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Special Report 178 December 2006

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions .

Contents 

Introduction 2

Jordan’s Interests: Security and Stability 3

Jordan’s Influence in Iraq: Positive but Modest 7

Compatibility with U.S. Interests—Present and Future 11

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 15

About the Report

Iraq’s neighbors are playing a major role—both positive 

and negative—in the stabilization and reconstruction of 

“the new Iraq.” As part of the Institute’s “Iraq and Its 

Neighbors” initiative, a group of leading specialists on 

the geopolitics of the region is assessing the interests 

and influence of the countries surrounding Iraq and the 

impact on U.S. bilateral relations with these countries. 

The Institute is also sponsoring dialogue between Iraqi 

national security and foreign policy officials and their 

counterparts from the neighboring countries. Scott 

Lasensky’s report on Jordan is the fourth in a series of 

special reports by the U.S. Institute of Peace on “Iraq 

and Its Neighbors.” Jon Alterman’s report on Kuwait and 

the Gulf States and Steve Simon’s study on Syria will 

be published in the coming months. Peter Pavilionis is 

the editor of the series. For more information about the 

“Iraq and Its Neighbors” project, go to http://www.usip.

org/iraq/neighbors/index.html.

Scott Lasensky is a senior research associate at the 

Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention 

and an adjunct professor of government at Georgetown 

University. He directs the Institute’s “Iraq and Its 

Neighbors” project. The research for this report includes 

interviews with Jordanian, Iraqi, and U.S. officials over 

the past two years. The author wishes to thank Sam 

Parker and Kerem Levitas for their research support, as 

well as the reviewers for their comments.

Scott Lasensky 

Jordan 

and Iraq

Between Cooperation and Crisis

Summary

• Jordan wants a strong, stable, moderate, and unified Iraq. Having wrestled with the 

dilemmas of an assertive Iraq for many years, Jordan—like Iraq’s other neighbors—

now faces a myriad of challenges presented by a weak Iraq. The kingdom, for years 

a linchpin in the U.S. strategy to promote peace and stability in the region, is now 

less secure in the wake of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Jordanian leaders worry 

that Iraq is becoming a haven for terrorist groups, a fear dramatically heightened 

by the November 2005 suicide bombings in Amman. Jordan also has an interest in 

the development of an Iraq that does not inspire radical Islamist politics in Jordan. 

Moreover, the kingdom is anxious about growing Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics, 

and—more broadly—increasing Iranian and Shiite influence in the region. 

•	 Despite periodic crises of confidence and lingering Iraqi resentment over Jordan’s 

close ties with Saddam Hussein, the two countries have managed to forge deep ties; 

in fact, Jordan has taken the lead among Arab states. In the face of repeated attacks 

and threats, Jordan has maintained a strong diplomatic presence in Baghdad. The 

kingdom has also played a positive, if modest, role in stabilization and reconstruction 

efforts. 

•	 The economic impact of the Iraq crisis in Jordan has been mixed. Jordan has benefited greatly from serving as a “gateway” to Iraq for governments, aid workers, contractors, and businesspeople; its real estate and banking sectors are booming, and it 

stands to reap more benefits from increased trade and transport should the situation 

in Iraq improve. However, with the fall of Saddam Hussein, Jordan lost the sizable oil 

subsidies and customary shipments it received from Iraq. One of Jordan’s principal 

economic interests in the new Iraq is securing future energy assistance. 

I r a q a n d I t s N e i g h b o rs
•	 Unlike many of Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan can claim only modest influence over 

developments in Iraq. The kingdom does have notable intelligence capabilities vis-àvis Iraq, and it reportedly helped the United States track down and kill Al-Qaeda in 

Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Although some Jordanians highlight cross-border 

tribal and family connections with Iraqi Sunni Arabs, they pale in comparison to those 

of Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Jordan’s most significant means of influence is its hosting 

of a large and ever-changing Iraqi expatriate community, composed mostly, but not 

solely, of Sunni Arabs. 

•	 Jordan’s relationship with the United States remains strong. Viewing Jordan as a 

reliable and friendly government is nothing new in Washington, but what is new is 

the determination of King Abdullah to make a strategic relationship with the United 

States a centerpiece of Jordan’s foreign policy. Although the kingdom’s behind-thescenes support for the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq widened the credibility 

gap with the public, King Abdullah is willing to pay the cost for his close alliance with 

the United States in order to pursue what he sees as Jordan’s larger interests. 

•	 For Jordan, “the Palestinian Question” looms larger than Iraq. Given their support for 

U.S. policy in Iraq and their contributions to the global campaign against terrorism, 

along with the country’s central role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, Jordan’s leaders 

have been disappointed with what they see as U.S. inaction on the Middle East peace 

process. Moreover, given the turmoil in both Iraq and the Palestinian territories, Jordan must contend with the twin prospects of “state” failure to its east and west.

Introduction

Jordan, the only neighbor with close ties to both Iraq and the U.S. before the war, now 

faces a more threatening national security environment as it clings to its privileged relationship with Washington and settles into an uneasy relationship with Iraq’s new political elite. For its part, Jordan has played a positive, if modest, role in Iraq. Having long 

repaired the breach with Washington over the kingdom’s “neutral” stance in the 1990–91 

Gulf War, Jordan and the U.S. maintain robust cooperation over Iraq. “There was never an 

issue, thus never a conversation, to convince the king to be [privately] supportive of the 

Iraq war,” said a former senior U.S. diplomat. “The king was very clear that he believed 

there to be only one superpower and only one country that could be influential in the 

Middle East.”1 Despite its public opposition, as the U.S. went to war against Saddam 

Hussein, it had Jordan’s support. 

In terms of core objectives—a stable, free, and unified Iraq, at peace with its 

neighbors, free from Islamist terror groups, with an open economy, the rule of law and 

protection for minorities—the U.S. and Jordan are in agreement. American-Jordanian 

cooperation on Iraq, if properly managed, is likely to continue unchanged, even if the situation in Iraq worsens. But Jordan has paid a high price: Post-Saddam Iraq is destabilizing 

the kingdom. “Iraq was not the source of terrorism [before the U.S. invasion],” said former 

prime minister Taher Masri after the Amman bombings, “but now it has become exactly 

that.”2 Moreover, the threat of increased violence and terrorism is joined by new economic 

vulnerabilities brought on by the U.S. war against Saddam Hussein. 

U.S.-Jordanian cooperation has co-existed alongside wide divergences on a range of 

day-to-day policy questions, not to mention growing tensions and suspicions between 

the Hashemites and the new Iraqi leadership. Areas of divergence and tension between 

Amman and Washington relate principally to the Palestinian question, the marginalization 

of Sunnis, the role of Iran and ascendance of Iraqi Shiites, energy security, and Saddamera debt. These differences have been frequently aired in public, though less so since 

the establishment of the first permanent Iraqi government.3 Jordan also worries about 

Washington’s staying power. The kingdom’s nightmare scenario would be a precipitous 

American withdrawal, leaving Jordan caught between escalating Iraqi civil strife and 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by 

Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent 

conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase 

conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President of Government Affairs, 

International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, 

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • 

Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, 

D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public 

Policy, George Mason University • Mora L. McLean, President, 

Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. 

Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant 

Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

Members ex officio

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of 

Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, 

U.S. Marine Corps; President, National Defense University 
worsening Israeli-Palestinian violence. Areas of divergence between Jordan and Iraq are 

similar, but they hinge mostly on security. Iraq’s Shiite leaders accuse the kingdom of 

taking too soft a position on the insurgency. Jordan vehemently rejects such charges and 

itself fears the export of terrorism and instability from Iraq. 

For Jordan, the crisis in Iraq has highlighted a growing credibility gap between the 

ruling elite and the public. This credibility gap feeds into Jordanian attitudes about U.S. 

policy, which rank among the least favorable in the Arab and Muslim world.4 For example, 

only 9 percent of Jordanians thought that military force against Saddam Hussein was 

justified.5 This worsening credibility gap at home, and between the Jordanian public and 

the U.S., has not gone completely unnoticed in Washington; it is one reason why the 

U.S. is sometimes restrained in what it asks of Jordan. It may also explain why, at times, 

Jordanian leaders publicly accentuate their disagreements with the U.S.

Still, the bottom line for U.S. policymakers is that disagreements with Jordan and 

between Jordan and Iraq are manageable. Jordanian-American cooperation on Iraq will 

remain strong and Jordan will continue to play a positive, if modest, role. In terms of its 

sheer weight—that is, population, military capabilities, and economic power—Jordan is 

not in a position to play a pivotal role in Iraq.

But looking at raw power is just one measure. There are less obvious, harder to quantify ways in which Jordan will continue to be important to the future of the new Iraq. 

The kingdom has provided a reliable gateway through which governments, businesses, 

and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in Iraq. Jordan’s political support, 

especially in regional forums, is important to the U.S., particularly given that American 

influence in the region is waning. For much of the time since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Jordan has been the only Arab state to maintain full diplomatic engagement with 

Iraq. Beyond Iraq, Jordan remains one of America’s most reliable partners on a wide 

range of issues, from counterterrorism and Arab-Israeli peacemaking, to military and 

intelligence cooperation.6

Jordan’s Interests: Security and Stability

Jordan’s interests in Iraq center on two broad concerns: the kingdom’s endemic security 

and economic vulnerabilities, and the delicate balance of political forces at home. These 

two sources of anxiety, external vulnerability and a divided society, have both been aggravated by U.S. intervention in Iraq. 

A Stable Iraq Equals a Secure Jordan

What Jordan wants is a “strong Iraq,” said a Jordanian official, “stable, moderate, and 

unified—an Iraq that takes care of the needs of its people.” Stressing Jordan’s deep 

anxiety about Iraq’s breaking apart, he added that “Jordan can’t afford to have more than 

one Iraq to its east.”7 The kingdom is too vulnerable—economically, politically, and in 

terms of security—to insulate itself should events in Iraq worsen. In many ways, Jordan’s 

future is tied to Iraq’s.

Jordan wants to see Iraq with a strong central government where no sectarian group is 

marginalized, particularly the Sunni Arabs. The kingdom fears the emergence of separate 

or quasi-independent regions, assuming this would lead to more instability and even 

less control by Iraqis over their borders. The November 2005 triple suicide bombings in 

Amman, and the Aqaba missile attack that preceded it, demonstrated the growing threat 

of violence and terrorism spilling over from Iraq.8 The planning and execution of both the 

hotel bombings, which killed 57 people, and the Aqaba attack that targeted a U.S. naval 

vessel bore Iraqi fingerprints.

Even with the June 2006 killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (himself a Jordanian), who 

was responsible for numerous attacks against Jordan, the threat of spillover is unlikely 

to dissipate until the Iraqi government is able to exercise effective control at home and 
over its borders. On this score, Jordan’s fears are also America’s concerns. Previous plots 

have been aimed at both Jordanian and American targets in the kingdom. The 2002 

assassination of U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley in Amman was intended as a strike against 

both countries. 

Unlike the case with some other neighbors, there are no past or present unresolved 

territorial questions between Jordan and Iraq. Nor does the kingdom seek influence over 

a particular region or political group in Iraq. “The preservation of [Iraq’s] unity and stability is an obligation of all the neighbors,” said former foreign minister Marwan Muasher, 

adding that democracy will not bring stability to Iraq unless it is “coupled with respect 

for minority rights.”9 Sunni-dominated Jordan is anxious about the future of the Sunni 

minority in Iraq and has consistently and publicly advised the U.S. to take further steps 

to ensure that the Sunni community does not feel threatened. Jordan did not support the 

Sunni boycott of the January 2005 Iraqi elections, but the kingdom does lend its voice to 

support the complaints of Iraqi Sunnis that they are being marginalized. 

Jordan fears instability and violence to its east. This may explain King Abdullah’s 

comment in mid-2004 that post-Saddam Iraq could use a strongman. “I would say that 

the profile [of a leader for post-Saddam Iraq] would be somebody from inside, somebody 

who’s very strong . . . somebody with a military background who has experience of being 

a tough guy.”10 Since the January 2005 election, the king has not repeated this position in public, but worsening violence in Iraq has certainly reinforced the view among 

Jordanians. 

Iranian influence in Iraq is another top worry for Jordan: Anxiety about Iran is common both within official circles and among critics of the government. This fear relates to 

the larger Arab-Iranian and Sunni-Shia divides in the region, Jordan’s own fears about 

political Islam, Iran’s post-1979 attempts to export its Islamic revolution, and Iran’s 

continued support for Palestinian rejectionist groups, like Hamas, that pose a challenge 

to Jordan’s peace with Israel. 

Anxiety about Iran may explain the king’s oft-quoted warning of a new crescent of 

Shia influence that could destabilize the region and alter the balance of power. “Even 

Saudi Arabia is not immune,” said Abdullah, “. . . [from] the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni 

conflict . . . out of the borders of Iraq.”11 Abdullah has reportedly raised the specter of 

a widening arc of Shia power in discussions with American leaders, though he has toned 

down such rhetoric in public after it elicited hostile reactions from the new Iraqi leadership and from Iran. 

Domestic Politics: Keeping the Peace at Home

Jordan’s interest in a stable Iraq relates not only to traditional national security concerns 

but also to internal dynamics. Jordan, perennially anxious about instability and turbulence on its borders, also needs to avoid a situation where events in Iraq might upset the 

delicate balance of political, social, and economic forces at home. Because of its high 

Palestinian population (50–70 percent by various independent estimates), and with antiAmerican sentiment particularly high among Palestinians, Jordan has had to contend with 

a large, restive internal constituency that opposed the removal of Saddam and “wants to 

see the Americans suffer” in Iraq, in the words of a former advisor to the late King Hussein.12 In many respects, the Palestinian factor—both the situation west of the Jordan 

River and the role of Palestinians within Jordan—looms larger than Iraq. The same can be 

said for Islamism in Jordan. The Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections resonates 

far more strongly in Jordanian politics than does Iraqi Islamist politics. To be sure, from a 

security perspective the Jordanian regime worries about Zarqawi-style Salafist radicalism 

emanating from Iraq, but politically Hamas poses a much greater challenge­—to Jordan’s 

peace with Israel and to the balance between secular and religious forces at home. 

In response to unrest and opposition activity directed at both foreign and domestic 

policy, the king has taken a variety of heavy-handed measures at home. Following public 
protests in March 2003, the government banned most demonstrations. Moreover, the 

Jordanian government has tightened limits on the media and has leaned on them not 

to report on U.S. military activities in Jordan. In September 2004, the government also 

clamped down on the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the largest Islamist party in parliament, 

arresting a number of prominent leaders.13 Tensions with the IAF have continued to escalate. In August 2006, IAF parliamentarians were jailed for “inciting sectarianism” by visiting Zarqawi’s family in Jordan after his death and for referring to him as a “martyr.” The 

IAF threatened to boycott sessions of parliament if the MPs were not pardoned.14

Since 2003, the government has also tried to change the law governing professional 

associations and restrict their ability to express political views. The associations have 

become a hotbed of anti-American sentiment and protest against normalization with 

Israel. The new policies were condemned both by groups outside Jordan, like Human 

Rights Watch, and by opposition parties at home. IAF leader Hamzah Mansur said it 

amounted to an “assassination” of the associations.15 It was a clear attempt to constrain 

public space at a time when Jordanians feel the overall pace of political reform has moved 

backward.16

Although aware of the intense public opposition to U.S. actions in Iraq, and faced 

with a growing chorus of reform advocates, the king appears confident and willing to 

pay the costs of a widening credibility gap in order to pursue what he sees as Jordan’s 

larger interests. Given the increased threats facing Jordan, King Abdullah’s consolidation 

of authority and power is likely to continue. Offering the premiership to General Marouf 

Bakhit, an East Bank stalwart and former ambassador to Israel, reflects this trend.

Jordan is a Sunni Arab state, and one issue on which both the king and the public are 

united appears to be “Sunni solidarity.” The one group in Iraq toward which most Jordanians feel some affinity is the Arab Sunnis; it is both an enduring source of identity and 

a legacy of the Saddam years when Arab Sunnis controlled Iraq and maintained extensive 

links in Jordan. The king is using the Sunni card to bolster support at home and also to 

improve Jordan’s standing in the Arab world.

Energy, Trade, and the Economy

The extent to which the situation in Iraq leads to major economic disruptions, the more 

Jordanian leaders feel the heat at home. Fuel price increases in 2005, a direct result of 

the war, were a major source of public dissatisfaction with the government of then–prime 

minister Adnan Badran. So far, Jordan’s ability to secure alternative energy guarantees, 

together with the trade and real estate boom that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein, 

have prevented any serious economic upheavals. But Jordanians worry about the steadily 

increasing cost of fuel and whether the benefits of serving as a “gateway” to Iraq can 

be sustained over the long term. Should real domestic unrest bubble to the surface, it is 

more likely to be in response to economic factors rather than foreign policy decisions, as 

with the bread riots in 1989 and 1996.

Oil has always been an important consideration in Jordan’s relations with Iraq. Since 

the 1980s, not only was Iraq one of the largest players in Jordan’s economy, but also 

Saddam single-handedly guaranteed most of Jordan’s energy needs at below-market 

prices. Oil lay at the heart of Jordan’s late 1990s trade boom with Iraq. At the time, the 

Clinton administration turned a blind eye, seeing it as an unavoidable trade-off in order 

to maintain the larger international sanctions regime. Although Jordanians detested 

Saddam’s brutality toward his own people, Baghdad was a generous benefactor. Jordan 

now has a major stake in either restoring or replacing that munificence. 

In a bid for greater influence with Amman, Iraq sold oil to Jordan at below market 

prices after the UN Oil-for-Food Program was established in Iraq; in 2000, with prices 

around $30 a barrel, Jordan received Iraqi oil at $9.50 a barrel. Moreover, Iraq allowed 

Jordan, a country without domestic energy resources, to pay for the subsidized oil with 

consumer goods. Through the UN program, Iraq was able to steer preferential contracts 
to Jordan, and some Jordanian firms were essentially given monopolies. Exports to Iraq 

reached $420 million in 2001, nearly a quarter of Jordan’s exports.17 The system amounted 

to an annual grant, in real terms, of approximately $400–600 million a year.18 According 

to some estimates, the benefit was even higher—$500 million to $1 billion annually.19

In the post-Saddam era, Jordan has been able to secure its oil needs from Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates—quite a turn of events considering the chilly relations after the 1990–91 Gulf War. Throughout 2004, Saudi Arabia remained the principal 

guarantor of Jordan’s oil needs, supplying 50,000 barrels per day as a grant. Amman is 

trying to negotiate further short-term concessionary deals, but the generosity of the Gulf 

States is beginning to wane, and the prospect of an end to subsidized oil is real. The U.S. 

has encouraged the Gulf States to assist Jordan, but the negotiations have been managed 

largely by Jordanians on a bilateral level.20

The future of Jordan’s oil supplies is the subject of debate among Jordanians. Some 

acknowledge that the Saddam-era benefits are a thing of the past. Jordan should not 

expect a future Iraqi government to restore the Saddam-era “deals.” Moreover, it would 

be unrealistic to expect that the ongoing subsidies from the Gulf neighbors will continue 

indefinitely. “[T]his is not sustainable,” Muasher has said regarding the high economic 

growth rates accruing from oil subsidies; pressed on the subject, he conceded that “we 

need to move to a situation where we can do it on our own.”21

Yet although some Jordanians say the country will have to adjust to market forces, 

others see preferential energy benefits as an entitlement. In August 2006, Prime Minister 

Marouf Bakhit visited Baghdad and secured an Iraqi commitment to supply 10,000 barrels 

of oil per day at a slightly discounted price. If this arrangement holds it is more indicative 

of an easing of the strained relationship between Baghdad and Amman than a sign that 

the Saddam-era deals can be restored. With rising world energy prices, pressure is mounting on the government to further reduce fuel subsidies. Jordan’s large current account 

deficit in 2006 stems largely from this “one-two punch” of high energy prices and diminishing energy assistance. By comparison, Jordan’s position is the reverse of another small 

neighbor that has cooperated on post-Saddam Iraq—Kuwait. Increasingly, oil wealth has 

allowed Kuwait to weather the storm of the war and its aftermath. 

So far, Jordan’s worst-case fears about energy security have not materialized. Similarly, 

early concerns about the country’s economic position have since faded. In the three years 

following the war, Jordan has enjoyed robust growth. Not only has Jordanian trade with 

Iraq remained strong, but also much of the Iraqi-Jordanian commercial relationship has 

now shifted to Jordan’s private sector.22 Furthermore, the “gateway” role that Jordan has 

played has done much to compensate for the drop in tourism. (Ironically, the “gateway” 

benefits are an outgrowth of continuing instability in Iraq.) Some Jordanian businesses 

have also expanded into neighboring states.23 The “Iraq effect” is also creating a boom in 

Jordanian real estate, as Iraqis look for a safe haven and as more and more multinationals 

and NGOs base their Iraq operations out of Jordan. Even the used car market has been 

surging since the war. The kingdom’s relaxed rules on financial transactions have also led 

to a surge in Iraqi assets in Jordan’s growing banking sector, though the lack of transparency worries Iraqi and American authorities. 

Trade with the U.S. has also helped Jordan offset its economic dependence on Iraq. 

Just several years after the 2001 ratification of the Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 

Jordanian exports to the U.S. now top $1 billion annually—a fifty-fold increase compared 

to a decade ago. Jordan is also receiving increased foreign direct investment from the 

Arab world. Kuwait, which in the early 1990s treated Jordan like a pariah because of its 

pro-Iraq position in the 1990–91 Gulf War, is now the second-largest foreign investor in 

the kingdom behind France. Yet the rosy post-Saddam economic figures will not relieve all 

of Jordan’s concerns; with nearly half its population under the age of 15, Jordan will need 

much stronger economic growth to provide jobs for its burgeoning workforce.

Jordan’s Economy 2000–2007

Year GDP

(in $ billions)

GDP

% growth

2000 8.4 4.2

2001 8.9 4.2

2002 9.6 5

2003 10.2 3.2

2004 11.5 6

2005 12.9 6.1

2006 (est.) 5.7

2007 (est.) 5.1

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Jordan, various years
Jordan’s Interests: Unchanged or Newfound?

For the most part, Jordan’s interests vis-à-vis Iraq have not changed substantially over 

time, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom. Jordan’s need for support from major powers, 

its obsession with stability (internal and external), a rejection of Islamist politics, energy 

insecurity, the Palestinian question, and the kingdom’s systemic economic vulnerabilities 

remain as they were before 2003. Moreover, Jordan’s reliance on a strategic relationship 

with the U.S. is unchanged. Unlike the case with other neighbors, such as Syria or Iran, 

the use of U.S. military force to overthrow Saddam Hussein did not lead Jordanian leaders 

to worry that it could happen to them. 

But in two arenas, terrorism and Sunni politics, Jordan’s interests have been upended. 

In the past, challenges posed by Iraq stemmed from Baghdad’s strength. But in the postSaddam era, it is Iraq’s weakness that threatens Jordan. It is one of the great ironies of 

the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime that the new Iraq poses 

a serious threat to long-standing American allies like Jordan. Moreover, a Shia-led, Iranian-allied Iraq means that Jordan sees itself on the front line of the Arab-Iranian and 

Sunni-Shia regional divides. To the extent that Jordanian and Iraqi elites once shared a 

worldview—pro-modernization, secular Arab, anti-Iran—their perspectives now diverge. 

This fault line is partially mitigated by Iraq’s Arab identity. Still, the shifting balance has 

raised new anxieties for Jordan that are unlikely to be put to rest easily. 

Given recent steps to curtail political activity, as well as the king’s effective control 

over parliament (particularly on foreign policy, budget, and electoral issues), some might 

argue that the regime worries democracy in Iraq will increase pressure on the Hashemites 

to cede control. The democracy factor is undoubtedly a source of some concern, but more 

so over the long term. In the short term, particularly against the backdrop of the November 2005 bombings and the continuing threat of terrorism, both the regime and the public 

are much more concerned about stability than democracy. 

Constraints on Foreign Policy Objectives

U.S. actions in Iraq have placed constraints on Jordan’s other foreign policy objectives, the 

most glaring being the Palestinian question. The situation in Iraq has steadily increased 

pressure on the Jordanian government to improve relations between Israel and the Palestinians. “The Jordanian government calculated that there was significant potential benefit 

to Jordan in supporting the U.S. [behind the scenes] in the Iraq war,” said a former senior 

U.S. diplomat, “because if you can get the U.S. to participate in the peace process, that 

relieves tensions in Jordan and thus bolsters Jordanian stability.”24

After the war began, the kingdom was effective in urging the U.S. to move forward 

with a new peace initiative—the Bush administration’s Road Map for Peace—which bore 

some Jordanian fingerprints. Then, Yasser Arafat’s death, an informal Israeli-Palestinian 

cease-fire and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza gave Jordan some breathing room, enough 

to return its ambassador to Tel Aviv (withdrawn since 2000). But Israeli-Palestinian relations remain profoundly unstable. The election of Hamas in January 2006 has made Jordan 

uneasy, and as Israeli unilateralism further displaces the Road Map, Jordan’s position is 

undermined. Jordan tried to revive the Arab League initiative in early 2005 but failed to 

gather support. The mood among Jordanian officials is of increasing desperation. With 

both Iraq and Palestine mired in chaos and instability, not to mention Israeli-Lebanese 

fighting, Jordan finds its maneuverability tightly constrained.

Jordan’s Influence in Iraq: Positive but Modest

Unlike many of Iraq’s other neighbors, Jordan can claim only modest influence on developments in Iraq. Turkey has had a military presence in northern Iraq and has long been 
a vital gateway for Iraqi oil exports. Iran has close ties with key figures in the new Iraqi 

leadership and an extensive network of ties throughout the Shiite community. Kuwait 

and Saudi Arabia were for many years major financial backers of Iraq, for which the debt 

issue gives them leverage today.25 Moreover, Iraq has influence with its fellow Arab oil 

producers, and vice-versa; Syria has some influence, as it makes common cause with 

Iraqis opposed to the U.S. occupation. Syria also played host to Iraqi prime minister Nouri 

al-Maliki for nearly twenty years. But Jordan—lacking military or economic prowess, 

political or ideological ambitions, and adventurism—is not in a position to exert great 

influence over events in Iraq. In fact, if one considers the period before Saddam’s fall, 

the more interesting pursuit is gauging Iraqi influence in Jordan—which Saddam actively 

pursued through government-to-government assistance, privileged trade protocols, and 

attempts to buy influence with the Jordanian media and civil society.26

But Jordan’s influence is not totally absent. The kingdom serves as a “gateway” to 

Iraq, a role it began during the Iran-Iraq War and maintained throughout the 1990–2003 

sanctions period (principally via its Red Sea port of Aqaba and the land route).27 Amman 

and Aqaba are key pass-through points for a good deal of traffic going in and out of 

Iraq. Government officials, aid workers, contractors, and businesspeople—Iraqi and nonIraqi—have come to rely on Jordan’s position as a stable and reliable gateway. Should this 

be closed down, it would prove costly not only for Jordan, but also for Iraq.

In the security realm, Jordan has played host to a major international training facility for Iraqi police recruits. The kingdom has also run training programs and exchanges 

for several thousand Iraqi Army officers, with the hope that these efforts will contribute 

to tamping down the insurgency and restoring stability. Although opposed to putting 

troops on the ground, Jordan is seeking to influence the new Iraqi security services (and 

please Washington) by hosting these training programs. But given the enormity of Iraq’s 

security needs, the Jordanian programs—which average just a few weeks—have had 

limited impact on the ground.28 Jordan also plays a modest role on humanitarian issues, 

as evidenced by its involvement in resolving a number of hostage taking cases. Jordan 

also operated a large field hospital in Falluja. The kingdom has also assisted in training 

journalists and civil servants. 

In terms of U.S. military planning, the kingdom’s contributions have been valuable but 

not decisive. “Jordan went from marginal to semi-important with the disappearance of 

the Turkish front,” said one former senior U.S. official.29 The extent to which U.S. military 

forces have been operating out of Jordan is a closely guarded secret, and the Jordanian 

media is pressured not to report on the U.S. troop presence. During the war, the government acknowledged the presence of a small number of U.S. troops, ostensibly to operate 

Patriot antimissile batteries (a defensive measure). Independent estimates put the true 

figure at around 5,000 U.S. and coalition forces in Jordan at the time of the war.30 As U.S. 

military planners sought to keep Saddam Hussein guessing about invasion routes, Jordan 

again played a valuable role. Fearing a major U.S. invasion force from Jordan, Saddam 

reportedly overruled some of his own generals and allocated defenses toward blunting an 

invasion from the west.31

Some Jordanians argue that the kingdom, lacking the capability to influence events on 

the ground, is still able to exert some influence by providing counsel to Washington. Jordanians increasingly feel that the Bush administration is listening to—though not always 

acting on—their advice. Off the record, Jordanians will say that the United States (and 

Iraq) would be in a much better position today if they had listened to Jordan’s advice not 

to disband the army, to contain Iranian influence, and to avoid an accelerated timetable 

for elections.

Military and Security

Jordan has not provided direct or indirect support to any paramilitary groups in Iraq, 

nor does the Jordanian military operate in Iraq. Jordan has provided assistance to train 


Iraqi security forces in Jordan, but it has stated repeatedly that it will not send police 

or peacekeeping forces—unless requested by the Iraqi government or as part of a joint 

Arab force. The kingdom has also sold defense equipment to the new Iraqi security forces. 

Jordan’s intelligence service, widely considered the most professional in the Arab world, 

does have a presence in Iraq.32

Jordan and Iraq do have a long history of military cooperation in the period before 

1990, particularly in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iraqis fought alongside Jordanians in the 1948 and 1967 wars, and Iraq positioned aircraft in Jordan for safekeeping 

during its war with Iran.33 Although there are Jordanians participating in the insurgency, 

Zarqawi having been the most prominent, none appear to be doing so with the acquiescence of the Jordanian government.34 Moreover, the number of Jordanian militants in Iraq 

is relatively low.35

On the training side, Jordan is one of the few states in the region that has taken on 

a major role in training members of the new Iraqi security services. The police trainees 

are generally new and inexperienced recruits. They receive an intensive, but short training course in Jordan that is funded by the U.S. The Iraqi military officers are much more 

experienced than the police recruits, and Jordan’s outreach to the Iraqi military is patterned after the U.S. Defense Department’s International Military Education and Training 

(IMET) Program—from which many Jordanian officers themselves have graduated. (Next 

to Turkey, Jordan has the highest IMET participation rates.) 

But Jordan’s capacity for training is limited. In terms of potential peacekeeping or 

stability forces in Iraq, Jordan has firmly and publicly stated that it will not send forces. 

(The king was very clear about this during the May 2004 World Economic Forum in 

Jordan.) Yet there have been reports that Jordanian Special Forces have participated in 

targeted counterterrorism operations inside Iraq in conjunction with U.S. forces. This 

position is in line with U.S. and Iraqi views against intervention by the neighbors. That 

said, if invited and part of a larger Arab or regional force, Jordan might participate.

Shared History

Jordan and Iraq have similar postcolonial histories, but these historical connections 

afford little if any influence in the post-Saddam era. In fact, Baghdad’s Hashemite heritage could be a political liability for Jordan if not managed properly. Both states had their 

borders defined by the British, who installed Hashemite ruling families in Amman and 

Baghdad after World War I. While the Hashemites retained power in Jordan, they could 

not hold on in Iraq, where a violent coup wiped out the royal family in the late 1950s—

just a few months after signing a confederation agreement with Jordan.36 Despite this 

colonial connection, historically the two countries have not been closely linked, with 

Jordan oriented toward Palestine and the Levant. In recent years, gossip swirled around 

the idea of reviving the Hashemite connection, particularly following the appearance of 

Jordan’s Prince Hassan at a high profile meeting of Iraqi opposition figures in London 

before Operation Iraqi Freedom.37 Although some Jordanians interviewed for this report 

would not rule out a future political role in Iraq for a Hashemite (should Iraqis ask for 

such), most dismissed a priori any notion that members of Jordan’s ruling family would 

play a role in Iraq’s future.38

Economics

For more than two decades, Jordan and Iraq have enjoyed close economic relations. During the years of UN sanctions, mutual dependence reached its peak, but the balance of 

economic influence rested more with Iraq than Jordan. Although not a short distance, the 

Baghdad-Amman and Baghdad-Aqaba land routes became well-worn beginning with the 

Iraq-Iran War. The two countries have discussed major upgrades to roads and pipelines, 
10

but planning has repeatedly been delayed. Jordan’s international airport remains a critical air link for Iraq. Theoretically, Jordan could close these land and air routes and inflict 

damage on Iraq, but in light of Jordan’s own political and economic vulnerabilities, such a 

scenario seems remote. In terms of experience on the ground, Jordanian businesses have 

an advantage over their counterparts from the other neighbors. 

Religious, Cultural, and Humanitarian Links

Some Jordanians point to cross-border tribal and family connections with the Sunnis of 

western Iraq, citing these links as a source of influence, but this appears more imagined 

than real. Granted, there is a strong measure of Sunni solidarity between Jordan and the 

Iraqi Sunni community, but this falls short of the entrenched cross-border ties between 

the Kurds of Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; Iranian and Iraqi Shiites; or even the crossborder, tribal ties between Syria and Iraq, where the border is considerably longer and ties 

between populations are more deeply rooted. Moreover, even if Jordan could claim strong 

links, its ties with Washington would be a liability. “The strategic nature of AmericanJordanian relations,” writes a Jordanian analyst, “has not helped Amman win the confidence and support of broad sectors of Sunni Arabs dispersed among extremist fundamentalist and nationalist movements.”39

Jordan has also tried to use its humanitarian efforts, like the field hospital in Falluja, 

to reach out to Iraqi Sunni leaders. But the political impact has been marginal at best.40

Jordan may have ties with various strata of the Iraqi Sunni community, but it seems to 

enjoy little influence when it comes to mediating between Iraqi factions.

Expatriates

Jordan has played host to a large and ever-changing expatriate Iraqi community. During 

the 1990–91 Gulf War and the subsequent UN sanctions regime, Iraqi refugees swelled the 

population of Jordan by some 300,000–350,000, including members of Saddam Hussein’s 

family.41 In the aftermath of the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion in 2003, the number of 

Iraqis in Jordan rose dramatically. In the post-Saddam period, various estimates put the 

figure anywhere between 450,000 and 800,000—possibly even as high as one million 

(see sidebar this page); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees puts the current figure 

at 700,000 (see graphic opposite page).42 The Iraqi expatriate community is one way in 

which Jordan has tried to build bridges between Iraqi ethnic communities on both sides of 

the border and encourage Iraqi Sunnis to participate in the Iraqi political process. But the 

expatriate issue is also a source of tension: Iraqi leaders worry about a “brain drain,” and 

Jordanian officials worry about a growing source of Islamist militancy streaming across 

the country’s borders. Moreover, the Maliki government wants Jordan to extradite Saddam’s 

eldest daughter, Raghad, who is accused of bankrolling the insurgency, but Jordan’s decision to host her remains firm.

Iraq’s Neighbors

Jordan has sought to expand its influence by acting as an organizer and convener of 

Iraq’s neighbors, but it has a mixed record of success on this score. More often than not, 

when there is sufficient common cause to convene at a high level, larger powers vie for 

leadership. A November 2004 summit on Iraq was held in Egypt, not Jordan; before the 

war, Turkey played a more prominent role bringing together Iraq’s neighbors. Jordan did 

host a January 2005 foreign ministers meeting ahead of the Iraqi elections, but the Iranian foreign minister stayed away in protest of the king’s negative comments about Shia 

influence. Jordan also hosted three meetings of the World Economic Forum (2003, 2004, 

2005), where Iraq-related diplomatic activity occurred on the sidelines; the meetings were 

also an early forum for Iraq’s new leaders to interact with their regional and global counIraqis in Jordan

Like Syria and Iran, Jordan has played host to a 

large Iraqi expatriate community since the Iran-Iraq 

War. Although Syria and Iran were known as safe 

havens for Iraqi oppositionists, Jordan—which 

maintained strong ties with with Saddam Hussein—

played host to a much less politically active Iraqi 

community: Iraqis in Jordan tended to be secular, 

mostly Sunni, and Arab nationalist in orientation, 

which fit well with Jordan’s own national identity. 

Like Jordanians themselves, Iraqis in Jordan may 

not have favored Saddam Hussein but were staunch 

supporters of Iraq in its war with Iran. After Iraq’s 

defeat in the 1990–91 Gulf War and the ensuing UN 

sanctions, the Iraqi expatriate community swelled 

to several hundred thousand. During much of the 

1990s, Jordan was Iraq’s principal outlet to the 

West.

In the post-Saddam period, Iraqis have flooded 

into Jordan in numbers that far exceed both the 

earlier population flows and the current movements 

of Iraqis into Syria and other neighboring countries. 

Accurate figures are hard to come by and estimates 

vary considerably. What is certain is that the numbers have grown steadily since the fall of Saddam 

Hussein, particularly since the outbreak of largescale sectarian violence. In recent years, various 

sources put the figure anywhere between 450,000 

and 800,000—possibly even as high as one million. 

In mid-2006, a senior Jordanian official cited the 

800,000 figure, but stressed that the government 

tends to rely on low estimates. Several unofficial 

sources said the common assumption among the 

political elite in Jordan is that the Iraqi community 

numbers at least one million. Factoring in constant 

cross-border migration and repatriation, it is possible that several million Iraqis have spent at least 

some time in Jordan over the years. 

Given Jordan’s most recent population estimate of 5.9 million, the Iraqi refugee community 

amounts to a major human flood—and a possible 

threat. The community is mostly Sunni Arabs, who 

feel at home in Jordan (as in Syria), given their 

Arab nationalist perspective. Since the November 

2005 Amman suicide bombings, however, Iraqis 

have grown increasingly unwelcome in Jordan. Not 

only are Iraqis becoming associated with violent, 

radical, jihadist Islam, but some economic tensions have emerged, from access to healthcare and 

affordable housing to employment and education. 

An unmistakable feature of the new Iraqi expatriate 

community in Jordan is the presence of a large segment of the Sunni Arab leadership, from ex-Baathist 

military elites to tribal leaders from Anbar province 

to Islamists groups like the Muslim Scholars Association.

Tensions aside, as the West’s “gateway” to Iraq 

and the preferred destination for Iraqi expatriates, 

Jordan remains a critical link between Iraq, the 

region, and the international community.

Sources: Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, 

“Carriers of Conflict,” The Atlantic Monthly, November 2006; UN High Commissioner for Refugees; U.S. 

Committee for Refugees and Immigrants; World 

Factbook 2006
11

terparts. The kingdom also hosted an international donors conference in July 2005, where 

the neighbors and the international community discussed Iraqi aid.43

Compatibility with U.S. Interests—Present and Future

In practice, the Jordanian position on Iraq has been highly compatible with U.S. interests, 

and that foundation is firm. There is little chance Jordan will change course on Iraq or 

seek to disrupt U.S. or Iraqi policies. Under the surface, however, there remain a number 

of disagreements that could worsen over time.

First, there is Jordan’s strategic partnership with Washington. Jordan is a state beset 

with deep vulnerabilities in both its economy and its geostrategic position in the regional 

balance of power. The West, and the United States specifically, has long been a prominent 

part of Jordan’s strategy for addressing its endemic vulnerabilities. Jordan was able to 

maintain its strategic relationship with Washington and also preserve its close ties with 

Saddam Hussein, but it was the United States—not Saddam Hussein’s Iraq—that enjoyed 

an unprecedented place of privilege in Jordan’s national security strategy. Since the mid1990s, following the peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has made a determined effort to 

upgrade its ties with Washington and build a strategic framework based on close cooperation in security and trade—a relationship whereby Jordan relies on the U.S. to guarantee 

its security, lest it get trampled in an increasingly turbulent region.

Viewing Jordan as a reliable and friendly government is nothing new in Washington, 

but what is new is the determination of Jordan’s present leader to make a strategic 

relationship with the U.S. a centerpiece of the country’s foreign policy. King Abdullah is 

managing Jordan’s Iraq policy in such a way that reinforces Jordan’s strategic alliance with 

Washington. Abdullah also wants Jordan to hold a privileged place in Washington and is 

sensitive to the relative position of other Arab states, such as Egypt, that are also closely 

aligned with the U.S.44

Second, Jordanian leaders took a lesson from history: The costs that came with standing 

by Iraq in the 1990–91 Gulf War were unacceptable in retrospect, so this time around, not 

only did Jordan seek guarantees from the U.S. and its regional allies to offset the costs of 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Countries,

March 2003 to September-October 2006

500,000

300,000 returnees

700,000

20,000–40,000

10,000–13,000
12

Operation Iraqi Freedom, but it also heavily considered the positions of 

regional investors, such as Kuwait, which it could not afford to alienate. 

 Third, there is the Palestinian dimension. The Palestinian issue 

looms much larger than Iraq in Jordanian politics. Already under 

constraints imposed by the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process in 

2000 and the surging violence between Israelis and Palestinians that 

followed, Jordan believed U.S. actions in Iraq would be joined by 

positive movement on the Palestinian question. Although this was 

not the primary calculation that produced Jordanian cooperation 

in U.S. policy on Iraq, it was an important element in Jordanian 

decision making—and once Saddam was ousted, Jordanian leaders 

lobbied the U.S. very hard for more dramatic steps on the peace 

process. Former U.S. National Security Council analyst Flynt Leverett 

described King Abdullah’s position on the eve of the war as follows: 

“We are going to support you in Iraq, we assume you are going to 

take military action, we will do everything we can to support you. 

But we need more cover on the Palestinian issue, we need a road map.”45

Fourth, Jordan’s cooperation is also tied to Washington’s use of positive economic and 

military inducements. This strategy is not new: More than a decade ago, in the aftermath 

of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, the Clinton administration convinced Congress to 

cancel hundreds of millions of dollars of Jordanian debt. Arab-Israeli peace, together with 

counterterrorism priorities, led to a steep rise in annual foreign aid to Jordan. Then, after 

9/11, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement—signed under Clinton but still awaiting Senate approval—was quickly ratified. Bilateral trade has boomed. In addition, as the U.S. 

went to war against Saddam in early 2003, Washington put forward an expansive new aid 

package for Jordan. Unlike Turkey, which also received U.S. aid pledges, Jordan did not put 

the question of cooperation before its parliament. In 2003, U.S. aid to Jordan hit a highwater mark. Aid alone was not responsible for Jordan’s cooperation, but it did provide a 

powerful statement of support to the kingdom and reassured Abdullah at a moment when 

he was anxious about the economic dislocations of war. Since Saddam Hussein’s ouster, 

bilateral foreign aid to Jordan has remained at high levels, averaging about $500 million 

annually. 

As Jordan pursues what is an unpopular policy at home, foreign aid has allowed the 

king to make the case that he is putting “Jordan First”—a slogan favored by the Hashemites. Using foreign aid to bolster regime stability is a long-standing Jordanian strategy.46

Increased U.S. aid is the tangible manifestation of America’s commitment to the stability 

and well-being of Jordan. It is also a sign of Jordan’s relative importance to U.S. strategic 

goals in the region, from Arab-Israeli peacemaking to counterterrorism to rebuilding Iraq. 

Thus it is little surprise that aid to Jordan has risen so dramatically since 2001.

Jordan’s cooperation on Iraq has also been reinforced by the course of events. All 

things considered, said former foreign minister Marwan Muasher in late 2004, “we haven’t 

done too bad.”47 Despite all the instability brought on by war, Jordan has been able to 

maintain high growth rates (between 3 percent and 6 percent). In other words, Jordan 

has a vested economic interest in post-Saddam Iraq. The threat of terrorism continues to 

loom large, but Jordan has managed to do remarkably well economically since the fall of 

Saddam. The fact that Jordan’s worst case scenarios—interrupted energy supplies, a surge 

in unemployment, economic contractions—did not materialize has helped to reinforce the 

decision to cooperate with Washington.

Specific Areas of Concern 

The following areas of concern will dominate the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship in years to 

come. These issues, from terrorism and Iran to mutual mistrust and economic relations, 

Source: Congressional Research Service

(*requested)

U.S. Foreign Aid to Jordan since the 1990–91 Gulf War

Year

Millions of Dollars (unadjusted)
13

require patient diplomacy and a renewed spirit of mutual cooperation. The United States 

also has a large stake in the amelioration of these concerns. 

Spillover of violence and terrorism. Jordan, lacking economic or strategic power, is 

uniquely vulnerable to Iraq’s increasing chaos, instability, and sectarian strife. If Iraq 

moves toward full-scale civil war, Jordan will almost certainly experience a surge in violence. The November 2005 Amman suicide bombings, as well as earlier plots and attacks, 

highlighted a combination of flashpoints, including the large and fluid Iraqi exile community, lax Iraqi border control, violent opposition to the U.S. occupation, and opposition 

to Jordan’s strategic relationship with Washington. Even if Jordan’s highly regarded intelligence services continue to perform effectively, even the best counterterrorism capability 

is no substitute for a functional Iraqi state that can patrol its borders effectively and 

maintain public order. Nor can it compensate for the destabilizing effects of the U.S. 

occupation, which is a magnet for the Iraqi insurgency. Jordan is caught between its 

fundamental reliance on U.S. security guarantees and the negative externalities caused by 

the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the decline of American influence in the region.

Sunni marginalization and the role of Iran. Jordan worries about the marginalization 

of Iraq’s Sunni community and the possibility that Iraq is drifting deeper into Iranian 

control. The first alarm was sounded early after the fall of Saddam, when Jordan opposed 

the widespread U.S. de-Baathification campaign. As a result, the kingdom has tried to 

play a bridge-building role: “We are working to try to reach out to the Sunni community in 

Iraq and to convince them that they are part and parcel of the future of Iraq,” King Abdullah said in mid-2005.48 At the diplomatic level, the kingdom supports the Arab League’s 

reconciliation initiative and encourages Sunnis to join the political process—albeit with 

modest results so far. But Jordan’s fear of growing Iranian influence and a concomitant 

rise in Shiite power in Iraq is becoming more and more pronounced. Jordan’s concern, 

reflective of a broader concern in the Arab world, will remain a source of tension with 

Iraq. 

When it comes to Iraq’s problems, Jordanians are quick to blame Washington. “[The 

Bush administration] should not have disbanded the army,” said a senior Jordanian official.49 On this point, Jordanian officials—including the king—have spoken out strongly 

and consistently. Former foreign minister Marwan Muasher called on the United States 

to reinstate the Iraqi Army—presumably with its former Sunni ranks and command.50

Many Jordanians believe that the disbanding of the army has not only contributed to the 

security vacuum but also drastically marginalized the Iraqi Sunni community. The initial 

U.S. reliance on expatriate Iraqi opposition figures—many of whom were Shiite, virulently 

anti-Saddam, and bent on de-Baathification, such as Ahmed Chalabi—further exacerbated 

the situation. Jordanians were particularly troubled by the early role of Chalabi, who was 

convicted in Jordan of massive bank fraud and remains a much-reviled figure among 

Jordanian political leaders.

Mutual mistrust and the crisis of confidence with Baghdad. Mutual mistrust between 

Jordan and Iraq has worsened steadily since early 2005, and could lead to an enduring 

bilateral crisis of confidence. Given the close Hashemite-Saddam relationship, and the fact 

that Iraq’s new leadership is drawn heavily from Shia exiles persecuted by Saddam, the rift 

is not surprising. There was evidence of a nascent division even before the January and 

December 2005 elections. King Abdullah’s warnings about a Shia “crescent” in late 2004 

were not well received by members of the United Iraqi Alliance, who swept the election 

and now lead Iraq’s first permanent, post-Saddam government. Moreover, given that some 

insurgents are themselves Jordanian, a belief has developed among some Iraqi Shiites 

that the Jordanian government is complicit in exporting Zarqawi-style radicalism.51 At 

its worst, Shiite public opinion in Iraq views the Jordanian government as complicit in 

exporting Zarqawi-style radicalism; and at best, Iraq’s new political elite worries that 

Amman has been too permissive toward support for the insurgency.

The most dramatic incident to stoke the Iraqi-Jordanian crisis of confidence was the 

February 2005 bombing in Hilla, Iraq. The attack, reportedly carried out by a Jordanian, 
14

killed more than 120 Iraqis, mainly Shia. An obituary published in Jordan hailed the 

alleged bomber—Raed al-Banna, a Jordanian—as a “martyr.” The al-Banna case led to 

an outcry in Iraq, with Shiite leaders leveling harsh criticisms against Jordan. For months, 

accusations were hurled at Amman. “We are sorry to say that until now, a high number of 

the figures of the [former] regime and those who supervise terrorist groups are based in 

Jordan,” said Laith Kubba, spokesman for interim Iraqi prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari.52

After the Hilla bombing, demonstrators attacked the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad. 

The Iraqi demonstrations, followed by the withdrawal of ambassadors and mutual recriminations, signaled a steep decline in relations. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim said Jordan was exporting “terrorists” to Iraq. It was 

weeks before formal diplomatic relations returned to normal.53 The Amman bombings later 

that year fueled mistrust in the other direction, given that the bombers were Iraqi. 

Visible signs of the breach remain, such as the refusal of some Iraqi Shia leaders 

to travel to Jordan for conferences and meetings. Speaking at a June 2005 meeting of 

interior ministers from the neighboring states, former Iraqi interior minister Bayan Jabr 

singled out Jordan and Syria for not doing enough to stem the tide of foreign fighters. 

Iraqis have also been rankled by Jordanian columnists, many of whom they accuse of 

giving far more attention to anti-American tirades than to condemning Arab-on-Arab 

violence in Iraq. There is also lingering Iraqi resentment rooted in a belief that members 

of the Jordanian establishment profited from Saddam Hussein’s regime while average 

Iraqis suffered. Remarkably, the heart of the relationship—trade, transport, security 

training, and the “gateway”—appears largely untouched by the breach over Hilla and 

the Amman hotel bombings. Visits by Iraqi president Jalal Talabani and Jordanian prime 

minister Marouf Bakhit have healed some wounds on a day-to-day basis, but the crisis of 

confidence remains; part of the problem is that Jordanian elites are exposed to the large 

(and largely disaffected) Iraqi exile community. Left unattended, this crisis could develop 

into a more serious breach.

Economics: Sustainable growth, transparency, and debt. Trade and economic matters generate positive cooperation between Jordan and Iraq, but they are also a source 

of discord. Iraq relies on trade and transport routes via Jordan, bilateral trade is robust, 

and Jordan is a convenient safe haven for Iraqis to park their assets—illicit or otherwise. 

Stories of Iraqis using cash to purchase multimillion-dollar properties in Amman are all 

too common. More important, though, Iraq’s new leaders worry that former regime figures 

are using Jordan as a base to support the insurgency. “The family of Saddam is there 

with a huge wealth. [Jordanian] law is allowing them to support political activities,” said 

Kubba in mid-2005, adding that “they are attempting to revive the Baath Party. This is 

unacceptable and hostile from an Iraqi viewpoint.”54 Jordanian authorities reject such 

charges. Iraqi criticism could stem from a “blame others” tactic. But the financial ledger 

is murky, and full compliance is difficult to ascertain;55 the lack of transparency is noticeable. At least in terms of Saddam-era assets, U.S. officials interviewed for this report said 

Jordan has generally complied with U.S. and Iraqi requests to trace and return assets. 

Even though Jordan enjoys certain added economic benefits as a result of instability in 

Iraq, these benefits are unsustainable and potentially damaging to the Jordanian economy 

over the long term. The run-up in real estate is the best example of this mixed blessing; 

the real estate boom is having a vastly disparate impact on the Jordanian economy and 

contributing to an ever-widening income gap.

The pre-2003 economic balance sheet is also a source of discord. Jordan claims it is 

owed close to $1 billion in Iraqi commercial debt. The kingdom has worked tirelessly to 

ensure that its debt is not lumped into the larger multilateral debt process—Jordanian 

officials call the debt “exceptional” and say it should be handled on a separate ledger. 

They also complain that the U.S. is not fully supporting Amman in securing these funds. 

The kingdom has also lobbied creditor nations to reduce Iraqi debt by offering more reconstruction contracts to neighbors like Jordan.56 But the debt issue is complex. For example, 
15

without the Saddam-era concessions the balance sheet might look very different. If Jordan is intent on pressing the issue, the U.S. and other debtor nations should press Jordan 

to be more forthcoming in opening up the kingdom’s Saddam-era ledgers.57

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As noted earlier, U.S. actions in Iraq have further 

increased pressure on the Jordanian government to improve the situation in the Palestinian territories—which has also created some tension with the United States. Although 

Amman was pleased with the 2003 U.S. endorsement of the “Road Map” peace plan—for 

which Jordians claim some credit—the glaring lack of progress is a growing sore point for 

Amman. If the Aqaba Summit in June 2003—where President Bush presided and pledged 

to “ride herd” over the parties—was a high point for Jordan, the April 2004 Bush-Sharon 

exchange of letters was a low point.58 Jordanian officials point with some pride to the May 

2004 U.S. letter of assurances to King Abdullah, but what is heard more often is despair 

over unending Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the failure of mediation efforts. Jordanians 

are frustrated with the U.S. and the international community, and increasingly anxious 

about the lack of progress in implementing the Road Map. The dramatic escalation of 

violence in both Gaza and Lebanon in the summer of 2006 has further exposed Jordan’s 

peace with Israel and the kingdom’s moderate approach to regional peacemaking efforts. 

The hope that U.S. actions in Iraq would create a positive externality and relieve pressure 

on Jordan regarding the Palestinian issue has turned into a major disappointment. 

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

When it comes to Iraq and the Middle East, there are those who argue that Jordan is on 

the wrong side of the equation.59 “Abdullah works against U.S. interests in Iraq and elsewhere while pretending otherwise,” wrote Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post.60 This 

critique goes further, particularly on governance: “In short, Jordan has degenerated into 

the kind of despotic kleptocracy the Bush administration says it will no longer tolerate,” 

said former Wall Street Journal Middle East correspondent Stephen Glain. “But tolerate it 

the White House does.”61 But as this report suggests, such characterizations are off the 

mark. Although not without points of friction, on the whole Jordan continues to make 

positive contributions to post-Saddam Iraq. Without Jordan, the U.S. would face a much 

more difficult setting in Iraq and in the region. The kingdom, more vulnerable than the 

other neighbors, has every interest in continuing to cooperate with the U.S. and Iraq. 

Among Iraq’s neighbors, Jordan may not be pivotal, but neither is it peripheral. Ties 

could be improved in a number of ways. First and foremost, Jordan and Iraq need to overcome the crisis of confidence that has plagued their relationship. Some degree of mistrust 

and a lack of confidence was to be expected, given the recent history of Jordanian-Iraqi 

relations and the oppositionist background of Iraq’s new leadership.62 That said, Jordanian leaders must go further in projecting a positive message to Iraq. King Abdullah has 

already tempered his inflammatory rhetoric about Shiites following the January 2005 

election, but Jordanian leaders can do more to set an example for their own media and 

for the larger realm of public discourse in the Arab world. What Jordanian leaders should 

not do—and what outsiders should not encourage—is a media clampdown. Such a step 

would be counterproductive and would only work against the larger agenda of reform and 

political change. American and Iraqi leaders have every reason to expect Jordanian leaders to set a better example.

In both word and deed, Jordan’s message to Iraq needs to reinforce the notion of Iraq 

for all Iraqis and refrain from framing bilateral or regional relations in a sectarian context. 

On this issue, Washington could deliver stronger messages to Amman and demonstrate 

less tolerance for the kingdom’s Arab and/or Sunni posturing—which inevitably comes at 

the expense of the Iraqi government’s legitimacy at home and its credibility in the region. 

Admittedly, the more the new Iraqi leadership is able to bridge the internal divide and 
16

raise the level of inclusiveness with Iraqi Sunnis, the easier it will be for neighbors like 

Jordan to line up behind Iraq’s new political order. 

Beyond rhetoric, the crisis of confidence can also be addressed by increasing interactions between Jordanians and Iraqis at every level. Not only are Jordanians and the new 

Iraqi leadership separated by a troubled past, but the ongoing insurgency further isolates 

an already suspicious and insular political class in Baghdad. On this score, Jordan has 

begun to take positive steps, such as the spring 2005 meetings between Iraqi and Jordanian journalists.63 But much more needs to be done. The U.S. should encourage and 

even underwrite more such interactions, but it should also keep in mind that the proper 

role for outside parties is to facilitate from the sidelines; the more Jordanians come into 

contact and are familiar with the new Iraqi political class, the easier it will be to deal 

with future crises. 

Confidence could also be restored through small but symbolically important practical 

measures. A joint Iraqi-Jordanian military commission—with or without a U.S. presence—could be charged with releasing periodic reports about border security. Such a 

step would speak directly to Iraqi fears that Jordan is exporting Zarqawi-style terrorists, 

though admittedly it would not address the question of insurgents entering via other borders. A similar commission, or jointly sponsored independent audit, on trade and financial 

transactions would also help restore confidence.

Over the short term, the U.S. should continue to address Jordan’s economic and 

security needs. Washington should also continue to encourage other key regional powers 

to do the same, especially on energy security. As Jordan looks for further supplemental 

aid—and even new U.S. weapons systems—Washington should be forthcoming but selective, because there is little prospect the kingdom will change its present course on Iraq 

or other regional issues.

Over the long term, if the situation in Iraq stabilizes, energy prices fall, and Jordan’s 

economy continues to grow, some U.S. assistance to Jordan (at an all-time high in recent 

years) could be curtailed. At a minimum, the architecture of U.S. assistance and trade 

benefits should be reformulated to make a broader impact on larger segments of society, 

rather than channeling so much economic assistance through the government, not too 

mention the large military assistance program. The Qualified Industrial Zones initiative 

and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement represent a positive move in this direction, 

but more can be done with U.S. bilateral assistance programs. A different emphasis from 

Washington could induce Jordanians to relax controls on the NGO sector, which remain 

onerous. Changing the architecture of economic assistance would also help address a 

shortcoming in U.S. policy on governance. When merited, the U.S. should speak as frankly 

to Jordan as it does to other Arab states. 

For Americans, at a moment when Washington has declared its commitment to democratic change in the broader Middle East, Jordan’s democratic deficit should raise concern 

but not fire alarms. The “Jordanian exception,” as some call it, undermines the broader 

U.S. effort to support reform in the Arab world. The problem is made all the more acute by 

Jordan’s own boastings about political reform. “The gap between Jordan’s lofty democratic 

rhetoric and its erratically democratic record has grown wide in recent years,” Rami Khouri 

wrote in May 2005 in the Beirut Daily Star.64

But as is often the case with foreign policy, the U.S.-Jordanian relationship involves a 

diverse agenda with trade-offs. The long-standing argument for the “Jordanian exception” 

rests on striking a balance between promoting reform without destabilizing the regime 

at home. This line of reasoning has been further entrenched by the September 11 attacks 

and the war in Iraq—events that reinforced Jordan’s “strategic” value. The logic behind 

this argument may hold for the time being, but it could ultimately be self-defeating: Too 

much U.S. restraint on reform and good governance undermines American credibility in 

Jordan—and across the Arab world. Moreover, more progress on reform in Jordan could 

have a tremendous demonstration effect throughout the Arab world.
17

Notes

1. Author’s interviews with a former senior U.S. diplomat, September 2, 2004 and May 24, 2005, 

Washington, D.C. 

2. Masri quote in Ashraf Khalil, Ranya Kadri, and Josh Meyer, “Suicide Attacks Kill at Least 57 at 3 

Hotels in Jordan’s Capital,” Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2005. For another argument about why U.S. 

action in Iraq has destabilized Jordan, see Oraib al-Rantawi, “Fearing Iraq’s Instability, Jordan Seeks Its 

Unity,” Beirut Daily Star, December 27, 2005.

3. Typical of the earlier pubic criticism, see “Jordan’s King Says Iraq Elections Impossible in Current 

Chaos,” Associated Press, September 29, 2004.

4. For example, an overwhelming majority of Jordanians (70 percent) believe that suicide attacks 

against American targets in Iraq are justified. For three years running, Jordan has registered some of 

the highest anti-American views of any country in the Muslim world. See the Pew survey report, A Year 

after Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists (Washington, D.C.: Pew 

Research Center for the People and the Press, March 2003), http://people-press.org/reports/display.

php3?ReportID=206.

5. Survey data from “U.S. Standing in the Middle East Faces Serious Crisis” (Amman: University of 

Jordan, Center for Strategic Studies, April 2004).

6. The full extent of U.S.-Jordanian cooperation is not made public. For further details, see William 

M. Arkin, “Keeping Secrets in Jordan,” Washington Post, November 18, 2005.

7. Author’s interview with Royal Court official, September 12, 2004, Amman.

8. Jordan is no stranger to terrorism. The kingdom has uncovered numerous plans for spectacular 

attacks, like the millennium plot and the 2004 plan to blow up Jordan’s intelligence headquarters; see 

Desmond Butler and Judith Miller, “Police in Jordan Kill 4 It Says Plotted Against It and the U.S.” New 

York Times, April 21, 2004. In 2003, Jordan suffered a devastating attack on its embassy in Amman, 

suspected to be the work of Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who 

was killed in a U.S. air raid north of Baghdad in June. In 2002, U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley was 

assassinated in Amman. 

9. Marwan Muasher, transcript of remarks at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle 

East Policy forum on “A View from Jordan: Iraq, the Peace Process, and Arab Reform,” Washington, D.C., 

September 30, 2004, www. brookings.edu/fp/saban/events/muasher20040930.pdf, p. 9.

10. Alan Cowell, “Old Iraq Army Could Provide a Leader, Jordan’s King Says,” New York Times, May 

18, 2004.

11. See Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran; Leaders Warn 

Against Forming Religious States,” Washington Post, December 8, 2004.

12. Author’s interview with a former general in the Jordanian military and adviser to King Hussein, 

September 13, 2004, Amman.

13. Scott Wilson, “Jordan Acts to Curb a Rising Chorus of Critics,” Washington Post, September 30, 

2004. The government even cracked down on parliamentarians and Islamists who offered words of praise 

for Zarqawi after his death.

14. “Jordan’s Largest Political Party Boycotts Lower House Sessions,” Deutsche Press-Agentur, August 

21, 2006.

15. ”Jordan: Draft Bill Would Muzzle Civil Society,” Human Rights Watch, April 7, 2005. See also 

Stephen Glain, “Letter From Jordan: Kingdom of Corruption,” The Nation, May 30, 2005; and Samer 

Abu Libdeh and David Keys, Terror Attacks Highlight Case for Reform in Jordan. Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy PolicyWatch, no. 1053 (November 18, 2005), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2404.

16. See Rami Khouri, “Democratic Jordan: Enticing but Still Not a Done Deal,” Beirut Daily Star, May 

25, 2005.

17. See Hassan Fattah, “Amman Dispatch: After the Fall,” The New Republic, May 19, 2003, 12.

18. See David Schenker, Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations 

(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003), 3–41.

19. Fattah, “Amman Dispatch,” 12.

20. Interviews with a U.S. State Department official, November 2004 and March 30, 2005, Washington, D.C.

21. Muasher, transcript, pp. 29 and 21. 

22. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, 16 percent of all Jordanian exports go to Iraq, 

second only to the United States (24 percent); Economist Intelligence Unit, Jordan: 2006 Country 

Report, June 2006.
18

23. One area in which Jordan holds a comparative advantage over its Arab neighbors is banking and 

financial services. Jordan’s Housing Bank for Trade and Finance has already moved into Syria and Iraq; 

other financial firms are not far behind. See Rupert Wright, “Jordan Makes Best Of It Despite Regional 

Turmoil,” Financial Times (London), January 1, 2004.

24. Author’s interviews with a former senior U.S. diplomat, September 2, 2004 and May 24, 2005, 

Washington, D.C.

25. See the previous reports in the “Iraq and Its Neighbors” series: Henri J. Barkey, Turkey and Iraq: 

The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity. Special Report, no. 141 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of 

Peace, July 2005); Geoffrey Kemp, Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor.

Special Report, no. 156 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, November 2005); and Joseph McMillan, 

Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry. Special Report, no. 157 (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, January 2006). See also the project’s background memorandums, “Iraq and Its 

Neighbors: Implications for U.S. Policy,” Washington, D.C., U.S. Institute of Peace, November 17, 2004, 

www.usip.org/iraq/neighbors_memo.pdf. 

26. See Schenker, Dancing with Saddam, particularly chapter 3.

27. Jordan was a staunch supporter of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Support for Iraq also fueled 

Jordan’s economic boom during the 1980s.

28. As of late 2006, the police training facility in Jordan remains open but no longer accepts Iraqi 

recruits. For a critique of the training program, see Paula Broadwell, “Iraq’s Doomed Police Training,” 

Boston Globe, August 30, 2005.

29. Author’s interviews with a former senior U.S. diplomat, May 24, 2005, Washington, D.C.

30. See William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs, and Operations in the 

9/11 World (Hanover, N.H.: Steerforth Press, 2005); see also Arkin, “Keeping Secrets in Jordan.” 

31. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 

Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 345–47. According to his own account, General Raad 

Hamdani warned Saddam Hussein and high-level leaders that a U.S. attack from the south was imminent, 

yet he was overruled. Saddam and his advisers were convinced the attack from the south was a feint and 

the real attack was coming from the west. 

32. Jordanian intelligence reportedly shared information with the U.S. that led to the killing of 

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006. See Borzou Daragahi and Josh Meyer, “‘We Knew Him’: Jordanian 

Spies Infiltrated Iraq to Find Zarqawi,” Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2006. 

33. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 2002), 150, 186, 314, 346–48; see also Schenker, Dancing with Saddam.

34. See Middle East Media Research Institute, Al-Hayat Inquiry: The City of Al-Zarqaa in Jordan—

Breeding Ground of Jordan’s Salafi Jihad Movement. Special Dispatch Series, no. 848 (Washington, D.C.: 

MEMRI, January 17, 2005).

35. See International Crisis Group, Jordan’s 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism. Middle East Report, 

no. 47 (Amman/Brussels: ICG, November 23, 2005),13–14.

36. See Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East 

Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 84–86; and Robert 

B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 

19–40.

37. Mukul Devichand, “Unlikely Rebels,” Al-Ahram (Cairo), weekly edition, no. 595 (July 18–24, 

2002).

38. The strongest claimant by bloodline to the Iraqi Hashemite throne is Prince Raad, a Jordanian 

member of the royal family who, at one point, supported the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. A much more 

prominent claimant, Sharif Ali bin Ali Hussein, was long active in the Iraqi-exile opposition; he ran in 

the January 2005 Iraqi elections on the constitutional monarchy slate but failed to gain any seats in 

the parliament. See Nicholas Pelham, “Royal House Hopes to Bridge Iraqi Divisions,” Financial Times 

(London), April 14, 2003; and Jeffrey Gettleman, “The King is Dead (Has Been for 46 Years) but Two 

Iraqis Hope: Long Live the King!” New York Times, January 28, 2005.

39. Rantawi, “Fearing Iraq’s Instability, Jordan Seeks Its Unity.”

40. Author’s interviews with a former senior U.S. diplomat, September 2, 2004 and May 24, 2005, 

Washington, D.C.

41. Jordan has a long history of providing safe haven for Iraqi exiles, including survivors of Iraq’s 

Hashemite royal family. In the mid-1990s, Saddam Hussein’s two sons-in-law, Kamil Hasan and Saddam 

al-Majid, defected to Jordan and were granted asylum by King Hussein. But the two later returned to Iraq 

and were assassinated. At the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003, Saddam Hussein’s daughters fled 

to Jordan. With King Abdullah’s consent, they continue to reside in Amman. Raghad, the eldest daughter, 

has taken a high-profile role in her father’s Amman-based legal defense team; see Randa Habib, “Jordan 
19

Stands by Saddam’s Daughter Despite Iraq Extradition Call,” Agence France-Presse, July 3, 2006. Both 

daughters are reportedly living quite comfortably. 

42. The figures at the high end of the range came from the author’s interview with a senior Jordanian 

official, August 30, 2006.

43. James Glanz, “Iraqis Press Donors for Billions More in Reconstruction Aid,” New York Times, July 

19, 2005.

44. U.S.-Jordanian cooperation on security matters is far-reaching. There are reports that Jordan has 

participated in the CIA’s rendition program for suspected terrorists. According to a report by Amnesty 

International, Jordanian security agents have tortured U.S. terror subjects to obtain confessions; see 

Amnesty International, Jordan: “Your Confessions Are Ready for You to Sign.” Detention and Torture of 

Political Suspects. MDE 16/005/2006 (New York: Amnesty International, July 2006)

45. See the Public Broadcasting Service documentary, “Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs”; originally aired October 10–24, 2005 (released on DVD January 2006). 

46. See Laurie Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making (New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Markus Bouillon, “Walking the Tightrope: Jordanian Foreign 

Policy from the Gulf Crisis to the Peace Process and Beyond,” in Jordan in Transition, ed. George Joffe 

(New York: Palgrave, 2002), 1–22.

47. Muasher, transcript, 21.

48. King Abdullah, interview by Lally Weymouth in, “In the End, ‘Iraq Will Succeed,’” Washington 

Post, May 22, 2005. 

49. Author’s interview with senior Jordanian Foreign Ministry official, September 13, 2004, 

Amman.

50. Muasher, transcript, p. 8.

51. See Middle East Media Research Institute, Al-Hayat Inquiry. For more background on Jordanians 

and the Iraqi insurgency, see James Glanz, “In Jordanian Case, Hints of Iraq Jihad Networks,” New York 

Times, July 29, 2005; and Nir Rosen, “Iraq’s Jordanian Jihadis,” The New York Times Magazine, February 

19, 2006, and idem, “Thinking Like a Jihadist: Iraq’s Jordanian Connection,” World Policy Journal 23, 

no. 1 (Spring 2006): 1–16.

52. Kubba quote in “Iraq Wants Jordan to Extradite Ex-Regime Figures Behind Insurgency,” Agence 

France-Press, August 21, 2005. 

53. See Dexter Filkins, “Tortuous Trail: From a Bombing in Iraq to Fury at a Family in Jordan,” New 

York Times, March 15, 2005; Steve Negus, “Iraq Spat Deepens as Jordan Evacuates Embassy,” Financial 

Times (London), March 22, 2005; Nimrod Raphaeli, “Iraqi-Jordanian Tension Over the Most Lethal Suicide 

Bombing in Iraq,” Middle East Research Institute, March 29, 2005, www.intelligence.org.il/eng/memri/

apr_a_05.htm; and Rawya Rageh, “Iraq, Jordan at Odds over Border Security,” Associated Press, March 

21, 2005. The editor of the Jordanian paper that broke the story was forced to resign. 

54. Kubba in “Iraq Wants Jordan to Extradite Ex-Regime Figures Behind Insurgency.”

55. Interviews with Jordanian intellectuals and former government officials, September 22–25, 

2005, Athens.

56. See “Jordan Calls for Reconstruction Contracts to Lessen Iraq Debt,” Agence France-Presse, 

September 13, 2004.

57. The debt issue was reportedly raised during Prime Minister Bakhit’s August 2006 visit to Baghdad. A Jordanian official suggested to the author that one way to resolve the issue would be to “swap” 

the Iraqi commercial debt with the frozen assets of Iraq’s al-Rafidayn Bank held by Jordan, which, like 

the debt, totals approximately $1 billion. 

58. See David Sanger, “Middle East Mediator: Big New Test for Bush,” New York Times, June 5, 

2003. The Bush administration’s Road Map for Peace can be found at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/22520.

htm, and the Bush-Sharon correspondence can be found at www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/

Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm.

59. See Jim Hoagland, “Playing Both Sides in Jordan,” Washington Post, March 27, 2005; Glain, 

“Letter From Jordan”; and Jon Leyne, “Jordan Fears Loss of U.S. Favor,” BBC News, April 25, 2005, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4472833.stm. 

60. Hoagland, “Playing Both Sides in Jordan.”

61. Glain, “Letter from Jordan.”

62. See Phebe Marr, Who Are Iraq’s New Leaders? What Do They Want? Special Report, no. 160 

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, March 2006).

63. See “Jalalatuhu yaltaqi ‘adadan min abraz mumathili wasa’il al-‘i’lam al-‘iraqiya “ Al-Dustor 

(Amman), April 5, 2005.

64. See Khouri, “Democratic Jordan.”
United States 

Institute of Peace

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www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Iraq and regional security in the broader Middle East.

Recent and related Institute publications include:

•	 Weak Viability: The Iraqi Federal State and the Constitutional Amendment Process, by 

Jonathan Morrow (Special Report, July 2006) 

•	 Who Are Iraq’s New Leaders? What Do They Want? by Phebe Marr (Special Report, March 

2006)

•	 Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process, by Khalil 

Shikaki (Special Report, January 2006)

•	 Iraq and Its Neighbors/Saudi Arabia and Iraq: Oil, Religion, and an Enduring Rivalry,

by Joseph McMillan (Special Report, January 2006) **Arabic version available

•	 Iraq and Its Neighbors/Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the 

Nuclear Factor, by Geoffrey Kemp (Special Report, November 2005)

•	 Iraq and Its Neighbors/Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity, by 

Henri J. Barkey (Special Report, July 2005) **Arabic version available

•	 Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq, by Amatzia Baram (Special Report, 

April 2005)

•	 Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country’s Future (Special Report, 

February 2005) **Arabic version available

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USIP and Iraq

The Institute’s Iraq programming is 

directed by Daniel Serwer, vice president of the Center for Post-Conflict 

Peace and Stability Operations. Funded 

by a $10 million appropriation provided 

by Congress in late 2003 and a $3.08 

million transfer from the State Department in 2005, USIP Iraq programs aim 

to:

• Prevent sectarian violence, including through interethnic and interreligious dialogue.

• Build up the rule of law, especially 

through the constitutional process.

• Educate and train a new generation 

of democratic leaders.

• Prepare Americans to serve in Iraq 

on the basis of “lessons learned.”

Despite difficult security conditions, 

this effort has entailed the establishment of the first USIP office abroad—in 

Baghdad—as well as the Institute’s 

first foreign-language publications (in 

Arabic). We are grateful to the Iraqis 

who have courageously joined in this 

effort through USIP grants, training 

programs, faculty seminars, and legal 

workshops, and hope that the Americans who have received USIP materials 

before embarking will find them useful 

to their work in this most challenging 

of environments.