J-A21018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC COOPER

Appellant No. 1268 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 19, 2012

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008618-2010

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2015

Appellant, Eric Cooper, appeals from the December 19, 2012 judgment 

of sentence of 171⁄2 to 60 years’ imprisonment imposed after a jury found 

him guilty of one count each of third-degree murder, criminal attempt to 

commit murder, criminal conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a 

license, possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and aggravated assault.1 

After careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case 

as follows. On March 9, 2007 at approximately 3:18 p.m., Jacque Warren 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A §§ 2502(c), 901(a), 903(c), 6106(a)(1), 907(a), and 2702(a), 

respectively. 
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drove a purple van with a white fender in the area around 945 South 53rd 

Street in Philadelphia. N.T., 10/3/12, at 160-162, 167; N.T., 10/4/12, at 

135-136. After circling the block, Warren drove back up the street. N.T., 

10/3/12, at 160. The sliding door of the van on the driver’s side opened, 

and Nutta Verdier emerged and began shooting at Darrell Cobb.2 Id. at 

163, 169; N.T., 10/4/12, at 150. Appellant also exited the van from the 

passenger side and began shooting at Darrell Cobb. N.T., 10/3/12, at 163, 

168; N.T., 10/4/12, at 151. A man identified as “GoGo”3also exited the van 

and began shooting in “a whole opposite way.” N.T., 10/4/12, at 151. 

Gary Autry Bigelow and Derrick Seals were outside an auto mechanic 

shop at 945 South 53rd Street at the time of the incident. N.T., 10/3/12, at 

161. Bigelow was the stepson of the shop owner, and Seals was working as 

an auto mechanic at the shop. Id. at 160-161. During the incident, Bigelow 

was shot twice, once in the back and once in his left thigh. Id. at 73. He 

was taken to the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania and was 

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2 Cobb testified that upon shots being fired in his direction, he “shot once 

and [] ran down the street.” N.T., 10/9/12, at 15. 

Cobb and Warren were involved in a confrontation involving gunfire a 

week earlier, on March 2, 2007. There is conflicting testimony as to who 

fired shots that day, but there is no dispute that Appellant was not a part of 

this earlier encounter. See N.T., 10/4/12, at 126-128; N.T., 10/9/12, at 11-

13, 47.

3 GoGo was identified as Caliph Douglas in other portions of the record. 

See, e.g., N.T. 10/9/12, at 10.
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pronounced dead at 3:47 p.m. the same day. Id. at 72, 90. Seals ran to 

his vehicle and attempted to drive to safety; however, he was shot through 

the back windshield. Id. at 170. The bullet hit his right arm, and Seals 

suffered nerve damage from the wound; he is unable to work as an auto 

mechanic as a result of his injury. Id. at 175-176. 

While investigating the incident, police obtained a search warrant for, 

and recovered, a purple van with a white fender in the area of 5400 Belmar 

Terrace on March 13, 2007. N.T., 10/1/12, at 53. The police learned the 

van was owned by Joyce Chavis, and her address was 5410 Belmar Terrace. 

Id. at 54. On March 22, 2007 at approximately 5:30 a.m., Detective Joseph 

McDermott of the Philadelphia Police was executing a search warrant and 

attempting to arrest an individual pursuant to an arrest warrant, for an 

unrelated matter, at 5427 Belmar Terrace. Id. at 55, 72-73. After the 

attempt at finding the suspect was unsuccessful, Detective McDermott 

observed that an indoor light was illuminated at 5410 Belmar Terrace. Id.

at 57. He and Detective Maurizio4knocked on the door, and Chavis 

answered and identified herself as the van owner and confirmed she lived in 

the residence. Id. at 57-58. As the detectives were speaking to Chavis, a 

male appeared from the cellar stairway of the residence, looked in the 

direction of the detectives, and began running to the back of the residence. 

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4 Detective Maurizio’s first name does not appear in the certified record. 
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Id. at 58. Detective Maurizio ran through the house and detained the male. 

Id. Detective McDermott then heard running in the upstairs of the 

residence. Id. He ran up the stairs, encountered Appellant in the middle 

bedroom, and observed a box of Remington ammunition. Id. at 59-60. 

Detective McDermott then secured the premises and obtained a search 

warrant for the residence. Id. at 61-65. The search of the residence 

yielded, “one box of Remington .9-millimeter bullets, 25 total[;] [] one 

copper projectile; four loose .45 caliber rounds; one black extended pistol 

magazine; one clear sandwich baggie with four smaller baggies with 

numerous packets of an off-white chunky substance; and ... $495[.00] 

U[nited] S[tates] currency.” Id. at 65. 

On August 2, 2010, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information 

charging Appellant with the aforementioned offenses as well as simple 

assault, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), and first degree 

murder.5 On September 19, 2012, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial 

motion seeking suppression of evidence based on, inter alia, an illegal 

search conducted without a warrant or probable cause. Appellant’s Motion 

to Suppress, 9/19/12, at ¶ 9. The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s 

motion on October 1, 2012, and at the conclusion of the hearing, denied 

Appellant’s motion. N.T., 10/1/12, at 84-85. On October 2, 2012, Appellant 

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5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a), 2705, and 2502(a), respectively. 
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and codefendant Verdier proceeded to a jury trial. On October 12, 2012, the 

jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit 

murder, criminal conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a license, 

PIC, and aggravated assault.6 The charges of simple assault and REAP were 

nolle prossed. 

On December 19, 2012, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence 

of 171⁄2 to 60 years’ imprisonment.7 On December 27, 2012, Appellant filed 

a timely post-sentence motion. The motion was denied by operation of law 

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6 The jury found Verdier guilty of third degree murder, criminal conspiracy, 

aggravated assault, criminal attempt, firearms not to be carried without a 

license, and PIC. N.T., 10/12/12, at 28-29. Verdier appealed his conviction, 

but this Court dismissed said appeal on January 14, 2015 for failure to file a 

brief. Superior Court Order, 307 EDA 2013, 1/14/15.

In a separate trial, Warner was convicted of third degree murder, 

criminal conspiracy, and two counts of aggravated assault for his 

involvement in the events of March 9, 2007. On May 22, 2014, this Court 

affirmed his convictions, and our Supreme Court denied Warner’s petition for 

allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Warner, 104 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 786 (Pa. 

2014). 

7 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of ten to 40 

years’ imprisonment for third degree murder and a consecutive term of 

seven and one-half to 20 years’ imprisonment for criminal attempt. 

Sentencing Order, 12/19/12, at 1. The trial court determined the 

aggravated assault count merged with the murder count and imposed no 

further penalty on the remaining counts. Id. 
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on April 29, 2013. On April 30, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal.8

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our consideration.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to grant 

Appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence 

where the Commonwealth’s evidence established 

that the physical evidence was seized from 

Appellant’s residence pursuant to a search warrant 

based entirely on information obtained as a result of 

an earlier pre-dawn search conducted in the absence 

of probable cause or exigent circumstances?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We begin by noting our well-established standard of review over 

challenges to the denial of suppression motions. 

We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of 

the record as a whole. Where the record supports 

the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound 

by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. An 

appellate court, of course, is not bound by the 

suppression court’s conclusions of law.

Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).9

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8 The certified record discloses that the trial judge retired and did not order 

compliance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. 

9 To provide context, we have summarized the factual history of this case as 

developed through trial testimony. However, in resolving Appellant’s legal 

issue regarding his motion to suppress, we confine our review to the record 

of the suppression hearing. See generally In re L.J.. 79 A.3d 1073, 1085-

1089 (Pa. 2013). 
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In Appellant’s lone issue on appeal, he argues Detective McDermott 

entered Appellant’s residence without a warrant and without probable cause. 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. He argues, alternatively, “even if probable cause 

existed[,]” the entry was not permitted, as there were no exigent 

circumstances justifying police entry into the home. Id. at 17. The 

Commonwealth counters that there was “probable cause in light of the 

connection of the van used in the shooting to the residence, and exigent 

circumstances based on the sudden running of two men in the house where 

he was investigating a recent act of extreme violence.” Commonwealth Brief 

at 11.10

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 

1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution require that searches be conducted 

pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral detached magistrate.” 

Commonwealth v. Rowe, 984 A.2d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted). Therefore, “[i]n a private home, searches and seizures without a 

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10 The Commonwealth first argues Appellant waived his argument based on 

probable cause because he did not contest probable cause at the hearing on 

his motion to suppress. Commonwealth Brief at 11. However, Appellant 

argued in his suppression motion that there was a lack of probable cause to 

enter Appellant’s home and at the suppression hearing that there was 

“absolutely no basis” to permit a warrantless entry. Appellant’s Motion to 

Suppress, 9/19/12, at ¶ 9; N.T., 10/1/12, at 7. Further, the trial court 

specifically concluded there was probable cause in this case, and Appellant 

raised the issue of the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion in his 

post-sentence motion. N.T., 10/1/12, at 83; Appellant’s Post Sentence 

Motion 12/27/12, at ¶ 13. Accordingly, Appellant sufficiently raised the 

issue before the trial court, and it is preserved for our consideration. 
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warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including 

those situations where probable cause exists in conjunction with exigent 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Haynes, 116 A.3d 640, 644 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “Probable cause exists where the facts and 

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a 

prudent individual in believing that an offense was committed and that the 

defendant has committed it.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 24 A.3d 1037, 

1042 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 34 A.3d 82 (Pa. 

2011). We do not ask whether the officer’s belief was “correct or more likely 

true than false. Rather, we require only a probability, and not a prima facie 

showing, of criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 

982, 931 (Pa. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted, italics in 

original). When assessing whether probable cause was present, “we must 

consider the totality of the circumstances as they appeared to the arresting 

officer.” Griffin, supra. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Further, our Supreme Court has outlined several factors for 

consideration in the determination of whether exigent circumstances exist.

(1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the 

suspect is reasonably believed to be armed, (3) 

whether there is above and beyond a clear showing 

of probable cause, (4) whether there is a strong 

reason to believe that the suspect is within the 

premises being entered, (5) whether there is a 

likelihood the suspect will escape if not swiftly 

apprehended, (6) whether the entry was peaceable, 
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(7) and the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was 

made at night. These factors are to be balanced 

against one another in determining whether the 

warrantless intrusion was justified.

Other factors may also be taken into account, such 

as whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, 

likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police 

take the time to obtain a warrant, or danger to police 

or other persons inside or outside the dwelling. 

Nevertheless, police bear a heavy burden when 

attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that 

might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

Commonwealth v. Bowmaster, 101 A.3d 789, 793 (Pa. Super. 2014), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 270-271 (Pa. 1994).

At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth offered the testimony 

of Police Officer Michael Harris and Detective McDermott. Appellant did not 

present any evidence. Officer Harris testified that when he first observed 

the van, on March 11, 2007, he ran the vehicle information and discovered 

that it was registered to Joyce Chavis of 5410 Belmar Terrace. N.T., 

10/1/12, at 41-44. Officer Harris was aware the van was being sought in 

connection with a homicide investigation, and he notified the Homicide Unit 

of its discovery. Id. at 41, 45. 

Detective McDermott testified that he was investigating the death of 

Gary Autry Bigelow in March 2007 and had information that a 1998 Dodge

purple and white minivan was used in the homicide. Id. at 51-53. His 

testimony was consistent with Officer Harris’ regarding the ownership and 

residence connected with the van, as well as when the van was located and 
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seized. See id. at 53-54. He testified regarding the entry into Appellant’s 

home as follows.

Q. What address on Belmar Terrace [were you going 

to], do you recall?

A. I think it was ... 5427 Belmar Terrace.

Q. And why were you going to that location?

A. There was an arrest warrant for a male by the 

name of Tylil Porter. We were coming in with SWAT 

officers at that time.

Q. And was the arrest warrant ... related to the 

murder case? Explain to Her Honor.

A. Your Honor, we had some ongoing shootings out 

there in Southwest, a dispute between certain 

corners. ...

[The trial court]:

Q. So your arrest warrant was in connection to a 

different case?

A. A different case, yes, Your Honor.

...

[The Commonwealth]:

Q. Now, ... the arrest warrant for Tylil Porter, was 

that a homicide or was it a -- [?]

A. That was an aggravated shooting.

...

Q. Okay. All right. So what happened?

A. We went there. We had negative results for Mr. 

Porter, so we resumed from there. ... [W]e were on 
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the block of 5400 Belmar. Having knowledge about 

the van being recovered there, I then went to 5410. 

There was an indoor light illuminated inside.

Q. Okay.

A. So [] myself and Detective Maurizio, we knocked 

on the front door. I explained why we were there, 

that, you know, we were investigating a shooting 

and her van was recovered in the back driveway. 

And as we were talking, a male came out of the back 

stairway, Your Honor. I would call it a dining room. 

It was a living room, dining room. 

[The trial court]:

Q. Excuse me. Did you get the identity of the 

woman you were talking to?

...

A. That was Joyce Chavis, yes, Your Honor.

Like I said, when we were talking to her, a 

male appeared in the shadows, in the back, between 

the kitchen area and the dining room area. It 

appeared that he came out of the cellar stairway, 

looked in our direction, and he tried to -- made a run 

to the back of the building.

...

A. He ran to the back of the building through the 

kitchen area. Detective Maurizio then ran through 

the living room, dining room and then stopped the 

male. I then was hearing running around on the 

second floor hallway. Being familiar with a row 

house, growing up in a row house, I heard what -- it 

sounded like the male ran into the middle bedroom. 

And I ran up the steps, ran into the middle bedroom. 

And there was a male lying in the bed fully clothed.

I started yelling at him, yelling at him “police, 

police.” Ordered him up out of the bed. And that 
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man was [Appellant] -- turned out to be [Appellant], 

the defendant.

And the male in the kitchen we found out later 

was his brother, Corey Williams. 

Q. All right.

A. While taking [Appellant] out of the middle 

bedroom, I could see ... a box, which I’m familiar 

with. It said “Remington” on it. And it was an 

ammunition box, small cardboard box.

Id. at 55-59. Detective McDermott also testified that he had information 

that three shooters were involved in the events of March 9, 2007. Id. at 69. 

The trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of 

law on the record, following the hearing.

I find that the facts are in accordance with the 

testimony of Officer Harris and Detective McDermott 

whose testimony was clear and concise, supported 

by the relevant documents and exhibits and 

uncontradicted on cross-examination.

I find that as to the ammunition, the motion is 

denied.

I find that as a matter of law[,] the officers had 

probable cause when they saw -- they knew ahead 

of time that the van had been identified as having a 

connection with a homicide. They went to the home, 

and Ms. Chavis volunteered the fact that it was her 

van and they saw men running. They had a right to 

pursue the man who ran, and also to pursue the 

male who they heard upstairs.

Id. at 83. The trial court further found that “they had exigent circumstances 

that didn’t require them to have a warrant.” Id. at 85.
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Instantly, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s factual 

findings, and it did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. See

Gary, supra. Under the totality of the circumstances as they appeared to 

the officers, probable cause existed to believe that one or both of the fleeing 

males in the residence were involved in the March 9, 2007 shooting of Gary 

Autry Bigelow. See Griffin, supra. Detective McDermott testified that 

there were ongoing shootings in the neighborhood he was investigating, the 

van sought in connection with the March 9, 2007 shooting was located at 

Appellant’s residence11, and Chavis confirmed for the officers that she was 

the owner of the van and lived at that location. He further had information 

that there were at least three shooters involved in the incident. 

Significantly, upon Appellant’s brother seeing Chavis speak with police 

officers, he “made a run to the back of the building.” N.T., 10/1/12, at 58. 

At this time, Detective McDermott then heard “running around” on the 

second floor of the residence. Id. The facts and circumstances, as known to

Detective McDermott, demonstrate a probability that the fleeing males had 

been engaged in criminal activity. See Thompson, supra. 

Further, we conclude that in applying the Roland factors, exigent 

circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the home. Specifically, as 

to the first factor, the offense under investigation was a shooting in broad 

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11 It is not in dispute that Appellant lived in the residence with Chavis, his 

grandmother. See Commonwealth Brief at 6; Appellant’s Brief at 15. 
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daylight on the street, which resulted in a homicide. Moreover, police had 

been investigating other aggravated shootings in the same neighborhood. 

Under the second factor, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that a 

suspect would be armed given the nature of the offense under investigation. 

As to the third and fourth factors, we have concluded, under the totality of 

the circumstances, that there was probable cause to believe that persons in 

the residence were engaged in criminal activity, and the police corroborated 

that Appellant’s residence was the one to which the van was registered. 

Therefore, when police saw and heard men fleeing, they had strong reason 

to believe the men inside the residence were connected with the crime. The 

fifth factor favors a determination of exigency because upon observing 

police, Appellant’s brother fled and Detective McDermott heard running, 

indicating the suspects would escape if not swiftly apprehended. Regarding 

the sixth Roland factor, the initial encounter with Chavis was peaceable; 

however, the officers’ entry may be characterized as sudden. Finally, the 

time was not in the middle of the night, but in the early morning hours. 

Thus, we conclude that because the majority of these factors weighs in favor 

of a determination of exigent circumstances, the police entry into Appellant’s 

home was justified.12 See Bowmaster, supra.

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12 We note that nothing was seized at this time. Rather, following this 

encounter and the observance of the ammunition in Appellant’s bedroom, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude the trial court did not 

err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, as there was probable cause 

and exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless entry into 

Appellant’s home. Accordingly, we affirm the December 19, 2012 judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2015

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

police obtained a search warrant, which ultimately resulted in the discovery 

of incriminating evidence. N.T., 10/1/12, at 65.