U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Two Firefighter Deaths in 

Auto Parts Store Fire

Chesapeake, Virginia

USFA-TR-087/March 1996

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Security

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T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

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during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

The U.S. Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from Division Chief Thomas 

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Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Two Firefighter Deaths in Auto 

Parts Store Fire

Chesapeake, Virginia

Investigated by: J. Gordon Routley

Jeff Stern

This is Report 087 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EMW-94-4423 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

BUILDING DESCRIPTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Construction and History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Initial Actions Prior to Calling 9-1-1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Emergency Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Initial Size-Up and Company Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Original Assignment Dispatched. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Battalion Chief’s Arrival and Second Alarm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Engine 1 and Ladder 2 Arrive, Third Alarm Called. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Engine 3 Reports They Are Trapped, Roof Collapses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Extinguishment and Body Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

TIMELINE OF EVENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Fire Cause and Flame Spread. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Roof Collapse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Cause and Nature of Firefighter Deaths. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Fire Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Operational Risk Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Was it appropriate for Engine 3 to initiate an interior attack with the 

number of personnel on the scene?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

When should the interior crew have been ordered to evacuate the building?. . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Safety Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

APPENDIX A: Pre-Fire Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

APPENDIX B: Communication Center Transcripts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

APPENDIX C: Changes Initiated bythe CFD Sincethe FireChesapeake Fire

Department InitiativesTruss Identification Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

APPENDIX D: Photographs ofthe Advance Auto Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

1

Two Firefighter Deaths In Auto Parts Store Fire 

Chesapeake, Virginia

(March 18, 1996)

Investigated by: J. Gordon Routley

Jeff Stern

Local Contact: Division Chief Thomas H. Cooke

 Fire Marshal

 Chesapeake Fire Department

 304 Albemarle Drive

 Chesapeake, Virginia 23320

 (757) 382-6165

OVERVIEW

On March 18, 1996, two firefighters were killed in Chesapeake, Virginia when they became trapped 

by a rapidly spreading fire in an auto parts store and pre-engineered wood truss roof assembly collapsed on them. The cause of the fire was an electrical short created when a power company truck 

working in the rear of the building drove away with its boom in an elevated position, accidentally 

pulling an electrical feed line from the main breaker panel at the rear of the store. Post-incident investigations indicate that the electrical fault may have sparked multiple points of fire origin throughout 

the roof structure of the building, due to improperly grounded wiring.

This is another incident illustrating the rapid failure of lightweight construction systems when key 

support components are involved in a fire. It points out the importance of pre-fire planning and 

accurate size up by fire companies to determine the risk factors associated with a fire in this type 

of construction. Lessons regarding importance of initial company actions, constant re-evaluation of 

action plans, strong command and coordination of units on the fireground, and recognition of signs 

of impending structural failure were also reinforced.

This incident was investigated by the City of Chesapeake Fire Department Fire Marshal’s Office. 

Incident investigations and analysis were also conducted by the National Fire Protection Association, 

the Virginia Power Company, and the Virginia State Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

The Chesapeake Fire Department serves a rapidly growing area of 353 square miles in Tidewater, 

Virginia, just west of Virginia Beach and south of the City of Norfolk. The department has 319 career 

firefighters and EMS personnel that provide service from 14 fire stations. The estimated population 

in the City of Chesapeake is 170,000. The initiatives taken by the Chesapeake Fire Department as a 

result of this incident are listed in Appendix C to this report.
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issue Comment

Staffing The first alarm response provided a small attack force with limited capabilities. The full 

response brought only 10 personnel.

Size-up The first arriving company officer was not able to determine the location and extent of the 

hidden fire.

Pre-fire plan Information This complex required a pre-fire plan due to the complex arrangement, multiple occupancies, 

mixed construction, lack of fixed protection, limited access and difficult water supply problems. The first-due company did carry a pre-fire plan that showed the layout of the shopping 

center and the floor plan for the auto parts store, but the pre-fire plan was not referenced by 

the crew during the fire.

Delayed response The first arriving company was on the scene alone for several minutes with only 3 personnel. 

The back-up companies had long response times. The lack of evidence of a working fire 

prompted the initial incident commander to return some of the responding units, resulting in 

even longer response times.‐‐

Water Supply The first-in company did not establish a water supply. This required the second engine 

company to be committed to this task.

Incident Command The battalion chief was faced with a complicated and rapidly changing situation. He was not 

able to effectively transfer command from the initial officer and direct the operations of widely 

separated units.

Operational risk management The officers involved in the initial part of the operation had to make critical risk management 

decisions with limited information.

Accountability Accountability for the personnel operating in the hazardous area was not established prior to 

the structural collapse. As the situation became critical, no one realized that a crew was still 

inside the building.

Rapid intervention crew Additional crews did not arrive in time to assist the crew that was in trouble inside the 

building.

Radio communications The lack of a clear radio channel for fireground communications caused serious problems 

with command and control of the incident, including the failure to maintain communications 

with the crew inside and the failure to hear their request for assistance.

Lightweight construction The roof collapsed quickly and with very little warning. This should be anticipated with a lightweight wood truss roof assembly. This hazard was not recognized by the crews on the scene.
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 3

BUILDING DESCRIPTION

Construction and History

The fire occurred in a modern, lightweight construction building that was added to an existing 

strip mall in 1984. The older mall on exposure side four was separated from the fire building by a 

masonry fire wall and was constructed with masonry walls and a steel bar-joist roof structure. The 

exposures on side two consisted of additional stores that were similar in construction to the auto 

parts store. There were no exposures on sides one and three (Figure 1).

The auto parts store was constructed with two masonry exterior walls and two wood frame exterior 

walls, with a lightweight wood truss roof assembly. It was approximately 120 feet deep and 50 feet 

wide, providing about 6,000 square feet of open display and storage space. The roof assembly was 

a pre-engineered lightweight wood truss assembled from 2 x 6 top and bottom chords, with 2 x 4 

web members held together with metal gusset plates. There were no interior bearing walls or supports for the roof structure. At one end, the trusses were supported by a wood plate that was bolted 

to a metal beam1. The other end rested on top of the concrete block wall. Each truss was separated 

by 24 inches and they were covered with 1/2 inch CDX plywood sheathing under a two-ply rubber 

membrane. A drywall ceiling was attached to the underside of the trusses, creating a truss void space 

(truss loft) 24 to 36 inches above the ceiling. A drywall divider was located in the middle of the truss 

void as a draft stop. The roof had a slight pitch (Figure 2).

Three air handling units were on the roof of the building, with an estimated combined weight of 

3,000 pounds. It is not known when these units were installed and they may have represented an 

unanticipated dead load on the roof assembly. There was no indication that the trusses had been 

reinforced to support the extra weight of these units.

The original truss roof structure collapsed during the construction of the building, injuring three 

workers. Most of the trusses were damaged and had to be replaced at the time.

The fire building was occupied by Advance Auto Parts, a chain distributor of automobile parts and 

lubricants. The store was designed with an open retail area containing display racks for goods. A long 

counter ran from front to back behind which was shelving for additional auto parts. Waste oil and 

batteries were kept in a rear storage area separated from the front of the store by a drywall wall. The 

southwest corner of the building contained employee restrooms which had a small water heater 

located in the ceiling space just above them. (Figure 3).

The main entrance to the store was through two large glass doors at the front of the building. A delivery and service entrance was located in the rear and a 40 foot trailer was parked behind the building 

and used for additional storage.

1 Post incident investigations by the Chesapeake building inspector revealed that these ends may not have been properly 

secured to the beam.
4

ORE TS STAR

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Figur

UTVANCE A

View from the Northeast 

nerCor

AD
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 

5

ORE TS STAR

e 2 

O P

Figur

UTVANCE A

uss roof as viewed from front to back 

uilding. of the b

AD

Dissection of the tr
6

ORE TS STAR

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Figur

UTVANCE A

yout and Storage La

AD
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 7

THE FIRE

Cause

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 18, 1996, a power company employee set up a service truck 

at the rear of the Indian River Shopping Center in Chesapeake, Virginia. The worker was going to 

disconnect the electrical power to a customer who had not paid an electric bill. The customer, a cocktail lounge and bar, was located adjacent to Advance Auto Parts. In preparing to disconnect service, 

the power company worker elevated the articulating boom on his truck to roof level. Faced with the 

immediate loss of power, an employee of the lounge paid the electric bill while the power company 

employee was beginning work, and went to the back of the store to show the receipt. A stamped 

receipt indicates the bill was paid at 11:16 a.m. at a supermarket also located in the shopping center. 

The power company employee, working from the bucket of the articulating boom, lowered the 

boom and verified the receipt. Although the bucket had been lowered, the hinged elbow of the 

articulating boom remained elevated. The employee then radioed his supervisor from the cab of his 

truck, and received instructions not to disconnect power.

The power company employee then attempted to drive the service truck away, forgetting to secure 

the boom, which snagged on a power line feeding the meter at the rear of the Advance Auto Parts 

store. This caused a phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground arcing fault at the store’s electrical meter, 

starting the fire. The power company employee immediately stopped, exited his truck, and cut the 

remaining power connections to the meter at the rear of Advance Auto Parts.

Initial Actions Prior to Calling 9-1-1

After cutting the power line to the building, the power company employee removed the meter, 

noticed smoke coming from the meter base, notified his office and requested that another power 

company crew and a supervisor come and assist him. An employee of the Advance Auto Parts store 

came to the rear of the building and met the power company employee, telling him that the store 

had lost electrical power and that a fire was being extinguished inside the building. Another Advance 

Auto Parts employee discharged a dry chemical fire extinguisher on the spot fire that had started 

near the hot water heater above the employee restrooms. All believed the fire had been extinguished 

at this time.

At 11:29 a.m., the Chesapeake Fire and Police Emergency Operations Center received a 9-1-1 call 

from Advance Auto Parts reporting a problem with the fuse box in the store. The Chesapeake Fire 

Department was dispatched to a report of a fuse box sparking at 4345 Indian River Road at the 

Advance Auto Parts store.

Emergency Response

Initial response consisted of two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief, for a total of 10 

personnel. Engine 3 was the first due arriving company, responding from quarters. Engine 1 and 

Ladder 2 also responded. Battalion 1 was dispatched as the command officer, but requested that 

Battalion 2 cover the assignment since he was out of position. Battalion 2 acknowledged the request, 

and he responded with the first alarm companies.

Engine 3’s crew consisted of three personnel: a driver/pump operator; Firefighter Specialist John 

Hudgins, serving as Acting Lieutenant for the shift; and Firefighter Specialist Frank Young, detailed 
8

to the station for the day, was riding in the jump seat. Engine 3 was responding in a reserve engine 

that had a 500 gallon water tank.

Initial Size-Up and Company Actions

At approximately 11:35 a.m., about five and a half minutes after dispatch, Engine 3 arrived on the 

scene at the front of the strip mall. Hudgins reported “a single-story commercial structure, nothing 

showing from the front. Engine 3 is in command.”

Engine 3 took a position in front of the Advance Auto Parts Store. Hudgins and Young entered the 

structure from the front of the building to investigate. Conditions were clear in the store, and there 

was no visible smoke or flames showing. They discovered light smoke near the electrical panel in 

the rear of the building, and radioed to Battalion 2 that they had a fire and were checking for extension. Action Lieutenant Hudgins then radioed for Engine 3’s driver to reposition to the rear of the 

building.

Hudgins then radioed to Battalion 2, who had not yet arrived on the scene, that Engine 3 and Ladder 

2 could handle the incident. Battalion 2 and Engine 1, the second due engine company, both went 

in service.

Original Assignment Dispatched

About one minute later, the crew from Engine 3 discovered additional fire in the building and 

requested the original assignment continue to the scene. Battalion 2 and Engine 1 both acknowledged and started back to the call.

The driver/pump operator of Engine 3 observed light smoke coming from the roof-line on side two 

as he repositioned to the alley on side three of the store. Hudgins and Young met him at the rear of 

the building, where heavier smoke was showing from the edge of the roof. The firefighters pulled 

two 1 3/4 inch attack lines off Engine 3. Firefighter Young used the first attack line to sweep the 

rear of the building, where flames had started to come from the roof-line at the top of the rear wall. 

Acting Lieutenant Hudgins donned his SCBA and entered the rear of the building with the second 

attack line. Engine 3’s driver directed firefighter Young to assist Acting Lieutenant Hudgins, who was 

inside the building. Young closed the nozzle on his attack line, placed it on the ground, and followed 

the first attack line into the rear of the building.

Battalion Chief ’s Arrival and Second Alarm

Approximately eleven minutes after the time of dispatch, Battalion 2 marked on the scene, observing 

light gray smoke at the decorative arches in front of the building and a light haze of smoke inside 

the structure. Less than one minute later, Battalion 2 radioed for a second alarm, reporting “flames 

showing,” and requested police assistance with evacuating exposure occupancies. Two additional 

engines were dispatched for the second alarm. The battalion chief then proceeded to evacuate the 

exposures on sides two and four of the auto parts store (Figure 4).

Hudgins radioed to Battalion 2 that they had a fire in the ceiling and needed an additional crew to 

don SCBAs and come inside with pike poles to pull ceiling. Battalion 2 acknowledged the transmission and radioed that he had “a fire showing – building fire showing from outside.”
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 9

Engine 3’s driver radioed to Battalion 2 that he needed the second due engine company to lay a supply line to him at the rear of the building. Battalion 2 radioed to Engine 1 to confirm that they had 

understood the request.

Engine 1 and Ladder 2 Arrive, Third Alarm Called

Engine 1 marked on the scene approximately thirteen minutes after dispatch. As they passed by the 

front, a firefighter on Engine 1 noticed smoke and some fire in the front of the store, rolling down 

to the floor, and observed a strong draft pulling air into the building. Engine 1 then proceeded to the 

rear to reverse lay a supply line from Engine 3 and establish the water supply.

Once in the rear, the firefighter and the officer from Engine 1 observed one attack line from Engine 

3 that stretched into the back door of the Advance Auto Parts Store. Heavy smoke was visible inside 

and fire was coming from the roof in the rear of the store. The officer instructed Engine 3’s driver 

to set up a 2 1/2 inch attack line. In the time it took to prepare this line, the firefighter from Engine 

1 reported that the rear entrance to the building had become fully involved with fire, and the attack 

line into the rear door had burned through. Engine 3 ran out of water at this time and was unable 

to charge the 2 1/2 inch attack line. Engine 1’s officer attempted to contact Battalion 2 by radio, but 

was unable to get through.

Simultaneously, Ladder 2 was arriving in the front of the building and taking a position on side two 

of the store. While the diver was setting up the aerial to go to the roof, the officer and firefighter 

from Ladder 2 were preparing to enter the front of the building to assist Engine 3’s crew, but the 

officer noted heavy smoke inside the store and a large volume of air being drawn in through the 

front doors.

He determined that it was unsafe for his crew to enter the building and advised his driver to set up 

for defensive operations. Ladder 2’s officer then met with Battalion 2 in front of the building and 

suggested that a third alarm might be needed due to the growing size of the fire.

About eighteen minutes after dispatch, Battalion 2 reported “a working commercial building fire 

fully involved.” Within the next minute, he transmitted a request for a third alarm. At this time, 

Engine 1 was still in the process of laying five inch hose from Engine 3 to a fire hydrant located at 

the far corner of Indian River Road and MacDonald Road.

Engine 3 Reports They Are Trapped, Roof Collapses.

At approximately 11:49 a.m., almost 20 minutes after the initial dispatch time, Hudgins radioed that 

he and Young could not get out of the building. Battalion 2 radioed back that he could not understand their transmission. Hudgins then radioed that they needed someone to come to the front of 

the building and get them out. Again unable to understand their transmission, Battalion 2 radioed 

for any unit on the fireground to advise him if they heard the message that was transmitted. Engine 

4 responded that they were unable to copy the transmission. Engine 14 then marked the scene and 

was instructed by Battalion 2 to lay a supply line to the front of the building. Battalion 1, enroute to 

the fire on the second alarm, radioed to Battalion 2 that it sounded like someone was trapped inside. 

Battalion 3, also enroute, radioed that he would be on the scene momentarily and would assist.

At this time, Ladder 2’s crew was setting the outriggers and preparing to elevate their aerial ladder 

for defensive operations. In the short time it took to accomplish the stabilization of the ladder truck, 

the front of the store became fully involved, the building contents ignited, and the roof collapsed. 
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series ORE m Units TS ST Alar AR e 4 st O P Figur UTVANCE A ositions of Fir AD Initial P
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 11

Figure 5

INDIAN RIVER SHOPPING CENTER
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Due to the radiant heat, Ladder 2 was forced to retrace their outriggers and reposition to a safer 

defensive position on side one of the structure, and set up the aerial again. Ladder 2’s crew did not 

hear Engine 3’s transmission that they were trapped.

Simultaneously, Engine 1 ran out of supply line about 200 feet short of the hydrant. Engine 2, 

responding on the second alarm, picked up the hydrant that Engine 1 was attempting to reach and 

laid a supply line to one side. The driver of Engine 1 attempted to contact his officer by radio to 

advise that he could not reach the hydrant, but could not get through due to heavy radio traffic. He 

parked the engine in the roadway, donned his SCBA, and went to the rear of the building to report 

to his captain and rejoin his crew. Battalion 3 arrived on side one about this time and radioed for all 

companies to switch to channel two, an alternate fireground tactical frequency.

Driven by the northerly wind and the draft created by the burning contents of the structure, the fire 

at the rear had grown in such intensity that personnel were forced to move Engine 3. Assisted by 

employees of the power company, Engine 3 was moved back away from the rear of the building. At 

11:55 a.m., about 26 minutes after dispatch, the Captain of Engine 1, with his crew at the rear of the 

building, confirmed to Battalion 2 that “I got men on the inside from Engine 3, and the lines have 

been burned. I do not know their status, and we still have no water to go in after them.”

Battalion 3 met with Battalion 2 and discussed that they may have lost a crew inside. Battalion 3 

assumed command and Battalion 2 went to the rear of the building to coordinate rescue efforts. 

There, Battalion 2 met with the Captain from Engine 1.

By this time, the building was fully involved and no rescue efforts could be mounted until the fire 

was knocked down. Officers at the front and the rear attempted to conduct a personnel accountability report (PAR) to determine who was missing and where they might be located. An engine 

company responding on mutual aid from the Virginia Beach Fire Department was flagged down, 

connected to Engine 1’s supply line, and completed the water supply to a hydrant behind the shopping center within the City of Virginia Beach. Engine 3 was forced to move back once again, and the 

supply line was disconnected from Engine 3 and used to supply water to Engine 4, a telesquirt that 

was positioned for defensive operations at the rear.

Extinguishment and Body Recovery

The fire spread to the attic of the exposures on side two and was held in check by the fire wall on 

side four of the building. The fire was brought under control as the contents of the auto parts store 

burned off and several aerial streams were put into operation.

After the fire was extinguished, a search for the missing firefighters was initiated. After the bodies 

of the firefighters were located, they were packaged and removed from the fire building by members of the Virginia Beach Fire Department, and transferred by members of the Chesapeake Fire 

Department to medic units. The body recovery was supervised by the Chesapeake Fire Department 

Fire Marshal’s Office and documented. An investigation was immediately started by the Chesapeake 

Fire Department Fire Marshal.
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 13
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 15
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 17
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 19

ANALYSIS

Fire Cause and Flame Spread

The fire was caused by the electrical short created when the power company truck struck the power 

line to the building. Investigation by the City of Chesapeake Electrical Inspector after the fire revealed 

that the meter contained wiring that appeared to have been tampered with and did not comply with 

the electrical code. Several connections at the meter had been doubled-lugged, connecting multiple wires to single terminals. Additional investigation by Virginia Power revealed that the building 

may have been improperly grounded, leading to numerous hot connections when the short circuit 

occurred. The main fuse did not trip at the breaker panel and the wiring on all three air handling 

units had been fused. This probably resulted in the ignition of multiple spot fires in the truss loft 

above the store.

It appears that the fires in the truss loft were still relatively minor when Engine 3 arrived, but the 

fire spread rapidly throughout the space due to the light wood construction. The wind drawn from 

the open doors at the front of the building also promoted rapid fire growth. This would have created 

a tremendous hidden fire in the wood truss loft area despite clear conditions inside the structure. 

Reports of heavy smoke and fire conditions on the roof at the same time Engine 3’s crew was calling 

for pike poles and personnel to come inside are indications towards this scenario.

The interior of the auto parts store contained racks of auto parts and supplies, including oil, lubricants, rubber and plastic parts. The contents were packed closely together and stored in tall racks near 

the ceiling. Once the fire had broken through the ceiling in the rear of the building, these contents 

would have quickly reached their ignition temperatures, creating flashover conditions in the rear of 

the store as the fire progressed, trapping the firefighters and forcing them to seek an exit at the front 

of the store.

Roof Collapse

The collapse of the pre-engineered truss roof occurred approximately 21 minutes after the time of 

dispatch, and within 35 minutes of the initial accident that caused the electrical short. The structure 

appears to have collapsed within 10 to 12 minutes after the truss space became heavily involved. 

The collapse of similar truss assemblies under fire conditions within this time period has been well 

documented.

Post-incident investigations indicate that this truss assembly may have been weakened by deficiencies 

in the connection of the trusses to the beam on the east side of the building. Also, the dead load of 

the three air conditioning units may have contributed to the rapid failure of the roof.

Reports from firefighters on the scene indicate that a partial failure of the truss assembly may have 

occurred in the rear of the building, followed shortly by the failure of the entire roof assembly. It is 

possible that the crew of Engine 3 was trapped by the partial collapse of the roof in the rear, or by the 

collapse of racks containing auto parts in the building, or by the rapid spread of the fire and smoke 

which had broken through the ceiling. It is also possible that a combination of these events occurred 

simultaneously. The failure of the entire roof assembly and complete involvement of the interior of 

the building with fire took place within one minute after the firefighters radioed for help, before any 

reaction to assist them could take place.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Cause and Nature of Firefighter Deaths

The cause of the deaths of Firefighters John Hudgins and Frank Young can be attributed to becoming caught and trapped by rapidly spreading fire and falling debris, followed immediately by the 

collapse of the trussed roof. Autopsies determined the nature of their deaths as burns from direct 

flame exposure. The autopsies indicated that Firefighter Specialist Young, who was found with his 

mask on, had a blood carboxyhemoglobin level of 11 percent. Firefighter Specialist Hudgins, found 

without a mask on, had a blood carboxyhemoglobin level of 25 percent.

Fire Operations

Initial Response- The first alarm assignment was overwhelmed by the situation, the circumstances, and 

the unusual sequence of events that occurred at this incident. It is evident that a larger force would 

have been needed to initiate an effective offensive or defensive operation for a working fire in a 

6,000 square foot commercial occupancy, with attached exposures on two sides, with or without 

the unusual complications. The response of two engine companies, one ladder company and a battalion chief, provided a total of only 10 personnel on the initial assignment. The individual companies, 

which responded with three person crews, had limited capabilities to perform tasks independently.

This incident generated only a single call to 9-1-1 reporting an electrical problem. In most communities only a small percentage of potential structure fire responses actually turn out to be working 

fires and most of those incidents can be identified from the information that is received from callers. 

It is a common practice for many fire departments to send a limited initial response to possible structure fires and to dispatch additional companies if the first arriving units report a working fire. Many 

fire departments also dispatch additional companies if multiple calls are received or the information 

indicates a probable working fire.

In this case, there was no indication of a working structure fire when Engine 3 arrived. Response 

times for the second arriving engine and the ladder company were relatively long due to the location 

of the incident, which was in a remote point within the city limits of Chesapeake. The second due 

engine was further delayed by two to three minutes as a result of being canceled, then redispatched, 

As a result, Engine 3 was on the scene with only three personnel for eight minutes before any other 

companies arrived.

The response times for multiple alarm companies responding from other Chesapeake stations were 

also long, due to the location of the fire. The first of these companies was just arriving when the roof 

collapsed. After the first due engine, the next closest companies were located in the City of Virginia 

Beach; however, these companies were requested on mutual aid only after the second alarm.

Offensive Attack - Engine 3 had been on the scene for approximately four minutes before the crew 

realized that there was a working fire above the ceiling and the officer reinitiated the response of the 

second due engine and the battalion chief. At this point, the fire was spreading rapidly within the 

truss loft. The company initiated an interior offensive attack on the fire in the truss space of the auto 

parts store. The first preconnected line from Engine 3 was operated from the exterior, where flames 

had broken through the panels that enclosed the trusses. This line was operated for approximately 

one minute before the second line was advanced into the rear section of the auto parts store.

The battalion chief arrived and assumed command of the incident at about the time the line was 

being taken inside the building to begin the interior attack. At this point the fire in the truss space 
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 21

was growing rapidly and there were only four personnel at the scene: the officer and firefighter from 

Engine 3 were operating the line inside the building, the pump operator was outside at the rear, and 

the battalion chief had assumed command of the incident at the front of the shopping center. The 

engine officer, who was operating the hoseline inside, could not see how quickly the fire was developing above the ceiling. The pump operator knew that the officer and firefighter were inside, but his 

concern was directed toward the need for a supply line, because Engine 3 was still operating on tank 

water. Their reserve apparatus did not have a functioning tank gauge, which made it impossible to 

determine how much water was left in the tank.

The battalion chief was alone at the front of the complex, where he could see heavy smoke and 

flames coming from the roof at the rear of the auto parts store. The visible fire conditions prompted 

him to transmit a second alarm almost immediately after assuming command. He knew that Engine 

3 was operating at the rear, but he was not specifically aware of who was inside or what conditions 

they were encountering at that time. The need to evacuate exposures conflicted with the need for a 

strong command presence at this critical stage of the incident.

Engine 1 was committed to the rear as soon as it arrived in order to establish the water supply for 

Engine 3. While the captain and the firefighter from Engine 1 hooked up the supply line to Engine 3, 

the driver began to lay a 5 inch supply line to a hydrant. Engine 1’s officer could see that Engine 3’s 

line went inside the building and recognized the need for a 2 1/2 inch back-up line. By the time the 

back-up line was ready, flames were issuing from the door where the attack line had entered, but the 

back-up line could not be operated before the supply line was charged. No one at the rear anticipated 

or was aware of the problem of Engine 1 running out of hose before reaching a hydrant.

The offensive attack also required support functions, which are usually performed by ladder companies. The multiple support functions that are required for a fire in a building of this size would 

normally require at least two ladder companies; however, only one ladder company was dispatched 

on the initial assignment.

Before Ladder 2 arrived, Engine 3 had requested assistance inside the store to open ceilings and 

expose the fire. Upon arrival, the officer and firefighter from Ladder 2 prepared to enter, but by the 

time they reached the front door, the smoke and fire conditions inside the auto parts store made 

entry impossible. The driver who remained outside, began to set up the aerial ladder to reach the 

roof; however, no additional personnel were available to provide ventilation or perform other outside functions at that time. Conditions were deteriorating quickly at that point, making it necessary 

to reposition the ladder truck for defensive operations. The officer and firefighter had to assist the 

driver in moving the vehicle. There was no one immediately available to assist the two firefighters 

inside the building, and their request for help went unheard by crews on the scene.

Incident Management - The Chesapeake Fire Department has a documented incident command system 

which is in accordance with National incident management practices and guidelines; however, incident management was disorganized prior to the collapse of the roof. Several factors affected the management of this incident, including the difficulty in establishing water supply, calling for additional 

resources, and difficulty in communicating with units on the fireground while additional units were 

dispatched on the same frequency. The rapid fire spread and failure of the trussed roof assembly 

emphasized the need for command to be established and coordinated early in the incident, and for 

clear strategic goals to be determined, prioritized and carried out tactically under the supervision of 

sector commanders.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Operational Risk Management

There are several important issues related to operational risk management at this incident. Every fire 

officer must be prepared to make these types of critical decisions based on a risk management assessment of each operational situation. When examining the decisions that were made at this incident, 

it is important to consider the information that was available to the individuals who had to make 

those decisions at the time.

The first risk management issue relates to the decision to initiate an interior attack; the officer in 

charge of Engine 3 had to decide on an appropriate action for the situation, based on his assessment 

of the risks that were involved. The second risk management issue relates to the failure to evacuate 

the building before the interior attack crew became trapped. 

Was it appropriate for Engine 3 to initiate an interior attack with 

the number of personnel on the scene?

The analysis of this incident has caused a significant discussion over the number of personnel who 

are required to be on the scene of a structure fire to initiate an interior attack. NFPA 1500, the 

Standard for a Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 1992 edition, states that 

a minimum of two personnel must enter and work together as a team inside a hazardous area and 

that at least one individual must remain outside and must maintain an awareness of the location and 

function of the entry team members. This requirement could be satisfied with the three crew members on Engine 3, the officer and firefighter inside and the pump operator outside.

A tentative interim amendment (TIA) to NFPA 1500, adopted in 1993, added a requirement that 

a minimum of 4 members must be assembled at the scene before initiating an interior attack at a 

working structure fire, which is define as a fire that requires the use of breathing apparatus and at 

least a 1 1/2 inch attack line. This would be at least nominally satisfied by addition of the battalion 

chief, who arrived at about the same time as the attack line was being taken into the building

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the U.S. Department of Labor issued 

an interpretation on May 1, 1995, which is based in part on NFPA 1500 and in part on the OSHA 

standard for respiratory protection 29 CFR 1910.134. This interpretation has been referred to as the 

“2-in/2-out rule.” It makes reference to the NFPA requirement for a minimum of two personnel to 

work together inside a hazardous area – using a “buddy system.” It also refers to a requirement in 

the OSHA regulation for “men” to remain outside with the capability of rescuing workers who are 

using respirators in an atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).

The NFPA and OSHA requirements could be satisfied with four personnel on the scene, if two 

members remained outside while two entered the hazardous area. To meet all of the requirements 

the personnel outside would have to account for and maintain communications with the personnel 

inside, and would have to be prepared to assist or rescue them.

The Federal OSHA interpretation was issued in the form of an enforcement policy directive to 

agencies that enforce the Federal OSHA regulations. The Virginia Department of Labor and Industry 

enforces these regulations under a “State plan agreement” with the U.S. department of Labor. At the 

time of the incident, the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry had not announced its intentions with regard to an enforcement policy for fire departments in Virginia or taken any enforcement 

actions.
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 23

Accountability - The Chesapeake Fire Department had a standard operating procedure and had practiced the use of a personnel accountability system, but it was not implemented until after the roof 

collapse occurred. The Chesapeake Fire Department uses a system of magnetic helmet shields and 

plastic name tags. Each firefighter uses a helmet shield for the unit he is assigned to for the shift. The 

plastic name tags are placed on a common 2 inch by 5 inch Velcro strip or “passport” in each unit, 

and are then passed on to the sector officers or incident command post at the emergency scene. The 

system is used by all departments in the Tidewater, Virginia region. The Chesapeake Fire Department’s 

Incident Command System manual also provides for the establishment of an Accountability Officer 

to administer the Personnel Accountability System (PAS) at emergency incidents.

Since no sector officers were initially assigned to the rear of the building at E-3’s location, the passport would have been inaccessible for Battalion 2, at the front of the building. CFD PAS policy states 

that “passports and tracking of those companies should be delegated to a sector officer as soon as 

possible.” Due to the limited number of personnel on the fireground, nobody was available to be 

assigned to this rear sector until after the firefighters became trapped. The policy also calls for the 

dispatcher to use an alert tone and notify the incident commander after every twenty minutes of 

elapsed time in a working incident. This notification was not made. A personnel accountability report 

(PAR) is also called for at any report of a missing or trapped firefighter, any change from offensive to 

defensive modes of operations, or any sudden hazardous event at the incident. An evacuation order 

was not issued when heavy fire became evident from the roof, nor was a PAR called for during the 

set up of defensive operations or at the time of the roof collapse.

The CFD’s 14 page policy on fireground safety clearly states that “Ground crews must be notified 

and evacuated from interior positions before ladder pipes go into operation.” The policy also calls 

for the establishment of a Safety Sector. A specific section of this policy is titled “structural collapse” 

and states that “under fire conditions light weight wood truss and bar joist roof construction can 

be expected to fail after minimal fire exposure,” and goes on to state that “It is the principal command responsibility to continually evaluate and determine if the fire building is tenable for interior 

operation.” 

The battalion chief knew from the radio reports that the officer and possibly one or more crew members from Engine 3 were operating inside the building. He could not see the entry point and could 

not maintain accountability for who was inside or outside at any point in time.

The pump operator knew specifically that the officer and firefighter from Engine 3 had entered the 

building, but from his vantage point he could not see the door where they had entered and could 

not be sure if they remained inside or came back outside or if anyone else entered through the back 

door. His attention was occupied with stretching the back-up line and attempting to obtain a water 

supply. He later stated that he assumed that the interior crew must have made their way out through 

the front of the building when the fire conditions became untenable.

It was not realized for several minutes after the roof collapse that the officer and firefighter from 

Engine 3 were missing. It was impossible to conduct a search until the main body of fire was 

knocked down.

Communications - Each firefighter on the entry team had a portable radio, but the radio traffic quickly 

overloaded the single channel that was available for fireground communications. The Chesapeake Fire 

Department tactical channel was the non-repeated side of the dispatch channel, which was being 

used to dispatch multiple alarm companies, direct move-up assignments, and for other emergency 
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

and non-emergency traffic. This made it impossible to maintain a reliable communications link with 

the entry team.

The incident commander did not have a clear channel to provide instructions or receive reports from 

the company officer on the scene. He had left his vehicle and was trying to size-up the situation and 

evacuate the adjoining occupancies, while using a portable radio to communicate. At least one radio 

channel should be dedicated to tactical operations at working incidents and someone outside should 

continuously monitor the tactical radio channel that is used by crews working inside a building or 

hazardous area.

The radio traffic also made it impossible for the driver of Engine 1 to advise his officer or the incident commander that he had run out of hose. This caused a major delay in completing the supply 

line for Engine 3, which also contributed to the tragic outcome of the incident. 

Rescue Capability - The pump operator and the battalion chief both had protective clothing and 

breathing apparatus available to enter the building, if they had known the entry team members were 

in trouble and needed assistance. The pump operator was occupied with the water supply problem, 

while the battalion chief was busy trying to evacuate the adjoining occupancies and direct the other 

responding units. However, even if they had been prepared to enter, it is very unlikely that they could 

have rescued the entry team from the burning interior.

The real rescue capability for the interior crew was Engine 1, which was preparing the 2 1/2 inch 

back-up line. The rear portion of the auto parts store was already in flames by the time this line was 

stretched, but it could not be operated until the supply line was charged. The entry team was cutoff from their point of entry and their hoseline came through the area that was involved in the fire. 

Having run out of water, there was no chance for Engine 1’s crew to mount a rescue attempt.

When should the interior crew have been ordered to evacuate the building?

The two firefighters inside the auto parts store may have been the only firefighter’s on the scene who 

could not see that the fire conditions were becoming critical, before they realized that they were 

trapped. At least eight other firefighters were present outside the building before this occurred and 

all of them recognized that the magnitude of the fire was increasing quickly. No one warned the 

entry team to evacuate or heard their request for assistance when they became trapped.

Flames were coming through the roof and the interior was heavily charged with smoke for several 

minutes before the roof collapsed. The critical risk created by the fire conditions should have been 

recognized, even if the personnel on the scene did not know about the lightweight roof construction. In spite of the obvious fire conditions, no one warned the interior crew to evacuate.

The battalion chief knew that Engine 3 was working inside because the officer had asked for a team 

to come inside with breathing apparatus and pike poles to pull the ceiling. The crew of Ladder 2 was 

responding to that request and had determined that they could not enter safely through the front. 

The crew of Engine 1 could not see the line that went through the door and the fire conditions in 

the rear portion of the store. The pump operator assumed that his fellow crew members had made 

their way out through the front of the building.

Battalion 2 had reported that the building was becoming fully involved and requested the third 

alarm before the collapse occurred. Instead of concentrating on command functions, the battalion 

chief was personally involved in taking action, evacuating exposures on sides two and four.
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 25

Lightweight Construction – The critical risk factors of a working fire involving a lightweight truss roof 

assembly and an occupancy with an unusually high fire load were not recognized. Experience has 

shown that this type of roof can collapse after as little as 10 to 12 minutes of fire involvement. If the 

wood truss roof construction had been recognized or even suspected, the interior crew should have 

been ordered to evacuate the building immediately.

Recognition of the wood roof hazard would have required prior knowledge of the building details 

or reference to a pre-fire plan, since it could not be determined from visual observation at the scene 

of the fire. The existing pre-fire incident plan was available in a ring binder on Engine 3, but was not 

referenced by the crew on the response to the fire.2

It appears that by the time the inside crew realized they were in trouble and requested assistance, 

it would have been too late for anyone to rescue them, even if a rapid intervention crew had been 

standing-by outside the building. The entire roof collapsed very shortly after their message requesting assistance was transmitted. Their request for a crew to come in from the front of the building 

suggests that they initially became trapped by the fire which cut-off their path to the rear doors. This 

may have resulted from a partial roof collapse in the rear section of the building or from a ceiling 

failure which caused the highly combustible contents at the rear of the auto parts store to become 

involved in the fire. The major part of the roof collapsed within a minute after they reported that they 

were trapped and requested assistance.

Safety Equipment

All Chesapeake firefighters wear NFPA compliant turnout gear, including PBI/Kevlar turnout coats, 

rubber boots, protective hoods, helmets, gloves, and SCBA with PASS devices.

SCBA – The SCBA worn by Hudgins and Young were both NFPA compliant MSA brand Ultralite II 

models, with 1/2 hour air bottles. The SCBA were sent to NIOSH for testing after the incident.

Turnout Gear The turnout gear worn by Hudgins and Young was damaged by the fire conditions, 

which far exceeded the protective capabilities of the suits due to direct flame exposure. Parts of the 

protective ensemble underneath the firefighter’s bodies were intact. The remains of the protective 

clothing were secured by the Chesapeake Fire Marshal and examined after the fire. No defects were 

discovered.

PASS Devices Hudgins and Young both wore PASS devices. Due to the high heat conditions, these units 

melted when the firefighters were killed, and it was impossible to determine whether they were in 

the on, off, or alarm position.

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

This fire reinforced many operational issues that are essential to safe and effective firefighting operations. (Specific changes made by the Chesapeake Fire Department in response to this fatal fire are 

listed in Appendix C.)

2 The pre-fire plan for the building incorrectly identified the wood truss roof structure as steel truss, but still may have 

provided valuable information and forewarned the firefighters that they were under a trussed roof. During its inquiry, 

the Chesapeake Fire Department determined that John Hudgins had inspected the store two years earlier as part of an 

existing CFD company inspection program that requires all companies to inspect every commercial occupancy within 

their first response each year.
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

1. RISK ASSESSMENT is the primary responsibility of the incident commander.

This incident presented a very high risk to the firefighters who were attempting to make an 

interior attack. However, the risk factors were not recognized and the interior crew was not 

directed to abandon the building. Risk assessment should be a continual process, particularly 

when a situation is changing very quickly.

2. ACCOUNTABILITY is an essential function of the Incident Command System.

The location and operation of the initial attack crew was not tracked according to the incident 

command system that was in effect at the time of the fire. The system must keep track of the 

location, function, status, and assignment of every individual unit or company operating at the 

scene of an emergency incident. In order to be effective, the accountability process must be 

routinely initiated at the beginning of every incident, and updated as the incident progresses and 

units are reassigned to different tasks.

3. TACTICAL RADIO CHANNELS are essential for firefighter safety.

The fireground operations were conducted on the same radio channel as the routine dispatch 

and transfer of additional units, hampering the fireground communications during the important early stages of the incident. Designated radio channels should be set aside specifically for 

communications between the incident commander and the units operating at the scene of an 

incident. The exchange of information, orders, instructions, warnings, and progress reports is 

essential to support safe and effective operations. Tactical channels should be assigned early and 

routinely to avoid the confusion that occurs when units that are already working are directed to 

switch to a different radio channel.

4. FIRE OPERATIONS must be limited to those functions that can be performed safely with 

the number of personnel that are available at the scene of an incident.

The initial response to this incident did not provide enough resources to safely initiate an effective interior attack for the situation that was encountered. The first arriving company initiated 

interior operations that could not be adequately performed or supported with the limited number of personnel at the scene or responding. The delayed arrival of back-up companies increased 

the risk exposure of the first due company. The situation called for a more conservative initial 

attack plan and/or an early retreat when the magnitude of the fire became evident.

5. WATER SUPPLY is a critical component of a safe and successful operation.

The failed attempt to establish an adequate and reliable water supply for the interior attack was a 

critical problem at this incident. This task occupied the second due engine company, which was 

needed to provide either a back-up hoseline to support the interior attack or a rapid intervention 

crew.

6. LIGHTWEIGHT WOOD TRUSS CONSTRUCTION is prone to rapid failure under fire 

conditions.

If the construction of the building had been known or recognized, the early failure of the roof 

structure should have been anticipated and the interior crew should have been withdrawn. This 

requires pre-fire planning to identify high risk properties and a reliable system to label the 

building or to inform the responding units of the risk factors of the building. It is usually difficult or impossible to make this determination when the building is burning.
27

APPENDIX A

Pre-Fire Plans

29

APPENDIX B

Communication Center Transcripts
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 31
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 33
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 35
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 37
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
39

APPENDIX C

Changes Initiated by the CFD Since the Fire

Chesapeake Fire Department Initiatives

Truss Identification Program
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

CHESAPEAKE FIRE DEPARTMENT INITIATIVES

OPERATIONS

C Automatic response of 2nd BC on any working incident to support command structure.

C Developed policy of IDLH atmospheres, including on-site Rapid Intervention Team before entry 

of interior crews.

C Automatic response of EMS Captain to support command staff with personnel accountability.

C Automatic switching to Channel 2 (Fireground Tactical Channel) upon arrival on the scene.

C Developed comprehensive Operations Policy concerning communications and the use of radio 

equipment.

C Developed Truss Identification (TIP) to identify and mark all truss constructionwithin the City. 

Information is included in database and pre-plan books.

C Reinforce use of existing Incident Command System (ICS).

C Reinforce use of existing Personnel Accountability System (PAS).

C Reinforce use of existing PASS device use.

C Training staff automatically deployed to all working incidents, 2nd alarm or greater, to function 

as Safety Support Officers.

C Formed Research Committee to revise current pre-plan documentation data using computer 

based drafting, mapping, and storage capabilities.

EQUIPMENT

C Enhanced ICS Command pack with additional resources to improve command capabilities.

C Added communication equipment to ICS Command Pack to provide ability to communicate/

monitor both fire channels simultaneously.

C Added additional portable radios to each piece of apparatus.

C Research and development program to compare all current S.C.B.A. equipment on the market, 

and make recommendations to the department.

TRAINING

P Mandatory State certification for Incident Safety Officer for all Battalion Chiefs and Staff Chiefs.

C = Completed

P = Planned next year
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 41
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 43

45

APPENDIX D

Photographs of the Advance Auto Fire
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

s efighter e the fir

ear entrance; 

 as e we the fir

her

w of the r

her

wing (1) the door in the rear w

ed the vie

throoms w

). A

lock

yee ba

t b

tesy of the NFP

 sho

 (2) the trailer tha

 and (4) the emplo

Photo cour (ed.er

ear of the store,

ttack line;

w of the r

tion of the utility pole;

y discov inall

ated vie

ed with the 13/4 a

igor

v

(3) the loca

An ele

enter
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 47 w) ro hite cross (ar ). The w.otesy of the NFPA ated position on side tw Photo cour ere found. ( s w e from an elev efighter e both fir ior of the stor hertes w Photo of inter indica
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The truss loft area in another part of the Indian River Shopping Center. (Photo courtesy of NFPA).
USFA-TR-087/March 1996 49 er Shopping Center. ear of the Indian Riv t the r le photo). er to a meter aA fiUSF ( Utility pole connecting pow
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Ladder 2 is shown in its initial position on side two. Time of the photo 

is estimated between 11:50 and 11:52 a.m. 

(Photo courtesy of Chesapeake Fire Department).

Ladder 2 is shown in position on side one. Time of the photo is estimated 

at 11:52 a.m. The supply line in the front of the picture is from Engine 1. 

(Photo courtesy Chesapeake Fire Department).