If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

OLIVIA DENNIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 17, 2022

v No. 358222

Allegan Circuit Court

STEVE TYLER, LC No. 2013-052663-DM

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this divorce proceeding, defendant appeals as of right following the trial court’s order 

that vacated the child custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce that 

applied to the minor child, BT. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by not 

considering the best-interest factors for BT when vacating the custody and parenting-time 

provisions. We agree and remand the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

This case represents the third appeal stemming from the divorce proceedings between 

plaintiff and defendant. After this Court issued its opinions in Dennis v Tyler, unpublished per 

curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 21, 2017 (Docket No. 331503) (Dennis I), 

and Dennis v Tyler, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 30, 2019 

(Docket No. 345492) (Dennis II), the trial court received a notice of prior court proceedings 

occurring in Kalamazoo Circuit Court involving BT. Specifically, the Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

had entered an order of filiation regarding BT’s biological father, who is not defendant. The trial 

court then, sua sponte, entered an order vacating the parenting-time and custody provisions of the 

judgment of divorce in this case. Specifically, the trial court ruled:

The Court of Appeals indicated that the Trial Court complied with the first remand 

and that the Plaintiff needed to file a motion in order to change the custody and 

parenting time provisions of the Judgment of Divorce in light of the Court’s 

determination that the Defendant is not an affiliated father. Plaintiff has not filed 

such a motion. On September 25, 2020, this Court received a notice of prior court 

proceedings indicating that Kalamazoo had initiated a paternity case 2020-6166-
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DP regarding the child at issue in this case. Based upon the Court of Appeal’s 2019 

order, the initiation of the Kalamazoo 2020 case, and the requirement that paternity 

be established prior to any entry of Custody, Parenting Time, or Child Support, the 

Court hereby VACATES any provision relating to Custody, Parenting Time, or 

Child Support in 13-52663-DM.

Defendant moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied his motion because it found 

that he did not demonstrate palpable error. This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the provisions in the judgment 

of divorce must be vacated because defendant could not establish paternity, which the court 

concluded was necessary before an order for custody or parenting time could be entered. We 

agree.

“We review matters of statutory interpretation and constitutional issues de novo.” LeFever 

v Matthews, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2021) (Docket No. 353106); slip op at 4. 

Further, whether a party has legal standing to assert a claim constitutes a question of law that is 

reviewed de novo. Heltzel v Heltzel, 248 Mich App 1, 28; 638 NW2d 123 (2001).

This Court has emphasized that the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., is the 

exclusive means of pursuing child custody rights, whereas the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., 

establishes a putative father’s paternity and supplies a basis for court-ordered child support, 

custody, or parenting time, and the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., 

provides a means for a putative father to similarly establish paternity, but without further 

adjudication under the Paternity Act. See Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 153; 673 NW2d 

452 (2003); Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 148; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).

The trial court did not explain in its order vacating the provisions of the judgment of divorce 

why “the requirement that paternity be established before any entry of Custody, Parenting Time, 

or Child Support” required it to vacate the provisions of the judgment of divorce. However, in its 

order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court cited Hoshowski v Genaw, 

230 Mich App 498; 584 NW2d 368 (1998), for the proposition that a “putative father may not seek 

custody or parenting time under the Child Custody Act unless there is first an acknowledgement 

of paternity or an order of filiation under the Paternity Act.”

In Hoshowski, 230 Mich App at 499, the defendant was the biological mother of a child, 

and she appealed an order of filiation that determined that the plaintiff was the child’s father. The 

defendant argued that the Paternity Act controlled the plaintiff’s complaint and, before 1994, it 

required the plaintiff to file for paternity under the Paternity Act before moving for custody 

pursuant to the Child Custody Act. Id. at 500. However, this Court determined that the plaintiff 

and the defendant properly executed an affidavit of parentage when the child was born, and this 

acknowledgment established the plaintiff’s paternity “for all purposes” which would not require 

him to proceed under the Paternity Act before seeking custody and parenting time. Id. at 501. 

This Court in Hoshowski only ruled that an affidavit of parentage was sufficient to establish 

paternity “for all purposes,” which meant that the plaintiff could avoid moving for a paternity 

determination under the Paternity Act before moving for custody and parenting time under the 

Child Custody Act. Therefore, the trial court’s reasoning in this case is incorrect because 
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Hoshowski does not affirmatively require that every putative father establish paternity before being 

included in a custody and parenting-time order.

However, as explained by this Court in Aichele, 259 Mich App at 162, putative fathers 

must establish paternity before they have standing to move for custody and parenting time pursuant 

to the Child Custody Act. The defendant in Aichele, 259 Mich App at 148, was married to another 

man when she gave birth to a minor child who was fathered by the plaintiff. While she was still 

married to her husband, the defendant and the plaintiff executed an affidavit of parentage that listed 

the plaintiff as the biological father of the minor child. Id. at 148-149. The plaintiff then moved 

for joint legal custody, reasonable parenting time, and a determination of child support. Id. at 149. 

In response, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing, arguing 

that the minor child was presumed by the Paternity Act to be the child of her marriage to her 

husband, and denying that the plaintiff was the father. Id. The defendant’s husband then 

intervened, and he argued that he was the presumptive father and that the plaintiff’s affidavit was 

invalid because the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act required the defendant to be unmarried at 

the time the plaintiff and the defendant signed the affidavit. Id. at 150.

In determining whether the plaintiff had standing to move for custody and parenting time 

under the Child Custody Act, this Court ruled that “the Paternity Act, the Acknowledgement of 

Parentage Act, and the Child Custody Act, which serve interrelated purposes, must be interpreted 

consistently with each other and read in pari materia.” Id. at 161. This Court held:

Accordingly, under the Child Custody Act, when a child is born in wedlock and 

there has been no judicial determination that the child is not issue of the marriage, 

the “parents” are the mother and her husband. This is in keeping with Girard [v 

Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231; 470 NW2d 372 (1991)], in which our Supreme Court 

held that if a child is conceived or born during a marriage and there has been no 

judicial determination that the child was not issue of the marriage, a putative father 

has no standing to contest paternity under the Paternity Act or seek custody under 

the Child Custody Act.

Here, because defendant and [her husband] were married when the child 

was conceived and born, defendant and [her husband] are her parents. There has 

been no judicial determination otherwise. Under these circumstances, plaintiff 

cannot seek such a determination under the Paternity Act. Further, he cannot 

execute a valid affidavit of parentage under the Acknowledgement of Parentage 

Act. In essence, when a child is born during a marriage, a putative father can never 

successfully institute legal proceedings to be declared a parent. Because plaintiff 

cannot obtain a legal determination that he is the child’s “parent,” he does not have 

standing to seek custody of her under the Child Custody Act. [Id. at 161-162

(citations omitted).]

Therefore, putative fathers must have standing in order to seek custody of minor children under 

the Child Custody Act, and standing requires a showing of paternity.

In this case, defendant was not the party who initially raised the issue of custody. Plaintiff 

is the party who moved for divorce and moved for custody and parenting-time determinations of 
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the minor child. Defendant does not need to seek standing, through paternity, because he is the 

nonmoving party.

Additionally, and contrary to the trial court’s assertion, this Court has ruled that a party 

who is not a biological parent of a minor child may, nevertheless, be awarded custody of the minor 

child through divorce proceedings. In Sirovey v Campbell, 223 Mich App 59, 63; 565 NW2d 857 

(1997), the plaintiff was the biological father of a minor child, and the defendant was the biological 

mother. The plaintiff and the defendant were married at the time that the minor child was born, 

but then they later entered a consent judgment of divorce that awarded sole physical custody of 

the child to the plaintiff, without mention of custody or visitation for the minor child’s paternal 

grandparents. Id. The plaintiff then allowed the minor child to live with the plaintiff’s parents, 

who are also the minor child’s paternal grandparents. Id. at 63-64. However, the plaintiff and the 

defendant then entered into a stipulated order that awarded the defendant sole physical custody of 

the minor child, again without mention of the minor child’s paternal grandparents, and the trial 

court then modified the divorce judgment to be consistent with this stipulation. Id. at 64. The 

minor child’s paternal grandparents then attempted to intervene into the divorce proceedings to 

seek custody, or visitation, of the minor child because, they argued, the minor child had an 

established custodial environment with them. Id. at 64-65. Even though this Court ruled that the 

minor child’s grandparents lacked standing to intervene and bring a custody action, id. at 84, this 

Court also held that “a custody dispute is created by a person with standing to request the circuit 

court to make a determination of the child’s best interests with respect to custody of the child.” Id. 

at 81.

[T]he circuit court has jurisdiction under the divorce act to award custody of the 

child to a third party during the pendency of the divorce proceedings or upon entry 

of the judgment of divorce, not because the third party has a legal right to the child 

(standing), but because the court has determined that it is in the child’s best interests 

that custody be awarded to the third party. [Id.]

Similarly, in Ruppel v Lesner, 421 Mich 559; 364 NW2d 665 (1984), our Supreme Court 

ruled:

While custody may be awarded to grandparents or other third parties according to 

the best interests of the child in an appropriate case (typically involving divorce), 

nothing in the Child Custody Act, nor in any other authority of which we are aware, 

authorizes a nonparent to create a child custody “dispute” by simply filing a 

complaint in circuit court alleging that giving custody to the third party is in the 

“best interests of the child.” [Id. at 565-566 (citations omitted).]

Even though Sirovey and Ruppel involve the ability for grandparents to seek custody of a 

minor child, this Court and our Supreme Court have made clear that custody may be awarded to 

parties who are not the biological parent of a minor child, and may not otherwise have standing to 

move for custody, so long as it is in the best interests of the minor child.

Furthermore, the unambiguous language of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.27(1), does 

not require a party to be the biological parent, or have otherwise established paternity, in order to 

benefit from an order of custody or parenting time:
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If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an 

original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the 

circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the 

child the court may do 1 or more of the following:

(a) Award the custody of the child to 1 or more of the parties involved or to 

others . . . .

Simply put, the Child Custody Act allows custody to be awarded to one or more parties 

involved in a custody dispute, or to others, so long as it is in the best interests of the child. 

Defendant is a party to the judgment of divorce, which awarded him custody and parenting time. 

Therefore, defendant does not need to establish paternity to benefit from the custody and parentingtime provisions of the judgment of divorce. He also did not need to establish standing, through 

paternity, as the nonmoving party. Therefore, the trial court erred by ruling that the custody and 

parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce were required to be vacated because 

defendant had not demonstrated paternity.

Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the Kalamazoo Circuit 

Court’s order of filiation required the provisions of the judgment of divorce be vacated. We agree.

“This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to set aside a judgment under 

MCR 2.612 for an abuse of discretion.” Adler v Dormio, 309 Mich App 702, 724; 872 NW2d 721 

(2015). “A trial court has not abused its discretion if its decision results in an outcome within the 

range of principled outcomes.” Id. “The interpretation of a court rule, like a matter of statutory 

interpretation, is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

MCR 2.612(C)(1)(d) allows for relief from a final judgment when the “judgment is void.” 

It appears the trial court assumed that the custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment 

of divorce were void because the Kalamazoo Circuit Court had entered an order of filiation 

regarding the biological father of the child. Specifically, in its order denying defendant’s motion 

for reconsideration, the trial court stated that “[p]aternity was never established in the divorce 

matter but has been established in the recent Kalamazoo paternity action. Therefore, any order 

regarding custody and parenting time in the instant case is invalid . . . .”

However, the Kalamazoo Circuit Court’s order of filiation specifically did not make any 

judicial determination regarding custody or parenting time over BT. In its order of filiation, the 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court stated:

Neither parent appeared for hearing despite proper notice. The Court lacks 

sufficient information to make a judicial determination as to custody and parenting 

time factors. The filing of a motion, by either parent, is necessary to bring the 

matter back before the Court.

Furthermore, as explained previously, defendant did not need to establish paternity before 

the custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce were entered because he was 

not the moving party. This means that the order of filiation, establishing that the biological father 
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of BT had paternity, was also not in conflict with the custody and parenting-time provisions 

regarding defendant and BT because defendant’s paternity was not a dispositive issue for those 

provisions. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the custody and 

parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce were invalid because it is outside the range 

of principled outcomes that the order of filiation created a conflict with the judgment of divorce 

that rendered some of its provisions voidable.

Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by ruling that this Court’s order in Dennis 

II required the trial court to vacate the provisions of the judgment of divorce. We agree.

“Whether a trial court followed an appellate court’s ruling on remand is a question of law 

that this Court reviews de novo.” Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 275 Mich App 121, 

127; 737 NW2d 782 (2007).

The law-of-the-case doctrine holds:

[I]f an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for 

further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will 

not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the 

facts remain materially the same. The appellate court’s decision likewise binds 

lower tribunals because the tribunal may not take action on remand that is 

inconsistent with the judgment of the appellate court. [Grievance Administrator v 

Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259-260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000) (quotation marks, citation, 

and footnote omitted).]

“Law of the case applies, however, only to issues actually decided, either implicitly or explicitly, 

in the prior appeal.” Id. at 260.

In Dennis I, plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order that granted defendant summary 

disposition regarding his position as an “affiliated father,” as opposed to an “acknowledged 

father,” under the Revocation of Paternity Act (RPA), MCL 722.1431 et seq. This Court reversed 

the trial court and stated that the trial court “never determined BT’s paternity despite having been 

repeatedly asked to do so, [and therefore] the judgment of divorce did not establish [defendant’s] 

paternity as an affiliated father under the RPA.” Dennis II, unpub op at 11.

On remand to the trial court, plaintiff moved to terminate defendant’s paternity, and the 

trial court, through a visiting judge, granted plaintiff’s motion. Defendant then moved for 

reconsideration, which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed that reconsideration and 

argued that the trial court erred by failing to follow this Court’s opinion in Dennis I.

In Dennis II, this Court held:

In her claim of appeal from the trial court’s order that granted defendant’s 

motion for summary disposition of her RPA motion, plaintiff also asked this Court 

to amend the judgment of divorce to indicate that defendant is not the father of BT.

It is clear from even a cursory reading of [Dennis I] that the only issue addressed 

by this Court was whether “the parties’ divorce judgment determined BT’s 

paternity.” As already discussed, we concluded that, because there was no formal 
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expression of an opinion by the trial court that the disputed issue of BT’s paternity 

had been resolved, the judgment of divorce did not establish defendant as BT’s 

affiliated father. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court’s order of January 20, 

2016. We did not order modification of the judgment of divorce. In fact, the Court 

could not so order because it lacked jurisdiction over the judgment of divorce.

* * *

The trial court did not err in its understanding of the legal implications of 

this Court’s prior decision, and it fulfilled its duty to comply with the Court’s 

mandate. The trial court is also correct that if plaintiff wants to change the custody 

and parenting-time provisions in the judgment of divorce in light of this Court’s 

determination that defendant is not an affiliated father, she must file a motion for 

modification in the trial court. [Dennis II, unpub op at 3-4 (citations omitted).]

Subsequently, here, the trial court stated that it was vacating the custody and parentingtime provisions of the judgment of divorce because the Dennis II opinion required the provisions 

to be vacated. However, defendant is correct that the Dennis II opinion does not require the trial 

court to vacate the custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce because the 

Dennis II opinion does not instruct the trial court with any remand proceedings. Instead, the 

Dennis II opinion states that plaintiff may only modify the custody and parenting-time provisions 

of the judgment of divorce by seeking to modify the custody agreement. Furthermore, this Court 

in Dennis II stated that the Dennis I opinion did not require the trial court to terminate defendant’s 

paternity.

The trial court erred to the extent that it relied on this Court’s opinion in Dennis II as a 

directive to vacate the custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce because 

this Court ruled that it did not require any modification to the judgment of divorce and that it did 

not terminate defendant’s paternity.

Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by not considering the best-interest factors 

for BT when vacating the custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce. We 

agree.

This Court applies “three standards of review in custody cases.” Phillips v Jordan, 241 

Mich App 17, 20; 614 NW2d 183 (2000).

The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. A trial 

court’s findings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment 

and regarding each custody factor should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly 

preponderates in the opposite direction. An abuse of discretion standard applies to 

the trial court’s discretionary rulings such as custody decisions. Questions of law 

are reviewed for clear legal error. A trial court commits clear legal error when it 

incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law. [Id. (citations omitted).]

“All custody orders must be affirmed on appeal unless the circuit court’s findings were 

against the great weight of the evidence, the circuit court committed a palpable abuse of discretion, 
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or the circuit court made a clear legal error on a major issue.” Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 

68, 76-77; 900 NW2d 130 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

This Court will find that a trial court abused its discretion when the result is “so palpably 

and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of 

will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reasons but rather of 

passion or bias.” Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879-880; 526 NW2d 889 (1994) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, 

the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 

Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 516; 934 NW2d 64 (2019) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

“The purposes of the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21, et seq., are to promote the best 

interests of the child and to provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted 

custody changes.” Pennington v Pennington, 329 Mich App 562, 570-571; 944 NW2d 131 (2019) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “The Child Custody Act authorizes a trial court to award 

custody and parenting time in a child custody dispute and also imposes a gatekeeping function on 

the trial court to ensure the child’s stability.” Id. at 571.

“Whether an established custodial environment exists is a question of fact that the trial 

court must address before it makes a determination regarding child custody.” Demski v Petlick, 

309 Mich App 404, 445; 873 NW2d 596 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In 

determining whether an established custodial environment exists, it makes no difference whether 

that environment was created by a court order, without a court order, in violation of a court order, 

or by a court order that was subsequently reversed.” Hayes v Hayes, 209 Mich App 385, 388; 532 

NW2d 190 (1995). “Rather, the focus is on the circumstances surrounding the care of the children 

in the time preceding trial, not the reasons behind the existence of a custodial environment.” Id.

Regarding both custody and parenting-time orders, the Child Custody Act states that “[t]he 

court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order in order to 

change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and 

convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). For a showing 

to be clear and convincing, the evidence must be “so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as 

to enable [the fact-finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the 

precise facts at issue.” Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 265; 881 NW2d 694 (2009) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). “Above all, custody disputes are to be resolved 

in the child’s best interests,” as measured by the factors set forth in MCL 722.23. Eldred, 246 

Mich App at 150. It is not the case that any fact relevant to the best-interest factors will constitute 

sufficient cause. “Rather, the grounds presented must be ‘legally sufficient,’ i.e., they must be of 

a magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being to the extent that revisiting the 

custody order would be proper.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 512; 675 NW2d 847 

(2003).

In this case, the trial court did not consider the best interests of the child and, instead, only 

stated that it was vacating the child custody and parenting-time provisions “[b]ased upon the Court 

of Appeal’s 2019 order, the initiation of the Kalamazoo 2020 case, and the requirement that 

paternity be established before any entry of Custody, Parenting Time, or Child Support . . . .” As 
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discussed, neither this Court’s opinion in Dennis II, nor the Kalamazoo Circuit Court’s order of 

filiation, nor the reasoning that putative fathers are required to establish paternity before being 

granted custody, required the trial court to vacate the custody and parenting-time provisions of the 

judgment of divorce. However, the clear and unambiguous language of the Child Custody Act, 

MCL 722.27(1)(c), requires that the trial court “shall not modify or amend its previous judgments 

or orders or issue a new order in order to change the established custodial environment of a child 

unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” 

Even assuming that the trial court was correct, that custody and parenting-time provisions of the 

judgment of divorce are voidable, there presumptively existed a custodial environment for the 

minor child with defendant at the time that the trial court vacated those provisions. See Hayes, 

209 Mich App at 388. The trial court did not consider the best interests of the child when vacating 

the custody and parenting-time provisions of the judgment of divorce that would otherwise 

presumptively alter the custodial environment of the child; therefore, the trial court’s order was 

clearly erroneous because, after a review of the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made when the trial court did not consider the best-interest 

factors as required by the Child Custody Act.

Lastly, defendant asks this Court to rule on his standing to be able to participate in a future, 

speculative, custody hearing regarding BT. “An issue is preserved for appellate review when it is 

raised in and decided by the trial court.” Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms LLC, 326 Mich App 1, 10; 

930 NW2d 393 (2018). “Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not ordinarily subject to 

review.” Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 

422 (1993).

Although this Court need not review issues raised for the first time on 

appeal . . . this Court may overlook preservation requirements if the failure to 

consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary 

for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question of law and 

the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented. [Smith v Foerster-Bolser 

Constr, Inc, 269 Mich App 424, 427; 711 NW2d 421 (2006) (citations omitted).]

In this case, defendant is arguing that the trial court will err if it prevents defendant from 

participating in a future custody trial. Specifically, the trial court previously held a hearing 

concerning defendant’s motion for reconsideration and to vacate the trial court’s order that initially

vacated defendant’s paternity to BT. The trial court ultimately granted defendant’s motion for 

reconsideration and vacated the order, and it also stated that it was unclear “how much [defendant] 

could participate in terms of filing pleadings and making formal requests about the custody 

because I don’t know that he’d have standing to do that.” However, the trial court stated that it 

would “leave that to be decided on another day,” and it did not make any ruling regarding 

defendant’s standing in a potential custody hearing regarding BT. The trial court also did not 

entertain any argument regarding defendant’s proposed standing.

“When properly preserved, this Court reviews de novo the issue of whether a party has 

standing.” In re Knight, 333 Mich App 681, 686-687; 963 NW2d 676 (2020). “Unpreserved 

issues, however, are reviewed for plain error.” Id. at 687. “To avoid forfeiture under the plain 

error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, 

i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 
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240 Mich App 333, 336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]n 

error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the 

proceedings.” Lawrence v Mich Unemployment Ins Agency, 320 Mich App 422, 443; 906 NW2d 

482 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

This issue is unpreserved and is forfeited under the plain error rule because the error did 

not occur. Simply put, the trial court has not made any ruling regarding this issue.

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Michael J. Riordan