COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Kelsey, Huff and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

KATHRYN O’NEIL OPINION BY v. Record No. 1487

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- 1 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF MAY 1, 2012 JOSEPH O’NEIL

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Samuel T. Powell, III , Judge Charles E. Haden (Mara M edvin Matthews; Law Offices of Mara Matthews, on brief) , for appellant. Henry M. Schwan for appellee.
Kathryn O’Neil (“wife”) appeals an order of the Ci rcuit Court of the City of Williamsburg and County of James City (“circuit court”) transferring Joseph O’Neil’s (“husband”) appeal of a ruling of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Williamsburg and County of James City (“JDR court”) denying husband’s motion to amend spousal support . On appeal, wife contends that the circuit court erred in transferring the appeal
to the 22nd Judi cial District Court for the parish of St. Tammany, in the State of Louisiana , because the circuit c ourt had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order. For the foll owing reasons, we reverse and remand

. I. BACKGROUND The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. On May 6, 2005, the circuit court entered

a final decree of divorce and order ed that husband make monthly spousal support payments to wi fe in the amount of $5,250. The order transferred future issues pertaining to spousal support to- 2

- the JDR court. 1 On March 8, 2010, husband filed a motion to amend the spousal supp ort order in the JDR court

. On January 5, 2011, the JDR court denied husband’s motion to amend the spousal support order , and husband noted his appeal of the JDR court’s ruling to the circuit court

. On July 6, 2011, on its own motion, the circuit cou rt declined to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal and transferred the case to the d istrict c ourt in Louisiana, where both parties and their witnesses then resided. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “An issue of statutory interpretation pre sents a pure question of law, which we review de

novo on appeal .” Young v. Commonwealth , 273 Va. 528, 533, 643 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2007) (citations omitted). “When statutory construction is required, we construe a statute to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used.” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth , 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533

- 34 (1994) (citation s omitted). “‘When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts are b ound by the plain meaning of that language and may not assign the words a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually stated. ’” Giles v. Commonwealth , 51 Va. App. 449, 452

- 53, 658 S.E.2d 703, 705 (2008) (ci tation omitted )

. Furthermore, “‘[t]he rule is that when one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more s pecific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and whe re they conflict, the l atter prevails.’” Daniels v. Warden of the Red Onion State Prison , 266 Va. 399, 402

- 03, 588 S.E.2d 382, 384 (2003) (citation omitted).

1 In Virginia, the JDR court may obtain jurisdiction to enforce spousal support orders that have been transferred by the circuit court to t he JDR court pursuant to Code § 20

- 79(c). See 9 Peter Nash Swisher et al., Virginia Practice Series Family Law: Theory, Practice, and Forms § 9 :2 (2011).- 3

- III. ANALYSIS Wife contends on appeal that the circuit court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the app eal and in transferring the case to the district court of Louisiana. Specifically, wife argues that the plain language of Code § 20

- 88.43:2 provided the circuit court with continuing , exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order, and thus th e circuit court lacked the authority to de termin e that Virginia was an inconvenient forum for the appeal

. In respon se, husband asserts that Code § 8.01

- 265, the forum non conveniens statute for Virgin ia, narrows the scope of Code § 20

- 88.43:2 and is appli cable in this case. 2
In 199 4 , Virginia adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) and codified it, wi th minor amendments, at Code §§ 20

- 88.32 through

- 88.82. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom , 50 Va. App. 257, 262, 649 S.E.2d 200, 20 3 (2007). Code § 20

- 88.43:2 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] court of the Commonwealth issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law of the Commonwealth has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order throughout the existence o f the support obligation.” See Va. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enforce ment v. Richter , 23 Va. App. 186, 190, 475 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1996) (“[O]nce a court . . . enters a support decree with jurisdiction, it is the only body entitled to modif y it so long as it retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the [UIFSA].”).

2 Code § 8.01

- 265 provides, in pertinent part, that the court wherein an action is commenced may, upon motion by any party and for good cause shown, (i) dismiss an action brought by a person who is not a resident of the Commonwealth without prej udice under such conditions as the court deems appropriate if the cause of action arose outside of the Commonwealth and if the court determines that a more convenient forum which has jurisdiction over all parties is available in a jurisdiction other than t he Commonwealth or (ii) transfer the action to any fair and convenient forum having jurisdiction within the Commonwealth.- 4

- In addition , “[e]ach section of the uniform law is accompanied by an official comment that explains the purpose and application of the section

. ” Nordstrom , 50 Va. App. at 262, 649 S.E.2d at 20 3. “Although the General Assembly has not formally adopted any of the official comments in conjunction with its adoption of UIFSA’s various provisions, we have previously recognized that UIFSA’s official comments are an appropriate a id in dete rmining how Code §§ 20

- 88.32 to

- 88.82 apply in a given case.” Id. The official comment to UIFSA § 211 provides that “[t]he issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over an order of spousal support throughout the entire exist ence of the support obligation .” UIFSA § 211 cmt. at 204 (2001) (amended 2008), 9 U.L.A. (pt. 1B) 204

- 05 ( 1996 ) (e mphasis added) (distinguishing the UIFSA’s treatment of spousal support from child support, where it does provide for an issuing tribunal’s l oss of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the support order under certain conditions)

. It further explains that [t]he prohibition of modificati on of spousal support by a non[

- ]issuing state tribunal under UIFSA is consistent with the principle that a tribunal should apply local law to such cases to insure efficient handling and to minimize choice of law problems. Avoiding conflict of law problems is almost impossible if spousal support orders are subject to modification in a second [s]tate. Id

. at 205.
In view of the plain language and purpose of Code § 20

- 88.43:2, the specific statute governing jurisdiction over the modification of spousal support, we hold that Code § 20

- 88.43:2 supplants Code § 8.01

- 265, Virginia’s general forum non conve niens statute . Thus, Code § 20

- 88.43:2 requires that the court that issued the spousal support order retain continuing, exclusive ju risdiction to modify the support order for its duration . Because husband’s motion to amend spousal support arose from the May 6, 2005 support order of the circuit court , his appeal of the JDR court’s ruling on the motion to amend was exclusively f or the circuit court to decid e. Th erefore , the circuit court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal and in- 5

- tr ansferring the case to the district court of Louisiana. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reverse d and remanded

.