This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 ROLAND LUCERO and R & L 2 STRAIGHTLINE TILE, LLC a/k/a 3 R & L STRAIGHTLINE TILE, 4 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 5

v. NO. A-1-CA-35171 6 RICHARD SUTTEN, 7 Defendant-Appellant. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 9 Victor S. Lopez, District Judge 10 Law Office of Daymon B. Ely 11 Daymon B. Ely 12 Albuquerque, NM 13 William Gilstrap 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellees 16 James C. Ellis, Attorney at Law, P.C. 17 James C. Ellis 18 Corrales, NM 19 for Appellant 202 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 HANISEE, Judge. 2
{1} In this second appeal in this legal malpractice case, attorney Richard Sutten 3 (Defendant), appeals a judgment entered ag ainst him finding him thirty-five percent 4 liable for losses suffered by his client, Roland Lucero (Plaintiff), in a real estate 5 venture. Defendant argues th at liability should not have been imposed on him where 6 there is no supportable finding that his neg ligence was a cause of Plaintiff’s losses. 7 We agree and reverse. 8
{2} Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the 9 facts and procedural history of the case, wereserve discussion of the pertinent facts 10 for our analysis. 11 DISCUSSION 12
{3} Legal malpractice plaintiffs “have th e burden of showing not only negligence 13 on the part of their attorney but also th at their damages were proximately caused by 14 that negligence.” Akutagawa v. Laflin, Pick & Heer, P.A. , 2005-NMCA-132, ¶ 11, 138 15 N.M. 774, 126 P.3d 1138 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Encinias 16 v. Whitener Law Firm, P.A. , 2013-NMSC-045, ¶ 8, 310 P.3d 611 (“The elements of 17 legal malpractice are: (1) the employment of the defendant attorn ey; (2) the defendant 18 attorney’s neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the negligence re sulted in and was the 191 Our Supreme Court in 2005 eliminated us e of the word “proximate” for all 17 Uniform Jury Instructions that before then formally referred to “proximate cause.” UJI 18 13-305 NMRA, Use Note. The instruction is now called “causation” and encompasses 19 elements of both “cause in fact” and “proximate cause.” Id. 20 3 proximate cause of loss to the client.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 1 citation omitted)). “[E]vidence must be adduced to support each element necessary to 2 support a claim.” Lucero v. Lucero , 1994-NMCA-128, ¶ 21, 118 N.M. 636, 884 P.2d 3 527, superseded by statute on other groundsas stated in Chapman v. Varela , 4 2009-NMSC-041, ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 680, 213 P.3d 1109. Causation 1 is generally a 5 matter to be determined by the fact-finder. See Galvan v. City of Albuquerque , 1973- 6 NMCA-049, ¶ 12, 85 N.M. 42, 508 P.2d 1339 (“Where reasonable minds may differ 7 on the question of proximate cause, the matter is to be determined by the fact[-] 8 finder.”). “This Court does not reweigh th e evidence on appeal and is bound by the 9 trial court’s findings of fact unless they are demonstrated to be clearly erroneous or 10 not supported by substantial evidence.” Doughty v. Morris , 1994-NMCA-019, ¶ 9, 11 117 N.M. 284, 871 P.2d 380 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pursuant 12 to Rule 1-052 NMRA, in a bench trial, “the judgment must be supported by findings, 13 which in turn must be supported by substantial evidence.” First W. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 14 v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 1972-NMCA-083, ¶ 10, 84 N.M. 72, 499 P.2d 694 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 164 {4} Here, the original finder of fact—the di strict court judge who presided over the 1 bench trial—found that “[a]lthough [Defendant ’s] actions fell below the standard of 2 care for an attorney similarly situated, that conduct was notthe cause of Plaintiff[’s] 3 losses.” Plaintiff, who did not challenge that finding in the first appeal, concedes that 4 the district court “did find that [Defendant’s] negligence was not the cause of . . . 5 Plaintiff[’s] losses” but contends that th e district court made that finding “only 6 because there was an ‘independent interveni ng force[.’] ” Plaintiff ostensibly reasons 7 that as such and in light of this Court’s opinion in Lucero v. Sutten , 2015-NMCA-010, 8 ¶ 13, 341 P.3d 32, which held that the distri ct court “should not have considered the 9 doctrine of independent intervening cause [,]” the remand court was not bound by the 10 district court’s finding of no causation. The remand court apparently agreed with 11 Plaintiff and disagreed with Defendant, who—contending that the district court’s 12 ruling on independent intervening cause wa s ancillary to its broader ruling of no 13 causation—argued that the remand court “h a[d] to” find no causation based on the 14 district court’s earlier finding of no causation. 15
{5} Even assuming arguendo that the distri ct court’s finding of no causation was 16 not binding on the remand court because it wa s exclusively and, therefore, erroneously 17 based on the district court’s misapplication of the doctrine of independent intervening 18 cause—a matter of which we are not convinced but conclude we need not 195 resolve—there remains the question of whether there is a supported finding, or even 1 evidence that could support the remand court’s finding of causation, in Plaintiff’s 2 favor on the essential element of causation. Plaintiff argued on remand that “the issue 3 of causation has been established” and th at the only issue fo r the remand court to 4 decide was “what damages does [Plaintiff] have, what is the percentage of fault of the 5 actors that were involved[.]” While Plai ntiff stated, “We think causation has been 6 established by [the district court’s] decision,” Plaintiff neither identified which finding 7 or findings of the district court’s d ecision purportedly “established” causation nor 8 pointed to any evidence in the record that would form the basis of a finding of 9 causation. Nor did Plaintiff seek an opportunity in the remand court to present 10 evidence which could support a factual determination of causation; instead, Plaintiff 11 stipulated entirely to the existing district c ourt trial record. Plaintiff also did not ask 12 the remand court to reject, reverse, or in any way modify any of the district court’s 13 prior findings, including its finding of no causation that preceded its flawed 14 application of the doctrine of independent intervening cause. 15
{6} In its final order, the remand court adopted wholesale the district court’s letter 16 decision, findings, and conclusions “to the extent they are not inconsistent with” 17 Lucero . It explained that “[t]heunchallenged factual findings in this case, prior to 18 appeal, were binding on the appellate court, and on remand represent the established 196 facts in this case.” The remand court neither discussed nor re jected the district court’s 1 earlier finding that “[a]lthough [Defendant’s] actions fell below the standard of care 2 for an attorney similarly situated, that conduct was not the cause of Plaintiff[’s] 3 losses.” It also did not enter its own finding of causation but instead stated in its 4 conclusions of law that Plaintiff’s loss was “due, at least in part, to[,]” and was “a 5 proximate result of” Defendant’s actions. Gi ven the absence of any findings of fact 6 as to causation by the remand court, we are left to assume th at it agreed with Plaintiff 7 about two things: first, that the distri ct court’s finding of no causation was somehow 8 inconsistent with Luceroand, therefore, not binding as to the preexisting record before 9 the remand court; and second, that somewhere within the district court’s findings was 10 a sufficiently supported finding of causation of the sort needed to support the 11 imposition of liability on Defendant. We thus carefully consider the basis for 12 Plaintiff’s contention that the district c ourt “found that there was a causal connection 13 between [Defendant’s] professional neglig ence and . . . Plaintiff[’s] damages.” 14
{7} According to Plaintiff, there are two asp ects of the district court’s letter decision 15 and findings that support his argument that the district court’s decision “established” 16 causation in his favor. First, Plaintiff argues that the district court “recognized that 17 there were three contributing factors to Plai ntiff[’s] losses: (1) the lure of a $60,000.00 18 profit in [twenty] days[;] (2) [Plaintiff’s] reliance on his friend, Mark Brady; and (3) 197 the attorney ‘seal of approval[.’]” Second, and only parenthetically, Plaintiff points 1 to the district court’s statements in its letter decision that Defendant’s “conduct was 2 only one factor in Plaintiff[’s] decision” to invest and its characterization of the 3 connection between Defendant’s negligence and Plaintiff’s losses as “partial at best” 4 as being further evidence of an affirmative finding of causation by the district court. 5 From this and nothing more, Plaintiff conclude s, “Thus, [the district court] did find 6 a causal connection between [Defendant’s] negligence and Plaintiff[’s] damages.” 7 Plaintiff then contends that the remand court, by adopting the district court’s findings, 8 also “determined that [Defendant’s] neg ligence was a cause of . . . Plaintiff[’s] 9 damages.” We are not persuaded. 10
{8} In New Mexico, a negligent act or omissi on is considered a “cause” of an injury 11 or harm “if it contributes to bringing about the injury, if the injury would not have 12 occurred without it, and if it is reasonably connected as a significant link to the 13 injury.” Talbott v. Roswell Hosp. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-109, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 189, 118 14 P.3d 194; see UJI 13-305 NMRA. Plaintiff develops no argument, provides no 15 analysis, and cites no authority to support his contention that the relied-upon portions 16 of the district court’s decision—specifically the finding that “[Defendant’s] actions 17 gave the . . . [note] the attorney ‘seal of approval’ ”—are sufficient to establish the 18 causation element of his claim under New Mexico law. This Court is not bound by a 198 party’s unsupported assertions and has no duty to review an argument that is not 1 adequately developed. See Chan v. Montoya , 2011-NMCA-072, ¶ 9, 150 N.M. 44, 256 2 P.3d 987 (“It is not our practice to rely on assertions of counsel unaccompanied by 3 support in the record. The mere asserti ons and arguments of counsel are not 4 evidence.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. 5 Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to entertain 6 a cursory argument that included no explanation of the party’s argument and no facts 7 that would allow the Court to evaluate the claim). 8
{9} Moreover, we note that base d on Plaintiff’s own contention at trial, the issue of 9 causation came down to whether the districtcourt believed Plaintiff’s testimony that 10 he would not have gone through with the i nvestment but for Defendant’s negligent 11 advice, not whether Defendant had negligently given the note the “attorney seal of 12 approval.” Specifically, Plaintiff told the district court that if it found that “[Plaintiff] 13 would not have invested” had Defendant expressed his concerns about the 14 deal—specifically the fact th at the note was not secured and that Plaintiff did not have 15 a deed of trust in hand when Plaintiff signed the note—“then [Plaintiff is] entitled to 16 his $300,000 back[.]” Plaintiff’s expert w itness also testifie d that the issue of 17 causation would come down to a credibilitydetermination by the fact-finder as to 18 “whether [the fact-finder] believes [Plaintiff] when [Plaintiff] says, ‘I would have 199 walked away if this lawyer had told me this stuff.’ ” Thus, in light of Plaintiff’s own 1 acknowledgment of what it had to prove to establish causation, a finding that 2 “[Defendant’s] actions gave the [note] the attorney ‘seal of approval’ ” could not and 3 does not, alone, establish causation absent a commensurate finding that but for the 4 negligently given “seal of approval” Plaintiff would not have invested. 5
{10} Indeed, Plaintiff proposed two such findings, both of which the district court 6 rejected. Specifically, Plaintiff proposed a finding that “[Plaintiff] would not have 7 made the loan if [Defendant] had warned him that it was not a secured transaction.” 8 Plaintiff also asked the district court to find that “[r]elying on the advice of his 9 attorney, . . . [Plaintiff] loaned $300,000 to the development.” The district court 10 refused to make either finding, which this Court regards as findings against Plaintiff 11 on the issue of causation. See Empire W. Cos., Inc. v. Albuquerque Testing Labs. , Inc. , 12 1990-NMSC-096, ¶ 17, 110 N.M. 790, 800 P.2d 725 (“The refusal by the court to 13 accept a requested finding is regarded on app eal as a finding against the party bearing 14 the burden of proof on the issue at trial.”). Those findings—undisturbed by Lucero 15 and that Plaintiff did not ask the remand court to reconsider and reverse—stood on 16 remand and are evidence that the district court did not find that Plaintiff met his 17 burden of proving that Defendant’s neglig ence caused Plaintiff’s losses. In other 18 words, the record as a whole reveals that the district court did not believe Plaintiff’s 1910 claim that he would have “walked away” from the deal, meaning thatthe district court 1 was not convinced that Plaintiff had met his burden on establishing the element of 2 causation. 3
{11} Given the district court’s disbelief of Plaintiff’s testimony that Plaintiff relied 4 on to establish causation, no fact existed in the record established prior to the first 5 appeal to support a finding of causation. Onremand, and in li ght of the parties’ 6 stipulation to the existing record, it was in cumbent upon Plaintiff to seek reversal of 7 the district court’s prior determinati on of no causation and/or the adoption of 8 additional findings sufficient to support a finding of causation. Plaintiff did neither, 9 instead relying—mistakenly, we believe—on hi s belief that the district court’s original 10 decision contained a legally sufficient fi nding of causation. Becau se we conclude it 11 did not and because the remand court’s decision provides no other basis for supporting 12 a finding causation, we hold that the remand court erred in imposing liability on and 13 entering judgment against Defendant. 14 CONCLUSION 15
{12} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the remand court’s judgment and remand 16 for entry of judgment in favor of Defendant. 17
{13} IT IS SO ORDERED. 18

__________________________________ 19 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 2011 WE CONCUR: 1

_______________________________ 2 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 3

_______________________________ 4 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 5