United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Committee on the 

Judiciary, House of Representatives 

EXPORT CONTROLS

Agencies Should 

Assess Vulnerabilities 

and Improve Guidance 

for Protecting ExportControlled 

Information at 

Universities 

December 2006 

 

GAO-07-70 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

December 2006

EXPORT CONTROLS

Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities 

and Improve Guidance for Protecting 

Export-Controlled Information at 

Universities 

Highlights of GAO-07-70, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives

Foreign students and scholars have 

made substantial contributions to 

U.S. research efforts and

technology development. However,

according to a federal government

intelligence assessment, foreign 

access to sensitive U.S. technology 

has imposed a significant but 

unquantifiable cost to the United

States. 

Given this risk, GAO was asked to

(1) describe the nature of the 

research at universities and identify

steps they take to comply with 

export controls and (2) assess 

efforts by the Departments of 

Commerce and State—the key

export control agencies—to 

determine the risk of export

violations in university research. 

GAO reviewed Commerce and

State export control programs and 

met with officials from 13

universities, selected based on 

their foreign student populations,

applications for export licenses, 

and federal grants and contracts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that Commerce 

and State use available information 

to assess potential vulnerabilities 

and based on this assessment 

improve outreach, guidance, and 

interagency coordination. The 

agencies generally concurred, but

State disagreed with our 

recommendation on assessing

vulnerabilities. Broader 

assessments would increase State’s 

knowledge of risks and help 

improve its guidance to 

universities. 

The U.S. export control system requires export licensing for defense items 

and items that have both commercial and military applications, except 

where exclusions apply, such as those applicable to universities in some 

circumstances. The U.S. export control agencies place the onus on 

universities to understand and comply with the regulations. According to 

university officials we interviewed, their institutions focus almost 

exclusively on fundamental research—defined as basic and applied research 

in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and 

shared broadly within the scientific community. Such research is generally

not subject to export controls. Universities we visited conduct research in 

such areas as nanotechnologies, computer security, and chemical 

engineering. To ensure their research remains in the public domain, 

university officials said they negotiate contract language to remove 

publication or other dissemination restrictions for research they consider to 

be fundamental. If export controls apply, university officials stated they 

sometimes involve only those students eligible to conduct the research 

under a license exclusion, to avoid the lengthy license application process. 

In other cases, they refer such work to off-campus associated facilities that 

can better regulate and control foreign national access to the research. 

Universities we visited indicated that government-provided training and 

guidance on export control regulations is limited in informing their efforts to 

manage and protect export-controlled information in the university 

environment. 

State and Commerce officials expressed concerns that universities may not 

correctly interpret and apply export regulations, given the large number of 

foreign students participating in research at universities and the relative lack 

of license applications from universities. Although federal internal control 

standards contain guidelines for agencies to conduct risk assessments, State 

and Commerce have not conducted an overall assessment of available trend 

data on technology development research and foreign participation in such 

research at U.S. universities to identify potential vulnerabilities. For 

example, U.S. government agencies collect data on foreign student 

nationality, school enrollment, and types of research conducted at 

universities for federal agencies, which could supplement information that 

State and Commerce receive from visa application processes and other 

sources. Although State and Commerce provide guidance through training 

seminars, agency Web sites, and telephone help desks to assist exporters in 

understanding and complying with regulations, officials stated that their 

focus is on processing export license applications—primarily from industry. 

Recently, Commerce established an advisory committee composed of 

industry and university representatives who are expected to discuss issues 

such as the nature of university research and its relation to export controls. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-70.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact John Hutton at 

(202) 512-7773 or huttonj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 5

Universities Focus on Fundamental Research to Comply with 

Export Regulations 9 

State and Commerce Have Not Assessed the Potential Risk to 

Export-Controlled Information at Universities 14 

Conclusions 20

Recommendations for Executive Actions 20 

Agency Comments and our Evaluation 21 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Commerce 26 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 28 

Appendix IV Staff Contact and Acknowledgments 30 

Table 

Table 1: Examples of Research Areas Conducted at Universities 

Visited by GAO 10 

Figure 

Figure 1: Basic and Applied U.S.-Based Research Funding Sources 

for Universities and Colleges in Fiscal Year 2003 6 

Page i GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Abbreviations 

BIS Bureau of Industry and Security 

DDTC Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 

DOD Department of Defense 

EAR Export Administration Regulations 

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-70 Export Controls
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

December 5, 2006 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

U.S. national security and economic interests are heavily dependent on 

technological innovation and advantage. Many of the nation’s leading-edge 

technologies, including defense-related technologies, are being discovered 

by American and foreign national students and scholars in U.S. university 

research and university-affiliated laboratories. As the Department of 

Defense (DOD) invests less and less of its funding on in-house research 

and development, university-based discoveries are becoming increasingly 

vital to national security and other U.S. interests. 

To mitigate the risk of technology and knowledge falling into the wrong 

hands, the U.S. government—primarily the Departments of State and 

Commerce—controls the transfer of defense and “dual use” information.1

However, controlling the transfer of such information presents special 

challenges. U.S. export control regulations allow foreign students and 

researchers without export licenses to partake in fundamental research, 

defined to mean basic and applied research in science and engineering, the 

results of which are ordinarily published and shared broadly within the 

scientific community.2

 U.S. policymakers recognize that foreign students 

and researchers have made substantial contributions to U.S. research 

efforts, but the potential transfer of knowledge of controlled defense-

 1

 Dual-use information is that which has both commercial and military application. 15

C.F.R. Sec. 730.3. 

2

 National Security Decision Directive 189, issued September 21, 1985, and still in effect, 

established national policy for controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering 

information produced in federally-funded fundamental research at colleges, universities,

and laboratories. The directive defines fundamental research to mean basic and applied 

research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and

shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research

and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of

which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons. 

Page 1 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
related technologies to their home countries could have significant 

consequences for U.S. national interests. In a September 2005 testimony 

before Congress, the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that 

while the vast majority of foreign students in the United States are 

legitimately studying and advancing academic pursuits, some seek to 

acquire sensitive U.S. technologies to advance their own countries’ 

economic and military interests. Additionally, while not limited to foreign 

students, a 2005 federal report noted that the technology lost as a result of 

foreign efforts to target sensitive U.S. technologies has imposed a 

significant, but difficult to quantify, cost on the United States.

3

On the basis of your interest in continuing to attract foreign students and 

researchers to U.S. universities while protecting export-controlled 

information, you asked us to look at how academic institutions and the 

U.S. government protect against the illegal disclosure of such information. 

In response, we (1) described the nature of the research conducted at 

universities and identified the steps they have taken to comply with 

government export control regulations and (2) assessed the efforts of the 

Departments of Commerce and State to determine the risk of export 

violations in university research. 

To conduct our work, we met with officials from the Departments of 

Commerce and State and analyzed their regulations, guidance, and 

training. We also met with officials in the Department of Defense—which 

participates in the export control regulatory process—and the Department 

of Homeland Security—which has responsibility for tracking foreign 

students and scholars during their course of study in the United States. We 

visited 13 universities that were systematically selected based on their 

international student populations, export license applications, and federal 

grants and contracts. At the universities, we spoke with officials in such 

positions as vice chancellor for research, director of compliance, and

general counsel, among others. While our selection criteria included a 

range of university experiences with export controls and foreign students 

and scholars, the universities’ views stated in this report do not represent 

the entirety of the U.S. academic community. We also spoke with officials 

from various research institutes and academic associations. Additional 

 3 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Annual Report to Congress on

Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage—2004, NCIX 2005-10006, 

(Washington, D.C.: April 2005).

Page 2 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
details on the scope and methodology of our review can be found in 

appendix I. We conducted our review from March through November 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

According to university officials we interviewed, their institutions focus 

almost exclusively on fundamental research, which is generally not 

subject to export controls. By conducting fundamental research in areas 

such as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and robotics, universities 

can openly share and publish their research findings within a broad 

community that includes international students and scholars. To ensure 

their research remains in the public domain, most university officials said 

they extensively screen and review potential contracts and grants for 

fundamental research to ensure there are no publication or other 

dissemination restrictions. If export controls apply, university officials 

stated they sometimes reject the research contract, involve only students 

and scholars who can conduct the research under license exclusions, or 

refer such work to associated facilities and laboratories located offcampus that can better regulate and control foreign national access to 

such research. The U.S. export control system relies on universities to 

understand and correctly determine when export regulations apply and to

follow the regulations accordingly. To educate themselves on export 

control issues, academic officials take training courses offered through 

Commerce, State, and university associations; search government and 

other Web sites; request guidance from knowledgeable officials at other 

universities; and hire outside legal counsel and expertise on export 

controls. However, the universities we visited indicated that governmentprovided training and guidance on export regulations is limited in 

informing their efforts to manage and protect export-controlled 

information, and it does not clarify when fundamental research exclusions

should apply. 

Results in Brief 

Although State and Commerce provide some guidance and training to 

assist exporters in understanding and complying with export regulations,

these agencies have not fully assessed the potential for transfers of exportcontrolled information to foreign nationals in the course of U.S. university 

research. State and Commerce target their resources to processing license 

applications and provide assistance to exporters through guidance, 

training, and other outreach. However, they rarely coordinate these efforts 

or strategize their outreach on export controls to the academic 

community. Furthermore, officials expressed concerns that universities 

may not correctly interpret and apply export regulations—a concern 

raised by the rarity of export license applications from U.S. academic 

Page 3 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
institutions, considering the large foreign student and scholar populations

studying and conducting research in the United States. However, the 

agencies have not conducted an overall assessment of available data on 

foreign participation in research at U.S. universities to determine whether 

such research would require export protections. For example, U.S. 

government agencies collect data on foreign student nationality, school 

enrollment, and federally-funded research conducted at universities, 

which could supplement information that State and Commerce receive 

from visa application processes and other leads. Furthermore, State and 

Commerce outreach efforts have been largely reactive, and they have only 

recently begun to engage with the affected research community in forums 

to promote dialogue on issues such as fundamental research and its 

relation to export controls. 

To improve their oversight of export-controlled information at 

universities, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Commerce and 

State direct their export control entities to strategically assess potential 

vulnerabilities in the conduct and publication of academic research 

through analyzing available information on technology development and 

foreign student populations at universities. This could help to determine 

the extent to which research at universities may be subject to export 

controls. Furthermore, we recommend that, on the basis of this 

assessment, Commerce and State further coordinate efforts and improve 

guidance and outreach to ensure that universities understand when to 

apply export controls. 

The Department of Commerce generally agreed with our report and 

indicated that it has undertaken efforts to increase its outreach to the 

academic community and plans to further assess vulnerabilities and more 

precisely target outreach and compliance efforts. The Department of State 

agreed with our recommendation to improve interagency coordination on

training and guidance for universities and disagreed with our report’s 

finding that it does not assess the potential vulnerabilities associated with 

export-controlled information at academic institutions. However, we 

maintain that a trend analysis of available data on foreign students and 

scholars and federal contracts for research at academic institutions would 

be a valuable investment in providing a proactive plan for targeting 

outreach and training for the academic community. While State disagreed

with our recommendation, in its response it noted that it is considering 

conducting such an assessment. In addition, the Departments of State and 

Homeland Security provided technical comments that were incorporated 

as appropriate throughout the report. The Department of Defense had no 

comments on this report. 

Page 4 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
In November 2003, GAO reported that university research is a vital part of 

the nation’s research and development efforts, primarily funded by the 

federal government because of the broad consensus that university 

research is a long-term national investment in the future.4

 The federal 

investment in university research has yielded thousands of inventions each 

year that have fostered the development of new technologies, stimulated 

the creation of new jobs, and improved the quality of life. These benefits 

come through open communication among scientists and the sharing of 

research results. A National Academy of Sciences official underscored the 

importance of this issue in September 2005 congressional testimony, 

stating that over 55 percent of the engineering Ph.D. students in the United

States are foreign-born and that their research helps strengthen the United

States in the fastest-moving new technologies, some of which have 

potential defense-related application.5

Background 

Foreign students and scholars bring needed skills to our increasingly 

knowledge-based economy, build bridges to other countries and 

professional communities, and make other valuable contributions to our 

society. These contributions are particularly important for maintaining our 

competitiveness, fostering productivity and innovation, and strengthening 

our workforce. While the United States has long been a global leader in 

higher education and one of the most desired destinations for foreign 

students, international competition for the best and the brightest students 

and scholars is growing. Countries such as China have improved their 

educational capacities, possibly decreasing the incentives for students and 

scholars to study in the United States. The recent slowing of foreign 

student enrollment in United States universities and colleges has raised 

concerns about the extent to which we will be able to continue attracting 

talented foreign students and researchers to our universities and to our 

workforce after they graduate while also maintaining our nation’s security. 

Recognizing the importance of balancing national security interests with 

the need to allow the free exchange of information at U.S. academic 

institutions of higher learning, the federal government is a major funding 

 4

 GAO, University Research: Most Federal Agencies Need to Better Protect against 

Financial Conflicts of Interest, GAO-04-31 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 2003). 

5

House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, 

Border Security, and Claims, Hearing on Sources and Methods of Foreign Nationals 

Engaged in Economic and Military Espionage, Serial No. 109-58, (Washington, D.C., Sept. 

15, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
source for research conducted at U.S. universities and colleges. In fiscal

year 2003, the federal government funded almost two-thirds—

approximately $29.6 billion—of all basic and applied research funding 

provided to universities and colleges by external sources (see fig. 1). Other 

sources of funding come from industry, nonprofit organizations, as well as 

state and local governments. 

Figure 1: Basic and Applied U.S.-Based Research Funding Sources for Universities 

and Colleges in Fiscal Year 2003 

6%

23%

66%

Source: National Science Foundation data, GAO analysis.

Federal government

Industry

Nonprofit

Othera

5%

a

”Other” includes universities, colleges, and state and local governments. 

According to National Science Foundation data for fiscal year 2003, the 

National Institutes of Health of the Department of Health and Human 

Services funded approximately 62 percent (about $14.1 billion) of all 

federally funded science and technology research conducted by 

universities and colleges. Other federal research funding sources identified 

by university officials we spoke with include the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA); the National Science Foundation; various

Department of Defense agencies, including the Navy and the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency; and the Departments of Energy, 

State, and Transportation. This level of government funding was 

consistent with that of several of the universities we visited, where 

Page 6 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
officials stated that their research is primarily funded by government 

grants and contracts, including contracts that are directed toward industry 

and subsequently subcontracted, or “flowed through,” to universities. 

Over the past several decades in which the current export control system 

has been in effect, the global economy has changed significantly. DOD 

continues to seek innovative technologies to meet the needs of warfighters 

and to counter technologies developed by potential U.S. adversaries. To 

achieve these ends, DOD has become more willing to rely on the 

nondefense industry to supply its needs. DOD increasingly relies on 

commercial research, for areas such as information systems and 

telecommunications, where the cutting edge of technological

advancement lies. Such advances in communications technology have 

been made possible to a large extent by basic research, much of which 

was initially developed in universities and often involved foreign students 

and scholars. 

The U.S. export control system relies on the ability of exporters to 

recognize when certain goods and services meet the criteria for requiring 

an export license. The system is primarily divided between two regulatory 

regimes, one managed by the Department of State and another managed 

by the Department of Commerce. The regimes require export licensing for 

defense-related items and information, including data, except where 

exclusions apply. Both regulatory regimes include exclusions applicable in

some circumstances to universities and other academic institutions of 

higher learning. The U.S. export control system places the onus on 

universities and other exporters to understand and comply with the export 

control regulations. 

The Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) 

manages defense items through the International Traffic in Arms 

Regulations (ITAR).6

 State issues export licenses based on the U.S. 

Munitions List, which identifies defense articles, services, and related 

technical data that are controlled for export. Moreover, the regulations 

 6

 The ITAR (22 C.F.R.§§ 120-130) implements the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778). 

The Act authorizes the President to control the export of defense articles and services and

promulgate corresponding regulations, which has been delegated to the Secretary of State

by Executive Order 11958, as amended. The ITAR defines fundamental research to mean 

basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is 

ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished 

from research, the results of which are restricted for proprietary reasons or specific U.S.

government access and dissemination control. 22 C.F.R. sec.120.11 (a)(8). 

Page 7 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
state that unless otherwise expressly exempted or excluded, an export 

license is required for the oral, visual, or documentary transmission of 

technical data by U.S. persons to foreign persons,7

 by such means as inperson or telephone discussions and written correspondence including 

electronic messages, even when they are in the United States. The U.S. 

Munitions List contains 21 categories, covering items such as weapons, 

chemical and biological agents, missiles, and both commercial and military 

satellites. 

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) 

manages dual-use items, having both military and commercial 

applications, through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).8

Under these regulations, exporters are to obtain prior government 

authorization in the form of a license from BIS, or determine that a license 

is not needed, before exporting dual-use items. Commerce requires an 

export license for the release of technology or software source code to a 

foreign national9

 because such a release is deemed to be an export10 to the 

 7

 The ITAR defines a foreign person as any natural person who is not a lawful permanent

resident as defined by 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(20) or who is not a protected individual as

defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). It also means any foreign corporation, business

association, partnership, trust, society, or any other entity or group that is not incorporated 

or organized to do business in the United States, as well as international organizations, 

foreign governments, and any agency or subdivision of foreign governments (e.g.,

diplomatic missions). 

8

 The EAR (15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774) implements the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C.

2401-2420). Although the Act has lapsed, export regulations have been extended through 

executive orders, of which Executive Order 13222 (August 17, 2001) is the most recent. The 

EAR, like National Security Decision Directive 189, defines fundamental research to mean

basic and applied research in science and engineering where the resulting information is 

ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community. Such research

can be distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, 

production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for 

proprietary reasons or specific national security reasons. 15 C.F.R. sec.734.8. 

9

 The EAR defines a foreign national as a person who is not lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence in the United States or a person who is not a protected individual 

under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). 15 C.F.R. sec.734.2 

(b)(2)(ii). 

Page 8 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
home country or countries of the foreign national, even if the person is in 

the United States. Commerce regulates the dual-use items specified in the 

EAR’s Commerce Control List, which are controlled for a variety of 

reasons, including restricting exports that could significantly enhance a 

country’s military potential, preventing exports to countries that sponsor 

terrorism, and limiting the proliferation of chemical, biological, and 

nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The Commerce Control List 

has 10 categories covering items such as electronics, computers, 

telecommunications, and avionics. 

Most of the universities we visited aim to ensure that their research 

remains unrestricted and in the public domain by conducting fundamental 

research, which is generally excluded from export controls. To ensure that 

most of the research conducted on their campuses does not require an

export license, these universities negotiate to exclude any restrictions on 

publishing and disseminating the results of the research they consider to 

be fundamental. For research that may be subject to export control 

regulations, the universities we visited have taken steps to ensure that 

their personnel are informed about and comply with these regulations. 

According to most university officials, their institutions conduct basic and 

applied science and engineering research in a wide variety of areas, 

producing findings that are conducted, shared, and published openly 

within a broad community that includes international students and 

scholars. Table 1 lists examples of research areas conducted at 

universities that we visited. 

Universities Focus on 

Fundamental 

Research to Comply 

with Export 

Regulations 

Universities Focus on 

Conducting Fundamental 

Research 

 10 These transfers are commonly referred to as “deemed” exports. Commerce’s export 

control regulations (15 CFR 734.2(b)(2)(ii)) specifically utilize the term “deemed export” to

describe these transfers. While the ITAR does not use a precise corresponding term, State 

Department officials told us the concept of a “deemed” export is covered under the ITAR’s 

general definition of an export—that is, an export means “disclosing (including oral or

visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign person, whether in the United 

States or abroad” (see 22 C.F.R. Sec. 120.17), and the ITAR’s requirements for the export of 

unclassified technical data, which state “a license is required for the oral, visual or 

documentary disclosure of technical data by U.S. persons to foreign persons...regardless of 

the manner in which the technical data is transmitted (e.g., in person, by telephone, 

correspondence, electronic means, etc.)” (see 22 C.F.R. Sec. 125.2(a) and (c)). State 

officials told us they also refer to these transfers as “deemed exports.” 

Page 9 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Table 1: Examples of Research Areas Conducted at Universities Visited by GAO 

• Artificial intelligence 

• Atmospheric research 

• Biological sciences 

• Chemical engineering 

• Computational science and computer architecture 

• Computer security 

• Integrated circuit design and fabrication 

• Internet communications and advanced networking 

• Nanotechnologies 

• Physics 

• Remote sensing of Earth 

• Robotics 

Source: GAO analysis of universities’ Web sites. 

Most officials we spoke with stated that their universities specifically seek 

out research contracts and grants that do not restrict their ability to 

conduct fundamental research by extensively screening and reviewing the 

terms of potential contracts and grants. If a contract includes restrictions 

on fundamental research, some universities attempt to negotiate the 

restrictive language out of the contract. Some university officials noted 

that such negotiations have become more frequent because government 

and industry contracting officials are increasingly inserting restrictive 

language in contracts for research that universities consider to be 

fundamental. For example, according to university officials, DOD agencies

sometimes insert standard acquisition regulations language that prohibits

the contractor from releasing information, even unclassified information, 

outside of the contractor’s organization.11 According to university officials,

a rule proposed by DOD would have restricted universities from sharing 

information with other academic institutions and publishing research or 

 11Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 252.204-7000 prohibits the contractor from 

releasing any unclassified information to anyone outside of the contractor’s organization 

unless the contracting officer has given prior written approval or the information is

otherwise in the public domain before the date of release. 

Page 10 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
otherwise making such information available in the public domain.12 DOD 

revised the rule to minimize the impact on fundamental research 

conducted at universities and acknowledged that the free exchange of 

ideas is a foundational concept of U.S. research and educational 

institutions.13 Several universities we interviewed stated that if they are

unsuccessful in negotiating the restrictive language out of those research 

contracts they consider to be fundamental, they sometimes reject the 

opportunity to participate in the research. 

For research subject to export control restrictions, universities may 

modify the way the research is conducted to avoid the export license 

application process—a process some officials characterized as timeconsuming and complicated. For example, officials at one university said 

that instead of applying for an export license for one project, they opted to 

use only researchers who are excluded from export license requirements, 

such as U.S. citizens or foreign nationals with permanent residency status. 

In other cases, university officials stated they move export-controlled 

work to off-campus facilities and laboratories administered by the 

universities or the entity sponsoring the contract, where such research can 

be better segregated and controlled. At the six university-administered 

laboratories that we visited, each used access control systems such as 

badges and computer passwords. Such restrictions limiting access to 

information at laboratories are not as common on the main campuses we 

visited, where research information is more openly available.

Efforts Undertaken by 

Universities to Understand 

and Comply with Export 

Control Regulations 

According to a State official, U.S. export control regulations are designed

for “self-compliance.” For the academic community specifically, State 

officials said that it is the universities’ responsibility to conduct due 

diligence to determine whether their research activities are subject to 

export laws, and to identify whether an export license is required for 

foreign nationals within their purview. University officials we spoke with 

 12In 2005, DOD issued a proposed regulation that would have required contract officers to

ensure that contracts identify any export-controlled information and technology and the 

contractor to not allow access by foreign nationals or persons to export-controlled 

information and technology without obtaining an export license, other authorization, or

exemption. According to university associations, they were concerned that application of 

this regulation by contracting officers would not take into consideration whether exportcontrolled information is involved when restricting universities from sharing the results of 

fundamental research. 

13At the time of this report, the revised rule (2004-D010) had not been finalized. 

Page 11 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
have taken actions to become educated on complex export control 

regulations—an undertaking that several officials indicated requires an 

extensive time commitment because the government does not provide 

sufficient guidance. Some universities have also dedicated other resources 

to ensure they comply with U.S. export control laws, such as hiring legal 

counsel. 

To understand export control regulations, universities we visited 

frequently rely on agency training and guidance. Several university 

officials stated that they had attended training seminars sponsored by 

Commerce, as well as conferences sponsored by the Society for 

International Affairs, a nonprofit defense trade industry association that

sponsors events such as conferences and workshops to educate and 

instruct the export community on all aspects of defense and commercial 

exports and technology transfers.14 Most university officials indicated that 

they also accessed Commerce and State Web sites or their respective

telephone help desks. 

However, several university officials indicated that the agency training and 

guidance have limited utility for academic institutions. For example, 

according to some university officials, training provided by Commerce and 

State does not discuss how export regulations apply to universities that 

have fundamental research exclusions. One university official

characterized the Commerce-sponsored session that he attended as being 

“entry level” training directed at the corporate community. Commerce 

officials have acknowledged that about 95 percent of the attendees at their

seminars are repeat attendees, primarily from industry. Some university 

officials stated that the training was too narrowly focused on topics that 

do not pertain to universities. University officials also raised concerns 

with State’s and Commerce’s Web-based guidance. Some university 

officials characterized the Web-based information provided by Commerce 

and State as being unclear or only providing a general introduction to a 

topic without providing sufficient details to fully answer questions 

concerning export controls. For example, a university official stated that 

the Commerce and State Web sites do not identify which forms 

universities need to submit in seeking export licenses to involve foreign

researchers in certain research. Also, although some university officials 

 14 The Society for International Affairs is a volunteer, nonprofit, educational organization 

jointly formed in 1967 by the federal government and industry. Its purpose is to serve as a

forum for the exchange of information—through events such as luncheons, conferences,

and workshops—related to export and import licensing issues. 

Page 12 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
indicated that Commerce and State officials provide very useful 

information via the telephone help desks, they stated that getting 

immediate help was difficult at times and that return messages were 

untimely. 

To further their understanding of export control regulations, several 

universities have sought out other sources of information, specifically

sources tailored to universities. Several university officials indicated that

they rely on best practices by other universities that have shared and 

developed approaches for addressing different export control issues, 

including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, 

and the Universities of Oklahoma and Maryland. For example, officials 

from one university said that they have relied on other universities for 

guidance on applying for export licenses. Universities and academic 

associations exchange best practice information through seminars and 

workshops sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, such as the 

Association of American Universities, the Council on Governmental 

Relations, and the National Council of University Research 

Administrators. 

Many of the universities that we visited have also developed written 

guidance and training to help educate university personnel on their 

responsibility to comply with the export control regulations. For example, 

officials from one university we visited have developed a Web-based 

decision tree to assist university personnel in determining the applicability 

of export controls to their research projects. Officials from another 

university stated that their research institution requires that all staff take 

training—available on the university’s intranet site—related to the 

handling of controlled information. Another university adopted a targeted 

strategy of export control education for its researchers, reaching out to the 

researchers and programs most likely to be affected by export controls, 

such as those in engineering. 

A number of universities we visited have invested in other resources to 

ensure they comply with export control regulations. Some hire outside 

legal counsel who specialize in export controls. For example, one 

university routinely employs outside counsel to mitigate the risk of 

committing violations, because of the severity of the penalties for 

noncompliance.15 According to officials at another university, thousands of 

 15 The EAR and ITAR both impose criminal and civil penalties. 

Page 13 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
dollars are spent each year for legal services addressing export controls. 

Finally, two universities we visited use a software program to help 

determine if a proposed research project grant or contract is subject to 

export license requirements. According to officials at these two 

universities, the software program helps to facilitate a process that is very 

difficult, time-consuming, and costly because of the length and complexity 

of U.S. export control regulations. 

State and Commerce officials indicated that their top priority is processing 

the thousands of license applications received annually—the vast majority 

of which are from industry—leaving few resources for guidance and

outreach to exporters. However, they expressed concerns that universities 

may be misinterpreting their responsibilities under export regulations and 

that the potential may exist for foreign nationals to access sensitive 

information on U.S. campuses. Despite these concerns, neither agency has 

analyzed available information on university research and foreign student

populations to determine the potential risk of the illegal transfer of 

controlled information. 

According to Commerce officials, BIS receives approximately 1,000 

deemed export license applications per year. Officials confirmed that most 

of these applications are received from industry. For example, Commerce 

officials stated that of the 865 deemed export licenses processed by 

Commerce in fiscal year 2006, 99.7 percent were from industry. These 

same officials noted that over the last few years, only two universities 

have submitted deemed export license applications. A 2004 Commerce 

Inspector General report stated that license application data suggest that 

many industries (including chemical and biotechnology industries), 

academic institutions, and federal research facilities that may employ or 

host foreign nationals are not applying for deemed export licenses. 

State and Commerce 

Have Not Assessed 

the Potential Risk to 

Export-Controlled 

Information at 

Universities 

Commerce and State 

Prioritize Processing of 

License Applications and 

Target Their Resources to 

Industry 

State and Commerce officials stated that beyond processing export 

licenses, few resources remain for providing outreach and guidance to the 

export community. While both agencies provide guidance and outreach 

through conferences cosponsored with other organizations and agencysponsored training, much of their outreach is directed at industry, and not 

the academic community. Commerce cosponsors approximately 45 formal 

seminars annually, along with specialty seminars on deemed exports 

ranging from basic to advanced. As its principal training activity, State 

provides speakers for export licensing conferences that are organized by 

the Society for International Affairs and tailored to the needs of industry 

Page 14 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
and government participants. An official acknowledged that State is 

unable to fill all of the speaking requests that it receives, which number in 

the hundreds each year. Instead, State responds to requests based on the 

availability of personnel and travel funds. From January 2004 through June 

2006, State officials approved their personnel to participate in

approximately 135 outreach activities and events. 

Officials at both agencies indicated that their visits to or staffing of 

training seminars for the academic community are often in response to 

specific invitations from universities. A State official who is responsible 

for export outreach reported that since 2003, only one event has been held

that was specifically targeted to the academic community. While State 

policy officials have indicated that they would like to conduct more 

conferences for universities in the future, the official responsible for these 

conferences stated that none are currently scheduled because of limited 

resources. For Commerce, one official has noted that more universities 

have recently begun attending its training seminars. However, while 

Commerce stated it has increased its outreach to universities in the last 

few years, GAO analysis of its outreach records indicated that several 

events that Commerce categorized as targeted at universities were 

provided to government research entities instead.

In addition to conferences and agency-provided training, both State and 

Commerce maintain telephone help desks and Web sites for exporters to 

obtain guidance on export controls. State employs a three-person 

response team to answer telephone inquiries and provide informal advice 

on export control issues in response to the thousands of calls received

monthly from industry and academic institutions. Officials have indicated 

that they have improved help desk response times. Commerce’s and 

State’s Web sites provide exporters with guidance on when a license is 

needed and how a license can be procured. However, information is aimed 

at a more general audience, although a Commerce official stated that the

agency has posted more background information on the fundamental 

research exclusion on its Web site. State officials noted that they have 

made their Web site more user-friendly and taken steps to expand the Web 

site to provide additional guidance to exporters. 

Although State and Commerce have separate export control jurisdictions, 

the 2004 interagency Offices of Inspector General report stated that 

Commerce and State could improve their outreach by providing joint 

Page 15 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
training that explains the differences between the two agencies’ licensing 

requirements and procedures—a recommendation that, according to the 

report, was supported by company and academic officials.16 Furthermore, 

previous GAO reports have recommended that Commerce and State 

should better coordinate their efforts on analysis and export oversight.17

However, State and Commerce have taken few actions to coordinate their 

outreach efforts to universities. Though State engaged in six outreach 

events with Commerce between November 2003 and April 2004, a State 

official explained that staffing such joint events with Commerce remains 

difficult because State must use personnel from its licensing staff to 

participate in these events. With a backlog in license applications, the 

processing of applications is a priority, and the agency is reluctant to 

divert those personnel to outreach efforts. 

Commerce and State Have 

Not Conducted Analysis to 

Identify whether Any Risk 

Exists to ExportControlled Information at 

Universities 

State and Commerce officials expressed concerns that despite the export 

control exclusions for university research, the potential may exist for 

foreign nationals to access controlled defense and dual-use technologies 

and information on U.S. campuses. However, neither State nor Commerce 

has analyzed available data on university research contracts or student 

fields of study to identify any potential risk to export-controlled 

information at universities. According to federal internal control 

standards, agencies need to conduct risk assessments that generally 

include estimating the risk’s significance and likelihood of occurrence, 

deciding how to manage the risk and determining what actions should be 

taken.18

In the absence of an assessment of export control vulnerabilities at 

universities, State officials and a Commerce Inspector General report 

 16 Offices of Inspectors General, Interagency Review of Foreign National Access to 

Export-Controlled Technology in the United States, Report No. D-2004-062 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 16, 2004). 

17 See GAO, Export Controls: Improvements to Commerce’s Dual-Use System Needed to 

Ensure Protection of U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 Environment , GAO-06-638 

(Washington, D.C.: Jun. 26, 2006); GAO, Export Controls: Department of Commerce 

Controls over Transfers of Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement, 

GAO-02-972 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2002); and GAO, Export Controls: Processes for 

Determining Proper Control of Defense-Related Items Need Improvement, GAO-02-996 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2002) 

18GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 16 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
stated they were concerned that academic officials may be misinterpreting 

export control regulations and guidance. According to State officials, 

universities are unaware of the nuances of export control regulations. 

Specifically, they said universities have difficulty distinguishing and 

tracking export regulations when a specific project develops from basic to 

fundamental or applied research. For example, one State official 

questioned whether universities devote sufficient resources to export 

compliance and apply for export licenses with State and Commerce to the 

extent their research activities warrant. This official believes that 

academic institutions should designate individuals responsible for 

understanding export control regulations and tracking exports, just as 

companies do. However, most of the academic institutions we visited had

designated officials who were responsible for export control issues. 

Despite these concerns, Commerce and State have not fully assessed 

university compliance information to identify the potential for export 

control vulnerabilities in university research. Commerce and State are 

tasked with export control oversight, including administering policy, 

processing licenses, and reviewing compliance by exporters. According to

State officials, the department lacks the personnel to conduct extensive 

compliance audits. Instead, State relies on voluntary disclosure of possible 

export control violations—primarily by companies. When a company 

notifies State of a possible export violation, State may visit the company to

discuss the problem and offer advice on weaknesses in the company’s 

export control program. According to State officials, State does not target

universities for compliance and has not visited a university because 

universities make up a small percentage of all exporters. Officials stated 

that Commerce’s formal compliance review program is focused on 

deemed export license holders, the majority of which are from industry. 

Commerce does not conduct analyses to determine whether academic 

institutions that have not applied for licenses are in compliance with 

export control regulations. Instead, Commerce uses leads generated by 

intelligence agencies, internal Commerce sources, or the public via a 

hotline to investigate possible cases of export control violations. 

Furthermore, although Commerce gathers information about certain 

universities’ research activities on case-by-case basis, neither Commerce 

nor State analyzes available federal agency data on university research 

subjects to identify trends or determine the potential for such research to

be subject to export control regulations. Given that much of the research

conducted at U.S. universities is federally funded, data from other 

government agencies on the subjects of research conducted at academic 

institutions could supplement data from Commerce and State. For 

Page 17 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
example, DOD and NASA fund research at universities, some of which 

involves technologies that could become export controlled. General 

information on federal contracts available through the Federal 

Procurement Data System could also provide information on universities 

doing high volumes of research for other federal agencies. However, 

neither Commerce nor State makes use of these data sources to analyze 

trends in university research. Commerce, instead, relies on Internet 

searches or publicly available data on university research when preparing

to meet with academic officials. 

Other data could help Commerce and State identify potential risks of 

export control violations at academic institutions. Commerce officials 

stated that some foreign nationals on U.S. campuses are from countries 

that have historically tried to unlawfully obtain information about 

American technologies. However, while Commerce uses visa application 

data to generate leads for specific cases of deemed export violations, it 

does not use other data on foreign students’ and scholars’ majors or fields 

of study to identify potential areas of risk. For example, the Department of 

Homeland Security administers the Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System—a database that tracks student nationality, school 

enrollment, and changes to major or field of study—but within the past 3 

years neither State nor Commerce has requested these data from 

Homeland Security for the purposes of assessing export control risks. 

While a Commerce official indicated that the department would like to 

work with Homeland Security in the future, there is currently no 

information sharing between the two agencies for the purpose of 

identifying trends in student populations. Similarly, State does not use its 

Visas Mantis program—a security review procedure that aims to identify 

visa applicants who may pose a threat to U.S. national security by illegally

transferring sensitive technology—to identify trends of foreign students 

and scholars and their fields of study, although it occasionally receives 

alerts about individuals who might pose an export control risk. 

To improve controls at universities, in 2005 Commerce solicited 

information on the impact of a proposed rule change that would have

modified the definition of the use of export-controlled equipment by 

foreign nationals, which was recommended by the Commerce Office of 

Page 18 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Inspector General.19 Commerce received more than 300 comments in 

which many cited the potential impact on university research, including 

numerous comments that the modified definition would capture too many 

routine operations carried out by students and employees and would thus 

create a large and generally unnecessary compliance, financial, and 

administrative burden for universities, and an increased licensing burden 

on Commerce. Subsequently, Commerce withdrew the advanced notice of

proposed rule change in May 2006. 

Recently, U.S. export regulatory, oversight, and law enforcement agencies 

have taken some steps to engage the academic community on export 

issues. For example, in September 2006, Commerce established the 

Deemed Export Advisory Committee to address broad export control 

issues. Specifically, the committee’s charter is to review and provide 

recommendations to Commerce on deemed export policy. Thus, this 

committee will be responsible for ensuring that the deemed export 

licensing policy protects national security while ensuring that the United 

States continues to be at the leading edge of technological innovations. Its 

membership includes high-ranking university officials and chief executive 

officers of companies. According to Commerce officials, the committee 

members will serve for approximately one year. Commerce officials stated 

that they plan to address the issue of fundamental research in the 

committee’s work and to include participation by a number of export 

control agencies in committee meetings. Commerce highlighted one such 

issue in a May 2006 Federal Register notice where it described the 

difference between the academic community views that export controls 

would only apply to the results of research, and the Commerce view that 

export controls can also apply to the conduct of research. 

In September 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation established a 

separate forum to improve its lines of communication with the academic 

community. The National Security Higher Education Advisory Board—

consisting of the presidents and chancellors of several prominent U.S. 

universities—aims to foster outreach and to promote understanding 

between higher education and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The 

board will provide insight on the higher education culture of openness, 

academic freedom, and international collaboration and dialogue on issues

such as terrorism, counterintelligence, and homeland security. In addition, 

 19 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Final Inspection Report No. IPE-16176, Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop 

the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S. (Washington, D.C., 

Mar. 31, 2004). 

Page 19 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
the Department of Homeland Security's Project Shield America aims to 

work with exporters of U.S. technologies that could be illegally exported, 

in particular, technologies used in weapons of mass destruction. 

According to a DHS official, the project's first outreach effort specifically

targeting the U.S. academic community was scheduled to be held at the 

beginning of December 2006. 

Balancing the desire to attract gifted foreign research scientists to U.S. 

universities and the need to ensure that export-controlled research at 

universities is not compromised is a considerable challenge. Since 

government agencies place the responsibility for complying with export 

control regulations on universities and other exporting entities, it is 

essential that Commerce and State, the two agencies primarily charged 

with administering export regulations, understand whether universities 

correctly interpret and apply relevant export control policies and 

regulations when deciding whether their research is subject to export 

controls. Despite some concerns that universities may not understand 

their responsibilities when conducting research, Commerce and State have 

not leveraged available government information and assessed potential 

risks of illegal transfers of export-controlled information at universities. 

Furthermore, although Commerce and State have separate export control 

jurisdictions, the lack of coordination between these agencies on 

outreach, analysis, and oversight could hamper their ability to determine 

whether export-controlled information may be at risk of transfer to foreign 

nationals in the course of university research. Without such knowledge, 

the government agencies cannot determine whether their guidance and 

training for universities is appropriate and sufficient and whether their 

resources are strategically targeted to optimize their ability to regulate and 

monitor universities’ research. Until Commerce and State take such steps,

sensitive information may remain vulnerable to improper transfer, 

potentially putting at risk U.S. national security interests. 

To improve the Department of Commerce’s oversight of export-controlled 

information under its jurisdiction at universities, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of the Bureau of Industry 

and Security to 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Actions 

• strategically assess potential vulnerabilities in the conduct and 

publication of academic research by becoming more knowledgeable 

about research being conducted on university campuses and, in 

consultation with other agencies, make use of available information on 

Page 20 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
technology development and foreign student populations at 

universities to assess the extent to which research at universities may 

be subject to export controls and 

• on the basis of this assessment of university research and foreign 

student populations, improve interagency coordination, conduct 

additional outreach, and improve guidance to ensure that universities 

understand when to apply export controls. 

To improve the Department of State’s oversight of export-controlled 

information under its jurisdiction at universities, we recommend that the 

Secretary of State direct the Director of the Directorate of Defense Trade 

Controls to 

• strategically assess potential vulnerabilities in the conduct and 

publication of academic research by becoming more knowledgeable 

about research being conducted on university campuses and, in 

consultation with other agencies, make use of available information on 

technology development and foreign student populations at 

universities to assess the extent to which research at universities may 

be subject to export controls and 

• on the basis of this assessment of university research and foreign 

student populations, improve interagency coordination, conduct 

additional outreach, and improve guidance to ensure that universities 

understand when to apply export controls. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce, 

Defense, Homeland Security, and State for their review and comment. 

Commerce and State provided written comments, which are reprinted in 

appendixes II and III, respectively.20 Defense did not have any comments 

on our draft report. Homeland Security provided technical comments, 

which are incorporated as appropriate throughout the report.

Agency Comments 

and our Evaluation 

The Department of Commerce generally agreed with the report’s 

recommendations, and stated that the Deemed Export Advisory 

 20 Commerce’s response letter also included comments on our draft report on export

controlled information, Export Controls: Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities and

Improve Guidance for Protecting Export-Controlled Information at Companies, 

GAO-07-69 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2006). 

Page 21 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Committee will aid in this respect. However, Commerce stated that 

Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) data are too

general for use in identifying whether foreign students and scholars are 

subject to deemed export license requirements and that the collection of 

more specific visa application information is needed to assess 

vulnerabilities. While we agree that additional information from the visa 

application process could be useful, we found that SEVIS data include 

information that State and Commerce could use to perform general trend 

analysis to determine where best to focus outreach and compliance efforts 

at the university level. For example, an analysis of the majors that foreign 

students and scholars are pursuing at universities with large federal 

research contracts could provide Commerce and State with a proactive 

plan for targeting their outreach and training efforts for the academic 

community. Furthermore, while Commerce states that about one-third of

its outreach events focus on the academic community, as our report 

states, we found that several of the events that Commerce classified as 

academic outreach were actually targeted at government research entities. 

Finally, Commerce correctly notes that our report focuses on fundamental 

research or other research that may be subject to export controls while 

excluding other research that falls outside of the export control universe. 

We identified the application of the fundamental research exclusion as a 

significant issue between the academic community and Commerce, and as 

Commerce’s letter notes, some universities could benefit from a better 

understanding of deemed export control requirements. Our report 

indicates that an assessment of the vulnerabilities will best allow 

Commerce to focus its outreach and training efforts toward addressing 

this issue with the academic community. 

State agreed with our recommendation to improve interagency 

coordination on training and guidance for universities and disagreed with 

our report’s finding that it does not assess the potential vulnerabilities 

associated with export-controlled information at academic institutions. 

State responded that it is currently working with the Department of 

Commerce and the Department of the Treasury to conduct an export 

control conference during 2007 specifically aimed at universities. As we 

recommended in our report, such outreach that is specifically targeted to

the academic community, particularly in coordination with other agencies, 

could improve universities’ understanding of regulations concerning 

export controlled information. However, while such outreach may help 

universities seeking guidance on deemed export regulations, State would 

benefit from strategically assessing vulnerabilities at universities using 

readily available data, such as SEVIS, to help the department identify and

address areas of potential risk. While State disagreed with our 

Page 22 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
recommendation, in its response it noted that it is considering conducting

such an assessment. A trend analysis conducted on SEVIS and federal 

procurement data would be a valuable investment in providing a proactive 

plan for targeting outreach and training for universities. State also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated throughout the 

report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees and to the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense,

the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of State. Copies will 

be made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-7333. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in

appendix IV.

Sincerely, 

John Hutton, Acting Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 23 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To describe the nature of the research conducted at universities and 

identify the steps they have taken to comply with government export 

control regulations, we interviewed and obtained documentation from 

officials at 13 universities in positions such as vice chancellor for research, 

director of compliance, and general counsel. We conducted our review at 

the following 13 universities: Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts; 

California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California; Carnegie Mellon 

University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Colorado State University, Fort 

Collins, Colorado; George Washington University, Washington, D.C.; Johns 

Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland; Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, Cambridge and Lexington, Massachusetts; Stanford 

University, Stanford, California; University of California at Berkeley; 

University of California at Los Angeles; University of Colorado at Boulder;

University of Maryland at College Park; and the University of Southern 

California, Los Angeles, California. To get a general overview of the nature

of research at universities, we also spoke by telephone with officials from 

the Association of American Universities, Association of University 

Technology Managers, National Council of University Research 

Administrators, and the Southwest Research Institute. To systematically 

select the universities that we visited, we cross-tabulated data on 

universities with large numbers of international students or scholars, those 

that are associated with federally funded research centers, those that had

applied for International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export 

Administration Regulations export licenses, and those that had high-dollar

contracts with either the Department of Defense or other government 

entities. While some of the selected academic institutions fall within the 

top tiers across the selection criteria, their views stated in this report do 

not represent those of the entirety of the U.S. academic community. 

To assess Commerce’s and State’s efforts to determine the risk of export 

violations in university research, we interviewed officials from the Bureau 

of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and its related 

export offices: National Security and Technology Transfer Controls, 

Exporter Services, Export Administration, Export Enforcement. We also 

interviewed officials in the Department of Commerce’s Offices of General 

Counsel and Inspector General. At the Department of State, we 

interviewed officials and reviewed data from the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs’ Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, the Bureaus of 

Consular Affairs and International Security and Nonproliferation, and the 

Office of the Inspector General. We obtained and analyzed regulations, 

guidance, and training documents from these departments. We also 

collected data and other documentation and met with officials from the 

Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy of the Department 

Page 24 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration Policy 

Directorate and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

We conducted our work from March 2006 through November 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 25 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 26 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce 

Page 27 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of State 

Department of State 

Page 28 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 29 GAO-07-70 Export Controls
A

A

ppendix IV: Staff Contact and

cknowledgments 

Page 30 GAO-07-70

Appendix IV: Staff Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact John P. Hutton (202) 512-7773 

John Neumann, Sharron Candon, Gregory Harmon, Arturo Holguin, Angela 

Thomas, and Sandra Moore made key contributions to this report. Other 

key contributors include Marie Ahearn and Karen Sloan. 

Export Controls

Acknowledgments 

(120508) 
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