IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 8, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES MARIO STARNES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 14427 Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge

No. M2016-02274-CCA-R3-CD

The Appellant, James Mario Starnes, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit

Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an 

illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion 

stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Nicholas E. R. Simons, Shelbyville, Tennessee, for the appellant, James Mario Starnes.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Counsel; 

Robert James Carter, District Attorney General; and Michael David Randles, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In 1999, the Appellant pled guilty to one count each of attempted second degree 

murder and especially aggravated robbery and received a total effective sentence of 

twenty-five years. See State v. James Mario Starnes, No. M2002-01450-CCA-R3-CD, 

2003 WL 1094071, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

June 30, 2003). On May 18, 2016, the Appellant filed the instant Tennessee Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The motion alleged that 

the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences without “find[ing] enhancement factors 

on the record to justify” increasing the length of his sentences.

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The trial court appointed counsel to represent the Appellant. At the motion 

hearing, Appellant’s counsel argued that the Appellant’s sentences were improperly 

enhanced by the trial court’s use of enhancement factors not found beyond a reasonable 

doubt by a jury in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). On October

14, 2016, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion. The trial court 

concluded that the record belied the Appellant’s claim that his sentences had been 

enhanced without the finding of any applicable enhancement factors and that an alleged 

Blakely violation was not a cognizable claim for Rule 36.1 relief. 

On appeal, the Appellant’s sole contention is that the trial court enhanced his 

sentences in violation of Blakely. Rule 36.1 provides that either the defendant or the 

State “may seek to correct an illegal sentence.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(1). “Illegal 

sentence” is defined in the rule as a sentence “that is not authorized by the applicable 

statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2). 

The term “illegal sentence” “is synonymous with the habeas corpus concept of a ‘void’ 

sentence.” Cox v. State, 53 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), overruled on 

other grounds, Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005). 

“[F]ew sentencing errors [will] render [a sentence] illegal.” State v. Wooden, 478 

S.W.3d 585, 595 (Tenn. 2015). Examples of illegal sentences include “sentences 

imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences designating release 

eligibility dates where early release is statutorily prohibited, sentences that are ordered to 

be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served consecutively, and 

sentences not authorized by any statute for the offense.” Id. Conversely, “attacks on the 

correctness of the methodology by which a trial court imposed [a] sentence” will not rise 

to the level of an illegal sentence. Id.

This court has previously held that a Blakely violation would not rise to the level 

of an illegal sentence for Rule 36.1 purposes. See State v. Rafael Antonio Bush, No. 

M2014-01193-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7204637, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2014), 

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 12, 2015). That holding is consistent with this court’s 

holdings in habeas corpus cases that a Blakely violation would render a sentence merely 

voidable, not void. See Jackie F. Curry v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No. E2011-00607-

CCA-R3-HC, 2011 WL 4600621, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2011); Gene Shelton 

Rucker v. State, No. E2010-00440-CCA-R3-HC, 2010 WL 4324320, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Nov. 1, 2010); Billy Merle Meeks v. Ricky J. Bell, Warden, No. M2005-00626-

CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 4116486, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 13, 2007). Accordingly, 

we conclude that the Appellant’s Rule 36.1 motion failed to state a colorable claim for 

relief and affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.
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Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

_________________________________ 

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE