No. 45 September 14, 2017 805

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of K.A.M.,

a Youth.

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent on Review,

v.

K.A.M.,

Petitioner on Review.

(CC 070424JB; CA A154130; SC S064469)

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted May 12, 2017.

Christa Obold-Eshleman, Portland, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.

Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 

review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 

General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Marsha Levick, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, and Roy Pulvers, Holland & Knight LLP, 

Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Juvenile Law 

Center.

Before Balmer, Chief Justice, and Kistler, Walters, 

Landau, Nakamoto, Flynn, and Duncan, Justices.**

KISTLER, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 

judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is 

remanded to the circuit court.

______________

** On appeal from Jackson County Circuit Court, Patricia Crain, Judge. 279 

Or App 191, 379 P3d 686 (2016)

** Brewer, J., retired June 30, 2017, and did not participate in the decision of 

this case.
806 State v. K. A. M.

Case Summary: Youth moved to suppress evidence obtained after an officer 

entered a bedroom, told youth’s companion that she needed to “stay off the meth,” 

asked their names, and then asked youth and his companion whether they had 

anything illegal on them. Youth argued that the officer’s actions constituted an 

unlawful stop for purposes of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 

The trial court denied youth’s motion, finding that no stop had occurred. The 

Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Under the circumstances, youth reasonably 

concluded that the officer had stopped him. The officer’s unexplained entry into 

the bedroom and his accusation that the companion was using or had recently 

used methamphetamine conveyed that the companion and youth were suspected 

of illegal drug use and were not free to leave until the officer had completed his 

inquiry. In addition, the presence of multiple officers in the house, as well as the 

officer’s question whether they had anything illegal on them, added to the coercive pressure.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit 

court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court.
Cite as 361 Or 805 (2017) 807

KISTLER, J.

The question in this case is whether youth was 

stopped during the search of a drug house when a detective 

came upon youth and a friend in one of the bedrooms, told 

youth’s friend to “stay off the meth,” asked them their names, 

and then asked whether they had anything illegal on them. 

Because the trial court ruled that no stop occurred, it denied 

youth’s motion to suppress evidence discovered during the 

encounter. The Court of Appeals upheld that ruling, agreeing that no stop had occurred. State v. K.A.M., 279 Or App 

191, 379 P3d 686 (2016). Because we conclude that a stop 

occurred, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision and the 

trial court’s judgment. We remand the case to the trial court 

for further proceedings.

We take the facts from the hearing on youth’s suppression motion and state them consistently with the trial 

court’s ruling.1

 Five Medford police and probation officers 

were conducting a “parole sweep,” looking for persons who 

had violated their probation or parole. The officers had 

information that a suspected parole violator was in a singlefamily house on 11th Street and went to the house looking 

for her. A person who had rented the house gave the officers 

permission to look through it. One of the officers, Detective 

Schwab, testified that the house was a known drug house. 

When asked to describe the condition of the house, Schwab 

testified that it was “dilapidated,” with personal property 

strewn everywhere. He added, “It looked like a typical—I 

mean, for [lack of] better words, it looked like a drug house.”

All five officers went through the house looking for 

the suspect. While four of the officers were searching other 

parts of the house, Schwab went into a back bedroom. He 

was dressed in plain clothes, except for a raid vest that said 

“POLICE” on it. In the bedroom, he found youth and a young 

woman, who were waiting there to find out if they could live 

in the house for awhile. According to Schwab’s testimony, 

he did not explain to youth or the young woman why he and 

the other officers were searching the house or why he had 

1 Youth did not ask the Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s factual 

findings de novo. See ORS 19.415(3)(b). Rather, he specifically accepted the trial 

court’s express and implicit factual findings.
808 State v. K. A. M.

come into the bedroom. Rather, he testified that he entered 

the bedroom, noticed that both of them appeared to be under 

the influence of a stimulant, asked them their names, and 

asked if they had anything illegal on them. At that point, 

youth said that he had a pipe on him. Schwab asked youth if 

he would produce it, which he did. The pipe contained methamphetamine residue.

The young woman testified to a different version of 

events, part of which the trial court credited. Specifically, 

the court credited her testimony that, “when Schwab came 

into the room, all of the other detectives, officers, whoever 

they were, were going through the rest of the house.” It 

also credited her testimony that, when Schwab came into 

the bedroom, he told her she “need[ed] to stay off the meth” 

before asking youth and the young woman their names. 

Given that evidence, the trial court found:

“Clearly, there were not five officers in the room. 

According to [the young woman], it was just Officer Schwab. 

That he walked in and he said, ‘You need to stay off the 

meth.’ And then asked if they had anything.

“So at that point, there was no particular coercion. 

There was no particular indication that the parties were 

not free to leave. So it looked to me like a conversation, not 

a stop. And [youth] volunteered, yeah, here’s a pipe.”

The court accordingly denied youth’s motion to suppress 

the pipe without deciding whether Schwab reasonably suspected that youth and the young woman had committed or 

were committing a crime. Considering the pipe and other 

evidence, the trial court found youth within the jurisdiction 

of the court for having committed acts that, if committed 

by an adult, would constitute methamphetamine possession. 

The court entered judgment accordingly.

Youth appealed from the judgment, assigning error 

to the trial court’s ruling denying his suppression motion. 

Before the Court of Appeals, youth argued that his personal 

characteristics—17 years old and homeless—should be considered in determining whether he reasonably perceived 

that Schwab had stopped him. K.A.M., 279 Or App at 194-

95. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Id. at 195. Relying on 

an earlier Court of Appeals decision, the court explained 
Cite as 361 Or 805 (2017) 809

that, “[a]bsent some other show of authority, a person is not 

seized when an officer asks to see a person’s identification 

and asks whether the person has anything illegal in his or 

her possession.” Id. It followed, the court concluded, that 

youth was not stopped in this case. The Court of Appeals 

accordingly upheld the trial court’s ruling on his suppression motion and the resulting judgment.

On review, youth raises two issues. First, relying on 

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 US 261, 131 S Ct 2394, 180 L 

Ed 2d 310 (2011), he argues that, in determining whether 

he was stopped for the purposes of Article I, section 9, of 

the Oregon Constitution, we should consider that he was not 

yet 18 years old and thus was more impressionable than an 

adult.2

 Second, he contends that, even if he were viewed as 

an adult, a reasonable adult would not have felt free to leave 

in the circumstances in which youth and his friend found 

themselves. We begin with the first issue that youth raises.

We do not foreclose considering a youth’s age as part 

of the reasonableness inquiry. See J.D.B., 564 US at 271-72 

(holding that courts should consider a youth’s age in determining a Fifth Amendment Miranda issue).3

 However, this 

is hardly the case in which to resolve that question under 

Article I, section 9. That is so for at least three reasons. 

First, youth did not preserve the issue in the trial court. He 

never asked the trial court to factor his age into the determination of how a reasonable person would have perceived 

Schwab’s actions. Second, youth was 17 years and 9 months 

old when Schwab encountered him in the drug house. Even 

2 On review, youth argues that Schwab stopped him without reasonable 

suspicion in violation of both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment. 

However, youth did not raise a Fourth Amendment argument in the Court of 

Appeals. Having lost in that court, he cannot rely on the Fourth Amendment as a 

basis for reversing the Court of Appeals decision. See State v. Ghim, 360 Or 425, 

443, 381 P3d 789 (2016).

3 The holding in J.D.B. is narrow. The Court emphasized the limited inquiry 

that its holding required:

“[A] child’s age, when known or apparent, is hardly an obscure factor to 

assess. *** [O]fficers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of 

developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social 

and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need to 

know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult.”

564 US at 279-80.
810 State v. K. A. M.

under J.D.B., which youth asks us to follow, he would be 

regarded as an adult, not a child. See id. at 277 (citing Justice 

O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

541 US 652, 124 S Ct 2140, 158 L Ed 2d 938 (2004), for that 

proposition and agreeing with the dissent in J.D.B. that 

“‘teenagers nearing the age of majority’ are likely to react 

to an interrogation as would a ‘typical 18-year-old in similar 

circumstances’”). Third, the stop inquiry requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances: in this case, circumstances other than youth’s age lead us to conclude that 

he reasonably perceived that he was not free to leave.

We accordingly leave for another day the first issue 

that youth urges us to decide and turn to the second issue 

that he raises—whether a reasonable person, regardless of 

age, would have felt free to leave. On that issue, this court 

recently explained that a police officer’s request for identification is, in and of itself, not a sufficient show of authority 

to constitute a stop. State v. Backstrand, 354 Or 392, 412, 

313 P3d 1084 (2013) (stating that proposition). However, the 

court was careful to add that

“when the content of the questions, the manner of asking them, or other actions that police take (along with the 

circumstances in which they take them) would convey to 

a reasonable person that the police are exercising their 

authority to coercively detain the citizen, then the encounter rises to the level of a seizure.”

Id. As the court also noted in Backstrand, that “inquiry necessarily is fact specific and requires an examination of the 

totality of the circumstances involved.” Id. at 399.

In this case, Detective Schwab’s entry into the bedroom, the lack of any explanation for his presence, and his 

apparent accusation that the young woman was using methamphetamine persuade us that a reasonable person would 

perceive that Schwab was exercising his authority to detain 

both youth and the young woman. More specifically, according to the evidence that the trial court credited, youth and 

the young woman were in the bedroom of the house when 

Schwab and four other officers entered the house and began 

searching it. Schwab then walked into the bedroom without any explanation for his presence. To be sure, Schwab 
Cite as 361 Or 805 (2017) 811

testified at the suppression hearing that the renter had 

given the officers permission to look through the house for a 

suspected parole violator. But Schwab never communicated 

that information to either youth or the young woman.

Ordinarily, police officers do not walk into a person’s 

bedroom uninvited or, if they do, not without some explanation as to why they are there. That is, however, precisely what 

Detective Schwab did. He simply walked into the bedroom 

where youth and the young woman were, and the first words 

out of his mouth were to tell the young woman, “You need 

to stay off the meth.” Both Schwab’s unexplained entry into 

that private space and his accusation that the young woman 

was using or had recently used methamphetamine created a 

coercive atmosphere that reasonably conveyed that she and 

youth were suspected of illegal drug use and were not free 

to leave until Schwab had completed his inquiry. Two other 

circumstances support that understanding. Schwab asked 

whether youth and the young woman had anything illegal 

on them, a question that, given Schwab’s prior accusation 

of methamphetamine use, reasonably added to the coercive 

pressure. And the young woman was aware (and so presumably was youth) that, although Schwab was the only officer 

who had come into the bedroom, other officers were searching through the house. The officers’ unexplained presence in 

the house added to the coercive effect of Schwab’s presence 

in the bedroom.

In those circumstances, youth reasonably concluded 

that Schwab had stopped him—that is, that Schwab was 

exercising his authority to detain him. In reaching that conclusion, we note that this is not a case in which an officer 

asked a person for identification for the apparent purpose of 

getting the person to leave a place where he or she was not 

authorized to be. Cf. Backstrand, 354 Or at 415 (explaining that, when an officer noticed a person who appeared to 

be a minor in an “adult bookstore,” a request for identification was not a stop; at most, the person’s answer would 

have led to the person’s being asked to leave the store); 

State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 78, 854 P2d 421 (1993) (explaining that the officers’ request to look for and return a motel 

room key, viewed in light of the motel manager’s and the 
812 State v. K. A. M.

officers’ prior requests that the defendant leave the premises, did not constitute a seizure). Nor is this a case in which 

an officer approached a person who had arrived at a house 

being searched by the police, explained to the person why 

the officer had approached him, and then asked the person 

his name and connection to the house. Cf. State v. Anderson, 

354 Or 440, 452-53, 313 P3d 1113 (2013) (reasoning that, 

in those circumstances, the request for information did not 

constitute a seizure). Finally, this is not a case in which 

an officer approached the driver of a parked car while his 

passengers (the defendant and a companion) walked away, 

later returned of their own accord, and responded to the officer’s request for identification after returning. Cf. State v. 

Highley, 354 Or 459, 469, 313 P3d 1068 (2013) (relying on 

the officer’s focus on the driver, the defendant’s exercise of 

his freedom to walk away from the officer, and his unilateral 

decision to return, in concluding that the officer’s request for 

identification did not constitute a stop).

As explained above, two circumstances combine 

in this case to reinforce the conclusion that the detective’s 

actions constituted a stop. The first is the place where the 

encounter occurred: Detective Schwab walked into a bedroom where he found youth and the young woman. See State 

v. Fair, 353 Or 588, 600-01, 302 P3d 417 (2013) (explaining 

that an officer’s actions taken within a house can have a 

more coercive effect than actions taken in public places). We 

recognize that youth and the young woman were not yet residents of the house when Schwab walked in on them in the 

bedroom. Rather, they were there waiting to learn if they 

could stay there, and their right to privacy was derivative 

of the person who had rented the home. See State v. Tanner, 

304 Or 312, 321, 745 P2d 757 (1987) (discussing relative 

rights of owners and guests). However, youth and the young 

woman reasonably viewed the coercive effect of Schwab’s 

unexplained entry into the bedroom as if he had entered the 

bedroom without authority.

The second factor is what Schwab said. After entering the bedroom, he told the young woman that she needed 

to “stay off the meth.” He effectively accused her of being 

on or using methamphetamine—a statement that, in the 

context in which it was made, would cause a reasonable 
Cite as 361 Or 805 (2017) 813

person to conclude that he or she was not free to leave until 

Schwab had finished his inquiry. See State v. Jackson, 268 

Or App 139, 146, 342 P3d 119 (2014) (following line of Court 

of Appeals decisions holding that telling a person he or she 

has committed an offense can constitute a stop). Because we 

hold that Schwab’s actions constituted a stop, the remaining issue is whether the stop was justified—namely, whether 

Schwab reasonably suspected that youth and the young 

woman had engaged or were engaging in criminal activity. 

On that issue, the state argues that there are potentially 

disputed issues of fact that the trial court did not resolve 

and asks us to remand the case to the trial court if we conclude a stop occurred. We accordingly do so.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case 

is remanded to the circuit court.