Sheltered and waiting

AP/Wide World Photos
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Chapter 12

Federal Preparations

The National Response Plan (NRP) was intended to form the basis of the federal 

government’s response to disasters and for its interaction with state and local governments during such events. Th e response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster varied 

across the federal government. 

Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with preparing for and 

responding to domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters, failed to 

lead an eff ective federal response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS did not fully adapt or adequately train to meet its obligations under the NRP before Hurricane Katrina. Nor did the 

Department address the known defi ciencies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), such as staffi ng shortages, inadequate training, poor commodities tracking, and 

insuffi cient plans for post-disaster communications. In the critical days before landfall, DHS 

leadership mostly watched from the sidelines, allowed FEMA to take the lead, and missed 

critical opportunities to help prepare the entire federal government for the response. 

Th e Coast Guard – like FEMA, a DHS component – prepared well, largely on its own initiative, due to its well-developed and well-exercised hurricane plans and a commitment to 

deploying assistance without waiting for requests. 

Under the NRP, the Department of Defense has a supporting role for all Emergency Support Functions, and provides help as requested by FEMA. Traditionally, DOD’s policy has 

been to step in only when local, state, and federal resources have been overwhelmed. DOD 

took modest steps to prepare before Katrina, deploying liaison personnel to coordinate the 

response and establishing administrative processes so that it was fully prepared to handle 

FEMA requests once they arrived.

Th e Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) began to mobilize U.S. Public 

Health Service offi cers days before the storm, but poor planning meant that some never 

arrived, while others got no further than Jackson, Mississippi. Th ough HHS ordered additional medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile the day before landfall so that 

they could arrive at the New Orleans Superdome before Katrina struck, they didn’t arrive 

until the day of landfall. 

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS and its leaders failed to prepare the nation adequately for the unprecedented devastation of Hurricane Katrina. As discussed in Chapter 27, DHS failed to fully adapt and 

appropriately train to meet the requirements of the NRP in the nine months between its 

promulgation and Hurricane Katrina. Nor did the Department address FEMA’s defi ciencies 

such as staffi ng shortage, weaknesses in commodities tracking, and insuffi cient plans for 

post-disaster communications. 

Th is chapter examines the steps DHS leaders took in the critical days before Katrina made 

landfall, and what they could have done diff erently to speed and coordinate the federal 

response and thereby reduce victims’ suff ering. As Katrina was bearing down on the Gulf 

Coast, they failed to take reasonable steps during that period to create a full awareness and 

a sense of urgency across the federal government about the impending catastrophe. DHS’s 

actions and inactions during the days immediately prior to landfall had consequences in the 

days that followed. 
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Besides DHS’s failure to organize, train, and equip its personnel under the NRP, poor 

preparation, and missed opportunities led to responders’ improvising actions because they 

had no clear plan to guide them. Th e failures of the response fl owed logically from these 

mistakes made before landfall. 

DHS Leadership in the Days Before Landfall

Th e job of leading the federal response to a catastrophe rests with the Secretary of DHS.1

In the days before Katrina made landfall, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff ’s eff orts in this 

regard fell short of what was reasonably expected of him.

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he saw his role as “lead[ing] the entire Department, imparting strategic guidance and direction based upon the plan developed, priorities established, 

and information provided. I also work with the President and other Department heads and 

deal with governors, members of Congress and other offi cials.”2

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that over the course of the weekend before landfall, he “followed 

planning activities closely” and “stayed in continual contact with senior DHS and FEMA 

offi cials and my experienced advisors.”3

On the Saturday before landfall, Secretary Chertoff was at home working on unrelated matters, and his only apparent Katrina-related activity was to receive a briefi ng about that day’s 

FEMA video teleconference (VTC).4

 Th ese video teleconferences are a means by which key 

federal and state personnel involved in emergency management share information about 

their disaster preparations, including the latest weather forecasts, the progress of evacuations, and the pre-positioning of commodities.

On Sunday, Secretary Chertoff participated in the FEMA VTC. He heard assurances from 

then-FEMA Director Michael Brown and others that preparations were well in hand. For 

instance, Brown told attendees on the conference call “I want that supply chain jammed up 

as much as possible. ... Just keep jamming those lines full as much as you can with commodities” and “get to the edge of the envelope ... if you feel like you [missing] go ahead and 

do it. I’ll fi gure out some way to justify it.”5

Secretary Chertoff off ered to assist Brown in enlisting aid from other DHS components: “If 

there’s anything that you need from Coast Guard or any other components that you’re not 

getting, please let us know.” 6 Brown told Secretary Chertoff , “I appreciate it ... the Coast 

Guard and ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] and all of the others have been 

incredibly good to us.” Secretary Chertoff also asked, “Are there any DOD assets that might 

be available? Have we reached out to them [DOD], and have we I guess made any kind of 

arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?” Brown responded that 

there were DOD assets at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge 

that were “fully engaged.”7

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he did not second-guess statements he heard on the Sunday 

VTC – including those by state emergency managers and state National Guard offi cials 

who, as he termed it, “express[ed] very clearly their satisfaction with the state of aff airs.”8

During the August 28 conference call, Brown asked the Acting Deputy Director of the 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Colonel 

Jeff Smith, if there were “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you 

need” to which Colonel Smith responded, “Mike, no . . . it looks like those resources that are 

en route are going to – to be a good fi rst shot.” Colonel Smith also cautioned that, “Naturally, once we get into this thing ... I’m sure that things are going to come up that maybe some 

of even our best planners hadn’t even thought about. So I think fl exibility is going to be the 

key.” He also stated that it would be important to “cut through any potential red tape when 
165

Emergency Management: Mississippi

those things do arise.”9 Th e Mississippi representative on the call said “FEMA has been 

great. You’re leaning forward, and we appreciate that.” He later said, “We’ve got everything 

that we need from the federal government.”10 Secretary Chertoff thought the emergencymanagement offi cials on that call had hundreds of years of combined professional experience managing hurricanes.11

Secretary Chertoff also spoke with Governors Barbour of Mississippi, Blanco of Louisiana, 

and Riley of Alabama that day.12

Th e Secretary and other senior leaders did not take affi rmative steps prior to landfall, beyond his statements on the Sunday VTC, to ensure that DHS components with operational 

responsibilities under the NRP were prepared to respond.13 Instead, the evidence suggests 

that Secretary Chertoff and DHS responded to Katrina as if DHS headquarters had no special responsibilities outside the normal course of operations. 

Despite assurances and lack of affi rmative requests from the governors of the Gulf states, 

the Secretary still should have taken additional steps to better prepare his Department for 

the coming storm. 

From all corners, the message throughout the weekend, especially at the Saturday and Sunday VTCs, was that a catastrophe was about to strike the Gulf Coast, and the greater New 

Orleans area in particular. Th e head of the National Hurricane Service, Max Mayfi eld, had 

been making calls to leaders in parishes, cities, states, and the federal government. Th e Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004 had predicted that fl ooding from a catastrophic storm – what 

had been known for years among meteorologists and government offi cials as the “New 

Orleans scenario” – might kill as many as 60,000. In the weekend conference call, Brown 

referred to the approaching storm as the “big one.”14 As Mayfi eld said, “I think the wisest 

thing to do here is plan on a Category 5 hurricane ... no matter where it hits it’s going to 

have an impact over a very, very large area. ... I don’t think any model can tell you with any 

confi dence right now whether the levees will be topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, 

very grave concern.”15

During the weekend, as Katrina neared New Orleans, there was a need for initiative, for recognition of the unprecedented threat and the equally unprecedented response it required. 

Leadership – direction, encouragement, a sense of purpose and urgency – was needed. 

Secretary Chertoff did not provide it. 

For example, he did not ask specifi cally what preparations were under way, how much 

material was being pre-positioned, and whether it would be enough.16 And though the DHS 

Inspector General had issued a draft report in June 2005 stating that FEMA’s logisticsmanagement systems had performed poorly during the four Florida hurricanes in 2004,17

Secretary Chertoff did not inquire whether the system could handle the expected impact of 

Katrina. Th e Committee has found no evidence to suggest that anyone, including Secretary 

Chertoff , attempted to determine if the system could handle the expected impact of Katrina. 

Similarly, a DHS study had concluded that FEMA’s procurement offi ce was understaff ed.18

Yet the Secretary did not ask whether this important offi ce was up to the coming task.

Although he has stated repeatedly that he relied on Brown as his “battlefi eld commander,”19

aside from on the Sunday VTC, according to Brown, Secretary Chertoff did not talk to his 

“commander” directly over the weekend, either while Brown was in Washington or aft er 

he left for the Gulf on Sunday aft ernoon.20 In view of Secretary Chertoff ’s testimony that he 

stayed in contact with “senior DHS and FEMA offi cials and [his] experienced advisors,”21 this 

omission is particularly inexplicable. Because Secretary Chertoff was placing so much faith in 

Brown to lead the preparations and response, it was incumbent on the Secretary to do more 
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166

than just have a brief conversation with him in front of dozens of state, local, and federal 

offi cials – including the President of the United States – on a VTC. Secretary Chertoff should 

have called Brown privately to discuss in more detail the status of preparations and the level 

of cooperation Brown was getting from DHS and other government departments. 

Conversely, Brown failed to inform the Secretary of the FEMA defi ciencies that he has since 

claimed in testimony and media interviews to have known about at the time. Th ese two 

key players’ failure to communicate is evidence of the profound dysfunction then existing 

between DHS and FEMA leadership.

Additionally:

• Th ere should have been a plan to maintain situational awareness at the 

Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). Th e Director of DHS’ Operations Center, Matthew Broderick, testifi ed “there was no plan.”22 Th e HSOC 

plans months in advance for events such as the Super Bowl, yet no eff ort was 

being made to identify sources of information specifi c to New Orleans and 

the Gulf Coast, such as local National Weather Service stations or local media 

outlets. Rather, the intention was to rely exclusively on FEMA offi cials and the 

very state and local entities that would be bearing the brunt of the storm’s fury 

to provide situational awareness. Secretary Chertoff bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring that there is such a plan.23 (See Chapter 19 for further information on situational awareness.)

• Th e National Communications System (NCS) never developed a plan to 

restore communications to emergency responders, such as the police and fi re 

departments, aft er a catastrophic disaster. Instead, the NCS intended to rely 

solely on the private sector to restore communications capabilities.24 Additionally, Peter Fonash, the Director of NCS, was not familiar with the “New 

Orleans scenario,” until the day before landfall.25 Th e Secretary bears ultimate 

responsibility for this lack of preparation. 

• Th e investigation uncovered no evidence that anyone coordinated with the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) to determine which agency was going to take the 

lead under Emergency Support Function 13, Public Safety and Security.26 (See 

Chapter 25, Public Safety and Security.) Th ere was no DOJ representative at 

the Public Safety and Security desk at the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC),27 FEMA’s national operations center in charge of overall 

coordination of the response at the national level. Each of the Emergency 

Support Functions is represented there to coordinate activities in their area of 

expertise. Additionally DOJ did not have a response plan (either for itself or 

to coordinate with DHS) to execute Public Safety and Security responsibilities 

following a natural disaster.

• Th e investigation uncovered no evidence that senior DHS leadership contacted the leadership of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), Customs 

and Border Patrol (CBP), Federal Protective Service (FPS) or the Secret Service 

to assess their planning and preparation – or even to determine if they were 

planning and preparing. Th ere was confusion over staffi ng the Public Safety 

and Security desk at the NRCC – FPS had attempted to send a representative 

to the desk, only to be rebuff ed by FEMA.28 Moreover, ICE was going forward 

with a previously scheduled conference in Baltimore for its Special Agents in 

Charge (SACs), and the New Orleans SAC was still planning to fl y out Sunday 
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167

morning to attend the conference rather than remain in the area to lead his 

offi ce’s response eff orts aft er the storm had passed.29

In addition, the Secretary has broader responsibilities that reach across the federal government.30 Yet, there is no evidence, nor any testimony by the Secretary, that he reached out 

to other Cabinet secretaries to assess their level of preparedness, to determine if they were 

coordinating eff orts with DHS, or to ensure that they responded quickly and fully to any 

requests that might come from DHS or FEMA.31

Finally, it is reasonable to expect that the Secretary would be engaged with the President 

during critical times in a catastrophe. Th e Committee was unable to develop any record 

as to whether the Secretary was in fact keeping the President informed in the pre-storm 

period. 

Th e lack of plans to maintain situational awareness, the lack of coordination in the deployment of federal law enforcement assets, and the communications problems at all levels of 

government all resulted in part from some of the pre-landfall inaction described above.

Much was expected of Secretary Chertoff , and there were things that only he, as a Cabinet secretary, could do. In his testimony before the Committee, U.S. Comptroller General 

David Walker (the head of the non-partisan Government Accountability Offi ce, which is 

commonly referred to as the investigative arm of Congress) described the unique leverage 

Inspecting: General Landreneau, 

Mayor Nagin, Michael Brown, 

Senator Landrieu (behind Brown), 

President Bush, Senator Vitter 

U.S.Coast Guard photo
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of such a position: “No matter how capable the person [leading the response eff ort] might 

be, level matters in this town, unfortunately, especially with regard to certain departments 

and agencies like the Department of Defense. Hierarchy is real.”32

What DHS Should Have Done

Th e evidence suggests that neither Secretary Chertoff nor DHS leaders fully understood 

the Department’s responsibilities under the NRP. But he had at his disposal other mechanisms that could prompt greater coordination of response and recovery eff orts, as well as 

to convey an increased sense of urgency. He did not take advantage of them. Th ree of these 

mechanisms warrant greater scrutiny.

What DHS Should Have Done: The Catastrophic Incident Annex

Th e NRP-Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) exists to create a “proactive national 

response to a catastrophic incident.”33 For a “typical” disaster, the standard practice is that 

the federal government does not extend aid until a state requests assistance. During a catastrophe, however, NRP-CIA activation prompts the government to help without waiting for 

requests. 34 Secretary Chertoff did not activate the NRP-CIA, as he had the authority to do.

None of the senior DHS offi cials interviewed recalled considering activating the NRP-CIA 

pre-landfall,35 and it isn’t clear from Secretary Chertoff ’s testimony whether he considered doing so.36 Secretary Chertoff has since stated that he believed that Katrina “was not 

the type of event contemplated by the CIA”37 because, in his view, the NRP-CIA was for 

“no-notice or short-notice incidents where anticipatory preparation and coordination with 

the state under the Staff ord Act [which authorizes the federal government to play a role in 

emergency response] are not possible.”38 Th is interpretation is not imposed by the Staff ord 

Act and is illogical. As Comptroller General Walker testifi ed to the Committee, “Th e idea 

that we would be less proactive in dealing with a known natural disaster just defi es common 

sense.”39

Th e NRP-CIA refers to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) for specifi c operational details such as what “incident-specifi c ‘packages’” the various federal agencies will 

be expected to deploy once the NRP-CIA is activated.40 Th e Supplement was still in draft 

when Katrina made landfall.41 Th e draft Supplement provides that it should be used when 

the “Secretary determines that an incident has resulted or will result in a mass victim/mass 

evacuation situation.”42 Th e Committee believes that a major hurricane bearing down on a 

major American city lying below sea level qualifi es as an event that is likely to result in “extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely aff ecting the population, 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.”43

It does appear that the issue was at least raised to a FEMA offi cial. Janet Benini, a former Director for Response and Planning for the White House Homeland Security Council, worked 

on developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and a planning scenario that included 

a catastrophic hurricane striking Louisiana.44 On Saturday, August 27, Benini e-mailed 

David Garratt, Deputy Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division, to ask whether there was 

“any talk of implementing the Catastrophic Plan.” Benini noted that “with a Cat 4 heading 

directly into New Orleans this might be the time.” Garratt responded that he had heard no 

such discussion.45

Apart from any practical benefi ts, activating the NRP-CIA pre-landfall would have changed 

the tenor of federal preparation eff orts, prompting federal agencies to anticipate state and 

local needs instead of waiting for requests from overwhelmed offi cials in Louisiana and Mississippi. Brown said: “[I]n every disaster we push, because we pre-positioned supplies and 

equipment, but in this case we should have started the push system that never stopped. You 
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169

know, we pre-positioned and then tried to see what was going to happen and then started it 

back up again. We should have just kept pushing.”46

Obviously, the precise eff ect of such an activation is diffi cult to quantify, and the NRP-CIA 

is not a panacea. As noted above, its operational component – the Catastrophic Incident 

Supplement – was not yet complete or in eff ect, nor had federal agencies trained or exercised its use. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that activating the NRP-CIA could have 

led to the mobilization and deployment of some additional assets before they were requested through normal NRP protocols. 

Activating the NRP-CIA also could have accelerated the involvement of the Department of 

Defense. Under the NRP, DOD is a supporting agency to all 15 Emergency Support Functions. As discussed elsewhere in the report (see Chapter 26, Military Operations), the day 

aft er landfall, DOD took the initiative and activated forces, deploying troops and resources 

without waiting for requests for assistance from FEMA or the aff ected states. DOD eventually deployed over 20,000 active-duty military personnel and coordinated deployment of 

50,000 National Guard troops, as well as hundreds of helicopters, and numerous ships.47

Activating the NRP-CIA may have accelerated DOD planning even further, resulting in 

earlier pre-positioning of helicopters and deployment of ships, which did not sail from Norfolk, Virginia, until August 31, two days aft er landfall.48

While speculative, these examples illustrate how the disaster response may have proceeded 

more effi ciently had DHS acted with a greater sense of urgency and activated the NRP-CIA 

before landfall.49

What DHS Should Have Done: Appointment of a PFO

Secretary Chertoff did not appoint a Principal Federal Offi cer (PFO) until the evening 

of Tuesday, August 30, approximately 36 hours aft er landfall.50 Th e position is provided 

for in the NRP so that the Secretary will have an on-the-ground representative to oversee 

the federal response. It is designed to support the unifi ed command structure and be the 

primary point of contact and situational awareness for the Secretary in a disaster area.

51

Th e Secretary appointed a PFO months in advance for events such as the Super Bowl.52 Yet 

DHS waited until the day aft er landfall to appoint one for what many government offi cials 

– including Brown – feared was a potential catastrophe.

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he did not appoint a PFO on Saturday, when the President 

issued the emergency declaration for Louisiana, because the PFO “doesn’t exercise command authority; it is a coordinating authority.” He also stated that he believed Brown had 

all the authority he needed to coordinate the federal eff ort by virtue of his rank within DHS. 

Th e Secretary elaborated: 

Given the fact that Michael Brown was an Under Secretary of the Department, 

so he was the third ranking member of the Department, at least in terms of 

level, and given the fact that he and the team working on this had been working together for a week, I frankly didn’t think it was necessary at that point to 

add an additional title or additional measure of authority.53

Th e Committee disagrees that Brown’s rank in DHS was a substitute for PFO designation. 

With other duties to perform, and with no way of knowing whether Katrina would be the 

only disaster in store, Brown was in no position to commit to the 100 percent on-scene 

focus required in a PFO. Th e Committee believes Secretary Chertoff should have appointed 

a PFO in conjunction with the President’s declaration on Saturday, August 27.54 Doing so 

could have laid the groundwork for a unifi ed approach to preparation and signaled strongly 

that DHS and the federal government was stepping forward with all available assets. Ap-
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pointment before landfall could have allowed the individual appointed to bring together 

state, local, and other federal offi cials in the region and to put in place coordinated plans for 

a response in advance of the storm rather than trying to establish control in the midst of the 

response. Defi ciencies, such as the failure to evacuate special-needs individuals or the lack 

of planning for post-landfall evacuation of the general population, might have been identifi ed earlier. None of this happened.55

Th at said, it’s unclear that appointing Brown PFO prior to landfall would have improved 

the response. Brown has made it very clear that he did not want to be appointed PFO. In 

fact, he thought the entire concept “silly,”56 as he felt it added an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. Th e choice of Brown as PFO – whether before landfall or aft er – was poor, even 

if for no other reason than his animosity toward the PFO concept, the NRP, and DHS, not 

to mention his lack of emergency-management training and experience. Perhaps Secretary 

Chertoff , who was in his position for less than seven months, wasn’t aware of Brown’s attitudes or was poorly advised. Or perhaps he chose Brown in the hope that he would rise 

above policy diff erences in the face of catastrophe. 

One of the PFO’s main responsibilities is to keep DHS leadership informed of the situation on the ground,57 but Brown, who has expressed disdain for this structure as ineffi cient,

refused to communicate with the Secretary, circumventing the chain of command to communicate directly with the White House. His actions were inexcusable – not only insubordinate, but disruptive to DHS’s awareness of the threats and problems that it was facing.

Brown was a poor choice for another reason. Even when appointed PFO, Brown remained 

the Director of FEMA, an apparent violation of the NRP’s requirement that a PFO not be 

“‘dual hatted’ with any other roles or responsibilities that could detract from their overall 

incident-management responsibilities.”58 According to DHS Deputy Secretary Michael 

Jackson, “for the incident of a hurricane, PFO and Director of FEMA, ‘macht Nichts’ [German: ‘amounts to nothing’]: they both have the same capacities, capabilities, performance 

capabilities in managing the events.”59 Th ere is, however, a practical reason why a PFO 

should have no other responsibilities: the PFO has to be focused entirely on the catastrophe 

at hand. But just as DHS and Secretary Chertoff had responsibilities that were broader than 

Katrina, so, too, did FEMA and its Director. On Th ursday, September 1, a minor earthquake occurred in California.60 Had this earthquake been more severe – or had there been 

wildfi res, fl ooding, or another disaster elsewhere – it remained FEMA’s responsibility to respond, and the FEMA Director’s job to see that it did so. Either Brown shouldn’t have been 

appointed PFO, or someone else should have become Acting Director of FEMA. Neither 

happened.

What DHS Should Have Done: Activating the IIMG 

Th e Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) brings together senior-level offi cials 

from multiple agencies, in theory to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in managing national incidents. Th e IIMG was formally activated at 11:30 a.m., Tuesday, August 

30.61 Over the weekend, the Director of the IIMG, Robert Stephan, consulted twice with 

Matthew Broderick, who, as the Director of the Homeland Security Operations Center, the 

primary hub for domestic incident management, operational coordination and situational 

awareness, was charged with recommending activation to the Secretary. Stephan recalled 

asking Broderick whether there was “anything signifi cant at this point in time that we need 

to be worried about and that would cause us to bring in the IMG [sic] this evening? And 

the answer was no.”62 Each time the two consulted, they decided that the FEMA and HSOC 

structures were “robust” enough without the IIMG.63 Instead, prior to landfall, members of 

the IIMG were told to be ready to convene on 90 minutes’ notice.64
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171

It’s unclear whether early activation of the IIMG might have resulted in a more eff ective 

federal response. Th ough the IIMG was designed to be a mechanism by which to share information, identify available resources, and coordinate government eff orts, some witnesses 

criticized the IIMG as ineff ective in practice. One witness derisively called it the “bright idea 

brigade.”65 Th e FEMA designee to the IIMG said that it actually hindered response eff orts 

aft er its activation in Hurricane Katrina by meddling in operational details.66 One emergency-preparedness offi cer said that “It became a huge animal you have to feed information 

to.”67

Since the IIMG was not activated until recovery was under way, it’s unclear whether 

response eff orts would have improved if it had been activated pre-landfall. However, the 

decision not to activate the IIMG prior to landfall suggests that DHS leadership did not fully 

recognize the potential scope of the damage Katrina presented, or its obligation to lead the 

federal response in accordance with the NRP. While the performance of the IIMG appears 

to have been mixed aft er landfall, things might have gone more smoothly if it had been activated sooner and been allowed before the height of the crisis to work through issues associated with its fi rst use since the implementation of the NRP.68 Alternatively, if activating the 

IIMG before landfall was not called for in an incident the magnitude of Katrina, this calls 

into the question the utility of the organization itself and suggests that consideration should 

be given to abolishing it and distributing its functions to operating elements.

Conclusion

Despite knowledge that Katrina was a looming “nightmare scenario,”69 DHS and Secretary 

Chertoff failed to adequately prepare the federal government for what became one of the 

most destructive natural disasters in the nation’s history. As Katrina approached the Gulf 

Coast, those in the top ranks of DHS failed to understand the potential scope of the pending 

catastrophe and FEMA’s limited capacity to address an event of this magnitude.

Equally important, DHS failed to carry out its own responsibilities under the NRP and associated Presidential Directives.70 A November 2005 report by the DHS Inspector General 

regarding an April 2005 training exercise (“TOPOFF 3”) found that “Th e exercise highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles 

and protocols set forth in the NRP.”71 Others in government – most notably then-FEMA 

Director Michael Brown – simply refused to accept the NRP, choosing instead to proceed as 

if the NRP did not exist.

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he believed his role as chief executive of the Department 

was to impart strategic guidance and deal with senior offi cials, not be a “hurricane operator.” But Secretary Chertoff came up short by his own yardstick. A chief executive should 

understand the responsibilities of the organization he runs. In the days before Katrina, 

Secretary Chertoff appeared not to have fully understood the broader role of DHS under the 

NRP. A strategic leader chooses capable subordinates and provides those subordinates with 

guidance, works eff ectively with other key government offi cials, and, in DHS’s case, cooperates eff ectively with states. Even judging the Secretary by his own criteria, his performance 

in the nation’s worst domestic disaster fell short of reasonable expectations.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA Pre-Landfall

Before landfall, Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Katrina in New Orleans, called Edward Buikema, FEMA’s Acting Director of Response. “I don’t think we’re 
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172

thinking big enough,” he told Buikema. “[Katrina] is bigger than how we normally do 

things.”72

Wells was exactly right. Despite knowing for years the catastrophic impact that a large 

hurricane could have on New Orleans, despite the predictions of the exercise known as 

Hurricane Pam, and despite FEMA’s own internal slides showing projections that Katrina 

could be worse than Pam’s predictions of 60,000 fatalities – FEMA just wasn’t thinking big 

enough for Katrina. 

DHS is the central federal entity for preparing for and responding to disasters. FEMA is 

one of the agencies within DHS charged with responsibilities under the NRP. FEMA is the 

lead agency for fi ve of the 15 Emergency Support Functions under the NRP.73 Despite these 

obligations, FEMA did not prepare adequately for Hurricane Katrina. 

Th is section analyzes FEMA’s preparations in the days during which Katrina was moving 

toward land.

FEMA offi cials knew the threat a large hurricane posed to New Orleans. Buikema testifi ed 

that FEMA considered a large hurricane hitting New Orleans to be one of the worst catastrophes that could occur in the United States.74 Eric Tolbert, FEMA’s Director of Response 

until February 2005, testifi ed that while at FEMA, the hurricane threat to New Orleans was 

his top priority and that FEMA knew a hurricane Category 3 or stronger could breach or 

overtop the levees.75 (Th ere is a more detailed discussion of FEMA’s knowledge of the threat 

posed to New Orleans by a hurricane in Chapter 8.) 

Despite this knowledge, FEMA’s leadership failed to ensure that the federal government’s 

preparations for the response were adequate. Its leaders didn’t compel the federal government to think bigger than usual. Th ey failed to ask the right questions to make sure FEMA’s 

response was big enough. Th ey did not utilize all available resources. FEMA seemed to be 

following pages from its regular playbook instead of a playbook made for “the big one.” 

Some of FEMA’s pre-landfall failures had to do with FEMA’s systematic weaknesses, discussed in Chapter 14 . Th ey included insuffi cient staff ; limited ability to track commodities; 

unexercised, untrained, under-equipped emergency-response teams; unprepared disasterassistance workforce; lack of operating procedures; and lack of necessary funding. FEMA 

Director Michael Brown sought additional funding to address many of these problems, 

but DHS did not provide suffi cient additional funding. Th e failure to address or solve these 

many problems cast the die even before Katrina moved towards the Gulf Coast.

As early as Saturday morning, August 27, Michael Lowder, FEMA Deputy Director of 

Response, e-mailed several FEMA employees: “If [this] is the ‘New Orleans’ scenario, we 

are already way behind. Let’s don’t hold back. Let’s make sure that all of our Emergency 

Support Functions are fully engaged and ramped up, everything turned on, etc. Th is may be 

IT!”76 Because of the inadequate preparations, even before landfall, the federal government 

was already behind in fi ghting Katrina’s terrible wrath. 

Weather Warnings in the Days Before Landfall 

In the days as Katrina moved through the Gulf of Mexico, FEMA was repeatedly warned 

that it was a potentially catastrophic hurricane headed toward the Gulf Coast. Despite these 

warnings, Brown has admitted that the federal government’s level of preparedness wasn’t 

adequate for the big one.77 William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana during Katrina, agreed: “Communications and coordination was lacking, preplanning 

was lacking. We were not prepared for this.”78
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173

Th e warnings began early. Th e 5 p.m. National Weather Service (NWS) report on Th ursday, August 25, said some models showed Hurricane Katrina moving to the west, bringing 

it “inland between Mobile, Alabama, and Grand Isle, Louisiana [southeastern Louisiana],” 

although the National Hurricane Center (NHC) model did not show it moving that far 

west.79 Six hours later a new NWS report predicted that Katrina was expected to strengthen 

and that “Katrina will be a dangerous hurricane in the northeastern Gulf of Mexico in about 

3 days.”80

By 11 a.m., Friday, August 26, the NWS report said that Katrina’s track should “fl atten out 

in a more westward direction.” It reported some models showing the storm going west over 

Louisiana, but most showing Katrina going inland over the northeast Gulf Coast. Th e report 

warned, “Strengthening to a major hurricane is expected.”81 On a noon video teleconference 

between federal and state offi cials hosted by FEMA, Max Mayfi eld, NHC Director, warned: 

“Right now we’re forecasting it to be a strong Category 3 hurricane. It’s going to be stronger 

than that.”82 Another NHC offi cial said that Katrina “has defi nitely shift ed well to the west 

towards New Orleans ... we’ve really got to pay attention all the way from Louisiana over 

into the Florida Gulf Coast.”83 

Th us, at least as early as Th ursday evening, FEMA was aware of a dangerous hurricane 

forming in the Gulf of Mexico and by noon Friday was aware that Katrina was shift ing west 

toward New Orleans. Th is awareness did not provoke action. On Friday, August 27, when 

asked, Brown permitted Acting Response Division Director Buikema to go to Alaska for a 

previously scheduled emergency-management conference even though “Th e predictions 

are now Katrina will turn into a Cat 4.”84 Buikema ultimately cut his trip short and returned 

from Alaska, arriving at FEMA headquarters on Sunday around 11 a.m.85 As a result, however, he was unavailable until Sunday morning to oversee his division’s preparations as the 

storm moved toward landfall.86

A Friday morning e-mail to Lokey from William Irwin of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the lead agency for Emergency Support Function 3 (ESF-3) (which includes executing contracts for ice and water) under the NRP, expressed concern that FEMA was moving 

too slowly: “FEMA Region IV [covering Alabama and Mississippi, among other states] is 

reluctant to make a decision to provide mission assignments [the mechanism by which 

FEMA requests other federal agencies to provide support during a disaster response] for 

a possible Alabama hit. ... Th e storm will speed up and rapidly strike on Monday and if 

FEMA/Alabama wants to have ESF#3 support ... the trigger needed to be pulled already.”87

On Friday, FEMA’s national operations center and its Region IV operations center in Atlanta were operating at a moderate level of readiness.88 Th e Texas-based Region VI operations center that covered Louisiana remained at its lowest state of readiness, for no known 

threat of disaster, on Friday.89 Although by Friday morning the National Weather Service 

began predicting that Katrina was shift ing towards the west, FEMA did not activate the national operations center to its highest readiness level until Saturday at 7 a.m.90 Th e regional 

operations centers were activated to the highest level at noon Eastern Time on Saturday.91

By Saturday, warnings were growing even more grave. FEMA’s 5:30 a.m. National Situation 

Report stated that Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen Blanco had declared a state of emergency, 

noting that New Orleans was “of particular concern because much of that city lies below sea 

level. According to Governor Blanco, Lake Pontchartrain is a very large lake that sits next to 

the city of New Orleans and if the hurricane winds blow from a certain direction, there are 

dire predictions of what may happen in the city.”92 By early Saturday morning, the projected 

path of the storm was directly over New Orleans. FEMA briefi ng slides dated 9 a.m., August 

27, 2005, at FEMA headquarters, stated: “Current projected path takes storm directly over 

New Orleans.”93 Th e briefi ng slides also noted that the Pam exercise predicted 60,000 fatali-
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ties and 1 million-plus persons displaced, and that Pam’s estimates are “exceeded by Hurricane Katrina real life impacts.”94 (See Chapter 8.)

Also on Saturday morning, FEMA distributed copies of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, also known as the Hurricane Pam plan, to its employees.95

On Saturday morning, the State of Louisiana requested an emergency declaration under 

the Staff ord Act – the federal law that provides a framework for federal assistance and 

reimbursement to states struck by declared disasters – so that it could better prepare for 

the storm. President Bush granted Louisiana’s request Saturday evening.96 Mississippi and 

Alabama requested emergency declarations on Sunday; the President granted them the 

same day.97 Th is unusual declaration of emergencies before landfall ensured that the federal 

government would fi nance many pre- and post-landfall actions taken by state and local 

offi cials.98 Th is had only been done once in the previous 15 years, when President Clinton 

issued four pre-landfall declarations, all for Hurricane Floyd in 1999.99

By late Saturday and very early Sunday, the weather projections became even more severe, 

warning that Katrina could become a very intense and dangerous Category 5 hurricane, and 

that the storm surge could be as high as 25 feet in some areas.100 Another Sunday weather 

report, from the Slidell, Louisiana, offi ce of the National Weather Service, stated that “devastating damage expected ... a most powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength ... 

most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks ... perhaps longer.”101

FEMA’s Sunday morning National Situation Report warned:

Katrina could be especially devastating if it strikes New Orleans because the 

city sits below sea level and is dependent on levees and pumps to keep the water out. A direct hit could wind up submerging the city in several feel of water. 

Making matters worse, at least 100,000 people in the city lack the transportation to get out of town.102

Also on Sunday, DHS released a report, stating, “Any storm rated Category 4 or greater ... 

will likely lead to severe fl ooding and/or levee breaching. Th is could leave the New Orleans 

area being submerged for weeks or months. ... Th e magnitude of this storm is expected to 

cause massive fl ooding.” Th is report was circulated to the White House’s situation room, 

throughout DHS, and to all agencies in DHS’s HSOC.103

Brown testifi ed that he spoke to White House offi cials at least 30 times during the weekend 

prior to landfall, repeatedly warning them about Katrina.104 Brown said he spoke directly 

to the President on Saturday, August 27, and warned that Katrina could be catastrophic.105

Brown later called to ask that the President contact Governor Blanco and “do everything 

he could within his persuasive powers to convince [Louisiana offi cials] to do a mandatory 

evacuation.”106 Brown testifi ed that he told both Chief of Staff Andy Card and Deputy Chief 

of Staff Joe Hagin prior to landfall that he was concerned about how bad Katrina could be, 

saying he thought Katrina could be the catastrophic “big one.”107

On the Sunday before landfall, President Bush and Hagin both participated in FEMA’s 

noon video teleconference (VTC), where Max Mayfi eld, Director of the National Hurricane Center, predicted Katrina would be a “very dangerous hurricane” and warned, “I 

don’t think any model can tell you with any confi dence right now whether the levees will be 

topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern.”108 Although the President 

appeared on the VTC, promised federal government assistance, and thanked Governor 

Blanco and Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour for heeding these warnings, and doing all 

they could possibly do to prepare for this storm, the President did not ask any substantive 
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175

questions.109 On that call Colonel William Doran, operations division chief for LOHSEP, 

noted that the State of Louisiana was “way ahead of the game there” with catastrophic planning “thanks to the help of FEMA, when we did the Hurricane Pam exercises.”110 Colonel 

Smith said Louisiana’s evacuations were going “much better than it did during Ivan.”111

Aft er the Sunday noon VTC, Brown had another conversation with Hagin in which he 

said he again raised his concerns about the storm and complained that he had never been 

allowed to do the catastrophic planning that was necessary for FEMA to be prepared for 

a storm like Katrina that he had pushed to be able to do.112 “I [was] just adamant that they 

understand my concern about New Orleans,”113 Brown described the call.

FEMA’S Preparation for Katrina 

FEMA’s many failures in preparing for Katrina include: (1) multiple failures involving deployment of personnel; (2) not taking suffi cient measures to deploy communications assets; 

(3) insuffi cient planning to be prepared to respond to catastrophic events, (4) not pre-staging enough commodities; (5) failures associated with deployment of disaster medical assistance teams and search and rescue teams; (6) failures involving evacuation; (7) failure to 

establish a joint fi eld offi ce quickly enough; and (8) failure to take measures prior to landfall 

to ensure proper security for emergency response teams. All of these contributed to FEMA’s 

failed response, which will be discussed in later chapters. 

FEMA’s Deployment of Personnel for Katrina

FEMA went to war without enough troops. Unlike many other disasters, hurricanes provide 

emergency managers with advance warning. Th us, FEMA should also begin its preparations, such as personnel deployment, in advance of a storm. With each passing day, FEMA 

had more accurate information about the strength and path of the storm. FEMA’s limited 

staff – it had only approximately 2,250 permanent, full-time employees in November 2005 

and around a 17 percent vacancy rate when Katrina struck114 – and resources require that its 

leadership be fl exible and adaptable to changing predictions. As Katrina developed, FEMA 

was forced to choose how to allocate its limited staff across at least three states. 

As early as Th ursday, August 25, before landfall, FEMA was aware that Katrina would likely 

make a second landfall somewhere on the Gulf Coast. On Friday, FEMA decided to move 

an Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT-A) from the West Coast to Mississippi.115

William Carwile was notifi ed that he would be the Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in 

Mississippi. He arrived there on Saturday, August 27, to take charge of FEMA’s response 

to what he later described as “the worst disaster to strike the United States in recent history 

from a response standpoint.”116

By Friday aft ernoon, Katrina was shift ing westward and was being projected to make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. FEMA leadership discussed deploying the National Emergency Response Team (ERT-N), but deployed no teams to Louisiana until noon, Saturday, August 27.117 ERT-N teams are emergency-response teams designed for high-impact events.118

Shortly aft er September 11, 2001, ERT-N teams had about 125 to 175 members, but FEMA 

had gradually reduced their size to the current level of about 25 members.119 While the NRP 

states that the Secretary of Homeland Security “determines the need for ERT-N deployment, coordinating the plans with the aff ected regions,” Secretary Chertoff played no role 

in deploying the team.120 Th e decision was made by FEMA senior leadership.121 Th e team’s 

Saturday deployment was simply too late, but it’s unclear whether the Secretary’s personal 

involvement would have sped it up. To make matters worse, once deployed, many team 

members were slow to reach the aff ected area, arriving only aft er landfall. Also, the deployed ERT-N went into service as a combination of the two national teams, rather than a 
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176

pre-selected team, because of a shortage of FEMA employees and because some available 

team members were already deployed in the Gulf region.122

FCO Lokey arrived in Baton Rouge between 6 and 7 p.m. on Saturday, meeting Deputy 

FCO Scott Wells at the State EOC.123 Lokey admitted that key positions on the ERT-N were 

not fi lled prior to landfall.124 According to Lokey, by Saturday, only fi ve ERT-N members 

had arrived, and by Sunday night only 12 to 15 ERT-N members were there.125 Prior to 

landfall, then, only about half of the ERT-N members were in place. 

According to Mike Hall, a leader of one of FEMA’s ERT-N teams, team members are supposed to deploy immediately once activated.126 Carwile said it is “very important” that an 

ERT-N arrive in a timely matter.127 However, FEMA does not dictate how quickly those 

team members should arrive since they are coming from diff erent parts of the country.128

Carwile said that the ERT-N teams used to have procedures to speed their arrival, but that 

they had been discarded.129

FEMA deployed an ERT-A team from Region I, which is headquartered in Boston, to the 

Region VI center in Denton, Texas, on Sunday, August 28. Phil Parr, the leader of this team, 

arrived on Sunday late aft ernoon or early evening; his team arrived in staggered fashion, 

some arriving on Sunday, others on Monday, the day of landfall.130 Of the 20 to 25 members assigned to his ERT-A team, about 10 eventually deployed.131 On Saturday, Texas was 

not within the cone of the projected path of the hurricane.132 According to a Parr e-mail, 

Parr agreed the storm was not headed to Texas.133 On Monday, FEMA redirected Parr and 

some of his team members to Louisiana. Parr and his team members did not arrive in New 

Orleans until Tuesday, August 30.134

FEMA also did not have available the kind of fi rst-responder teams it was supposed to have 

under the NRP. Th e First Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST teams) were not available when Katrina made landfall because FEMA had not yet hired staff for them.135 FIRST 

teams are designed to arrive quickly to assess the situation and identify potential requirements for federal help, provide advice on protective actions, coordinate response activities, 

and assist with critical life saving measures. Th e teams are supposed to deploy with sophisticated communications equipment to support state and local fi rst responders.136 Several 

witnesses said these teams would likely have been a major asset in responding to Katrina.137

Prior to landfall, Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA public-aff airs staff er, was the only FEMA employee deployed to New Orleans.138 He arrived in New Orleans at 11 p.m. Saturday to prepare for VIP visits to the area. By chance, he rode out the storm in the New Orleans EOC, 

located near the Superdome.139 On Sunday aft ernoon, there was a growing realization that 

more people were heading to the Superdome than offi cials had anticipated. Offi cials at the 

Orleans Parish EOC were becoming concerned. Bahamonde took pictures of the gathering 

crowds at the Superdome and sent them back to FEMA headquarters. Th roughout Sunday, 

Bahamonde continued to provide information to FEMA headquarters about the growing 

numbers of people and the deteriorating conditions.140

Brown arrived in Baton Rouge on Sunday evening. He was accompanied by two FEMA 

press employees, a FEMA congressional-relations liaison, security detail, and his personal 

assistant, but no operations experts.141 Th ey traveled on military aircraft ; FEMA’s operational personnel took commercial fl ights.142 Once in Baton Rouge, Brown went to dinner and to 

the hotel, but did not go to the state EOC.143

As discussed more fully in Chapter 14, FEMA suff ered from staffi ng shortages, lack of 

training, and diffi culties with its disaster-surge workforce. Moreover, the teams deployed 
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177

were unprepared, unequipped, and (aside from many members participating in a simulated 

hurricane tabletop exercise the previous June) had not trained together as a team.144 Carwile 

believed that his Mississippi team, though not an ERT-N, was actually more experienced 

and better-trained than the ERT-N team members sent to Louisiana.145

Staffi ng shortages and inadequacies contributed to FEMA’s failure to prepare for Katrina.146

Wells admitted that FEMA didn’t have the staff to run a 24-hour operation in Katrina. 

People were working, he said, “50 hours over 2 days.”147 Carwile agreed:

Th e inability to fi eld experienced personnel in Mississippi had a major impact 

on our operations there. FEMA needs many more trained people who can 

deploy to disasters. Both career professionals and temporary disaster assistance 

employees (DAEs) [used by FEMA to quickly increase staffi ng during disasters] performed their jobs well in Mississippi, especially in the fi rst chaotic days 

aft er landfall. However, there were not enough trained people to adequately 

staff all of the positions. Of all the shortfalls that I had to manage as FCO this 

was the most diffi cult. Th is paucity of qualifi ed personnel hurt us in both the 

response and recovery phases of the operations.148

To make matters worse, FEMA had few personnel specifi cally devoted to response activities.149 For instance, although there are generally pre-arranged rosters for emergency-response teams, oft en those members are in other jobs or working on other disasters and are 

not available when a new disaster hits. Th erefore, the teams consist of individuals who have 

not necessarily previously served in these positions, who have not trained, worked, practiced, or planned together, and who are sometimes not qualifi ed for the job. Wells referred 

to the way positions are fi lled on emergency response team as the “hey-you roster” and said 

that under this system “you get people that are not qualifi ed for the job. It’s secondary jobs 

for everybody. ... I can probably count on my hand the number of people that their primary 

job is go out in the fi eld and do these things. Th is is not a team that goes out that is trained 

and worked and planned and operated together.”150

In addition to full-time FEMA personnel, FEMA uses temporary employees, called Disaster 

Assistance Employees (DAEs), to surge up for disasters. According to Marie Sloan, director 

of the DAE program, fewer than half of the DAEs were available when Katrina made landfall – a typical availability rate.151 Records show that FEMA was also slow to deploy available 

DAEs for Katrina. For instance, of the approximately 4,000 DAEs, only 25 were deployed 

on Friday, 116 on Saturday, and 53 on Sunday. FEMA spread these DAEs over four states 

to respond to Katrina’s fi rst landfall in Florida, and to its expected second-landfall states of 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.152

DAEs and other FEMA personnel were also delayed in arriving at the actual disaster sites 

because of FEMA’s policy that all personnel deployed to a disaster must fi rst visit a “mobilizations center” in Florida or Georgia for things like badge issuance and briefi ngs.153 While 

some DAEs may have needed this check-in process in order to be better prepared, several 

FEMA leaders complained that this requirement delayed the deployment of workers to 

the disaster. For example, on the day aft er landfall, one FEMA employee complained that 

she had had “zero” DAE requests fi lled and that the DAE deployment process is “killing 

us. Th ere has been no consistent guidance and not only are we unable to lean forward, we 

can’t even stand up! ... this will bring us to our knees.”154 A few days aft er landfall, FEMA 

changed the policy to allow at least some personnel to deploy directly to the disaster.155

FEMA did not deploy operations personnel in or near the New Orleans metropolitan area 

prior to landfall. Central to FEMA’s ability to provide assistance to state and local responders is to have trained personnel in the fi eld prior to landfall. Th ese individuals can provide 
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178

invaluable situational awareness, serve as liaisons with the state and local offi cials, and 

help identify needs and coordinate the response. Yet, FEMA didn’t deploy anyone to New 

Orleans, and in fact it actually evacuated qualifi ed personnel out of New Orleans prior to 

landfall.156

In contrast, prior to landfall in Mississippi, FEMA deployed personnel to EOCs in several 

counties most likely to be impacted by the hurricane.157 Th ese liaisons provided valuable onthe-ground information and assistance to locals in the crucial hours immediately following 

landfall and were invaluable in helping to coordinate the response in Mississippi. FEMA has 

a longstanding policy of not putting its emergency responders in the path of a storm, so that 

they will not be in need of rescue themselves. Lokey, however, testifi ed that he would have 

liked to put some individuals in local EOCs prior to landfall, just as Carwile did in Mississippi, but that he didn’t have enough personnel to do so.158 Instead, the only FEMA offi cial 

in New Orleans was Bahamonde, the public aff airs offi cer sent to prepare for eventual VIP 

visits. Ultimately, Bahamonde served in some operations capacities, such as providing critical situational awareness, including the notice of broken levees.159 In Louisiana, FEMA’s 

response was adversely impacted by the failure to put personnel in or near New Orleans in 

advance of the storm.

Communications

FEMA neglected to adequately pre-stage communication assets and suffi ciently equip its 

personnel. In fact, Lokey said that he “still lose[s] sleep over” the fact that prior to landfall, 

more measures could have been taken to provide for communications.160 “We obviously did 

not bring enough or plan enough satellite or cell phones or alternative technology,” he said. 

“And once it all went bad, we scrambled to get it, but as I was the FCO, I should have, but 

... I obviously didn’t.” It was “a step I missed.”161

Lokey found a safe place in Baton Rouge to park the “Red October,” FEMA’s large, mobile command center with signifi cant communication assets and conference space, and on 

Saturday evening requested that Red October be placed there prior to landfall.162 His request 

was denied,163 because then-FEMA Director Michael Brown had reportedly reserved the 

center.164 Lokey therefore had no communications vehicle available to him at the EOC on 

landfall, though one arrived the following day.165

FEMA did pre-stage communications vehicles, prior to landfall, at Barksdale Air Force Base 

in Shreveport, Louisiana, which off ered a secured site out of the storm’s immediate path and 

was a convenient place to stage.166 Th is put the vehicles about 350 miles from New Orleans 

and about 250 miles from Baton Rouge, however. Th is distance, and the fact that FEMA did 

not request that the assets be deployed from Shreveport until over 24 hours aft er landfall, 

meant they took some time to reach their new locations for response work.167 In at least some 

instances, this delay may have prevented the assets from being placed where most needed.

For example, even though the area around the Superdome did not fl ood until around noon 

on Tuesday, FEMA was not able to get the Red October into the area because of fl ooding; 

Red October did not get to Baton Rouge until Wednesday.168 Besides not placing communications vehicles at the EOC169 and not adequately equipping its employees with communications assets, FEMA also did not place any communications assets in the Superdome prior 

to landfall. As discussed in Chapter 18, the failure to have communications assets in the 

Superdome cut the eff ectiveness of FEMA’s on-site response team by 90 percent.170

As discussed below, there was vast devastation to the land-line and cellular communications networks aft er Hurricane Katrina, which made communications very diffi cult. Indeed, 

Wells said the lack of communications at the EOC made it like a “black hole.”171 Lokey 

referred to it as a “vacuum” and said it was “very diffi cult to have a good operational picture 

of all that was going on.”172 Th is hindered the response. 
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179

Catastrophic Planning 

FEMA had long known it needed to do general catastrophic planning for responding to 

large disasters, but had problems getting necessary funding. Requests for $100 million for 

catastrophic planning and an additional $20 million for catastrophic housing planning in 

fi scal year 2004 and fi scal year 2005, respectively, were denied by DHS.173 

Although catastrophic planning for southeast Louisiana was recognized as a priority by 

FEMA regional staff and the State of Louisiana in 1999, funding shortages, staffi ng changes, 

and competing priorities delayed the planning. Funding shortages also aff ected the scope of 

the planning. Some areas that the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness (LOHSEP) had identifi ed as topics it wanted to address, such as pre-landfall 

evacuation, as well as other areas, were dropped.174 Follow-up workshops were also postponed. Lack of funding also prevented implementation of the Hurricane Pam plan.175 

Despite these setbacks, FEMA attempted to use the Pam plan in responding to Katrina. 

Copies of the Pam documents were circulated throughout FEMA on Saturday, August 

27. Additionally, Lokey ordered the contractor for the Pam project to come to the EOC in 

Baton Rouge to assist FEMA employees in implementing Pam.176 In responding to Katrina, 

however, FEMA failed to follow some aspects of Pam. For example, the draft Pam plan said 

Region VI would activate its regional coordination center when the NWS advised that a 

hurricane or tropical storm posed a threat to Louisiana.177 It also said the FEMA headquarters would deploy an evacuation team.178 However, Region VI did not activate the RRCC 

until Saturday morning and FEMA appears not to have sent an evacuation team to Louisiana.179 It also appears that FEMA also failed to identify buses and drivers and pre-stage 

buses and drivers pre-landfall as suggested in Pam.180

While it is impossible to know whether completing the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan sooner would have resulted in a better response to Katrina, it is clear that 

FEMA had failed to do enough catastrophic planning. FEMA wasn’t prepared. Th is lack 

of planning inevitably led to mistakes in the response. As Secretary Chertoff said, Katrina 

“tested our planning, and our planning, I think, fell short.”181

Commodities

At the beginning of the 2005 hurricane season, FEMA had pre-positioned commodities in 

the Gulf Coast region as a way to speed up the response to hurricanes.182 Th e eff ort included 

30 tractor-trailer loads of water, 17 trailer loads of ice, and 15 trailer loads of MRE military 

rations at Camp Beauregard, a federal staging area in central Louisiana.183

However, preparations for a hurricane should not have ended with that initial pre-positioning, and the supplies pre-positioned were not enough for a storm as strong as Katrina. Ken 

Burris, FEMA’s Acting Chief Operating Offi cer, confi rmed that the initial pre-positioning was only a start, and that the specifi cs of a storm dictate whether FEMA should move 

more supplies to the area or move commodities closer to the predicted landfall.184 While 

some supplies already staged in the region were moved to Mississippi or Alabama, records 

indicate that relatively few additional truckloads arrived in FEMA’s staging areas in the days 

before landfall.185 Indeed, FEMA documents show that FEMA did not get any additional 

commodities to the Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, staging area as Katrina moved through 

the Gulf of Mexico.186 Th e record is not clear whether additional supplies were moved into 

the region bypassing FEMA’s staging areas. With Katrina bearing down on the Gulf Coast 

as a catastrophic storm, FEMA should have gotten additional supplies to its staging areas in 

Mississippi and Louisiana. Additionally, although FEMA tried to place some commodities 

in the Superdome prior to landfall, it was only able to get part of the quantities it intended 

there as its contractors stopped trucking due to weather conditions.187 
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180

Despite eff orts to move some commodities into Mississippi, there were major defi ciencies. 

Carwile wrote several e-mails on Sunday in which he expressed concern with commodities issues.188 FEMA had ordered 400 trucks of ice, 400 trucks of water, and 250 trucks of 

MREs for the Meridian Naval Air Station in Mississippi before the storm made landfall. 

Although FEMA and state offi cials in Mississippi were never able to discover exactly how 

many truckloads actually arrived pre-landfall,189 according to Tom McAllister, Director 

of Response and Recovery at MEMA the amount of supplies FEMA pre-positioned was 

“nowhere near what we asked for,” leaving Mississippi “critically shorthanded” for the fi rst 

few days.190

Some senior leadership at FEMA lacked a basic understanding of commodities. Patrick 

Rhode, then Acting Deputy Director of FEMA, received information on quantities of 

pre-staged supplies on Friday aft ernoon, two and a half days before landfall.191 Rhode later 

told interviewers that he did not believe the amount was adequate, but admitted he did not 

know how much was in a truckload, and had no idea for the amount of commodities he believed should be pre-staged.192 “I don’t know if I would have said specifi cally that we needed 

to provide more,” Rhode said. “I was concerned as to whether or not our experts believed 

that we were doing everything that we could.”193

FEMA’s poor planning for transportation was a key factor in the problems with commodities. Gary Moore, FEMA’s Director of Logistics, said FEMA had diffi culty moving commodities during Katrina.194 For instance, on Saturday aft ernoon, FEMA realized it did not have 

enough truck drivers to deliver commodities and equipment and started reviewing resumes 

to hire additional drivers.195 By Sunday aft ernoon, records show that FEMA was short 68 of 

the 94 drivers who would be needed to move commodities for a short response eff ort and 

short 162 drivers needed for a longer response.196 To make matters worse, FEMA’s transportation contractor, Landstar, does not own any vehicles. Instead, it locates independent 

drivers only aft er FEMA asks it to move commodities, which can also lead to delays.197

FEMA had to compete against Landstar for drivers to hire198 – a task made more diffi cult 

because it took place over a weekend.199

FEMA’s failure to pre-stage more commodities prior to landfall contributed to the human 

misery caused by commodities shortages aft er landfall. 

FEMA Deployment of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams

Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) comprises specialized emergency-medical and response teams who are federal fi rst responders in a medical emergency. FEMA 

activated the NDMS on the Th ursday before landfall. Although a number of teams were 

mobilized and began moving into the Gulf region, this eff ort fell far short of needs. By the 

night before landfall, only four complete Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), two 

partial teams, and a few small fi ve person strike teams – a total of about 250 personnel – 

were staged in the entire Gulf region, and only one team was deployed in Louisiana.200 Th us, 

fewer than 10 percent of FEMA’s 52 DMAT teams were in the region. Moreover, though 

activating NDMS four days before Katrina’s arrival was prescient, NDMS’s decision to place 

teams far from Katrina’s path meant the teams faced hundreds of miles and hours of travel 

to reach areas in need aft er landfall. Th e NDMS teams were plagued by other inadequacies, 

including that no deployed team possessed a full inventory of medical supplies.201

Search and Rescue

As more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 21, FEMA failed to take appropriate action 

pre-landfall to prepare for search and rescue operations. FEMA offi cials knew that a major 

hurricane striking New Orleans could cause widespread fl ooding throughout the metropolitan New Orleans area. Yet prior to landfall, FEMA pre-positioned only three of its 28 Urban 
Federal Preparations

181

Search and Rescue (USAR) teams in Shreveport, Louisiana, and two others in Meridian, 

Mississippi.202

Despite the expectation of fl ooding, FEMA did not pre-position boats for its USAR teams.203

One USAR team manager said later: 

I don’t recall that, that we were thinking about, gee, we’re going to need a lot of 

boats down here. Actually, when the hurricane went through there, the news 

was saying, it’s not a big deal. It spared the city. Th at’s kind of the impression 

we were getting from watching the news on there, so we were not thinking 

about massive amounts of boats and things like that at that time, that I can 

recall. I’m sure we had some discussions about it.204

Finally, FEMA pre-staged the teams in Shreveport205 – approximately 340 miles from New 

Orleans. Lokey made this choice because he wanted to be sure they would be out of harm’s 

way while the storm’s path was uncertain.206 However, this distance meant that FEMA 

USAR teams did not reach New Orleans until Monday night, and did not begin rescue missions until Tuesday morning207 – 14 hours aft er the Coast Guard and state and local teams208

began rescuing people. FEMA’s teams were too few, too late, and boatless. 

Evacuation

Th e evacuation of the Gulf Coast was one of the most critical and controversial issues addressed during the investigation. For a discussion of any role or responsibility FEMA may 

have had in planning for the pre- or post-landfall evacuation, see Chapters 16 and 22.

Establishing a Joint Field Offi ce

A Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) is a coordination center that FEMA sets up, where federal, state, 

and local organizations with primary responsibility for disaster response can work together 

and coordinate the response. FEMA did not take adequate steps to set up the JFO before 

landfall.209 While the preparatory step toward a JFO – an Initial Operating Facility (IOF) 

– was opened pre-landfall,210 the JFO was not fully operational until 12 days aft er landfall.211

In a disaster, FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Systems employees are responsible 

for setting up the JFO. Lokey was told that the JFO would be operating within 72 hours.212

Th e nine-day delay past that 72-hour period in completing JFO set-up was mostly due to 

diffi culty in establishing Internet connectivity for the state’s computer system.213 Th e state 

could not move into the JFO until the technology issues were fi xed.214 Until the second week 

in September, members of the JFO coordination group in Louisiana were located at several 

diff erent locations while lacking reliable communications and the many benefi ts of co-location. FEMA employees working at borrowed space at the state EOC shared limited communications equipment, had limited access to computers, and worked in cramped conditions.215 FEMA employees held many meetings in hallways for lack of other space. Th ese 

cramped conditions and delays in setting up the JFO made it very diffi cult for FEMA to 

coordinate and operate with the state offi cials, which impeded a unifi ed response.216 Coordination greatly improved once the JFO was fully functional.217

Some of the problems caused by delays in setting up the JFO might have been alleviated if 

Lokey had had regular access to a command vehicle in which he could hold meetings with 

state and local offi cials.218 As noted, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown had reserved the 

Red October command center.219 Lokey did not request another command vehicle because 

he was told the JFO would be operational in three days aft er landfall.220
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Security

Th e Federal Protective Service (FPS) generally provides security for FEMA assets and 

personnel at FEMA’s request. Even without the threat of violence, DMAT teams may 

require security because they arrive with a cache of prescription drugs. Similarly, FEMA’s 

search-and-rescue teams come with substantial and valuable equipment. However, FEMA 

sent DMAT and USAR teams into the fi eld without security and without coordinating with 

other agencies to provide for their security. Historically, the FPS “take[s] over the ESF-13 

[public safety and security] in the event that FEMA does declare an emergency.” 221

It wasn’t until the morning of August 30 that FEMA issued the fi rst in a series of mission 

assignments to the FPS to provide security for its responders. Even then, FEMA’s assignment did not mention the Superdome. Th e fi rst request for support at the Superdome was 

not created until mid-aft ernoon on August 30.222 Th e following day, FPS received an additional mission assignment to send 14 offi cers to the Superdome to provide crowd control 

for the evacuation.223 By then, although it was reported to those in the Superdome complex 

that there were 14 FPS offi cers just a couple of blocks away on the overpasses, the offi cers 

“couldn’t fi nd a way into the Dome,” probably because of the fl ooding. 224

As early as Sunday, August 28, the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) – federal law-enforcement assets at DHS’s disposal – placed a 100-agent deployment element on full standby.225

Th e availability of this unit was reported in the CBP’s twice-daily situation reports to DHS, 

although it is not clear where they were located. It was not until Wednesday, August 31, that 

these federal law-enforcement personnel were called up for deployment, and another 18 

hours passed before they arrived in Louisiana, “to assist National Guard with crowd control 

and evacuation of 25 to 30 thousand individuals from the New Orleans Superdome.” 226

FEMA issued each of these assignments too late to ensure a timely arrival of FPS personnel. 

By the time of the earliest FPS mission assignment,227 DMAT personnel and equipment had 

already staged at the Superdome complex with water quickly fl ooding all around them.

In the absence of FPS, or of any other dedicated security contingent, FEMA personnel in 

the Superdome found themselves forced to choose between their mission and their security.228 Th e responders’ concerns for their safety increasingly distracted them from delivering 

medical care. On Th ursday morning, September 1, concerned for their own safety, FEMA’s 

DMAT and ERT-A teams left the Superdome, leaving behind the team’s “cache, equipment, 

and rental vehicles”229 – not to mention patients and others taking shelter there. When these 

teams left , FEMA no longer had a presence at the Superdome, and the medical burden on 

remaining state and local health-care professionals increased. 

Department of Defense 

Perhaps one of the most obvious consequences of FEMA not “thinking big enough” was its 

delay in asking the Department of Defense to apply its resources. Brown conceded that he 

should have spoken with DOD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld prior to landfall to request assets.230 So, too, should have Secretary Chertoff , as discussed above. As discussed in Chapter 

26, DOD was surprised by the early silence from FEMA.231

Th e pre-landfall need for DOD assets such as helicopters, boats, and communications 

equipment, was considered but not acted upon by FEMA or DHS leadership. On the August 28 VTC, Secretary Chertoff inquired, “Are there any DOD assets that might be available? Have we reached out to them, and have we, I guess, made any kind of arrangement 

in case we need some additional help from them?”232 Brown replied that “We have DOD 

assets over [here] at the EOC. Th ey are fully engaged.”233 Apparently, Brown was referring 

to DOD liaisons to the EOC, known as Defense Coordinating Offi cers (DCOs); in this case, 

two individuals, rather than tangible resources that could be positioned or readied. Secre-
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183

tary Chertoff accepted this reply, telling Brown, “good job.” Neither Brown nor Secretary 

Chertoff sought to ascertain or understand what specifi c capabilities DOD might bring to 

the response, nor did they seek to call upon those capabilities before landfall. 234

Conclusion

FEMA’s mistakes in preparing for Katrina were many, and, as we will see, contributed to 

its overall defi cient response. Despite knowing for years the catastrophic impact a hurricane could have on New Orleans, FEMA’s leadership failed to move far enough beyond 

its normal modes of operation as “the big one” moved to shore. Th ose ordinary operating 

protocols were inadequate for a catastrophic disaster, and did not make enough use of the 

assets at the agency’s disposal. Th e words of one FEMA employee are telling: “We kind of 

assumed it was going to be just a regular, normal response to a disaster.” FEMA’s pre-landfall preparations fell far short of what the situation called for. FEMA was simply not “thinking big enough.” 

U.S. Coast Guard 

As discussed in other sections, the Coast Guard performed well in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina. Any problems were due mostly to the poor preparation of other DHS components.

Unlike their counterparts in other DHS components, Coast Guard personnel were quite 

familiar with the NRP. Th ey also had detailed plans for evacuation and continuity of government, had a clear mission statement, and were familiar with state and local offi cials and geography from their daily work as fi rst responders and from their disaster planning. Although 

DHS failed to take advantage of the Coast Guard’s intelligence-gathering capability in the 

critical hours aft er landfall, overall, the Coast Guard’s advance moves were exemplary. 

Th e Coast Guard is unique among federal agencies involved in emergency response in that 

it has military, law-enforcement, and fi rst-response obligations.235 Rigorous planning, training, and exercising are key elements in the Coast Guard’s approach to disaster response.236

In the spring of 2005, as in every spring prior to the start of the hurricane season, the 8th 

Coast Guard District – which stretches from the Appalachians, to the Rockies, south of the 

Great Lakes, and to part of Florida – and all its subordinate units, including Sector New 

Orleans, exercised their hurricane plans.237 Because personnel turnover in the New Orleans 

District runs about one-third each year, the exercise provides a good opportunity to bring 

new personnel into the Coast Guard’s culture of operations on the Gulf Coast, including 

how to make hurricane plans for their own families.238

Th e exercise involved a simulation of a hurricane hitting New Orleans. As Rear Admiral 

Robert Duncan, the Commander of the 8th District, commented, “We take them through a 

timeline of the storm approaching, the storm getting close, the storm hitting, and the recovery piece.”239 During the exercise, Coast Guard offi cials visited state, municipal, and other 

EOCs, as well as their own pre-designated primary and secondary “safe havens” for prelandfall evacuations.240 Th ey also confi rmed critical phone numbers241 and reviewed their 

Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) to ensure they could maintain essential services 

without interruption:242

Sector New Orleans will provide search and rescue support, restore essential 

aids to navigation, respond to hazardous material spills, manage waterways 

including traffi c and safety or security zones, provide transportation of victims, provide essential waterborne and airborne logistics support, deliver vital 

supplies and materials, provide access to storm damaged areas to key response 

personnel, and perform any and all acts necessary to rescue and aid persons 

and protect and save property.243
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184

Th ree days before the storm hit, Sector New Orleans sent out warnings to the port community, maritime industry, and the public at large urging them to take necessary precautions.244

Staff established the Sector’s alternative incident-command post in Alexandria, Louisiana, 

and evacuated their personnel and family members from New Orleans and nearby areas 

in the projected path of the storm.245 Sector Mobile moved its command to Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama.246 Following its hurricane evacuation plan, the 8th District Command 

moved to St. Louis.247

Th e Coast Guard pre-positioned patrol boats, river tenders, and small boats and crews away 

from their exposed home ports.248 Th ey deployed the medium-endurance cutter USCGC

Spencer from the East Coast to the Louisiana area so it could later act as a command-andcontrol platform.249 Th ey alerted a C-130 aircraft and crew in Clearwater, Florida, that they 

would be needed aft er landfall to assess damage to the off -shore oil facilities in the Gulf of 

Mexico.250

On August 27, the Coast Guard positioned its fi ve search-and-rescue helicopters from Sector New Orleans in Houston, Texas, and Lake Charles, Louisiana, just out of the hurricane’s 

path, so they could fl y in behind the storm.251 As they fl ew out of New Orleans that day, 

Captain Bruce Jones, the Commander of Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans, told his 

fl ight crews, “Take a last look folks, because when you come back, it will be under twenty 

feet of water.”252

Coast Guard liaison offi cers were positioned at the State EOC in Baton Rouge and at the 

City EOC in New Orleans.253 Admiral Duncan called Governors Blanco and Barbour and 

advised them of Coast Guard preparations for the storm.254 At noon on Sunday, August 28, 

the Coast Guard closed the Mississippi River to all vessel movements, ceased cargo operations, and sent out fi nal advisories to the maritime industries on necessary precautions to 

safeguard property.255

As it became clear that Katrina would make landfall in heavily populated areas, Coast 

Guard units in other stations around the country prepared to deploy following landfall,256

though there were no orders to do so. As Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivien Crea described 

Coast Guard culture, “Th ere’s just an understanding and a predisposition that ... if something happens and you’re in the way, you either hunker down or move out of the way so 

you can come in behind. If you’re not in the target zone and it’s bad enough, you better be 

prepared to go there and help out.”257

At 2:50 p.m. on Monday, August 29, Coast Guard helicopters made their fi rst rescue in the 

New Orleans area.258

As further discussed in Chapter 21, the Committee’s investigation established that several 

factors contributed to the Coast Guard’s success in preparing for Hurricane Katrina. First, 

rigorous planning, training, and exercising are key elements in the Coast Guard’s approach 

to disaster response. Second, the Coast Guard’s plans and exercises help personnel develop 

and maintain close ties to state and local offi cials, with whom they coordinated closely during the Katrina response eff ort. Th ird, the Coast Guard has a clearly articulated response 

mission understood by all personnel. Fourth, the Coast Guard notifi es public- and privatesector partners of storm risks and of necessary safety precautions. Fift h, the Coast Guard 

aggressively moves personnel and assets out of the storm’s path, but positions them to 

maximize their utility in the response eff ort. Finally, the Coast Guard plans for and rapidly 

deploys additional assets from outside the aff ected area without signifi cant bureaucratic 

hurdles, owing to an institutional commitment to providing assistance whenever possible. 

Th e Coast Guard’s eff orts – including the rescue of over 33,000 people – demonstrate the 

eff ectiveness of proactive planning for disaster response.259
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185

Unfortunately, DHS, which had extremely poor situational awareness of the storm’s impact, 

failed to make use of the Coast Guard’s early presence in the area. Coast Guard helicopter 

pilots were fl ying missions over the city as early as 3 p.m. on landfall day, Monday, August 

29, and were probably the fi rst federal offi cials to see the breach in the 17th Street Canal. 

Admiral Duncan was the highest-ranking federal offi cial to see New Orleans on August 29, 

when he fl ew over the city at approximately 6 p.m. in a Coast Guard Falcon jet to perform a 

damage assessment, and saw widespread fl ooding. However, as discussed in Chapter 20, it 

does not appear that any eff ort was made to harness this information-gathering apparatus 

in service of the broader DHS mission.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

and FEMA’s National Disaster Medical System

On Th ursday, August 25, four days prior to landfall, FEMA Response Division Chief Edward Buikema wrote a memo to his Operations Branch Chief, William Lokey, activating 

the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) – a system of medical and specialty teams 

designed to respond to medical emergencies.260 Th e basic unit of NDMS is the Disaster 

Medical Assistance Team (DMAT). FEMA “leaned forward” on the premise that Katrina 

presented a potentially catastrophic event, and began to mobilize and pre-position teams 

without state requests. (See Chapter 27 for a discussion of situations when the NRP empowers the federal government to off er help without waiting for requests.) Th ey made these 

decisions based on senior leadership experience and the need to avoid delay, Beall said:

We front-loaded those resources, and then as the state would request ESF-8 – we need a 

team down at this hospital, that hospital – the resource was there. In the past, they would 

ask, and I would have to get a team rostered, get transportation, try to fl y the resource, 

and get it. A lot of times it could get there, but you needed it yesterday, not two days from 

now.261

Mick Cote, the NDMS state representative in Region VI, which covers New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, expressed the urgency felt by NDMS leadership in 

an e-mail to NDMS Director Jack Beall on August 27:

40+ medical facilities in the 11-Parish impact zone. Models predict up to 20 

ft . of water in those 11 parishes with little hope of removing it in less than 2 

months. Th e catastrophic plan predicts 7,500 casualties per day over a 5-day 

period and 60,000 fatalities. In addition, estimates place critical care patients, 

staff , families and refugees sheltered in hospital at 10,000+.262

Cote went on to inform Beall that the State of Louisiana had identifi ed three medical staging areas to handle victims of the hurricane. Th ese sites were expected to be outside of the 

storm path but close enough to send care quickly: Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton Rouge (80 miles from New Orleans), Southeast Louisiana University in Hammond (58 

miles), and Nichols State University in Th ibodaux (67 miles). Cote communicated Louisiana’s need to Beall: “Based on the casualty estimates, the plan calls for three full DMATs at 

each medical staging site and two medical strike teams263 to be located at each of four Search 

and Rescue Bases of Operations.” 264 Beall replied, “Mick, by 1800 hours tomorrow night, I 

will have 9 DMATS, 9 [fi ve]-person strike teams, 2 MSTs [Management Support Teams].”265

Yet, by 6 p.m. on August 28, the night before Katrina’s landfall, NDMS logs indicate that 

there were only four complete DMATs and two partial teams staged in the entire Gulf 

region, and only one of them deployed within Louisiana.266 Th at team, Oklahoma-1 DMAT, 

had been directed to the Superdome not by NDMS, but at the request of U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary Stewart Simonson.267 Under the 
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186

NRP, HHS is the federal agency responsible for coordinating federal medical care in an 

emergency. 

Aft er a Sunday-morning phone conversation with New Orleans’s Health Director, Dr. 

Kevin Stephens, Assistant Secretary Simonson requested that two DMATs deploy to the 

Superdome before landfall.268 FEMA sent only one team (Oklahoma-1), which did not manage to reach the Superdome before landfall.269 It appears from the NDMS status reports that 

Oklahoma-1 was the only DMAT actually available to be deployed to the Superdome at that 

time.270

Aside from Oklahoma-1, which diverted to the Louisiana State University on Sunday night 

when it could not reach the Superdome, NDMS did not stage its DMATs at the Louisiana 

sites identifi ed by Cote on August 27 or at any other locations in Louisiana or Mississippi. 

Instead it staged them outside these states: at the Hyatt Regency in Houston, Texas (350 

miles from New Orleans); at the Noble Training Site in Anniston, Alabama (312 miles from 

Mobile, AL); and at the Marriot Hotel in Memphis, Tennessee (379 miles from Biloxi, Mississippi).271

It is not clear why NDMS chose these sites for the pre-staging of DMATs, especially aft er 

Louisiana apparently requested that the teams be brought closer. Under the NRP, ESF-8 

(which is the interagency coordinating group for health care) is tasked with making decisions about the deployment of medical response assets.272 On Sunday, August 28, Beall 

wrote an e-mail to Lokey asking “Bill, I am hearing the State of [Louisiana] is requesting 

DMATs be moved closer within the state. Can you advise?”273 Lokey responded in ambiguous terms. “ESF 8 is working with state on a plan. No visibility on the outcome.”274 NDMS 

team status reports show that no NDMS teams were ever moved to Louisiana or Mississippi 

before landfall except for Oklahoma-1.275

In sum, while FEMA’s Response Division deserves credit for activating the NDMS four days 

before Katrina’s arrival, the NDMS decision to place teams so far away from Katrina’s path 

meant they were hundreds of miles and hours of travel from areas in need. When HHS asked 

for two DMATs to go to the Superdome, FEMA apparently was unable to muster two teams 

to respond. Th e one team that actually arrived at one of Louisiana’s three medical staging 

areas – Oklahoma-1 – was there by “mistake,” because it couldn’t reach the Superdome.

Assistant Secretary Simonson directed that HHS deploy its own assets to the Superdome as 

well. Th e morning of Sunday, August 28, Simonson directed the Offi ce of Force Readiness 

and Deployment (OFRD) within HHS to assemble a team of 50 U.S. Public Health Service 

(USPHS) offi cers from Washington, D.C., and an additional team from the Atlanta area to 

provide medical support for the Superdome. 276 OFRD is the offi ce that is responsible for 

deploying USPHS personnel.

OFRD had already begun to plan for Hurricane Katrina when it was still a tropical storm. 

On August 25, OFRD had been asked to roster a team of 100 USPHS offi cers for pre-deployment to the Gulf Coast. OFRD staff sent a mass e-mail to these 100 offi cers and then 

also tried to contact many via phone. Each time a USPHS team is needed, the team is created on an ad-hoc basis because USPHS offi cers are scattered across the nation and are not 

a part of pre-existing teams.277

By Saturday evening, Rear Admiral John Babb, the OFRD chief, reported that OFRD had 

been able to assemble 55 offi cers, who were waiting for travel orders.278 (In such situations, 

offi cers reach their destinations by commercial fl ights; at this point, however, OFRD had 

not received the deployment destinations.279) When Assistant Secretary Simonson directed 
Federal Preparations

187

that a team be assembled to go to the Superdome, this 55-person team could simply not 

get there before landfall.

As a result, on Sunday, Admiral Babb and his 

staff had to essentially start from scratch to 

assemble a new team that could be fl own in 

by charter aircraft . Th ey called hundreds of 

telephone numbers to reach USPHS offi cers 

in Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, but could 

only connect with 38 offi cers.280 Eventually, 

37 offi cers boarded the chartered fl ights arranged by Babb; a shortage of seats forced 

one offi cer to stay behind.281

Due to the late hour and deteriorating 

weather, the fl ights were routed to Jackson, 

Mississippi. Th e Health Service team got to 

Louisiana on the Tuesday aft er landfall, and 

was assigned to help staff the state’s medical 

staging facility at Louisiana State University 

in Baton Rouge.282

Assistant Secretary Simonson also directed the HHS offi ce that manages the Strategic 

National Stockpile (SNS) (a stockpile of medical supplies that can be provided to states in 

medical emergencies) in Atlanta, Georgia, to dispatch a shipment of supplies to the Superdome.283 Assistant Secretary Simonson based his request on an initial list dictated to him by 

Dr. Stephens, the New Orleans health director, on Sunday. Assistant Secretary Simonson 

e-mailed the director of the Strategic Stockpile around 1 p.m. that aft ernoon:

I need to get the following to N[ew] O[rleans] before the H[urricane] strikes: 

Gloves, bandages, blanked [blanket], blood pressure cuff s, adult diapers, Ace 

wraps, slings, gauze, hot and cold packs, [glucometers] and sticks, oxygen and 

other basic medical supplies. Th ey are expecting something like 50,000 people 

in the Super Dome. Any ideas about how to handle dialysis. What about 

oxygen, do we have any supplies? Please get this together asap and tell me how 

much we can send.284

Offi cials at the Strategic National Stockpile advised Assistant Secretary Simonson that they 

had located almost all of the materials and dispatched the shipment.285 However, they were 

unable to transport the materials into New Orleans: “At this point, we believe cannot safely 

move to New Orleans prior to the hurricane so are making preparation to transport to 

Barksdale A[ir ]F[orce ]B[ase] [in northwest Louisiana] which FEMA indicates will be their 

logistics staging area.”286 Th ese supplies did not reach Louisiana until mid-day on Monday, 

aft er landfall, and were turned over to the State of Louisiana late the same day.287

Department of Defense

Under the NRP, the Department of Defense (DOD) is assigned a supporting role for all 

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and can also be requested to provide assistance in 

support of those functions by FEMA. 

Zephyr Field staging area, Louisiana

U.S. Coast Guard photo
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188

 At the headquarters level – the civilian Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense (OASD-HD) and the uniformed Joint Directorate of Military Support 

(JDOMS) within the Pentagon’s Joint Staff – offi cials took several actions in anticipation of 

receiving requests from FEMA, and monitored FEMA’s teleconferences. When Hurricane 

Katrina appeared as a tropical depression on August 23, DOD offi cials took an inventory 

of available commodities, and identifi ed medical facilities and potential staging bases for 

FEMA.288 DOD offi cials at the Pentagon did not alter their usual asset-inventory process as 

Katrina strengthened and moved toward the Gulf Coast.289 However, on the Sunday before 

landfall, JDOMS established a 24-hour “crisis action cell” to allow for rapid processing once 

they began to receive requests from FEMA.290

Military commanders have a limited authority to deploy assets without orders from their 

superior offi cers or authorization from the DOD – if commanders label the deployment an 

“exercise.” 

Within the Army, Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander of the U.S. First Army 

based in Atlanta, Georgia, had provided assistance during the destructive 2004 hurricane 

season. As a Louisiana native, Lt. Gen. Honoré understood the potential damage Katrina 

could infl ict on the Gulf Coast. In coordination with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the headquarters for command and control of domestic military operations, he prepared to deploy himself and his staff on an “exercise mission” to Camp Shelby, an Army base in southern Mississippi. He also requested that assets 

he thought would be required in the immediate hours aft er landfall, including helicopters, 

small boats, and communications gear, be identifi ed and alerted to speed their deployment 

in response to an eventual request.291

Within the Marine Corps, several generals began to assess the availability of helicopters 

and engineering equipment.292 In the Navy, the Commander of the Second Fleet recognized 

that the USS Bataan, a helicopter-bearing ship in port in Texas, was well-positioned to 

provide assistance and ordered the ship to get underway on August 28 and steam in behind 

the hurricane.293 Th e Bataan had been deployed to the area on an exercise, so the fl eet 

commander was acting within his authority. As a result, once Katrina made landfall, the 

Bataan’s helicopters were among the fi rst active-duty aircraft to conduct search-and-rescue 

missions beginning on Tuesday.294 Nonetheless, DHS personnel questioned the admiral’s 

forethought and authority, and were reportedly angered that the Navy had acted in advance 

of a request.295

At NORTHCOM, the Operations Directorate commenced daily teleconferences on August 

24.296 On August 19, as a general measure for the hurricane season, the Secretary of Defense 

had granted authority for NORTHCOM to take several specifi c measures prior to landfall.297

Beginning on August 26, NORTHCOM used this authority to deploy coordinating personnel fi rst to Florida, then to Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Th e Louisiana representatives arrived the night of August 27. Under this authority and in response to a request from 

FEMA, NORTHCOM designated two military bases in Mississippi and Louisiana as federal 

staging facilities.298

Th e preparations by the commanders were not always coordinated with DOD, and on at 

least one occasion, met with resistance from a DOD headquarters component. General 

Honoré’s request on the eve of landfall that certain assets be identifi ed for immediate use299

was not answered by the Joint Staff ,300 despite the fact that the NORTHCOM Director of 

Operations made the same request by personally contacting the Director of JDOMS. 301

Several witnesses explained that, traditionally, the Pentagon will only take disaster-assistance action with a specifi c request from FEMA and once the actual requirement has been 
Federal Preparations

189

verifi ed,302 though as noted above, several commanders took the initiative to mobilize and 

alert assets in advance of FEMA requests. 

Although DOD was prepared to receive and process requests, it received very few requests 

from FEMA prior to landfall. In addition to staging bases, FEMA requested that DOD 

provide helicopters for rapid needs assessment prior to landfall; JDOMS only approved this 

request 12 hours aft er landfall, a sign, according to some witnesses, of its initial reluctance 

to provide assistance without the conditions described above.303 And although the Department’s preparations for Katrina were consistent with its procedures and prior practices in 

civil-support missions, they were not suffi cient for a storm of Katrina’s magnitude. Additional preparations in advance of specifi c requests for support could have enabled a more 

rapid response.

1 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 clarifi es the responsibilities given to DHS by the Homeland Security Act 

by formally designating the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal federal offi cial for domestic incident management.” Th e NRP further affi rms the preeminent role of the DHS Secretary in coordinating the federal response to a 

disaster. Th us, the authority of the DHS Secretary is derived from the President in HSPD-5 within the framework of the 

NRP. Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

2 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15.

3 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 15.

4 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005.

5 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 37. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000102.

6 Sec. Michael Chertoff , FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 38. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000103. 

7 Sec. Chertoff , VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 38. 

8 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee Hearing, Feb. 15, 2006.

9 Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000083 through 0000084.

10 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 21. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0105-0000086. Brown testifi ed that by his questions, he was seeking information from the state on what it needed 

at that moment only. Committee Staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, 

transcript pp. 62-67. 

11 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006. Sec. Chertoff also testifi ed that he relied on FEMA’s experience and expertise: “If there is nothing else that FEMA is an expert in, it is hurricanes.” Source: Sec. Chertoff , Senate 

Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006. However at the time of Katrina, only one individual in FEMA’s front offi ce, Acting 

Chief Operating Offi cer Ken Burris, had emergency management experience before joining FEMA. Prior to joining 

FEMA, Brown had been working as a Commissioner for the International Arabian Horse Association for approximately 

10 years. Acting Deputy Director and Chief of Staff Patrick Rhode, Policy Director Brooks Altshuler, Acting Deputy 

Chief of Staff Scott Morris, and Special Assistant Michael Heath all had no prior emergency management experience. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 

219-220. 

12 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 15.

13 In his response to one of the Committee’s post-hearing questions, Sec. Chertoff described his activities over the 

weekend as follows: “In the weekend before landfall, I followed planning activities closely and I stayed in continual contact with senior DHS and FEMA offi cials and my experienced advisers. I participated in the noontime FEMA VTC on 

Sunday, August 28, at which time I explicitly asked Mr. Brown if he required any additional assistance from other DHS 

components, and if he was getting everything he needed from DOD. Louisiana offi cials also noted at that time that they 

were satisfi ed with the level of pre-positioning of assets and cooperation that they were receiving from FEMA. I was also 

in direct personal contact with each of the governors of the aff ected states that day, and repeatedly thereaft er.” Source:

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 15; Committee staff interview 
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of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 59-60 

(“I mean, I think that there was certainly informal communication in which he was, you know, briefed about the status 

of things and to which he may have given, you know, feedback, but I don’t recall, you know, memos or specifi c, you 

know, orders and things like that; not to say there weren’t any, but I don’t recall.”); Committee staff interview of Michael 

Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 60-61; 

Committee staff interview of Matt A. Mayer, Counselor to Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 74-75; Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for 

Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 50-51.

14 Brown, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 38. 

15 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 3-6. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000068 through 0000071.

16 Although Sec. Chertoff has stated that over the course of the weekend before landfall he “followed planning activities 

closely” and “stayed in continual contact with senior DHS and FEMA offi cials and my experienced advisors,” Source:

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15. Th e Secretary has provided 

no more detail about these discussions, so it is unclear what he learned or what questions he asked. Aside from the 

foregoing, the Committee’s investigation has uncovered no other evidence regarding the specifi cs of such inquiries 

– no e-mails referring to Sec. Chertoff ’s inquiries and no communications with anyone outside his senior staff at DHS. 

UnderSecretary Brown testifi ed that he did not recall speaking directly with Sec. Chertoff the weekend before landfall. 

Source: Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 88. Deputy Sec. Jackson did speak with Brown over the weekend. Brown testifi ed that he told Deputy Sec. Jackson that he was concerned that Katrina could be a catastrophic event, but did not ask 

Deputy Sec. Jackson for any additional assistance from DHS because he believed FEMA could and would make those 

requests through the Emergency Support Functions or directly to other DHS components. Source: Brown interview, Jan. 

23, 2006, pp. 88, 96, 105.

17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Could 

Better Integrate Information Technology with Incident Response and Recovery,” Sept. 2005. In an August rebuttal to the 

draft report, Brown disputed its fi ndings and argued that FEMA had responded successfully to the hurricanes. Th e IG responded that Brown “incorrectly equate[d] the agency’s ability to meet the disaster challenges to date with eff ective and 

effi cient IT management. While we state in our report that [FEMA] was able to get through the 2004 hurricanes, we also 

recognize that FEMA’s accomplishments were not necessarily because of its IT systems, but oft en in spite of them. Users 

across [FEMA] consistently told us that they did not use the headquarters-supplied systems, but instead relied upon 

alternative methods, such as creating ad hoc spreadsheets and databases or resorting to manual methods, to perform 

their jobs. Where IT systems were used, they oft en did not operate eff ectively.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Offi ce of Inspector General, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Could Better Integrate Information Technology 

with Incident Response and Recovery,” Sept. 2005, pp. 23, 35.

18 Committee staff interview of Pat English, Chief Procurement Offi cer, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript 

pp. 64, 81-84 (“I know he [DHS Chief Procurement Offi cer Greg Rothwell] briefed senior management in DHS, the 

Under Secretary, the DepSec, and on that scorecard, FEMA[’s procurement offi ce] was red, which indicated, you know, 

understaff ed.”).

19 Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005; Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 44, 84.

20 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 88; Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 

2006, p. 15

21 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15. 

22 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), former Director, Homeland 

Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 81-82. 

23 Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 82.

24 Committee staff interview of Peter Fonash, Ph.D., Director, National Communication System, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 49-52.

25 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 120-21.

26 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15; Wood interview, Jan. 27, 

2006, pp. 56-57; Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 76-77; Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 208-210; 

Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 69-71. 

27 An “ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity” produced by the ATF said that on Sept. 2, 2005, the “ATF established 

point of contact at the ESF 13 Desk and the NRCC and at the IIMG.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Summary of Signifi cant Activity. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF 0000000009.

28 Committee staff interview of Wendell Shingler, Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, conducted on Jan. 31, 2006, transcript pp. 54-55.

29 John Clark, e-mail to Gary Lang and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 5:58 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSICE-1-0002-0000550.

30 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, pp. 9, 15 
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191

[hereinaft er NRP]. 

31 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15.

32 Testimony of David Walker, U.S. Comptroller General, Government Accountability Offi ce, before U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, 

Mar. 8, 2006. 

33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Annex. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, p. CAT–1 [hereinaft er NRP-CIA].

34 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–5.

35 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 35; Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 37.

36 Although the Secretary provides several reasons why it was not a mistake not to have activated the CIA, the Secretary 

never explicitly states that he considered and rejected this alternative. Th e NRP-CIA also was not activated for Hurricane 

Rita, but the federal government’s preparation was more proactive pre-landfall than was the case for Hurricane Katrina. 

37 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 3.

38 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 3.

39 Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006. Secretary Chertoff argued that in the case of Katrina there was a 

great deal of coordination with the states, and the President’s pre-landfall declarations had opened “the legal and strategic fl oodgates to allow as much information – as much resources and as many assets to be pushed into the theater of 

engagement as possible.” He added that “If there is a diff erent view of the Annex, I am always ready to consider clarifying the text.” Source: Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 4.

40 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1 (“Accordingly, upon designation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of a catastrophic incident, Federal resources – organized into specifi c “packages” – deploy in accordance with the NRP-CIS and in coordination with the aff ect State and incident command structure.”).

41 In his response to one of Committee’s questions, the Secretary asserted that more assets than those that were called 

for under the CIS were in fact pre-positioned. Source: Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, pp. 3-4. Any suggestion that the CIS was followed de facto is not accurate, since two of the actions 

called for by the CIS pre-landfall – appointing a PFO pre-landfall and activating the IIMG – were not carried out in that 

timeframe. Committee staff interview of David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery, FEMA, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 8-13.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, Draft for Offi cial 

Use Only, Sept. 2005, p. 10. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0109-0000010 [hereinaft er Catastrophic Incident Supplement].

43 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1.

44 Garrett interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 36-37. Janet Benini, e-mail to Eric Tolbert and Ron Castleman, July 1, 2004, 4 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000261.

45 Janet Benini, e-mail to David Garret, Aug. 27, 2005, 12:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0096-0000395.

46 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 167.

47 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 

before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina and 

the Defense Department Response, Feb. 9, 2006.

48 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), pp. 9-11. Provided to Committee; 

U.S. Fleet Forces Command, briefi ng slides, “Hurricane Katrina Nay Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief 

from the Sea, Air and Land,” Nov. 14, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee.

49 Two emergency management experts, Chuck Mills and John Harrald, both told committee staff that they believe that 

invoking the NRP-CIA would have made a diff erence by instilling a “sense of urgency” in the response. Committee staff 

interview of Chuck Mills, Vice President, Emergency Management Services International, Inc., and John Harrald, Ph.D., 

Co-Director, Th e George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management, conducted on Feb. 

14, 2006 (untranscribed). 

50 Sec. Michael Chertoff , memorandum to Deputy Secretary and others, Aug. 20, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. DHS 0002822 through 0002824. 

51 NRP, p. 33.

52 Committee staff interview of Ken Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Offi ce, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 46.

53 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 40.

54 Some witnesses saw the appointment of a PFO as important to a coordinated eff ort. For example, Admiral Th ad Allen 

– who would ultimately be named to replace Mike Brown as PFO and was widely praised for his eff orts in that role – sent 

an e-mail to Chief of Staff John Wood on the day of landfall suggesting that a PFO should be appointed. Source: Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Th ad Allen, Chief of Staff , U.S. Coast Guard, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript 

pp. 113-114. And, although it occurred aft er landfall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale 
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told staff in an interview that he asked his Deputy Peter Verga to call DHS Tuesday morning, August 30, regarding the 

lack of a PFO. McHale stated that he thought that naming a PFO “would be an important initial step in triggering the 

capabilities available under the NRP.” Source: Committee staff interview of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 131.

55 Hurricane Rita demonstrated the diff erence that early appointment of a qualifi ed PFO can make. Th ere, an early, 

massive and coordinated federal eff ort was led by a PFO appointed two days before landfall. Th e federal government 

provided over 650 buses for general evacuation and arranged for ambulances and aircraft to evacuate thousands of 

special needs individuals. While there is no doubt that much of the federal government’s pre-Rita steps were a result 

of lessons learned from Katrina, and though the Rita evacuation as a whole was far from perfect, the federal eff ort was 

coordinated, in no small part because a PFO was in place to lead it at a very early point.

56 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 70. 

57 NRP, p. 33 (“Th e PFO provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the Secretary of 

Homeland Security”).

58 NRP, p. 33.

59 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 41.

60 FEMA Operations Center, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0003138. Th e e-mail was also sent to Michael Brown and indicated that a “light” earthquake 

measuring 4.8 on the Richter Scale had occurred in California. 

61 Under the NRP, the decision to activate the IIMG rests with the Secretary, but Stephan testifi ed that he took the 

action because he knew the Secretary was traveling and was concerned that he would be diffi cult to reach. Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 44-45.

62 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 68.

63 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 57.

64 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 23.

65 Committee staff interview of Col. Don Harrington, National Guard, Liaison to National Response Coordination 

Center, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 17-18.

66 Committee staff interview of Gil Jamieson, Acting Director, National Incident Management System Integration Center, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 81-85.

67 Committee staff interview of Capt. Michael McDaniel, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison to FEMA, U.S. Navy 

Reserves, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 112.

68 Th e IIMG was activated for Hurricane Isabel in September 2003 and several times when the government’s alert level 

was raised to “orange.” Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 48, 99-100. Katrina, however, was the fi rst major test of 

the IIMG since the NRP was completed. 

69 In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee investigating the preparation for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Sec. Chertoff stated “We went into this situation the weekend before with an understanding and with 

warnings that this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I think people have talked about for years in terms of New 

Orleans.” Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005.

70 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 clarifi es the responsibilities given to DHS by the Homeland Security Act 

by formally designating the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal federal offi cial for domestic incident management.” Th e NRP further affi rms DHS’s responsibilities: “During actual or potential Incidents of National Signifi cance, 

the overall coordination of Federal incident management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. Other Federal departments and agencies carry out their incident management and emergency response authorities 

and responsibilities within this overarching coordinating framework.” 

71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “A Review of Top Offi cials 3 Exercise,” Nov. 

2005, p. 6.

72 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 118, 129. 

73 FEMA is the lead agency for ESF–3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF–5 (Emergency Management), ESF–6 (Mass 

Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF–9 (Urban Search and Rescue) and ESF–14 (Long Term Community Recovery 

and Mitigation. NRP, p. ESF–v.

74 Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director of Response Division and Regional Director, Region V, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript p. 234.

75 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, 

transcript pp. 137-38.

76 Michael Lowder, e-mail to EST-DIR and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:58 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0068-0000257. 

77 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 99.

78 Testimony of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the 
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193

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search 

and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 20, 2006.

79 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #9, Aug. 25, 2005, 5 p.m. ET, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.009.shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005.

80 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #10, Aug. 25, 2005, 11 p.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.

gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.010.shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005.

81 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #12, Aug. 26, 2005 11 a.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005. See also: FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 

5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000262.

82 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 26, 2005, p. 4. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000025.

83 Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 26, 2005, p. 7. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0105-0000028.

84 Michael Brown, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Aug. 26, 2005, 12:41 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0028-001396. Patrick Rhode recommended that Buikema return to headquarters “with anyone else who 

is needed – vs. fi shing in Alaska.” Source: Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler and Michael Health, Aug. 26, 2005, 

9:26 a.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0004035.

85 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 128-129.

86 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 128-129. Buikema admitted that most of the preparations for the storm were 

done by others, but he was in communication with both his deputy Michael Lowder and Undersecretary Michael Brown. 

Source: Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 238.

87 William Lokey, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Aug. 26, 2005, 3:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0028-0000245.

88 ESFs activated at the National Operations Center included Transportation (1), Public Works and Engineering (3), 

Firefi ghting (4), Emergency Management (5), Resource Support (7), External Aff airs (15) and a military liaison. At the 

region IV level, ESFs activated included Transportation (1), Public Works and Engineering (3), Firefi ghting (4), Resource Support (7), Long-Term Recovery and Mitigation (14), External Aff airs (15), and Department of Defense. Source:

FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 26, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0037-0000191. Alabama’s own activation of its EOC was also at its lowest level of activation on August 26 at noon and 

they did not plan to raise it to the highest level until 9 a.m. the following day. Source: FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, 

Aug. 26, 2005, p. 10. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000031.

89 FEMA, Shift Change Briefi ng, Aug. 27, 2005, 7 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-

0000548.

90 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #12, Aug. 26, 2005 11 a.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml? Accessed on Apr. 25, 2006. See also: FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005 

5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000262.

91 FEMA, Region VI Regional Response Coordination Center, Situation Report 1, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0073-0000118; FEMA, Region VI Status Briefi ng, Aug. 27, 2005, p.1. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0073-0000197.

92 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0037-0000262.

93 FEMA, “Tropical Storm Katrina,” Aug. 27, 2005, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-

0002139.

94 FEMA, “Tropical Storm Katrina,” Aug. 27, 2005, 9 a.m., pp. 1-3. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0055-0002139 through 0002141.

95 Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michael Pawlowski and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000455.

96 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (Sept. 7, 2005); Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 10. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000049.

97 70 Fed. Reg. 54061-62 (Sept. 13, 2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 53239 (Sept. 7, 2005). 

98 “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. § 5191.

99 64 Fed. Reg. 51975-01; 64 Fed. Reg. 51976-02; 64 Fed. Reg. 52316-02; 64 Fed. Reg. 52318-01.

100 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #19, Aug. 27, 2005, 10 p.m. CT. http://www.nhc.noaa.

gov/archive/2005/pub/al122005.public.019.shtml? Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005; National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Special Discussion # 20, Aug. 28, 2005, 2 a.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.020.

shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005. 

101 Michael Lowder, e-mail to Michael Brown and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 2:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS 0002487.
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102 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0037-0000354.

103 Jon MacLaren, e-mail to William Flynn and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 2:49 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-INFP-0003-0001949 through 0001950; William Flynn, e-mail to Bob Stephan and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 6:39 

p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-INFP-0003-0001850; Frank DiFalco, e-mail to HSOC.HSIN and 

others, Aug. 28, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000059 through 0000099; 

Lon Biasco, e-mail to HSOC-All-Desks, Aug. 28, 2005, 10:33, p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSHSOC-0002-0000114; Andrew Akers, e-mail to HSOC SWO and others, Aug. 29, 2004, 1:47 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK–15894. 

104 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of the DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

105 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006.

106 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006; Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 33-34. 

107 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 91.

108 Mayfi eld, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 2, 6. On that same call, the National Hurricane Center discussed storm surges: 

“Well obviously where it’s headed you’re at the worst possible locations for storm surge. You remember Camille and 

its 26 feet. I would advise all the folks that are in the potential path of this storm to be looking at their maximum off the 

surge models, the meows and whatnot off of a Category 4 or 5 storm, and plan accordingly. Source: Bill Ryder, FEMA 

Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 4-5. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-

0000044 through 0000045. Joe Hagin, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , was on the VTC, listening to these warnings. 

Source: Joe Hagin, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 24. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000063.

109 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 13-15. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0105-0000066 through 0000104.

110 Col. William Doran, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 17. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000082.

111 Col. Smith, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 17. 

112 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 34. 

113 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 36. 

114 FEMA, Employee Count as of Nov. 12, 2005. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0082-

0000208; Committee staff interview of Michael Hall, Acting Director, Human Resources, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 28 

2005, transcript p. 61. 

115 Written statement of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 1-2.

116 Written Statement of William Carwile III, Senate Committee Hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 1-2.

117 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0037-0000355.

118 NRP, p. 40.

119 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 197-198; Committee staff interview of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 78.

120 NRP, p. 40.

121 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 61; Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 

2005, pp. 32-33. 

122 According to William Lokey, “When Mr. Brown decided to dispatch the ERT-N on Saturday morning, because we 

don’t have a lot of people and a number of the ERT–N ... were already deployed to Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and 

in Louisiana, out of their respective regions, what I asked was that [we] activate both the Red and Blue team and fi ll the 

rosters with whoever called back fi rst. So we in essence had a plaid response of people.” Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, 

pp. 32-33.

123 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005 pp. 42-43.

124 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 200.

125 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 41.

126 Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 218. 

127 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 78-80.

128 Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 217-220.
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195

129 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 79.

130 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 10-11, 102.

131 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 11.

132 Additionally during the Saturday video teleconference the National Weather Service offi cial stated that although it 

couldn’t “totally rule out the possibility” of the storm hitting Texas, “there’s nothing we’re looking at now . . . that would 

take it that far west.” Source: Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2004, p. 8. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000047. See also: National Hurricane Center, Katrina Graphics Archive, Aug. 27, 

2005, 4 p.m. CT and 10 p.m. CT, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA_graphics.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 

25, 2006. 

133 Philip Parr, e-mail to James Russo, Aug. 27, 2005, 2:57 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA 

0073-0000174. Gary Jones, Director of FEMA Region VI said that a team was sent to Texas in case the hurricane took 

a turn towards Texas. Source: Committee staff interview of Gary Jones, Acting Regional Director, Region VI, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript p. 44; Phil Parr, e-mail to James Russo, Aug. 27, 2005, 2:57 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0073-0000430 through 0000432.

134 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 28-29.

135 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 110.

136 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 109; Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 54.

137 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 113; Committee staff interview of Michael Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 79. See also: Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 54 (discussing 

the response capabilities of FIRST teams).

138 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 19.

139 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 39-40.

140 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, pp. 45-47.

141 Committee staff interview of Tom Bossert, former Deputy Director of Legislative Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 

20, 2005, transcript pp. 27-28

142 Marshall Sanders, e-mail to Michael Heath and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 7:55 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0086-0002291 through 0002293.

143 Bossert interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 60-61.

144 Committee staff interview of Bob Fenton, Response Branch Chief for Region IX and Operations Chief, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, transcript pp. 20-22; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 47-48, 197-198.

145 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 111-112.

146 FEMA exacerbated its lack of qualifi ed personnel by deploying the trained staff it did have as late as Friday and 

Saturday before landfall on Monday. 

147 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 67-68. Wells also said “Th is was a catastrophic disaster. We don’t have the structure; we don’t have the people for a catastrophic disaster. It’s that simple.” Source: Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 69.

148 Written Statement of Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 6-7. 

149 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59.

150 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 55-56, 70.

151 Committee staff interview of Marie Sloan, Section Chief, Disaster Workforce Response Division, FEMA, conducted 

on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript pp. 8-9; Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 24-25; FEMA, “Daily Disaster and Post Disaster 

and Other Travel Deployments (DAEs only).” Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0055-0000209 

through 0000211.

152 FEMA, “Daily Disaster and Post Disaster and Other Travel Deployments (DAEs only).” Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0055-0000159 through 0000160.

153 Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 171-172.

154 Nancy Ward, e-mail to William Carwile, Aug. 30, 2005, 7:50 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0083-0000490. 

155 Michael Hall, e-mail to Mary Lynne Miller, Gary Jones, and Teresa Gauger, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:11 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0000490.

156 Sandy Coachman, FEMA FCO, was in New Orleans working a previous disaster. On Sunday, she was ordered to 

evacuate New Orleans prior to the storm’s landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Sandy Coachman, Federal 

Coordinating Offi cer, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 7. Scott Wells testifi ed that it was 

“contrary to our policy” and “doctrine” to have placed personnel in New Orleans prior to landfall. Source: Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 172-173.

157 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 97-99. However, Scott Wells testifi ed that there is general reluctance 
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by states to allow FEMA liaisons in the states. Source: Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 131.

158 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 91-92.

159 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, pp. 126-129.

160 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006 pp. 31-32.

161 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 21,18.

162 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 23. 

163 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 23.

164 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 23. 

165 Committee staff interview of William Milani, Chief, Mobile Operations Section, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 59.

166 Committee staff interview of James Attaway, Telecommunications Specialist, Mobile Emergency Response System, 

Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 97-99. 

167 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 59, 70 

168 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 59.

169 FEMA did not ask MERS, FEMA’s communications unit, to deploy to the EOC pre-landfall. Source: Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 54-55.

170 Committe staff interview of Philip Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005.

171 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 116

172 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 173.

173 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 28-29; Ron Castleman, e-mails to Patrick Rhode and Michael Brown, Dec. 29-

30, 2003. Provided to Committee. Despite these denials, funding for catastrophic planning for New Orleans was found 

elsewhere in the Response Divisions budget. DHS authorized money for fi scal year 2006 for FEMA’s catastrophic planning initiative. FEMA requested $20 million for this initiative, but as of February 2006, only $65,000 had been obligated. 

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 65.

174 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Branch Chief, Response Operations Region VI, FEMA, conducted on 

Jan. 18, 2006, transcript pp. 129-132; Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, Former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 

52-58, 89-92. According to witnesses, with the need to narrow the project scope, pre-landfall evacuation was eliminated 

because, unlike other subjects, it had frequently been the subject of planning over the years. Source: Testimony of Madhu 

Beriwal, President and CEO, Innovative Emergency Management Inc., before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006; 

Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 57-58, 89-92.

175 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Th e Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005. 

176 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 184-187. At 8:19 a.m. on Aug. 27, 2005, FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director Patrick 

Rhode e-mailed the Acting Director of Response a request for a copy of the New Orleans Catastrophic Plan. Source: Patrick Rhode, e-mail to David Garratt and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0085-0003866. At 9:07 a.m. William Lokey replied to Rhode, Brown, and other that “Copies are being made as 

we speak.” Source: William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode, David Garratt and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860. At 10:35 a.m. Sharon Blades e-mailed 25 FEMA personnel 

including William Lokey, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, and Wayne Fairley an electronic version of the plan, and told 

them that copies were being printed. Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michel Pawlowski and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003570. Later that aft ernoon Deputy Chief of Staff 

Brooks Altshuler e-mailed twice asking for additional copies for the front offi ce. Source: Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Sharon Blades and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325. 

A few minutes later he received a reply that 50 copies were being printed. Source: Michel Powlowski, e-mail to Brooks 

Altshuler and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003570. At 

8:37 p.m. that night Sharon Blades again e-mails Altshuler: “We have printed up more plans and they are on the mezz 

in Area A. We are also printing copies of the latest draft s and a preface explaining the planning process and the various 

documents because they all have not been fi nalized and assembled into one document. Th is will, we hope, avoid confusion.” Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325.

177 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, p. 2 

[hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005].

178 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, p. 4.

179 Tony Robbins, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 15. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000054; Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 66.
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180 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 66.

181 Sec. Michael Chertoff , Th e Charlie Rose Show, PBS, Jan. 9, 2006, 11 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

182 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 30.

183 Robbins, VTC, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 16-17. See also: FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

184 Committee staff interview of Kenneth Burris, Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 16.

185 FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017. See also: FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

186 Federal Operational Staging Area Camp Beauregard, LA Situation Report as of 1900 28 Aug. 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0080-0000005; FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS, & Ice Storage, Aug. 26, 2005, 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017. 

187 Ernest Hudson e-mail to Wayne Fairley et al., Aug. 29, 2005, 11:47. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0080-000003; Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Patrick Rhode and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:56 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0004937.

188 Michael Lowder, e-mail to Gary Moore and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 1:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000716; Michael Lowder, e-mail to William Carwile, Aug. 28, 2005, 12:37 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000718; Gary Moore, e-mail to Michael Lowder and others, Aug. 28, 

2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0068-0001236 through 0001237; Michael Lowder, 

e-mail to William Carwile, Aug. 28, 2005, 12:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-

0000722.

189 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 

2006, transcript p. 8.

190 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

191 Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, 

transcript pp. 40-42.

192 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 42-47. 

193 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 53.

194 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 37. 

195 Teresa Gauger, e-mail to Lisa Williams, Marie Sloan, and Michael Hall, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0001575. See also: Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 31-33.

196 Kerry Young, e-mail to Jules Hurst and Mary Ann Veitch, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0011518.

197 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 35.

198 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 35-37. Moore testifi ed that FEMA’s transportations system “catastrophically...

broke down” because of the disaster. Source: Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 83.

199 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 36. 

200 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

201 Committee staff interview of Jack Beall, Chief, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 10, 

2006, transcript pp. 10-13.

202 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 66-67, 72-83, 90.

203 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 67-68, 80.

204 Committee staff interview of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

25, 2006, transcript pp. 38-39.

205 Strickland interview, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 33-34. 

206 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 88-90.

207 Strickland interview, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 44-45, 82-83.

208 Testimony of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

209 Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 77-78. Aft er he learned the city was fl ooding and it was a major catastrophe, 

MERS took steps to get additional resources and supplies. “I went about having our guys locate the local communications...and establishing accounts with them. We actually started ordering supplies. I got into the building next door and 

started doing a survey of the building to layout the facility that we wanted to put in there. We did quite a lot of work 

right quick.” Source: Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 77-78.
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210 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 8-9. “A JFO does not exist until the facility is fully functional. Until that time, the

people may be working in the building and it is called an Initial Operating Facility (IOF).” Th e IOF in Louisiana began 

operating pre-landfall and was rapidly ramped over the course of 12 days until a designation as JFO on September 9. 

“So as other Federal agencies started arriving, by a couple of days, there were several hundred people there. Th ere were a 

thousand people there within a week.” Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 10. However, state employees could not 

move into the JFO until the technology issues were addressed, thus although federal agencies were at the IOF, because 

the state employees could not be there, it was harder to coordinate the response. 

211 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 101; Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program 

Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 16; Committee staff interview of Mark Misczak, Individual 

Assistance Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 12. 

212 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 30. 

213 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 9-10.

214 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 30; Committee interview of William King, Branch Chief, Region V, Radiological 

Emergency Preparedness Program, Technical Services Branch, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 93. 

215 For example, the FEMA Director of Planning in Louisiana, Bill King, said the EOC only had one computer dedicated 

to FEMA. Source: King interview, Jan. 17, 2006, p. 91. One FEMA employee who worked in EOC until the JFO opened 

explained: “You’re limited. I mean, we had a – it was a little offi ce. ... [Th ere was] one telephone in there that the Comm 

Center knew that number and knew that was a room where FEMA people were working, and so every call that came in 

got funneled in there, no matter who it was for or who was calling. And people would come in and use that phone – the 

search and rescue guys or whatever – come in and use that phone and leave that number for [them] to call, so it was kind 

of telephone central when it’d work.” Source: Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 54.

216 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 25.

217 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 28. 

218 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 24-25.

219 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 17, 23.

220 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 23-24.

221 Shingler interview, Jan. 31, 2006, p. 11.

222 “Need 10-12 FPS offi cers to escort NDMS teams assigned to Louisiana Super Dome in New Orleans. Twenty-four 

hour coverage required NDMS teams are comprised of 35 members.” Source: FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LAFPS-02, Sept. 30, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0035-0000023.

223 “Request (14) FPS [Federal Protective Service] offi cers to deploy to LA Superdome to assist in crowd control during 

Superdome evacuation. Must be equipped with crowd control weaponry.” FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LAFPS-04, Sept. 31, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0035-0000143.

224 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 93.

225 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Commissioner’s Situation Room, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-CBP1-0001-0000003.

226 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Commissioner’s Situation Room, Aug. 31, 2005, 3 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-CBP1-0001-0000029.

227 “Request (29) Federal Protective Service (FPS) personnel to provide physical security to assure the safety of personnel and equipment of NDMS teams (i.e., DMAT, DMORT, VMAT) deployed and staged in Region 6” to provide 

24-hour coverage/escort for NDMS teams and equipment assigned to multiple locations aff ected by Hurricane Katrina. 

FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-FPS-01, Sept. 30, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0035-0000015.

228 But contrast with the National Guard testimony in the Superdome that there was no security problem. Committee staff interview of Col. Pat Prechter, State Chief Nurse, Louisiana Army National Guard and Deputy Commander, 

Louisiana Medical Command, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 63-68, 100-103; Committee staff interview of 

Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, 

transcript pp. 81-82, 171-175, 222-223. 

229 Gary Sirmons, e-mail to Gerald Gomes, Sept. 1, 2005 11:09 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0136-0000021. Later on CCN, DMAT personnel thought that they “saw looters ... going through the [team] CA6’s personal belongings.” Source: Gerald Gomes, e-mail to Gary Sirmons and others, Sept. 2, 2005, 3:53 p.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0136-0000021. “Th e team commanders were not comfortable moving into 

the arena [Th ursday night]. We discussed the situation at length, but I was not able to assuage their fears. Further, the 

FPS Regional Director decided he wouldn’t take the teams in until tomorrow morning.” Source: William Lokey, e-mail 

to Steven Posner, Gary Simons, and Joan Harding, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0136-0000022.

230 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2005.

231 Committee Staff interview of Gen. Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff , conducted on Feb. 28, 2006, transcript p. 9.
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199

232 Sec. Chertoff , VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 38. 

233 Brown, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 38-39. 

234 Sec. Chertoff , VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 38-39. 

235 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Robert Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, 8th Coast Guard District, for 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast 

Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2. Th e Coast Guard is “a law enforcement authority as well as an 

armed force.” Testimony of Rear Adm. Robert Duncan, Commander, 8thCoast Guard District, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

236 U.S. Coast Guard, “U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian,” Jan. 1, 2002, pp. 55-56 (“Successful mission 

execution begins with a thorough understanding of the environment in which we operate. Based on that understanding, 

we develop operational concepts, acquire appropriate equipment, and put our people through rigorous formal training. 

We build on that foundation by continuous training and drills, by improving our personal skills and by maintaining our 

equipment at the highest state of readiness. In short, consistently successful performance requires thorough preparation.”).

237 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2. In fact, Coast Guard Air 

Station New Orleans exercised its hurricane plan several times each season. Testimony of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. 

Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

238 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

239 Scott R. Gourley, “Th e Coast Guard and Hurricane Katrina,” Homeland Security, Jan. 2006.

240 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

241 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

242 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

243 Testimony of Capt. Frank Paskewich, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Sector New Orleans, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

244 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

245 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005; Committee staff interview of Capt. Frank Paskewich, 

Commander Coast, U.S. Coast Guard, Guard Sector New Orleans, conducted on Oct. 6, 2005 (Captain Paskewich told 

staff there were no Coast Guard dependents left in the city of New Orleans prior to landfall).

246 U.S. Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina: Response and Recovery, Sept. 7, 2005, p. 4.

247 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3; Committee staff interview 

of Capt. Bruce Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans, conducted on Oct. 

6, 2005.

248 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005. For example, the Seagoing Buoy Tender Coast Guard 

Cutter Cypress, home ported in Mobile, Alabama, was pre-staged in Houston, Texas and loaded with as many Aids to 

Navigation supplies as “she could physically carry.” Source: Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee 

hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3. 

249 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3. Vice Adm. Vivian Crea, the 

Coast Guard Atlantic Area Commander, authorized this movement. Source: Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, 

Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3. Th e cutter Spencer arrived in New Orleans two days aft er landfall. Source:

Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3.

250 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005; Capt. Jones interview, Oct. 6, 2005. In fact, this C-130 

was later used by the Coast Guard as a communication platform relaying messages to and from the helicopter search and 

rescue crews operating over the city. Source: Captain Jones interview, Oct. 6, 2005.

251 Capt. Jones interview, Nov. 2, 2005.

252 Capt. Jones interview, Nov. 2, 2005.

253 Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Shari Ben-Iesau, U.S. Coast Guard, Public Aff airs Offi cer, Coast Guard 

Sector New Orleans, Oct. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 2-3; Committee staff interview of Lt. Valerie Boyd, U.S. Coast Guard, 

Command Center Watch Offi cer, 8th District Offi ce Headquarters, New Orleans, conducted on Nov. 7, transcript pp. 

4-6. 

254 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

255 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

256 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3.

257 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Vivien Crea, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 

conducted on Jan. 3, 2006, transcript p. 16.
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200

258 Capt. Jones, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

259 Th e Department of Defense deployed in support of the Coast Guard and rescued 2,911 people. FEMA also ran 

search and rescue missions, and saved over 6,000 people. 

260 National Disaster Medical System, 2006. www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006; U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Current NDMS Overview, Jan. 6, 2006.

261 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 29.

262 Mick Cote, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 27, 2005, 6:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489 through 0004490.

263 Strike teams are small, four to fi ve person medical treatment teams which are deployed where or when a full 35 

person Disaster Medical Assistance Team is not needed.

264 Mick Cote, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 27, 2005, 6:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489 through 0004490.

265 Jack Beall, e-mail to Mick Cote, Aug. 27, 2005, 5:29 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489.

266 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 10 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

267 Committee staff interview of Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript pp. 57-59.

268 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 37-39, 57-59.

269 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 58-59.

270 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

271 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; Rand McNally, Maps & Directions, www.randmcnally.com. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

272 NRP, pp. ESF #8-1 through ESF #8-13.

273 Jack Beall, e-mail to William Lokey, Aug. 28, 2005, 11:53 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0098-0003831.

274 William Lokey, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-

0003831.

275 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 a.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

276 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. John Babb, Director, Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 8, 2006, transcript pp. 5, 22-26.

277 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 14-15, 22-23.

278 John Babb, e-mail to Kenneth Moritsugu, Aug. 28, 2005, 6:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OSG 

186.

279 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 23.

280 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 24.

281 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 24; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, PHS Katrina Response: Baton Rouge Deployment Alpha Team, Oct. 16, 2005. Provided to Committee.

282 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006.

283 SNS OPS Center Lead, e-mail to KC Decker, Aug. 28, 2005, 6:14 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

OPHEP 471 through 472. Th ese supplies were dispatched by truck from Atlanta and Tennessee on the aft ernoon of 

September 28 and arrived at Camp Beauregard, LA aft er landfall.

284 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to Steven Adams and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 1:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27780.

285 SNS OPS Center, e-mail to Stewart Simonson and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 4:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27150.

286 SNS OPS Center, e-mail to Stewart Simonson and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 4:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27150.

287 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Flash Report #4 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:30 a.m. ET. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 28247 through 28248; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Flash Report #5 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 3 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 

28249 through 28251; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Flash Report #6 – Hurricane Katrina, 3 a.m. ET, 

Aug. 30, 2005, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 28252 through 28254; SNS OPS Center Lead, email to EOC Report and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. CDC 2899.

288 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce 
Federal Preparations

201

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript, pp. 36-37.

289 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 41.

290 Committee staff interview of Col. Darryl L. Roberson, U.S. Air Force, Assistant Deputy Director for Antiterrorism 

and Homeland Defense, Operations Directorate, Joint Staff , conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 31.

291 First U.S. Army, Message to U.S. Northern Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) ISO possible DSCA 

operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 5, 2005, 2816 Z. 

292 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. James Amos, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Second Marine Expeditionary 

Force, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript, p. 9; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell, U.S. Marine 

Corps, Commander, Fourth Marine Division, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 16-18.

293 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, conducted on 

Nov. 15, 2005.

294 Committee staff interview of Capt. Rick Snyder, U.S. Navy, Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan, conducted on Nov. 14, 

2005. 

295 Michael Ritchie, e-mail to Anthony Capra, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:14 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as no. MMTF 

00418-05.

296 Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Muir, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Current Operations, U.S. Northern 

Command, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 14.

297 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Message to Commander, U.S. Northern Command, et al., “CJCS EXORD,” 

Aug. 5, 2005, 1923 Z.

298 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), pp. 2-3. Provided to Committee.

299 First U.S. Army, Message to U.S. Northern Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) ISO possible DSCA 

operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 5, 2005, 2816 Z . 

300 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, U.S. Army, Director of Operations, U.S. Northern Command, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 31-32.

301 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to NC-JOC – Director – OMB and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:31 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as MMTF00452-05.

302 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 31; Committee staff interview of Capt. Michael McDaniel, U.S. Navy, 

Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer to FEMA, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 156; Col. Harrington 

interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 89.

303 Th e Defense Department intends to broaden the actions it takes in advance of a hurricane’s landfall. According to 

several witnesses, the Joint Staff is considering broadening the Severe Weather Order to allow NORTHCOM to designate or position helicopters, boats, and communications gear prior to landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Maj. 

Gen. Terry Scherling, U.S. Air Force, Director of the Joint Staff , National Guard Bureau, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, 

transcript p. 81; Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 29. Col. Richard Chavez, the Senior Military Advisor in the 

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, explained that in the future he intends to include shallow-draft 

boats among the assets that he inventories prior to landfall. Source: Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 27. In light of 

the lack of situational awareness experienced by almost all entities within the Department during the fi rst 24 hours aft er 

landfall, many witnesses have attested to a need to deploy information-gathering assets – including National Technical Means – so as to gain timely and accurate information in the fi rst critical hours aft er a disaster. Source: McHale 

interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 136. Because the issue raises questions of domestic intelligence-gathering and dissemination of 

potentially classifi ed material, the Department has yet to determine an appropriate solution.