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SERBIA: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

Serial No. 109–224

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

PETER T. KING, New York, Vice Chairman 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

TED POE, Texas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY RAZON, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Daniel P. Serwer, Ph.D., Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and 

Stability Operations, Centers of Innovation, United States Institute of 

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 5

The Honorable Alexander G. Rondos, Member, International Commission on 

the Balkans ........................................................................................................... 8

Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, Executive Director, Balkan Trust for Democracy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States .......................................................... 13

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 3

Daniel P. Serwer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 6

The Honorable Alexander G. Rondos: Prepared statement ................................. 10

Mr. Ivan Vejvoda: Prepared statement .................................................................. 15

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SERBIA: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE 

DIRECTION 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m. in room 

2002, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Today the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on current developments in Serbia 

and the future direction of that country. This is an important moment in Serbia’s democratic transition 6 years after Slobodan 

Milosevic was forced from power. Serbia’s direction over the next 

decade will largely depend on how two key issues and events play 

out over the next 12 to 18 months. 

First, the future status of Kosovo, the Serbian province that has 

been under UN control since the end of the Kosovo War in 1999 

will be determined within the next 3 months. Second, the alleged 

Serb war criminal, Radtko Mladic, is still at large. The international community is increasing its pressure on Serbia to apprehend General Mladic and turn him over to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. 

These two issues are very important because of their impact on 

the upcoming Parliamentary elections in Serbia which are scheduled no later than December of next year. If the elections are held 

after the Kosovo negotiations are complete, there is an increased 

likelihood that the extreme nationalist Radical Party will make 

gains or possibly be able to form a coalition government. If this 

were to happen, it would lead to a series of policies such as noncooperation of capturing Mladic and would set back Serbia’s relations with United States and Europe. 

Furthermore, even if the democratically-oriented political parties 

stay in power, the way in which Serbia deals with the outcome of 

the Kosovo negotiations and the war criminal issue will set the 

stage for Serbia’s bilateral relations with the United States, its 

timetable for integration into NATO and the European Union and, 

of course, Serbia’s relationship with its neighbors in the Balkans. 

In my opinion, United States policy toward Serbia would follow 

a two-track approach. On the first track we should continue to insist that the Serbian Government do everything in its power to 

track down and apprehend Mladic and other outstanding war 

criminals. This is a non-negotiable position. Serbia would be wellVerDate Mar 21 2002 08:24 Nov 28, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EET\092006\29974.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
2

advised to look at Croatia’s cooperation in locating and arresting 

General Gotovina in the Canary Islands. This was a difficult move 

for Croatia, but it has paved the way for accelerated negotiations 

for both NATO and EU membership. 

At the same time, the United States should pursue a policy of 

engagement with Serbia in many different levels, including military and intelligence cooperation, and stronger economic ties. Once 

Mladic is apprehended, we should quickly open negotiations with 

Serbia regarding its possible NATO membership. In addition, we 

should be encouraging our European allies to make clear EU membership would be on the table, depending on Serbia’s resolving the 

war criminal issue, and their acceptance into the UN-brokered solution on Kosovo. 

Although Serbia is undergoing a challenging period, I believe it 

has the potential to be a strong ally with the United States and 

a pivotal country in the economic and political resurgence of the 

Balkan region. We should note that Serbia has already successfully 

met one important challenge by the manner in which they have accepted the results in the referendum that led the independence of 

Montenegro. 

I look forward to the testimony of our three witnesses on the situation in Serbia and what steps the United States can take to help 

Serbia move in the right direction. 

At this point, I would defer to my good friend, Mr. Wexler, for 

any opening statement. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to thank 

you for holding this hearing as well as thank the witnesses for testifying before the Subcommittee. Today’s hearing comes at a critical juncture for Serbia and the Balkans given the decision by the 

Contact Group to give the chief UN mediator the go-ahead to complete the UN-led talks on the status of Kosovo. 

Although substantial political, economic and social progress has 

been made in the Balkans and peace and stability have taken hold 

in South-Central Europe, there remains several outstanding issues 

including the status of Kosovo that must be resolved before the region can break completely free from the ethnic conflicts of the 

1990s. 

Over the next several months the United States, EU and the 

United Nations must remain deeply engaged in the Balkans in 

order to build on successful reforms both regionally and in Serbia 

and to resolve the post-conflict problems and cross-border issues. 

To this end, Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica and President 

Tadic, along with other governments in the region, must have the 

willpower and wherewithal to take several difficult steps in order 

for them to fully integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

Lasting peace and security in the Balkans and full integration in 

the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which is in America’s and Europe’s 

interest, can only be successful if Serbia remains a strong and 

democratic ally of its neighbors and the West. 

Almost 6 years after the fall of former President Milosevic, Serbia has taken significant steps to strengthen its democratic institutions, reform defense institutions, address ethnic tensions in southern Serbia and build a stronger economy. Having had several opportunities to meet face-to-face with President Tadic to discuss 

3

what I think is fairly described as a bold vision of Serbia’s future 

as a full member of the European Union and NATO, I am hopeful 

his vision, which I share, can be achieved in the near future. 

Despite substantial progress, pro-democratic forces in Serbia face 

significant challenges over the coming months that must be taken 

into account in Washington and Brussels. The biggest threat to 

Serbia’s future in the Euro-Atlantic community is the Radical 

Party and the ultranationalists in Serbia who recklessly reject reconciliation and oppose efforts to promote democracy, rule of law 

and human rights advances. 

I urge Secretary Rice, who recently joined President Tadic in the 

signing of a Status of Forces Agreement in Washington, to continue 

to strengthen bilateral relations with Serbia. The people of Serbia, 

who face a difficult and emotional decision regarding the future of 

Kosovo, need to know that while certain prerequisites for inclusion 

in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, including Serbia’s capture of General Mladic and implementation of its Action Plan for Hague Cooperation, the United States and EU view Belgrade as a partner 

and ally in a ‘‘Free and Whole Europe.’’

If the Action Plan at the Hague is implemented to its fullest extent possible it is incumbent upon America and Europe to act immediately offering tangible carrots including reinstating the EU 

Stabilization and Association talks with Serbia and membership in 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which would be offered at the Riga 

Summit. 

Mr. Chairman, Serb’s concerned about their future should know 

that America considers them an ally and friend, and that integrating a democratic Serbia into the Euro-Atlantic community is a 

top priority of the Bush Administration and Congress. Thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Chairman Gallegly, I want to thank you for holding this hearing on Serbia as well 

as the witnesses testifying before the subcommittee. 

It is clear that today’s hearing comes at a critical juncture for Serbia and the Balkans given the decision by the Contact Group to give Chief UN mediator Martti 

Ahtisaari the go ahead to complete by the end of year UN led talks on the status 

of Kosovo. 

Although substantial political, economic and social progress has been made over 

the past fifteen years in the Balkan’s and peace and stability have taken hold in 

South Central Europe there remain several outstanding issues including the status 

of Kosovo that must be resolved before the region can break completely free from 

the ethnic conflicts of the 1990’s. 

Over the next several months the United States, EU and UN must remain deeply 

engaged in the Balkans in order to build on successful reforms both regionally and 

in Serbia and to resolve post-conflict problems and cross-border issues. To this end, 

Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic along with other governments in the region including Bosnia-Hezegovina, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro—must have the will power and wherewithal to take difficult steps—in order 

for them to fully integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 

I strongly believe that lasting peace and security in the Balkans and full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions—which is in America and Europe’s interest—can 

only be successful if Serbia remains a strong and democratic ally of its neighbors 

and the West. 

Almost six years after the fall of former President Slobodan Milosevic—Serbia has 

taken significant steps to strengthen their democratic institutions, reform defense 

institutions, address ethnic tensions in Southern Serbia and build a strong economy. 

4

Having had several opportunities to meet face to face with President Tadic to discuss his bold vision of Serbia’s future as a full member of the European Union and 

NATO—I am hopeful his vision which I also share can be achieved in the near future. 

Despite substantial progress pro-democratic forces in Serbia face significant challenges over the coming months that must be taken into account in Washington and 

Brussels. The biggest threat to Serbia’s future in the Euro-Atlantic community is 

the Radikal Party and ultra-nationalists in Serbia who recklessly reject reconciliation and oppose efforts to promote democracy, rule of law and human rights. 

I urge Secretary Rice, who recently joined President Tadic in signing a Status of 

Forces Agreement in Washington, to continue to strengthen bilateral relations with 

Serbia. The people of Serbia, who face a difficult and emotional decision regarding 

the future of Kosovo, need to know that while certain prerequisites for inclusion in 

Euro-Atlantic institutions including Serbia’s capture of General Mladic and implementation of its Action Plan for Hague Cooperation, the United States and EU view 

Belgrade as a partner and ally in a ‘‘Free and Whole Europe.’’ If the Action Plan at the Hague is implemented to the fullest extent possible it 

is incumbent on the US and EU to act immediately offering tangible carrots including reinstating the EU Stabilization and Association talks with Serbia and membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace which could be offered at the Riga Summit. 

Mr. Chairman, Serb’s concerned about their future should know that American 

considers them an ally and friend and that integrating a democratic Serbia into the 

Euro-Atlantic community is a top priority of the Bush Administration and Congress. 

The Balkans is once again at a crossroads and we must be resolute in our determination to bring lasting peace and security to the region.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Rob. We have three witnesses today, 

and I will introduce them from our left to our right. Our first witness is Daniel Serwer, Vice President and Director of Peace and 

Stability Operations and the Balkans Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He has worked on preventing inner ethnic and inner 

religious conflicts in Iraq, and has been deeply engaged in facilitating dialogue between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. 

As State Department Director of European and Canadian Analysis, in 1996 and 1997, he supervised Bosnia and the implementation of the Dayton Accords, as well as the deterioration of the security situation in Albania and Kosovo. Dr. Serwer served in 1994 

and 1995 as United States’ Special Envoy and Coordinator for the 

Bosnian Federation, mediating between Croats and Bosnians and 

negotiating the first agreement reached at the Dayton Peace Talks. 

Our second witness is Ambassador Alexander Rondos, a former 

Greek Ambassador and member of the International Commission 

on the Balkans. Ambassador Rondos is a Greek national born in 

Tanzania, and has had an extensive career in journalism, relief and 

development work and diplomacy. He has served as Advisor to the 

Foreign Minister in Greece, and has worked extensively throughout 

the Balkans region as a diplomat for Greek Foreign Ministry. 

Our third witness is Ivan Vejvoda who is Executive Director of 

the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a project of the German Marshall 

Fund dedicated to strengthening democratic institutions in Southeastern Europe. Mr. Vejvoda came to the GMF in 2003 after his 

distinguished service in the Serbian Government as Senior Advisor 

for Foreign Policy and European integration to Prime Minister 

Zoran Djindjic and Zoran Vikovic. He has unique experience with 

the democratic reform movement within Serbia and brings unique 

insight into the current political leadership in Serbia. 

Forgive me for my stumbling over some of these names. It is 

sometimes more challenging than it should be. With that, I would 

introduce again our first witness, Dr. Serwer, for purposes of his 

testimony. Welcome. 

5

STATEMENT OF DANIEL P. SERWER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, 

CENTER FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, CENTERS OF INNOVATION, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my understanding 

that you want to limit our opening remarks to 5 minutes. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. If you would, please, and be aware that without 

objection your entire testimony will be made a part of the record 

of this hearing. 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Serbia, in my 

view, has chosen a slow and difficult transition. There has been 

progress especially on the economic front, pursued mainly by the 

political party known as G17, but with the support of the rest of 

the government. There is a long way to go still. I find the media 

in Serbia under pressure, religious freedom circumscribed, the security sector largely unreformed and the government supported by 

unreformed Radicals and Socialists. And of course Mr. Mladic has 

not yet been captured. 

In my way of thinking, the U.S. should be using the assistance 

that has been suspended as a result of the failure to arrest Mladic. 

That assistance should go to civil society organizations like those 

of Natasha Kandic and Sonja Biserko, who are today under constant attack in Serbia. 

It is not surprising with this slow and difficult transition that 

Serbia is showing no flexibility on Kosovo. Belgrade is determined 

to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity. It will try to delay 

a Kosovo decision. If it fails to do that, it will try to divide the territory, and it will try to distract the internationals by asking to 

postpone the status decision until after elections. This, Belgrade 

promises, will reduce the likelihood of the Radicals coming to 

power, and permit President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica 

to be more flexible. 

I do not believe they will be able to be more flexible, especially 

after a referendum on the new Constitution and elections in which 

Kosovo will be the overriding issue. This is important to understand. Once they go to approval of a new Constitution and elections, holding onto Kosovo will be the only issue in that referendum 

and in the approval of the Constitution, making it exceedingly difficult for the Serbian Government to show any flexibility. 

We should not get sucked in. It seems to me, we should let the 

Serbs elect whom they want, have elections when they want. We 

do not control that. If they elect the Radicals, frankly the decision 

on Kosovo will be so much the easier. I do not believe the Radicals 

can reverse democratic progress in Serbia, and I do not think they 

can bother their neighbors as they did in the past. 

Whatever Serbia does by the way of referendum and elections, 

the international community should get on with settling Kosovo’s 

status. I would frankly prefer we do it before Serbia locks itself 

into a hardline position with a referendum and elections. 

You have to ask yourself, Are we asking too much? I am thinking 

of a conversation I had with Mr. Wexler some time ago in which 

he asked me precisely that question. Should we postpone? No. 

Delay, in my opinion, I think this is proven by the facts of the last 

several years, would only increase the strength of the nationalist 

6

forces inside Serbia and weaken democratic ones. That is what has 

happened for the last several years, and that is what will happen 

if we delay further at this stage. 

If we move ahead, in my view, Serbia will get over Kosovo as it 

has gotten over Montenegro, freeing itself of the national question 

and enabling itself to move ahead toward NATO and the EU. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL P. SERWER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR

POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, CENTERS OF INNOVATION, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute 

of Peace, which does not take positions on policy.

Thank you for this opportunity to offer my personal views at an important moment in Serbia’s democratic transition. Within the next year—perhaps even within 

a few months—Serbia will face two dramatic challenges: elections in which 

unreformed parties previously allied to Slobodan Milosevic will re-emerge as 

major—perhaps even majority forces—on the Serbian political scene; and a decision 

on Kosovo’s status. Before discussing these challenges, let me review Serbia’s transition process. 

SERBIA HAS CHOSEN A SLOW AND DIFFICULT TRANSITION . . . 

After the fall of Milosevic in October 2000, the newly elected President of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica, sought to restore order quickly and preserve intact the 

institutions that had previously been instruments of repression and war: the army, 

the police, the secret services and the judiciary. Serbian prime minister Zoran 

Djindjic wanted faster reform, but his assassination in March 2003, apparently by 

elements of the security forces, and Kostunica’s election to the prime ministry a 

year later ensured that Serbia would change only slowly and without major impact 

on elements of the previous regime. In fact, the votes of Milosevic’s Socialist Party 

and the Radical Party, whose paramilitaries wrecked havoc in Bosnia and Kosovo 

during the 1990s, keep Kostunica’s government in office. 

Even slow change, if it goes in the right direction, will bring good things over 

time. More than three years into Kostunica’s mandate, Serbia has made progress. 

Kostunica’s coalition partner—G17 Plus—has ensured macroeconomic and monetary 

stability, substantial privatization and progress towards a market economy. A new 

War Crimes Court has begun to prosecute lower level perpetrators. Lower level police are behaving better towards Serbia’s citizens. The Parliament is becoming a serious legislature and has begun to exercise oversight responsibilities. It is no longer 

possible to imagine that Serbia will trouble its neighbors with military and paramilitary force. 

That said, there is still a long way to go. Serbian media—even those that had a 

reputation for independence in the Milosevic period—are being pressured to conform 

to government views. The recent religion law is a step backwards. State institutions—especially in the security sector—still depend on personnel who supported the 

Milosevic regime in its worst crimes. This is why Ratko Mladic has not been arrested or sent to The Hague. It is also why Djindjic’s murderers have not been tried 

and two witnesses have been murdered, with no subsequent arrests. The Radical 

and Socialist parties that support Kostunica’s government are unreformed and 

unapologetic advocates of Greater Serbia, including the ethnic cleansing and crimes 

against humanity that they used in the 1990s to ensure all Serbs lived in one country and were not governed by non-Serbs. 

People associated with these views have threatened and even physically attacked 

Serbia’s most prominent human rights advocates, including the courageous Natasha 

Kandic and Sonja Biserko. It is not clear that the Serbian police have done all they 

could to prevent such attacks. The Congress would be wise to require that suspended US assistance money be spent on grants to Serbian civil society organizations that are willing to campaign in favor of completing Serbia’s democratic transition. 

... AND IS SHOWING NO FLEXIBILITY ON KOSOVO. 

While some of these problems should concern the international community in 

their own right, the need for a decision on Kosovo’s status heightens their signifiVerDate Mar 21 2002 08:24 Nov 28, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\092006\29974.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
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cance. Serbia is approaching the Kosovo problem with the same objective as 

Milosevic, but notably without threatening the use of force: Belgrade seeks to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was made absolutely clear during the 

recent visits of Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic, neither of whom 

showed flexibility on the sovereignty question. It is also clear from Belgrade’s intense effort to ensure that the Russians will veto any Security Council resolution 

that offers independence to Kosovo. 

Belgrade knows, however, that its proposal of ‘‘maximum autonomy’’ for the 

Kosovo Albanians may not succeed. The Russians will not hold forever. The fallback 

position is the three Ds: delay, division and distraction. Belgrade would like a long 

delay—decades if possible—but it will also be pleased with a few months. This will 

enable Serbia to solidify control over the northern three and a half municipalities 

in Kosovo as well as several Serbian enclaves and present the international community with de facto partition. Already the reintegration of the north would be a major 

challenge for the internationals. Delay also increases the likelihood that Albanian 

extremists will attack Serbs in Kosovo, thus undermining Kosovo’s campaign for 

independence. 

The third D is distraction. President Tadic during his recent visit argued that if 

Kosovo is given independence the Radicals will win Serbia’s next parliamentary 

elections, to be held by late 2007. He therefore seeks delay on Kosovo, promises that 

after elections Kostunica’s party and his own will govern together (cutting out the 

Radicals), and implies that he and Kostunica will be more flexible than heretofore. 

This is appealing if you think the Radicals threaten democracy in Serbia and if you 

believe the promise of greater flexibility in the future. 

BELGRADE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO MANAGE ITS OWN POLITICS . . . 

I do not believe either of these premises. The Radicals may halt but will not be 

able to reverse Serbia’s democratic progress or bother Serbia’s neighbors. They are 

likely to do well in the next elections, and Tadic and Kostunica will try to form an 

anti-Radical coalition, whatever happens with Kosovo. But if Tadic and Kostunica 

come to power together, it is unlikely that they will demonstrate greater flexibility 

after a political campaign in which they will pledge over and over again that they 

will not give up an inch of Serbian territory or an iota of Serbian sovereignty. It 

is moreover likely that a new constitution asserting that Kosovo is an integral part 

of Serbia will be adopted before the elections, making greater flexibility all but impossible. 

The fact is that it would be far easier for the international community to settle 

the Kosovo question with the Radicals in power. No one could then expect the 

Kosovo Albanians to remain in a common state with Serbia. Letting the Radicals 

take the rap for losing Kosovo would be much better for Serbian democracy than 

pinning that responsibility on more democratic political forces. 

The international community does not, however, decide when Serbian elections 

are called. If Kostunica and Tadic want to force a delay of several months, they can 

call elections when they want. If they do, in my view the United States would be 

well advised to allow formation of any government that reflects the will of the Serbian people. Washington’s behind-the-scenes efforts to maintain Kostunica in power 

over the past three years have been counter-productive: they damage Serbian democracy and hurt the prospects for a Kosovo settlement by making the US hostage 

to internal Serbian politics. 

... AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD GET ON WITH SETTLING KOSOVO’S

STATUS. 

While Belgrade has made progress on the path to democracy, it has painted itself 

into a corner on Kosovo. It offers no realistic way in which two million people who 

do not accept Belgrade’s authority can be represented internationally. Belgrade does 

not want to do it, and at the same time it does not want the Albanians to represent 

themselves. No one in Belgrade would pay the price of keeping Kosovo part of Serbia—following the Kurdistan precedent that would mean an Albanian president, foreign minister and deputy prime minister. Nor would any Kosovars occupy those positions. 

If Kosovo is to become part of the European Union—as Americans and Europeans 

agree it should in due course—it will have to negotiate its entry as a sovereign 

state. By then, I trust Mladic and Karadzic will be serving their sentences and Serbia will have been a member of the EU for a long time. Would Serbia really want 

to seek EU membership on Kosovo’s behalf, or would it want to be exercising a veto 

over Kosovo’s membership? Already today, a significant percentage of Serbian citizens accept independence as a realistic, even if not desirable, option for Kosovo. 

8

Kosovo is not on the list of top concerns for most Serbs, who are far more worried 

about their livelihoods, their pensions and their hopes for a European future. 

This does not prevent Serbia from viewing Kosovo through its own prism, which 

sees its ‘‘loss’’ as one in a long string of humiliations. Across the political spectrum 

in Serbia, there are complaints about double standards: if borders are sacrosanct, 

why are you willing to change Serbia’s borders? Why can’t Republika Srpska be 

independent? Why are criminals who committed crimes against Serbs let off easy 

at The Hague, or not charged at all? Serbs are convinced that the international community is against them, even though they have gotten a far better deal from the 

US and the EU than anyone might have imagined possible in Milosevic’s time, including the Status of Forces Agreement signed a few weeks ago. Serbs will resent 

the loss of Kosovo, but it is not a vital national interest and they will get over it, 

as they have quickly gotten over the loss of Montenegro. 

I am often asked whether we are asking too much of Serbia, whether it would 

be wise to postpone settling the Kosovo issue to give the Serbs time to consolidate 

their democracy. My answer is no. The experience of the last few years has taught 

us that keeping the Kosovo issue open is a sure-fire way to strengthen nationalist 

forces in Serbia and weaken those who want to take the country as quickly as possible into the EU. I believe that settling the Kosovo issue will resolve the national 

question and enable Serbia to move forward, taking its proper place as a leading 

democratic force in the Balkans.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Dr. Serwer. Ambassador Rondos. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER G. RONDOS, 

MEMBER, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS 

Ambassador RONDOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is 

a great pleasure to be here and to be reminded, for those of us who 

are from the region, what an example it is to be able as a foreigner 

to come to testify in an institution like this. It is something that 

we are not accustomed to in our region and something we need to 

learn. So I am deeply grateful, and with that due respect, let me 

offer some thoughts and follow on Dr. Serwer’s candor. Let me 

come at a slightly different angle to the issue. 

Serbia has elections sometime in the next 12 months. The choices 

are pretty stark for Serbia. It is going to be between those who 

want to complete the market and democratic reforms that began 6 

years ago or those who were, in effect, the collaborators in 

Milosevic and who want to get their time in the sun again. They 

are putting on new clothes. They will seem very democratic but it 

is open to question whether they will live with the spirit of democracy. 

So we are going to be very careful here. We are watching in 

many post-Communist countries, sort of a rollback. All these people 

have learned how to play with democracy, how to use its trappings, 

but then to abuse it once they are in. We have got to be very careful. Those people who sacrificed for democracy merit some support. 

Secondly, it is vital that those who have fought hard to bring 

Serbia into the European Union, into those alliances with which we 

are all associated—NATO, the European Union and many others—

that, I think, they continue that work. The opposition, as far as I 

am concerned, the Radicals, whomever, have yet to express themselves as to what they want. So there is a real issue here. There 

is a choice. 

Are we going to have a government in Serbia that will continue 

on the path to which it has already committed in terms of the 

grand alliances that I think are what are needed on the globe? Or 

are we going to end up making moves that will end up encouraging 

those who cast out on all of those? I am not sure that Serbia is a 

9

piece of the jigsaw that we can dispense with that easily, strategically. We need Serbia, all of us, and I speak as certainly as someone from the region. Without Serbia, we are in trouble, in serious 

trouble as we were throughout the 1990s. 

The next choice is whether Serbia will have cause for optimism 

to join the European Union. The European Union is, in my view, 

the great peace project of Europe. It is the great peace project that 

the United States created and began in the 1940s and early 1950s. 

It is an unfinished business. Europe is not whole and free yet, and 

it must be. 

Without Serbia, without the Balkans—and I want to be clear 

here, I speak about all our Albanian neighbors as well as our Serbian neighbors. We need them in Europe and fast. We cannot afford to decelerate and play what I consider to be little games rather 

than think big, be bold. That is a European issue but we all, in a 

sense, have a stake in that. 

Finally, there is the question of Kosovo. I will focus a little bit 

on this because I think sometimes it is easy to misunderstand the 

role that this issue plays. The rational perspective on Kosovo—and 

I speak to you as politicians who have to get elected—and one of 

the important things is that in Serbia, thank God, we also have the 

same. Gone are the days when we negotiated among two or three 

dictators who had big propaganda machines, and they could just 

make decisions like that and inflict them on their countries. That 

was the 1990s. We are now in the Balkans of the 2000s, which are 

democratic. We have politicians who have to be elected, who have 

to respect history, legacy, heritage, as well as to see how those can 

be folded into a concept of progress and a future. 

Kosovo. Rationally speaking, we would all ask, does Serbia really 

want to have the burden of 2 million people growing fast demographically as part of its country? Does it want to bear the financial costs? We can go through a whole list of rational questions like 

that, in a province where Serbs represent no more than 10 million. 

There is, however, as we all know in politics, the irrational feelings and history that will play in. For many Serbs, Kosovo is something of deep emotional significance. It is, some have said—and in 

a sense I agree as an Orthodox Christian—the Jerusalem of the 

Serbian Orthodox and even though there may be few Serbs who 

live there, it has a profound symbolic importance. I think we 

should be very careful about being cavalier about how we deal with 

an issue that can have deep emotional significance. 

As a Greek, frankly, it is with dismay that I have to go to 

Istanbul and I cannot pray in my mother church because it was a 

mosque and now it is no more than a museum. There are many 

Serbs who feel that is what will happen to them and what they 

consider their mother church. Now, I am not interested in the statistics of how many Serbs go to church or not. There is something 

much deeper. What constitutes how a Serb feels to be a Serb is 

their religious identity, for many of them. 

This can become a dark force. It can also become a force of enlightenment in society, and I leave that as something that is yet 

to be decided. But I simply say that politically, this is a factor that 

no politician in Serbia can simply discount. It is there waiting to 

be mobilized to those who want to be unscrupulous, waiting to be 

10

put to the service of something that could be positive in the entire 

region. 

So we must tread very carefully. Thus, I come finally and in conclusion to the question of the elections. I have offered some choices 

that the Serbs face. To me, therefore, it is logical that if we want 

a Serbia that is part of Europe whole and free, part of the alliances 

that we want, a Serbia that is pursuing market and political reforms which I think it is with a great deal of robustness, then we 

must be very careful how we choose to act in a period when a country is going through an electoral process. 

Unlike many other countries, there is a capacity among those of 

us from outside to act in a way that could actually influence the 

elections. That is on Kosovo especially. So we must be very, very 

wise. My own view is simple. We should wait until the elections are 

done. December 2006, to me, is just a deadline that was set. It was 

set by people who were not necessarily thinking about the political 

process in Serbia. 

In other words, the fate of a democracy is being decided by bureaucrats who are not elected, and I have always thought that is 

a simple issue that one needs to understand very clearly. I would 

prefer politicians who know what it is to be elected making some 

serious decisions, strategic ones, internationally, about what is necessary for another democracy and for those who are the tribunes 

of that democracy. It is absolutely vital, I think, that that be understood. 

Therefore, I would simply ask that one think very seriously 

about the consequences of one’s actions. Serbia has many responsibilities toward the international community. I think it is aware 

of them. In some of them it has been much more tardy than it 

should be, but in many others it is time to start acknowledging 

that a cup is half full rather than half empty, and let us start filling that cup fast and helping them do so. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Rondos follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER G. RONDOS, MEMBER, 

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BALKANS

Mr. Chairman: 

My name is Alexander Rondos. I am a former Ambassador of Greece and have 

been closely involved with Balkan politics for the last eight years. I was also a member of the International Commission on the Balkans. I am very pleased to have this 

opportunity to testify on Serbia before the Sub-Committee on Europe and Emerging 

Threats. 

Your hearing is timely. The course of political events in Serbia in the next year 

can have a decisive effect both for the future of the country and for the stability 

of the Balkans.

• Serbia must have elections in the next twelve months. It will certainly have 

them sooner. In these elections there will be a stark choice between those who 

want to build on and complete the work of market and democratic reform that 

began in 2000 with the overthrow of Milosevic and those who were collaborators of Milosevic whose intentions are still shrouded in nationalist rhetoric.

• Serbia will either keep a coalition of political forces that will continue the 

push towards transparent market reform and prepare the country for membership of the European Union, or it will give way to those forces that want 

to restore the privileges they enjoyed during the years of isolation under 

Milosevic.

• Serbia will have been given serious cause for optimism by the European 

Union that its candidacy might be possible or it will be left as a European 

11

afterthought, confirming to some in Serbia that the West is not to be taken 

seriously.

• Serbia will be confronted by the decision on the status of Kosovo. If that decision is taken by the international community before elections, it will be very 

difficult to hold off the assault of those in Serbia who say that the democratic 

forces simply gave in and surrendered Serbia’s Jerusalem.

We therefore have a choice, as members of the international community, to decide 

to take the strategic high road and argue that the primary goal is to secure Serbian 

democracy, ensure security in Kosovo and stability in a still fragile region. The cornerstone of Serbian democracy is the guarantor for satisfactory settlement on 

Kosovo and for stability in the region. Such a roadmap for Balkan success would 

culminate with the European Union giving assurances that Serbia would become a 

candidate of the Union, perhaps in late 2007. If we believe that this is the path to 

follow, then we have to be very careful about how these external issues like Kosovo 

will influence the choices Serbs make in their elections. 

The alternative is to argue that the Serbs mortgaged themselves morally with 

Milosevic and that they have not paid their mortgage off. This means going ahead 

immediately with some solution on Kosovo and allowing the European Union to procrastinate and prevaricate over Serbia’s future role in Europe. As far elections are 

concerned, Serbs would be informed that they are welcome to have them whenever 

they want and the international community will follow its own timetable for Kosovo. 

I happen to believe that the first option is the wise way to go. I fear that I am 

in a minority and that the fate of Serbia may be decided by external influences that 

are guided by indifference, impatience and perhaps a touch of vindictiveness. 

I chose to be with you to ring an alarm bell. I believe that it is in our collective 

strategic interests to do what is necessary to help the Serbian nation complete the 

work it has begun in building a thriving democracy. When you have friends who 

want to stand up and be counted with you as part of the family of democratic nations, then it is also our obligation to stand by them. If we do not, then surely we 

have no reason to complain when they turn their backs on us and dismiss us as 

moral and political gadflies. We have an opportunity to be serious in our efforts to 

work with Serbia and I believe that Serbia is ready to reciprocate. Above all, a little 

vision could take us a long way to success. 

The domestic political choice in Serbia is between the parties that struggled to 

bring democracy to Serbia and those that collaborated with Milosevic. It is a choice 

between a Western orientation of the economic, political and defence alliance, and, 

one that is much more suspicious of the benefits that such alliances can bring. It 

will be a choice between one group of parties that have yet to make themselves over 

from the past and those that are shaping to be the forces for the future. It will be 

a choice between a more competitive, modernised economy and one that—in the absence of a clear opposition platform—will try to reward those who feel they have 

been excluded form the benefits of the last few years of democratic life and economic 

growth. 

These choices are common to most societies in transition from the communist period. I would like to focus on the variables that are uniquely Serbian and often easily misunderstood outside of Serbia. 

I would like to reduce these briefly to the following:

a. The shape of Serbia’s economy;

b. The shape of democratic life;

c. The shape of Serbia’s territory

d. Serbia’s place in the world.

Given that Serbia was economically isolated by sanctions for close to a decade, 

it is remarkable how the country has succeeded in bring back some balance to economic life. Monetary stability is in stark contrast to the spiraling inflation of the 

1990s. The banking sector is expanding impressively. Recent privatizations have 

added new revenue to the budget and turned almost 75 percent of the former socially owned enterprises into private ownership. Foreign investors have been important contributors to the process. The macro-economic indicators, in short, are impressive. Now Serbia faces the task of building a thriving economy that can expand 

employment opportunities while lifting living standards. In my view, the democratic 

governments that succeeded the Milosevic era have exercised economic management 

with considerable wisdom, leaving it in the hands of an impressive group of technocrats who have imposed economic discipline while also disciplining expectations. 

Continuity is in Serbia’s interests. 

12

Democratic life in Serbia is healthy. It does not fit the classic patterns of Left 

verses Right. The parties that assumed power upon the overthrow of Milosevic are 

clearly in opposition to those parties, like the Radicals (SRS) and the Socialists 

(SPS) that collaborated with Milosevic. A victory by the Radical Party would not 

cripple democracy. The trappings of democratic life will remain. The threat lies elsewhere. We have seen in other parts of the post-communist world, a roll back from 

the initial gains of democratic politics and a return to power of people who exude 

nostalgia and a contempt for the spirit of democracy. What is at risk in Serbia is 

that these parties of the past have yet to demonstrate that they have moved beyond 

the politics of isolation and resentment. Until they do so, they will infect the political life with the politics of injured national pride and vindictiveness rather than 

the politics of openness and patriotic self-respect. 

This prompts some reflection on the third issue. Either before or after its elections 

Serbia will be confronted by a very difficult choice regarding the status of Kosovo. 

I hope that this occurs after the election when a government with a fresh mandate 

can finalise the negotiations and proceed to the next stage of national life, whatever 

that may be. Already this year, Serbia has had to handle the separation with Montenegro. 

Why is this issue of Kosovo so important and not to be under-estimated nor misunderstood? There are rational arguments and then there are—to the secular west- erner—the irrational. Both views command respect. The rational view asks whether 

Serbia really wants to have a territory 90 percent of which is populated by an Albanian population that is growing demographically at a dramatically high rate. Do 

these two people really want to live together? Does Serbia want to have the financial and political responsibility for this Albanian population? Will Albanians participate in the elections in Serbia? 

But there is a powerful emotional counterpoint. Kosovo is at the heart of Serbia’s historical identity. There may be quite a number of Serbs who do not feel this affinity to Kosovo. There are also many for whom it matters. Serbia is not alone having 

its Jerusalem as an issue that has deep emotional affinity that translates into politics. I can only think of my own country, Greece where many have the profoundest 

feeling for what we call our lost motherlands. I will not hide my own sorrow that 

I am unable to attend liturgy in my own Mother Church, Aghia Sofia, in what is 

now Istanbul. I am required to pay to visit a museum that was once a mosque after 

it was desecrated. I can only imagine that for many Jews the issue of Jerusalem 

has an equally profound pull. These are not issues to be dismissed lightly. In a 

world where secularism is still so fashionable—and passes as modernism—the risk 

of misunderstanding the attraction of those unquantifiable symbols that bind a people can be fatal. The desecration of countless Churches in Kosovo since 1999, when 

the administration of Kosovo passed to the international community, merely adds 

to the suspicions for many in Serbian politics that part of the national heritage is 

being deliberately sold away, literally, and that the cradle of its faith is being lost. 

Thus, the electoral nightmare for Serbia would be a decision on Kosovo, before 

the elections, which would possibly result in Serbs fleeing from Kosovo and the belief, manipulated by many politicians, that the Serbian government had failed to 

strike an honorable bargain with an international community intent on appeasing 

the Albanian population and its well publicized threats of violence. 

In short, the risk we run is that the electoral fate of those who want to consolidate democracy in Serbia risks being sacrificed to appease who threaten violence. 

My fourth point concerns Serbia’s place in the world. Were it not for Kosovo, the 

need to render Ratko Mladic to the Hague and the protracted decision over 

Montenegro’s fate, I firmly believe that Serbia would already be a candidate member of the European Union. The negotiations with the EU are currently stalled over 

the EU insistence that Serbia demonstrate that it is doing everything to deliver 

Mladic. The result is that the international community has trapped itself and Serbia. While wanting and needing Serbia the country is being isolated. Little wonder 

that those who are nostalgic for the past now ask what has been the point of even 

opening up to the West. 

A mere look at the map of Europe and the potential of Serbia should be enough 

to explain why Serbia should be in the European Union. What I worry about is 

whether the European Union is willing to engage in the type of strategy that will 

give Serbia the prospect to show its electorate that the EU is a possibility and not 

a pipe-dream. 

I will conclude by repeating the opening vision. A strategy in which the European 

Union offers a framework and a future for the Balkans would allow the negotiations 

on Kosovo to come to a natural conclusion, when a new democratic government is 

installed in Belgrade. Interim arrangements can be made to begin the already much 

delayed implementation of agreements among Serbs and Albanians. This would proVerDate Mar 21 2002 08:24 Nov 28, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EET\092006\29974.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
13

vide the confidence to allow for security to prevail in Kosovo. With these elements 

in hand, it is possible to envision a Serbia actively contributing to the stability of 

the whole region and a Kosovo no longer in an existential limbo, developing the instruments of statehood and law and order, and, progressing towards prosperity. 

I hope that we will all have the wisdom to be patient in order to gain a greater 

good for all.. 

Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. 

Vejvoda. 

STATEMENT OF MR. IVAN VEJVODA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

BALKAN TRUST FOR DEMOCRACY, THE GERMAN MARSHALL 

FUND OF THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. VEJVODA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation, and I repeat the words of Ambassador Rondos that it is a 

great honor to be invited here, as a citizen of Serbia from Belgrade, 

to speak on this important issue. Allow me to mention also that 

this hearing occurs as we celebrate 125 years of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and Serbia established 

on the 14th of October, 1881, and I think that speaks much to not 

only the length of our relationship but also to the new responsibility that we have to each other with all the differences that we 

have. 

I would like to start out by defining the framework in which the 

issues of Kosovo, the elections, and the obligations toward the 

International Criminal Tribunal from Yugoslavia are occurring. 

That framework is first of all the transatlantic relationship which 

is, I would say, cardinal to finding the way to getting the Balkans 

into Europe whole and free, and it has been the sturdiness of that 

relationship that has allowed us to move forward. 

Secondly, because all the Balkan countries aspire to entry into 

the European Union and NATO, I would submit to you that in fact 

all of their actions, ultimately, are defined by that next day when 

they will have to negotiate their entry, whoever they are and however they are defined. This is in the back of their minds, and I say 

this because I believe it will dampen the willingness to go to extremes or to maximum solutions. 

Of course that awareness has to be fostered also from the outside, but ultimately that is the goal. As it has been recently written 

in an article, it is Brussels that is the next capital of the Balkans, 

whether it is the European Union or NATO. I believe in that sense 

that an early entry into Partnership for Peace—and I had stated 

this in my testimony to you last year in April—I think would be 

welcomed. 

Because the reform of the security services of the military security services is an imperative, I think it has been to our detriment 

that we have not had Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and 

Herzegovina outside of Partnership for Peace, and I think it would 

help accelerate all those obligations that you have mentioned if 

these countries were to receive a signal at the NATO Riga Summit 

to go forward on this. 

Clearly leadership is required in these issues, and a democratic 

leadership is all the more responsible to moving faster rather than 

moving at a slower pace. But I would like to say, in different words 

maybe, what Ambassador Rondos said that as we tackle all of these 

14

issues of the future of this region, there is a legitimate political 

transition that is occurring. We have political parties that are relatively new that are unsure of their foothold in the political market, of their constituencies, and there is a parallel, legitimate political competition, that is occurring as the country needs a focal census and unity of parties to tackle the issues of Kosovo, of Mladic, 

of the negotiations toward the European Union and NATO. 

And thus I think we have to be mindful of the democratic legitimacy of all of the governments in the region as we go forward toward the solution of the future status of Kosovo. And here I think 

the region is important. All the countries that are in the region or 

neighboring the region, such as Bulgaria and Romania, that will 

become members of the European Union in a few months, Greece 

to our south, all are mindful as neighbors that we have to be very 

cautious and tread carefully as we move forward. 

And let me simply stress that I think we all desire to move forward quickly because we have to put these issues behind ourselves 

no matter what the solution is because that is the condition for the 

quicker integrative movements into Europe and into NATO. 

On the specific issue of the elections in Serbia, it seems as of the 

past week that there is an agreement between the democratic 

forces to go forward with the finalizing of the Constitution and go 

toward a referendum, trying to shore up public opinion behind the 

current government, and I would say more broadly behind the family of democratic parties, and then to go toward the elections, possibly in the spring, in trying to strengthen the democratic leadership. 

I think—and I think it is important to stress—that we have witnessed a deeper political sociology of Serbia since the overthrow of 

Milosevic, and let me remind you that there was a deliberate decision by the democratic forces at large—political parties, civil society, media, and youth—to overthrow Milosevic through a peaceful, 

electoral, democratic process. Now, this great victory of the Serbian 

people over their retrograde regime and their old regime has a 

price. That price is that there was not a violent revolution that rid, 

the next morning, all of those who were the enemies of freedom 

and of democracy. 

We have had to live with those people who governed us during 

the 1990s, whether they were elected in Parliament or otherwise. 

We are, as Dr. Serwer said, in a situation where tabloids are attacking individuals, important leaders of civil society, and he mentioned them. But even worse, they are attacking the Deputy Prime 

Minister of our country, Mrs. Ivana Dulic Markovic, and this is 

worrisome. 

The Radical Party has attacked her in Parliament. The tabloid 

newspapers are slandering her. The government has come to defend her, President Tadic and others, but this is the atmosphere 

within which we are working. But let me give you a flipside to the 

mindset because I think it is important as we go forward. 

Three months ago, on June 23, two U.S. Air Force F–16s landed 

at a military Air Force base in Belgrade. These were planes that 

actually bombed Belgrade 7 years prior to their coming. They were 

received by their colleagues, Air Force fighter pilots of the Serbian 

Air Force. They were received by the Serbian Minister of Defense, 

15

and there was absolutely no public reaction at a time when in 

Ukraine and in Odessa there was an outcry because there were 

NATO soldiers about to engage in a relatively small exercise. 

I would submit to you that this is the mindset of Serbia. We are 

a Westernized country. We have been your allies in the First and 

Second World Wars. We have come back to that alliance, and there 

is a willingness to move quickly. So the future direction of Serbia, 

as the title says, I think is secured. What we are really talking 

about here are the next 12 months. How do we weather going 

through Seylla and Charybdes that are put before us? And this is 

where we need your help. It behooves us in Serbia, the citizens and 

the government, to push and resolve these outstanding issues. 

My final sentence to you is the fact that I was here in Washington in July 2000, this was 3 months before the elections where 

we beat Milosevic. I went around the institutions inside the Beltway with a message: We will defeat Milosevic, and, secondly, we 

will need your help very badly when we do that. My message today 

is the same. I do not think the Radicals will win in the next elections. The democratic parties will find it within themselves to constitute a coalition to win in these elections, to reinforce the government, and we will need help to go forward with that new government as we go through these issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vejvoda follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. IVAN VEJVODA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BALKAN TRUST

FOR DEMOCRACY, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to come and testify before you today 

at this crucial moment in the Balkans path toward a stable and peaceful future in 

the Euro-Atlantic community. It is an honor to be here. 

Allow me to mention that this hearing is being held as we celebrate 125 years 

of diplomatic relations between the United States and Serbia established on October 

14, 1881 (although contacts were initiated as early as 1867). These relations are 

today on a clear positive upward path in all fields. 

I am here to offer you my personal views on the situation in Serbia and the importance of the framework of European Union and EuroAtlantic integration, as well 

as the role of the United States, for the betterment of the country and the region 

as a whole. 

INTRODUCTION: THE REGION MOVES FORWARD

The Balkans, or Southeastern Europe, today, more than ten years after Dayton 

and seven years after the NATO bombing of Serbia (and Montenegro) are in a different mind set and with different priorities. The democratically elected governments of the region have opted for the priority of EU integration and accession to 

NATO. The region has moved away from the immediate post-conflict zone and into 

one of sustained transitional democratic reform policies, addressing developmental 

issues and tackling the challenges of EuroAtlantic integration. 

The gravitational pull of the EU and NATO is the defining and cardinal instance 

of all the processes we are witnessing. All the key political actors in the last resort 

have this in mind, whatever their maximalist goals may be. This is important to 

note because the magnetism of EuroAtlantic integration has a dampening effect on 

extremism, although this of course is not foolproof. 

The region has made significant strides: Slovenia is a full member of the European Union; along with Romania and Bulgaria it is a member of NATO; Romania 

and Bulgaria expect to become the twenty sixth and twenty seventh member states 

of the European Union on January 1, 2007. 

Croatia is negotiating entry into the EU; Macedonia is a full candidate for entry, 

while Albania has recently signed a Stabilization and Association agreement with 

the EU. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia have been longstanding members of 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and have formed three years ago a regional 

security grouping: the Adriatic Charter in view of fully cooperating in light of their 

future full NATO membership 

16

Three countries while part of this overall dynamic are lagging behind: Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. All three have clearly declared their 

EuroAtlantic integration priorities. 

For all intents and purposes the part of the region called the Western Balkans 

(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, including Kosovo) is in a sense already part of the EU and NATO. It will formally and 

geographically be fully encircled by the EU in about three months time. NATO 

troops have been present in the region for more than ten years. 

All the countries are at different progressive stages of their integration into both 

EU and NATO. 

At present we are facing the last major unresolved issue of the breakdown of 

former Yugoslavia: the question of the future status of Kosovo. 

The penultimate issue was resolved in a referendum on May 21, 2006 when the 

electorate of Montenegro opted for independence, and separation from the State 

Union with Serbia. In a peaceful, orderly and rule-based procedure overseen by EU 

representatives the people of Montenegro voted with a majority of 55.4% for independence. 

Due to the absence of the Balkans from the international headline news I wish 

to stress that notwithstanding the significant remaining difficulties, unresolved 

issues and subsequent challenges that lie ahead—the region is moving in a positive 

direction. 

This is the reason why it is imperative that all those in the US, EU, NATO who 

have been working with the citizens and governments of the region continue to 

move the democratic and EuroAtlantic agenda forward—stay the course and see 

these peaceful processes through to their haven of a Europe whole and free. 

The positive peer group effect among the countries in the region should not be 

underestimated. At an important level they do act as communicating vessels—observing each other and having ultimately, with all their differences, a mutual pulling effect toward Euro-Atlantic integration. This sometimes, fortunately not often, 

has its converse side. 

Enlargement for the Western Balkans seems to be on course in spite of the ‘‘enlargement fatigue’’ and ‘‘absorption capacity’’ issue that appeared after the French 

and Dutch referenda last year. Apart from the emphatic, repeated commitment coming from the administration of the EU in Brussels (originally made at the EU 

Thessalonica Summit in June 2003), it is interesting to note that the possible future 

candidate for the French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, with no ambiguity, most recently said that the Western Balkans will be members of the EU. 

SERBIA

Mr. Chairman, Serbia is at the heart of this remaining as yet not formally integrated region of the Western Balkans. It is the largest country by territory and population. Its role in contributing to lasting stability and peace is fundamental. That 

is why staying the course with the democratic citizens and democratic leaders of 

Serbia as they tackle the remaining key challenges is a way to succeed in the immediate future—in an area in which the Western alliance has now been present with 

significant human and material resources for a long period of time. 

It goes without saying that it behooves the government and citizens of Serbia, to 

do everything in their power and more to accelerate the democratic reform dynamic, 

see to it that the outstanding obligations toward the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are fulfilled, and that the future status of Kosovo, 

whatever the solution is, respectful of the legitimate rights of all, be seen through 

in a peaceful stabilizing process, avoiding any recurrence to non-democratic means. 

Serbia’s demonstrable prudent, constructive and stabilizing role should be the 

goal of all of its responsible leaders, its civil society and media. This is the only way 

to forge a future-looking agenda which will allow us to continue overcoming the burdening legacies of the past with a civic and democratic approach. 

The obstacles and pitfalls are as in any similar situation not to be neglected. The 

struggle between the friends of democracy and those who would like to slow down 

or reverse the course of Serbia’s democratization and modernization is still ongoing 

in certain spheres. 

As an example of the retrograde forces still at work one can cite the recent spate 

of vitriolic hate speech against the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Ivana Dulic 

Markovic, as well as in a variety of tabloid newspaper attacks against prominent 

civil society leaders. There has been a public outcry, condemnations by officials and 

a demand that the prosecutor’s office be involved in investigating and possibly prosecuting these incidents. 

17

The continuing legitimate political transition, the early stages of democratic pluralism, the political parties’ search to assure constituencies and a foothold in the 

political market are all often disruptive—disruptive of the need for a consensus on 

means to rapidly accomplish a future based on fundamental democratic and modernizing goals. 

Thus, apart from full Serbian domestic engagement, a commitment to change, and 

a democratic future, help and support from friends and allies is of the essence to 

see these processes of consolidating democracy and fostering a democratic political 

culture—a key ingredient to stability and lasting peace in the Balkans. 

SERBIA: FUTURE DIRECTION

The future direction of Serbia is clear. It is towards the EU, NATO, and WTO. 

Serbia made this choice in the fall of 2000, when it defeated Milosevic and his regime in a peaceful, non-violent, electoral battle. This was the long sought after victory achieved by an alliance of democratic political parties, civil society, democratic 

media, the citizens and youth. This civic, democratic victory was home-grown and 

achieved after many struggles and through a long, painstaking learning process that 

began in 1990. This is a cardinal positive democratic legacy for the future. Although 

difficult maybe to understand today, it will prove to have been the defining moment 

of Serbia’s democracy. 

All the subsequent elections (in particular the parliamentary in December 2003, 

and the presidential ones in June 2004) have confirmed this choice and the new concomitant deeper political sociology of Serbia: namely that (broadly speaking) the majority of the Serbian electorate votes for the democratic parties, against a minority 

who votes for a combination of old-regime, populist, chauvinist parties. 

Thus, the mid-term future is easily foreseeable. Serbia will join the other countries of the region on the path to full EU integration; it will become a candidate 

for membership and will begin EU membership negotiations after signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement, hopefully soon. It will become member of 

Partnership for Peace and will rapidly begin work on a Membership Action Plan 

(MAP) for NATO. It will join the World Trade Organization and with a projected 

5.5% growth rate this and next year it will be catching up its neighbors, and attracting investments due to a much greater degree of certainty and stability. 

The real issue we are addressing here today, and in general, is the very short 

term—the next nine months in its geopolitical, political, economic, security, judicial 

aspects. The question is: how does Serbia navigate the upcoming straits, the Scylla 

and Charybdes, and sail into the chartered waters of the full integrative processes? 

In fact the integrative processes are happening in parallel while the country addresses the outstanding unresolved issues. 

I will briefly attempt to portray the current issues by addressing the difficulties 

and obstacles in the path of Serbia’s movement forward, but also how Serbia has 

become a responsible and prudent neighbor and regional partner, as well an engaged contributor to stability and security in the region and is making its first steps 

of contributing to global security operations. 

SERBIA AT THE BEGINNING OF YEAR SEVEN OF TRANSITION

Here are two stories to show that only a complex view of transitional processes 

in general, and in Serbia in particular, can help us understand how far we’ve come 

and how far we need to go.

1. It is just three months ago, on June 22, 2006, that two US Air force F–16s 

from the Aviano air-base in Italy flew to Serbia and landed at Batajnica airbase accompanied by two MIGs of the Serbian Air force—for a friendly visit. 

These were planes that had bombed Serbia only seven years ago. The Minister of Defense of Serbia and generals of the Serbian Air force were on hand 

to greet them. The event was accompanied by extensive press reports and 

no negative reaction of any significance was aired. I believe this example, at 

the time when in another country there were protests against a similar 

event, exemplifies in a specific way the state of mind and heart about where 

Serbia’s alliances are and where the future direction of the country is, notwithstanding the fact that those of us who lived with our families through 

the 78 days of the bombing will carry that traumatic experience with us always.

2. It was during the seventh year of the transition in Spain after the end of 

Franco’s regime, that a certain Colonel Tejero with a group of officers entered the Spanish parliament and attempted to turn back the wheel of democratization by overtaking violently the Spanish Cortes.

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Serbia in two weeks enters into its seventh year of democratic transition. One has 

to think back to the end of 1995. To the situation and challenges faced by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were still nine years away from EU membership. Slovakia was had still three more years to go under Meciar’s rule. 

The intention of these examples and comparisons is to draw attention to the fact 

that, although different, certain patterns in the processes of confronting the difficult 

legacies of the past are discernable, and should be taken into account when analyzing the current situation and determining what can be expected about the path 

forward and its speed. 

Briefly, Serbia confronted a most complex political landscape after October 2000: 

a government in which the victorious democratic family had to share power with 

the old regime until December 2000 in the Serbian Parliament, and until February 

2003 in the Federal, i.e. State Union Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro. This 

is often forgotten. Mrs. Mira Milosevic, sat as a member of the State Union Parliament until February 2003 (when she fled the country to go to Russia, where her 

son had fled in October 2000). 

Once having taken the reigns of power at the level of Serbia (within the still Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic initiated a fast paced democratization and modernization reform and privatization process which helped Serbia lurch forward. These were the days of the reform ‘‘dream team.’’ Slobodan 

Milosevic was arrested and sent to the ICTY in June 2001 followed by numerous 

other indictees. Djindjic began towards mid-2002 to set up a whole judicial framework for the struggle against organized crime and war criminals. The result was 

the creation of a special court for war crimes and organized crimes, with protected 

witness schemes to begin eradicating the bad legacies of the criminalized state left 

by Milosevic’s regime through due process. This meant complying with and addressing the required obligations of international law. 

The Spanish Colonel Tejero, in his Serbian guise proved to be much more dangerous, because parts of the state security services plotted to turn the wheel of Serbian democratic reform backwards by assassinating Prime Minister Djindjic in 

March 2003. This was a severe and traumatic blow to Serbia’s fledgling democracy 

in year three. It took away the most committed and determined of Serbia’s leaders—

a true enlightened democratic modernizer. 

Fortunately, thanks in greatest part to Zoran Djindjic’s own Herculean efforts and 

results in democratic state institution building, Serbian democracy was able to 

throw the gauntlet back in that traumatic moment. By introducing a short lasting 

state of emergency the government of Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic rounded up 

the perpetrators of the assassination and of many other previous crimes and put 

them on trial. 

The killing of the Prime Minister slowed down dramatically the initial pace of reform. Serbia went into an electoral cycle at the end of 2003 and has had a government led by Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica since March 2004. 

SERBIA: CURRENT ISSUES

Serbia is faced with several practical domestic political choices. Should it call for 

elections before going into the final stretch of the resolution of the future status of 

Kosovo? Or should the current government run its full course and hold elections 

within, more or less, the regular time frame of 2007? 

It is my firm belief that the future democratic direction of Serbia will be confirmed at the next parliamentary elections (whenever they take place—before the 

New Year or in 2007). All relevant polling data (even the most recent published last 

week by CESID and Medium-Gallup) and in depth surveys over the past three years 

show that a coalition of democratic parties carries the majority, even though the 

Radical Party may result in being the strongest single party in an election. The political reality is that it will not be able to form a government. 

But, clearly, such a potential victory for the democratic family of parties has to 

be most assiduously and seriously worked for. It can be earned by addressing the 

needs of the electorate and more particularly the disillusioned citizens, prone to abstain due to what they perceive as ‘politicking’, instrumentalization of politics for 

personal or particular ends, a slowness in accomplishing promised reforms and betterment of standards of living. There has been much procrastination on a number 

of issues and this has led citizens to feel lest out. 

SERBIA AND MLADIC

Several considerations have to be taken into account, but the defining issue the 

one on which all issues hinge in the short term is the whole issue of the obligations 

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toward the ICTY, and in particular the necessary arrest, by Serbian authorities, and 

delivery of Ratko Mladic to the Hague. 

It is this remaining Gordian knot that stands out as the key obstacle in Serbia’s forward movement. 

The current government and its Prime Minister, after having neglected cooperation with the Hague Tribunal as a state priority, went through a dramatic change 

of mind when under their watch 16 indictees ended up in the Hague from February 

to April 2005. But everything stopped after that, notwithstanding strong rhetorical 

pronouncements that Mladic was a priority and that ‘‘he should have been in the 

Hague yesterday.’’ Serbia, its 7.5 million citizens, finds itself hostage to the fact that 

it has not fulfilled its international legal obligations. 

When will Ratko Mladic be apprehended and sent to The Hague? The EU Brussels administration again last week called for Serbia to fully implement its own Action Plan designed to make the search for Mladic and the remaining indictees more 

efficient. US Ambassador John Clint Williamson was in Belgrade last week with the 

same message. 

The great majority of public opinion in Serbia will not flinch when Mladic is arrested and sent to The Hague just as it did not when the same fate befell Milosevic. 

Serbia is ready and eager to move forward. This stalled situation is frustrating the 

need to accelerate the reform process and catch up to the countries in the region 

that are ahead. Everyone is carefully observing every move and statement of the 

government to see whether we are closer to this goal. 

Were Mladic to be arrested the full positive policy direction of EU and PfP/NATO 

integration would come into play. This would bolster the country in a significant 

way. The image of the country would be boosted and self-confidence would be buttressed. 

The future of Kosovo and Metohija, the Autonomous Province of Serbia, under UN 

Security Council Resolution 1244 control, is being negotiated and debated today at 

the UN General Assembly by all he relevant international and domestic actors. 

The Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, US) within the EU seems inclined to a form of conditional independence for Kosovo which would be defined by 

a new UN SC resolution. Many questions arise. Will Russia and China obstruct or 

accept (abstain) such a solution? Will the EU take over the protectorate mandate 

from the UN as it seems by the latest decisions of the European Council preparing 

an EU mission? How many troops will remain? Currently there are around 17,000. 

Will it remain a NATO mandate or will the EU take over as it did in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina? How will the high levels of organized crime and corruption be dealt 

with? Will there be an international judicial presence? In other words, what would 

be the substance of the adjective ‘‘conditional’’ and how long would it last for? 

The question of regional Balkan stability arises with regard to this future status 

of Kosovo. Nearly all regional leaders from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and others 

in less open ways are concerned with the impact of an imposed or partially imposed 

solution, one in which the parties are not in full or partial consent. Whatever the 

solution to the future status of Kosovo, respect for human rights, for the right of 

return, for local rights of self-government, for the right of the Orthodox Church to 

have a special status as an institution, for the right of heritage sites to have full 

protection and sustainability—all have to be upheld. This is what was supposed to 

be the ‘‘standards’’ that should have been implemented before defining the ‘‘status.’’

It is clear now that the situation is advancing to a definition of status towards the 

end of this year (with a possible postponement until spring), heavily conditioned, a 

continuing protectorate, under which only then standards should be implemented. 

The question for Serbia is how it will react in case such a potential process goes 

forward. The Serbian Parliament last week voted to stipulate in the new constitution being prepared and slated to be finalized by the end of the year, that Kosovo 

and Metohija have been, are and will be part of Serbia. But in the statements made 

by both the President and Prime Minister a response using violent means has been 

fully ruled out. 

The new constitution that was stated as the key priority of the incumbent government is now at the top of the agenda, and the political parties seem to be edging 

towards a compromise on its content. Were it to be finalized and presented to the 

people of Serbia for a Referendum, there is great likelihood that it will be passed. 

The great lacunae of this process is that there is as yet virtually no real public debate on the substance of the constitution. It would be desirable that the Serbian 

public be given a chance to deliberate on what for any country is a grounding document that defines its present and future. 

The vote in a referendum for a new constitution would open the way for parliamentary elections. The ruling coalition party G17 had indicated in May 2006 

that, were the negotiations between Serbia and the EU to remain suspended, the 

20

party would leave the Government thus creating a governmental crisis. There are 

speculations in fact that G17 ministers would resign, keeping in that way their 

promise, while being obliged to stay in their posts as caretakers. 

SERBIA ADDRESSING ORGANIZED CRIME, WAR CRIMES AND CORRUPTION. 

It should be noted that Serbia is one of the rare countries in the region in which 

a Supreme Court Judge has been arrested (Ljubomir Vuckovic in September 2004) 

and tried for corruption and sentenced to eight years in prison. There have been 

a number of arrests in the principal Commercial Court pertaining to what has been 

named the ‘‘bankruptcy mafia.’’ Investigations are still on course. The US Government last week in Belgrade gave a $9.4 million grant to work on 

revising legislation and procedures related to bankruptcy. 

The courts dealing with war crimes have been fully active. The most recent closed 

case is on the Vukovar, Ovcara farm crime, with severe sentences for the accused. 

Regional cooperation in the Dayton triangle (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 

Serbia) is very intense. The public prosecutors of the three countries have reiterated 

their willingness to cooperate and exchange information and materials. A weeklong 

meeting on issues of Transitional Justice, in Igalo, Montenegro this summer under 

the auspices of UNDP, allowed judges and prosecutors to exchange and discuss their 

mutual experiences relating to war crimes trials, issues of reparations for war victims, the necessary reforms to state institutions and to establishing truth about the 

past. They agreed to establish a permanent regional working group. 

The process of establishing an independent judiciary has proved to be one of the 

most difficult issues in countries of post-communist transition.The Serbian case is 

additionally burdened with the issues of the legacy of the war of the 1990s and of 

the brutal assassination of the Prime Minister by state security services. 

The trial against those who perpetrated the killing of Prime Minister Djindjic has 

now been ongoing for three years. It has advanced all too slowly with many twists 

and turns, which has made it particularly frustrating for the family of the late 

Prime Minister and for democratic public opinion. Due process is being respected 

and the trial will probably arrive at a condemnation of the accused in the not too 

distant future. The trial suffered a set-back with the resignation of the chief judge 

in the trial (Marko Kljajevic), the reasons for his resignation are not fully clear. 

It is important to note that the most severe sentences have recently been passed 

(against the same indictees) in the trial for the assassination of Ivan Stambolic, 

former President of Serbia. In his closing statement the public prosecutor, Mioljub 

Vitorovic, linked Slobodan Milosevic directly to this crime and said that he was at 

the top of this pyramid of (state) crime. The Supreme Court of Serbia confirmed the 

sentences of 40 years for the key accused persons. Prosecutor Vitorovic’s mandate 

as a special prosecutor was not renewed, and this caused much criticism and 

disheartedness. 

SERBIA’S MILITARY AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

In a testimony I gave to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 14, 

2004, I stressed the importance of Serbia and Montenegro being accepted in NATO’s 

Partnership for Peace. I have repeated this plea at a hearing in front of this Subcommittee on April 5, 2005. What I stressed and repeat here today is that it is 

hugely detrimental to the goal of stability, security and peace in the Balkans to 

have the then two, now three remaining countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia) outside of this crucial institution which moves the military and 

its country into a collective security alliance. 

We are now in 2006, two months away from NATO’s Riga Summit. It would benefit all were the three countries to be taken into the Partnership for Peace program. 

Need I remind that Belarus is for example a member? 

It is worth here stressing that the US Government has seen fit to go around this 

problem and in the recent past has developed intense bilateral relations between the 

Pentagon and the Serbian Army. Exchanges have been intense. President Boris 

Tadic during his visit to Washington DC two ago signed a Status of Forces Agreement. Furthermore an agreement of cooperation was signed in Columbus, Ohio with 

the National Guard of Ohio. 

The Serbian Government in addition last month decided that the Serbian Army 

would send contingents to the multilateral forces in both Afghanistan and Lebanon. 

An idea to send Serbian troops to Afghanistan was initially proposed by Prime Minster Zoran Zivkovic in the summer 2003 during his visit to Washington DC. 

All this stems among other from the fact that integration into NATO is defined 

as a priority in the National Defense Doctrine, which was voted on by the parliament of then Serbia and Montenegro a year ago. 

21

The reform of the military overall and in particular of military security is a key 

chapter on Serbia’s way forward. Many officers in the Military are regaining and 

eager to regain their rightful position domestically and in international missions, 

after having been as an institution instrumentalized by politicians in the 1990s. A 

new generation is rising of which the acting Chief of Staff is an example. They 

would like to follow in the paths of those Serbian military traditions who were with 

always (except for the 1990s) part of the Western Alliance throughout World War 

I and II, and in key peace keeping missions after WW II. One need only mention 

that a then Yugoslav general Slavko Jovic was head of the UN monitoring mission 

in 1988 after the eight year Iran—Iraq war. 

Membership in Partnership for Peace would support all democratic reform minded 

citizens of Serbia but those in the military especially. 

Security in the Balkans is still and shall be dependant on the presence, in particular in the protectorates on the United States, the European Union and NATO. 

They are seen as the guarantors in the ongoing EuroAtlantic processes. 

REGIONAL AND BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS AND SERBIA’S ROLE

Regional collaboration and cooperation is an untold story of the Balkans. Its 

multifaceted forms have grown and branched out across the region. The homegrown 

South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) is one of the most significant 

intergovernmental institutions of the region. It has spearheaded an agreement on 

cooperation in the field of energy, by the announcement of the creation of a regional 

energy market. One only needs to read the Sarajevo Declaration of 21 April 2004 

emerging from the summit meeting the heads of state of the SEECP to realize the 

range and depth of ongoing initiatives in the fields of combating organized crime, 

security and defense exchanges, asylum, migration and sustainable return. 

Serbia has taken an active role in these processes. Goran Svilanovic, chairman 

of the Democratization working table of the Stability Pact has taken an active part 

in reforming the Stability Pact for SEE, with the Chair Erhard Busek and others. 

But what is unseen to a broader international public is the intensity of the regional and bilateral dialogue. President Tadic was the first foreign president to visit 

newly independent Montenegro. On the same regional trip he visited the Krajina 

region of Croatia together with President Stipe Mesic and addressed the Serbian minority there urging that their loyalty is with their state of Croatia. In Bosnia and 

Herzegovina Tadic strongly emphasized that it was in Serbia’s utmost interest to 

see a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina prosper and that issues of a referendum 

in the entity of Republika Srpska were not on the agenda. 

Serbia is playing a key role in helping create a multilateral free trade agreement 

in the region, to be in fact part of CEFTA. This should spur free trade, leading eventually to a custom’s union and ultimately integration into the EU’s single market. 

The negotiations are ongoing at moments difficult due to differing levels of economic 

production in a variety of spheres. 

To many this is an invisible network. But it has taken on a life of its own and 

is a crucial component of the general movement toward reconciliation and toward 

the recognition, fostering and then buttressing, of common interests and approaches 

to joint challenges. 

The visit of Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader to Serbia on July 22–23 July, 

this year was a major bilateral achievement. All issues between the two countries 

were laid out and addressed—some resolved, some with well defined ways of resolution. The Serbian—Croatian bilateral relationship is key to the overall stability in 

the region of the Western Balkans and this visit has confirmed the understanding 

of the responsibility that both sides have to strengthen it. 

Bilateral relations with all other countries are most positive notwithstanding unresolved issues that at moments are prone to flare up. 

SERBIA’S CIVIL SOCIETY

It should not be left unsaid that Serbian civil society plays an important role in 

the overall democratic process. Whether through social support programs, cooperating as much as possible to the extent that the government opens spaces, on the 

Poverty Reduction Programs, on advocacy to implement legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act, or simply and importantly raising its voice when injustice, 

intolerance, hate speech, violence rear their ugly head. 

In dealing with the past civil society has been and is playing an important role, 

often working together with certain media outlets. One example is the documentary 

on ‘‘Vukovar’’ co-produced by a Serbian (B92 Television) and a Croatian team which 

was extremely well accepted by publics in Belgrade and Zagreb and then received 

the key Prize at the Sarajevo documentary film festival. 

22

The efforts that civil society organizations have put into dialogue and reconciliation efforts are commendable. In particular currently a variety of projects are ongoing in which Serbs and Albanians are involved together at the community level for 

example. 

Civil society is playing an important role in cross-border cooperation and transferring best practices. 

Donors are still present and apart from the European Union as the most important donor, the US government through USAID and its implementing agencies, as 

well as Swedish, Dutch, German donors are making a significant contribution. This 

effort should be continued and reinforced as we go into the final stages of stabilization in the region. 

The German Marshall Fund of the United States and its project of the Balkan 

trust for Democracy which I lead, are a long ten year commitment to the regions 

efforts at democratic consolidation 

CONCLUSION

Serbia along to being a ‘‘normal,’’ post-communist transition country, has an additional immensely burdening legacy of the retrograde, anti-democratic regime of the 

1990s. This recent past had struck back through the assassination of the Prime 

Minster Zoran Djindjic adding to the difficulties and slowing down what had begun 

as an accelerated exit from the past into the future. 

A policy creating a strong constituency for reform, bringing together political parties, civil society and economic actors ready to take over responsibilities and the 

hard work of change is warranted for. Only this can allow Serbian society to dispel 

the lingering nefarious fantasies of the past. 

Leadership is needed at all levels both domestically and internationally in the 

case of Serbia and the Balkans so as to arrive at stable and secure region. The Montenegrin referendum and the lead-up to it demonstrate how when domestic and 

international actors focus, they can prove that by playing by consensually accepted 

rules, outcomes become acceptable. This should be replicated in other instances. 

These processes must be conducted with care and caution 

The magnet of Europe and its transformative (soft) power are defining as I mentioned at the beginning the behavior of all regional actors and so of Serbia as well. 

All wish to be in the EU and NATO and will thus align their acts to that goal. 

It is time also for business leaders to play a much more active role in taking the 

country forward. It is only by creating the full conditions of an enabling investment 

environment with a breaking down of a variety of still existing monopolies that the 

economy will be able to begin fully prospering. 

As the past and conflict recede in time, the vision of integration takes precedence. 

The attraction that the model of membership creates, the virtue of precedent of 

post-communist countries entering the EU and NATO in 2004—all provoke a pulling 

effect, 

The future of Serbia and of the whole Balkan region is within the EU and NATO.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Vejvoda. You have already answered one of the questions that I was going to ask from 

your standpoint. I would like to ask Dr. Serwer: How strong a support for the SRS do you see there is for the SRS? And do you see 

any prospect of it coming into power? And if so, what would the 

consequences be if that party entered into the national government? 

Mr. SERWER. The polls show the Radicals with somewhere in the 

low 30s by way of support. There are a lot of people who feel that 

there is kind of a ceiling on their support. That they cannot go 

much higher. I am not so sure about that. I think in a referendum 

on Kosovo, and an electoral campaign that follows, that they could 

really do quite well. 

But I do not think it makes any difference. This is a democratic 

system. They are an unreformed Greater Serbia Party. They supported thugs and deployed thugs during the early 1990s but they 

cannot do it again. They do not have Milosevic in power to help 

them do that, and the neighbors will not allow it anymore. And the 

internationals will not allow it. 

23

My view is that if Serbia wants to be governed by these people 

and chooses them in a democratic election, I find it hard to object. 

I find it, however, much easier to decide the issue of Kosovo if they 

are in power. I am frankly quite concerned that what Ivan Vejvoda 

suggests is not true. I am concerned that Tadic and Kostunica will 

not do as well as he thinks, and I am not so sure that they will 

decide to govern together either. 

Mr. Kostunica shares the Greater Serbia views of the Radical 

Party. There is no difference between them on whether Kosovo is 

an integral part of Serbia and on whether part of Bosnia should be 

part of Serbia. These are well-established views, and frankly I 

think there are real possibilities that a right-wing nationalist coalition would come to power in Serbia. But again, I do not see anything like the kind of trouble that they caused in the past. I do not 

see anything like that in the future, and I think we could readily 

prevent it. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you. Ambassador Rondos, your answer to 

the same question? 

Ambassador RONDOS. Thank you, and thank you for giving me 

the opportunity because I completely differ with Dr. Serwer on this. 

This is not the Prime Minister Kostunica that I know. He is a patriot. Thank goodness we have them in every country. He has a 

deep feeling for all Serbs who are within his borders and those who 

are without the borders. That is a perfectly justified point of view 

to have. 

But this is a man who is a democrat, a constitutionalist, and a 

darn good politician who knows exactly where his limitations are. 

What he is struggling with is how to choreograph the fate of his 

country and the politics of his nation over the next 12 months. This 

is absolutely fundamental to understand, I think. 

Prime Minister Kostunica is clear, as everyone is, that Kosovo is 

a historic part of the Serbian territory. He also knows and understands what is happening in terms of political reality as it unfolds. 

Secondly, I have been struck by the fact that Prime Minister 

Kostunica has come out repeatedly to note that whatever happens 

with Kosovo, it will be done only with legal means, and also President Tadic and Kostunica have come out recently arguing very 

strongly to tell the Bosnian Serbs that they must do everything 

that they can to exist within Bosnia itself. 

I think that needs to be acknowledged, that they have those 

views that are what I call patriotic. There is a definition here between ugly nationalism and healthy patriotism. They put them 

squarely in the camp of healthy patriots, and then good for them, 

and we have all got to learn to deal with that too. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Vejvoda, maybe you want to give that a shot 

as well. 

Mr. VEJVODA. I will just add a few elements to what I have already said. The polls have showed that the Radicals are the party 

that comes out on top, and there are many reasons for that. There 

is a lot of social discontent. Apart from being a nationalist party, 

it is a party that gathers a lot of the social protest vote or inclinations of those who have paid the cost of unemployment as we have 

gone through the economic transition. 

24

But conversely there is a lot of disillusionment with the government and with the democratic parties who have not been able to 

deliver on a more prosperous Serbia, and I think we have seen that 

in all transition countries from the Baltics in the north to the countries in the south. And it behooves those democratic parties, as we 

go into an electoral campaign, to mobilize those who have been disillusioned and who in fact are part of what I would call a silent 

democratic majority that needs to be gotten out of their houses and 

come out and vote that day. 

So the polls do reflect, of course, a current reality but I think 

that reality will be different come decision-time in the booth when 

people will cast their vote. But more seriously, the deeper political 

sociology that emerges from all the polling over the past 3 years, 

not to mention the past 6 years, is that a democratic coalition, 

whether it is spoken of or unspoken of, wins the day in the elections, but it requires the work of the leaders and of the party members to go out and do that door-to-door campaign to explain why 

it is important that we do not have the Radicals win. 

They might come out on top as they did in the last election but 

ultimately it is the democratic parties who come below them that 

will have a majority of the votes to constitute the next government. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Before I defer to the gentleman from Florida, the 

Ranking Member, I have been called to the Intelligence Committee, 

so you are going to have to forgive me. I am going to turn the 

Chair over to Congressman Poe, and with that, Mr. Wexler, you 

are on. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. And again forgive me for having to leave. 

Mr. WEXLER. As you are leaving, Mr. Chairman, I just want to 

thank you for organizing a fascinating discussion, and to each of 

the panelists, I think we benefit greatly from hearing your very 

candid thoughts. 

I am trying to marry, to a degree, the three responses. Dr. 

Serwer, if I understand this correctly, if you are right and no Serbian politician will ever be able to deal with Kosovo in a fashion 

that will satisfy the international community so, therefore, do not 

delay; and the worst that can happen is the more radical elements 

gain power which, under your view, then makes it easier for the 

international community to determine the question of Kosovo; if 

you are right, I think I understand the consequences. But if you 

are wrong, and we moved on Kosovo too early, which then had the 

ripple effect that these two witnesses speak of and we undermine 

to a degree the ability of people like President Tadic, who I think 

at least from an American point of view would always be advocating a more responsible position, then we will have compromised 

or completely undermined the opportunity for a more rational, 

more moderate approach to an end game in Kosovo. 

I understand what happens if you are right and I think I understand what happens if you are wrong. The only thing we lose by 

testing to see whether you are wrong, to determine whether you 

are right, is 12 months. If we assume you are right, then we never 

find out whether you were wrong because there will not be any opportunity. 

25

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Wexler, I am afraid this is an argument for 

postponing almost any decision. 

Mr. WEXLER. But it is only 12 months, in fairness. It is not 5 

years or 10. 

Mr. SERWER. It does not even have to be 12 months. The fact of 

the matter is, that if Belgrade calls elections tomorrow or calls for 

the referendum, approves the Constitution and calls elections, they 

can do that. We cannot do a thing about it, and it will cause a postponement. But why would you expect things to be better after a 

referendum and election in which the only serious issue is whether 

Serbia is to hold onto Kosovo or not? 

You cannot expect of democratic politicians, responding to their 

constituencies, as they should, more flexibility after a referendum 

and an election campaign of that sort. The fact is that they have 

shown no flexibility up until now. They are painting themselves 

into a corner intentionally to be able to give as little as possible, 

and inviting an imposed solution. 

It seems to me that to back off at this stage would be to try the 

patience, if I may put it that way, of 2 million people in Kosovo. 

This is a situation in which there are two sides to the equation. 

Mr. WEXLER. Absolutely. In your view, may I ask you, are the 

people in Kosovo better off or worse off if the Radicals win the election? 

Mr. SERWER. I think most people in Kosovo would see a Radical 

victory in the elections as confirming what they believe is true, 

which is that Serbia is determined to hold onto Kosovo and has not 

given up the greater Serbia program in its heart. That there are 

people who have given it up, that there are people who look forward to NATO and the EU, I have absolutely no doubt. They have 

very little traction on that issue, and you can see it in the failure 

to capture Mladic. 

There is no question in anyone’s mind that for a good part of the 

year, since the fall of Milosevic, Serbia could have taken Mladic. 

The question may be whether they know where he is now, but that 

they could have at one time is absolutely clear. Why did they not? 

Mr. WEXLER. If I could follow, and this will be it for me for now; 

as you understand American foreign policy interest in the region, 

are we better off or worse off if the Radicals win the election? 

Mr. SERWER. Look, I am a believer in democratic process, and I 

think we are best off if we stop trying to tamper with the democratic process in Serbia. There has been a pretty concerted effort 

from Washington over several years now to prevent Kostunica’s 

Government from falling. This kind of diplomacy does not impress 

me. 

I think we are committed to a democratic system in Serbia, and 

have to be committed to the results. If the Radicals come to power, 

I have no doubt but that that will delay some good things that 

could happen between the United States and Serbia, but it would 

be the choice of the Serbian citizens not of the United States. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thanks. 

Mr. POE [presiding]. Chair recognizes Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The argument 

from Mr. Rondos and Mr. Vejvoda seems to be, do not decide 

Kosovo now because by doing so will just strengthen the hands of 

26

the Radicals in Serbia. The converse, the opposite of that, is if you 

do not decide it now you strengthen the hands of the Radicals in 

Kosovo because everything is an action and reaction. 

There are two sides to the equation. I think the Serbian people 

have a decision to make, and I hope that Serbia will eventually become part of the European Union and even NATO, and I hope that 

the United States and Serbia will have a long and fruitful alliances. Mr. Vejvoda pointed out Serbia has been an ally of the 

United States for the better part of the 20th century anyway. 

I think that the Serbian politicians really need to start talking 

the truth to the Serbian people, and the truth is that for whatever 

reason—and certainly Milosevic’ genocide and ethnic cleansing is a 

major reason—that Serbia has lost Kosovo. It may not be fair. It 

may not be right. It may even be in people’s hearts. 

They feel it is an outrage, but the fact is you have 2 million people living in Kosovo that do not want to be ruled by Belgrade, and 

if there had been a more enlightened leadership in Belgrade 

throughout the course of the 1990s and early 21st century, perhaps 

it could have been different. But you cannot go back and what it 

is, it is. You know I think that Serbian politicians need to tell their 

people the truth, and they are afraid to tell their people the truth 

because they are afraid of what the reaction would be. 

But I will tell you something. I think that to delay this decision 

on Kosovo would be the absolutely worst thing that can be done, 

and I think that ultimately once Kosovo becomes an independent 

country—and it will—I think that it will accrue to the benefit of 

Serbia as well because it is a monkey that Serbia can finally throw 

off its back, and it does not mean that Kosovo should become independent and that the Serb interest in Kosovo should be ignored, because there are still many Serbian people living in Kosovo. Serbian 

citizens living in Kosovo. They have to be protected. Serbian holy 

places, religious places, have to be protected. 

There are going to have to be all kinds of safeguards, and it is 

no blank check for Kosovo. They are going to have to be democratic 

and abide by the same principles that we would expect Serbia to 

abide by. I think Dr. Serwer pointed out that Serbia has not turned 

over General Mladic to the International Criminal Tribunal. The 

former Prime Minister of Kosovo turned himself in when he was 

indicted, and the rhetoric out of Serbia just continues without abeyance. 

So I want to see Serbia integrate into the region with North Atlantic structures, but I do not believe that the region or Europe 

should be held back while Serbia is held up by its Radicals or while 

it clings to false hopes that it will hold onto Kosovo. We should get 

on to settling the status of Kosovo, and we should do it before the 

end of the year. It needs to be done, and we need to finally try to 

put that region on an even keel. 

While I am sympathetic somewhat to the people who say, ‘‘Please 

do not punish us for what Milosevic did’’—and that is why I think 

that there are plenty of carrots that can be offered to Serbia, European Union admission, NATO admission, all kinds of things—we 

need to do that. We owe it to the Serbian people but we cannot 

close our eyes and pretend that the ethnic cleansing and the genocide never existed. 

27

So that is my statement. Anyone wants to comment on it, I am 

very happy to do it, but let us also remember that you have got 

2 million Albanians in Kosovo who are not going to take kindly to 

another delay. We have Radicals, Radicals do not only exist on the 

Serbian side. They exist all over, and moderates exist all over. And 

I think the moderates in Kosovo and Pristina, we want to strengthen their hand as well, and the way you do it is by coming to the 

only conclusion I think that can become, and that is decide 

Kosovo’s status now. Anyone who wants to comment on that I 

would be happy to hear what they have to say. 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Engel, I wonder if I could just comment along 

these lines, and I know you do not disagree with this. The biggest 

obstacle between Kosovo and final status that comes from inside 

Kosovo is the failure to treat the Serbs correctly and to get them 

back to their homes. And so it seems to me that is where the moderates in Pristina have their obligation really to make returns and 

correct treatment of the Serbs a top priority. 

Mr. ENGEL. Dr. Serwer, I could not agree with you more, and I 

have said that wherever I go, and I am convinced that the leadership in Pristina understands that and means it. I just hope that 

we can get the same thing out of the leadership in Belgrade. 

Ambassador RONDOS. Mr. Engel, I think you are raising an absolutely critical issue, and I think there are a couple of things here. 

Speaking as someone who looks at the region and deals with the 

region from Greece, so it is an integral part for us existentially, 

Greece is a nation which has almost a million Albanian immigrants 

who are part of our life daily, for example. 

We have an historic relationship with Serbia as well. So looking 

at it from that perspective, it is absolutely clear that we must 

make sure that when we discuss the Kosovo situation we do not 

end up dancing on the head of a pin. There is an issue here about 

how this region is going to emerge in the best possible way, and 

as soon as possible heading toward Europe, NATO, all those good 

things in life. 

And I think that you are touching on the critical issue. There are 

2 million Albanians in Kosovo who feel they have an absolute, profoundly-felt sense of unrequited destiny. Let me put it that way. 

And that is something that has to be acknowledged by everyone in 

the region. That is absolutely clear cut. 

I think that there have been two things that certainly worry me, 

and I reduce this now to the tactical level. If we want to come out 

to a region, an entire region, that is not just Serbian, an entire region that is in the European Union, associated with NATO, prosperity on the rise, rule of law, all those things that we are desperately in need of, we need to arrive at two points. 

One is how can we get Albanians and Serbs actually to be talking to each other rather than talking through international diplomats? I mean this is my own personal view, and with all respect 

to the process that is occurring in Vienna in the like. Sooner or 

later people have to sit at a table and just talk to each other and 

come to some arrangement, and I hope that starts happening soon. 

I say this irrespective of the timing of elections and timing of decisions. That is the way you negotiate with maturity and arrive at 

a solution that will be to everyone’s benefit in the long run. 

28

Now, on the question of delay, I tend to look at it quite simply 

by saying that I think that everyone understands where the reality 

lies, but in terms of politically, I see it as political choreography. 

How do we make sure that everyone, especially those who are moderate on both sides of this equation, can arrive and emerge as winners? This is the key. Is it before or after? I happen to think if one 

could wait until after Serbian elections there would be democrats 

in Serbia emboldened to deal with issues. 

I may be proven wrong but that is my view, and my hope is that 

at the same time there would be the moderates—of whom there are 

many in Kosovo—who would also be ready then to sit at a table 

and start hammering out the sort of deal that will make everyone 

better off. But ultimately it is about how the region, not just Serbia, has a soft landing, how a whole region lands, and that I think 

is the question we need to really come to grips. 

Mr. ENGEL. If I might quickly, I know we have taken a lot of 

time and I apologize; there are those in Serbia, let us face it, who 

hope to delay this as much as possible and then ultimately hope 

to buy off some kind of a partition of Kosovo. 

I just think that partition is the worst thing that we could think 

about because once you start changing borders in the Balkans—you 

gentlemen know better than I—there is no end to it, and I think 

we better be very, very careful, and frankly I think that the sooner 

we get on with what needs to get on with—you mentioned, Mr. 

Rondos, that everyone pretty much knows what the end game will 

be. The sooner we do it, I think, the better it will be not only for 

Kosovo but I think for Serbia as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I just have a couple of questions. I would ask that you 

make it kind of simple. I am from Texas, and I would really prefer 

that it be very simple. Explain to the Western mind, and I am talking about the American mind, why there is a difference in independence for Montenegro and independence for Kosovo in the eyes 

of the Serbs. Who wants to take that on? It is a good question. 

Mr. VEJVODA. I can give the constitutional and historical answer. 

Kosovo became part of Serbia in 1913 after the Balkan Wars and 

prior to the creation of Yugoslavia or, rather, the Kingdom of 

Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Fast forward to post-Second World 

War, the republics that were constituted in the then-Yugoslavia 

were six, and Montenegro was a part and parcel republic whereas 

Kosovo was ‘‘only an autonomous province within Serbia’’ which 

had another autonomous province which was Vojvodina. 

This was all enshrined in the last Constitution of the former 

Yugoslavia in 1974, where the republics did have the right to selfdetermination, as many Communist Constitutions had, but this 

right was not given to the autonomous provinces. That is sort of 

the legal answer that you would find. 

Mr. POE. Anybody else want to make a comment on that? Mr. 

Serwer. 

Mr. SERWER. Ivan is impeccable in his description of the legal situation. The real situation is that they could not do anything about 

Montenegro so they did not, and if Kosovo is granted a different 

status by the international community, by the Security Council, the 

same thing will happen. They will not be able to do anything, and 

they will not. 

29

Mr. POE. I want to thank all three of you for being here. You 

know, as you mentioned, Mr. Vejvoda, the United States and Serbia have been allies for a long time. A lot of people do not know 

that, and in World War II, especially, the Serbian underground 

helped a lot of American fliers that were shot down, at the risk of 

their own lives, to get them back into allied hands, and a very good 

friend of mine who is now 93 is proud of his Serbian heritage, and 

emigrated to the United States, and he was one of those men that 

worked in the underground for 5 years helping the allies. But I 

want to thank all three of you for being here, and this Committee 

meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:28 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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