UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4457

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MONIQUE MINOR HUNTER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior

District Judge. (4:10-cr-00074-RGD-DEM-4)

Submitted: January 30, 2012 Decided: February 9, 2012

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Maureen Leigh White, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Laura P. Tayman, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Monique Minor Hunter was convicted by a jury of 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 

more than 100 grams but less than 1 kilogram of heroin, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006); distribution and/or aiding 

and abetting the distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); possession 

with intent to distribute eighty-two grams of heroin, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved 

premise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (2006), and 18 

U.S.C. § 2; and two counts of use of a communication facility to 

facilitate a felony drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 843(b) (2006). The district court sentenced Hunter to 

sixty-nine months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hunter challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the district 

court erred in denying her motions for a mistrial and for a new 

trial based on the prosecutor’s comment on her failure to 

testify. We affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a 

motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Hickman, 626 

F.3d 756, 762 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 469 

(2011). We must “sustain a guilty verdict that, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is 

supported by substantial evidence.” United States v. Osborne, 
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514 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable 

finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to 

support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 

1996) (en banc). The defendant’s burden is a heavy one, and 

reversal is proper only in “the rare case ‘where the

prosecution’s failure is clear.’” United States v. Beidler, 110 

F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Burks v. United States, 

437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978)).

Much of Hunter’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence attacks the credibility of the witnesses. However, in 

evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we will not review the 

credibility of witnesses, and we must assume the jury resolved 

all contradicting testimony in the light most favorable to the 

Government. United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th 

Cir. 2007). Hunter also asserts that there was no explicit 

reference to her involvement with drugs in the telephone calls 

and text messages presented at trial. Our review of the record

leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the 

jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hunter was 

guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute heroin, see United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 

(4th Cir.) (stating elements of offense), cert. denied, 131 S. 
4

Ct. 271 (2010); aiding and abetting the distribution of heroin, 

see United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 

2008); Burgos, 94 F.3d at 873; possessing with intent to 

distribute heroin, see United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 

519 (4th Cir. 2005); maintaining a drug-involved premise, see 21 

U.S.C. § 856(a)(2); and using a communication facility to 

facilitate a felony drug offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); United 

States v. Lozano, 839 F.2d 1020, 1023 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying Hunter’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal.

Turning to Hunter’s second argument, a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal only if the reviewing 

court determines the comment (1) was improper and (2) “so 

prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights as to 

deprive [her] of a fair trial.” United States v. Jones, 471 

F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir. 2006). A prosecutor’s statement does 

not amount to an improper comment on a defendant’s refusal to 

testify unless, in context, the offending language was 

“manifestly intended to be, or [was] . . . of such character 

that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 

comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Id. 

Relevant to this inquiry is whether “the comment[] . . . invited

the jury to draw an ‘inference of guilt’ against the defendant.” 
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United States v. Francis, 82 F.3d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1996) 

(quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).

After reviewing the transcript and reviewing the 

prosecutor’s comment in context, we conclude without difficulty 

that the comment does not warrant reversal because it was a 

factual clarification of the prosecutor’s prior misstatement. 

See Jones, 471 F.3d at 542. Moreover, even if improper, we 

conclude that the comment did not affect Hunter’s substantial 

rights and constituted harmless error. See United States v. 

Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507-10 (1983) (providing standard); 

United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 1998). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED