### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 25, 200 5 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JAM ES N . H AR REL L

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty No. F -9808 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2005- 01074-CCA -R9-C O - F iled March 6, 2006

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J
., d i s s en t i n g.

Respectf ully
, I dissent f

rom the majority ’s conclusion that the prosec utor’s re jection of pretria l dive rsion rests upon sold le g al bases. To be sure, the prosec utor ca ref ully considere d and discussed all criteria rele vant to his pretria l dive rsion determination. Thus, my departure from the majority is not grounde d upon any shortcoming s in the prosec uto r’ s ef fo rt ; rather , I

conclude that de sp ite his tho ro ug h r e sp on se to the pe tit ion , he ult imate ly re lie d upo n g ro un ds that do no t le g a lly support the denial of

diversion.

The prose cutor conclude d that diversion was inapt in the prese nt c ase be cause (1) the defe ndant was insincere and unremorse ful and (2) diversion would be inim ical to the dete rre nce of sim ila r f utu rec ri me s.
This court has pr eviously said that a de fendant’s fa i l u re to acknowle dg e g uilt or demonstrate a

lack of remorse are not sufficient by themsel v es t o s upport a de nial of pre tiral diversion. See State v . Stoney Ge ne Golden
, No. 88-146-I I I , slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na sh vil le
, Ap r. 12 , 1 98 9) ; Sta te v . De wey L. Cl ar k , No. 03C01-9706-CR-00227, slip op. at 7 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. , Kno xvill e , July 16 , 1 99 8) ; State v. Christie Quick , No. 01C01-9510-CC-00323, slip op.

a t 5-6 (T e nn . Crim . A pp ., Na sh vil le , F e b. 20 , 1 99 7) ; State v. Carl Capps
, No. 47, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. , Kno xvill e , Jun e 13 , 1 98 9) ; cf. State v. King , 640 S.W .2d 30, 33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (pr etrial d i v er s i o n cannot be conditioned upon entry of g uiltyplea)
, overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Sutton , 668 S.W .2d 678, 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)

.

Acc ording ly , I

turn my focus to the prosec utor’s other ba sis for the denia l, deterr ence

.

In the par ag raph of h i s l et t erd en y i n g t h e d ef en d an t ’s d i v er s i o n re q u es t , t h e p ro s ec utor state d th a t de nia l w a s n e c e ssa ry to d e te r f utu resim ila

r c ri min a l c on du c t:T h e di s t r i ct at t or n ey ge n er al f u r t h er c i t es t h at t h e i n t er es t s of t h e pu bl i c an d j u s t i ce w ou l d n ot be s er v ed by 1

a g r ant of

pre t r i al di ver s i on. H owever , I bel i eve t hat t he t hi s r at i onal e i s s o s i mi l ar t o t he det er r enc e r at i onal e t hat t hey
may be cons i dere d as one.

-2- The State ha s considere d the deter rent e ffe ct that g ranting pretria l diversion may have on others. This w rec k took the life of Shannon Gr een and resulted in serious injuries to f ou r ( 4) oth e r o c c up a nts . T he tw o f e ma le su rv ivo rs , B ro ok e Gr e e n a ndKatie Hillis, have had to unde rg o psy cholog ical counseling and one has attempted suicide

a s a re su lt o f this inc ide nt. Th e de fe nd a nt wa s c on su min g a lc oh ol a nddrivi ng we llabo ve thesp e e d li mit

on a narr ow, h ill y , tw o- la ne d r oa d. He ne ve r atte mpt e d to br ake a ft e r l os ing c on tr ol o f the ve hic le
, va lui ng his ne w truc k mor e than th e sa fe ty of the pa sseng ers. To r ewa rd such be havior with pre trial diversion would h av e no deter rent e ffe ct and may

well s end a me ssag e that ther e is littl e conse quence s to be h a d f o r d ri n k i n g a n d s p e e d i n g r e c k l e s s l y r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d e a t h o f a n i n n o c e n tp art y. 1

A prosec utor is constrained to identify a fa ctual ba s i s fo r h is denial of pre trial diversion based on the nee d for de terre nce. See State v . Pinkham , 955 S.W .2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997) (n oti ng that a

pr os e c uto r i s r e qu ir e d to “ ide nti fy thefa c tua l ba sis a ndrat ion a le fo r the de c isi on to de ny pr e tria l di ve rs ion ” ); see also State v. Lane , 56 S.W .3d 20, 28 (Tenn. 2000) (finding the nee d for deterre nce improperly applied in case wher e prosecutor failed t o elucidate the factual basis and rationale for the ne ed to deter crimes of

perjur y ). I n the instant case , when c iting the ne ed for de te rr e nc e a s a bas is fo r de nying the de fe nd a nt’ s pre tria l dive rs ion re qu e st, thepr os e c uto r f a ile d to ide nti fy a fa c tua l ba sis fo r the pe rc e ive d n e e d to de te r f utu resim ila

r c ri me s.

Moreove r, this court h as re jected a denial of dive rsion based upon the need f or deter renc e mer ely beca

use t he reckless driving resulted in death, noting that the offe nse of ve hicular homicide is statutorily

elig ible for pr etrial diver sion consideration. See State v. K elly Colson , No. 03C01-9612-CR-00465, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knox ville, Aug . 29, 1997) (“ I n essenc e, the District Attorney

stated that he f

elt that this offense involving the death of a pe rson s h o uld not be considere d for pretria l dive rsion beca use it would depre ciate the deter rent eff ect to th e D ef

endant and other s who might be char g ed with t he same offe nse. The offense [ of vehicular homi cide] . . . is a n o f f e n s e e li g ib lef

o r c o n s id e r a ti o n f

o r p r e tria l d iv e r s io n

. . . . T h e r e f o r e , th is r e a s o n w a s n o t [ a pr op e r b a sis fo r d e nying ] pr e tria l di ve rs ion .” ); Sta te v . J e re myW ins e tt , No. 02C01-9409-CR-00223, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Crim. App., J ackson, Fe b. 29, 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1997) (re versing

a de nia l of pr e tria l div e rs ion in a c a se in wh ic h 18 -y e ar- old de fe nd a nt wa s c ha rg e d w ithtw o c ou nts of vehic ular homicide by

rec klessness and r emanding for a g rant of diversion beca use prose cutor, inte r a lia , d e nie d d ive rs ion ba se d on the ne e d for de te rr e nc e a nd pr ote c tin g the int e re sts of thepu bli c wh e n v e hic ula

r ho mic ideis an o ff

e ns e that qu a lif

ie s f or pr e tria l di ve rs ionc on sid e ratio n) ; se e als o Lane , 56 S.W .3d at 28 (holding that deter renc e wa s not a valid basis to support the prosec utor’s denial of pretria l diversion bec ause, inte r a lia
, perjury is not statutorily excluded from conside ration for pr etrial diver sion).-3- I n my view, the pr osecutor’ s stated basis and rationale for the ne ed for deter renc e as supporting his de nial of pre trial diversion is in sum a reiter ation of the fa ct that the def endant’ s

re c kle ss be ha vio r wh ile drivi ng his ve hic le re su lte d in se ri ou s in jurie s to his oc c up a nts a ndthede a th of one oc cupant. More over, I cannot discern facts about the circumstances that demand a deter rent response . This conclusion i s supported by the aware ness t hat y outhful indiscretion, inexperience
, lack of judgme nt, and/or brava do acc ounted for the loss of life and injuries. Actions born of suc h fac tors are prac tically

not deterr able.

Acc ordi n g ly
, I

c o n c lu d e th a t th e p r o s e c u to r d e c li n e d th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s r e q u e s t f

or pretria l diversion mere ly

beca use of the nature of the defe ndant’s crimes. I reiter ate that a ll of the de fe nd a nt’ s c ri me s a

restatut orily e lig ibl e fo r pr e tria l dive rs ion c on sid e ratio n, a fa c t th a t th e state did not dispute in the t ri al co u rtor on appe al. Thus, an a buse of discr etion occur s when the ne ed for deter renc e bec omes the only

otherwise via

ble basis for de ny ing dive rsion.

Be cause the nee d for de terre nce w as an ina ppropriate g rounds for deny ing dive rsion and bec ause the other ba sis for the denia l, the defe ndant’s fai l u re to acknowledg e g uilt or demonstrate r emorse, a

re insuff icient by themselves to support a pretria l diversion denial, the trial
court e rrone ously

conclude d that the prosec utor did not abuse his discretion when denying dive rsion. Be cause the prosec utor’s extremely thoroug h letter discusses a ll releva nt criteria appli cable to a pretria l diversion consideration, we should not remand this ca se for further find i n gs b u t rathe r

rema nd and instruct the district attorney g ener al to enter

into a memorandum of unde rstanding for pretria l diversion with the defe ndant. Se e Cur ry , 9 88 S.W. 2da t 15 9- 60 ; c f. Sta te v . B e ll , 69 S.W .3d 171 (Tenn. 2002) (re versing and re manding the ca se to district attorne y gener al for f urther

co n s i d er a t i o n o f a l l re l ev an tfa ct o rs b ec au s e d i s tri ctat t o rn eygen er al fa i l ed t o co n s i d eran d we i gh substantial evidencefavor able to the de fendant, unlike instant c ase in whic h district attorney g ener al considere d all rele vant criteria but base d denial on improperly applied fa ctors).

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE