COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

 417 SOUTH STATE STREET

JOSEPH R. SLIGHTS, III DOVER, DELAWARE 19901

 VICE CHANCELLOR TELEPHONE: (302) 739-4397

 FACSIMILE: (302) 739-6179

June 29, 2016

Via File & ServeXpress

 and First Class Mail

Mr. Weih Steve Chang Gary H. Kaplan, Esquire

122 Pumpkin Patch Lane Marshall Dennehey Warner

Hockessin, DE 19707 Coleman & Goggin 

1007 North Orange Street, Suite 600 

Wilmington, DE 19801

Kevin S. Mann, Esquire

Cross & Simon, LLC

1105 North Market Street, Suite 901

Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

Date Submitted: June 8, 2016

Dear Counsel and Mr. Chang:

I have reviewed the many motions and other filings made in this case. I am 

aware that the parties are in the process of briefing a motion to dismiss. That work 

should continue according to the schedule that was previously entered by the 

Court. This letter addresses three motions recently filed by Plaintiff, Weih Steve 

Chang: (1) Motion to Re-Open Jane Doe 30 vs. Earl B. Bradley (CA No. 10C-05-

EFiled: Jun 29 2016 01:57PM EDT 

Transaction ID 59209787

Case No. 11632-VCS
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

Page 2

023) By Granting Joinder of Persons/Parties (“Motion to Reopen”); (2) Motion to 

Recuse; and (3) Motion to Stay.

1. Motion to Reopen

The nature and bases for this motion are difficult to discern. It appears that 

Plaintiff seeks to add additional defendants to this lawsuit and thereby reopen a 

class action against Earl B. Bradley, M.D. that was litigated and then settled in the 

Superior Court of Delaware (the “Bradley litigation”). The new parties Plaintiff 

seeks to add as defendants were either parties or lawyers involved in the Bradley 

litigation. According to Plaintiff, the Bradley litigation settlement was procured by 

fraud. For the reasons that follow, the motion must be denied. 

While the motion is extremely difficult to follow, it appears that Plaintiff is 

seeking to amend his complaint to add new parties and perhaps new claims. While 

motions to amend are liberally granted in this Court, the Court will deny a motion 

to amend on futility grounds when it is clear that the proposed amendment would 
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

Page 3

not survive a motion to dismiss.1Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile for 

several reasons. 

First, Plaintiff offers no basis upon which this Court could exercise its 

jurisdiction to “reopen” a case that has been litigated and settled in the Superior 

Court. I also am unaware of any ground upon which this Court could enter such 

an order. Moreover, it is not at all clear to me that Plaintiff has standing to seek to 

reopen the Bradley litigation in any event. He has made no allegation that he was a 

party to the Bradley litigation or that he or anyone he purports to represent was a 

member of the class that was certified in that litigation. Nor has he made an 

attempt to justify an order allowing him to intervene, pursuant to Court of 

Chancery Rule 24, in order to challenge the Bradley litigation settlement assuming, 

arguendo, that this Court had the authority to grant such relief (which it does not).2

 

1

FS Parallel Fund, LP v. Ergen, 2004 WL 3048751, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004), aff’d,

879 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005) (TABLE).

2

See In re MCA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 774 A.2d 272, 276–78 (Del. Ch. 2000) (denying 

motion to intervene in order to challenge settlement approved by the court seven years 

prior to the attempted intervention). 
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

Page 4

Second, to the extent the proposed amendment is grounded in the Court’s 

authority to provide relief from judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 60(b), 

Plaintiff has failed to set forth any basis upon which this Court could provide relief 

from a judgment entered by the Superior Court. Even if the Court could provide 

such relief, Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence that would meet the “high 

Rule 60(b) standard,” which requires “the most egregious conduct involving a 

corruption of the judicial process itself.’”3 Plaintiff’s “[s]inister suspicions and 

‘dark imaginings’ [of “duplicitous” conduct] are not enough” to sustain this heavy 

burden.4

 

3 MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 785 A.2d 625, 638 (Del. 2001) (quoting 

In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d at 280) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at 639 

(“A party seeking to vacate an order on the ground that his or her opponent effectuated a 

fraud on the court bears a heavy burden.”).

4

In re MCA, Inc., 774 A.2d at 280 (holding that to state a claim that a settlement should 

be set aside because of fraud on the court the plaintiff not only must plead the fraud with 

particularity under Court of Chancery Rule 9(b), but also must state a factual basis to 

support a reasonable inference that the approving court was somehow “duped” into 

blessing the settlement).
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

Page 5

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen is DENIED. To the 

extent the Motion to Reopen seeks an order for leave to amend the complaint to 

name additional defendants related to the Bradley litigation, that motion is likewise 

DENIED.

2. Motion to Recuse 

Plaintiff asserts that I must recuse myself from this case since I was the 

judge who presided over the Bradley litigation when I served on the Superior 

Court. He is correct that I presided over the Bradley litigation from its inception 

through its conclusion with a class action settlement that I approved. My role as 

presiding judge in that case, however, provides no basis for me to recuse myself 

from this case.

Under Delaware law, a judicial officer must recuse himself if there is “any 

reasonable basis to question [his] impartiality.”5

When faced with a claim of personal bias or prejudice ... the judge is 

required to engage in a two-part analysis. First, he must, as a matter 

of subjective belief, be satisfied that he can proceed to hear the cause

free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Second, even if the 

judge believes he has no bias, situations may arise where, actual bias 

 

5 Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 952 (Del. 1988).
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

Page 6

aside, there is the appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the 

judge’s impartiality.6

Here, Plaintiff argues that I will likely be a witness in his effort to set aside 

the Bradley litigation settlement. As I have denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen, 

there is no reason for me to be involved in this case, or any other related case, as a 

witness. With this in mind, I have considered on a subjective level whether I can 

“proceed to hear [this case] free of bias or prejudice” and I am satisfied that I can.7

Likewise, Plaintiff has provided no reasonable basis upon which I can conclude 

that there is or will be an “appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to [my] 

impartiality.”8 My involvement as the presiding judge in the Bradley litigation 

cannot reasonably be viewed as a disqualifying event that would justify my recusal 

from this separate action.

 

6

Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384–85 (Del. 1991).

7

Id.

8

Id. at 385.
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

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In denying this motion to recuse, I am mindful of my “duty to sit.”9“A trial 

judge has a duty to hear cases assigned to him unless some reasonable factual basis 

to doubt his impartiality or fairness is shown by some kind of probative 

evidence.”10 As this Court has correctly observed, “judges who too lightly recuse 

shirk their official responsibilities, imposing unreasonable demands on their 

colleagues to do their work and risking the untimely processing of cases.”11

Although my service on this Court has spanned all of three months, I have already 

come to appreciate that the Court’s docket is crowded and its judges are, to put it 

mildly, very busy. While I have no particular desire to hear this matter, which 

involves disturbing allegations of child abuse, I would be “abrogating my 

responsibility”12 if I forced one of my colleagues to take over this case based on 

 

9

State v. Desmond, 2011 WL 91984, at *8–9 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (discussing at 

length the so-called “benign” version of the “duty to sit” and denying a motion to 

recuse).

10 In re Will of Stotlar, 1985 WL 4782, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1985) (denying motion to 

recuse).

11 Reeder v. Del. Dept. of Ins., 2006 WL 510067, at *17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2006).

12 Stotlar, 1985 WL 4782, at *1.
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

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Plaintiff’s vague allegations and misguided attempt to reopen litigation that was 

resolved in another court years ago.

The Motion to Recuse is DENIED.

3. Motion to Stay 

The Motion to Stay is based, in part, on the fact that the Motion to Recuse 

should be decided before this litigation proceeds. That motion has now been 

decided. Plaintiff also seeks a stay of this litigation so that he may “re-prioritize 

his focus on pending litigations in the district court” and “re-direct his time and 

other resources to his employment and his business obligations.”

13 This Court’s 

rules of procedure impose an obligation on parties who file cases in this Court to 

prosecute those cases.14 Defendants who are brought before this Court have a right 

to expect that the plaintiff will prosecute the case against them “diligently” or face 

the consequence of dismissal.15 While I appreciate that the costs and burdens of 

 

13 Mot. to Stay, Tr. ID 59116993.

14 Ct. Ch. R. 41(a), (e). 

15 Yancey v. Nat’l Trust Co., Ltd., 1993 WL 155492, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 7, 1993) 

(dismissing a case for plaintiff’s failure to prosecute), aff’d, 633 A.2d 372 (Del. 1993) 

(TABLE).
Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632-VCS

June 29, 2016

Page 9

litigation can, at times, be difficult to bear, particularly for pro se parties, Plaintiff 

has chosen to initiate this litigation and has failed to demonstrate any justifiable 

reason why the Court should allow him to park this case here indefinitely while he 

attends to matters elsewhere.

The Motion to Stay is DENIED.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Joseph R. Slights, III