IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v ) CR. NO. 3:06cr199-MEF

) (WO)

ANTHONY SANFORD )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

The defendant, Anthony Sanford (“Sanford”), is charged with the unlawful transport

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On November 15, 2008, Sanford filed a

motion to suppress a Derringer pistol and other evidence seized without a warrant during the

search of a house on 448 Halfway Road. (Doc. No. 15.) On February 24, 2009, Sanford

filed an additional motion to suppress, in which he asserts that his statement to law

enforcement officers was involuntary and that a waiver of his rights was not knowingly and

intelligently made. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on May 13, 2009.

Based on the evidence presented to the court and argument of the parties, the court concludes

that the motions to suppress are due to be denied.

II. Facts

A. The Search of the Halfway Road House

During the course of a drug investigation on July 28, 2006, a confidential informant

purchased illegal narcotics from a residence at 253 Willie J. Harris Drive. (Suppression

Hearing Transcript, R. 7, 18-21.) The confidential informant told Tuskegee Police Detective

Daniel Motley that, on the day of the purchase, he went next door to a house at 251 Willie

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 During the hearing, Ms. Sanford testified that she remained in handcuffs for approximately two

hours and forty minutes. She stated that the cuffs were removed after she gave written consent to search the

Halfway Road properties. Detective Motley, however, testified that Ms. Sanford was not wearing handcuffs

during the search of her residence. Detective Motley recalled that entry into Ms. Sanford’s residence occurred

at 5:47 a.m., that he allowed her to use his cell phone to call her sister prior to giving consent, and that she

signed the consent forms at 6:08 a.m. and 6:11 a.m. The court does not find Ms. Sanford’s testimony that

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J. Harris Drive, where he learned that Darlene Moore was locked in a room. (R. 24.) The

confidential informant stated that he saw Sanford unlock the door, allow Ms. Moore to get

some water, and then lock her into the room again. (Id.) Later that same day, Detective

Motley obtained a warrant to search the residences at 251 and 253 Willie J. Harris Drive

based on the confidential informant’s information. At that time, Detective Motley also had

a warrant to arrest Sanford for an unrelated felony offense. (R. 8, 40.)

Three days later on July 31, 2009, two Alabama Department of Public Safety SWAT

teams comprised of ten to twelve members each, as well as six Tuskegee police officers,

drove up in two vans and at least three police cars to the residences. (R. 26-27.) At 5:47

a.m., the SWAT teams and officers executed the search warrants. (R. 45.) The officers used

a battering ram to break down the door of the residence at 251 Willie J. Harris Drive. (R. 34-

35.) Sanford’s mother, Jacquelyn Sanford, awakened to the sound of a loud boom. (R. 120.)

As Ms. Sanford got out of bed, five or six officers walked into her room with guns drawn and

forced her onto the floor, where an officer used plastic restraints to secure her arms behind

her back. (R. 121-22.) When Ms. Sanford complained that the plastic restraints were hurting,

the officer removed the restraints and secured her arms in front of her with another set of

restraints. (R. 122.) Detective Motley escorted her to the front yard. (R. 33, 35.) At some

point, an officer removed the plastic restraints.1

 

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she remained in plastic restraints while outside her home over a two hour and forty minute period to be

credible. The court was able to observe the demeanor of both witnesses during the hearing, and finds that

Detective Motley’s recollection is more accurate and logical than that of Ms. Sanford’s recollection of events.

2

 During the hearing, Ms. Sanford explained that her sister, mother, and grandmother own the

property on Halfway Road.

3

Detective Motley and two other officers stood outside and talked to Ms. Sanford. (R.

37-38.) Detective Motley explained that the law enforcement officers received information

that Ms. Moore was being held against her will by Sanford and that they were searching for

them. (R. 41.) The officers cautioned Ms. Sanford that she could be charged with harboring

a fugitive. (R. 123.) When Detective Motley questioned Ms. Sanford about the whereabouts

of Sanford, Ms. Sanford indicated that she did not know where he was at the present time,

that he she saw him leave with Ms. Moore the previous day, and that there was a possibility

that he was in another house or trailer down the street at 444 or 448 Halfway Road. (R. 8-9,

42, 57-58.) Ms. Sanford told Detective Motley that the property belonged to “her and her

family.”2

 (R. 5, 46-47.) Before signing consents to search the residences, Ms. Sanford

called her sister on Detective Motley’s cell phone and explained the situation. At 6:08 a.m.

and 6:11 a.m., Ms. Sanford signed consent forms to search the house and trailer on Halfway

Road. (R. 43, 45.) Afterward, Ms. Sanford told Detective Motley, “Don’t hurt my baby.”

(R. 58.)

The law enforcement officers drove to the house and trailer on Halfway Road. (R. 9.)

At 7:30 a.m., the officers announced their presence, entered the one-story house, and began

searching the interior of the house and its attic. (R. 10.) The house had no furniture and was

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 Ms. Moore testified that Sanford kept her in the house against her will with a loaded pistol, but that

her hands were not bound.

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empty. (R. 53.) The officers found a Model D38 Derringer pistol and six bullets in a tin can

along the edge of the chimney/fireplace area and a bullet proof vest in the attic. Inside a

closet, an officer found Ms. Moore. Her hands were bound with wire,3

 she was not wearing

a shirt, she had two braids in her hair, and she was limping. (R. 10, 13.) She told the officers

that Sanford had beaten her and that he was inside the house. (R. 11.) Although officers used

tear gas and other law enforcement tactics, they could not find where Sanford was hiding.

(R. 52.) Detective Motley began to doubt Ms. Moore’s statement that Sanford was in the

house. (Id.) Ms. Moore, however, insisted that Sanford was hiding inside the house. (Id.)

At some point, an ambulance took Ms. Moore to the hospital. (R. 10.)

 In their final efforts, the officers borrowed a chainsaw from a fireman on the scene.

(R. 52.) When an officer started the chainsaw and began cutting the sheet rock, Sanford’s

head “popped up” into the attic. (R. 53.) The officers who were searching in the attic pulled

Sanford out from an area between the sheet rock and the chimney wall where he had hidden

himself during the search. (R. 55.) Sanford was arrested and transported to the Macon

County Jail. (R. 11.)

B. The Mental Limitations

A clinical psychologist, Dr. Robert D. Shaffer, testified concerning Sanford’s mental

conditions. The psychologist conducted examinations on November 18, 2008 and November

20, 2008. After conducting testing, Dr. Shaffer determined that Sanford’s I.Q. was in the low

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average range. In addition, Dr. Shaffer diagnosed Sanford as suffering from post-traumatic

stress disorder and major depressive disorder, recurrent. The psychologist’s determination

was based in part on Sanford’s reports of a traumatic childhood and a prior incident in which

Sanford was the victim of police brutality. Dr. Shaffer testified that Sanford’s performance

on the Suggestibility Scale resulted in a yield score approximately one standard deviation

above the norm, indicating that Sanford had a greater than average tendency to agree with

a questioner or admit to things that are not true. (R. 91.) Dr. Shaffer also assessed that, due

to Sanford’s tendency toward suggestibility, his mental conditions, and his recurring memory

of a prior negative experience with a law enforcement officer, Sanford was afraid of being

“severely injured or killed” if he did not answer correctly at the time he waived his Miranda

rights and gave a statement to law enforcement officers. (R. 95.) 

During the suppression hearing, Dr. Shaffer indicated that he had not received a copy

of Sanford’s statement to police prior to making his determination. (R. 109.) After a recess

in which the psychologist was given an opportunity to read the transcript in its entirety, Dr.

Shaffer modified his previous findings and testified that he “[did] not sense [Sanford] was

entirely suggestible” when providing a statement to the police and that Sanford was “acting

in a self-serving manner” when he denied beating the victim. (R. 113 , 117.) Dr. Shaffer,

however, did not alter his previous opinion that Sanford’s past history and mental conditions

prevented him from having the capability of appreciating his Miranda rights, specifically his

right to counsel. (R. 113-14.)

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The entire text of the Amendment provides:

[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

6

III. Discussion

A. The Halfway Road House Search 

Sanford asserts that the warrantless search of the house on Halfway Road was

unreasonable because his presence, custody, and control over the residence established that

he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, the officers did not knock and

announce themselves before entering, and his mother’s written consent to search the house

was not voluntarily given. 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

CONST. AMEND. IV.4

 The Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect citizens from

unwarranted governmental intrusion and to prevent abusive police power. See Johnson v.

United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54

(1980) (plurality opinion). The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the threshold of a

residence because “‘[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to

retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365

U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). Unless consent is given or exigent circumstances exist, police officers

must obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to justify a search under the Fourth

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Amendment. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir.2005); Payton, supra.

A search of property without a warrant and probable cause is constitutionally permissible if

preceded by valid consent. United States v. Dunkley, 911 F.2d 522, 525 (11th Cir.1990). 

First, the court must determine whether Ms. Sanford had the authority to consent to

the search of the house on Halfway Road. “[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a

warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was

given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third

party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises

or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). “The

authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with

its attendant historical and legal refinements . . . , but rests rather on mutual use of the

property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is

reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection

in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might

permit the common area to be searched.” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. See also Georgia v.

Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (U.S. 2006) (“[T]he reasonableness of such a search is in

significant part a function of commonly held understanding about the authority that coinhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests.”). During the hearing, Ms.

Sanford testified that the house on Halfway Road belongs to her mother and grandmother and

that her sister’s “name is on all the papers.” (Suppression Hearing Transcript, R. 126.) She

also stated that “she don’t have no right in [the house].” (Id.) Ms. Sanford’s testimony

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indicates that she did not have “joint access or control [of the house] for most purposes.”

Matlock, supra. Therefore, Ms. Sanford did not have actual authority to consent to the

search of the house. 

Nonetheless, the search of the house is justified based on the searching officers’

objectively reasonable, good faith belief that Ms. Sanford had authority to consent to the

search of the house on Halfway Road. A warrantless entry is valid when it is based upon the

consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of entry, reasonably believed possessed

authority over the premises. U.S. v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)). As with other factual determinations bearing

upon search and seizure, “determination of consent to enter must be judged against an

objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man

of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?”

Id. at 1074. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). If the answer is no, “then

warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if

so, the search is valid.” Rodriguez, supra. In this case, Ms. Sanford told Detective Motley

that the property belonged to “her and her family.” (Suppression Hearing Transcript, R. 5.)

The record also indicates that the house on Halfway Road is on property near Ms. Sanford’s

home. (R. 5.) In addition, Ms. Sanford indicated on the consent form that she was “the

owner or person in charge of the item or premises to be searched.” (Attach. to Doc. No. 21.)

Thus, the officers’ belief that Sanford’s mother had the authority to consent to the search of

family property on Halfway Road was objectively reasonable. See e.g., United States v.

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Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577, 1584 (11th Cir. 1996) (officers had an objectively reasonable belief

that defendant’s mother had the authority to consent to search a detached garage next to her

house); Hughes v. Coconut Creek Police Dept., 233 Fed. Appx. 919 (11th Cir. 2007) (no

Fourth Amendment violation where officer had an objectively reasonable good-faith belief

that he had obtained valid consent from the defendant’s father to search the bedroom). 

Next, the court will discuss whether Ms. Sanford’s consent was voluntary. A

consensual search is constitutional if it is voluntary, i.e. the product of an essentially free and

unconstrained choice. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir.2001); United

States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.

568, 602 (1961)). Voluntariness is a factual assessment and depends on the totality of the

circumstances. Purcell, supra. In evaluating voluntariness, the court considers several

factors, including the presence of coercive police procedures, the extent of the individual’s

cooperation with the officer, the individual's awareness of his or her right to refuse consent,

the individual's education and intelligence, and the individual's belief that no incriminating

evidence will be found. Id. See also U.S. v. Sanders, No. 08-10198, 2009 WL 449181, at *2

(11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2009) (unpublished). 

In this case, the Government submitted a consent to search form signed by Ms.

Sanford, in which she acknowledged that she understood that she had the right to refuse the

search of the property on Halfway Road, that she had the right to withdraw her consent, that

she could consult with her attorney, and that she was under no obligation or pressure to allow

the search. (Attach. to Doc. No. 21.) During the hearing, Ms. Sanford testified that officers

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pointed a gun at her, rolled her out of the bed onto the floor, and handcuffed her. (R. 120-

21.) She stated that, after the officers took her outside, they accused her of harboring a

fugitive and asked her if she knew where Sanford was. (R. 123.) At the time she signed the

consent form, there were at least three officers standing in front of Ms. Sanford and she heard

others behind her. (R. 125.) Ms. Sanford testified that she believed her choices were “to

cooperate or go to jail.” (R. 125.) She also stated, “I think [the officers] told me if I didn’t

do what I need to do, because I’m harboring a fugitive, then I knew I had to do what I need

to do to stop from going to jail.” (R. 131.) 

The detective’s description of the events surrounding the signing of the consent form

is somewhat different. Detective Motley acknowledged that 24 officers dressed in SWAT

gear and carrying special guns arrived at Ms. Sanford’s residence and a house next door to

her property and secured the residences with their guns drawn. (R. 31.) Detective Motley

testified that he and other officers awakened Ms. Sanford and escorted her to the front yard.

(R. 35.) Detective Motley explained to Ms. Sanford why the officers were searching her

residence. (R. 39.) Detective Motley testified that Ms. Sanford was no longer handcuffed

during their discussion. (Id.) Detective Motley stated that he told Ms. Sanford that he was

looking for Darlene Moore and was concerned about her safety and asked if she knew where

Sanford and Ms. Moore were at that time. (R. 42.) Ms. Sanford initially stated that she did

not know Sanford’s location. (Id.) When Detective Motley asked where Sanford most likely

would have gone, Ms. Sanford told him he could have gone to the house or trailer on

Halfway Road. (Id.) Detective Motley also testified that he did not threaten Ms. Sanford and

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that she did not appear to be afraid. (R. 56.)

Courts have found consent to be voluntary in factual scenarios more coercive than that

described by Ms. Sanford. In United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 704 F.2d 507, 513 (11th

Cir.1983), for example, the court found consent voluntary where the consenting individual

was arrested at gunpoint and consented to the search of his automobile while lying on the

ground and while one officer had a weapon drawn. In United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566,

1571 (11th Cir.1993), consent was voluntary where the defendant was “arrested by SWAT

team members who broke into his home in the early morning, woke him, and forced him to

the ground at gunpoint.” In Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 362 (11th Cir. 1989), the consenting

individual was arrested and handcuffed in the presence of fourteen law enforcement officers

when consent was provided. In each of these cases, consent was found to be voluntary

despite evidence of some physical coercion. The situation described by Ms. Sanford, in

which she was awakened by officers in SWAT gear, temporarily placed in handcuffs, taken

outside her home, and cautioned by a detective that she could be arrested for harboring a

fugitive if she did not disclose her son’s whereabouts, does not rise to the level necessary to

invalidate her consent to search the house. This court therefore concludes that Ms. Sanford’s

consent to search the house on Halfway Road was voluntary.

Furthermore, the evidence does not demonstrate that Sanford had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the abandoned house. While the government bears the burden to

demonstrate an exception to the warrant requirement where police conduct a warrantless

search, the defendant first bears the burden to demonstrate that he had a legitimate

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expectation of privacy in the area searched. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, n.12 (1978) (defendant’s

burden to demonstrate reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Baron-Mantilla,

743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (“defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas to be searched.); United States v. Chaves, 169

F.3d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1999) (a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an

expectation of privacy in the place to be searched, and that his expectation is reasonable).

Although Ms. Sanford told Detective Motley that Sanford sometimes goes to the Halfway

Road house when he is not at her residence, there is no admissible evidence indicating that

he had permission to be there. Ms. Moore, who was found inside a closet and had spent

considerable time with Sanford, testified that the house was abandoned. (R 65.) The house

had no furniture and the only belongings found were a tin can filled with bullets, a pistol, and

a bullet-proof vest. In his brief, Sanford argues he had an expectation of privacy in the house

because the door to the house was locked when the officers arrived. Nothing in the record,

however, indicates that Sanford locked the door or that he had a key to the Halfway Road

house. Consequently, this court concludes that Sanford has not established that he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the abandoned house. See United States v. McCrae, 156

F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 1998) (no subjective expectation of privacy in vacant house where

defendant did not own or rent house, was there for limited period, and condition of house did

not indicate permanent occupation). Cf. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight

guest can assert reasonable expectation of privacy in home of host). Furthermore, even if this

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court were to assume that Sanford had a sufficient privacy interest in the premises, the

officers in this case were reasonable in believing that Ms. Sanford had provided valid consent

to search the house on Halfway Road. Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that the

defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the house on

Halfway Road should be denied.

B. The Statement

Sanford asserts that the waiver of his rights was involuntary because he suffers from

mental deficiencies. Specifically, he contends that law enforcement officials took advantage

of his low intelligence and mental condition when they asked him to sign a waiver and

questioned him about the incident. Sanford also asserts that the waiver was not knowing and

intelligent because he has a verbal I.Q. of 83, has only a tenth grade education, repeated three

grade levels in school, and his demeanor and mannerisms clearly indicate that he would have

difficulty comprehending the rights outlined in a waiver form.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that a person questioned by law enforcement

officials after being “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way” must first “be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any

statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the

presence of an attorney.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Therefore, under Miranda, the

admission of statements taken during a custodial interrogation conducted outside the

presence of a suspect’s attorney is conditioned on the Government’s ability to show “that the

defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his

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 The interview lasted fifty-one minutes. (Doc. No. 39, pp. 2, 37.)

14

right to retained or appointed counsel.” 384 U.S. at 475. The inquiry has two distinct

dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that

it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). “[C]oercive police activity is a

necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of

the Due Process Clause.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Second, the

waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveals both an uncoerced choice and the

requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that a defendant’s Miranda

rights have been waived. Moran, supra. 

In this case, no evidence supports a conclusion that law enforcement officials coerced

Sanford into giving a statement. Absent allegations of coercive police tactics to obtain a

statement, a confession will not be deemed involuntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167;

Singleton, 847 F.2d at 671; U.S. v. Scheigert, 809 F.2d 1532, 1533 (11th Cir. 1987).

Detective Motley and Agent Brown did not subject Sanford to an interrogation of

“exhaustingly long duration.”5 Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1988). In

addition, Sanford does not allege that law enforcement officials applied physical force or

threatened to do so. Nor is there any suggestion that law enforcement officers made any

promises of reward to induce Sanford’s statement. 

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Sanford claims that due to his limited mental functioning and his tendency to become

easily confused or manipulated, the officers “should have known that he did not understand

the document or the ramification of executing the waiver.” (Doc. No. 30, p. 4.) The mere

fact that a defendant suffers from a mental disability does not render a waiver involuntary.

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-70; United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 585 (11th Cir. 1995).

The low intelligence of a defendant also will not in itself render a confession involuntary.

See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. Instead, in the absence of other evidence of coercion, it must

be shown that the police took advantage of the defendant’s mental limitations in securing a

Miranda waiver. Barbour, 70 F.3d at 585; United States v. Jennings, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1072,

1076 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 

There is no evidence that Detective Motley or Special Agent Dwight Brown knew that

Sanford suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, or any other mental

limitations. Moreover, the transcript of the police interview indicates that the officers took

numerous precautions to ensure that Sanford’s waiver of Miranda rights and his statement

were voluntarily made. During the interview, Sanford acknowledged to Agent Brown that

he understood his rights. On several occasions throughout the interview, Agent Brown

reminded Sanford that he could stop the questioning at any time and that he did not have to

answer the questions. (Doc. No. 39, Interview Transcript, pp. 7, 10, 15.) Sanford refused

to answer two of Agent Brown’s questions and neither Detective Motley nor Agent Brown

dissuaded him from doing so. (Id., pp. 10, 12.) Indeed, Sanford’s refusal to answer some

of the questions during the interview indicates that he understood and was aware of the

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 In light of Dr. Shaffer’s modification of his previous findings upon reading the police interview

transcript, this court rejects the defendant’s argument that Sanford was susceptible to suggestibility during

the police interview. 

16

consequences of waiving his right to silence. For example, at one point during the interview,

Sanford refused to answer a question about a prior escape charge and said, “I don’t want to

mess myself up.” (Id., p. 7.) Later during the interview, Sanford indicated that he would not

answer a question about an incident with another woman and said, “That’s a serious question

right there. . . . That get me in trouble.” (Id., pp. 10-11.) Sanford’s refusal to answer some

of Agent Brown’s questions during the interview indicates that he understood and was fully

aware of the consequences of waiving his right to silence. 

Although Dr. Shaffer testified that Sanford told him he did not understand that he

would not have to pay for an attorney, the court does not fully credit Dr. Shaffer’s opinion.

At the request of Sanford’s defense counsel, Dr. Shaffer examined Sanford on two occasions

over a one week period for the purpose of determining whether he was competent to waive

his Miranda rights. Dr. Shaffer admitted that Sanford’s police interview indicated that he

was capable of acting in a self-serving manner. Given the gravity of the situation, it is likely

that Sanford also acted in a self-serving manner during the psychological evaluation

conducted by Dr. Shaffer. Moreover, Sanford’s statements during the police interview

indicate his understanding of the legal system is greater than what he represented to Dr.

Shaffer. For example, during the police interview, Sanford asked whether the charges he

faced were felonies and whether giving a statement would help or hurt his case. This court

therefore concludes that Sanford’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary.6

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A finding based on the lack of evidence of coercion, however, does not complete the

analysis. The waiver must also be knowing and intelligent. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,

412 (1986). Recent psychiatric evaluations and test scores indicate that Sanford’s

intelligence is in the low average range of intellectual functioning. As previously discussed,

Sanford’s refusal to answer some of the questions indicated that the waiver of his right to

silence was made with an awareness of the consequences of doing so. In addition, the record

indicates that Sanford has sufficient intelligence to understand the consequences of waiving

his right to counsel and that his rights were read to him prior to giving a statement. This

court therefore finds that Sanford’s waiver of his constitutional rights was made with a full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the

decision to abandon it. See Toste v. Lopes, 861 F.2d 782 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that

defendant who was “streetwise, communicated relatively well, and operated at about a sixth

to seventh grade level,” knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent). 

Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,

this court concludes that Sanford’s choice was uncoerced and that he had the requisite level

of comprehension to waive his rights and provide a statement to law enforcement officials.

See Moran, supra.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the

defendant’s motion to suppress be denied. It is further

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ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on

or before June 15, 2009. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 2nd day of June, 2009.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:06-cr-00199-MEF-CSC Document 47 Filed 06/02/09 Page 18 of 18