1985–2001 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

GOES-N 1998–2011 13, O, P, Qc

GOES-R 2007–2020 R, S, T, U 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

a

Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite launch.

b

The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate contracts for (1) two early prototype 

satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on 

launch) and GOES-7. 

c

NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

Page 6 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on experimental 

geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While these satellites 

operated effectively for many years, they had technical limitations. For 

example, this series of satellites was “spin-stabilized,” meaning that the 

satellites slowly spun while in orbit to maintain a stable position with 

respect to the earth. As a result, the satellite viewed the earth only about 5 

percent of the time and had to collect data very slowly, capturing one 

narrow band of data each time its field-of-view swung past the earth. A 

complete set of sounding data took 2 to 3 hours to collect. 

Original GOES Satellites 

In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of GOES, 

called the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements developed by 

NOAA’s National Weather Service, NESDIS, and NASA, among others. 

GOES I-M consisted of five satellites, GOES-8 through GOES-12, and was a 

significant improvement in technology from the original GOES satellites. 

For example, GOES I-M was “body-stabilized,” meaning that the satellite 

held a fixed position in orbit relative to the earth, thereby allowing for 

continuous meteorological observations. Instead of maintaining stability 

by spinning, the satellite would preserve its fixed position by continuously 

making small adjustments in the rotation of internal momentum wheels or 

by firing small thrusters to compensate for drift. These and other 

enhancements meant that the GOES I-M satellites would be able to collect 

significantly better quality data more quickly than the older series of 

satellites. 

GOES I-M Series 

In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES I-M, 

called the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies for the 

instruments and added system upgrades, including an improved power 

subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing accuracy. Furthermore, the 

GOES-N satellites were designed to operate longer than its predecessors. 

This series originally consisted of four satellites, GOES-N through GOESQ. However, the option for the GOES-Q satellite was cancelled based on 

NOAA’s assessment that it would not need the final satellite to continue 

weather coverage. In particular, the agency found that the GOES satellites 

already in operation were lasting longer than expected and that the first 

satellite in the next series could be available to back up the last of the 

GOES-N satellites. As noted earlier, the first GOES-N series satellite—

GOES-13—was launched in May 2006. The GOES-O and GOES-P satellites 

are currently in production and are expected to be launched in July 2008 

and July 2011, respectively.

GOES-N Series 

NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES satellites, 

called the GOES-R series. This series will consist of four satellites, GOESPlanned GOES-R Series 

Page 7 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
R through GOES-U, and is intended to provide the first major 

technological advance in instrumentation since the first satellite of the 

GOES I-M series was launched in 1994.3

GOES-R Program—An 

Overview

NOAA is planning for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology 

of prior GOES series, in terms of both system and instrument

improvements. The system improvements are expected to fulfill more 

demanding user requirements and to provide more rapid information 

updates. Table 2 highlights key system-related improvements GOES-R is 

expected to make to the geostationary satellite program. 

Table 2: Summary of Key GOES-R System Improvements 

Key feature GOES-N (current) GOES-R 

Total products 41 ~152 

Downlink rate of raw data collected by 

instruments (from satellite to ground stations) 

2.6 Mbps 132 Mbps 

Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from 

satellite to users) 

2.1 Mbps 17–24 Mbps 

Raw data storage (the length of time that raw 

data will be stored at ground stations) 

0 days 30 days 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to significantly 

increase the clarity and precision of the observed environmental data.

NOAA plans to acquire five different types of instruments. The program 

office considers two of the instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager 

and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—to be most critical because 

they will provide data for key weather products. Table 3 summarizes the 

planned instruments and their expected capabilities. 

 3

The instruments were based on 1980s technology. 

Page 8 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Table 3: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006 

Planned instrument Description 

Advanced Baseline Imager Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric information of the earth’s surface, 

atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key features include 

• monitoring and tracking severe weather, 

• providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and 

• providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage simultaneously. 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite Expected to provide information about the earth’s surface to aid in the prediction of weather

and climate monitoring. Key features include 

• providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support forecasts and climate

monitoring, 

• monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, coastal erosion, and harmful 

algal blooms, and 

• providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in the prediction of particle 

precipitation, which causes disturbance and disruption of radio communications and 

navigation systems. Key features include 

• measuring magnetic fields and charged particles, 

• providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons and protons, and 

• enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, telecom services, astronauts, 

and airlines. 

Solar Imaging Suite Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range of solar X-ray features, from 

coronal holes to X-class flares, as well as estimate the measure of temperature and 

emissions. Key features include

• providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor solar storms and 

• providing improved imager capability. 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over the United States and provide a more 

complete dataset than previously possible. Key features include 

• detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and 

• providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on polar satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

The program management structure for the GOES-R program differs from 

past GOES programs. Prior to the GOES-R series, NOAA was responsible 

for program funding, procurement of the ground elements, and on-orbit 

operation of the satellites, while NASA was responsible for the 

procurement of the spacecraft, instruments, and launch services. NOAA 

officials stated that this approach limited the agency’s insight and 

management involvement in the procurement of major elements of the 

system. 

GOES-R Program Office 

Structure 

Alternatively, under the GOES-R management structure, NOAA has 

responsibility for the procurement and operation of the overall system—

Page 9 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
including spacecraft, instruments, and launch services. NASA is 

responsible for the procurement of the individual instruments until they 

are transferred to the overall GOES-R system contractor for completion 

and integration onto the spacecraft. Additionally, to take advantage of 

NASA’s acquisition experience and technical expertise, NOAA located the 

GOES-R program office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. It also 

designated key program management positions to be filled with NASA 

personnel (see fig. 3). These positions include the deputy system program 

director role for advanced instrument and technology infusion, the project 

manager for the flight portion of the system, and the deputy project 

manager for the ground and operations portion of the system. NOAA 

officials explained that they changed the management structure for the 

GOES-R program in order to streamline oversight and fiduciary 

responsibilities, but that they still plan to rely on NASA’s expertise in 

space system acquisitions. 

Page 10 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Structure and Staffing

Source: NOAA.

Program Scientist: 

NOAA

Program Control

Lead: NOAA

Program Mission Assurance

Lead: NASA

Program Systems

Engineering

Lead: NOAA

Contracts

Lead: NOAA

Flight Project

Project Manager: NASA

Deputy: NOAA

Operations Project

Project Manager: NOAA

Deputy: NASA

Commerce

System Program Director: NOAA

Deputy System Program Director: NOAA

Deputy System Program Director for Advanced

 Instrument and Technology Infusion: NASA

NESDIS

NOAA

Satellite Programs Often 

Experience Technical 

Problems, Cost Overruns, 

and Schedule Delays 

Satellite programs are often technically complex and risky undertakings, 

and as a result, they often experience technical problems, cost overruns, 

and schedule delays. We and others have reported on a historical pattern 

of repeated missteps in the procurement of major satellite systems, 

including the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS), the GOES I-M series, the Space Based Infrared System

High Program (SBIRS-High), and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency

Page 11 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Satellite System (AEHF).

4

 Table 4 lists key problems experienced with 

these programs and is followed by a summary of each program. 

 4

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and Keys to Addressing 

Them, GAO-06-776R (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program’s Direction 

on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays

Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16,

2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and

Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); Defense Acquisitions: 

Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule 

Overruns, GAO-04-48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2003); Military Space Operations: 

Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO-03-825R 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon 

Programs, GAO-03-476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather Satellites: Action 

Needed to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, GAO/NSIAD-91-252 

(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory 

Board Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs 

(May 2003). 

Page 12 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Table 4: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems 

Problem NPOESS GOES I-M SBIRS–High AEHF

Insufficient technical readiness prior to critical decision points

Inadequate preliminary studies prior to the decision to award a development 

contract 

X X X

Insufficient technical maturity prior to the decision to move to production X X X X 

Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates

Optimistic assumptions including:

• savings from heritage systems X X X

• readiness of technology maturity X X X X

• constant and available industrial base X

• no weight growth X X X

• no requirements growth X

• savings from lot buys versus single-unit purchase X

• overly aggressive schedule X X X X

Poor program and contractor management

Quality and subcontractor issues X X X X 

Inadequate systems engineering capabilities X X X X 

Inadequate earned value management capabilities X X X 

Insufficient management reserve X X 

Ineffective contract award fee structure X X X 

Poor senior executive level oversight

Infrequent meetings X 

Inability to make timely decisions X 

Other

Unstable funding stream X X X 

Unstable requirements X X 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data. 

NPOESS is being developed to combine two separate polar-orbiting 

environmental satellite systems currently operated by NOAA and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) into a single state-of-the-art environment 

monitoring system. A tri-agency program office—comprised of officials 

from DOD, NOAA, and NASA—is responsible for managing this program. 

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities. 

NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the converged 

system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the acquisition; 

and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the development and 

incorporation of new technologies into the converged system. 

National Polar-orbiting

Operational Environmental 

Satellite System 

Page 13 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Since its inception, the NPOESS program has encountered cost overruns 

and schedule delays. Specifically, within a year of the contract award, the 

program cost estimate increased by $1.2 billion, from $6.9 billion to $8.1 

billion, and the expected availability of the first satellite was delayed by 20 

months. We reported in September 2004 that these cost increases and 

schedule delays were caused, in part, by changes in the NPOESS funding 

stream.5

 Subsequently, in November 2005, we reported that problems in 

the development of a critical sensor would likely cause program costs to 

grow by at least another $3 billion and the schedule for the first launch 

would likely be delayed by almost 3 years.6

 The senior executive oversight 

committee for NPOESS was expected to make a decision in December 

2005 on the direction of the program—which involved increased costs, 

delayed schedules, and reduced functionality. We urged this committee to 

make a decision quickly so that the program could proceed. However, in 

late November 2005, the NPOESS program’s anticipated cost growth 

triggered a legislative requirement forcing DOD to reassess its options and 

to recertify the program.7

 In June 2006, DOD decided to reduce the 

system’s capabilities and number of satellites from six to four, and 

announced that the newly-restructured program was estimated to cost 

$11.5 billion and the launch of the first satellite had been delayed by at

least 4 years from the time the contract was awarded. 

NPOESS’ problems involved a number of factors, including unrealistic 

cost and schedule estimates, insufficient technical maturity of critical 

sensors at a key development milestone, poor performance at multiple 

levels of contractor and government management, insufficient executive 

oversight, and excessive award fee payments to the contractor. 

Specifically, in 2003, an Air Force cost group performed an independent 

cost estimate for NPOESS and found that, based on actual outcomes from 

historical programs similar to NPOESS, the program office underestimated 

contract costs by almost $1 billion. This group also concluded that the 

program office underestimated the required time needed to integrate the 

sensors onto the spacecraft by almost 80 percent. Despite the differences

in planned cost and schedule, the program office moved forward with its 

 5

GAO-04-1054. 

6

GAO-06-573T and GAO-06-249T. 

7

10 U.S.C. section 2433, as amended by Pub. Law No. 109-163, Div. A, section 802 (Jan. 6, 

2006). 

Page 14 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
own estimates—and, in turn, established unrealistic budgets that led, in

part, to the eventual restructuring of the program. 

Further, an independent review team charged with assessing the NPOESS 

program found that the program management office did not sufficiently 

validate the subcontractors’ design work on various sensors. As a result, 

the sensors were approved to move into production before they reached a 

sufficient level of technical maturity. This resulted in unexpected technical 

problems during sensor production.

We also reported that the development issues on one critical sensor were 

attributed, in part, to the subcontractor’s inadequate project management.8

Specifically, after a series of technical problems, internal review teams 

sent by the prime contractor and the program office found that the 

sensor’s subcontractor had deviated from a number of contract, 

management, and policy directives set out by the main office and that both 

management and process engineering were inadequate. Neither the 

contractor nor the program office recognized the underlying problems in 

time to fix them. Further, an independent review team reported that the 

program management office did not have the technical system engineering 

support it needed to effectively manage the contractor. In addition, the 

program office and contractor set aside less than 10 percent of their 

budgets in management reserve—an amount which was insufficient to 

effectively deal with these technical problems. With just 2 years into the 

contract, the prime contractor had spent or allocated over 90 percent of its 

reserves. 

The involvement of the NPOESS executive leadership committee was also 

inconsistent and indecisive—it wavered from frequent heavy involvement 

to occasional meetings with few resulting decisions. In the 32-month 

period from May 2003 through December 2005, the committee met 

formally six times. Despite mounting evidence of the seriousness of the 

critical sensor problems, the committee did not effectively challenge the 

program manager’s optimistic assessments, and from May 2003 through 

December 2004, convened only twice to consider the program’s status.9

 8

GAO-06-249T. 

9

Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and

Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, 

OIG-17794-6-0001 (May 8, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
In May 2006, the Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) Inspector 

General reported that the NPOESS award fee structure was not an 

effective system for promoting high-quality performance by the contractor. 

Despite the significant delays and cost overruns on the program, the 

contractor received about 84 percent of the available fee pool for the first 

six billing periods. 

In its development of the GOES I-M series, NOAA experienced severe 

technical challenges, massive cost overruns, and risky schedule delays. 

The overall development cost of the program was over three times greater 

than planned, escalating from $640 million to approximately $2 billion.

Additionally, the launch of the first satellite of this series, which had been 

planned for July 1989, did not occur until April 1994. This nearly 5-year 

schedule delay left NOAA in danger of losing geostationary satellite 

coverage, although no gap in coverage occurred. We reported that these 

problems were caused by a number of factors, including insufficient 

technical readiness of the satellite design prior to contract award, 

unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, and inadequate management by 

NOAA and NASA.10

GOES I-M Series 

Specifically, NOAA and NASA did not require any engineering analyses to 

be completed prior to the award of the GOES I-M contract. As a result, 

both agencies were unable to anticipate the level of complexity of NOAA’s 

requirements (related to the satellite’s pointing accuracy) or the 

contractor’s approach to meeting those requirements. This unanticipated

design complexity led to additional analyses, redesigns, and 

remanufacture of parts, which resulted in increased costs and schedule 

delays. Additionally, the lack of adequate understanding of the system 

prior to contract award also prevented program officials from establishing 

realistic cost and schedule estimates for the program. 

The inadequate management of the GOES I-M program—by both the 

government and contractor—played a significant part in its cost increases 

and program delays. Specifically, NASA and NOAA made the decision to

forgo preliminary studies of the system because of fiscal constraints and 

pressure to launch the first satellite as quickly as possible. This decision 

was compounded by NASA’s limited technical support in the areas of 

optics, satellite control systems, and thermal engineering. Additionally, 

both the prime contractor and major subcontractor had little experience in 

 10GAO/NSIAD-91-252. 

Page 16 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
directing the design of complex weather instruments. The subcontractor 

had also noted that it was not prepared for GOES I-M. For example, the 

instruments were expected to meet manufacturing and testing standards 

that the subcontractor had never experienced before. We recommended 

Congress consider directing NASA and NOAA to report on their progress 

in resolving these problems and the timeframe and cost for achieving 

proposed solutions. Further, we recommended that funds for the 

production and testing of the satellites be withheld until a favorable 

solution was identified and reported to Congress. 

SBIRS-High satellites are being developed to replace DOD’s older missile 

warning satellites. In addition to missile warning and missile defense 

missions, the satellites are also expected to perform technical intelligence 

and battlespace characterization missions. After the program was initiated 

in 1994, it faced cost, scheduling, and technology problems. SBIRS-High 

had experienced schedule slips of at least 6 years and cost increases that 

have triggered legislative requirements to reassess and recertify the 

program several times—most recently in 2005. While DOD’s total program 

cost estimate was initially about $3.9 billion, it is now $9.9 billion—nearly 

a 150 percent unit cost increase. DOD is currently reexamining this 

program, potential alternatives, and cost estimates. 

Space Based Infrared System 

High Program 

Our reviews have attributed past problems on the SBIRS-High program to 

serious hardware and software design problems, insufficient oversight of 

contractors, and technology challenges.11 Further, an independent review 

team chartered by DOD reported that a root cause of these problems was 

that system requirements were not well understood by DOD when the 

program began. Specifically, the requirements-setting process was often ad 

hoc, many decisions on requirements were deferred to the contractor, and 

the program was too immature to enter system design and development. 

As a result, there was too much instability on the program after the 

contract award—leading DOD to undertake four major replanning efforts. 

We made multiple recommendations to improve this program, including 

commissioning an independent task force to assess the development 

schedule, the stability of the program design, and software development 

practices, and to provide guidance for addressing the program’s 

underlying problems. In addition, we recommended that DOD establish a 

mechanism for ensuring that the knowledge gained from the assessment 

was used to determine whether further programmatic changes were 

 11GAO-04-48 and GAO-03-476. 

Page 17 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
needed to strengthen oversight, adjust cost and schedule estimates, and 

address requirements changes. 

AEHF is a satellite system intended to be DOD’s next generation of highspeed, protected communication satellites and to replace the existing 

Milstar system. In 2003, we reported that cost estimates developed by the 

Air Force for this program increased from $4.4 billion in January 1999 to 

$5.6 billion in June 2001 for five satellites.12 Moreover, DOD would not 

meet its accelerated target date for launching the first satellite in 

December 2004. To minimize costs, DOD then decided to purchase three 

satellites with options to purchase the fourth and fifth—which brought the 

program cost to $4.7 billion. Despite this action, AEHF costs grew to about 

$6.1 billion—an increase of more than 15 percent over the baseline 

estimate, which triggered legislative requirements to assess and certify the

program. Schedule slippages for launching this communication system 

have now stretched to over 3 years. 

Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency Satellite System 

A number of factors contributed to cost and schedule overruns and 

performance shortfalls. First, in the early phases of the AEHF program, 

DOD substantially and frequently altered requirements—resulting in major 

design modifications that increased costs by millions of dollars. For 

instance, a new requirement for additional anti-jamming protection led to

a cost increase of $100 million and an added set of requirements for 

training, support, and maintainability that cost an additional $90 million. 

Second, based on a satellite constellation gap caused by the failure of a 

Milstar satellite, DOD accepted a high-risk schedule that turned out to be 

overly optimistic and highly compressed—leaving little room for error and 

depending on a chain of events taking place at certain times. Third, AEHF 

allocated 4 percent of its budget to management reserve—which was an 

inadequate amount to cover unforeseen problems for the duration of the 

program. Between December 2002 and June 2005, the contractor had 

depleted about 86 percent of its reserves with 5 years remaining on the 

contract. Lastly, at the time DOD decided to accelerate the program, it did 

not have the funding needed to support the activities or the manpower 

needed to design and build the satellites more quickly. The lack of funding

also contributed to schedule delays, which in turn, caused more cost 

increases. We made a number of recommendations to improve this 

program and others, including implementing processes and policies that 

stabilize requirements and addressing shortfalls in staff with science and 

 12GAO-03-825R and GAO-03-476. 

Page 18 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
engineering backgrounds. These recommendations were made to assure 

that DOD had an investment strategy in place that would better match 

resources to requirements. 

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase on its GOES-R 

program and plans to award a contract for the system’s development in 

August 2007; however, because of concerns with potential cost growth, 

NOAA’s plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the near 

future. To date, NOAA has issued contracts for the preliminary design of 

the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expects to award a 

contract to one of these vendors to develop the system in August 2007. In

addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing new instruments, 

NASA has issued contracts for the early development of one critical 

instrument and for the preliminary designs of four other instruments. The 

agency plans to award these contracts and then turn them over to the 

contractor responsible for the overall GOES-R program. However, this 

approach is under review and NOAA may wait until the instruments are 

fully developed before turning them over to the system contractor. Table 5 

provides a summary of the status of contracts for the GOES-R program. 

GOES-R Procurement 

Activities Are Under 

Way, but System 

Requirements and 

Cost Estimates May 

Change 

Table 5: Status of GOES-R Program Contracts, as of June 2006 

Contract item

Date contract was 

awarded for design

Planned date contract 

will be awarded for 

development 

Instruments 

Advanced Baseline Imager May 2001 September 2004 (actual)

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite December 2004 August 2006 

Solar Imaging Suite September 2004 September 2006 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite June 2004 June 2007 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper February 2006 August 2007 

GOES-R System 

Acquisition and Operations October 2005 August 2007 

Source: NOAA. 

According to program documentation provided to the Office of 

Management and Budget in 2005, the current life cycle cost estimate for 

GOES-R is approximately $6.2 billion (see table 6). However, program 

officials reported that this estimate is over 2 years old and is under review. 

Page 19 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Table 6: GOES-R Program Life Cycle Cost Estimate, as of June 2006 

Major cost category Dollars in millions

System level $533

Space segment 2,494

Ground segments 729

Launch segment 686

Operations and support 1,147

Government program office 637

Total $6,226

Source: NOAA. 

NOAA is tentatively planning to launch the first GOES-R series satellite in

September 2012. The development of the schedule for launching the 

satellites was driven by a requirement that the satellites be available to 

back up the last remaining GOES satellites (GOES-O and GOES-P) should 

anything go wrong during the planned launches of these satellites. Table 7 

provides a summary of the planned launch schedule for the GOES-R 

series. 

Table 7: GOES-R Program Schedule, as of June 2006 

Milestone Planned date

GOES-O launchaApril 2008 

GOES-P launchaOctober 2009b

GOES-R satellite available for launch September 2012 

GOES-S satellite available for launch April 2014 

GOES-T satellite available for launch October 2015 

GOES-U satellite available for launch April 2017 

End of operations and maintenance 2028 

Source: NOAA. 

a

GOES-O and GOES-P are not part of the GOES-R series program. Their launch dates are provided 

because of their relevance to the GOES-R series satellite schedules. 

b

Because GOES satellites have been operating longer than expected, NOAA is considering moving 

the planned launch of the GOES-P satellite to July 2011. 

Commerce is scheduled to make a major acquisition decision before the 

end of this year. Commerce will decide whether or not the GOES-R series

should proceed into the development and production phase in December 

2006. Program officials reported that the final request for proposal on the 

Page 20 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
GOES-R contract would be released upon completion of this decision 

milestone. 

However, NOAA’s plans for the GOES-R procurement could change in the 

near future because of concerns with potential cost growth. Given its 

experiences with cost growth on the NPOESS acquisition, NOAA recently 

asked program officials to recalculate the total cost of the estimated $6.2

billion GOES-R program. In May 2006, program officials estimated that the 

life cycle cost could reach $11.4 billion. The agency then requested that 

the program identify options for reducing the scope of requirements for 

the satellite series. Program officials reported that there are over 10 viable

options under consideration, including options for removing one or more 

of the planned instruments. The program office is also reevaluating its 

planned acquisition schedule based on the potential program options. 

Specifically, program officials stated that if there is a decision to make a 

major change in system requirements, they will likely extend the 

preliminary design phase, delay the decision to proceed into the 

development and production phase, and delay the contract award date. 

NOAA officials estimated that a decision on the future scope and direction 

of the program could be made by the end of September 2006. 

NOAA has taken steps to apply lessons learned from problems 

encountered on other satellite programs to the GOES-R procurement. Key 

lessons include (1) establishing realistic cost and schedule estimates, 

(2) ensuring sufficient technical readiness of the system’s components 

prior to key decisions, (3) providing sufficient management at government

and contractor levels, and (4) performing adequate senior executive

oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA has established plans designed 

to mitigate the problems faced in past acquisitions; however, many 

activities remain to fully address these lessons. Until it completes these 

activities, NOAA faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will 

repeat the increased cost, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that 

have plagued past procurements. 

The GOES-R Program 

Office Has Taken 

Steps to Address Past 

Lessons Learned, but 

Significant Actions 

Remain 

Page 21 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
We and others have reported that space system acquisitions are strongly 

biased to produce unrealistically low cost and schedule estimates in the 

acquisition process. For example, we testified last July on the continued 

large cost increases and schedule delays being encountered on military 

space acquisition programs—including NPOESS, SBIRS-High, and AEHF.13

We noted that during program formulation, the competition to win funding 

is intense and has led program sponsors to minimize their program cost 

estimates.14 Furthermore, a task force chartered by DOD to review the 

acquisition of military space programs found that independent cost 

estimates and government program assessments have proven ineffective in 

countering this tendency.15 NOAA programs face similar unrealistic 

estimates. For example, the total development cost of the GOES I-M 

acquisition was over three times greater than planned, escalating from 

$640 million to $2 billion. The delivery of the first satellite was delayed by 

5 years. 

NOAA Is Taking Steps to 

Improve the Reliability of 

Cost and Schedule 

Estimates, but Key Steps 

Remain in Reconciling 

Cost Estimates 

NOAA has several efforts under way to improve the reliability of its cost 

and schedule estimates for the GOES-R program. NOAA’s Chief Financial 

Officer has contracted with a cost-estimating firm to complete an 

independent cost estimate, while the GOES-R program office has hired a 

support contractor to assist with its internal program cost estimating. The 

program office is re-assessing its estimates based on preliminary 

information from the three vendors contracted to develop preliminary 

designs for the overall GOES-R system. Once the program office and 

independent cost estimates are completed, program officials intend to 

compare them and to develop a revised programmatic cost estimate that 

will be used in its decision on whether to proceed into system 

development and production. In addition, NOAA has planned for an 

independent review team—consisting of former senior industry and 

government space acquisition experts—to provide an assessment of the 

program office and independent cost estimates for this decision milestone. 

To improve its schedule reliability, the program office is currently 

conducting a schedule risk analysis in order to estimate the amount of 

adequate reserve funds and schedule margin needed to deal with 

unexpected problems and setbacks. Finally, the NOAA Observing System 

 13GAO, Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment Planning 

Needed to Address Continuing Problems, GAO-05-891T (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005). 

14GAO-05-891T. 

15Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on 

the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (May 2003). 

Page 22 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Council16 submitted a prioritized list of GOES-R system requirements to 

the Commerce Undersecretary for approval. This list is expected to allow 

the program office to act quickly in deleting lower priority requirements in 

the event of severe technical challenges or shifting funding streams. 

While NOAA acknowledges the need to establish realistic cost and 

schedule estimates, several hurdles remain. As discussed earlier, the 

agency is considering reducing the requirements for the GOES-R program 

to mitigate the increased cost estimates for the program. Therefore, the 

agency’s efforts to date to establish realistic cost estimates cannot be fully 

effective in addressing this lesson until this uncertainty is resolved. NOAA 

suspended the work being performed by its independent cost estimator 

until a decision is made on the scope of the program. Further, the agency 

has not yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the independent 

and program office cost estimates once final program decisions are made. 

Without this process, the agency may lack the objectivity necessary to 

counter the optimism of program sponsors and is more likely to move 

forward with an unreliable estimate. Until it completes this activity, NOAA 

faces an increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the cost 

increases and schedule delays that have plagued past procurements. 

NOAA Is Conducting 

Preliminary Studies in 

Order to Avoid Technical 

Problems in Later 

Acquisition Phases, but 

Steps Remain in 

Determining Components’ 

Technical Maturity 

Space programs often experience unforeseen technical problems in the 

development of critical components as a result of having insufficient 

knowledge of the components and their supporting technologies prior to 

key decision points. One key decision point is when an agency decides on

whether the component is sufficiently ready to proceed from a preliminary 

study phase into a development phase; this decision point results in the 

award of the development contract. Another key decision point occurs 

during the development phase when an agency decides whether the 

component is ready to proceed from design into production (also called

the critical design review). Without sufficient technical readiness at these 

milestones, agencies could proceed into development contracts on 

components that are not well understood and enter into the production 

phase of development with technologies that are not yet mature. For 

example: 

 16NOAA’s Observing System Council is the principal advisory council for NOAA’s earth

observation and data management activities. It includes members from each NOAA line 

office, other relevant councils, and program offices. The Assistant Administrator for 

Satellite and Information Services and the Assistant Administrator for Weather Services 

serve as the co-chairs of the council. 

Page 23 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
• On the GOES I-M series, NOAA and NASA did not require engineering 

analyses prior to awarding the development contracts in order to 

accelerate the schedule and launch the first satellite. The lack of these 

studies resulted in unexpected technical issues in later acquisition 

phases—including the inability of the original instrument designs to 

withstand the temperature variations in the geostationary orbit. 

• Both the NPOESS and SBIRS-High programs committed funds for system 

development before the design was proven and before the technologies 

had properly matured. For instance, at the critical design review milestone 

for a key NPOESS sensor, the program office decided that the sensor was 

ready to proceed into production even though an engineering model had

not been constructed. This sensor has since faced severe technical 

challenges that directly led to program-wide cost and schedule overruns. 

To address the lesson learned from the GOES I-M experience, in 1997,

NOAA began preliminary studies on technologies that could be used on 

the GOES-R instruments. These studies target existing technologies and 

assessed how they could be expanded for GOES-R. The program office is 

also conducting detailed trade-off studies on the integrated system to 

improve its ability to make decisions that balance performance, 

affordability, risk, and schedule. For instance, the program office is 

analyzing the potential architectures for the GOES-R constellation of 

satellites—the quantity and configuration of satellites, including how the 

instruments will be distributed over these satellites. These studies are 

expected to allow for a more mature definition of the system 

specifications. 

NOAA has also developed plans to have an independent review team 

assess project status on an annual basis once the overall system contract 

has been awarded. In particular, this team will review technical, 

programmatic, and management areas; identify any outstanding risks; and 

recommend corrective actions. This measure is designed to ensure that 

sufficient technical readiness has been reached prior to the critical design 

review milestone. The program office’s ongoing studies and plans are 

expected to provide greater insight into the technical requirements for key 

system components and to mitigate the risk of unforeseen problems in 

later acquisition phases. 

However, the progress currently being made on the only instrument 

currently under development—the Advanced Baseline Imager—has 

experienced technical problems and could be an indication of more 

problems to come in the future. These problems relate to, among other 

Page 24 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
things, the design complexity of the instrument’s detectors and 

electronics. As a result, the contractor is experiencing negative cost and 

schedule performance trends. As of May 2006, the contractor incurred a 

total cost overrun of almost $6 million with the instrument’s development 

only 28 percent complete. In addition, from June 2005 to May 2006, it was 

unable to complete approximately $3.3 million worth of work. Unless risk 

mitigation actions are aggressively pursued to reverse these trends, we 

project the cost overrun at completion to be about $23 million. (See app. II

for further detail on the Advanced Baseline Imager’s cost and schedule 

performance.) 

While NOAA expects to make a decision on whether to move the 

instrument into production (a milestone called the critical design review) 

in January 2007, the contractor’s current performance raises questions as 

to whether the instrument designs will be sufficiently mature by that time. 

Further, the agency does not have a process to validate the level of 

technical maturity achieved on this instrument or to determine whether 

the contractor has implemented sound management and process 

engineering to ensure that the appropriate level of technical readiness can 

be achieved prior to the decision milestone. Until it does so, NOAA risks 

making a poor decision based on inaccurate or insufficient information—

which could lead to unforeseen technical problems in the development of

this instrument. 

In the past, we have reported on poor performance in the management of 

satellite acquisitions.17 The key drivers of poor management included 

inadequate systems engineering and earned value management

18

capabilities, unsuitable allocation of contract award fees, inadequate 

levels of management reserve, and inefficient decision-making and 

reporting structure within the program office. The NPOESS program office 

lacked adequate program control capabilities in systems engineering and 

Efforts to Strengthen 

Government and 

Contractor Management 

are Under Way, but 

Significant Work on 

Program Controls Remains 

 17GAO-06-573T, GAO-06-249T, GAO/NSIAD-91-252, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid 

Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-06-66 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005), and Weather Satellites: Cost Growth and Development

Delays Jeopardize U.S. Forecasting Ability, GAO/NSIAD-89-169 (Washington, D.C.: June 

30, 1989). 

18Earned value management is a method, used by DOD for several decades, to track a 

contractor’s progress in meeting project deliverables. It compares the value of work 

accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected in that period. 

Differences from expectations are measured in both cost and schedule variances. 

Page 25 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
earned value management to effectively manage the contractor’s cost, 

schedule, and technical performance. Furthermore, Commerce’s Inspector 

General reported that NOAA awarded the NPOESS contractor excessive

award fees for a program plagued with severe technical problems and a 

consistent failure to meet cost and schedule targets.19 Additionally, on 

SBIRS-High, the program management office had fewer systems engineers 

than other historical space programs. As a result, the program did not have 

enough engineers to handle the workload of ensuring that system 

requirements properly flowed down into the designs of the system’s 

components. Further, the NPOESS and AEHF programs had less than 5 

percent of funds allocated to management reserve at the start of the 

system’s development and spent or allocated over 85 percent of that 

reserve within 3 years of beginning development. On GOES I-M, NOAA 

found that it did not have the ability to make quick decisions on problems 

because the program office was managed by another agency.

NOAA has taken numerous steps to restructure its management approach

on the GOES-R procurement in an effort to improve performance and to 

avoid past mistakes. These steps include: 

• The program office revised its staffing profile to provide for government 

staff to be located on-site at prime contractor and key subcontractor 

locations. 

• The program office plans to increase the number of resident systems 

engineers from 31 to 54 to provide adequate government oversight of the 

contractor’s system engineering, including verification and validation of 

engineering designs at key decision points (such as the critical design 

review milestone). 

• The program office has better defined the role and responsibilities of the 

program scientist, the individual who is expected to maintain an 

independent voice with regard to scientific matters and advise the 

program manager on related technical issues and risks. 

• The program office also intends to add three resident specialists in earned 

value management to monitor contractor cost and schedule performance. 

 19Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and

Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, 

OIG-17794-6-0001 (May 8, 2006). 

Page 26 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
• NOAA has work under way to develop the GOES-R contract award fee 

structure and the award fee review board that is consistent with our recent 

findings, the Commerce Inspector General’s findings, and other best 

practices, such as designating a non-program executive as the feedetermining official to ensure objectivity in the allocation of award fees. 

• NOAA and NASA have implemented a more integrated management 

approach that is designed to draw on NASA’s expertise in satellite 

acquisitions and increase NOAA’s involvement on all major components of 

the acquisition. 

• The program office reported that it intended to establish a management 

reserve of 25 percent consistent with the recommendations of the Defense 

Science Board Report on Acquisition of National Security Space 

Programs.20

While these steps should provide more robust government oversight and 

independent analysis capabilities, more work remains to be done to fully 

address this lesson. Specifically, the program office has not determined 

the appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee

the program and the planned addition of three earned value management 

specialists may not be enough as acquisition activities increase. By 

contrast, after its recent problems and in response to the independent 

review team findings, NPOESS program officials plan to add 10 program 

staff dedicated to earned value, cost, and schedule analysis. An insufficient 

level of established capabilities in earned value management places the 

GOES-R program office at risk of making poor decisions based on 

inaccurate and potentially misleading information. Finally, while NOAA 

officials believe that assuming sole responsibility for the acquisition of 

GOES-R will improve their ability to manage the program effectively, this

change also elevates NOAA’s risk for mission success. Specifically, NOAA 

is taking on its first major system acquisition and an increased risk due to 

its lack of experience. Until it fully addresses the lesson of ensuring an 

appropriate level of resources to oversee its contractor, NOAA faces an 

increased risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the management and 

contractor performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. 

 20Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on 

the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs (May 2003). 

Page 27 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
We and others have reported on NOAA’s significant deficiencies in its 

senior executive oversight of NPOESS.21 The lack of timely decisions and 

regular involvement of senior executive management was a critical factor 

in the program’s rapid cost and schedule growth. The senior executive 

committee was provided with monthly status reports that consistently 

described in explicit detail the growing costs and delays attributable to the 

development of a key instrument. Despite mounting evidence of the 

seriousness of the instrument’s problems, this committee convened only 

twice between May 2003 and December 2004 to consider the program’s 

status. 

NOAA formed its program management council in response to the lack of

adequate senior executive oversight on NPOESS. In particular, this council 

is expected to provide regular reviews and assessments of selected NOAA 

programs and projects—the first of which is the GOES-R program. The 

council is headed by the NOAA Deputy Undersecretary and includes 

senior officials from Commerce and NASA. The council is expected to 

hold meetings to discuss GOES-R program status on a monthly basis and 

to approve the program’s entry into subsequent acquisition phases at key 

decision milestones—including contract award and critical design 

reviews, among others. Since its establishment in January 2006, the

council has met regularly and has established a mechanism for tracking 

action items to closure. 

The establishment of the NOAA Program Management Council is a 

positive action that should support the agency’s senior-level governance of 

the GOES-R program. In moving forward, it is important that this council 

continue to meet on a regular basis and exercise diligence in questioning 

the data presented to it and making difficult decisions. In particular, it will 

be essential that the results of all preliminary studies and independent 

assessments on technical maturity of the system and its components be 

reviewed by this council so that an informed decision can be made about 

the level of technical complexity it is taking on when proceeding past 

these key decision milestones. In light of the recent uncertainty regarding

the future scope and cost of the GOES-R program, the council’s 

NOAA Has Established a 

Senior Executive 

Committee to Perform 

Critical Oversight of the 

GOES-R Program 

 21GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place

Program’s Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006); 

Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and

Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, 

OIG-17794-6-0001 (May 8, 2006). 

Page 28 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
governance will be critical in making those difficult decisions in a timely 

manner. 

Procurement activities are under way for the next series of geostationary 

environmental satellites, called the GOES-R series—which is scheduled to

launch its first satellite in September 2012. With the GOES-R system 

development contract planned for award in August 2007, NOAA is 

positioning itself to improve the acquisition of this system by 

incorporating the lessons learned from other satellite procurements, 

including the need to establish realistic cost estimates, ensure sufficient 

government and contractor management, and obtain effective executive 

oversight. However, further steps remain to fully address selected lessons. 

Specifically, NOAA has not yet developed a process to evaluate and 

reconcile the independent and government cost estimates. In addition, 

NOAA has not yet determined how it will ensure that a sufficient level of 

technical maturity will be achieved in time for an upcoming decision 

milestone, or determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to 

adequately track and oversee the program using earned value

management. Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces an increased

risk that the GOES-R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule 

delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. 

Recent concerns about the potential for cost growth on the GOES-R 

procurement have led the agency to consider reducing the scope of 

requirements for the satellite series. A decision on the future scope and 

direction of the program could by made by the end of September 2006. 

Once the decision is made, it will be important to move quickly to 

implement the decision in the agency budgets and contracts. 

To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the procurement of the 

GOES-R system, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct its

NOAA Program Management Council to take the following three actions:

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Once the scope of the program has been finalized, establish a process for 

objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and independent 

life cycle cost estimates. 

• Perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline Imager, using 

system engineering experts, to determine the level of technical maturity 

achieved on the instrument, to assess whether the contractor has 

implemented sound management and process engineering, and to assert 

Page 29 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
that the technology is sufficiently mature before moving the instrument 

into production. 

• Seek assistance from an independent review team to determine the 

appropriate level of resources needed at the program office to adequately

track and oversee the contractor’s earned value management. Among 

other things, the program office should be able to perform a 

comprehensive integrated baseline review after system development 

contract award, provide surveillance of contractor earned value 

management systems, and perform project scheduling analyses and cost 

estimates. 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Department of Commerce (see app. III). In the department’s response, the 

Deputy Secretary of Commerce agreed with our recommendations and 

identified plans for implementing them. Specifically, the department noted 

that it plans to establish a process for reconciling government and 

independent cost estimates and to evaluate the process and results with an 

independent team of recognized senior experts in the satellite acquisition 

field. The department also noted that an independent review team is 

planning to perform assessments of the technical maturity of the 

Advanced Baseline Imager and the extent to which the program 

management structure and reporting process will provide adequate 

oversight of the GOES-R system acquisition. Additionally, the department 

expressed concern regarding our use of a cost estimate that they 

considered to be premature and misleading. During the course of our 

review, NOAA provided us with a cost estimate that was later determined 

by agency officials to be inaccurate and was subsequently corrected. We

have incorporated the revised cost estimate of $11.4 billion for the overall 

GOES-R program to ensure that all cost estimates reported at this time are 

accurate. 

The department provided additional technical corrections, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 30 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 

of NASA, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other 

interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on

our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

David A. Powner 

Director, Information Technology 

 Management Issues 

Page 31 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of and plans for the 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R) 

procurement and (2) identify and evaluate the actions that the project 

management team is taking to ensure that past problems experienced in

procuring other satellite programs are not repeated. To accomplish these 

objectives, we focused our review on the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) GOES-R program office, the 

organization responsible for the overall GOES-R program. 

To determine the status of and plans for the GOES-R series procurement, 

we reviewed various program office plans and management reports such 

as acquisition schedules, cost estimates, and planned system 

requirements. Furthermore, we conducted interviews with NOAA and 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials to 

determine key dates for future GOES-R acquisitions efforts and 

milestones, and potential changes in program scope, cost, and schedule. 

To identify the steps the GOES-R project management team is taking to 

ensure that past problems experienced in procuring other satellite series 

are not repeated, we analyzed our past body of work on major space 

system acquisitions, including the Advanced Extremely High Frequency

satellites, the GOES I-M satellites, the National Polar-orbiting Operational

Environmental Satellite System, and the Space Based Infrared System 

High program in order to identify key lessons. We also analyzed findings 

from other government reports on satellite procurements, such as by the 

Defense Science Board–Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task 

Force and the Department of Commerce’s Office of Inspector General. We

assessed relevant management documents, such as cost reports and 

program risk plans. Our evaluation included the application of earned 

value analysis techniques1

 to data from contractor cost performance 

reports over an 11-month period (from June 2005 to May 2006). We also 

conducted interviews with agency officials to identify and to evaluate the 

adequacy of the actions taken to address these lessons. 

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from officials at the 

Department of Commerce and incorporated these comments as 

appropriate. We performed our work at NOAA and NASA offices in the 

 1

The earned value concept is applied as a means of placing a dollar value on project status. 

It is a technique that compares budget versus actual costs versus project status in dollar 

amounts. For our analysis, we used standard earned value formulas to calculate cost and

schedule variance and forecast the range of cost overrun at contract completion. 

Page 32 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Washington, D.C., metropolitan area between December 2005 and August 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Page 33 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix II: Current Shortfalls in Contractor Appendix II: Current Shortfalls in Contractor Performance on Key Instrument Development 

Performance on Key Instrument 

Development 

The development of one of the critical GOES-R instruments, the Advanced 

Baseline Imager (ABI), is experiencing technical challenges and, as a 

result, the contractor is missing cost and schedule targets. Despite the 

uncertainty regarding the future scope of the GOES-R program, it is 

expected that the requirements for this instrument will not change. 

Contractor-provided data from June 2005 to May 2006 indicates that ABI’s 

cost performance is experiencing a trend of negative variances. Figure 4

shows the 11-month cumulative cost variance for the ABI contract. As of 

May 2006, the contractor has incurred a total cost overrun of almost $6 

million with ABI development only 28 percent complete. This information 

is useful because trends tend to continue and can be difficult to reverse 

unless management attention is focused on key risk areas and risk 

mitigation actions are aggressively pursued. Studies have shown that, once 

work is 15 percent complete, the performance indicators are indicative of 

the final outcome. 

Based on contractor performance from June 2005 to May 2006, we 

estimated that the current ABI instrument contract—which is worth 

approximately $360 million—will overrun its budget by between $17 

million and $47 million. Our projection of the most likely cost overrun will 

be about $23 million. The contractor, in contrast, estimates about a $7 

million overrun at completion of the ABI contract. Given that the 

contractor has 72 percent of work remaining and has already accumulated 

a cost overrun of $5.9 million, the likelihood that the contractor will meet 

its estimated projection is small. 

Page 34 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix II: Current Shortfalls in Contractor 

Performance on Key Instrument Development 

Figure 4: Cumulative Cost Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract over an 11-

month Period

Our analysis also indicates that the contractor has been unable to meet its 

planned schedule targets. Figure 5 shows the 11-month cumulative 

schedule variance for the ABI contract. From June 2005 to May 2006, the 

contractor was unable to complete approximately $3.3 million worth of 

scheduled work. The contractor reported that its incorporation of revised 

subcontractor budgets resulted in the fluctuations in schedule 

performance data prior to March 2006. The current inability to meet 

contract schedule performance could be a predictor of future rising costs, 

as more spending is often necessary to resolve schedule overruns. 

Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA data.

-7,000

-6,000

-5,000

-4,000

-3,000

-2,000

-1,000

0

1,000

June

2005 2006

July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May

Dollars in millions

Page 35 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix II: Current Shortfalls in Contractor 

Performance on Key Instrument Development 

Figure 5: Cumulative Schedule Variance of the ABI Instrument Contract over an 11-

month Period

According to contractor-provided documents, the cost and schedule 

overruns were primarily caused by design complexity issues experienced

in the development of the instrument’s detectors and the electronics 

design for the cryocooler1

 and the unplanned time and manpower 

expended to resolve these issues. Other significant cost and schedule 

drivers include software issues on the scanner and supplier quality issues 

on some parts. 

Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA data.

-5,000

-4,000

-3,000

-2,000

-1,000

0

1,000

June

2005 2006

July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May

Dollars in millions

 1

The cryocooler is a key component of the ABI instrument. It is intended to cool down

components of the instrument. 

Page 36 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Commerce 

Department of Commerce 

Page 37 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 38 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 39 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 40 GAO-06-993 Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 41 GAO-06-993 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Carol Cha, Neil Doherty, Nancy 

Glover, Kush Malhotra, Colleen Phillips, and Karen Richey made key 

contributions to this report. 

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(310827) 
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