GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL:

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND

THE CHALLENGES OF RECONSTITUTING THE ARMY, 1939-41

JOHN T. NELSEN II

February 1993
******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This book is approved for public release;

distribution unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this publication are invited and may

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed by calling the Conference Organizer, Dr. Gary L.

Guertner, via commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

******

This study is dedicated to Brenda, James, and Eric, whose

encouragement and sacrifice were instrumental to its completion.

 The author would like to thank Dr. Forrest C. Pogue for his

gracious assistance in narrowing the topic, suggesting productive

lines of inquiry, and providing invaluable insights into George

C. Marshall's life. The author also wishes to thank the staff

members at the G.C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington,

Virginia, for their enthusiastic cooperation in making research

efforts there especially efficient and fruitful. Finally, the

author wishes to express a special note of appreciation to Dr.

Jay Luvaas, Professor of Military History, U.S. Army War College,

for his encouragement and advice in refining the manuscript and

in following through to see it published.
FOREWORD

The study of strategic leadership as a formal, analytical

concept is relatively new. Therefore, concrete, historical

examples of leaders who have wrestled with the width and breadth

of strategic-level challenges are of inestimable value. Such

examples not only help to enrich the general understanding of the

concept, but also inoculate the associated discussions against

becoming overly abstract, esoteric, or idealistic.

In this connection, the study of General George C. Marshall,

covering his pre-World War II service as Army Chief of Staff,

1939-41, is as inspirational as it is illustrative. Marshall

began his tour of duty at a time when the Army was isolated

politically and institutionally, when it was profoundly

undermanned and poorly equipped, and when the prospects for

improving this dismal situation were far from encouraging. In

the ensuing 2 1/2 years, the Army's posture changed dramatically

for the better, largely through Marshall's Herculean efforts to

prepare for the kind of war he saw threatening on the horizon. 

In effect, he "reconstituted" the Army. It is no exaggeration to

say that Marshall enabled America to enter the war with a

distinct "running start" in terms of military preparedness--

something this country had never before succeeded in doing.

Marshall's contributions were no accident of history. They

resulted from the exercise of effective strategic leadership,

consciously and consistently applied across a broad spectrum of

activities and interests. This study analyzes the nature and

effects of that leadership and captures the magnitude of

Marshall's achievements as a strategic leader during what were

frequently regarded as the unglamorous prewar years.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT

Major General, U.S. Army

Commandant
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

George C. Marshall formally assumed the duties of Chief of

Staff, U.S. Army, on September 1, 1939. Earlier that same day,

Germany had invaded Poland, triggering war in Europe. Marshall

subsequently served over 6 grueling years as Chief of Staff,

becoming a popular American hero for his role in the war effort.

Winston Churchill's praise of him as "the true organizer of

victory" for the Allies has found an enduring resonance over the

years. Intuitively, he remains regarded as one of the greatest

strategic leaders of this century. In this connection, his

performance during the war years, 1942 to 1945 in particular,

gets by far the bulk of historical attention for obvious reasons.

Yet, his actions during the prewar years, 1939 to 1941,

offer equally valuable insights into the exercise of strategic

leadership in a democratic society. The challenges Marshall

faced in 1939 seemed monumental. In later years, Marshall

himself admitted that the prewar years were his toughest. As he

assumed his new duties, he felt an urgent need for massive

improvement in the Army's preparedness to conduct modern, mobile

warfare. He could easily imagine that America might eventually

be drawn into a European war, as it had been in 1917. The U.S.

Army in 1939 ranked 17th in the world in size, consisting of

slightly more than 200,000 Regular Army soldiers and slightly

less than 200,000 National Guardsmen--all organized in woefully

understrength and undertrained formations. The Army possessed

only 329 crude light tanks and only a handful of truly modern

combat aircraft within a total inventory of just over 1800

planes. It was a force equipped with the leftover weapons,

materiel, and doctrine of the last war. It had a grossly overage

officer corps, in which advancement was largely a function of

seniority. Captains, for example, were usually in their late

thirties or early forties. War-related industries were

infinitesimal. Congress and the public were united in their

staunch opposition to any increased military expenditures or

involvements abroad. The mood of the country was distinctly

isolationist. Extremely sensitive to this mood, President

Roosevelt was very reluctant to sponsor sizable military

increases. The potential political costs were too great. Against

this political backdrop, Marshall was a relatively unknown and

uninfluential figure in Washington. As Deputy Chief of Staff

(October 1938-June 1939) and as Acting Chief of Staff

(July-August 1939), he had appeared before Congress several times

and had interacted with the President from a distance. But he

had acquired no real personal leverage to shape the larger issues

which confronted him. Roosevelt had appointed him on the

recommendations of others; thus, Marshall had to start almost

from scratch to build a working relationship with the President.1

The situation inside the War Department painted an equally

unpleasant picture. The Secretary of War, Harry Woodring, was in
a continual feud with his primary civilian assistant, Louis

Johnson, who coveted his boss' job. With strong political

influence of his own, Johnson felt his position completely

secure; at the same time, he thought he had already secured

assurances of being Woodring's eventual successor. The two

seldom agreed on anything, and Marshall was caught squarely in

the middle of this dysfunctional situation. The War Department

had great difficulty speaking with a single voice on any issue. 

Marshall walked a tightrope to keep from alienating either man. 

At the same time, the War Department was locked into an

antiquated organizational setup by long-standing congressional

legislation. With multiple, semi-independent power centers and

no clear coordinating authority below that of the Chief of Staff

personally, the Department's structure was fundamentally

inefficient, unresponsive, and ponderous in decision making and

in following up on matters.

By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the

Army's overall situation had changed dramatically for the better.

 By then, over 1.4 million men were serving in the Army,

organized into 36 divisions and 64 air groups. War industries

were in high gear, making America the "arsenal of democracy." 

The Army as a whole was experienced in army and corps-level

maneuvers, well along the way in preparing for mobile warfare. 

The officer corps had been invigorated. A selective service

system was in place. America's leaders had made great strides in

laying the foundation for wartime strategy, and the War

Department had been reorganized to run more efficiently and

effectively.

Marshall cannot be credited solely for these

accomplishments; however, his role was pivotal at the highest

levels of government, in the halls of the War Department, and in

the field. He emerged with enormous influence in Congress, in

the government bureaucracy, and in the White House. He had

become a respected and trusted public figure who had placed his

personal stamp on America's preparation for war. Thanks to his

efforts, America entered the war with a running start and was

able to launch a large-scale offensive less than one year later.

 In short, Marshall's accomplishments were gigantic. The depth

and breadth of his leadership were awe-inspiring.

That leadership will serve as the focus for this study, with

Marshall's actions from 1939 through early 1942 being analyzed

from the perspective of strategic leadership. The intuitive

notion of strategic leadership long pre-dates World War II;

however, as a formal concept, it is relatively new. Examining

Marshall through this prism will provide useful illustrative

insights and shed light on what has been for most an unglamorous

period overshadowed by the more dramatic events of the war. 

Interestingly enough, Marshall's situation during the prewar

years has much in common with that of any strategic-level leader

in peacetime attempting to achieve what he considers to be an

adequate military force in the face of significant public
opposition. Many of the insights are timeless. Apart from this,

Marshall's leadership serves as an inspiring example in itself.
CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

The U.S. Army has formalized the concept of strategic

leadership. In fact, one of the Army War College's core courses

bears this title. According to this concept, the strategic

leader occupies a major position of leadership in his country's

larger and more complex organizations. He operates at a level

where he has significant opportunities to shape national military

strategy by virtue of his office. In so doing, he interacts

extensively with key authoritative figures across a broad

spectrum of governmental and private institutions involved with

influencing policy, legislation, or popular opinion. He usually

networks with a number of such people to exchange timely

information, ideas, or assistance in accomplishing important

tasks. Such networking yields considerable leverage in

influencing decisions and in lubricating the usually ponderous

machinery of government. In this regard, successful strategic

leaders excel at cultivating strong personal bonds of trust and

channels of communication in ever-increasing circles of

influence.

This interaction requires rather sophisticated interpersonal

skills such as polished communication abilities, well- developed

powers of persuasion, negotiating talents, a keen sense of

timing, and the sagacity to compromise on lesser issues to

achieve agreement on more weighty matters. In this regard, the

ability to build consensus among people of institutionally

diverse viewpoints is an essential attribute. Success requires

great peripheral vision. The strategic leader must have an open

mind and a refined understanding of how his institution relates

to the larger operating environment of government and other

policy influencers, in general and issue-by-issue. He must have

the knack for seeing issues from others' frames of reference,

allowing him to anticipate opposing positions and prepare cogent

counterarguments in advance.

Within his own organization, the strategic leader's

influence is most often exercised indirectly, oriented on

long-term change. He spends much of his time designing,

operating, or improving complex systems, processes, and

organizations. For the most part, this systemic approach

produces incremental adjustments over time rather than massive,

immediate, dynamic change.

In fact, the strategic leader must focus chiefly on the

future. He develops and articulates a strategic vision, which

paints a picture of the long-term end state he desires his

organization to achieve. This is his most essential task, for

from this vision the entire organization derives its sustaining

sense of purpose, motivation, and direction. It serves as the

touchstone for orchestrating all ensuing major plans and actions.

 Ideally, it results in the entire organization moving
enthusiastically, in conscious and coherent unison, toward

meaningful, distant objectives.

Consistent with his vision, the strategic leader shapes the

values of his organization. He may reinforce some of the

existing values, downplay others, modify some, or introduce new

ones. In any event, he articulates those values which are

particularly important to him, stimulating their widespread

acceptance and carefully monitoring their manifestations. He

sets up his systems to reward those faithfully exhibiting such

values and to reprove those who do not. Relative to these

values, the strategic leader himself serves as the preeminent

role model. In so doing, he frames the cultural and ethical

fabric for the organization and emphasizes preferred patterns of

conduct.

Of equal importance, the strategic leader structures his

organization so that it can effectively pursue his vision and

reinforce the more important institutional values. Almost

always, this requires periodic adjustments, and can result in

incremental or radical reorganizations. Major shifts in the

overall operating environment also drive organizational changes.

 An organization, for example, may have to operate differently in

wartime than it does in peacetime, even in pursuit of the same

vision and values.

In considering all proposed changes and policies,

organizational and otherwise, the strategic leader must

demonstrate the prescience to foresee their derivative effects,

often termed their second- and third-order effects. These are

non-primary, consequential results; they may be intended,

unintended, beneficial, or harmful to the organization. They are

usually not obvious beforehand. Taking these effects into

account, the strategic leader avoids or mitigates undesirable

by-products of his decisions, actions, or omissions. He can also

use positive effects as tools to influence the organization

subtly in desired ways.

In steering his organization, the strategic leader must

demonstrate additional competencies as well. First, he

establishes effective feedback loops so that he can monitor how

the organization is progressing, particularly regarding his

intentions and special interests. Second, he develops

sophisticated, competent leaders to whom he can confidently

delegate responsibility. These leaders are key to running large,

complex organizations; to providing honest and meaningful

feedback; to translating his vision into specific programs,

activities, and procedures; to inculcating desired values; and to

furnishing future strategic leadership in their own right. 

Third, he allocates resources wisely.

The last point to make about strategic leadership is that

"it's lonely at the top." The strategic leader habitually

operates in a milieu of ambiguity and uncertainty. He usually
defines his tasks, articulates his vision, and takes positions

with little, if any, guidance from superiors. Most voyages are

through uncharted waters. Most choices defy recognition in

advance as being "right" or "wrong." It is not a vocation for

the weak at heart. The strategic leader thus works constantly on

the "fuzzy" edges of analysis, perception, and anticipation. He

must have the intense intellectual courage to oppose what he sees

as "poor" decisions and to advocate "good" ones of major impact,

especially when superiors have opposite inclinations.2
CHAPTER 3

MARSHALL'S STRATEGIC VISION

Marshall assumed his duties as Acting Chief of Staff in July

1939, at a time of great uncertainty. To many, including

Marshall, the flames of conflict worldwide seemed about to get

out of control. Europe stood on the verge of war, and Japan

seemed bent on establishing hegemony, by force if necessary, in

the Western Pacific and throughout the adjoining Asian

hinterlands. The comforting sense of security from external

threats that America felt in the 1920s and early 1930s seemed to

have evaporated. Somehow the world was now more threatening,

although specific threats to American security were difficult to

envisage or articulate clearly. For most Americans, the real

fear was that the United States would repeat its experience of

the Great War, being eventually drawn into a major conflict

overseas. In this unsettling mood of ominous ambiguity and

uncertainty, Marshall brought to his new duties a sense of

urgency and mission.

In planning and preparing for conflicts, strategic thinkers

by nature gravitate toward using worse-case scenarios. This is

because the consequences of not doing so can be so catastrophic

and definitive. Marshall was no exception in this regard. He

considered it likely that America would be faced with major

hostilities as a result of the continuing deterioration in

stability abroad. As a soldier charged with a major portion of

his nation's war preparedness, he had to act based on the

probability of such hostilities, involving perhaps multiple

theaters of war. Furthermore, he felt strongly that war might

come within several years. Hence, given the poor state of the

Army's readiness and the long lead time needed to correct

fundamental deficiencies and shortfalls, Marshall believed that

time was of the essence. This sense of urgency and

responsibility framed Marshall's strategic vision for the prewar

years.

Before discussing the specifics of that vision, two

prefatory points need to be made. First, Marshall admirers tend

to assume that he envisaged in 1939 exactly all he would do for

the next few years; the magnitude of his accomplishments, both in

quantity and quality, suggest that he must have had a detailed

blueprint from the beginning. This is clearly a myth. Evidence

suggests rather that he had a much more general concept, or

vision, of what he wanted to accomplish; that it was flexible

enough to support a wide range of actions; and that he chose

astutely from among those courses of action, based on changing

conditions at home and abroad. The strength of his vision was its

vitality. Despite changing circumstances, it served as a solid

structural framework upon which to hang the many, inevitable

adjustments, additions, embellishments, refinements, and actions

without collapsing. Second, the term "strategic vision" is a

by-product of the 1980s and 1990s. Marshall and his
contemporaries didn't use the term. However, Marshall did have

and consistently articulated what today would be called a vision;

furthermore, it served as the conceptual lodestar for his

actions. In Marshall's day, the notion of vision might have been

called a program, a plan of action, or a set of objectives.

Preparedness.

The centerpiece of Marshall's strategic vision was his

mental image of an American Army fully manned, trained, and

equipped in sufficient size during peacetime to deter aggression

against the United States and its more important interests; if

deterrence failed, this Army was to conduct decisive, successful

combat operations almost immediately to win the war while

continuing to expand, as necessary, through an efficient program

of mobilization. Key wartime industries would have developed to

the point that they could support the full war effort with needed

supplies and equipment. In short, Marshall wanted the Army and

related military industries largely prepared for war when the war

began. This meant considerable preparatory actions during

peacetime, the intensity and magnitude of which would be governed

by the seriousness of potential threats from abroad. At the

time, this was a revolutionary idea, never before achieved in

American history.3

This aspect of his vision grew out of his experiences in

World War I. He had been stunned by America's unpreparedness for

that war. A full year was required after Congress had declared

war before even a crudely trained army could be deployed. 

Because of the lack of quality peacetime training, casualties

were needlessly excessive. Moreover, American war production

never had time to gear up. As a result, the American

Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) fought largely with French- or

British-made guns, ammunition, airplanes, supplies, and

equipment. "We went into the line...[with] everything begged,

borrowed, or stolen--certainly not manufactured in America," he

remarked in 1931. Marshall was determined never again to allow

America to be placed in this "ghastly situation" of an "almost

criminal lack of proper preparation."4

For the new Chief of Staff, the notions of being prepared

for war and going about doing it were inseparable. In general

terms, he continuously struck the theme of progressing with a

"step-by-step coordinated increase." Above all, he wanted to

proceed "in an orderly manner" to build a "balanced force" of all

arms welded into "a perfect team." Remembering vividly the

dysfunctional panic and waste which resulted when an unprepared

America suddenly went to war in 1917, Marshall cautioned against

the extremes of doing nothing and of trying to do all at once. 

In his experience, the first usually led to the second when the

public suddenly awakened to the danger of war. His remarks on

October 11, 1939 at a banquet are insightful:
Let me strongly emphasize the fact that we must not

become involved by impatience or ignorance in an

ill-conceived, overnight expansion, which would smother

well-considered methods and leave us in a dilemma of

confused results, half-baked and fatally unbalanced.

In his mind, the only workable antidote was a systematic,

well-thought-out series of incremental, digestible steps to

strengthen the country's military posture.5

First and foremost among such steps was the need to prime

the pump of the nation's military industrial base. Marshall

emphasized repeatedly that gearing up industry for military

production was the most time-consuming element in the

mobilization process. Much of what was to be used in war had to

be produced in peace. As he told an audience in Brunswick during

1938:

No matter how many billions of dollars Congress places

at our disposal on the day war is declared, they will

not buy ten cents worth of materiel for delivery under

twelve months, and a great deal of it requires a year

and a half to manufacture.

It took even longer before troops had these items in

sufficient quantity for meaningful training. In comparison, men

and units could mobilize at a much faster pace. Thus, for

Marshall, the first priority was the production of materiel in a

balanced program to establish the reserve stocks needed for

subsequent manpower mobilization. In fact, Marshall repeatedly

emphasized that any orderly, balanced mobilization required the

necessary equipment on hand before men could form new units and

train properly. In this connection, the massive equipment

shortages during mobilization for the Great War haunted Marshall

as one of the greatest nightmares of his lifetime.6

The Fighting Formations.

In addition to such materiel concerns, Marshall's vision of

a fully manned and trained force encompassed some very specific

criteria vis-a-vis the existing state of the Army. First, he

envisioned an Army organized into corps and field armies, with

their corresponding complements of "specialized" supporting

troops--such as military police, engineers, logistical elements,

air defense units, field artillery units, and signal elements. 

In 1939, neither the Regular Army nor the National Guard had any

tactical corps or field army headquarters. During the lean years

since World War I, the Army had concentrated on keeping the

divisions as filled as resources permitted. Even so, all

divisions were outrageously understrength. The larger formations

required a certain "excess" which Marshall intended to create. 

This was particularly important. In his mind's eye, the corps

and field armies constituted the fundamental fighting formations
of the next war. Second, he expected most corps to consist of

both Regular Army and National Guard divisions, operating after

much training as a truly unified team. Third, the corps and

field army formations could only attain true proficiency through

large-scale maneuvers.7

One can hardly overstate Marshall's emphasis on the

importance of these maneuvers. He believed strongly that any

future conflict would involve fluid movement and maneuver of

large formations on the battlefield. The speedy German victory

over Poland only reinforced his belief. Maneuvers featuring

opposing corps and field armies trained higher-level commanders

and staffs in the movement of large bodies of troops, a lost art

in the U.S. Army by 1939. Marshall regarded these maneuvers as

"a great college of leadership for the higher officers" and a

"wonderful practical schooling" for younger leaders and their

men. Only through maneuvers could a corps' or field army's

diverse elements interact under pressure in a realistic

environment; only in this way could they develop the

combined-arms teamwork needed to prevail in battle. Only in this

way could the larger headquarters hone the skills and procedures,

only imperfectly imagined in the school house. Marshall

emphasized this point during congressional testimony on November

30, 1939:

What appears satisfactory on paper too frequently we

find quite impractical in actual operations....there is

little that can be done in time of peace to simulate

closely the conditions under which troops operate in

war. Therefore, it is all the more important that we

make every effort to learn the practical business of

troop leadership and teamwork, utilizing field

maneuvers for this purpose, and especially to wash out

the over-theoretical or academic conceptions. We must

have more simplicity of procedure, and that requires

teamwork, and teamwork is possible only if we have an

opportunity to practice as a team.8

Maneuvers also contributed in other ways. They helped

identify significant flaws in the structuring of organizations of

all sizes, serving as an invaluable catalyst for refinement. 

They also helped develop the kind of resilient, vigorous,

competent leaders which Marshall deemed essential for the

rigorous demands of fast-paced mobile warfare. The truly gifted

officers could be more readily earmarked for accelerated

promotion because their talents more visibly stood out during

demanding field duties.9

Autonomy Versus Independence for the Air Corps.

Another aspect of Marshall's strategic vision concerned the

Army Air Corps. As Deputy Chief of Staff, he had observed that

air officers had almost no representation on the General Staff
and that most General Staff officers had little interest in

air-related matters. In fact, there was a strong anti-air bias.

 Many young air officers were going to Congress on their own, and

stirring up everything, creating a general muddle. "They had

something to complain about," Marshall later recalled, "because

they were not getting recognition, and the ground staff at that

time had little understanding of the air." Many Air Corps

supporters, inside and outside the Army, advocated an independent

air force modeled after Britain's Royal Air Force; they

cultivated congressmen to champion their cause. Many ground Army

senior officers, on the other hand, would have been only too

happy to rid themselves of the Air Corps.10

Marshall found this situation deplorable, but decided to

move cautiously. In his view, the Air Corps formed a

particularly critical part of the combined-arms team to be

forged. Ground and air officers had to grow to understand and

respect each others' roles if anything approaching the necessary

teamwork between them could be realized. This mutual

understanding and respect could not be dictated; it had to be

nurtured so it could flourish of its own accord. This was

Marshall's approach. He intended to increase incrementally the

autonomy of the Air Corps within the Army, in the process

developing its leaders so they could perform respectably as

senior commanders and staff officers. In fact, Marshall aimed to

give the Air Corps all the autonomy it could handle. However, he

kept this intention fairly close-hold, making it a semi-hidden

aspect of his strategic vision. To have articulated this openly

would have ignited a fire storm of attention, undermining his

efforts to effect subtle, almost imperceptible, attitudinal and

organizational changes. Marshall thus envisioned an autonomous

Air Corps, working harmoniously with the ground forces to form

the "perfect combined-arms team," in addition to performing

strategic bombing missions apart from the ground forces.11

In working toward this end, he wanted to postpone

indefinitely Air Corps independence. He felt that establishing a

separate air force on the verge of war would create

organizational chaos and make air-ground teamwork all the more

difficult to achieve. It was trying enough just dealing with one

other service, the Navy. An independent air force would result

in a quantum drop in unity of effort for a long time. This

Marshall wanted to avoid at all costs. He advocated expanding

the Air Corps' strategic bombing capacity, but he also insisted

on enhancing the air's tactical capability to support ground

maneuver. In an independent air force, the advocates of

strategic bombing could easily get the upper hand, causing

enormous problems in obtaining the needed support for ground

troops. Besides, in Marshall's sage judgement, the Air Corps

lacked sufficient educated and experienced senior officers to

establish its own effective General Staff, a prerequisite for

independence.12
Organizational Inadequacies.

Another element of Marshall's strategic vision, also only

faintly articulated, concerned the basic organization of the War

Department. That structure may have been adequate for the

sleepy-hollow pace of the 1920s and early 1930s, but by 1939 it

had become increasingly dysfunctional. Marshall had experienced

this first-hand as Deputy Chief of Staff. The War Department's

Staff consisted of many diverse sections, each of which had set

responsibilities for certain aspects of Army matters. The

problem was that no staff section by doctrine or tradition had

the authority to require collaboration and resolution of issues

across staff lines. Since most problems involved matters

affecting two or more staff sections, virtually every issue had

to percolate up to the Chief of Staff personally for decision. 

This even applied to purely administrative and procedural rulings

of relatively little account. No one below the Chief had the

authority to force a decision, for example, when staff sections

disagreed fundamentally. The Staff, as a rule, felt comfortable

with the setup. There was a certain feudal quality about it. 

Virtually every staff section head had direct and frequent access

to the Chief of Staff. Since such access equated to power and

prestige, it was a tenaciously guarded prerogative.13

From Marshall's perspective, the process was incredibly

inefficient. It overwhelmed him with an avalanche of unnecessary

detail that left little time to deal with larger, weightier

matters. Sixty-one staff officers had direct access to him; in

addition, the commanders of some 30 major and 350 smaller

commands fell under his immediate control in his role as the de

facto commanding general of all U.S. Army forces. Since staff

sections coordinated sequentially on issues, the process of

analyzing and proposing solutions was extremely slow. Even

worse, once decisions were made, no one staff section was

empowered to follow up comprehensively to ensure faithful

compliance. As a result, the War Department's routine was

unresponsive and fragmented, due to extreme structural

compartmentalization. Things were continuously falling through

the cracks.14

Marshall envisioned a much simplified and streamlined

command and staff structure, although he wasn't sure exactly what

form it should take. In general, he wanted an organization

wherein he could delegate authority to make and follow-up on

routine decisions. He wanted a mechanism by which some staff

entity could drive a rapid and comprehensive analysis of issues

across staff lines, ensuring an equally comprehensive follow-up

in implementing decisions. In short, Marshall intended to mold

an efficient system that relieved him of the crushing burden of

unnecessary detail so he could concentrate on broader policy

matters.15

In attempting to implement this part of his vision, Marshall
knew to proceed cautiously. Any major changes to the War

Department's staff structure required congressional approval in

the form of legislation. This would be difficult to obtain since

any radical reorganization would trigger a virtual "palace

revolt" by those who would be "disenfranchised" within the War

Department. The likely result would be an extended and ugly

debate aired through the open process of congressional testimony.

 Even if successful, this approach "would do more harm than

good," Marshall commented. The Army would emerge with its

prestige tarnished and its morale diminished.16

Wishing to avoid such a Pyrrhic victory, Marshall decided to

move incrementally, although he had no comprehensive blueprint in

mind. By so doing, he demonstrated a masterful understanding of

the counterproductive derivative effects of proceeding in a more

direct and draconian fashion.

Reaching Out to the Navy.

The last element of Marshall's strategic vision in 1939

addressed the Navy. Again, without any detailed plan in mind, he

wanted to build a much more active and cooperative working

relationship with his sister service. First and foremost, this

meant establishing sound relations, personally and

professionally, between the Chief of Naval Operations and

himself. Marshall correctly perceived that, as war approached,

the Army and the Navy would have to act increasingly in unison on

a host of matters, extending from procurement to training, to the

conduct of joint operations, to the formulation of strategy. 

Marshall intensely wanted to improve the foundation for a truly

propitious wartime working relationship at all levels.17

In summary, Marshall's strategic vision dealt almost

exclusively with the need to reshape and rebuild the Army. In

1939, the Army constituted a mere skeleton of an effective combat

force, inadequate even by World War I standards. The open

warfare anticipated by Marshall involved significantly higher

standards. Facing such a daunting challenge at a time of growing

hostilities abroad, it is not surprising that Marshall devoted

the great bulk of his mental and physical energies to preparing

the Army for war, the worst contingency foreseeable from the

ominous flow of world events. Only slowly, as the foreign

situation became increasingly unstable and as he matured in his

position, would Marshall concern himself with more profound

considerations of strategy. These were largely peripheral to his

initial strategic vision.
CHAPTER 4

EXPANDING THE ARMY, 1939-40

The Army in 1939 was in sad shape. Ranked 17th globally in

manpower, it consisted of only 9 Regular Army and 18 National

Guard divisions--all very much understrength and equipped with

obsolete World War I-vintage materiel. Of these units, only

three Regular Army divisions had enough men to conduct operations

effectively above the battalion level. On September 1, 1939,

Regular Army strength was approaching 210,000 enlisted men, while

National Guard strength stood at slightly below 200,000 in twice

as many divisions. These figures fell well short of those

authorized by the National Defense Act of 1920, which Congress

had originally intended to serve as the framework for defense in

the post-Great War era. This legislation authorized a Regular

Army of 280,000 enlisted men and a National Guard of 450,000 men;

however, Congress had subsequently declined to vote the

appropriations to field the full authorized strength. It was a

hollow Army in every way.18

Hitler's invasion of Poland triggered hopes for substantial

increases, but those hopes were short-lived. President Roosevelt

allowed only a modest increase of 17,000 in the Regular Army and

35,000 in the National Guard; he claimed that it "was all the

public would be ready to accept without undue excitement."19

Marshall was disappointed, but made the most of this initial

expansion. He immediately carried out a long-contemplated

reorganization of Regular Army divisions. The old cumbersome

"square division" of four large regiments was replaced by a

"triangular division" structure of three, smaller, more mobile

regiments. Using the 17,000-man increase plus the additional

troops generated by the move to a smaller division, Marshall

created five fully manned divisions of the new type. He also

created a host of specialized units to serve as support troops

for one corps. Then he moved quickly to get these formations

into the field for meaningful training to build combined-arms

teamwork and to test the new organizational structure. He also

scheduled corps and division maneuvers for the spring of 1940,

and arranged for the Third Division to conduct a joint amphibious

operation with the Navy in January 1940 on the West Coast.20

Intermediate Goals.

While modest by later standards, these steps appeared

dramatic compared to the inactivity of the previous interwar

years. Marshall, however, had grander designs. While he had no

exact picture of the Army's ultimate size in accordance with his

strategic vision, he did have in mind some very specific

intermediate goals.

Marshall's most immediate goal was to bring the existing
troops "to a full state of efficiency as quickly as possible." 

This translated into the divisional reorganization, the creation

of a corps headquarters and one set of corps support troops, and

the scheduling of maneuvers previously discussed. It also

involved ensuring that existing forces possessed all of their

authorized equipment and sustaining supplies.21

His next goal related to the General Staff's existing

mobilization plan. That plan called for an Initial Protective

Force (IPF) of 400,000 men, theoretically made up of 165,000

Regular Army soldiers and 235,000 men from the National Guard. 

The IPF made up the immediate defense force, a component of the

larger Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP) force, which would

mobilize over a 4-month period. On paper, the PMP force

consisted of all 280,000 men of the Regular Army and all 450,000

men of the National Guard authorized by the National Defense Act

of 1920; it also included 270,000 men to be recruited as

replacements upon mobilization. Thus, the PMP called for a total

force of one million men. Marshall's plan aimed at expanding the

Army until it could provide the full IPF on short notice and at

procuring all critical supplies and equipment (e.g., ammunition,

rifles, artillery, tanks, trucks, uniforms) necessary for the

full PMP force. This procurement action was especially critical

to Marshall's calculations since it required 1-2 years to

complete. To field the IPF, the Army needed all 280,000 Regular

Army soldiers authorized by the National Defense Act; those not

counted against the IPF itself were either already stationed

overseas or needed to train recruits for the PMP force. To get

165,000 Regulars for the IPF required an inventory of 280,000 men

on hand from the beginning. In short, Marshall's approach was to

build up the PMP force, making it for the first time a truly

credible basis for national defense.22

In the process, Marshall sought to organize the IPF into

nine corps, each consisting of one Regular Army division, two

National Guard divisions, and 10,000 corps support troops. In

addition, he planned to establish two pure Regular Army corps for

use as a rapid deployment force in a sudden emergency. But his

overarching intent here was to create a more "unified force" in

the sense of a closer operational and associational relationship

between Regular Army and National Guard units.23

In striving toward these intermediate goals, Marshall would

grow frustrated repeatedly during the winter and spring of

1939-40. While his own sense of urgency permanently increased

with events in Poland, the mood of the country demonstrated a

distinct mercurial character. The surrender of Poland and the

uneasy quiet, the so-called "Sitzkrieg" or Phoney War, which

settled over Europe sapped the initial zeal to rebuild America's

defenses. Many expressed the hope that Britain and France could

handle Germany by themselves, allowing the United States to stay

out of the looming conflict.24
Discord within the War Department.

Secretary of War Woodring, by background a strong

non-interventionalist, was absolutely unwilling to push for

significant military increases. Locked in an open and

embarrassing power feud with Assistant Secretary of War Louis

Johnson, he had, in addition, lost most of his influence with the

President; his uncompromising views on neutrality were far too

extreme even for Roosevelt at the time. Johnson, a strong

advocate for increased airpower, saw no alarming need to expand

ground forces. Thus, Marshall could expect no help whatsoever

from his immediate civilian superiors in running interference on

Capitol Hill or at the White House. Wisely, he kept good

personal relations with both Woodring and Johnson although the

two seldom spoke to each other. By skillfully remaining neutral

in this feud, Marshall kept the War Department fully functional

and active during a period of potentially disruptive internal

discord. Even so, one could not say that the War Department

spoke with a single voice. For his part, Marshall received

virtually no guidance from above.25

Relationship with the President.

With no help from his civilian superiors in gaining entree

to the White House, Marshall found the President generally

indifferent to the arguments for sizable Army expansion. 

Roosevelt was a Navy man with little cultivated interest in Army

matters. He proposed building hordes of planes and ships to deal

with future threats, knowing that such actions were more

palatable to the American people. Ships and planes implied a

purely defensive posture to fend away would-be aggressors from

the Western Hemisphere. But a large land Army clearly suggested

a possible intent to ship America's sons to fight abroad, a

message Roosevelt shied away from sending at this point. For

these reasons, the President significantly reduced the War

Department's requested appropriations for fiscal year 1941. 

While the reduced figure was still high compared to that of

previous years, it fell far short of what Marshall needed just to

complete equipping the existing Regular Army and National Guard

troops. In addition, Roosevelt allowed no increase in troop

strength, to Marshall's great frustration.26

This frustration was intensified by the Chief of Staff's

personal relationship with the President. Roosevelt was a

daunting figure who usually attempted to dominate and terminate

conversations on his own terms. Marshall had trouble getting a

chance to present his views. Since the President didn't want to

discuss seriously any Army increases, he repeatedly and slyly

steered the subjects of their conversations in other directions.

 So thwarted, Marshall had extreme difficulty getting his views

aired to the President in a comprehensive and consistent way.27

The Chief of Staff's approach was also a factor. He was a
naturally formal person who strove to keep some personal distance

between the President and himself. He had seen how Roosevelt

tended toward more informal relations with cabinet members and

advisors; however, the President used semi-familiarity as a means

to poke fun at those individuals in order to dismiss ideas glibly

which did not appeal to him. Familiarity didn't breed contempt;

but it did breed an environment wherein the President had a clear

upper hand in flippantly disregarding thoughtful advice. 

Marshall resolved to play by different rules. He wanted a

relationship based on mutual respect, one more geared to his own

reserved personal style. Thus, he refused to "drop in" at the

White House or curry favor with the President on purely personal

terms. His discussions focused strictly on business with no

unrelated personal chats. Marshall even deliberately refused to

laugh at the President's jokes; laughter only encouraged him to

filibuster his way around difficult questions requiring immediate

attention. He used levity to manipulate subordinates like

puppets. Marshall denied him the use of that tool.28

In the short term, the Chief of Staff's approach made it

very difficult for him to establish a good working relationship

with the President, at least until the General learned to be more

forceful in speaking his mind. For some time, Roosevelt was

clearly uncomfortable with Marshall's extreme seriousness. In

the long run, however, this approach had the desired effect. The

unwavering formality set an impressive tone of dignity and

respect in their relations; this, in turn, eventually gave

Marshall enormous influence with Roosevelt. Marshall was

regarded as his own person, not a Roosevelt creature. However,

this influence developed gradually as they came to know each

other better. It was hardly in evidence before May 1940.29

Initial Relations with Congress.

In addition to his initial rough going with the President,

Marshall also encountered a generally unsympathetic Congress. 

With his presidentially scaled-down budget for 1941 in hand,

Marshall testified repeatedly before the House from February 23

until April 3, 1940. Only by intense, last-minute lobbying did

he succeed in averting draconian cuts. Even so, the House

slashed the proposed budget by almost 10 percent, and approved

only 57 of the meager 166 planes requested. Again, Marshall

mixed disappointment with deepening concern.30

Despite this frustration, Marshall set some key themes with

Congress which would return later to serve him well. In

February, he shared that part of his strategic vision concerning

the need for a balanced, step-by-step approach to military

expansion:

As to the existing crisis abroad, we must face the

facts. Any major developments there should be

paralleled by added precautions in this country. If
the situation grows more desperate, we should add to

the numbers of seasoned troops....If Europe blazes in

late spring or summer, we must put our house in order

before the sparks reach the Western Hemisphere.

Marshall went on to say that he opposed massive, sudden

expansions; he also opposed waiting until the last moment and

then attempting the impossible. Congressmen and the public would

recall these themes later when Europe did, in fact, begin to

blaze in a big way. Marshall's almost prophetic suggestion,

combined with his very reasonable and steady approach, would

later enhance his prestige greatly; he would appear as the man

with a coherent, consistent plan at a time of alarming

uncertainty. He would appear as a steadying hand at the wheel

when sentiments became almost frantic. The foundation for this

stature with Congress and the public was laid during the first

three months of 1940. The consistency with which he repeatedly

articulated what appeared to be a calm, deliberate, measured,

well-thought-out approach was crucially important in this

regard.31

Despite the lack of satisfactory progress in pleading his

case for minimal expansion, Marshall kept the faith. He remained

totally loyal to the President. He decided early to operate

faithfully as a member of the administration's team; while he was

frequently tempted to plead his case directly to the public, he

felt that any short-term gains would be dwarfed by adverse

second- and third-order effects, namely, the loss of trust and

confidence in him by the President. A certain group of senators

was very sympathetic to Marshall's designs. They privately

encouraged him to state openly that the nation's security

depended on more military appropriations than the President was

willing to grant. These senators pressured the Chief of Staff

intensely and repeatedly. So did many members of his own staff.

 Yet, Marshall refused. He felt that direct appeals of this

nature violated the spirit of the Constitution regarding civilian

control over the military, a principle he deeply revered. Such

conduct would make him appear "political," power-hungry, and

self-serving. Most important of all, this kind of conduct would

permanently undermine his reputation as a "straight shooter," one

who deals with people and issues in a straightforward manner

without a complex web of hidden agendas lurking in the shadows. 

This perception would be fatal to anyone in Marshall's shoes. It

would prevent him from ever obtaining the President's full trust

and confidence. It would also reduce his credibility on Capitol

Hill, where such disloyalty engenders no enduring respect or

admiration on a grand scale. People would regard him as just

another Washington climber with strong personal ambitions. 

Marshall wisely decided that in the long run the interests of the

country and the Army would be best served by working "within the

team of which the president was the head." This approach

genuinely reflected his own temperament as well.32

Marshall was reluctant to make any direct appeals for
another reason. He wanted to avoid creating the impression that

he was at the forefront of pushing the country toward involvement

in a new world war overseas. If he got too far ahead of the

President and the Congress in this regard, the public and the

press would likely turn against him and undermine his

credibility. He would be branded as just another militarist. 

For this reason, Marshall chose to tread softly in awakening the

public consciousness to the need for military expansion. A too

forceful effort could lead to a complete rejection of his views

and a dramatic reduction of his influence, to the ultimate

impairment of the entire rearmament effort.33

Only one thought really comforted Marshall about his

somewhat checkmated situation. He presciently expected events in

Europe to take a turn for the worse; if they did, he would be

prepared to capitalize on them. Plans for additional increases

were readied and placed on the shelf for the proper moment. 

Marshall was already demonstrating a masterful sense of timing. 

In considering the military appropriation bill for fiscal year

1941, Marshall remarked to his staff, "It will react to our

advantage if our bill is acted on at the latest possible date. 

It is probable that events in Europe will develop in such a way

as to affect Congressional action." He was also demonstrating a

very refined sense of the art of the possible, both for the

moment and for the future.34

Training and Readiness.

While not particularly productive from a legislative

perspective, the spring of 1940 was extremely fruitful for Army

training. Soon after becoming Chief of Staff, Marshall had

acquired the funding from Congress for sizable maneuvers in 1940.

 He placed great emphasis on their importance and dedicated

enormous resources to their preparations. First, the Regular

Army conducted extensive field training through division level

during the winter and early spring. Then he grouped the

divisions in several instances into opposing corps for a number

of larger maneuvers. One exercise involved over 70,000 men

organized into opposing provisional field armies. National Guard

training also improved through additional drill periods and an

extra week of field training obtained previously by Marshall from

Congress. This series of exercises upgraded profoundly the

readiness of the units involved and provided invaluable

experience for conducting future maneuvers of even greater

magnitude. Newly developed doctrine, techniques, procedures, and

organizations were tested and refined. 

Marshall was pleased with the results, but Congress remained

skeptical of the benefits. He had to defend constantly the value

and costs of these exercises. As he noted, these were the first

genuine peacetime corps and field army maneuvers in the history

of the nation. Before the fall of 1939, he emphasized, "the

Regular Army, although highly developed in the efficiency of its
small units, has been largely an army of battalions." It was

stationed overseas and in 130 different posts across the country.

 As he remarked during a radio broadcast in February 1940:

Seldom were regiments complete or united. Brigades

were a rarity. We possessed no complete divisions and

the battalions of the incomplete divisions were widely

scattered. The Army corps, the great battle team,

existed solely on paper.

The credit for the dramatic transformation in training readiness

in less than a year must go completely to Marshall. He drove the

preparations and overcame virtually every major obstacle

personally. With regard to this element of his vision, Marshall

followed through in impressive and consistent style.35

Army-Navy Relations.

At the same time, he significantly improved Army-Navy

cooperation. At his initiative, the two services conducted a

successful division-size amphibious exercise in January 1940. 

The Army Area commander on the scene, Lieutenant General DeWitt,

subsequently wrote to Marshall:

There was not a single case of friction, and the good

will of each [service] toward the other was most

apparent. It was a very happy situation and I think

has built a solid foundation for the successful

initiation and outcome of any future exercises....The

basis for it all, of course, exists in the relationship

between yourself and Admiral Stark [the Chief of Naval

Operations] and it has permeated down through all

echelons in both services.36

This was music to Marshall's ears. He had very deliberately

nurtured a strong relationship with his counterpart in the Navy

involving a host of issues and interests. At Marshall's

initiative, they had established their own informal Joint Air

Advisory Committee outside the purview of the more formal and

bureaucratic Joint Board umbrella. This committee concerned

itself with aviation matters of mutual interest, with a charter

to advise the two service chiefs on employment considerations,

joint operations, common production specifications, and

common-use facilities. The Chief of the Air Corps headed the

Army's delegation, while the Chief of the Aeronautical Board

headed the Navy's. The real purpose behind the committee was to

facilitate the exchange of views and ideas, building consensus in

those areas where working in concert yielded greater

efficiencies; the design or production of planes and other

aviation equipment was perhaps the most frequently discussed

topic.37

Marshall was pleased with the general direction of Army-Navy
relations, which had "put the two services on a more solid basis"

and worked out "common problems...on a very intimate basis." In

his mind, the Army and the Navy had begun to work together

harmoniously on a considerably expanded scale. By so doing, they

were strengthening the foundation for the kind of joint teamwork

and unity of effort essential for any major conflict.38

Networking and Lobbying.

Despite making headway in some of these areas, Marshall

smarted from the 10 percent cut to his proposed budget for 1941

voted by the House on April 3, 1940. He now turned to an old and

powerful acquaintance for help. Bernard Baruch, an independently

wealthy banker, had served as a confidant to many presidents,

including Roosevelt. He was also an invaluable pipeline to key

congressional leaders. While serving as Pershing's aide,

Marshall had met Baruch in the early 1920s and had maintained a

cordial relationship ever since. Baruch generally supported

expanded military preparedness, and had bombarded the new Chief

of Staff with a steady stream of "good ideas"--most of which were

less than practical. Nonetheless, conscious of Baruch's

influence and large ego, Marshall assigned to a member of his

immediate staff the additional duty to keep in close contact with

the old man, to listen carefully to all his suggestions, and to

ensure they were brought to the Chief of Staff's personal

attention promptly. Marshall also ensured Baruch was well

informed of the Army's needs; he even had Baruch flown to

exercises and training centers to keep him abreast of the latest

problems and developments. Responding now to Marshall's request

for assistance, Baruch quickly arranged a private dinner with key

senators so Marshall could explain his needs. Baruch felt

strongly that the Army had never really gotten its story over.39

Events abroad helped somewhat. The Germans attacked both

Denmark and Norway on April 9, intensifying Marshall's concern

over the critical items which the Initial Protective Force still

lacked. The next night, at the dinner, the senators had the

fresh news of Denmark's surrender ringing in their ears. 

Nonetheless, he faced a tough audience. Marshall pleaded his

case until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning but, judging from the

stern faces and comments of the senators, felt he had failed to

persuade anyone. But his array of facts and compelling

arguments, pursued with a powerful sense of conviction, won the

day. Senator Alva Adams, speaking for most of his colleagues,

told Marshall, "You came [here tonight] before the committee

without even a piece of paper and you got every damned thing you

asked for."

Other European events would soon ensure that Marshall would

get much more than the equivalent of the 10 percent budget cut

back, but this dinner session was critically important for future

relations with the Senate. Baruch considered it "a turning point

in convincing such critics of preparedness as Senator Adams of
the urgent need for speeding the rebuilding of our defenses." 

Even more important, Marshall had deeply impressed particularly

powerful senators and opened new channels of communication with

them, in the process demonstrating superb interpersonal skills. 

He had profoundly expanded their trust and confidence in his

stewardship. Marshall's networking with, and through, Baruch had

paid handsome dividends.40

Confronting the President.

Five days later, on April 15, the Chief of Staff advised

Secretary Woodring that the worsening international situation

required him to advise an increase in the state of military

preparation. The President soon approved the request in

principle for additional critical items for existing units of the

Regular Army and National Guard, but then pruned the request down

from $25 million to $18 million.41

Marshall reacted strongly. What he had requested was the

bare minimum needed. He now sought to influence the President

indirectly by seeking the support of Secretary of the Treasury

Henry Morgenthau, one of the more powerful and influential

members of Roosevelt's inner circle. Morgenthau invited Marshall

to his office. The Secretary told him that the War Department

was making a mistake in "feeding the President little pieces here

and little pieces there" in terms of what was needed. He

encouraged Marshall to present a balanced proposal for overall

defense needs that they could sell to the Congress. The problem

to date had been Marshall's difficulty in getting Roosevelt's

attention long enough to make a thorough presentation. This had

been compounded by Marshall's natural deference to the

President's dominating conversational style.42

On May 11, the day after Germany attacked Holland and

Belgium, the Chief of Staff visited Morgenthau and presented a

program amounting to a staggering $650 million. Marshall was

brutally frank. Desperately needed, along with dramatic

increases in Regular Army manpower, were many fighters and

bombers to build a modern air force; ammunition plants; reserve

equipment for the entire Protective Mobilization Plan force; and

a host of equipment from blankets to rifles for the grossly

underequipped existing forces, Regular Army and National Guard. 

His plan also called for raising the PMP force to 1.25 million

men, under arms and combat ready within 6 months of declaring

full mobilization.

Marshall's articulate arguments won Morgenthau over. He

agreed to serve as the Chief of Staff's advocate when they met

with the President two days later. The Secretary sagely advised

Marshall to speak frankly and forcefully: "There are too few

people who do it and he likes it."

Marshall took the advice. The meeting at the White House on
May 13 was pivotal. On that day, news of dramatic German

successes against the French and British had just arrived. The

President proposed building 50,000 planes a year and expanding

the Navy; he saw no dire need to build up the ground forces. He

wasn't even interested in training enough pilots to fly a

substantially larger number of planes. He had locked onto

airplane production as an overly simplistic, one-dimensional

panacea for national security. Of course, this flew in the face

of all Marshall wanted in terms of a holistic, complementary

force of combined-arms elements, adequately equipped and 

trained. Roosevelt dominated the conversation and dismissed

Morgenthau's suggestion that he hear out the Chief of Staff. "I

know exactly what he will say," commented Roosevelt. "There is no

reason for me to hear him at all." Neither Secretary Woodring

nor Assistant Secretary Johnson, who were present, supported

Marshall or the general thrust of his proposals which Morgenthau

had outlined earlier.

Nonetheless, the General was determined to have his day in

court. He walked over to the President and, looking down, firmly

and sternly asked for three minutes of his time to speak. The

President relented graciously. Marshall then made a concise

presentation, about the state of the Army, complete with anger,

frustration, and concern. The vehemence and emotional intensity

of the presentation stunned the President, as did the striking

facts. Roosevelt asked Marshall to return the next day with a

detailed list of what was needed. The result was the President's

agreement to submit a supplementary Army appropriation of $732

million, covering most of what Marshall had requested. Roosevelt

sent it to Congress on May 16.43

Marshall later characterized this encounter as the breaking

of a log jam. Again, his compelling arguments and articulateness

had largely carried the day. But they would never have

succeeded, had he not mustered the moral courage to speak

candidly and vigorously to challenge the President in a forceful

way. Marshall had for the first time made Roosevelt appreciate

the reasoning for a balanced force, as well as the necessary

components of that force. This was a remarkable achievement

which raised Marshall's standing with the President; this

experience altered their relationship fundamentally in a positive

way. The cordial working relationship which the Chief of Staff

had established beforehand with Morgenthau played a major

facilitating role.44

Public Perceptions Change.

While the German invasion of Denmark and Norway heightened

general concern, most Americans seemed confident that Britain and

France would triumph in the end by themselves. After all, many

military experts rated the French Army alone as the best in the

world. However, the spectacular German victories in Western

Europe during May and June 1940 dramatically changed this
thinking. Suddenly both the public and the Congress perceived a

clear and evident threat and became much more disposed toward

increased military spending. France had been completely

eliminated as a world power. The British Army had lost most of

its heavy equipment. To many, the invasion of Britain itself

seemed imminent. As Marshall later wrote,

The precariousness of the situation and its threat to

the security of the United States became suddenly

apparent to our people, and the pendulum of public

opinion reversed itself, swinging violently to the

other extreme, in an urgent demand for enormous and

immediate increases in modern equipment and of the

armed forces. 45

Congress warmly greeted the President's request of May 16

for an additional $1 billion, of which $732 million was earmarked

for the Army. As the German victories loomed even more total,

Marshall and others convinced Roosevelt to forward a second,

supplemental appropriations bill to the Hill on May 31; of this

amount, $709 million was for Army needs. Congress not only

approved both proposals but also added to them, appropriating

money to raise the authorized Regular Army enlisted strength from

230,000 to 375,000. But most important to Marshall, the approved

funds allowed production to start in earnest on all sorts of

items needed to equip the entire PMP force--from blankets and

uniforms to tanks and airplanes. The approved money would also

allow the Army to stockpile critical, long-lead items for a force

of two million, as well as to build an industrial base capable of

supplying a total force of four million.46

While satisfying in so many ways, these large increases

raised many apprehensions for Marshall. Recalling his vivid

World War I experiences, he remembered that the huge expenditures

in 1917 had also created huge and unrealistic public expectations

of immediate results. When these results did not quickly

surface, much outrage was directed at those in charge. In short,

Marshall knew fully the psychological derivative effects of the

enormous appropriations, and sought to inoculate the public mind

against those expectations. He also wanted to continue to sell

his concept for orderly, measured, systematic approaches to

further mobilization. 

Thus, in his frequent testimony before congressional

committees and in a series of speeches and radio broadcasts, he

hammered home these themes. He emphasized that the recent

appropriations "would bear no fruit for at least a year, and for

the majority of items, a year and a half to two years." He went

on to caution that "an army--a large army--can not be recruited,

equipped, and trained overnight." He reiterated that the War

Department had long-standing, well-thought-out plans for

step-by-step coordinated increases, as required by the

international situation, and that he intended to proceed with

them in an orderly, businesslike manner. "My thought," he said,
"is...that we should resist ideas and enthusiasms that will not

stand the searching test of common sense. The impulse of

patriotic America is a wonderful thing, but its impatience to

overcome the delays of past indifference, can be a destructive

force." 47

Marshall's conduct during May and June of 1940 greatly

enhanced his stature with the public, the Congress, and the

President. His poise and calmness during such uncertain and

near-panicky times were widely noted. He had been a tower of

strength and resolve. He appeared to have a comprehensive,

flexible, reasoned plan to handle these and future developments.

 More importantly, he displayed impressive self-confidence and

seemed to know what he was talking about. His words exuded

eminent common sense. His greatest achievement, however, was in

getting America in focus with his strategic vision for war

preparedness. In this whole realm of mobilization, he now

emerged as the leading coherent, conceptual force within the

government.

This period also witnessed the end of the Woodring-Johnson

feud. Given the international crisis, Roosevelt determined to

make a bold move. He named Henry Stimson, a 72-year-old former

Secretary of War and a Republican, as Woodring's replacement. 

Johnson was replaced as well. Marshall and Stimson were men of

similar temperament and values. Stimson strongly supported steps

to strengthen America's preparedness. He and the Chief of Staff

worked hard at developing their relationship on the basis of

teamwork, mutual support, unity of effort, and respect. They

went on to form an extremely effective team. Once again, the War

Department could speak with a single voice. Here again,

Marshall's superb interpersonal skills, including a remarkable

sense of give and take, were critical in getting and keeping the

relationship on a sound footing. Very fortunately, Stimson was

equally adept at applying those skills.48

The Draft and the National Guard.

With Germany driving the final stake into the heart of

France, the next major public issue involving mobilization

centered about the draft, or selective service. Earlier that

spring, Grenville Clark, an influential New York lawyer, took up

the cause of introducing selective service as "the only fair,

efficient and democratic way to raise an army." He put together

a highly effective bipartisan movement to lobby congressmen,

generals, the press, and like-minded associates. He organized

dinners, wrote letters to editors, recommended those favorable to

his cause for influential positions, and proposed selective

service legislation to Congress. During May, his group

unsuccessfully sought the support of the President, as well as

that of Marshall, for the legislation. Both men felt strongly

that the time was not quite right. Public support, they

believed, was lacking for such a drastic measure. Certainly
Congress would summarily reject the proposal as premature. 

Undaunted, Clark persisted in advocating the draft. Marshall

preferred to focus on recruiting up to the new authorized

manpower ceiling for the Regular Army; using the additional men,

he intended to bring all active divisions up to their full

peacetime strength. An immediate draft would disrupt this

process by causing many Regulars to be sent to train the huge

influx of inductees. Marshall was content to build up production

stockages for later manpower expansion.49

Nonetheless, Clark lobbied and lobbied. The completeness of

Germany's conquest of France and the appointment of his law

partner, Henry Stimson, as Secretary of War greatly assisted his

 efforts. The fall of France especially galvanized public

sentiment in favor of preparedness; suddenly the passage of a

draft bill in peacetime seemed a distinct possibility.

Marshall, who had since the early 1920s philosophically

supported the notion of selective service, finally decided in

early June to support the measure, but only clandestinely at

first. He wanted to see the bill introduced as a ground-swell,

civilian initiative, a sort of popular act. If he lent his

official sponsorship to the legislation before it was formally

introduced, he thought the public would regard it as his bill. 

This would likely precipitate an antimilitary backlash in

Congress; this development, in turn, could well have adverse

spillover impacts in disrupting future mobilization efforts. 

Privately, however, with the President's blessing, Marshall sent

members of his staff to help write the legislation. He also

lobbied very discretely on the Hill.50

Once the bill was introduced, he went "all out in the

arguments for its passage...." He openly courted congressmen and

testified repeatedly before congressional committees, endorsing

the bill in the strongest terms. He argued that the possible

fall of Great Britain in the near term dictated the need to bring

both Regular Army and National Guard units up to full strength;

this could only be done with inductees. He did not believe it

was possible to form an Army large enough to meet likely

contingencies through voluntary enlistments alone. The only

realistic alternative was the selective service system, "which

would furnish sufficient personnel to bring the National Guard

and the Regular Army to full strength in the shortest possible

time, and to do this in a controlled and therefore efficient

manner, in contrast to the piecemeal, unbalanced basis of

voluntary enlistments."51

In supporting the draft legislation, Marshall insisted on

the need to federalize the National Guard and call it to active

duty for 18 months of training. He offered compelling arguments.

 First, the Guard would be needed to train a large share of the

inductees by absorbing them into its understrength companies and

battalions. Second, the Regular Army could not be enlarged as an

alternative because it didn't have enough understrength units to
absorb so many inductees; it could create new units only by

emasculating old ones. Also, there was no equipment on hand yet

for additional Regular units, unless it were pulled from National

Guard units, an unacceptable proposal if the Guard was to

continue training. Furthermore, Guard units were manned at about

only 40 percent strength; they needed the inductee fillers and

the associated, intensified training to upgrade their war

readiness.52

Marshall's testimony was brilliantly informed,

comprehensive, and persuasive. Single-handedly, he represented

the administration, and beat back a plethora of counterproposals

and counterarguments. But he did have to compromise on one key

point to ensure passage. The bill would only call the Guard to

Federal service for 12 instead of 18 months.

On August 27, Congress authorized the call-up of the

National Guard for 1 year of Federal service. On September 14,

it approved the selective service legislation; 2 days later, the

first National Guard units reported for active duty. On 

October 8, Congress approved a third supplemental appropriation

for the Army; it amounted to slightly more than $1.5 billion to

cover the costs of mobilizing the National Guard and implementing

selective service. It also provided for critical items needed to

expand the Army to 1.4 million men by the end of 1941.53

On September 16, Marshall made a broadcast on CBS radio

regarding the recently passed Selective Service Act. He stated:

...the National Defense Act of 1920, the lesson of our

lack of preparation in 1917 and 1918, is being put

forth into effect in a progressive, business-like

manner. The Selective Service Act has added the final

touch of authority to enable America to go to work

effectively at the business of preparing herself

against the uncertainties, the threatening dangers of

the immediate future.

Marshall's consistent and persistent pursuit of the very

core element of his strategic vision made this so. America was

now clearly on the road to preparing for war--a rocky road that

Marshall had roughly imagined a year before.54

By the end of the year, the results were astounding. At

that point, the Army had 800,000 men in the field undergoing

intensive training. The net gain in strength during the last

three months was 182,000 men, nearly equal to the total size of

the Regular Army when Marshall became Acting Chief of Staff in

July 1939. By Christmas, these soldiers were manning 18

divisions, with 9 more soon to appear. The two weak mechanized

regiments had grown into an armored corps of two divisions. The

passage of the Selective Service Act, in effect, authorized a

Regular Army of 500,000 men, a National Guard of 270,000 men, and

an inductee population of 630,000 men for an aggregate strength
of 1.4 million.55

Most of Marshall's time from September 1940 to June 1941 was

spent in managing this enormous expansion. Facilities had to be

erected, maneuvers had to be planned, recreational services had

to be provided, and equipment had to be procured and distributed.

 It was a Herculean task which consumed the bulk of his time.
CHAPTER 5

TRAINING AND PRESERVING THE NEWBORN ARMY, 1941

Marshall's relations with the Congress appeared more cordial

than ever when he testified on behalf of a huge appropriations

bill during the spring of 1941. Congress granted a

record-breaking $9.8 billion for fiscal year 1942. Amended to

the accompanying text was mention of the "magnificent job" he was

doing. However, a major crisis for the Army loomed on the

horizon, one that would severely test the Chief of Staff's

influence with Congress, his interpersonal skills, and his

courage.56

Already in the fall of 1940, the War Department General

Staff had surfaced concerns about the expiration of the National

Guardsmen's Federal activation period of 1 year, as well as of

the 1-year term of service for the inductees. Repeatedly

throughout the first months of 1941, Marshall attempted to lay

the groundwork with Congress and the President for extending both

terms of service. The issue was a political hot potato which very

few politicians wanted to handle.

For Marshall, however, the matter seriously threatened to

undermine virtually everything of significance he had

accomplished involving manpower mobilization. The Army had used

draftees to fill out National Guard units, as well as most

Regular Army ones. Only two Regular divisions continued to

consist of strictly volunteers. Inductees, therefore, made up on

the average of 25-50 percent of a division's manpower across most

of the Army. Also, between 75-90 percent of each Regular

division's officers were Reserve officers called to active duty

when the Selective Service Act was implemented; their terms of

service were legislatively tied to those of the National

Guardsmen. Thus, about 600 Reserve officers in every Regular

division would be entitled to demobilize when the National

Guardsmen did. Demobilization of the Guard and the inductees at

their 1-year mark of individual service would emasculate the

Army; the rump would form a disorganized, disjointed skeleton

force incapable of responding to any sizable crisis for many

months. The active force would go almost overnight from a

robustly trained one to a largely ineffective, shattered one

which would require rebuilding from the ground up. This

development would set back the Army at least 1 1/2 years, perhaps

2. As Marshall commented later, "It meant the complete

destruction...of the fabric of the army we had built up. We

would be in a worse predicament than we were a year before."57

Forcing the Issue.

Seeing the flow of international events as increasingly

ominous, Marshall determined to force the issue. In courting a

host of key congressmen, however, he soon discovered that few of
them were willing to champion his cause. While many admitted

privately the soundness of extending the National Guard and draft

service terms from a purely military perspective, few were

willing to pay the political price at the polls the following

fall. The public, they feared, would regard any such extension

as a breach of promise.

Finally, in mid-June, Marshall urged the President once

again to ask Congress for the term extensions. Time was running

out. Roosevelt, however, shied away from making the request. 

Deeply concerned, Marshall opted to take a bold step. He cleared

the idea with the President of making some sort of public

statement on his own recommending the extension.

Wrestling with the question of how to do so, he settled on a

fairly creative approach. He could not make a direct, formal

appeal to Congress without appearing to be disloyal by attempting

to go around the President. At the same time, he did not want to

appear as the mouthpiece of a President who himself was afraid to

raise the issue. Marshall could, however, write a nonpolitical,

formal report addressing the dire situation. Previous chiefs of

staff had, on occasion, produced annual reports discussing the

posture of the Army at the end of the fiscal year. (The fiscal

year ended on June 30 at this time.) Marshall had neglected to

write one since becoming Chief of Staff, but there was still

enough time for him to prepare a report before the end of June. 

He would appear to have dropped the annual report in favor of a

more comprehensive biennial one. Addressed to the Secretary of

War and releasable to the press, this report would be regarded as

a legitimate and proper channel for Marshall to express himself

impartially on the need for the service extensions. 

Consequently, he and his staff worked day and night to produce

it.58

The report was skillfully prepared. In fewer than 40 pages,

Marshall carefully laid out the situation. He used very

understandable, nontechnical language, accompanied with simple,

clear charts and maps to depict the Army's posture. After

describing the enormous achievements made in the previous 2

years, he made a strong plea for the service extensions, lest the

existing active forces evaporate.

He released the report to the press on July 3, hoping for a

response. He got it almost immediately. The report was soon

engulfed in a fire storm of controversy. First, Marshall had

neglected to forewarn the administration's supporters in

Congress; they felt blind-sided by the unexpected release of the

report from out of the blue. Second, he had failed to construct

a press release focusing attention on the points he wanted to

highlight. As a result, the press not only dug out his argument

but also focused on his use of the nebulous term "task forces,"

seeing in the use of the term the Army's veiled intent to form

expeditionary forces to fight overseas. Isolationists and

neutralists denounced this surmised suggestion with harsh words,
many of which were aimed at a "warmongering Roosevelt." Two days

later, the British commander retreating before Rommel in North

Africa added fuel to the fire. He was quoted as saying that the

British would soon receive the American supplies, equipment, and

manpower they needed to prosecute the war successfully. Two days

later, another British commander remarked publicly, "We certainly

are going to need American manpower, just as we did in the last

war." These comments, perfectly ill-timed, seemed to confirm the

worst suspicions for many about Marshall's "task forces."59

From this unpromising start, Marshall made a steady

comeback. He quickly soothed ruffled congressional feathers with

some artful explanations of his altruistic concerns and motives;

he quickly won forgiveness and support from key Democratic

leaders on the Hill now that the battle was joined. Then he

addressed the controversial issue of task forces by assuring

Congress publicly and privately that the term had a specific

technical meaning which in no way implied the eventual use of

American troops to fight abroad a la World War I. Task forces,

he explained, were simply tailored groupings of units to

accomplish given missions; they could refer to units of varying

sizes, from a battalion to a corps. He had used the term in the

report in connection with asking Congress to lift the existing

ban on employing drafted soldiers outside the Western Hemisphere.

 He foresaw instances where "task forces" might be needed on

short notice to perform contingencies outside the Hemisphere in

response to immediate threats against U.S. interests; in such

instances, the ban posed great organizational and planning

problems. With the exception of two all-volunteer Regular

divisions, no existing large formations could be sent without a

major reorganization to strip out all inductees and replace them

with Regulars from other outfits. From a military standpoint,

this was a recipe for disaster which would destroy unit integrity

across the entire Army on the verge of a deployment.

Convincing Congress.

Marshall's explanation was too vague to overcome the

distrust in many circles of the President's motives. Neutralist

and isolationist sentiments regarded lifting the ban as

tantamount to giving Roosevelt a "green light" to lead the United

States into the war. Congressmen advised Marshall that the

legislation had no chance of passage unless he dropped the

request to lift the ban. He agonized at length. The ban

hamstrung the Army profoundly in planning for contingencies;

Marshall already knew, but couldn't yet disclose, that the Army,

for example, would take over the defense of Iceland from Britain

in the near future. Without a lifting of the ban, the units

designated to occupy the island would have to be completely

reorganized. Would this gut-wrenching process be required on an

ad hoc basis as each such contingency arose?

In this case, Marshall wisely applied the art of the
possible. He correctly assessed that the congressional advice he

had received was sound. It was more important to secure the term

extensions, thereby keeping the Army from disintegrating. 

Marshall quickly recognized that he had no chance of doing so if

he remained unyielding about the ban. Therefore, he reluctantly

accepted a compromise dropping further discussion of the ban in

return for the promise of broadened congressional support for the

term extensions. It was a painful but necessary pill to swallow.

 In this instance, to have insisted on having the whole pie would

most assuredly have led to having none.

As he continued to lobby Congress, Marshall discovered that

much of the vehement opposition was directed against the

President personally. In fact, significant numbers of both

Republicans and alienated Democrats intended to vote against the

measure on purely political grounds to embarrass what they

regarded as an increasingly "dictatorial," high-handed President

 fixed on somehow involving the United States in a another major

war.60

Facing this opposition, the Speaker of the House, Sam

Rayburn, convinced the President and the Secretary of War that

Marshall should personally lead the fight. Rayburn observed, "Of

all the men who ever testified before any committee on which I

served, there is no one of them who has the influence with a

committee of the House that General Marshall has." After all, he

had convinced enough congressmen the year before to vote for the

nation's first ever peacetime draft, despite Rayburn's prediction

that the votes were simply not there.

Thus, with only a brief Presidential radio message as

support, virtually the entire burden of seeing the battle through

fell on Marshall's shoulders. At this point, few legislators

would openly support the extensions. One congressional aide

noted, "In forty years on the Hill he had never seen such fear of

a bill." As Marshall later commented, "the trouble was we were

undertaking very severe war measures and we were not at war."61

During the ensuing month, the Chief of Staff testified

repeatedly before committees of both houses of Congress. In the

process, he emphasized critical themes which profoundly softened

the opposition and transformed the debate to a higher level than

that of pure politics. The selection and articulation of those

themes demonstrated considerable sophistication in the art of

persuasion, meriting a more detailed analysis.

First, Marshall argued that the effort to seek the

extensions was his initiative alone, born of a genuine concern

for the military security of the country. He told the House:

My recommendations were based on military necessity

only, and I was especially concerned that they be made

in a manner that was clearly nonpolitical. I consulted

no one with respect to them and no one knew I was going
to make them. I thought that my action was in the best

interests of national defense.

He made a similar statement to the Senate:

I made the specific recommendations regarding the

extension...purely on the basis of a military necessity

for the security of the country. The Commander in

Chief, that is, the President, had no knowledge that I

was going to make them. My report was submitted to the

Secretary of War and at the same time was released to

the press.

He went on to say that he had tried to keep as wide a separation

as possible between military necessity, the sole basis for his

recommendations, and "political considerations which are matters

for the decision of the President and the Congress." He further

submitted "that the question of readiness for service in the Army

should not be confused with those political considerations."62

Next, Marshall emphasized the gravity of the moment. "The

declaration of an emergency does not create it," he testified. 

"An emergency exists whether or not Congress declares it. I am

asking you to recognize the fact--the fact that the national

interest is imperiled and that an emergency exists. I am not

asking you to manufacture a fact." He then proceeded to describe

the adverse impacts on the Army if the extensions were not

approved, noting that such actions would leave the nation largely

defenseless in the face of uncertain, unsettling developments

abroad. He went on to expand this thought before a Senate

committee:

...in view of the international situation and its

rapidly increasing threat to our security, I submit, on

the basis of cold logic, that the virtual disbandment

or immobilization of two-thirds of our enlisted

strength and three-fourths of our trained officer

personnel at this time might well involve a national

tragedy.63

Then Marshall went on with a comment that hit hard at

something near and dear to Congress--the continuing vitality of

the National Guard. He pointed out that if the National

Guardsmen were sent home en masse, they would have to be replaced

permanently by Regular Army units over time. "It will eliminate

the National Guard from further serious consideration as a factor

in the national defense," he told the House. "It will have to be

placed in a much lower category for the immediate defense of this

country, and it would be necessary to maintain large forces of

some other kind." This thought was extremely sobering for

Congress, and one prone to give pause.64

Marshall then struck several other themes that made good

sense. He did not see any immediate need for additional
increases in forces. Rather, he wanted to focus on improving the

quality of the existing divisions, something that could only be

done if the term extensions were granted. He told a House

committee, "We prefer to have our existing units reach as high a

state of efficiency as possible, rather than to take them apart,

spread them into a larger number, and start all over again." In

addition, he didn't intend to keep inductees or National

Guardsmen on active duty indefinitely. They would be released on

a case-by-case basis, but in a way to allow their gradual

replacement by new inductees so as to minimize personnel

turbulence and the associated adverse impacts on unit readiness

and training. To do so, he wanted to be able to use his own

judgement in applying a flexible rule rather than wearing the

straightjacket of meeting a mandatory deadline for all at once. 

In this regard, he appealed to the confidence of Congress in him

personally. He said, "You must trust in my good faith, in our

professional common sense. I have tried to be very frank. The

War Department has been scrupulous in its efforts to meet, as far

as possible, the desires of Congress. Though encompassed with

too definite and too numerous laws, we have not tried

circumlocution or evasion." In short, he appealed to the great

store of good will he had built up with the Congress in the

previous 2 years.65

Marshall then made a connection with something he had

consistently emphasized before Congress--the concept of

proceeding in a deliberate, measured, businesslike manner to

develop appropriate military forces. To send all the Guard units

and initial inductees home at once flew in the face of such an

approach--an approach Congress had come to embrace increasingly

over time through Marshall's many testimonies.66

At this point, under congressional advice, Marshall agreed

to another compromise. With the President's approval, he

accepted an amendment which limited the term extensions to a

maximum individual service of 18 months. This timely compromise

made the whole issue more palatable to the public and greatly

improved the promise of the bill's passage, although he had

earlier opposed this restriction most vehemently.67

As the time to vote neared, Marshall increased his lobbying

efforts, especially with the House; there significant opposition

remained. Notably, he pleaded with 40 key Republican members for

5 hours, invoking appeals to both logic and patriotism. About 12

were clearly moved at that point to declare support for the

measure, even though they thought such support would cost them

the next election.68

Finally, Marshall successfully argued against a counterplan

proposed by House Republicans and some antiadministration

Democrats. It sought to shift responsibility from the Congress

to the President for extending the inductees' terms of service. 

Under the provisions of the Selective Service Act, draftees could

be discharged into the Reserve. Then, as members of the Reserve,
they could be recalled by Presidential authority alone into

active service for an additional 12 months. Marshall strongly

opposed this approach for what it would be regarded--an evasion

of congressional responsibility. He emphasized, "I think it

would have a most unfortunate effect on morale....We would give

our men the feeling that we were taking some unfair though legal

advantage of them." His arguments found the mark. The

counterplan was dropped.69

On August 7, the Senate voted, 54-30, to support the term

extensions. Everyone expected the subsequent House vote to be a

real squeaker. It was. On August 12, the House voted, 203-202,

in favor of the resolution to extend the terms of service. The

Army had been saved by a single vote.70

Marshall's role in this whole episode was absolutely

pivotal. Faced with a serious situation most politicians wanted

to avoid, he forced the issue into the open public forum. He did

so by the brilliant and creative maneuver of issuing a biennial

report when all other doors of formal communication seemed

closed. Despite some missteps surrounding the report's issuance,

he made a rapid recovery. He alone shouldered the

administration's burden of arguing for the term extensions before

Congress, transforming a no-win situation into a winning one. He

did so by striking a series of convincing themes, which gave

congressmen enough solid ground to justify voting for the

extensions. He also executed a superb, behind-the-scenes

lobbying effort and demonstrated impressive skills at striking 

 timely compromises. His growing circle of civilian, and

especially congressional, contacts also played a key role. 

Important to note, Marshall's persuasive talents were not applied

manipulatively; he never sought to mislead or deceive. What he

said, he meant fully from the mind or from the heart. When he

appealed on altruistic grounds, he acted from altruistic motives.

This approach gave him a moral high ground and a strength of

character which greatly deepened the respect which Congress

already had for him. If he was the architect of the Army as it

existed in July 1941, he was the savior of that Army as it

continued to exist beyond September. His will and his efforts

had made the difference.

The GHQ Maneuvers of 1941.

The late summer and early fall saw the fruition of

Marshall's efforts in another arena. He had carefully planned a

series of large-unit exercises which far eclipsed those of the

previous year. He gave these exercises particular emphasis. 

Corps maneuvers were staged separately during August in the

Second and Third Army areas. Then these forces joined others in

Louisiana and Texas during September for field army-level

exercises which made a deep impression on the country. Nearly

400,000 men participated. Paratroops were used in exercises for

the first time, as was an armored corps in full maneuver with
tanks over extended distances. The Chief of Staff was pleased at

the demonstrated improvement in the ground forces. Finally, in

November, the First Army and the IV Armored Corps maneuvered in

the Carolinas, showing still further improvement.71

Thus, as Pearl Harbor approached, Marshall had in 1941 both

kept the Army together and intensified its training. These

stunning achievements did not come easily; they resulted from

enormous efforts and struggles, in the cause of which George

Marshall exercised remarkably competent leadership at the highest

levels of government.
CHAPTER 6

RELATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS

As previously outlined, Marshall established a progressively

effective and influential relationship with Congress during the

period, 1939-41. He developed this relationship gradually

without much outside assistance from the rest of the Executive

Branch, and tempered it with several controversial legislative

campaigns. Later on, Marshall would be declared as Time

Magazine's "Man of the Year" for 1943. In the caption article,

Time said the following about the Chief of Staff:

Never in U.S. history has a military man enjoyed such

respect on Capitol Hill. One reason is that he...is

completely free of political concerns. When Colorado's

Senator Edwin C. Johnson mentioned him as a

Presidential possibility, General Marshall's negative

reaction was so unmistakably genuine that Congress

knew: this man is a trustee for the nation.

During World War II, the Congress continued to cooperate

almost instinctively and unquestioningly with the proposals of

General Marshall. The basis for this special relationship was

firmly anchored in the experiences of 1939 to 1941.72

Above all, Marshall saw himself as the loyal servant of the

Republic and the Constitution which served as its framework. He

fully trusted in the concept of military subordination to

civilian authority, and displayed enormous respect and deference

both to Congress and his civilian superiors. He fully accepted

the notion that the burden to articulate persuasively the

country's security needs rested squarely on the shoulders of its

military and naval leaders. He emphasized this point in December

1939 during a speech before the American Historical Association:

 "In our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the

popular will, military policy is dependent on public opinion, and

our organization for war will be good or bad as the public is

well informed or poorly informed regarding the factors that bear

on the subject." About two months earlier in another speech, he

had remarked: "The great problem we have in going before

Congress is one of being able to present simply and

understandably the general requirements and respective

priorities."73

For this reason, Marshall prepared assiduously for any

testimony before congressional committees. He purged from his

remarks virtually all confusing technical terms, acronyms, and

military jargon. He always attempted to communicate in a style

that the average man on the street could understand.

He continued to have great faith in Congress and the public.

 If they were properly and completely informed, he felt, they

would make generally sound decisions about military policy. For
this reason, Congress was not the enemy. Rather, congressmen

were loyal Americans generally trying to do the right things as

they understood them. To staff members who wanted to avoid

potentially embarrassing revelations to a Senate Committee,

Marshall remarked, "It seems to me that a free and easy and

whole-souled manner of cooperation with these committees is more

likely to create an impression that everything is all right in

the War Department, than is a resentful attitude." He continued,

"...it must be assumed that members of Congress are just as

patriotic as we ....I do not believe that we should adopt an

attitude of official nervousness." On another occasion, he noted

"that 95 percent of the members of Congress were worthy of his

high regard." Thus, Marshall's approach to Congress was founded

from the beginning on respect and deference rather than fear or

apprehension. He welcomed opportunities to go before Congress to

get his points across, and he brought to all congressional

relations a deeply genuine spirit of cooperation that made a

profoundly positive impression even on congressmen who opposed

the main thrusts of his proposals.74

Congressional Committees.

Marshall's performance before congressional committees was

impressive for other reasons as well. First, he habitually spoke

without any notes. He did so consciously for effect, as he later

recalled, "because I found that the minute you began to read you

lost your audience. It was better to forget something." This

technique also had another impact. It clearly helped establish

Marshall as an "expert," the man clearly at the military helm in

the War Department. His words were his words, not words written

by someone else to be read before the committee. They were

spoken with conviction and with piercing eye contact. This

approach, coupled with his clarity of expression and mastery of

associated facts or considerations, immeasurably enhanced his

credibility. He was clearly someone "in charge" who knew what he

was trying to do. This impression, combined with his ability to

think on his feet, rapidly established Marshall's credentials as

a man of considerable intellectual capacity, a quality

congressmen inherently respected and admired.75

Second, his manner and mood in testimony were always

correct, given his ingrained respect for the institution. He

always asked or proposed, but never demanded. He was never

arrogant. He avoided talking down to congressmen. He

demonstrated an often disarming frankness in answering questions

or admitting problems. He avoided any effort to manipulate,

obfuscate, or deceive; his responses were honest and

straight-forward, even if they damaged his immediate cause. 

Marshall felt that long-term trust and confidence from Congress

were infinitely more valuable than any short-term benefits

acquired deceitfully. Besides, Marshall's own moral code

rejected any sort of dishonest behavior. He also displayed an

enormous capacity for patience under questioning that was
frequently less than sympathetic or intelligent. In this regard,

he demonstrated great restraint, never losing his temper or

becoming emotionally distraught.76

Third, he strictly refused to be drawn into the realm of

political considerations. His approach was that of a military

servant of the Republic who was concerned only with the military

considerations for the nation's security. He clearly

communicated on several occasions that he was his own person, not

another mouthpiece for the administration. He pointed out to

Congress that the President and he did not always see eye-to-eye

on needed appropriations. Incidentally, he did this in a way

which dispelled the notion that the President was a War Hawk or

Warmonger, as he was often accused of being by his adversaries;

the President always emerged with a flattered image from such

revelations. This general approach often transformed debates

about specific issues from a partisan to a bipartisan level of

consideration, something few others in the Executive Branch could

achieve at the time.

Fourth, Marshall came across as one uninterested in personal

fame, recognition, or gain. He generally refused press

interviews and discouraged writings about himself. His manner

before Congress was exceptionally modest and self-effacing. He

never bragged or boasted, but rather pursued his duties in a

quiet, sober, intense fashion. Even his famous biennial report

of 1941 downplayed his monumental personal role in building up

the Army. From time to time, he quickly suppressed suggestions

that he seek public office, even perhaps the Presidency in the

future. To Congress, Marshall was a man without political

ambitions.77

Fifth, Marshall repeatedly made it clear that his requested

military increases were not motivated by any desire to involve

the country in war. "I am more of a pacifist than you think," he

told one subcommittee. "I went through one war, and I do not

want to see another." Nor were his proposals aimed at empire

building, or increasing the Army for its own sake, as he stated

convincingly to Senator Truman's committee in 1940:

There is not the slightest thought in any of our minds

of trying to utilize this emergency to aggrandize the

Army, or of making exorbitant demands to put something

over, as it were, under the pressure of the situation.

These sentiments gradually raised his stature in the minds

of many congressmen to that of a "trusted honest broker" in

administering the security needs of the nation.78

Acting in Good Faith.

In dealing with congressional matters, Marshall invested

enormous chunks of his valuable time. If a congressman asked for
a time to visit to discuss something, Marshall made it a habit to

go to the congressman. He personally reviewed most of the

replies to congressional inquiries. Eventually he established a

Legislative and Liaison Division, headed by a general officer, on

the General Staff to assist him with handling the ever increasing

incidence of congressional questions and requests. Showing such

deference to Congress only increased its favorable impression of

him as a man who always acted in good faith and in a genuine,

cooperative spirit.79

Showing such deference to Congress, however, did not mean

that Marshall was unwilling to say "no" to inappropriate requests

or appeals. Time and time again, he strictly refused requests

for such things as "political" promotions, appointments or

assignments for congressional acquaintances. One example in

particular illustrates this. In the fall of 1941, the Army was

deeply into the process of identifying and purging incompetent

and overage officers, especially senior officers, from its ranks.

 Two of the officers so identified just happened to be generals

from the Texas National Guard. They had been recently sent home

and retired. Marshall had personally reviewed their cases and was

absolutely convinced, based on extensive evaluations, that they

should be retired. Subsequently, Senator Tom Connally of Texas

raised a storm of protest directly to the Chief of Staff and the

Secretary of War. This was a fundamental matter of principle to

Marshall. He refused to give any ground whatsoever, explaining in

great detail the basis for his original decision. The Senator

quickly realized that he was treading on shaky ground and

relented; he came away with an even higher regard for Marshall's

competence, honesty, moral courage, integrity and strength of

character. This and a host of like incidents made it clear that

Marshall was no soft touch. When it came to core principles, he

was as tough as they got. And it was this quality which

tremendously increased congressional respect and admiration for

him over time.80

In summary, the Chief of Staff's high regard for congressmen

as partners, not adversaries, in the democratic process led him

to establish a cooperative working relationship based on mutual

respect. He did not fight the process. He worked very hard at

this. He kept the congressional relationship as businesslike and

nonpolitical as he could. He sought to act always in good faith

toward Congress, showing deference, respect, honesty, frankness,

and responsiveness. At the same time, he was his own person, who

refused to yield the high ground on fundamental matters,

especially involving inappropriate influence or other ethical

matters. In short, his relationship with Congress was cordial

but reservedly dignified. In return, Congress bestowed upon him

greater trust and confidence. An example of this from a Senate

hearing over appropriations in May 1940 is insightful. Senator

Commins said, "... we want this money spent properly and we

believe you are going to spend it properly." Senator Powers

followed by remarking, "May I say in closing, General Marshall--

and I say this in all reverence--I think this committee and this
Congress has just got to trust in God and General Marshall to see

that these funds are expended properly." What made such trust

and confidence so enduring was that Marshall worked tirelessly to

live up to expectations.81
CHAPTER 7

INSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Marshall brought to his duties as Chief of Staff several

deeply ingrained values which he chose to emphasize across the

institution. Among the more prominent were efficiency,

responsiveness, teamwork, initiative, and morale. His emphasis

on these was, by and large, gradual and low-key, and initially

involved those most immediately associated with him, members of

the War Department General Staff and subordinate commanders.

Efficiency and Responsiveness.

The notion of efficiency was for Marshall inseparable from

that of professionalism, responsibility, and stewardship. He

himself felt the heavy burden of responsibility for the avoidance

of "waste" and for the efficient use of resources granted him by

Congress and the President. He soon discovered as Chief of Staff

that the tempo of War Department actions and activities was

increasing in quantum-leap fashion as the process of mobilization

began to gear up. This increased tempo, combined with an

antiquated War Department organization which centralized

virtually all major decision making around the Chief of Staff,

placed overwhelming demands on his time. Unable to reorganize the

Department radically for the present, Marshall chose to emphasize

efficiency, the application of which was intended to save time,

energy, and physical resources.82

First, to emphasize the urgency surrounding the need for

efficient operations, Marshall told new officers reporting to the

War Department as early as the summer of 1939 that they should

consider their jobs "as war assignments" and "approach their

problems as if they were at war." 83

From his staff he subsequently demanded concise, articulate

reports and studies which addressed issues in a frank,

straight-forward fashion. He was exceptionally impatient of

excess verbiage and set very high standards in this regard,

especially for any correspondence prepared for his signature. 

Briefings were expected to be short and to the point. He grew

irritated at the slightest sign of muddled thinking or

articulation. He expected issues to be presented to him

logically, lucidly, and succinctly. Those presenting staff

papers were expected to understand them thoroughly and to make

recommendations for final action, whether or not they had

actually authored the papers.84

Second, in Marshall's mind, responsiveness and attention to

detail were inseparable from efficiency. With regard to this, he

wanted senior level staffs to respond rapidly and thoroughly to

the needs of units in the field. In January 1940, preparing for

his first scheduled series of maneuvers, Marshall sent a
memorandum to the General Staff:

The concentration of troops in the field amounts to a

partial mobilization of the regular establishment of

the Army....Therefore, action which affects the

comfort, efficiency, or unhampered operation of these

units, whether originating in the field or in the War

Department, will be followed through to its conclusion

by the responsible officer of the Staff, or of the arm

or service concerned, to avoid the inevitable delays

incident to routine procedure, and to insure that the

interests of the troops and the training objectives

are given the desired priority.

He wrote a few months later to the Commandant of the Infantry

School,

...we must effect a decided change in the state of mind

of all staff officers...to the end that anything that

concerns troops in the field will be considered as of

more importance than any other matter to be handled at

the moment. Also, that the officer first concerned

will feel a definite responsibility to speed the matter

on its way in the most effective fashion.

He also wrote in other correspondence about "the necessity

for guarding against the bureaucratic self-satisfied state of

mind."

He used his Inspector General (IG) frequently to search through

the War Department looking for just such conditions. Later that

same year, he even asked his IG to "look into the business of

expediting War Department administration by checking up on the

possible advantage of some rearrangement being made in the

conduct of offices pertaining to receiving, recording, and

distribution of papers." In the interest of responsiveness,

Marshall directed that all communication within the General Staff

be condensed in the basic document to a single page, simply

worded.85

In this connection, Marshall focused his attention beyond

the General Staff. He made frequent inspection trips across the

Army, always looking especially for signs of inefficiency. He

initiated corrective action immediately, and usually followed up

to ensure that the corrective action had been effective. His

letter in March 1941 to Brigadier General John P. Smith,

Commander of the 4th Corps Area, accurately conveys the spirit of

his intent:

...now I am rather fixed in the belief that some of the

[corps] headquarters are not functioning at the speed

demanded by the emergency. There is too much of the

time-clock procedure....The last has been a frequent

criticism of your headquarters from any number of
directions. I am inclined to think that several of

your staff are not sufficiently aggressive, energetic,

and far-seeing.86

Teamwork.

The third value to be highlighted is teamwork. For

Marshall, the concept was multidimensional. It applied first and

foremost to that coordination and cooperation within the Army

needed to build effective combined-arms formations capable of

operating effectively in battle. Marshall was constantly

striking the theme that "success in combat depends primarily upon

the development of the trained combat team composed of all arms."

Branch parochialism would immediately get one in hot water

with Marshall. He encouraged officers to develop a broader

understanding of how various branches could operate together for

greater overall effect. As early as 1938, while still Deputy

Chief of Staff, he told the students and faculty at the opening

of the Air Corps Tactical School to work in that direction:

Military victories are not gained by a single arm--

though the failures of an arm might well be disastrous-

-but are achieved through the efforts of all arms and

services welded into an Army team.

He continued that many of the students would later be called

upon to fill positions as principal staff officers or as higher

commanders with mixed forces--"positions," he emphasized, "which

require an intimate knowledge of the combined arms, and a breadth

of vision impossible to the man who devotes his entire interest

to a single arm." To stimulate such thinking, for example,

Marshall attached pilots from the Advanced Flying School to

ground force commanders of companies, batteries, and troops

during the 1940 maneuvers.87

Teamwork also meant coordination and cooperation within the

General Staff. This flowed naturally as well from the value of

efficiency. Marshall expected the various elements of the staff

to share information readily which applied to other elements and

to coordinate thoroughly across the staff all reports, studies,

or issue papers coming to him for decision. An uncooperative

attitude in this sense was the undoing of many a staff officer,

whose days were often quickly numbered as a result. In addition,

the staff was expected to communicate decisions and actions taken

so that a coordinated follow-up effort could be made to ensure

proper and full implementation. Marshall had a comprehensive

memory. Any staff officer who presented him a problem about

which he had previously made a decision was likely to receive

"something akin to a verbal flaying."88

A third dimension of teamwork applied to interservice

cooperation with the Navy. As previously discussed, Marshall
worked hard to develop a strong cooperative relationship with the

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. He also emphasized to

his staff the importance of cordial interservice relations on a

staff-to-staff basis, especially regarding joint planning. Staff

officers who were inherently hostile to the Navy found themselves

quickly dismissed from the General Staff. The emphasis he placed

on the mutual planning and execution of joint Army-Navy maneuvers

in early 1940 drove home the point. To make waves with the Navy,

especially to be undiplomatic or tactless, was considered a

serious incident. In this connection, his letter to the new Army

commander in Hawaii, written in February 1941, reflected this

attitude:

Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations

that our mission is to protect the base and the naval 

concentration [at Pearl Harbor], and that purpose

should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmell. I

accentuate this because I found yesterday...in a matter

of extreme importance, that old Army and Navy feuds,

engendered from fights over appropriations, with the

usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist

in confusing issues of national defense. We must be

completely impersonal in these matters....89

Initiative.

Initiative is the fourth value to be highlighted. Marshall

felt strongly that modern, mobile warfare required fast- and

creative-thinking leaders who were willing to make decisions in

the absence of detailed orders or instructions. In his more

immediate surroundings in Washington, he wanted his staff to take

the initiative whenever it could to resolve problems at the

lowest level possible. During the 1920s and early 1930s, General

Staff procedure and tradition drove virtually every substantial

issue to the very top of the War Department for resolution. 

Marshall abhorred this practice. He wanted men who would make

sound decisions, given general policy guidance, and then act on

them in their own spheres of responsibility. The ideal here was

speed and efficiency, both of which were lost when all decisions

were deferred to the very highest uniformed authority in the War

Department. When Eisenhower reported to the General Staff in

1941, Marshall told him bluntly: "...the Department is filled

with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled

always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have

assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later

what they have done." Marshall was extremely tolerant of honest

mistakes born of taking initiative and usually supported and

encouraged subordinates, although, as they gained in experience,

he expected fewer errors.90

Marshall especially valued subordinates taking the

initiative in arguing against his positions or proposed courses

of action. They helped him immeasurably to see issues from many
angles so that when the final decision was made, it was based on

a thorough analysis. He despised "yes-men." Soon after Omar

Bradley became one of Marshall's assistants in 1940, he and the

other assistants were called in before the Chief. "Gentlemen,"

he said, "I'm disappointed in you. You haven't yet disagreed

with a single decision I've made." Bradley replied that they had

had no occasion to disagree, but when they did, they would speak

up. In the future they did. However, Marshall had made his

point, emphasizing the value he wished his assistants to

internalize.91

Morale.

The fifth value to be highlighted was critical for Marshall,

that of morale. Perhaps his most fundamental statement on the

topic came in November 1939 during a speech before the Community

Chest Committee in the nation's capital. "As a professional

soldier," he stated, "I know that high morale is the strongest

and most powerful factor in the Army, just as lack of morale will

bring about the defeat of almost any army however well armed." 

On another occasion, he remarked that "morale...is the most

important factor in the makeup of an Army."92

Soldier morale was a function of many things. It involved

caring leaders who persistently looked after their men's welfare

and who helped attack the great destroyers of morale--inadequate

creature comforts, boredom, and a sense of unfair treatment. It

also involved public support, especially for civilian-soldiers

called to active duty--Reserve officers, draftees, and National

Guardsmen.93

Marshall made morale a headline topic in the Army. He

constantly stressed to commanders their obligations to build and

maintain sound morale as one of their primary command

responsibilities. He secured considerable funding for

recreational facilities and closely monitored progress around the

country in building them. During his many inspection trips,

considerations of morale and associated programs were among his

priority agenda items. Finally, in early 1941, he established a

Morale Branch on the General Staff and placed a general officer

in charge. Its purpose was to coordinate morale-related

activities, needs, and services more efficiently across the

entire Army. At the same time, he required every headquarters

down to, and including, the division level to establish a morale

officer as a full-time special staff officer. His intent was "to

bring forcibly to the attention of all Army personnel and

commanders the extreme importance of the matter." He wanted

commanders to give considerations of morale their close,

personal, continuing attention. "Since it is rather intangible,"

he wrote to an Army Commander in 1941, "it requires considerable

initiative, authority, and imaginative thinking. It usually

happened that the other more tangible duties were carried out,

and little time was left for the much more important question of
morale."94

By and large, Marshall succeeded in institutionalizing the

values of efficiency, responsiveness, teamwork, initiative, and

morale. He especially succeeded in inculcating those values in

the bright, young, promising leaders who worked closely with him

during the period, 1939-41. Genuine reflection of those values

was certainly a central consideration for promotion and

advancement. Among those leaders appeared such names as

Eisenhower, Bradley, Smith, Ridgeway, Gerow, Collins, Arnold,

Clark, Taylor, Eichelberger, McNair, and Spaatz.
CHAPTER 8

SHAPING THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

As previously discussed, Marshall envisioned two primary

developments with regard to War Department restructuring. First,

he wanted a General Staff which dealt primarily with issues of

broad policy and which could make decentralized decisions on

routine matters flowing from policy guidance; he also wanted a

staff which could comprehensively and responsively focus on key

issues and follow-up on decisions across staff lines of interest.

He wanted an efficient operation which filtered out unnecessary

clutter with which he had to deal so he could concentrate on

weightier concerns. In short, he wanted a setup whereby he made

decisions only involving issues truly appropriate to his level of

responsibility. He desired subordinates to make most decisions

in lesser matters. Second, he foresaw Army Air Forces operating

for the immediate future with something approximating autonomy

inside the War Department; at the same time, he wanted those

forces to forge a closer and more cooperative relationship with

the ground forces, especially in areas of mutual concern such as

planning and operations.95

Marshall did not work with detailed blueprints in hand. 

Enlightened trial and error more aptly describes the process. He

tried several approaches, some of which just didn't turn out very

well. But in the end, by early 1942, he had largely realized his

objectives. Soon after entering the war, America had a

streamlined War Department organization vastly improved over that

of 1939 and capable of efficient strategic direction over

multiple theaters of war. America also entered the war with

strong, centralized, autonomous Air Forces which were, at the

same time, an integrated component of the Army's combined-arms

team.

Autonomy for Army Air.

When Marshall became Chief of Staff, he had to deal with

enormous animosities within the Army between air and ground

officers, especially evident in Washington. There were very few

air officers on the General Staff, which itself fluctuated from

indifference to hostility regarding air matters. Influential air

officers, on the other hand, spurned by the rest of the Army and

inspired by successful examples of independent air forces abroad,

lobbied Congress for independence and found significant resonance

there. It was a mess.96

Marshall endeavored to move more air officers into the

General Staff. He had difficulty, however, finding air officers

qualified to serve on the Staff by virtue of graduating from the

Army War College. Nonetheless, he moved in as many as he could

find. One of the most important was a former temporary Major

General and head of the Air Corps, then-Colonel Frank Andrews. 
Marshall had him promoted to Brigadier General and assigned as

the G3 of the General Staff, in charge of training across the

entire Army. Andrews was the first aviator to hold such a

prestigious position on the Staff, and he performed there

exceptionally well.97

At the same time, Marshall pushed ground officers on the

Staff to develop a greater appreciation for air by flying to

distant posts for inspection trips. Some refused on the grounds

that private insurance companies at that time would not cover

travel by such a hazardous mode. Nonetheless, Marshall continued

to apply pressure. After a while, officers who persisted in

refusing to fly found themselves quietly reassigned. As Marshall

said years later, "...if you came in there, you flew." Also

quickly reassigned were ground officers who continued to display

a condescending or hostile attitude toward air officers. In both

instances, Marshall drove home his point. He expected

cooperation, teamwork, and mutual respect between the ground and

the air.98

Marshall worked as well in subtler ways. He ensured that

air perspectives and concerns were articulated in staff meetings

and that air interests were generally promoted in decision

making. He clearly supported Air Corps expansion programs,

including the acquisition of heavy bombers along with aircraft

capable of providing direct support to ground troops. In this

way, he cast a somewhat transparent but nonetheless effective,

protective umbrella around the Air Corps.99

The Chief of Staff also established a particularly close

relationship with then-Major General "Hap" Arnold, who had become

Chief of the Air Corps in 1938. Arnold agreed fully with

Marshall's designs for the Air Corps, and became a faithful

collaborator. Marshall was deeply impressed with Arnold's

abilities, both as a leader and an administrator. He ensured

that Arnold increasingly got opportunities to express his views

to the Secretary of War and the President, thereby helping him

establish credible credentials as the nation's chief spokesman

and advocate for air power. He also gave Arnold ever increasing

latitude to develop Army aviation across a broad spectrum of

activities.100

In the summer of 1940, Marshall activated General

Headquarters (GHQ) in Washington. The concept of this

headquarters emerged from post-World War I studies which

recommended a staff comparable to Pershing's GHQ which could

organize and lead a large expeditionary force into a theater of

operations. The General Staff's War Plans Division was supposed

to form the core of this headquarters. In concept, the Chief of

Staff, or some other commander designated by the President, was

supposed to use this headquarters to take the nation's field

forces overseas in war a la Pershing. Of course, the plan

assumed that the next war would follow the pattern of the

previous one, a war in a single theater of operations. The
dramatic Nazi victories in the spring of 1940 gave enormous

impetus to large-scale mobilization of American forces in the

months that followed. Marshall, increasingly overwhelmed by

detail, decided to activate GHQ, entrusting to it the associated

training function. While in name the Commander of GHQ, Marshall

delegated its day-to-day operations to a trusted subordinate,

Major General Lesley McNair, who was named chief of staff, GHQ. 

McNair was charged to direct the training of the tactical units

of the Army, found primarily in the four field armies and the

armored force. This move greatly relieved Marshall from a

crushing load of detail and transferred it to what, in effect,

functioned as a subordinate headquarters with McNair fully in

charge.

The new GHQ continued to relieve both Marshall and the

General Staff of a whole host of problems associated with

induction and training, but the remaining demands continued to

grow until they all but consumed his available time. Finally, in

November 1940, Marshall moved to expand the number of Deputy

Chiefs of Staff from one to three. One deputy, as before, was

responsible for "all matters incident to General Staff business";

one deputy was made responsible for questions involving supply,

equipment, construction, and the Armored Force; the third was

responsible for air issues. To this last position, Marshall

appointed "Hap" Arnold, who retained his title and functions as

Chief of the Air Corps. This arrangement, although still far

from ideal, relieved Marshall of considerable time-consuming

detail work, with the three deputies now better able to filter,

clarify, and often resolve issues before they had to go to him. 

The Air Corps rejoiced, for now their chief had both a greatly

elevated status and the consequent entree associated with it. 

Things were looking up. The Air Corps seemed to be marching

steadily toward greater autonomy.101

This rejoicing, however, was short-lived. Two weeks later,

Marshall removed the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ Air

Force) from under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps

and subordinated it to the GHQ run by McNair. Since the GHQ Air

Force was charged with planning and conducting unit training and

combat operations, the move made considerable organizational

sense, given the GHQ's overall training function in the States

and its potential command function overseas. However, from the

view of most air leaders, the reorganization separated the

materiel and individual training functions administered through

the Air Corps from the unit training and combat operation

function handled by GHQ Air Force. Thus, the basic air functions

were organizationally separated. Marshall had hoped that Arnold,

in his dual capacity, could effectively coordinate the activities

of the two divided components of Army aviation. Actually Arnold

did a superb job trying. But nobody was really satisfied with

the arrangement, which was aborted 7 months later.102

In the interim, Marshall gave the air an enormous boost

toward greater autonomy in the staff realm. The Chief of Staff
observed with growing frustration that the air establishment was

"battered around in a maelstrom," organizationally trying to

coordinate its issues among the various General Staff sections,

where air matters at best were regarded as peripheral concerns. 

Marshall finally responded in March 1941 with a simple directive,

in effect directing the Chief of the Air Corps thereafter to

prepare for final action all papers, studies, memoranda, and

other actions relating to purely Air Corps matters except those

pertaining to war plans and intelligence. In addition, the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was told to coordinate all air

matters, to include those previously handled by the senior Deputy

Chief of Staff under the rubric of "General Staff business." 

Marshall based this action on the need for improved efficiency,

given the upcoming increases in demands on the Air Corps tied to

expansion programs. The Chief of Staff also emphatically told

the G1, G3, and G4 not to delay matters affecting the air

establishment.103

The second- and third-order consequences of this simple

directive were profound. First, the staff of the Air Corps

acquired a degree of coordinating authority approaching that of

the General Staff sections. As a result, it would play a more

central role in planning activities and enjoy a more elevated

status than before within the War Department. Second, the

authority of both the Air Corps and the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Air was significantly expanded. Third, air issues would be

handled more expeditiously and cooperatively than ever before by

the General Staff. These results, which were consciously

intended by Marshall, amounted to a turning point in the movement

for autonomy of the air establishment.104

Increasingly dissatisfied with the divided aviation

functions, Marshall and the Secretary of War in March 1941

decided to place the entire air arm under a single commander. 

Marshall initiated a study of how best to do this, and encouraged

Mr. Stimson to revive the position of Assistant Secretary of War

for Air. Secretary Stimson did so almost immediately and

appointed Robert A Lovett, who had been serving as special

assistant on air matters, to the position. His charter involved

two major tasks: promotion of aircraft production and

streamlining the organization of the air arm. The

reestablishment of this position elevated even further the

stature and priority linked with air matters within the War

Department.

In June, the new reorganization of the air arm went into

effect in accordance with a revised version of Army Regulation

95-5 (Status, Functions, and Organization of the Air Component).

 The regulation established the Army Air Forces (AAF). Its

chief, General Arnold, was given control over two subordinate

organizations: the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command

(AFCC), the latter replacing the old GHQ Air Force. Thus,

administration, logistics, and combat operations were all placed

under Arnold's purview. In addition, Arnold, as Chief of the
AAF, was made directly responsible to the Chief of Staff and

given authority to establish comprehensive plans and policies for

all aspects of Army aviation. In keeping with Marshall's vision

for both greater decentralization within the War Department and

greater air establishment autonomy, the regulation provided the

AAF with an Air Staff to assist in policy formulation. General

Arnold also retained his position as Deputy Chief of Staff for

Air, serving as a high-level bridge between the AAF and the

General Staff. GHQ's responsibility for air force training was

limited to combined air-ground operations on those occasions when

air task forces would be attached, such as for maneuvers or for

overseas deployment.105

The impact of this reorganization was enormous. It raised

Arnold to unquestioned and unprecedented preeminence in all air

matters. Specifically, his duties encompassed determining

requirements for the AAF and the "preparation of necessary plans

for the development, organization, equipment, training, tactical

operations, supply, and maintenance thereof, including overseas

garrisons and task forces for theaters of operation and the

assignment of personnel and materiel thereto." Through the AFCC,

he controlled "all aerial operations" save for units assigned or

attached to task forces, overseas garrisons, or other commands. 

He was also responsible for planning the air defense of the

United States. The broadened scope of these duties also ensured

promotion for him to lieutenant general. Brigadier General

Gerow, head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, noted

in his office diary that the airmen had gained "a complete

autonomy similar in character to that exercised by the Marine

Corps of the Navy."106

Unfortunately, however, the GHQ and the AAF continued to

dispute their somewhat overlapping operational responsibilities.

 Smelling even greater opportunities, some on the new Air Staff

offered a series of proposals for total independence of the Air

Forces inside a National Defense establishment. Marshall and

Arnold rejected these. But, Marshall gradually concluded that

GHQ would not be suited to exercise direction over theater level

commands overseas; rather, a streamlined and redesigned General

Staff would be the more appropriate instrument.107

Reorganizing the War Department.

Nonetheless, Marshall was reluctant to initiate a sweeping

reorganization of the General Staff in late 1941. He knew

generally want he wanted. But, as he recalled a few months

later, "...the difficulty was how to bring it about without so

much...dissention and opposition within the Army and on the Hill

and in the press that I would be stirring up a most unfortunate

morale situation at a critical moment and would also be defeating

my purpose." Thus, Marshall chose to refine reorganization

studies and plans for the present, awaiting a more propitious

opportunity to act.108
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the consequent

American entry into the war provided that opportunity. On 

December 18, 1941, Congress gave the President sweeping authority

to reorganize the government under terms of the First War Powers

Act. This action paved the way legislatively for swift action. 

Furthermore, the very nature of transition from a peacetime to a

wartime footing made fundamental organizational changes seem

suddenly more palatable and logical. Also, most of those likely

to protest a resultant loss in stature, the various chiefs of

arms and the adjutant general, were due to retire; the two not

scheduled to retire would be transferred to more important

positions for which they were fully qualified.109

Marshall thus chose to strike while the iron was hot. He

secured rapid approval for the reorganization plan from the

Secretary of War and the President. The latter then signed an

executive order, putting it into effect on March 9, 1942. 

Marshall proceeded with a rapid, ruthless implementation for two

reasons. He wanted to prevent any coherent opposition from

developing before the changes were a fait accompli. And, amid

the enormous burdens of transitioning to war, any such sweeping

reorganization could be enormously disruptive if prolonged.110

The implementing circular fundamentally altered the role of

the General Staff. An expanded War Plans Division (later

redesignated the Operations Division, or OPD) was created to

serve as Marshall's global command post; it was to have

unprecedented coordinating authority across the entire General

Staff to increase efficiency and responsiveness. OPD's primary

functions were strategic planning and operations. It was charged

with comprehensively monitoring reports and inquiries from the

field, serving as a clearing house for information; with ensuring

that needed responses were taken; and with following up

holistically to ensure that all orders and directives, internal

and outgoing, were issued and executed. In short, the Operations

Division was in itself a self-contained, mini-General Staff, with

the coordinating authority and panoramic overview of activities

which the old General Staff was simply too fragmented in

structure to exercise. The remainder of the General Staff was to

be significantly reduced in size and was to focus on very broad

matters of policy beyond the purview of individual subordinate

commands. Across the entire General Staff, the intent ultimately

was that roughly half the members should be air officers. Beyond

doubt, this last measure would finally ensure an adequate level

of cooperation, understanding, and communication between air and

ground officers in all aspects of plans and operations.111

The reorganization also abolished GHQ, and created three

co-equal, autonomous commands to administer the Army in the Zone

of the Interior (i.e., the Continental United States): the Army

Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply. 

All three commands reported directly to the Chief of Staff. The

Commander of Army Ground Forces was responsible for all aspects
of preparing ground forces to fight overseas (e.g., doctrine,

equipment, organization structure, training, and schools). The

Commander of Army Air Forces assumed responsibility for all air

personnel, aviation equipment procurement and disposition,

training, doctrine, aircraft development, specific air forces

construction and supply, and all aerial operations except by

units assigned to other commands. The Commander of the Services

of Supply had purview over all general supply, procurement,

construction, transportation, and administration matters.112

Thus, the Reorganization of March 1942 marked an achievement

that Marshall had generally envisioned when he assumed office. 

The Army Air Forces had gained virtual autonomy within the War

Department, but were more than ever an integrated part of the

Army's combined-arms team. The three Zone-of-the-Interior

commands relieved the General Staff and Marshall himself from a

myriad of issues, which could now be worked out, for the most

part, within those commands. Only issues applying to two or more

commands, or too difficult to resolve at lower levels, would now

percolate up to Marshall. This freed him considerably from the

tyranny of detail, and enabled him to focus on matters of broad

policy and strategy appropriate to his level of responsibility. 

Just as important, he now had a streamlined General Staff with a

broader outlook to match his own. Within that Staff the

Operations Division served as a center to monitor situations

around the globe and as a conduit for orders and directions. 

Just as important to Marshall, OPD had the requisite coordinating

authority to orchestrate comprehensive, rapid responses across

the General Staff on important matters; it also had the charter

to follow up so that nothing "fell through the cracks" due to

neglect or compartmentalized thinking within the General Staff or

within subordinate headquarters.

Marshall's actions during the prewar years thus demonstrated

great skill in using organizational structuring and restructuring

to influence the fulfillment of his vision, as well as the

reinforcement of desired institutional values. Those values--

especially teamwork, responsiveness, efficiency and initiative--

were promoted by the changes he instituted.
CHAPTER 9

STRATEGY

George Marshall, prior to becoming Chief of Staff, had

acquired little direct experience in strategic planning. It is

truly amazing, therefore, to analyze the remarkable

transformation he underwent in this arena from 1939 until early

1942. The catalyst in this transformation was the dramatic

sequence of events overseas, which portrayed an ever more

aggressive Germany, Italy, and Japan increasingly threatening the

existing international order.

In his first 9 months as Chief of Staff, Marshall focused

almost exclusively on the ways and means to rebuild and train the

American Army. His time and energies were consumed by that

effort. Strategic considerations remained in the background of

his attentions. At the same time, Germany had yet to fight

France and Britain in Western Europe. Most Americans envisioned,

at worst, a repeat of the World War I scenario, in which their

country would enter a stalemated ground war on the Western Front

to deliver the coup de grace to an exhausted foe.113

Marshall appears during this period to have largely accepted

such a scenario with one key exception. He presciently felt that

any American expeditionary force sent overseas would have to be

fully ready to fight a campaign as soon as it landed--totally

unlike Pershing's American Expeditionary Force (AEF) of World War

I. This thinking permeated his arguments on behalf of a greatly

expanded Army experienced in large-unit maneuvers at the corps

and field army levels. He articulated those sentiments to

Congress as early as November 27, 1939:

The First Division of the A.E.F. arrived in France in

July 1917 and entered into intensive training, for the

first time, as a division. It was not prepared to take

its position in the line until the following January,

even under the forced training schedule of a unit in

wartime within sound of the guns on the battle front.

Fortunately, under the protection of the Allies, it was

given a year in which to find itself....The future

problems for our Army visualize no such protected

period for overcoming peacetime military deficiencies.

 We must be prepared to stand on our own feet from the

outset.114

Hemispheric Defense.

The cataclysmic events of the spring and summer of 1940

added a new dimension to Marshall's strategic thinking--serious

concern about the security of the Western Hemisphere. Some

concern had existed beforehand. He had previously emphasized

that one of the Army's two general missions was to "prevent the
domination of territory in the Western Hemisphere by an overseas

power." He had also argued that a violation of the Monroe

Doctrine by European powers was "not beyond the realm of

possibility." He specially regarded Nazi designs to take over

Brazil and Venezuela as a credible threat; both countries had

substantial German populations, which could serve as a fifth

column, using subversion and sabotage to seize power under a

pro-German, fascist banner. Nonetheless, such concerns had been

relatively fuzzy in nature. But Germany's Blitzkrieg victories

over Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, France, and Britain now

made follow-up threats to the Western Hemisphere seem much more

specific and acute. It did not require much imagination to

envisage a complete Axis victory in Europe, involving perhaps

even the surrender or conquest of Great Britain. If the Germans

thereby acquired both the French and British fleets, they would

be in a position to invade the Western Hemisphere. The rapid

conquest of Norway on the cheap was seen as the model for the

initiation of such a campaign.115

Much of Marshall's rationale for requesting the

federalization of the National Guard and the Selective Service

Act in the summer of 1940 was couched in terms of hemispheric

defense. His considerable efforts to upgrade defenses in the

Panama Canal Zone and in the Caribbean area resulted directly

from this thinking. Indeed, Marshall could hardly have advocated

sending American ground troops overseas to fight, given American

policy and public sentiment to avoid involvement in another

European war. Even his fuzzy hinting of such involvement a year

later in his first biennial report triggered a sharp outcry.116

However, the call to bolster hemispheric defenses did

provide a publicly palatable rationale for expanding air and

ground forces; they had the legitimate mission to deal with a

plausible contingency near to home shores--and something the Navy

alone might not be able to handle, such as a fascist coup in

Brazil or even Panama. In this regard, the popular sentiments

surrounding the Monroe Doctrine were extremely supportive. Even

for mainstream isolationist thought, hemispheric security seemed

a logical extension of the notion of self-defense, unlikely to

stir up the fundamental fear of foreign entanglements. Yet,

unlike defense at America's shores, hemispheric security required

the ability to project forces--land, sea, and air--to defeat

incursions and to man crucial outposts such as the Panama

Canal.117

Despite his belief in likely threats to the hemisphere,

Marshall continued quietly in his thinking that America could

well get directly involved in the European war. He did not,

however, at this point see such involvement as inevitable. 

Nonetheless, he proceeded to plan further mobilization efforts

with this kind of involvement in mind, as a sort of worst-case

scenario.
"Europe First."

Marshall also began to direct increasing attention to war

planning. The Navy's preferred orientation in previous planning

had focused on the Pacific, specifically involving war with

Japan. And, indeed, the Japanese in the fall of 1940 seemed

determined to pursue a course of regional hegemony which put them

on a collision course with America. In September, they occupied

northern Indochina and announced joining the Rome-Berlin Axis. 

The likelihood of a two-theater war now loomed larger than ever

before.118

Marshall's resultant thinking began to coalesce around the

concept that in such a two-theater war, the priority of U.S.

interests lay in the Atlantic and in Europe. He articulated this

view increasingly in broader planning circles. Within a

relatively short span of time, both he and Admiral Stark were in

full agreement on the issue. When Stark published a

comprehensive strategic analysis in November 1940 recommending a

Europe-first strategy, Marshall threw his complete support behind

it. Together, he and Stark convinced the Secretary of the Navy,

the Secretary of War, and the President to accept it in principle

by January 1941.119

The supporting assertion was the recognition that America's

security rested to a very large extent on the fate of Great

Britain. Stark argued in his analysis that "...if Britain wins

decisively against Germany we could win everywhere; but that if

she loses the problems confronting us would be very great; and

while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win

anywhere." If Great Britain collapsed, the victorious Axis powers

would eventually seek expansion, first economically and then

militarily, into the Western Hemisphere. Thus, Britain must be

assisted in every possible way. An all-out simultaneous war

against Japan in the Pacific would draw essential resources away

from the more critical effort in Europe. Even Japan's defeat

would not contribute significantly to the more important

objectives of defending the Western Hemisphere and preserving

Great Britain. The conclusion drawn was that in a two-theater

war the United States could "do little more in the Pacific than

remain on a strict defensive." Also embedded in the analysis was

the assessment that Great Britain had neither the manpower nor

materiel to defeat Germany alone; the assistance of powerful

allies would ultimately be required; furthermore, blockade and

air bombardment, the means favored by the British, would be

inadequate by themselves to resolve the war. The only certain

way to defeat Germany was "by military success on shore." This

would require the United States to send large land and air forces

to participate in a great land offensive.120

Thus, Marshall and his naval counterpart played the leading

roles in both developing and selling the "Germany-first" approach

which became the centerpiece of American strategy during World
War II. The British supported this approach in the ensuing secret

British-American staff conferences in Washington, January-March

1941. A few months later, the Joint Board completed RAINBOW 5,

the umbrella plan which outlined the objectives and missions of

American forces in a two-theater, Germany-first war.121

Strategic Unity Of Command.

Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack and America's

consequent entry in the war, the leaders of Great Britain and the

United States assembled in Washington for a conference,

christened Arcadia. Meeting from December 22, 1941 until January

14, 1942, these leaders attempted to identify and come to grips

with the fundamental issues surrounding their new Allied

relationship. Quickly, they confirmed the Germany-first approach

and went on to deal with a host of related issues.

Then, on Christmas Day, while discussing the disposition of

reinforcements en route to the Southwest Pacific area, Marshall

stunned all present. As a result of his World War I experience,

he asserted "that the most important consideration is the

question of unity of command....I am convinced that there must be

one man in command of the entire theater--air, ground, and ships.

 We cannot manage by cooperation....If we make a plan for unified

command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles." He

continued, saying that the one man in control would operate under

a charter, or "controlled directive," supplemented as necessary

with additional guidance, issued by the military service chiefs

of Britain and the United States. He continued:

We had to come to this in the first World War, but it

was not until 1918 that it was accomplished and much

valuable blood, and treasure had been needlessly

sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified command

now, it would be a great advance over what was

accomplished during the World War.122

The initial reaction by all present was negative. Neither

Admiral Stark nor Admiral King, the Commander of the U.S. Fleet,

rallied to his support. The issue was delicately tabled for the

rest of the meeting.

But Marshall persisted. At the next meeting, he showed up

with draft sample orders to a theater commander. Now the group

had something concrete to examine and discuss. The document was

in the form of a letter of instructions, defining the mission,

and the authority granted. It also excluded from his authority

any interference in matters which were strictly the business of

any particular government; this assured all present that no real

risk was involved to the interests of any Allied power. He next

suggested that the Far Eastern Theater be the first so organized;

he named this theater ABDA, an acronym for Australian, British,

Dutch, and American. As a sweetener, Marshall suggested that a
British general, Sir Archibald Wavell, be named supreme

commander.123

The next day, after extensive discussion, Marshall convinced

the President, as well as Admirals Stark and King, to support the

proposal. Finally, after extensive debates and behind-the-scenes

lobbying, he personally convinced a very reluctant Churchill and

the British chiefs of staff to accede. This approach, applied

initially only to ABDA, was intended as the eventual command

model for all theaters of war.124

The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Marshall then threw his full support behind a British

proposal for the composition and organization of the Allied

council which would give the theater supreme commanders their

directives. He quickly garnered support from the President, as

well as from Admirals Stark and King. This council, to be known

as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, would consist of the British

Chiefs of Staff and their American counterparts; it would report

collectively to the President and the Prime Minister. 

Furthermore, the seat of the Combined Chiefs would be in

Washington; the British would station a Joint Staff Mission there

to represent their chiefs of staff in regular meetings with their

American counterparts. Making Washington the single seat of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff was also the result of Marshall's

insistence. The original proposal had called for two co-equal

seats, Washington and London, an arrangement less likely to

produce the unity of effort and unity of command Marshall

sought.125

Marshall's performance during the Arcadia Conference left a

deep impression. Like a man possessed, he had pursued the

concept of unity of command in theaters of war, exercised through

supreme commanders answering to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He

articulately pleaded the case, gradually winning broad

acceptance. In so doing, he played the undisputed leading role in

providing the Allies with an effective instrument for close

cooperation, unity of effort, and strategy formulation virtually

unprecedented in scope and magnitude.

In the process, Marshall established himself as a diplomatic

but forceful personality. He emerged from the Arcadia Conference

as the chief American spokesman, the primus inter pares, of the

U.S. military representatives. Over time, he would achieve the

same status among the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a whole.126
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

During his prewar years as Chief of Staff, George Marshall

was concerned primarily with the challenge of preparing the Army

for war. Events in Europe made the eventual commitment there of

American ground forces very imaginable for him, although the

specific conditions and situations of such a commitment were

ambiguous. Driven by his own poignant experiences from World War

I, Marshall determined that the Army must be ready to fight

coherently in large formations as polished, combined-arms teams

when the war began. This meant as well that all modern supplies

and equipment, in addition to a warm, functioning industrial base

to support sustainment and expansion, had to be on hand from the

onset. His strategic vision thus revolved around the efforts

comprehensively to expand and upgrade the Army during this

period. With the Army's small size, its inadequate level of

training, its obsolescent equipment, its virtually nonexistent

military industrial base, its underdeveloped Air Corps, and its

anachronistic War Department organization, the tasks associated

with implementing this vision seemed staggering. They consumed

the great bulk of his time and energies from 1939 through 1941.

Given the generally unsympathetic attitude in Washington and

around the country in 1939 toward any steps which smacked of

involvement in another European ground war, Marshall's

achievements over the next 2 1/2 years were truly remarkable.

Without question, Marshall's actions addressed in a

particularly impressive way all aspects of strategic leadership

which were abstractly postulated at the beginning of this report.

 He developed, articulated, and followed a vision which served as

the enduring road map for himself and the Army. In the process

of implementing his vision, he demonstrated extremely adept

interpersonal talents. In this regard, his ability to persuade

diverse groups, to develop networks of influential contacts, and

to make timely compromises was critically important. In

connection with, and in support of, his vision, he strongly

promoted certain crucial values across the Army as an

institution--namely, efficiency, responsiveness, teamwork,

initiative, and morale.

In addition, he consistently revealed an indepth

understanding of the derivative effects of actions, as well as of

a related keen awareness of the timing associated with execution.

 His means of gaining feedback from the Army at large were

effective--ranging from his many, frequent inspection trips, to

the broad use of his Inspector General, to his copious, direct

correspondence with subordinate commanders. Marshall definitely

kept his fingers on the pulse of the Army as it expanded.

While so doing, he rapidly advanced a whole new leadership

generation into the general officer ranks, based on demonstrated
skills, adherence to institutional values, and potential for

increased responsibility. By and large, these young leaders

covered themselves with distinction during the ensuing war years,

and well beyond.

Marshall's strategic leadership was also manifested by the

fashion in which he progressively evolved the War Department's

organizational structure to reflect both his vision and his

desired institutional values. This evolution itself comprised an

insightful lesson in the art of the possible and the timing of

related actions.

In the realm of strategy formulation, he played a central

role in shaping the acceptance of the "Germany-first" approach as

the linchpin of American wartime strategy. He went on to play

the central role in formulating the highly successful

Anglo-American wartime structure at a very formative point in the

Alliance. The employment of theater supreme commanders reporting

back through the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and

the Prime Minister was clearly a creature of his making; it was

adopted only because he doggedly persisted without much

encouragement in pursuing the concept. Some authors have gone so

far as to characterize the acceptance of this setup as the single

most important strategic contribution of the war--a necessary

prerequisite for the unprecedented unity of command which

undergirded subsequent Allied success.

George Marshall clearly made a difference. He started out

in 1939 as a relative unknown in Washington circles and emerged 2

1/2 years later as one of this nation's better known and

influential figures. He had to face squarely many unpopular

issues which politicians of all types just didn't want to handle.

 Yet, he persisted in focusing attention on them, articulating

the Army's needs relative to them, and forcing politicians over

and over again to view the issues in a different light--the

nonpolitical perspective of national security. To be sure,

Marshall was helped repeatedly by developments abroad. But all

his fights still remained uphill ones against the odds. In this

connection, it is hard to imagine America being as ready for

World War II as it was without the yeoman efforts of its Army

Chief of Staff. Marshall and Marshall alone made the

federalization of the National Guard and the Selective Service

Act realities in 1940. Again, he alone engineered the term of

service extensions for the National Guardsmen, Reserve officers,

and inductees in 1941, an act which kept a coherent force from

disintegrating completely. Marshall made the autonomy of the

Army Air Forces a reality while ensuring that air and ground

forces formed a better combined-arms team. He pushed hard for a

firm organizational structure to reflect Anglo-American adherence

to an unprecedented degree of Allied unity of command. All these

results had an important and lasting impact on this country's

later performance in the war. These achievements appear

impressive in retrospect. They appear truly monumental looking

forward from the perspective of 1939. Unquestionably, they alone
place George Marshall among the great American strategic leaders

of this century.
ENDNOTES

1. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope,

1939-1942, New York: Viking Press, 1966, pp. xiv, (hereafter

cited as Ordeal and Hope); Ed Cray, General of the Army George

C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman, New York: Simon and Schuster,

1990, p. 143; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global

Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, U.S. Army in World War II

Series by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department

of the Army, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office

(hereafter cited as GPO), 1955; reprint ed., 1984.

2. U.S. Department of the Army, Executive Leadership,

Department of the Army Pamphlet, Number 66-80, Washington: GPO,

June 19, 1987, pp. 13-16, 24-31, 33-40,48-53; U.S. Department of

the Army, U.S. Army War College, Army Command and Management:

Theory and Practice, 1991-1992, Reference Text Prepared by the

Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Carlisle

Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, August 19, 1992,

pp. 5-1 to 5-12.

3. George C. Marshall, Appearance before the U.S. Senate,

Sub-Committee, Committee on Appropriations, May 29,

1940,"Testimonies: Appearances of General of the Army George C.

Marshall before the Congress of the United States" (hereafter

cited as "Testimonies"), p. 382, Papers of George C. Marshall,

George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia

(hereafter cited as GCMRL).

4. George C. Marshall, Speech to the Committee on the

Community Chest, Washington, DC, November 16, 1939; The Papers of

George Catlett Marshall, vol 2: We Cannot Delay: July 1,

1939-December 7, 1941, ed. by Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour,

and Clarence Wunderlin, Jr., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1986, p. 103 (hereafter cited as Marshall, Papers, II); 

George C. Marshall, Address at the Army Ordnance Association

Meeting, Washington DC, October 11, 1939, Selected Speeches and

Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall, ed. H.A.

DeWeerd, Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945, pp. 19-26

(hereafter cited as Marshall, Selected Speeches and Statements);

 Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the

American Century, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989, p. 45; William

Frye, Marshall, Citizen Soldier, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947,

p. 181; George C. Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World

War, 1917-1918, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976, pp. 167,180.

5. George C. Marshall, Address at the Annual Banquet of the

National Guard Association of Pennsylvania, Washington,

Pennsylvania, October 13, 1939, "Broadcasts, Statements, and

Speeches by George C. Marshall," (hereafter cites as "Speeches"),

Marshall Papers, GCMRL; Address at the Opening of the Air Corps

Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama, October 1, 1938,

Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. xii, 1-2; Frye, p. 260;

Marshall, Letter to Brigadier General Ralph M. Immell, September
14, 1939, and Testimony before the House Appropriations

Committee, May 1, 1940, Papers, II, pp. 56-57, 195; Forrest C.

Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939, New

York: Viking Press, 1963, pp. 334-335 (hereafter cited as Pogue,

Education of a General).

6. George C. Marshall, Address at Brunswick, Maryland,

November 6, 1938, and Remarks at the Opening of the Army

Industrial College, Washington, DC, September 9, 1939, Selected

Speeches and Statements, pp. 9,18; Frye, pp. 262-264.

7. Marshall, Letter to Brigadier General Ralph M. Immell, 

September 14, 1939, and Letter to Major General Milton A.

Reckord, August 30, 1939, Papers, II, pp. 41-42, 56-57; 

Marshall, Appearance before the House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on Appropriations, November 27, 1939, Marshall

Papers, GCMRL.

8. Marshall, Speech to the Army Ordnance Association,

October 11, 1939, Papers, II, pp. 83,112; Marshall, Statements

on the Purpose and Advantages of Army Maneuvers before the House

of Representatives Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, 

November 30, 1939, Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. 33-34.

9. Marshall, Memo for G2 [McCabe], January 5, 1940, Papers, II, p. 136.

10. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 85; George C. Marshall,

George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C.

Pogue, Lexington, Virginia: Marshall Research Foundation, 1991,

pp. 310-311, 340 (hereafter cited as Interviews).

11. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 437-439; Lawrence S. Kuter,

"George C. Marshall: Architect of Airpower," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 61, August 1978, p. 67; Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff:

Prewar Plans and Preparations, U.S. Army in World War II Series

by the Historical Division, U.S. Army, Washington: GPO, 1950;

reprint ed., 1974, p. 280.

12. Kuter, p. 67; Marshall, Interviews, pp. 276, 312-313,

436-439; Watson, pp. 8, 281-282, 293; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p.

86; DeWitt S. Copp, "The Pioneer Plan for Air War," Air Force

Magazine, Vol. 65, October 1982, pp. 74-78.

13. Frye, pp. 268-269; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 8; Ray S.

Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, U.S.

Army in World War II Series by the Office of the Chief of

Military History, Department of the Army, Washington: GPO, 1951;

reprint ed., 1970, pp. 38-39.

14. Watson, p. xi; Frye, p. 262; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 8-9; Otto L. Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946, pp. 328-334.
15. Frye, pp. 268-269, 282; D.K.R. Crosswell, The Chief of

Staff: The Military Career of General Walter Bedell Smith,

Contributions in Military Studies, Number 110, New York:

Greenwood Press, 1991, pp. 75-76, 82; Marshall, Letter to LTG

Daniel Van Voorhis, August 22, 1940, Papers, II, pp. 293-294.

16. Crosswell, pp. 73-74; Cray, p. 150; George C. Marshall,

Letter to BG John McA Palmer, March 12, 1942, The Papers of

George Catlett Marshall, Vol 3: The Right Man for the Job:

December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943, ed. by Larry I. Bland and Sharon

Ritenour Stevens, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

1991, pp. 129-131 (hereafter cited as Papers, III).

17. Interview with Forrest C. Pogue, Arlington, Virginia,

November 21-22, 1991.

18. Watson, p. 157.

19. Ibid.; Cray, pp. 146-147.

20. Frye, p. 271-272; Marshall, Speech to the Army Ordnance

Association, October 11, 1939, Papers, II, p. 85.

21. Marshall, Speech to the Army Ordnance Association,

Papers, II, p. 85; Interview with Forrest C. Pogue, Arlington,

Virginia, November 21-22, 1991.

22. Watson, pp. 29-30, 128; Frye, p. 265; Marshall,

Appearance before the House of Representatives, Committee on

Appropriations, February 26, 1940, "Testimonies," pp. 123-124,

158, Marshall Papers, GCMRL; Marshall, Remarks at the Opening of

the Army Industrial College, Washington, DC, September 9, 1939,

Selected Speeches and Statements, p. 18; Marshall, Memorandum for

the Secretary of War, September 7, 1939, and Letter to General

Malin Craig, September 19, 1939, Papers, II, pp. 52-53, 59, 163;

Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, Department of

the Army Pamphlet Number 20-212, Washington: GPO, 1955, pp.

485-490.

23. Marshall, Speech to the National Guard Association of

Pennsylvania, October 13, 1939, Papers, II, p. 89.

24. Cray, pp. 146, 148-149.

25. Ibid.

26. Watson, p. 15; Cray, pp. 145,147; Pogue, Ordeal and

Hope, pp. 16-18.

27. Marshall, Interviews, p. 282.

28. Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., Nineteen Stars: A Study in

Military Character and Leadership, 2d ed., Novato, California:
Presidio Press, 1981, p. 89; Pogue, Education of a General, p.

324; Marshall, Interviews, pp. 282, 417; Cray, p. 144; Frye, pp.

310-311.

29. Ibid.

30. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 16-18.

31. Frye, pp. 273-274; Watson, pp. 104-105.

32. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 297, 304.

33. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 301-302; Watson, p. 181;

Interview with Forrest C. Pogue, Arlington, Virginia, November

21-22, 1991.

34. Cray, p. 165; Watson, p. 164.

35. Marshall, Radio Broadcast to the Reserve Officers'

Association of the United States, from Washington, DC, February

16, 1940, and Statements on the Purpose and Advantages of Army

Maneuvers before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee,

Committee on Appropriations, November 30, Selected Speeches and

Statements, pp. 33-34,40-43; Marshall, Testimony before the House

of Representatives, Subcommittee on Appropriations, November 27,

1939 and February 26, 1940, "Testimonies," pp. 34-35, 156-157,

Marshall Papers, GCMRL; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 89-90;

Marshall, Memorandum for Colonel Burns, February 23, 1940,

Papers, II, pp. 133, 164-165; War Reports of General of the Army

George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff; General of the Army H.H.

Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and Fleet Admiral 

Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief

of Naval Operations, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1947,

p. 18 (hereafter cited as War Reports).

36. Marshall, Letter to Marshall from LTG DeWitt, January

31, 1940, Marshall Papers, GCMRL; Marshall, Papers, II, pp. 101,

133.

37. Marshall, Letter to MG Charles H. Martin, January 16,

1940, and Memorandum for Admiral Stark, February 24, 1940,

Papers, II, pp. 141, 166.

38. Marshall, Appearance before the U.S. Senate,

Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, May 29, 1940,

"Testimonies," pp. 252-253, Marshall Papers, GCMRL.

39. Marshall, Papers, II, p. 592; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 26-27; Watson, p. 165; Marshall, Interviews, pp. 484-485,

609-610.

40. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 28; Cray, pp. 151-152.

41. Watson, pp. 165-166.
42. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 28-29.

43. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 328-330, 514-518; Marshall,

Papers, II, pp. 209-211; Cray, pp. 153-155.

44. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 30-32.

45. War Reports, p. 20; Marshall, Papers, II, p. 197;

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces

in World War II, 7 Vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1948-58, Vol. 1: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to

August 1942, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 127

(hereafter cited as Plans and Early Operations).

46. War Reports, pp. 20-21; Marshall, Interviews, pp.

331-332; Marshall, Memorandum for the President, May 29, 1940,

Papers, <F14M>II<F255D>, pp. 238-240; Cray, p. 166; Marshall,

Appearance before the U.S. Senate, Subcommittee, Committee on

Appropriations, June 15, 1940, "Testimonies," p. 421, Marshall

Papers, GCMRL.

47. Marshall, Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars,

Akron, Ohio, June 19, 1940, and Speech to the National Aviation

Forum, May 27, 1940, Washington, DC, Papers, II, pp. 225-227,

249.

48. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 39-45; Cray, p. 162.

49. Cray, pp. 166-168.

50. Stoler, pp. 75-76; Marshall, Interviews, p. 305.

51. War Reports, p. 22; Marshall, Interviews, pp. 302-303;

Marshall, Statement before the Senate Committee on Military

Affairs, July 12, 1940, Selected Speeches and Statements, pp.

61-62, 64.

52. Marshall, Statements before the Senate Committee on

Military Affairs, July 30, 1940, Selected Speeches and

Statements, pp. 71-74; Marshall, Papers, II, pp. 262-264;

Marshall, Appearance before the House of Representatives,

Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, July 24, 1940, and

Appearance before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs,

July 12, 1940, "Testimonies," pp. 437-438, 495, Marshall Papers,

GCMRL.

53. Cray, pp. 169-172; Marshall, Papers, II, p. 308.

54. Marshall, CBS Radio Address on Selective Service,

from Washington, DC, September 16, 1940, Papers, II, pp. 309-311.

55. War Reports, p. 24; Marshall, NBC Radio Address on the

Progress of National Defense, November 29, 1940, Papers, II, pp.
323, 355-356.

56. Watson, p. 217.

57. Cray, p. 196; War Reports, pp. 29-33; Marshall,

Interviews, p. 286; Marshall, Papers, II, pp. 565-566; Kreidberg

and Merton, p. 592.

58. Frye, pp. 290-292; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 146-147;

Marshall, Interviews, p. 594.

59. Cray, pp. 204-206.

60. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 307-308; Pogue, Ordeal and

Hope, p. 149; Cray, pp. 204-206.

61. Cray, pp. 204-206; Marshall, Interviews, pp. 307-308.

62. Marshall, Statements before the House of

Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, July 22, 1941,

and Statements before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,

July 17, 1941, Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. 135-144,

146-167.

63. Marshall, Statements before the Senate Committee on

Military Affairs, July 9, 1941, and Statements before the House

of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, July 22, 1941,

Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. 129-130, 133, 146-167.

64. Marshall, Statements before the House of

Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, July 22, 1941,

Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. 146-167.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Cray, pp. 206-208.

68. Ibid.

69. Cray, pp. 208-210.

70. Ibid., pp. 206-210.

71. Marshall, Letter to Westbrook Pegler, March 22, 1941,

Papers, II, p. 451; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 162-165.

72. Watson, p. 9; "General: Man of the Year," Time, Vol.

43, January 3, 1944, pp. 15-18.

73. Marshall, Speech to the American Historical

Association, Washington, DC, December 28, 1939, Papers, II, p.

123; Marshall, Speech to the National Guard Convention,
Baltimore, Maryland, October 27, 1939, Marshall Papers, GCMRL;

Larry I. Bland, " George C. Marshall," in Military Leadership and

Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures, 1987, ed. by Henry

S. Bausum, Lexington, Virginia: VMI Foundation, 1987, pp.

132-133.

74. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Global Commander,

The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, Number 10,

Colorado Springs, Colorado: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1968, p. 15;

Cray, pp. 185-187; Marshall, Statements before the House of

Representatives, Sub-Committee, Committee on Appropriations,

February 23, 1940, "Testimonies," p. 79, Marshall Papers, GCMRL;

Bland, "George C. Marshall," pp. 132-134.

75. Marshall, Interviews, p. 355.

76. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Global Commander, p. 15;

Frye, pp. 274-275.

77. Frye, pp. 257-258, 334; Marshall, Papers, II, pp.

39-40, 387-388.

78. Cray, pp. 152-153; Marshall, Statements before the U.S.

Senate, Committee on Appropriations, May 1, 1940, "Testimonies,"

p. 253, Marshall Papers, GCMRL.

79. Bland, "George C. Marshall," pp. 133-134; Marshall,

Memorandum to Admiral King, September 7, 1943, Marshall Papers,

GCMRL.

80. Puryear, p. 91; Marshall, Interviews, p. 456.

81. Marshall, Statements before the U.S. Senate,

Sub-Committee, Committee on Appropriations, May 29, 1940,

"Testimonies," pp. 356, 385, Marshall Papers, GCMRL.

82. Marshall, Speech to the Army Ordnance Association,

Washington, DC, October 11, 1939, Papers, II, p. 85.

83. Crosswell, p. 84; Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 86.

84. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, New York: Henry

Holt and Company, 1958, p. 62; Frye, pp. 270-271; Pogue, George

C. Marshall: Global Commander, p. 14; Bland, "George C.

Marshall," p. 138; Puryear, p. 82.

85. Crosswell, p. 77; Marshall, Memorandum for the

Inspector General [Peterson], December 26, 1940, and Memorandum

for All Staff Divisions, Chiefs of Arms and Services, January 25,

1940, and Letter to John C. O'Laughlin, August 8, 1940, and

Memorandum for BG Asa L. Singleton, March 23, 1940, Papers, II,

pp. 146, 178, 188, 372.

86. Marshall, Memorandum to BG John P. Smith, March 27,
1941, Papers, II, p. 456.

87. Crosswell, p. 91; Marshall, Address at the Opening of

the Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama, October 1,

1938, Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. 1, 3-4; Marshall,

Address over the Columbia Broadcasting System (WJSV), Washington,

DC, September 16, 1940, "Speeches," Marshall Papers, GCMRL;

Marshall, Letter to LTG Stanley D. Embick, March 23, 1940,

Papers, II, p. 177.

88. Frye, pp. 269-270.

89. Marshall, Letter to LTG Walter C. Short, February 7,

1941, Papers, II, pp. 257, 413.

90. Puryear, pp. 59, 82-83; Crosswell. p. 80; Cray, pp.

265-266.

91. Puryear, pp. 83-84; Cray, pp. 150-151; Interview with

Forrest C. Pogue, Arlington, Virginia, November 21-22, 1991.

92. Marshall, Speech to the Committee on the Community

Chest, Washington, DC, November 16, 1939, Papers, II, p. 104;

Marshall, Broadcast to Celebrate the Anniversary of the Founding

of West Point, from Montgomery, Alabama, March 15, 1941,

"Speeches," Marshall Papers, GCMRL.

93. Cray, pp. 177-188.

94. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 113-114; Marshall, Letter

to LTG Hugh A. Drum, May 14, 1941, Papers, II, pp. 501-502.

95. Frye, p. 282.

96. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 310-311.

97. Ibid.; Kuter, p. 66.

98. Ibid.

99. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 448-449; Kuter, p. 66.

100. Watson, pp. 286-287; Pogue, George C. Marshall: Global

Commander, pp. 2-3.

101. Nelson, p. 329.

102. Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations, pp.

114-115.

103. Watson, pp. 291-292.

104. Ibid.
105. Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations, pp.

114-115; Watson, pp. 293-294.

106. Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations, pp.

257-265; Marshall, Papers, II, pp. 682-685.

107. Ibid.

108. Marshall, Letter to BG John McA Palmer, March 12,

1942, Papers, III, pp. 129-130; Frye, p. 301.

109. Watson, p. 297; Marshall, Letter to BG John McA

Palmer, March 12, 1942, Papers, III, pp. 127-130.

110. Crosswell, pp. 73-74.

111. Cline, pp. 78-79, 95; Craven and Cate, p. 265.

112. Marshall, Papers, III, pp. 127-129.

113. Interview with Forrest C. Pogue, Arlington, Virginia,

 November 21-22, 1991.

114. Marshall, Statements before the House of

Representatives, Subcommittee on Appropriations, November 27,

1939, "Testimonies," pp. 33-34, Marshall Papers, GCMRL; Marshall,

Papers, II, p. 112; Interview with Forrest C. Pogue, Arlington,

Virginia, November 21-22, 1991.

115. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 336-337, 342;

Marshall, Papers, II, p. 245; Marshall, Radio Broadcast to the

Reserve Officers' Association of the United States, from

Washington, DC, Selected Speeches and Statements, pp. 40-43;

Craven and Cate, p. 117; Watson, pp. 94-97; Marshall, Interviews, pp. 284-285.

116. Cline, pp. 43-44.

117. Pogue, Education of a General, pp. 336-337, 342;

Watson, p. 96.

118. Lewis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of

Allied Strategy in World War II," in Command Decisions, ed. by

Kent Roberts, prepared under the Auspices of the Office of the

Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington: GPO, 1960;

reprint ed., 1971, pp. 33-34.

119. Morton, p. 38; Watson, pp. 117-118.

120. Morton, pp. 35-47.

121. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning

for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, U.S. Army in World War II Series

by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, Washington: GPO, 1953; reprint ed., 1970, pp. 43-46.

122. Vernon E. Davis, The History of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in World War II: Organizational Development, 2 Vols.,

Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs

of Staff, 1972, Vol 1: Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of

Staff, pp. 151-155.

123. Davis, pp. 151-155; Cray, pp. 272-274.

124. Marshall, Interviews, pp. 594-595; Davis, pp. 151-155;

Cray, pp. 272-274.

125. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, pp. 282-284.

126. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, p. 13; Thomas B. Buell, Master

of Sea Power: A Bibliography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King,

Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980, p. 163.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOHN T. NELSEN II is an Infantry Colonel currently assigned as a

Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Fellow. He has served at

every major level from platoon through corps. His more recent

assignments include Chief, War Plans Division, G3, III Corps, Ft.

Hood, Texas; Commander, 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 8th

Infantry Division, Germany; and Senior Task Force

Observer-Controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels,

Germany. Colonel Nelsen holds a B.S. in Mathematics from the

Virginia Military Institute; an M.A. in European History from the

University of Wisconsin; and a Master of Military Art and Science

degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft.

Leavenworth, Kansas. He has also served on the faculty of the

Department of History, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. In

addition, he is the recipient of the Hughes-Army ROTC Trophy for

1971. A 1992 graduate of the U.S. Army War College, Colonel

Nelsen has published several articles, including "Auftragstaktik:

A Case for Decentralized Combat Leadership," The Challenge of

Military Leadership (1989), and "Crushing the Soviet Forward

Detachment," Military Review (April 1988).
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Author

Colonel John T. Nelsen II

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Cover Artist

Mr. Lawrence C. Miller