United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Opportunities Exist 

to Enhance 

Collaboration at 24/7 

Operations Centers 

Staffed by Multiple 

DHS Agencies 

October 2006 

GAO-07-89 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2006

HOMELAND SECURITY

Opportunities Exist to Enhance 

Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers 

Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies 

Highlights of GAO-07-89, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Because terrorists do not operate 

on a 9-5 schedule, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) and

its operational components have 

established information gathering

and analysis centers that conduct

activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a 

week, 365 days a year. Staff at

these operations centers work to 

help detect, deter, and prevent 

terrorist acts. DHS has determined

that out of 25 operations centers, 

four require higher levels of 

collaboration that can only be 

provided by personnel from

multiple DHS agencies, and other 

federal, and sometimes state and

local, agencies. For these four 

multi-agency operations centers, 

this report (1) describes their 

missions, products, functions, and

customers and (2) assesses the 

extent to which DHS efforts to

promote collaboration among the 

multiple agencies responsible for 

the centers reflect key practices for 

enhancing and sustaining

collaborative efforts. To do so, 

GAO visited operations centers,

reviewed data and reports from the 

centers, and interviewed center 

and other DHS officials. 

Each of the four multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers has a different 

mission and therefore produces different products, yet all contribute to the 

larger mission of DHS and have similar functions and customers. Customs 

and Border Protection runs two of the four multi-agency operations 

centers—the National Targeting Center and the Air and Marine Operations 

Center. The former monitors the international movement of potential 

terrorists and produces reports on suspect individuals; the latter maintains 

situational awareness of the nation’s airspace, general aviation, and sealanes and produces reports on suspicious private air and marine craft. The

Transportation Security Administration’s operations center monitors 

passengers on commercial flights; works to mitigate the vulnerabilities of 

commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines, the National Capital Region, 

and critical infrastructure across the nation; and produces reports on these 

topics. DHS’s Operations Directorate runs the National Operations Center 

Interagency Watch and works to enhance efficiency and collaboration 

among DHS components. This operations center has a more strategic 

mission in that it uses information gathered by the other operations centers 

to provide overall national situational awareness, and it prepares security

briefs for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

Opportunities exist to enhance collaboration among 24/7/365 multi-agency 

operations centers. While DHS has leveraged resources by having staff from 

multiple agencies work together, the centers lack joint strategies for 

collaboration and staffing needs assessments, and they have not established 

a definition of watchstander roles for all agencies at each center. The centers 

also lack standards and procedures for using DHS’s primary information 

sharing network; mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; 

and reinforced accountability through agency plans and reports. 

GAO’s previous work has shown that such practices are effective in 

enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. The 

establishment of DHS’s Operations Directorate in 2005 provides a means to 

promote implementation of more collaborative practices at the centers. 

Staff Working to Maintain Situational Awareness at Operations Centers 

Sources: From left to right: TSA and CBP.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Director 

of the DHS Operations Directorate

provide guidance to multi-agency

operations centers to implement 

key practices to enhance and 

sustain collaboration. DHS agreed

with our recommendations and 

identified a number of actions that 

the Operations Directorate plans to

take to enhance collaboration. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-89.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Jones 

at (202) 512-8777 or jonespl@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6

Background 9

While the Four Multi-Agency Operations Centers’ Missions and 

Products Differ, Functions and Customers Are Similar 13 

Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS’s Four MultiAgency Operations Centers 25 

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 35 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35 

Appendix I Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Staffed by One 

DHS Component 38 

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 44 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49 

Tables 

Table 1: 24/7/365 DHS National Operations Centers Staffed by 

Multiple DHS Agencies 3 

Table 2: Description of the Functions Performed by the Four DHS 

Multi-Agency Operations Centers 23 

Figures 

Figure 1: Organizations within the Department of Homeland 

Security That Conduct 24/7/365 Activities 10 

Figure 2: Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information 

and Data 15 

Figure 3: National Targeting Center Sources of Information and 

Data at and between the Nation’s Ports of Entry 17 

Page i GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Figure 4: Modes of Transportation Monitored by the 

Transportation Security Operations Center 19 

Figure 5: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch 

Information and Data Sources 22 

Abbreviations 

AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

NOC National Operations Center 

NOC-Watch National Operations Center–Interagency Watch 

NTC National Targeting Center

TSA Transportation Security Agency 

TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USSS United States Secret Service 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

October 20, 2006 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Norm Coleman 

Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Homeland Security Act of 20021

 established the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) with the primary mission of preventing terrorist 

attacks against the United States. To accomplish this mission, DHS must 

be aware of the potential risks and vulnerabilities faced by the nation, 

including terrorist threats to our transportation infrastructure (such as 

rail, aviation, and shipping); terrorists entering our country through land,

air, and sea ports; and terrorists operating within our borders. Because 

terrorists do not operate on a 9-to-5 schedule, DHS and some of its 

operational components (six DHS agencies and DHS’s Operations 

Directorate2

) have established information gathering and/or analysis 

centers that conduct activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a 

year. Staff at these operations centers conduct monitoring and 

surveillance activities to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts by 

providing real-time situational awareness to a variety of federal, state, and

local governments and private-sector entities. According to DHS, this 

constant situational awareness is needed to facilitate an immediate 

response during times of crisis or other national incidents. 

The six DHS agencies and the DHS Operations Directorate that run 

national operations centers “24/7/365” gather and/or analyze information 

through monitoring and surveillance activities to help detect, deter, and 

 1

 Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

2

 Established in 2005, the Operations Directorate is a separate organization within DHS that 

is responsible for one 24/7/365 center and exists to improve operational efficiency and

coordination across the department, among other things. 

Page 1 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
prevent terrorist acts across the entire United States.3

 In addition, DHS 

conducts other 24/7/365 activities, such as telecommunications services, 

security alarm monitoring, and region-specific operations at a variety of 

other centers. We identified a total of 20 national and 5 regional DHS 

centers that conduct 24/7/365 activities.4

 Twenty-one of the 25 centers 

employ staff from one DHS agency on a regular full-time basis and perform 

agency-specific functions. Appendix I provides details on the missions and 

functions of these centers. 

DHS has determined that the remaining 4 centers have broader security 

missions and require higher levels of collaboration that can only be 

provided by personnel from multiple DHS agencies, and other federal, and 

sometimes state and local, agencies. In January 2003, we designated 

implementation and transformation of the new Department of Homeland 

Security as high risk based on three factors: the enormity of the effort, the 

challenges faced by the components, and the potential impact of failure to

effectively carry out the homeland security mission.5

 Given the critical 

homeland security role played by these operations centers and the 

opportunity to facilitate the department’s transformation efforts by 

maximizing collaboration at the program level, this report focuses on 

these four national operations centers that are “multi-agency,” that is, 

staffed by personnel from more than one agency within DHS, along with 

other federal, and sometimes state and local, agencies. The 4 centers are 

described in table 1. 

 3

 The six primary component agencies that conduct 24/7/365 operations are the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, Customs and 

Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the 

U.S. Secret Service; the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services does not have an

operations center that conducts activities 24/7/365 days a year. 

4

 As defined for this report, the national centers conduct information gathering and/or

analysis activities that cover the entire nation as opposed to a specific region or activities 

limited to alarm system monitoring or communications relays. For example, the U.S. Coast 

Guard has 46 command center locations at the area, district, and sector levels to serve as 

regional points of coordination for operational command and control, communications, 

and intelligence and analysis. Meanwhile, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s

Federal Protective Service Mega-Center System consists of four individual regional center 

locations that provide alarm monitoring to federally owned or leased buildings. We did not

count these DHS regional centers with multiple locations more than once since they

performed the same mission. As another example, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Mobile Emergency Response Support Operations Centers are located in five

regions that we counted as one center, for the purposes of our review. 

5

 GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

Page 2 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Table 1: 24/7/365 DHS National Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies 

Sponsoring 

organization: center Mission

Other participating 

DHS agencies 

Other participating 

agencies outside DHS 

To detect, sort, track, and facilitate 

the interdiction of criminal entities 

throughout the Western 

Hemisphere, by utilizing integrated 

air and marine forces, the latest 

technology, and tactical 

intelligence. 

U.S. Coast Guard Federal Aviation Administration

Department of Defense National 

Guard Bureau-Air National Guard 

Government of Mexico 

Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP): 

Air Marine and

Operations Center 

(AMOC)a 

National Targeting 

Center (NTC) 

To coordinate and support all

agency field-level anti-terrorism

activities by providing tactical

targeting and analytical research, 

and to be a single point of 

reference for all agency antiterrorism efforts. 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

Federal Air Marshals 

Transportation Security 

Administration

U.S. Coast Guard 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Department of State 

Food and Drug Administration

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA): 

Transportation Security 

Operations Center 

(TSOC)b

To provide situational awareness 

and information sharing in day-today coordination and incident 

management for all transportation 

security-related operations and 

issues worldwide by monitoring, 

responding to, and investigating 

security incidents involving all

transportation sectors. 

U.S. Secret Servicec

Customs and Border Protectionc

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

U.S. Capitol Police 

U.S. Air Force 

D.C. Metro Police 

DHS Operations

Directorate: 

National Operations

Center Interagency 

Watch (NOC-Watch)d

To act as the primary national-level 

hub for domestic situational 

awareness, common operating 

picture, combining and sharing of 

information, communications, and 

operations coordination pertaining 

to the prevention of terrorist attacks 

and domestic incident management 

by facilitating information sharing 

with other federal, state, local,

tribal, and nongovernmental

emergency operations centers; and 

by fusing law enforcement, national 

intelligence, emergency response, 

and private-sector reporting. 

U.S. Secret Service 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

Federal Protective Service 

Federal Air Marshals 

Transportation Security 

Administration

Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

National Security Agency 

National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Department of Interior 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives 

Virginia State Police 

Fairfax County Police 

New York, Boston, and Los 

Angeles police departments 

Source: GAO generated based on information from DHS. 

Page 3 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
a

On August 22, 1988, the Customs Air Interdiction Program established the Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence Center, West, at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California. In 

October 1994, the facility was renamed the Domestic Air Interdiction Coordination Center. In 1999, 

marine programs were merged with air interdiction programs, and the name of the Riverside facility

was changed to the Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center. Effective March 1, 2003, the 

center was renamed the Air and Marine Operations Center. 

b

The TSOC comprises three watch functions—the National Capital Region Coordination Center is 

responsible for National Capital Region air security and defense functions; the National Infrastructure

Coordination Center is responsible for continuously assessing the status of the nation’s critical 

infrastructure and key resources; and the TSA Command Watch is responsible for coordinating the 

execution of the TSOC mission. 

c

The National Capital Region Command Center, one of three watch functions of the TSOC, 

constitutes the multi-agency element because it is staffed by other DHS component agencies—the 

U.S. Secret Service and CBP. 

d

Prior to May 25, 2006, the National Operations Center-Interagency Watch was called the Homeland 

Security Operations Center. The Interagency Watch also incorporates staff from DHS’s Offices of 

Information & Analysis; Infrastructure Protection, and Incident Management Division, as well as a

variety of other DHS and non-DHS organizations.

To assess the collaboration among DHS agencies working at each multiagency 24/7/365 operations center, this report answers the following 

questions: 

1. What are the missions, functions, and products of the multi-agency 

24/7/365 DHS operations centers and who are their customers? 

2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing 

and sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers? 

To answer our first objective, we analyzed information obtained from the 

responsible component agencies and the Operations Directorate on the 

mission and functions of all of the 24/7/365 activities in DHS. We visited all 

4 multi-agency centers, as well as centers operated by other component 

agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S.

Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service to observe their operations, 

interview officials responsible for managing the centers, and identify 

centers that employed staff from multiple DHS agencies.6

 From the 4 

national operations centers that employed staff from multiple DHS 

 6

 During incidents or emergencies, other operations centers may employ staff from multiple 

agencies. For example, the Coast Guard’s regional command centers that normally focus 

on a variety of U.S. Coast Guard’s missions and are not normally interagency in structure

have established protocols with other DHS agencies, such as Customs and Border

Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident 

command structure when needed. These U.S. Coast Guard centers have extra space and 

equipment that allow for surge capabilities and full coordination with each partner agency 

to host ad hoc interagency operations. 

Page 4 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
component agencies--the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), the 

National Targeting Center (NTC), the Transportation Security Operations 

Center (TSOC), and the National Operations Center-Interagency Watch 

(NOC-Watch)—we obtained additional information on both the products 

the centers regularly developed and their primary customers. We also 

interviewed several staff assigned to centers from participating DHS 

component agencies—referred to as watchstanders7

—to discuss their 

roles and responsibilities at the centers and the overall mission of the 

centers to which they had been assigned. 

To answer our second objective, we met with the acting director and other 

responsible officials from the Operations Directorate to discuss its role 

and responsibilities. We reviewed transition, management integration, and 

planning and policy documents as well as strategic plans and annual 

performance reports and planning documents from DHS and its 

component agencies. We also reviewed and analyzed the results of studies 

undertaken by DHS to assess and improve coordination and collaboration 

at the multi-agency centers as well as reports from GAO, the 

Congressional Research Service, the DHS Office of Inspector General, and

others that addressed the integration, coordination, and collaboration of 

departmentwide program functions. We then assessed DHS’s efforts 

related to integration, coordination, and collaboration at the multi-agency 

centers to determine the extent to which they reflect DHS’s application of

the key practices we have found can help enhance and sustain 

collaboration among federal agencies and found to be at the center of 

successful mergers and transformations.8

We conducted our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix II includes more detailed information on our scope and 

methodology. 

 7

 For the purpose of this report, we use the term “watchstander” to refer to an individual 

required to work full-time on a rotating 24-hour schedule, 7 days per week, to maintain 

situational awareness, conduct information assessment and threat monitoring to deter, 

detect, and prevent terrorist incidents. A watchstander may also act as a liaison between 

his agency and other agency representatives at the center, and may manage response to

critical threats and incidents. 

8

 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
The four multi-agency operations centers each have their own mission and 

generate different products while performing some similar functions and 

sharing a number of customers. The missions of the AMOC, NTC, and 

TSOC are tactical, including such activities as monitoring the nation’s 

airspace, the movement of potential terrorists, and the passengers on 

commercial flights, respectively. NOC-Watch’s mission is more strategic in

that it collects information gathered by the other multi-agency operations

centers9

 and provides a national perspective on situational awareness for 

potential terrorist activity. The products of the four multi-agency 

operations centers reflect their different missions and range from reports 

on suspicious private air and marine craft from the AMOC, individuals 

entering the country at land, sea and airports from the NTC, and 

individuals traveling on commercial flights from the TSOC, to an overview

of the national threat environment from the NOC-Watch. The multi-agency

operations centers all share common functions such as maintaining 

situational awareness, information sharing and communications; 

coordinating internal operations and coordinating among federal, state, 

local, tribal, and private-sector entities; and managing incidents and 

making decisions. In addition, the AMOC and NOC-Watch exercise 

operational command and control and, along with the NTC, coordinate 

with foreign governments. The four multi-agency operations centers’ 

primary customers include federal, state, and local governments; privatesector entities; and some foreign governments. 

Results in Brief 

DHS has leveraged its resources—one key collaborative practice—by 

having staff from multiple agencies work together at the four operations 

centers. However, opportunities exist to further implement this and the 

other relevant practices that our previous work has identified as important 

to enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. 

Specifically, not all of the components responsible for managing the 

operation centers have 

• established goals to define and articulate a common outcome and 

mutually reinforcing or joint strategies for collaboration (related to two 

of our key practices); 

• assessed staffing needs to leverage resources; 

• defined roles and responsibilities of watchstanders from agencies other 

than the managing one;

 9

 In addition, the NOC-Watch gathers information from other DHS operations centers, as 

well as a variety of other federal, state, and local government and law enforcement 

organizations. 

Page 6 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
• applied standards, policies, and procedures for DHS’s information 

sharing network to provide a means to operate across agency 

boundaries;

• prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results of the 

operations centers to reinforce collaborative efforts; and 

• reinforced agency accountability for collaboration efforts through 

agency plans and reports. 

For example, some DHS components have established a variety of internal 

and external working agreements, memorandums, and in the case of the 

Joint Field Offices, standard operating procedures. However, DHS’s 

Operations Directorate, which is responsible for coordinating operations, 

has not provided guidance on how and when such agreements should be 

used to improve collaboration among the sponsoring and participating 

components at the operations centers we reviewed. Nor have any of these 

centers documented goals or joint strategies using these or other types of 

agreements. Without having a documented joint strategy for collaboration,

there is a risk that center staff monitoring potential terrorist activities may

not operate in the most collaborative manner. DHS has also not assessed 

staffing needs to leverage resources and help ensure that there are enough 

watchstanders, who occupy the primary positions at the multi-agency

operations centers, to conduct surveillance activities. While three of the 

four multi-agency operations centers had developed descriptions for the 

watchstander position staffed by their own agency, only one center—the 

AMOC—had also developed a position description for staff assigned to the 

center from another DHS agency. The other centers relied on the 

components providing staff to define their watchstanders’ roles and 

responsibilities. Lack of a consistent definition for the watchstander 

position may lead to people at the same center in the same role performing 

the same responsibilities differently or not at all. Because of the 

potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive action at 24/7/365 

operations centers, it is important that the roles and responsibilities of 

watchstanders are described and understood by both the staff and the 

officials responsible for managing the operations centers. In another 

example, DHS had not provided the standards, policies, and procedures 

for the use of its Homeland Security Information Network, its primary 

information-sharing tool. Without the application of the standards, 

policies, and procedures, users were unsure of how to use the network 

and, therefore, did not maximize the operation centers’ capacity for 

sharing security-related information. In terms of monitoring, evaluating, 

and reporting the results of joint efforts at the multi-agency operations 

centers, in January 2004, AMOC began collecting data to measure 

productivity, but had not yet evaluated efforts, and the rest of the multiPage 7 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
agency centers have not developed any methods for evaluating and 

reporting results. Finally, neither DHS nor the multi-agency operations 

centers have reinforced accountability for collaborative efforts through 

joint agency planning and reporting. Such public accounting through 

published strategic and annual performance plans and reports makes 

agencies answerable for collaboration results. The Operations Directorate, 

established in November 2005 to improve operational efficiency and 

coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity to more fully implement 

the key practices that are important to enhancing and sustaining 

collaboration at its multi-agency operations centers. Although the 

Operations Directorate does not possess administrative, budgetary, or 

operational control over the other component’s operations centers, 

guidance from the Operations Directorate could help the other 

components responsible for the 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers 

make key advances in each collaborative practice.

To provide a setting for enhanced collaboration among the staff at each 

operations center, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security charge the Director of the Operations Directorate with 

developing and providing guidance and helping to ensure the three 

component agencies of the four multi-agency operations centers take the 

following six actions: define common goals and joint strategies; clarify the 

roles and responsibilities for watchstanders; apply standards, policies, and 

procedures for using DHS’s information network; conduct staffing needs 

assessments; prepare mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the 

results of collaborative efforts; and address collaborative efforts at the 

four multi-agency operations centers in plans and reports. 

In reviewing a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the recommended 

actions to enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations 

centers. Among other things, DHS noted plans to conduct an independent 

study, initiated in September 2006, to leverage technical and analytical 

expertise to support expanding the capabilities of the Operations 

Directorate. In addition, DHS said it plans to move elements of the 

National Operations Center to the Transportation Security Operations 

Center in 2007 and, ultimately to colocate the DHS headquarters, and all

the DHS component headquarters along with their respective staffs and 

operations centers, at one location. We agree that these leadership efforts 

provided by the Operations Directorate could further enhance 

collaboration among DHS’s component agencies, along with the key 

practices suggested by our review of collaboration practices among 

agencies across the federal government. DHS’s written comments are 

presented in appendix III. 

Page 8 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
DHS was created in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 

2001. Not since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 has the

federal government undertaken an organizational merger of this 

magnitude. Enacted on November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act 

established DHS by merging 22 distinct agencies and organizations with 

multiple missions, values, and cultures.10 The 22 agencies whose powers 

were absorbed or in part assumed by DHS came from eight different 

departments (Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human 

Services, Justice, Transportation, and the Treasury) and two independent 

offices (the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the General 

Services Administration). In addition, DHS merged responsibilities from 

former agencies to create some new agencies, such as Customs and 

Border Protection. On March 1, 2003, DHS officially began operations as a 

new department. DHS is among the largest federal government agencies, 

with approximately 180,000 employees and an estimated budget of $43.6 

billion for fiscal year 2007. 

Background 

Twenty-two Agencies 

Merged to Form DHS in 

the Aftermath of 9/11 

DHS’s mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America, 

prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect against and respond to threats 

and hazards to the nation, ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful 

immigrants and visitors, and promote the free flow of commerce. Six of 

the seven primary operational agencies, and the Operations Directorate of 

the department, have identified the need to conduct activities in support of 

the homeland security mission 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a

year. The department’s July 2006 organizational chart, as illustrated in 

figure 1, highlights these six agencies and the Operations Directorate. 

 10 DHS was initially created with 22 originating agencies and organizations. Shortly 

thereafter in June 2003, a 23rd organization, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, was 

transferred into DHS from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 

Page 9 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Figure 1: Organizations within the Department of Homeland Security That Conduct 24/7/365 Activities

Department of Homeland Security

Organization Chart

Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Chief of Staff

Under Secretary

Management

Chief Financial

Officer Director

Operations

Coordination

Director

Counternarcotics

Enforcement

Privacy

Officers

Civil Rights/Civil

Liberty Officer

Ombudsman

Citizenship &

Immigration Services

Under Secretary

Science & 

Technology

Assistant Secretary

Office of Intelligence &

Analysis

Director

Domestic Nuclear

Detection Office

Federal 

Coordinator Gulf

Coast Rebuild

Director

Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center

Assistant Secretary

Transporation Security

Administration

Commissioner

Customs & Border

Protection

Director

U.S. Secret Service

Director

Citizenship &

Immigration Services

Assistant Secretary

Immigration & 

Customs

Enforcement 

Commandant

U.S. Coast Guard

Under Secretary

Federal Emergency

Management

Directorate 

Assistant

Secretary Policy

Under Secretary

Preparedness

General

Counsel

Assistant Secretary

Public Affairs

Inspector

General

Assistant Secretary

Legislative &

Intergovernmental Affairs

Executive Secretary

Military Liaison

Source: DHS.

Three DHS Components 

Sponsor Multi-Agency 

Operations Centers 

The three components of DHS that have overall responsibility for the four 

multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers were created in response to the 

events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of DHS. 

By merging portions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture with elements of U.S. Customs, CBP was 

created as part of DHS in 2003 to protect the nation’s borders in order to 

prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering or exiting the 

United States while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP 

sponsors two 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers: the Air and Marine 

Operations Center and the National Targeting Center. TSA, established in

Page 10 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
2001 (as part of the Department of Transportation), and incorporated into 

DHS in 2003, protects the nation’s transportation systems to ensure 

freedom of movement for people and commerce and sponsors the 

Transportation Security Operations Center. DHS established the Office of

Operations Coordination (referred to as the Operations Directorate) after 

a broad internal review in 2005. The Operations Directorate, which 

sponsors the National Operations Center (includes the previous Homeland 

Security Operations Center), is responsible for coordinating internal and 

external operational issues throughout the department, conducting 

incident management, and facilitating rapid staff planning and execution.

11

The three sponsoring components provide overall direction and 

management for their respective centers. 

Transformation Challenges 

and Practices That Can 

Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among 

Federal Agencies 

We have previously reported that establishing the new DHS is an 

enormous undertaking and the new department needs to build a 

successful transformation that does the following: instills the organization 

with important management principles; rapidly implements a phased-in 

transition plan; leverages the new department and other agencies in 

executing the national homeland security strategy; and builds 

collaborative partnerships with federal, state, local, and private-sector 

organizations.

12

DHS faces significant management and organizational transformation 

challenges as it works to protect the nation from terrorism and 

simultaneously establish itself. For these reasons, in January 2005, we 

continued to designate the implementation and transformation of the 

department as high risk. DHS’s Inspector General reported, in December 

2004, that integrating DHS’s many separate components into a single, 

effective, efficient, and economical department remains one of its biggest

 11 According to DHS, the National Operations Center incorporates the 24/7/365 Interagency 

Watch, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s National Response Coordination Center, and an office called the Planning 

Element. The National Operations Center also shares responsibility for the National 

Infrastructure Coordination Center which is colocated and integrated as a watch function 

at the Transportation Security Operations Center. 

12 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures, Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

Page 11 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
challenges.13 We also reported in 2005 that agencies can enhance and

sustain their collaborative efforts by engaging in eight key management 

practices:14

• defining and articulating a common outcome; 

• establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; 

• identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; 

• agreeing on roles and responsibilities; 

• establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 

operate across agency boundaries; 

• developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results of 

collaborative efforts; 

• reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts through 

agency plans and reports; and 

• reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through 

performance management systems. 

Although there is no commonly accepted definition for collaboration, in 

our previous assessment of collaborative efforts among federal agencies 

we defined it as any joint activity by two or more organizations that is 

intended to produce more public value than could be produced when the 

organizations act alone. This report focuses on the actions DHS and its 

components have taken to make collaboration at multi-agency operations

centers as effective as possible. Joint activities take place at operations 

centers where multiple components staff watchstander positions and 

provide liaison, expertise, and access to information that would not 

otherwise be on hand. For this report, we selected the first seven of the

eight key practices listed above and assessed the first two key practices 

together, thereby reducing our focus to six areas. We did not address the 

eighth practice—reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative 

efforts through performance management systems—because an in-depth 

examination of component agencies’ performance management systems 

was beyond the scope of this review. 

 13 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, Major 

Management Challenges Facing The Department Of Homeland Security, DHS/OIG-05-06

(Washington, D.C.: December 2004). 

14 GAO-06-15, 4.

Page 12 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
The four multi-agency operations centers each have their own mission and 

generate different products while performing similar functions and sharing 

a number of customers. The missions of the AMOC, NTC, and TSOC are 

tactical, including such activities as monitoring the nation’s airspace, the 

movement of potential terrorists, and the passengers on commercial 

flights, respectively. NOC-Watch’s mission is more strategic in that it 

collects information gathered by the other multi-agency operations 

centers15 and provides a national perspective on situational awareness. 

The products of the four multi-agency operations centers reflect their 

different missions and range from reports on suspect individuals traveling 

on commercial flights to reports on suspicious private air and marine craft. 

The multi-agency operations centers all share some common functions: 

maintaining situational awareness and information sharing and 

communications; coordinating internal operations and coordinating 

among federal, state, local, tribal, and private-sector entities; and 

managing incidents and making decisions. While all the multi-agency

operations centers share common customers, such as foreign, federal, 

state, and local governments, the NOC-Watch has a larger number of 

customers, given its role as a hub for overall situational awareness. 

Of the four multi-agency operations centers, three—AMOC, NTC and 

TSOC—have tactical yet different missions and provide different products 

that reflect their respective missions. The NOC-Watch has a more strategic

mission in providing an overall assessment of situational awareness. 

The AMOC’s primary mission is to detect, sort, track, and facilitate the 

interdiction of criminal entities throughout the Western Hemisphere, by 

utilizing integrated air and marine forces, the latest technology, and 

tactical intelligence. AMOC’s maintains day-to-day, around-the-clock 

airspace situational awareness of the nation’s borders through 

identification and detection of foreign and domestic threats. Created in 

1988 by the U.S. Customs Service and located in Southern California, the 

AMOC was established as the Air and Marine Operations Center on March 

1, 2003. In addition to CBP and U.S. Coast Guard personnel, the AMOC is 

staffed by the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of 

While the Four MultiAgency Operations 

Centers’ Missions and 

Products Differ,

Functions and 

Customers Are 

Similar 

The Different Missions of 

the Four Multi-Agency 

Operations Centers Result 

in Different Products 

Air and Marine Operations 

Center 

 15 In addition, the NOC-Watch gathers information from other DHS operations centers, as

well as a variety of other federal, state, and local government and law enforcement 

organizations. 

Page 13 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Defense National Guard Bureau-Air National Guard, as well as a 

representative of the government of Mexico. 

AMOC staff use surveillance systems and databases to detect, identify, and 

track potential threats, and to coordinate the apprehension of criminals 

using law enforcement air, marine, and ground interdiction forces. Staff 

utilize a surveillance system that includes an extensive network of over 

200 ground-based radar and satellite tracking systems throughout North 

America and the Caribbean. Staff also use numerous law enforcement and

Federal Aviation Administration databases to ensure that U.S. entry policy

and procedures are followed. Figure 2 shows the variety of information 

and data sources employed by the AMOC. 

Page 14 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Figure 2: Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information and Data 

Lear jet

Radar dome

Operations center

Unmanned aerial vehicle

Helicopter

P-3 radar aircraft

Tethered radar balloons

Sources: From left to right, top to bottom: CBP, CBP, FAA, CBP, CBP, CBP, and CBP. 

Staff can conduct detailed research from a transnational and criminal 

threat perspective to identify suspect persons, aircraft, and marine vessels. 

AMOC staff use the resulting information to coordinate air and marine law 

enforcement activity with various agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; federal, state, and local law 

enforcement; the Department of Defense; U.S. and foreign air traffic 

Page 15 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
control facilities; and foreign government coordination centers.16 The 

AMOC Daily Intelligence Report focuses on the nation’s borders involving 

suspicious private air and marine craft that are detected by radar, 

eyewitnesses, or surveillance aircraft. 

The NTC’s mission is to coordinate and support all agency field-level antiterrorism activities by providing tactical targeting and analytical research, 

and to be a single point of reference for all agency anti-terrorism efforts. 

NTC monitors the movement of potential terrorists and prevents them and 

any weapons of terror from entering and exiting our country through land, 

air, and sea ports. Established on October 22, 2001, under the U.S. 

Customs Service, the NTC, located in Northern Virginia, began 24/7/365

operations November 10, 2001. In addition to CBP personnel, the NTC is

staffed by the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

Federal Air Marshal Service, and the Transportation Security 

Administration. 

National Targeting Center 

NTC staff use sophisticated information-gathering techniques and 

analytical tools to look at data containing passenger and flight

information. These data include lists of known terrorists, foreign visitors 

whose official authorization permitting entry into and travel within the 

United States has elapsed (visa overstays), passport information, and 

cargo listings to seek potential matches. Any inconsistency identified in 

the data can trigger additional analysis. Figure 3 shows the variety of 

sources of information and data sources employed by the NTC. 

 16 Foreign government coordination centers that partner with the Air and Marine 

Operations Center include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Joint Interagency Task 

Forces, Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos, the U.S. Embassy Mexico’s Intelligence 

Analysis Center, and the Canadian National Operations Center. 

Page 16 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Figure 3: National Targeting Center Sources of Information and Data at and between the Nation’s Ports of Entry 

Patrol boat Border patrol station Land port of entry

Mobile science lab

Operations center

Aerial view of seaport Mounted border patrol Airport inspection

All-terrain vehicles

Sources: Bottom right: Houston Airport System; all others: CBP. 

NTC works with a variety of federal stakeholders. For example, the NTC

works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening 

Center to identify persons on the National Terrorist Watch List. NTC staff 

also provide information from CBP’s Advance Passenger Information 

System for TSA’s performance of a risk assessment on crewmembers on

Page 17 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
international flights. Federal Air Marshals use information developed by 

the NTC to determine if they need to put resources on a specific flight. 

Using NTC capabilities to screen crew, vessel, and cargo, along with other 

information, the U.S. Coast Guard determines vessels and crewmembers 

that warrant further surveillance or assessment and can prioritize its 

inspection efforts. NTC also helps in implementing the pilot Immigration 

Advisory Program by reviewing advance information on travelers 

forwarded by program teams to identify travelers at foreign airports that 

may present a risk or warrant more intensive examination before they 

board aircraft bound for the United States. (Passengers whose travel 

documents are invalid, expired, or otherwise may have been altered, 

counterfeited or obtained through fraud are advised, as is the airline, 

before they leave their foreign location that they will likely be deemed 

inadmissible and denied entry upon arrival in the United States.) The NTC 

reports we reviewed primarily identified individuals at and between 

domestic ports of entry and certain critical foreign ports. 

The TSOC’s mission is to provide situational awareness and information 

sharing in day-to-day coordination and incident management for all 

transportation security related operations and issues worldwide by 

monitoring, responding to, and investigating security incidents involving 

all transportation sectors. TSOC maintains situational awareness of 

passengers on commercial flights and works to minimize and mitigate 

security vulnerabilities of the National Capital Region and critical 

infrastructure such as commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines. 

The TSOC, located in Northern Virginia, began 24/7/365 operations in 

August 2003. The National Capital Region Command Center constitutes 

the multi-agency element of the TSOC because it is staffed by other DHS 

component agencies—specifically the U.S. Secret Service and Customs 

and Border Protection. In addition, representatives of organizations 

outside of DHS such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, District of 

Columbia Metro Police, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Capitol 

Police, and the U.S. Air Force (Northeast Air Defense Sector) provide 

watchstanders for the TSOC. 

Transportation Security 

Operations Center 

As part of its mission, TSOC staff coordinate with federal, state, and local 

homeland security entities to identify activities that might indicate a threat 

to national security and isolate indications of impending attack while 

assessing their potential impact. The TSOC also furnishes alerts and 

reports to field security organizations while combining intelligence with 

operational information across all modes of transportation. Last, it 

monitors incidents and crises, including national special events such as 

presidential inaugurations and the Super Bowl, for TSA headquarters and 

Page 18 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
makes recommendations to DHS leadership. Figure 4 shows the modes of 

transportation monitored by the TSOC. 

Figure 4: Modes of Transportation Monitored by the Transportation Security Operations Center 

Container cargo vessel Pipeline Rail

Operations center

Cruise ship Airport Train and highway

Sources: From left to right, top to bottom: GAO, PhotoDisc, CBP, TSA, GAO, PhotoDisc, and GAO. 

Page 19 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
The TSOC reports we reviewed provided information on incidents across 

all modes of transportation, including National Capital Region security 

incidents, critical infrastructure, and individuals of interest related to the 

No-Fly List.17

The NOC-Watch is designed to perform a more strategic mission than the 

other three multi-agency operations centers. NOC-Watch acts as the 

primary national-level coordination point for awareness of events that may 

affect national security or safety. The center is responsible for combining 

and sharing of information, communications, and operations coordination

pertaining to the prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident

management by facilitating information sharing with other federal, state,

local, tribal, and nongovernmental entities and by fusing law enforcement, 

national intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting. 

Created as the Homeland Security Operations Center and located in 

Northwest Washington, D.C., the center was established on February 19,

2003, and redesignated the National Operations Center on May 25, 2006.

The NOC-Watch is the 24/7/365 element of the center. In addition to staff 

from the Operations Directorate, the NOC-Watch includes other DHS staff 

from 20 components and offices such as representatives from the U.S. 

Secret Service, Federal Protective Service, Federal Air Marshal Service, 

Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection, 

U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Border 

Patrol, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, National Biological 

Surveillance Group, U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, and other DHS directorates. The NOC-Watch 

also includes representatives from 35 other federal, state, and local 

agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence 

Agency; National Security Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence

Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Interior (U.S. Park 

Police); Drug Enforcement Administration; Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 

and Explosives; Virginia State Police; Fairfax County Police; and the New

York, Boston, and Los Angeles police departments; and a number of other 

organizations. 

National Operations CenterInteragency Watch 

 17 The No-Fly List is a list of individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft. 

Originally created and maintained by TSA, the No-Fly List is the consolidated terrorist

watch list maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation-administered Terrorist 

Screening Center. Both TSA and CBP use the No-Fly List for screening airline passengers.

TSA is responsible for screening domestic airline passengers; CBP screens international 

passengers. CBP also uses this list to screen cruise line passengers. 

Page 20 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
NOC-Watch staff use information gathered and communicated by the three 

tactical centers; other DHS operation centers; other federal, state, and 

local entities; and a wide variety of other information sources to provide 

overall national situational awareness related to homeland security. The 

NOC-Watch reports, via the DHS Director of Operations, to the Secretary 

of Homeland Security and coordinates directly with the White House and 

focuses on two goals: (1) the detection, prevention, and deterrence of 

terrorist attacks and (2) domestic incident management during crises and 

disasters or national special events. Figure 5 shows some of the sources of

information and agencies with which that information is shared. 

Page 21 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Figure 5: National Operations Center-Interagency Watch Information and Data Sources 

Operations center/

NOC-Watch

Sources: Logos from GAO, photo from DHS. 

TSOC

State and local 

law enforcement

State homeland 

security and 

emergency NTC AMOC response offices

Situation reports prepared by the Operations Directorate’s NOC-Watch 

that we reviewed contained information reported from other DHS 

subcomponents and operations centers such as the TSOC, NTC, and 

AMOC, as well as external intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and 

the private sector. The NOC-Watch also prepares a Homeland Security 

Operations Morning Brief that provides information to federal, state, and

Page 22 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
local law enforcement agencies on the national picture at the sensitive but

unclassified level. 

The Four Multi-Agency 

Operations Centers Share 

Common Functions and 

Customers 

All four centers conduct common functions to maintain situational 

awareness and communicate and coordinate with other federal, state, and

local governments, as well as private-sector entities. The centers do so to 

support both the mission of the sponsoring component organization and

the underlying homeland security mission of DHS. On the basis of our 

discussions with center officials and our assessment of documents they 

provided, we summarized these functions and found that all DHS multiagency operations centers perform 9 of 11 functions identified in table 2. 

(According to TSOC officials, the TSOC does not coordinate with foreign 

governments, and NTC and TSOC officials said they do not exercise 

command and control functions.) 

Table 2: Description of the Functions Performed by the Four DHS Multi-Agency

Operations Centers 

Functions Description 

Situation awareness/information sharing

and communications

Situation awareness/monitoring 

(all four centers) 

The continual process of collecting, 

analyzing, and disseminating 

intelligence, information, and knowledge 

to allow organizations and individuals to 

anticipate requirements and to react 

effectively and to establish a common 

operational picture—a broad view of the 

overall situation as reflected by situation 

reports, aerial photography, and other 

information or intelligence. 

Situation assessment/analysis

(all four centers) 

The evaluation and interpretation of 

information gathered from a variety of 

sources (including weather information 

and forecasts, computerized models, 

Geographic Information Systems data 

mapping, remote sensing sources, 

ground surveys, etc.) that, when 

communicated to emergency managers 

and decision makers, can provide a basis 

for incident management decision 

making. 

Page 23 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Functions Description 

Information dissemination and real-time 

communications (all four centers) 

The process of providing information 

such as current threat-level information, 

announcements, reports, and urgent 

alerts to federal, state, local, tribal, and 

private-sector officials about possible 

terrorism activitiesa

 on a continuous 

basis. 

Coordination 

Intradepartmental coordination 

(all four centers) 

The sharing of information and 

operations with other DHS component 

agencies to synchronize activities and 

accomplish a collective task. 

Other federal agency coordination and state, 

local, tribal coordination 

(all four centers) 

The sharing of information, activities, and 

operations with federal, state, and local 

governments who have a shared 

responsibility in preparing for terrorist 

attacks as well as other disasters to 

accomplish a collective task. 

Private-sector, nongovernment coordination

(all four centers) 

The sharing of information, activities, and 

operations with organizations and entities 

that are not part of any governmental 

structure to accomplish a collective task 

(e.g., for-profit and not-for-profit 

organizations, formal and informal 

structures, commerce and industry, 

private emergency response 

organizations, and private voluntary 

organizations).

Foreign government coordination 

(NOC-Watch, NTC, and AMOC) 

The sharing of information and 

operations with representatives of other 

foreign national governments to 

synchronize activities and accomplish a 

collective task. 

Incident management and decisionmaking

Incident management 

(all four centers) 

The development of strategies and 

tactics and the ordering, coordination, 

and release of resources in response to 

an event, such as a terrorist attack or 

natural disaster. 

Decision-making support 

(all four centers) 

The development of ideas, alternatives, 

or plans to aid decision makers in 

selection of a course of action, in 

responding to a new event or to make 

adjustments as an ongoing situation 

changes. 

Page 24 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Operational activities 

Operational coordination 

(all four centers) 

The integrating or linking together of 

different organizational elements by 

synchronizing activities to accomplish a 

collective task. 

Operational command and control 

 (NOC-Watch and AMOC) 

The exercise of authority and direction by 

a properly designated command 

organization over assigned forces or 

assets in the accomplishment of a 

specified mission. 

Source: GAO based on DHS information. 

a

Section 892(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 

2252 (2002), defines homeland security information to include information possessed by a federal, 

state, or local agency that (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B) relates to the ability to 

prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C) would improve the identification or investigation of a 

suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (D) would improve the response to a terrorist act. 

Multi-agency operations centers’ customers include federal, state, and

local governments and private-sector entities, along with foreign 

governments. The NOC-Watch has a larger number of overall customers; 

as the national-level multi-agency hub for situational awareness and a 

common operating picture, the NOC-Watch provides information to a 

wider range of government customers, including federal executive 

leadership, and intelligence and law enforcement agencies at the federal,

state, and local level. 

DHS has leveraged its resources—one key collaborative practice—by 

having staff from multiple agencies work together at the four operations 

centers. However, opportunities exist to further implement this and the 

other relevant practices that our previous work has identified as important 

to enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. For 

example, not all of the components responsible for managing the 

operation centers had 

• established goals to define and articulate a common outcome and 

mutually reinforcing or joint strategies for collaboration (related to two 

of our key practices); 

Opportunities Exist to 

Enhance 

Collaboration at 

DHS’s Four MultiAgency Operations 

Centers 

• assessed staffing needs to leverage resources; 

• defined roles and responsibilities of watchstanders from agencies other 

than the managing one;

• applied standards, policies, and procedures for DHS’s information 

sharing network to provide a means to operate across agency 

boundaries;

Page 25 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
• prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results of the 

operations centers to reinforce for collaborative efforts; and 

• reinforced agency accountability for collaboration efforts through 

agency plans and reports. 

The Operations Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve 

operational efficiency and coordination, provides DHS with an opportunity 

to more consistently implement these practices that can enhance and 

sustain collaboration among federal agencies at multi-agency operations

centers. 

The Four Multi-Agency 

Operations Centers Lack 

Documented Goals and 

Joint Strategies 

The three DHS components responsible for the four multi-agency centers

have not developed and documented common goals or joint strategies for 

their operation that our work has shown could enhance collaboration 

among the agencies. Officials at the four multi-agency operations centers 

we visited said they did consider formally documenting working 

agreements but concluded it was not essential since all of the agencies 

involved were part of DHS. Officials from the NOC said that the lack of 

formal agreements is a reflection of the speed with which the center was 

established and the inherent flexibility offered to DHS agencies in order to 

get them to staff the operation center positions. Nonetheless, as the DHS 

Office of Inspector General has reported, memorandums of understanding 

are valuable tools for establishing protocols for managing a national-level 

program between two organizations.18 Within DHS, external and internal 

memorandums of agreement and other interagency joint operating plans 

are often used to document common organizational goals and how 

agencies will work together. For example: 

• The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan19 among the 

Department of Defense, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the 

AMOC highlights an agreement between a DHS component and other 

federal agencies. 

 18 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and 

Special Reviews, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection

with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2005). 

19 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Interdiction Command and Control 

Plan, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2005).

Page 26 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
• The Joint Field Office Activation and Operations Interagency 

Integrated Standard Operating Procedure20 describes how a temporary 

federal multi-agency coordination center should be established locally

to facilitate field-level domestic incident management activities related 

to prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery and addresses the 

roles and responsibilities of multiple DHS components such as the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency and Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement and other federal agencies such as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation.

• Guidelines Governing Interaction Between ICE’s Office of

Investigations and CBP’s Office of Border Patrol21 documents a 

memorandum of understanding between the Office of Investigations at 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement and CBP’s Border Patrol, 

entered into in November 2004, that governs the interaction between 

the two components and formalizes roles and responsibilities in order 

to further enhance information sharing. 

Thus, although some DHS components have established a variety of 

internal and external working agreements, memorandums, and in the case 

of the Joint Field Offices, standard operating procedures, DHS’s 

Operations Directorate, which is responsible for coordinating operations, 

has not provided guidance on how and when such agreements should be 

used to improve collaboration among the sponsoring and participating 

components at the operations centers we reviewed. Nor have any of these 

centers documented goals or joint strategies using these or other types of 

agreements. 

Our previous work has shown that memorandums of agreement or 

understanding and strategic plans can both be used to establish common

goals and define joint strategies for how agencies will work together. 

According to our work, collaborative efforts are further enhanced when 

staff working across agency lines define and articulate a common federal 

outcome, or purpose, that is consistent with their respective agency goals 

and missions. Joint strategies or mutual agreements also contribute to 

another key area when they are used as a vehicle for identifying and 

 20 Department of Homeland Security, Joint Field Office Activation and Operations 

Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure, version 8.3 Interim Approval 

(Washington, D.C.: April 2006) i-ii. 

21 As cited in DHS-OIG-06-04, 42. 

Page 27 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
defining more specific expectations of the roles and responsibilities of 

staff provided by collaborating agencies. 

The Four Multi-Agency 

Operations Centers Are at 

Varying Stages of 

Assessing Staffing Needs 

The extent to which officials responsible for managing the four multiagency operations centers had conducted needs assessments to determine 

the staffing requirements of each center varied. For example, CBP officials 

conducted an evaluation in June 2005 that addressed AMOC capabilities 

and continuing staffing needs related to AMOC personnel, but did not 

address the need for, or responsibilities of, U.S. Coast Guard staff at the 

center. AMOC officials did cite a requirement for additional staff from the 

U.S. Coast Guard, as well as a requirement for an Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement position in a subsequent strategic planning effort 

(although these requirements had not been filled). However, there was not 

a specific assessment supporting the need for these staff positions. NTC 

officials had not conducted a staffing needs assessment but said they plan 

to conduct an assessment based upon current targeting programs, the 

scheduled expansion of existing programs, and the onset of additional 

CBP targeting programs. They said they plan to include data on the volume 

of telephone calls handled by the center and the number of information 

requests completed by the NTC in support of CBP targeting and 

operations, and they expect to complete the assessment in October 2006. 

TSOC and NOC-Watch officials said they had not documented a needs 

analysis for staff from agencies other than the sponsoring agency. Instead, 

they viewed the cross-agency staffing requirement as a historical edict 

based on a general assumption that other agency staff expertise was 

needed to fulfill the mission of their operations center. 

Our work has shown that collaborating agencies should identify the 

resources, including human resources, needed to initiate or sustain their 

collaborative effort and take steps to leverage those resources. Because 

each agency, or component, has different strengths and limitations, 

assessing these varying levels allows them collectively to obtain additional

resources otherwise unavailable individually. Formal assessment of the 

need for all participating agencies’ staff to perform specific functions 

allows for the leveraging of resources to more effectively meet the 

operational needs of each agency or component. 

Page 28 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
While three of the four multi-agency operations centers had developed 

descriptions for the watchstander position staffed by their own agency, 

only one center—the AMOC—had developed a position description for 

staff assigned to the center from another DHS agency. At the AMOC, 

center officials require that Coast Guard staff meet a standardized set of 

requirements for radar watchstanders. The other centers relied on the 

components providing staff to define their watchstanders’ roles and 

responsibilities. Lack of a consistent definition for the watchstander 

position may lead to people at the same center in the same role performing 

the same responsibilities differently or not at all. 

Three of the Four MultiAgency Operations 

Centers Have Not 

Established a Definition of 

Watchstander Roles and 

Responsibilities for All 

Agencies at Each Center

Our work has shown that defining roles and responsibilities both enhances 

and sustains collaboration among federal agencies. Because of the 

potentially critical, time-sensitive need for decisive action at 24/7/365 

operations centers, it is important that the roles and responsibilities of 

watchstanders are described and understood stood by both the staff and 

the officials responsible for managing the operations centers. Further, a 

definition of the watchstander role and responsibilities is important for 

supporting agency officials who must make staffing decisions about 

assigning qualified and knowledgeable personnel to the centers. Finally, 

internal controls standards22 require that management and employees 

establish a positive control environment as a foundation for strong 

organizational internal controls. According to the standard, one activity 

that agency officials may consider implementing as part of the control 

environment is to identify, define, and provide formal, up-to-date job 

descriptions or other means of identifying and defining job-specific tasks. 

 22 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C. November 1999). 

Page 29 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
To collaborate by sharing information through DHS’s primary information 

sharing system, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),23

agencies participating in multi-agency operations centers need to be 

connected to the network and have the guidance that enables its use. In 

the course of our work, we learned that CBP’s National Targeting Center

could not collaborate with other users of HSIN because the system was 

not connected for NTC watchstanders.24 Other concerns about the use of 

HSIN to enhance coordination and collaboration have also been identified

by the DHS Inspector General. According to the Inspector General, DHS 

did not provide adequate user guidance, including clear information 

sharing processes, training, and reference materials needed to effectively

implement HSIN.25 The report noted that in the absence of clear DHS 

direction, users were unsure of how to use the system. Though DHS 

officials said other networks such as the Secret Internet Protocol Router 

Network and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 

are primarily used for coordination of intelligence analysis, the 

connectivity problem with the primary DHS-wide information sharing 

system, HSIN, remained unresolved as of September 2006. 

DHS Did Not Provide All 

Multi-Agency Operations 

Centers with Standards, 

Policies, and Procedures 

for Use of Its Information 

Sharing Network to 

Operate across Agency 

Boundaries 

Our work has shown that to facilitate collaboration, agencies need to 

address the compatibility of standards, policies, procedures, and data 

systems used in the collaborative effort. Furthermore, as agencies bring 

diverse cultures to the collaborative effort, it is important to address these 

differences to enable a cohesive working relationship and to create the 

mutual trust required to enhance and sustain the collaborative effort. 

Frequent communication among collaborating agencies is another means 

to facilitate working across agency boundaries and prevent 

 23 The HSIN is an unclassified, Web-based system that provides a secure, collaborative 

environment for real-time information sharing that includes reporting, graphics, and chat

capabilities, as well as a document library that contains reports from multiple federal, 

state, local, and private-sector sources. HSIN supplies suspicious incident and pre-incident 

information, mapping and imagery tools, 24x7 situational awareness, and analysis of 

terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons. 

24 Other single agency operations centers such as the U.S. Coast Guard’s Intelligence 

Coordination Center were also not fully connected. For example, U.S. Coast Guard officials 

told us that HSIN has never been widely used by analysts or watchstanders at their 

Intelligence Coordination Center due to technical and testing issues that made the system 

unavailable. We were also told that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Operations 

Center had never been connected to HSIN due to technical problems.

25 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Information 

Technology, HSIN Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38

(Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

Page 30 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
misunderstanding. The lack of standards, policies, and procedures for use 

of HSIN at DHS operations centers could limit the frequency and 

effectiveness of communications among the centers. 

Three of Four MultiAgency Operations 

Centers Have Not 

Developed Methods to 

Monitor, Evaluate, and 

Report Results of Joint 

Efforts 

With the exception of AMOC, the multi-agency centers have not developed 

methods to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of joint efforts. For 

example, the Office of Management and Budget’s assessment of the NOCWatch for 2005 determined that center officials had not established 

effective annual or long-term performance goals.

26 Nor were performance 

measures or other mechanisms in place to monitor and evaluate the joint 

efforts of multiple DHS agencies at the TSOC and NTC. In response to a 

report by the DHS Office of Inspector General in March 2004 that found 

the AMOC did not have organizational performance measures and 

individual performance standards to assess AMOC’s effectiveness and 

productivity,27 AMOC officials reported to the Inspector General that they 

began collecting data in January 2004 on a daily basis to measure 

productivity for the overall operations center as well as individual 

watchstanders, including U.S. Coast Guard representatives. 

Our work has shown that developing means to monitor, evaluate, and

report areas of improvement allow agencies to enhance collaboration. 

Developing performance measures and mechanisms to monitor and 

evaluate the contributions can help management, key decision makers, 

and both stakeholders and customers obtain feedback through internal 

reports in order to improve operational effectiveness and policy. 

Developing goals and providing performance results can also help 

reinforce accountability through joint planning and reporting of 

collaborative efforts. 

 26 As reported on ExpectMore.gov found at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail.10003615.2005.html. 

27 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, AMOC 

Needs To Improve Written Guidelines For Providing Assistance To Other Agencies, 

DHS/OIG-04-20 (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

Page 31 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Neither DHS nor the component agencies responsible for managing the 

four multi-agency operations centers consistently discuss or include a

description of the contribution of collaborative efforts of the multi-agency

operations centers in their strategic or annual performance plans and 

reports. The most recent DHS strategic plan, issued in 2004, neither 

included a discussion of performance goals nor addressed the joint 

operations of the multi-agency centers. The plan reported only that DHS 

“will provide integrated logistical support to ensure a rapid and effective 

response and coordinate among Department of Homeland Security and 

other federal, state, and local operations centers consistent with national 

incident command protocols.” CBP’s 2005 annual report on the operations 

of the NTC does, however, include a section dedicated to the contributions 

of the external liaisons in describing the roles and responsibilities of other 

DHS agency personnel including the Federal Air Marshal Service, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Coast Guard, and the 

accomplishments they have made in the center’s operations. In addition,

the AMOC strategic plan for 2005 generally discussed the importance of 

collaboration with other component agencies and included a goal to 

strengthen component agency partnerships to maximize homeland 

security strategies. Reports of the components responsible for managing 

the other centers do not address the roles and contributions of other 

supporting agencies in accomplishing the centers’ missions. DHS agencies 

responsible for providing staff to support watchstander positions for 

multi-agency operations centers managed by other agencies also do not 

address their participation in the operations of the operations center in 

strategic plans or performance reports. In general, managing and 

supporting agencies that do mention the operations centers do not include 

any discussion of the relationship between the participating agencies’ 

missions or strategies and those of the centers. 

The Four Multi-Agency 

Operations Centers Are at 

Various Stages of 

Reinforcing Accountability 

for Collaborative Efforts 

through Joint Agency 

Planning and Reporting 

Our work has shown that federal agencies can use their strategic and

annual performance plans as tools to drive collaboration with other 

agencies and partners and establish complementary goals and strategies 

for achieving results. These performance plans can also be used to ensure 

that goals are consistent and, if possible, mutually reinforcing. 

Accountability is also reinforced when strategic and annual performance 

plans help to align agency policy with collaborative goals. A public 

accounting through published strategic and annual performance plans and

reports makes agencies answerable for collaboration. 

Page 32 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
DHS established a new Office of Operations Coordination in November 

2005 (referred to as the Operations Directorate) to increase its ability to 

prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other 

emergencies and improve coordination and efficiency of operations. In 

responding to a draft of this report, DHS cited a number of efforts that the 

new directorate plans to take to fulfill this leadership role. Among other 

things, DHS said it plans to conduct an independent study, initiated in 

September 2006, to leverage technical and analytical expertise to support 

expanding the capabilities of the Operations Directorate. In addition, DHS 

said it plans to move elements of the National Operations Center to the 

Transportation Security Operations Center in 2007 and, ultimately to 

colocate the DHS headquarters and all the DHS component headquarters 

along with their respective staffs and operations centers at one location.

DHS also cited the development of a new working group that is developing

a national command and coordination capability. While we agree that 

these leadership efforts proposed by the Operations Directorate could

further enhance collaboration among DHS’s component agencies, because 

DHS officials did not provide any information or documentation of these 

efforts in response to our requests during the course of the review, we 

were unable to determine the extent to which these efforts are likely to 

enhance and sustain departmental collaboration. Nonetheless, further 

departmental focus on the key practices we have identified could enhance 

collaboration among the component agencies. For example, at the time of 

our review, the directorate had not taken steps to gather information on 

the resources available at each center. The director’s office did not have

ready access to information such as centers’ budgets or other financial 

information needed for reporting across the components, the number of 

staff employed at the multi-agency centers, or the number and type of 

operations centers managed by the various components. After being 

directed to the components for budget and staffing information, we found 

that the managing components of the multi-agency operations centers also 

did not have ready access to up-to-date information on the number of staff 

the centers employed. Such information could be useful to the 

directorate’s efforts to develop a national command and coordination 

capability and further enhance collaboration among the components with 

multi-agency operations centers. Directorate officials said that the 

Operations Directorate had not assumed its full range of responsibilities 

due to not being fully staffed until March 2006 and because of the revisions 

to the National Response Plan formalized in May 2006.28 In responding to a 

DHS’s Operations 

Directorate Has an 

Opportunity to Help

Ensure That Key Practices 

for Collaboration Are 

Implemented at the MultiAgency Operations 

Centers 

 28 Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Change to the National Response Plan

Version 5.0, (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006). 

Page 33 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
draft of this report, DHS said that the Operations Directorate does not 

have the authority to direct or exercise control over other components’ 

operations centers with respect to administration and support, including 

organization, staffing, control of resources and equipment, personnel 

management, logistics, and training. Nonetheless, while the Operations 

Directorate lacks authority to direct the actions of the other components’ 

operations centers and obtaining compatible data may be difficult since 

the reporting systems of several centers were in place prior to the creation 

of DHS, without compatible staffing and financial data Operations 

Directorate leadership officials are hampered in their ability to understand 

and compare the relative personnel and operating costs of the 24/7/365 

operations centers and use such information to promote the expected 

unity of effort within the department. 

Enhanced leadership from the Operations Directorate to support 

consistent reporting of operations centers’ budgets and staffing could also 

support collaborative actions in two of the previously mentioned key 

areas: assessing staffing needs to leverage resources, and applying 

standards, policies, and procedures to operate across agency boundaries. 

In the absence of leadership to support these and other collaborative 

efforts, DHS officials have not yet taken full advantage of an opportunity 

to meet the directorate’s responsibilities.29

The establishment of the Operations Directorate with the express intent of 

enhancing collaboration and coordination among the department’s 

operational components provides an opportunity to implement practices 

that could enhance collaboration among DHS agencies working together 

at each multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center. Having staff from multiple 

agencies work together is a way of leveraging resources, one key practice

for enhancing collaboration. However, those resources may not be used to

their full potential if other steps to enhance collaboration are not taken, 

and the Operations Directorate could provide guidance to help ensure that 

the sponsors of the operations centers take the appropriate steps. There 

are multi-agency operations centers that lack common goals and joint 

Conclusions 

 29 Our work on mergers and transformations suggests that leadership within the 

department must set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, consistent rationale 

that brings everyone together behind a single mission and establish integrated strategic 

goals to guide the transformation. Highlights Of A GAO Forum—Mergers and

Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other 

Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

Page 34 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
strategies; clearly defined roles and responsibilities; compatible standards, 

policies, and procedures for information networking; consistent staffing 

assessments; prepared mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the

results of collaborative efforts; and reinforced agency accountability 

through agency plans and reports. Our previous work has shown that 

these are all critical components in enhancing collaboration among federal 

agencies. Given that the collaboration in multi-agency operations centers 

focuses on gathering and disseminating information on real-time 

situational awareness related to disasters and possible terrorist activity, it

is important that the staff at the centers achieve the most effective 

collaboration possible. 

To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff at 

each multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center, we recommend that the 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security charge the Director of 

the Operations Directorate with developing and providing guidance and 

helping to ensure the agencies that sponsor the centers take the following 

six actions: 

• define common goals and joint strategies; 

• clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders; 

• implement compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using 

DHS’s information network to provide a means of operating across 

agency boundaries; 

• conduct staffing needs assessments; 

• implement mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results 

of collaborative efforts; and 

• address collaborative efforts at the four multi-agency operations 

centers in plans and reports on the level of each operation center’s 

managing agency. 

On October 16, 2006, DHS provided written comments on a draft of this 

report (see app. III.) DHS agreed with the six recommended actions to 

enhance collaboration at the DHS multi-agency operations centers and 

said it planned to take action to implement the practices. In the draft 

report, we said that the Operations Directorate had not yet taken actions 

to fulfill its leadership role and that a lack of leadership by the Operations 

Directorate to support consistent reporting of operations centers’ budgets

and staffing limits collaborative actions. DHS did not agree that leadership 

provided by the Operation Directorate to support collaboration is lacking 

and provided a number of examples of leadership efforts. Among other 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 35 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
things, DHS noted plans to conduct an independent study, initiated in 

September 2006, to leverage technical and analytical expertise to support 

expanding the capabilities of the Operations Directorate. In addition, DHS 

said it plans to move elements of the National Operations Center to the 

Transportation Security Operations Center in 2007 and, ultimately to 

colocate the DHS headquarters and all the DHS component headquarters 

along with their respective staffs and operations centers at one location.

We identified the planned actions in the report and agree that these 

leadership efforts by the Operations Directorate have the potential to 

further enhance collaboration among DHS’s component agencies, along 

with the key practices suggested by our efforts to review collaboration 

among agencies across the federal government. However, because 

Operations Directorate officials did not provide any information or 

documentation of these efforts in response to our requests during the 

course of the review, we were unable to determine the extent to which 

these efforts are likely to enhance and sustain departmental collaboration. 

In addition, DHS officials cited what they considered to be misconceptions 

expressed in the draft report. They said that the Operations Directorate 

does not have the administrative, budgetary, programmatic, or command 

and control authority to direct or exercise control over other component’s 

operations centers. They also said that our draft incorrectly reported that 

the National Operations Center replaced the Homeland Security 

Operations Center. Although it was not our intent to imply that the 

Operations Directorate has administrative, budgetary, programmatic, or 

command and control authority to direct or exercise control over other 

component’s operations centers, we added a clarifying reference to 

address DHS’s concern. Finally, although we reported that the new 

National Operations Center includes (rather than replaced) the previous 

Homeland Security Operations Center, we also added a footnote to further 

clarify that the scope of responsibilities of the new National Operations 

Center is greater than that of the Homeland Security Operations Center. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations, the Secretary of Homeland Security; the 

Assistant Secretary of the Transportation Security Administration, the 

Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others on

request. In addition, the report will be available on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 36 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, or wish to discuss 

the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or 

Jonespl@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Paul L. Jones 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 37 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers Staffed by One DHS Component 

Staffed by One DHS Component 

DHS agency # Center Mission

1. U.S.-Computer Emergency

Readiness Team

To monitor cyber security, respond to incidents, and direct 

communications. 

Department of Homeland

Security Headquarters 

(DHS) 2. National Communications Center To assist in the initiation, coordination, restoration, and 

reconstitution of national security and emergency 

preparedness telecommunications services or facilities 

under all conditions, crises, or emergencies. 

3. TSA Office of Intelligence To provide warning and intelligence analysis to inform field 

operators, industry, and TSA leadership. 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) 

4. Federal Air Marshal Service, Mission 

Operations Control Center 

To provide support to for scheduling, law enforcement 

situations, crisis management, and safety and securityrelated matters. 

5. Situation Room To provide information on significant incidents from field 

and sector offices, providing situational awareness to the 

Commissioner and senior CBP management. 

6. Caribbean Air Marine Operations 

Center (Regional Operations)

To utilize integrated air and marine forces, technology, and 

tactical intelligence to detect, sort, track, and facilitate the 

interdiction of criminal entities throughout the Caribbean 

area. 

7. National Airspace Security 

Operations Center (Regional 

Operations) 

To utilize integrated air forces, technology, and tactical 

intelligence to maintain air domain awareness, and detect, 

sort, track, and facilitate the interception of intruder aircraft 

throughout the National Capital Region. 

Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) 

8. National Law Enforcement 

Communications Center 

To monitor radio communications among CBP personnel 

for officer safety purposes, and to coordinate tactical 

communications and analytical investigative support to 

various DHS and other law enforcement agencies to 

support homeland security. 

9. ICE Operations Center To provide senior management with daily reports and 

coordination on all significant incidents, events, and 

matters that have an impact on the mission of ICE and 

DHS. 

10. ICE Intelligence Watch To provide timely, effective classified intelligence support 

to ICE headquarters and field personnel by serving as a 

clearinghouse for the screening, evaluation, processing, 

exploitation, dissemination, and coordination of intelligence 

information. 

11. Law Enforcement Support Center To provide timely immigration status and identification

information to federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies on aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of 

criminal activity. 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) 

12. Federal Protective Service MegaCenter System (4 regional centers)a

To provide alarm monitoring and dispatch services to all 

federally owned and leased buildings. 

Page 38 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers 

Staffed by One DHS Component 

DHS Agency # Center Mission

13. National Response Coordination 

Center 

To maintain national situational awareness and to monitor 

emerging incidents or potential incidents with possible 

operational consequences (becomes multi-agency under 

incident surge conditions). 

14. FEMA Operations CenterbTo facilitate, in coordination with the NOC, the distribution 

of warnings, alerts, and bulletins to the entire emergency 

management community using a variety of 

communications systems. 

Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) 

15. Mobile Emergency Response 

Support Operations Centers 

(5 regional centers) 

To serve as the emergency operations center for FEMA 

regions and associated state operations centers providing 

time-sensitive information flow affecting federal 

involvement and provide a deployed operations center 

platform using assigned mobile assets during all 

catastrophic events. 

16. Joint Operations Center To provide command, control, communication, and 

monitoring for ensuring the security of the White House 

complex and surrounding grounds. 

United States Secret Service

(USSS) 

17. Intelligence Division Duty Desk To coordinate communications for the receipt, 

coordination, and dissemination of protective intelligence 

information and activities that require immediate action in 

support of protection assignments. Also provides “as 

needed” information and coordination support for the 

service. 

18. U.S. Coast Guard Command Center To gather, coordinate, and disseminate information as the 

direct representative of the Coast Guard Commandant and 

the National Response Center. Serves as the primary 

communications link of priority operational and 

administrative matters between USCG field units, District 

and Area Commanders, senior Coast Guard officials, DHS 

officials, the White House, other federal agencies, state 

and local officials, and foreign governments. 

19. Intelligence Coordination Center 

(includes three 24/7/365 watch 

locations with one, the Intel Plot, 

colocated at U.S. Coast Guard 

Command Center) 

To function as the national-level coordinator for collection, 

analysis, production, and dissemination of Coast Guard 

intelligence. Provides all-source, tailored, and integrated 

intelligence and intelligence services to DHS, Coast 

Guard, Commandant/staff, intelligence community, 

combatant commanders, and other services and agencies.

The Intel Plot provides predictive and comprehensive 

intelligence support to priority requirements of the 

Commandant and senior staff at Coast Guard 

headquarters. 

United States Coast Guard 

(USCG) 

20. National Response Centerc

 To serve as the single federal point of contact for all 

pollution incident reporting. Also serves as a 

communications center in receiving, evaluating, and 

relaying information to predesignated federal responders, 

and advises FEMA of potential major disaster situations. 

Page 39 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix I: Missions of 24/7/365 DHS Centers 

Staffed by One DHS Component 

DHS Agency # Center Mission

21. Regional Command Centers (46)d

Area Command Centers (2) 

District Command Centers (9) 

Sector Command Centers (35)

To serve as points of coordination at various organizational 

levels for operational command, control, communications, 

intelligence, and analysis. 

Source: GAO generated based on information from DHS. 

a

According to a Federal Protective Service official, the service has expanded its mission parameters 

in recent years beyond physical protection, and has initiated programs to better identify 

vulnerabilities, threats, and response requirements for attacks by international or domestic terrorist

individuals or groups. The official said that with the advent of the National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan, the service is applying a specialized intelligence capability to support its expanded role as

national coordinator for enhancing the protection of all federal, state, and local government facilities

that are determined to be nationally critical. 

b

According to FEMA officials, the FEMA Operations Center serves as the alternate NOC. Should the 

NOC be rendered incapable of functioning for any reason, they said the FEMA Operations Center will 

assume critical NOC functions until the NOC is returned to normal operating status. 

c

According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, the National Response Center is a joint effort cochaired by 

the U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency that is housed at U.S. Coast Guard 

headquarters. 

d

According to a U.S. oast Guard official, the Area and District Command Centers are also designated 

as International Rescue Coordination Centers, and all Sector Command Centers are also designated

Rescue Sub-Centers in accordance with international convention. 

Page 40 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

Our overall objective was to assess the collaboration among the four 

multi-agency DHS operations centers. The key questions addressed were 

as follows: 

1. What are the missions, functions, and products of the multi-agency 

24/7/365 DHS operations centers and who are their customers? 

2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing and 

sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers? 

To answer our first objective, we obtained and reviewed information on 

the missions and functions of all 24/7/365 operations centers in DHS. We 

visited centers managed by the Operations Directorate, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the

Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the 

Secret Service to observe their operations, interview officials responsible 

for managing the centers, and identify centers that employed staff from 

multiple DHS agencies. We identified four centers that employed staff 

from multiple DHS component agencies: the Air and Marine Operations 

Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security 

Operations Center, and the National Operations Center-Interagency

Watch. We gathered and analyzed information regarding the products the 

multi-agency centers developed on a regular basis and the primary 

customers served by the centers. 

To answer our second objective, we met with responsible officials of the 

NOC-Watch and the acting Director of the Operations Directorate to 

discuss the roles and responsibilities of the new organization established 

as a result of the department’s Second Stage Review. We discussed the 

transition, current operations, and policy and procedures put in place by 

the Operations Directorate since the reorganization. We also met with 

officials from TSA, USCG, CBP, ICE, and the Operations Directorate to 

discuss how staff are assigned by these agencies to the four multi-agency 

operations centers. We spoke with watchstanders assigned to several of 

the centers from other DHS component agencies to discuss their roles and 

responsibilities at the centers, and the overall mission of the centers to 

which they had been assigned. We reviewed planning and policy 

documents including DHS’s strategic plans and performance and 

Page 41 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology 

accountability reports as well as our prior reports1 and reports from DHS’s 

Inspector General that addressed DHS management issues. For the four 

national operations centers we identified as multi-agency DHS centers, we 

also reviewed strategic plans, standard operating procedures, and annual 

reports and performance and accountability reports. We assessed DHS’s 

efforts and actions taken by the Operations Directorate to encourage 

coordination among the multi-agency centers and to promote 

collaboration among the staff representing DHS agencies at the centers to 

determine the extent that they reflected consideration of key practices 

that our previous work has shown can enhance and sustain a collaborative 

relationship among federal agencies. Eight practices we identified to 

enhance and sustain collaboration are identified below: 

• defining and articulating a common outcome; 

• establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; 

• identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources; 

• agreeing on roles and responsibilities; 

• establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 

operate across agency boundaries; 

• developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; 

• reinforcing agency accountability for collaboration efforts through 

agency plans and reports; and, 

• reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts through 

performance management systems. 

For the purposes of this review, we selected the first seven of the eight 

practices. We combined our discussion of the implementation of the first 

two practices—defining and articulating a common outcome and 

establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies. We did not address 

the eighth practice—reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative 

efforts through performance management systems—because an in-depth 

examination of component agencies’ performance management systems 

was beyond the scope of this review. We selected examples that, in our 

best judgment, clearly illustrated and strongly supported the need for 

improvement in specific areas where the key practices could be

implemented. 

 1

 GAO, A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management 

Integration, GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: March 2005); Practices That Can Help

Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington,

D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

Page 42 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology 

We conducted our work from October 2005 through September 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 43 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security 

Page 44 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 45 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 46 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 47 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 48 GAO-07-89 Homeland Security
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 49 GAO-07-89 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul L. Jones (202) 512-8777 

In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Keisling, Kathleen 

Ebert, Dorian Dunbar, Scott Behen, Keith Wandtke, Amanda Miller, 

Christine Davis, and Willie Commons III made key contributions to this 

report. Additional assistance was provided by Katherine Davis. 

 Homeland Security

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(440451) 
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