466

Guardsmen on the Gulf Coast

Clarence Williams/Iris Photocollective photo
467

Chapter 26

Military Operations

Background: Military Support to Civil Authorities

The National Guard generally constitutes the fi rst military support provided to civil 

authorities for domestic disaster relief. If civilian fi rst responders and the National 

Guard cannot adequately respond, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be asked 

to deploy active-duty forces.

The Statutes and Role of the National Guard in Emergency Response 

National Guard units conduct operations in one of three modes: (1) under control of 

their governor as commander-in-chief, on state active-duty status, with the state paying 

salaries and expenses; (2) under gubernatorial control, but operating under Title 32 of the 

U.S. Code, with the federal government paying mission costs;1

 or (3) under control of the 

President, having been federalized under provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.2

 While 

governor-controlled, National Guard units may perform law-enforcement missions.3

 When 

federalized under Title 10, however, National Guard units, like regular federal forces, are 

generally prohibited from enforcing laws.4

National Guard missions performed in state active-duty status include assisting in response 

to natural disasters such as hurricanes and other storms, and fi res and fl oods which have 

not been declared federal disasters. Governors routinely use their states’ National Guards 

for disaster-relief missions when local fi rst responders are overwhelmed.5

Th e DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, dated June 2005, says local 

National Guard units are particularly well-suited for civil-support missions: Th ey (1) are 

“forward deployed” in about 3,200 communities across the United States, (2) are readily 

available for use in either state active-duty status or Title 32 status, (3) routinely exercise 

with state and local fi rst responders, and (4) have experience mobilizing for local disasterrelief missions.6

Th e National Response Plan (NRP) guides federal-agency emergency response and recognizes the role of governors in a federal system for the public safety and welfare of their 

states’ people by coordinating state resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from a variety of man-made or natural disasters. Moreover, the Plan recognizes the 

governor’s constitutional role as the commander-in-chief of the state’s military forces – the 

National Guard – when in state active-duty or Title 32 status.7

Emergency Management Assistance Compact Provides a Framework for 

Interstate Mutual Aid

Th e Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement that 

provides a framework for interstate mutual aid using the National Guard. Th e National 

Emergency Management Association, an association of state emergency managers, administers EMAC8

 and has developed a nine-step process for mutual aid.9 In addition to the 

EMAC process, some state-to-state mutual-aid agreements also exist for providing lawenforcement and other assistance in a crisis.10 States that receive assistance requests under 

EMAC are not obligated to send their National Guard units to aff ected states. In addition to 

the emergency managers’ and state-to-state processes, the National Guard Bureau developed a 20-step process to deploy National Guard units in response to Hurricane Katrina 

under EMAC.11
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468

DOD Has a Supporting Role Under a Key Presidential Directive and the 

National Response Plan

DOD has a key supporting role under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD5) dated February 28, 2003,12 and the NRP.13 Th e Presidential Directive specifi es that DOD 

will provide military assistance to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by 

the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. Th e Directive also clearly states that the Secretary of Defense shall 

retain command of military forces when such forces are providing civil support. Finally, the 

Directive also requires DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish 

“appropriate” relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between the 

two Departments.14

DOD responds to a domestic disaster within the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS), which provides a framework to integrate disaster response at all levels of government and the private sector. To coordinate its participation in the system, DOD has 

provided certain specialized training to military offi cers, known as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cers, usually at the rank equivalent of Army colonel or Navy captain.15 Th e 

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cers deploy to national or regional incident-command 

centers such as the Homeland Security Operations Center to coordinate the DOD response 

to the event. To manage DOD’s assistance as directed by HSPD-5, DOD has also provided 

specialized training to another cadre of colonels known as Defense Coordinating Offi cers 

(DCO).16 Th ese offi cers generally deploy to the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) or other incidentcommand centers to process urgent requests for DOD assistance needed to assist civil 

authorities in responding to the immediate needs of the situation.17 DOD also provides a 

deployable support staff to the DCO, known as the Defense Coordinating Element, consisting of three to 30 service members or DOD civilians, depending on the nature and scope of 

the incident.18 DOD may also provide military offi cers to augment the staff of the Principal 

Federal Offi cer (PFO), the designee of the Secretary of Homeland Security in executing the 

federal disaster response.19 Finally, DOD has permitted FEMA, the Coast Guard, and other 

agencies to maintain a permanent presence at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 

the DOD Combatant Command for the North American area of operations.20 DOD may 

also provide augmentation to the FEMA offi ce at NORTHCOM in a large-scale disaster.21

Th e NRP establishes a key support role for DOD in assisting the federal agency that leads 

the federal disaster response. Th e NRP points out that the Secretary of Defense authorizes 

defense support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President, or 

when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the 

law – virtually the same language as that used in HSPD-5. Similarly, as with the Directive, 

the NRP specifi es that the Secretary of Defense retains control over military forces at all 

times during its assistance to civil authorities, as specifi ed in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.22

In addition to assigning DOD a general role to support civil authorities, the NRP identifi es 

DOD as a supporting agency to the lead agency in all 15 of the NRP’s Emergency Support 

Functions (ESF), refl ecting the fact that DOD has unique resources and capabilities to provide humanitarian relief in a catastrophe. It also identifi es DOD’s Army Corps of Engineers 

as a co-primary agency for ESF-3, Public Works and Engineering.23 Th e table below provides additional information on DOD’s assigned roles under the ESFs.
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469

Emergency 

Support Function DOD’s Specifi c Role

1. Transportation Provides military liaison to ESF-1 desk and military transportation to move resources, 

and assists in contracting for civilian aircraft.24

2. Communications Uses own resources to provide own communications and coordinates numerous other 

communication issues with the Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator.25

3. Public Works and 

Engineering

Army Corps of Engineers provides technical assistance, engineering, and construction 

management.26

4. Firefi ghting Conducts fi refi ghting on DOD installations and assists other lead agencies for fi refi ghting on non-DOD land.27

5. Emergency 

Management Annex No specifi c role identifi ed.28

6. Mass Care, Housing, 

and Human Services

Army Corps of Engineers provides ice and water; inspects shelter sites for suitability; 

and assists in construction of temporary shelters and temporary housing repair.29

7. Resource Support No specifi c role identifi ed.30

8. Public Health and 

Medical Services

Transports patients to medical care facilities; assists with mortuary services; procures 

and transports medical supplies; and provides DOD medical supplies, blood products, 

medical personnel, laboratory services, and logistics support.31

9. Urban Search 

and Rescue

When requested, serves as a primary source for rotary and fi xed-wing aircraft to support urban search-and-rescue operations; and Army Corps of Engineers provides (1) 

certain training and structural integrity analysis, (2) assessments of whether buildings 

are safe to enter, (3) building stability monitoring, and (4) other services.32

10. Oil and Hazardous 

Materials Response

Provides the federal on-scene coordinator and directs response actions for releases 

of hazardous materials from its vessels, facilities, vehicles, munitions, and weapons; 

and Army Corps of Engineers provides response and recovery assistance involving 

radiological dispersion devices and improvised nuclear devices.33

11. Agriculture and 

Natural Resources

Assesses (1) the availability of DOD food supplies and storage facilities, (2) transportation equipment at posts near the affected area, and (3) laboratory, diagnostic, and 

technical assistance; and assists in animal emergency response; develops appropriate 

plans; and the Army Corps of Engineers provides expertise and resources to assist in 

removal and disposal of debris and animal carcasses.34

12. Energy Coordinates emergency power team missions with power restoration activities and 

provides appropriate support.35

13. Public Safety and 

Security

If directed by the President, quells insurrection and provides physical and electronic 

security-systems assistance and expertise.36

14. Long Term 

Community Recovery 

and Mitigation

Provides technical assistance in community planning, civil engineering, and natural 

hazard risk assessment and supports national strategy development for housing, 

debris removal, and restoration of public facilities and infrastructure.37

15. External Affairs No specifi c role identifi ed other than to provide support as required.38

Applicable Statutes Provide DOD the Authorities to Deploy Forces

Various statutes govern DOD participation in emergency management. Th ese statutes 

establish pre-disaster and disaster-response reimbursement procedures, authorize the use 
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470

of military forces to put down insurrection, and generally prohibit the use of military forces 

for law-enforcement purposes except to put down insurrection and in certain other limited 

circumstances. 

Economy Act

Th e Economy Act permits federal agencies to provide goods or services to another federal 

agency when such support is requested. Such assistance will not necessarily be related to 

disaster response.39

Stafford Act

Th e Staff ord Act is the primary statute governing DOD and other federal agency disaster 

assistance under the NRP. Staff ord Act reimbursements are authorized once a governor has 

asserted that state capabilities are overwhelmed and federal assistance is needed, and the 

President has declared an emergency.40

Insurrection Act

Th e Insurrection Act authorizes the President to use military force to suppress an insurrection or end other domestic violence. Specifi cally, the President may employ military forces 

to restore order, prevent looting, and engage in other law-enforcement activities.41

Posse Comitatus Act

Th e federal Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the use of the Army and the Air Force 

(originally part of the Army) to execute the laws of the United States except where authorized 

by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress enacted the law to restrict the use of federal troops in the conduct of law enforcement in the South during Reconstruction.42 Federal 

courts have interpreted the Act to prohibit the use of troops in an active role of direct civilian 

law enforcement including search, seizure, and arrest. DOD has issued policy guidance extending the Posse Comitatus Act’s restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corps. Th e Act does 

not apply to the National Guard when under the direct command of a state’s governor.43

Congress has created a number of specifi c exceptions to the general restrictions in the 

Posse Comitatus Act to authorize DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a number of 

circumstances to 

• assist with drug interdiction and other law-enforcement functions, 

• protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection,

• assist the U.S. Secret Service,

• protect nuclear materials and assist in solving crimes involving nuclear material, 

• assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and 

• assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws.44

Title 10

Title 10 of the U.S. Code establishes the armed services; defi nes their organization, missions, 

and general military powers; specifi es personnel limits; defi nes training and education requirements and organizations; and specifi es service, supply, and procurement roles. Generally, under Title 10, the military departments defi ne training requirements, and design and 

implement the training.45 Certain military commanders have interpreted this to mean that 

such training can include the deployment of forces from their home installation to another 

installation, which, coincidentally, also may position them for use in an upcoming mission 

in the same area.46 In eff ect, this positions these commanders and forces closer to a disaster 

area before receiving a request for assistance, thus making them more immediately available 

to address immediate disaster relief needs.
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471

Other Authorities

Under DOD doctrine, local commanders have the authority to unilaterally act to prevent 

immediate threats to life and property if it is not feasible to obtain prior approval from higher 

military authorities. At the same time, DOD directives require an oral civilian request before 

exercising this authority, except during a civil disturbance. DOD would be unlikely to obtain 

reimbursements for assistance rendered under the immediate-response authority.47

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) Prepares for and Guides 

DOD’s Domestic Missions

Th e Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) is principally responsible for the 

overall supervision of Homeland Defense activities in DOD. Th e Assistant Secretary is to 

develop policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, make recommendations on homeland 

defense, and provide support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness, and domestic 

crisis management in DOD. Th e Assistant Secretary is also to assist the Secretary of Defense 

in providing policy direction to NORTHCOM, and other combatant commands, when 

appropriate, to guide development and execution of these commands’ plans and activities. 

Lastly, the Assistant Secretary is also the DOD domestic crisis manager and represents the 

Department on Homeland Defense and support to civil authorities matters with the lead 

federal agency,48oft en DHS.49

DOD’s Guidance and Key Strategy Documents Lay Out the Department’s 

Views of Its Mission

DOD’s guidance and Quadrennial Defense Review make clear that domestic natural-disaster response is not within the Department’s primary mission set and will only be undertaken when forces are available, or if directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Moreover, under the NRP, and consistent with departmental guidance, DOD provides support 

to the lead federal agency in responding to domestic natural disasters, but is not considered, 

and does not consider itself, to be a lead responder.50

DOD Directives Guide the Department’s Domestic Disaster Response

DOD has issued a set of directives and related documents that together establish DOD policy for military assistance to civilian authorities. Th e fi rst is DOD Directive 3025.1, Military 

Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), which requires DOD components to provide support 

requested by civil authorities once properly approved by the designated DOD approval authorities. Th e Directive is premised on the notion that DOD support is only to be provided 

if civil response capabilities are overwhelmed, as determined by FEMA. It also states that 

DOD’s military operations other than military assistance to civil authorities have priority unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. Th e Directive states that DOD 

components may not procure or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively 

for civil emergencies unless directed by the Secretary of Defense. Lastly, it also states that 

military forces will remain under the control of DOD at all times.51

Ordinarily, FEMA tasks DOD to perform a mission by sending DOD a “mission assignment.” However, DOD takes the view that among federal agencies, it is unique in that under 

the Constitution and under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, there is a military chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander. Th e 

NRP specifi es that the Secretary of Defense retains control over military forces at all times 

during its assistance to civil authorities, as specifi ed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code.52 Under 

“existing authorities and as a matter of policy,” DOD takes the position that “placing a 

FEMA offi cial or a DHS offi cial in command outside the Department of Defense within the 

military chain of command violates Goldwater-Nichols and is a bad idea.”53 DOD therefore 

interprets a “mission assignment” as a “request for assistance.”
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472

DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, was issued on February 

18, 1997, and specifi es the mechanisms that DOD’s designated approval authorities will use 

to evaluate whether or not support should be provided to civil authorities. Th e Directive 

establishes the following six criteria against which requests are to be evaluated, usually by 

DOD’s Offi ce of the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), which also determines 

what capability DOD has available to meet the request:54

• legality (compliance with laws),

• lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),

• risk (safety of DOD forces),

• cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),

• appropriateness (if it is in DOD’s interest to conduct the requested mission), and 

• readiness (DOD’s ability to perform its mission).55

Th e JDOMS makes a recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether 

to approve the request.56 Th e Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) reviews the request for consistency with policy.57

DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), governs 

DOD’s response to requests from federal, state, or local governments’ law enforcement 

agencies to assist with civil disturbances. Th e Directive requires a specifi c Presidential order 

before the military can deploy on such a mission, except that DOD commanders may act 

unilaterally in the case of unexpected disasters including an earthquake, fi re, or fl ood; if life 

is endangered; or if local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances 

preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President.58

All three Directives are actually out of date, as the mentioned DOD components no longer 

have the responsibilities identifi ed in the Directives or no longer even exist. For example, 

they specify that the Department of the Army is the DOD’s executive agent for military 

support to civil authorities.59 In fact, the JDOMS performed that function at the time of the 

Committee’s investigation.60 Directive 3025.1 designates the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. 

Atlantic Command as the planning agent for military support missions,61 although that 

command was re-designated in October 1999.62 Conversely, the Directives make no mention of U.S. Northern Command, even though that command began operations on October 

1, 2002, to carry out the types of domestic missions contemplated in the Directives.63

DOD Differs Critically From Other Agencies

DOD’s mission is to deter foreign aggression against the United States and to fi ght and win 

the nation’s wars if deterrence fails. Th e Quadrennial Defense Review released in February 

2006 addressed the use of military forces in domestic disaster-relief eff orts. It pointed out 

that the ability of military forces to mitigate the eff ects of an attack on the homeland may 

also be useful for disaster-relief operations.64

While DOD’s mission is clearly focused on overseas operations as documented in the 

defense strategy, the June 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review identifi es fi ve key strategic 

objectives to support civil authorities:

• achieve maximum awareness of potential threats,

• deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a safe distance,

• achieve mission assurance to ensure that DOD can continue to operate aft er 

an attack,
Military Operations

473

• support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from 

domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 

mass-casualty attacks, and

• improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and 

homeland security.65

While some active-duty and National Guard units are designed and structured to deploy 

rapidly as part of their military missions, the Department of Defense is not organized, 

funded or structured to act as a fi rst responder for all domestic catastrophic disasters.66

The Military Departments Prepare the Forces but the Joint Community Generally 

Employs Them 

In accordance with Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and 

Navy organize, train, and equip the force, among other things.67 To organize the force, the 

military Departments establish such organizational structures as brigades, divisions, air 

wings, battle groups, air/ground task forces, and other confi gurations needed to facilitate 

accomplishment of the mission. In addition, the Departments identify, develop, and deliver 

training deemed appropriate to prepare the forces for their mission. Lastly, the Departments develop and acquire the weapons systems, equipment, and supplies needed by the 

forces to successfully carry out their missions.68

While the military departments organize, train, and equip the force, the combatant commands generally execute the missions.69 DOD’s unifi ed-command plan establishes fi ve 

geographically based combatant commands that are responsible for conducting operations in 

their individual areas of operations.70 NORTHCOM is based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

and is responsible for conducting military operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, 

Cuba, certain Caribbean islands, and in the sea and air approaches to the United States.71

NORTHCOM’s specifi c mission is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat 

threats and aggression aimed at the United States within assigned areas of operations and, 

when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to provide defense support for civil 

authorities.72 NORTHCOM’s mission statement clearly indicates that the command only 

provides support to civil authorities if directed to do so, or the proposed mission is consistent with DOD’s directives and other documents that specify the circumstances under 

which DOD conducts civil support.73

NORTHCOM consists of the command headquarters, certain small deployable headquarters units, and certain non-deployable headquarters organizations that would coordinate 

operations within defi ned geographic locations, such as the National Capital Region and 

Alaska.74 NORTHCOM generally executes its assigned missions through Joint Task Forces 

which are established to carry out specifi c missions. NORTHCOM has a small number of 

forces assigned to its headquarters and subsidiary units.75

Status of Plans for Support to Civil Authorities

Th e Committee not know how eff ectively NORTHCOM planned for its role in Defense Support to Civil Authorities in a disaster response, nor is it clear if that planning is fi nished. At 

the Committee’s hearing on February 9, 2006, the Commander of NORTHCOM, Admiral 

Timothy Keating, testifi ed that Concept Plan 2501 (CONPLAN 2501) was “a comprehensive 

approach to providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities” and was “ready to be approved 

by the Secretary and it is on our shelf.”76 DOD defi nes a CONPLAN as “An operation plan 

in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an [operation plan] or [operation order]. A CONPLAN contains the combatant 

commander’s strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the 
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474

combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are 

not calculated.”77 Although DOD states, “Th e fact that CONPLAN 2501 was still in draft 

had no impact on the speed and effi ciency of NORTHCOM’s response,” the Committee 

has been unable to evaluate this assertion because, despite repeated requests, DOD has not 

provided the CONPLAN to the Committee. DOD has stated, “We cannot release the Draft 

USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501. It is still deliberative and pre-decisional.78

DOD Issues Execute Orders to Direct Missions and Augments Northern Command 

With Additional Forces When Needed

DOD directs that assigned commands undertake missions when ordered to do so via 

certain mission orders including “Execute Orders.” Th e Execute Order will be sent to 

commands assigned to missions and may include a variety of relevant information, including the provision of (1) intelligence or situational reports, (2) concepts of operations to be 

implemented, (3) procedures to be followed if assisting another lead federal agency, such as 

FEMA, (4) instructions in reporting on mission progress, and (5) mission-reimbursement 

information if appropriate.79

When given a mission via such an order, NORTHCOM submits a “request for forces” to 

the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, will assign appropriate forces for the duration of the 

mission. Forces temporarily assigned to Northern Command can be pulled from anywhere 

in the force structure, but generally consist of forces based in the United States which are 

not already deployed on another mission. DOD’s Joint Forces Command issues an order 

transferring operational control of those forces from their current command to NORTHCOM for the duration of the mission.80

Defense Coordinating Offi cers and Elements Are Often DOD’s First Deployers 

for Civil Support

Once DOD approves a request to provide defense support to civil authorities, it usually 

deploys the Defense Coordinating Offi ce (DCO) and Defense Coordinating Element to the 

Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) used to manage the federal response. Th e DCO serves as the single 

point of contact for requests to DOD originating at the JFO. (Other requests for DOD assistance may originate at such national response locations as the Homeland Security Operations Center.) Th e NRP identifi es the DCO’s position and describes its responsibilities.81

Th e offi cer may also assign liaison offi cers to the JFO-based ESFs and refer contentious issues to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) for resolution.82

U.S. Department of Defense Response

Introduction

[Th e] movement of 72,000 men and women in military uniform within the 

United States is the largest deployment of military capability within our country since the Civil War. Th e scope and speed of ... our DOD Katrina response, 

was the largest, fastest civil support mission in our nation’s history.83

– Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

When we got off the airplane, General [Russel] Honoré [Commander, Joint 

Task Force Katrina] picked me up about 30 minutes later. He fl ew in by his 

helicopter, grabbed me and said, okay, I’m going to go orient you to your mission ... your job is to fi x the airport and fi x New Orleans.84

– Major General William Caldwell, U.S. Army, Commander, 82nd Airborne Division
Military Operations

475

In general, DOD’s response to Hurricane Katrina can be divided into three phases. In the 

fi rst two phases – before landfall and immediately aft er landfall – DOD responded in accordance within its traditional posture under the NRP to provide assistance to civil authorities only aft er requested. However, as the DOD leadership recognized the potentially 

catastrophic nature of the disaster on Tuesday morning, August 30, 2005, DOD’s approach 

shift ed from this reactive approach to a forward-looking posture, including the mobilization 

of signifi cant assets that DOD commanders anticipated might be needed for the response. 

Th is third phase represented a departure from DOD’s traditional practice and enabled DOD 

to respond to requests for assistance in a timely manner. 

During the fi rst phase of DOD’s response, in the week prior to landfall, DOD began to plan 

and prepare for the deployment of forces to provide support that might be requested by 

FEMA. DOD identifi ed commodities that could be provided to FEMA, and led and participated in interagency teleconferences.85 In addition, DOD deployed DCOs to Louisiana 

and Mississippi and identifi ed military installations that would be available for FEMA use 

as staging bases. Although individual commanders exercised their own initiative to prepare, identify, and alert troops as a result of the forecasted magnitude of Katrina, and had 

expedited certain procedures, these actions were not coordinated by senior leaders of the 

Department. For the most part, DOD’s actions were consistent with the type of pre-hurricane activities it had undertaken in the past. One of the lessons from Katrina is that these 

procedures are inadequate for a catastrophic incident. 

Th e second phase occurred during and immediately aft er landfall. In this phase, DOD lacked 

any signifi cant information regarding the extent of the storm’s devastation. DOD offi cials 

relied primarily on media reports for their information. Many senior DOD offi cials did not 

learn that the levees had breached until Tuesday; some did not learn until Wednesday. As 

DOD waited for DHS to provide information about the scope of the damage, it also waited 

for the lead federal agency, FEMA, to identify the support needed from DOD. Although 

DOD continued to identify and prepare assets for potential deployments, for the most part 

DOD’s actions during this phase were again consistent with its traditional posture under the 

NRP to be prepared to respond to requests, rather than actually begin responding on its own 

initiative. DOD’s approach during this phase continued to be deliberative. Th e lack of situational awareness during this phase appears to have been a major reason for DOD’s belated 

adoption of the forward-looking posture necessary in a catastrophic incident.

By Tuesday morning, however, DOD leadership began to recognize that the scope of the 

disaster may have been catastrophic, and that an expedited DOD response likely would be 

necessary. In addition, there was a growing frustration within DOD over the lack of requests for assistance from FEMA. On Tuesday morning the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

informed the commander of NORTHCOM that he had a “blank check” for any DOD 

resources that he believed were reasonably necessary for the Katrina response. Th e Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the chiefs of the various services to begin deploying 

forces they believed might be needed for the response. Th is third phase of the response represented the type of approach that may be necessary in a catastrophic incident: anticipating 

requests and deploying assets in advance of requests. 

DOD’s shift in approach during this third phase enabled DOD to quickly respond to FEMA’s 

mission requests; in a number of instances DOD “response” began before FEMA submitted 

the request. FEMA offi cials stated that although in the past they had found DOD’s process 

cumbersome, during Katrina they felt DOD responded quickly and eff ectively to FEMA’s 

requests. In a number of critical instances, DOD off ered its assets and support to FEMA and 

DHS; in these instances, too, DOD support was deemed eff ective. 
Chapter 26

476

Th e third phase, however, revealed a critical need for improvement in military planning and 

preparation for catastrophic incidents, as well as the need to better integrate the military response into the overall response. In addition to DOD’s being tasked by FEMA to provide support, the State of Louisiana asked both the National Guard and DOD to provide large numbers 

of ground troops. Th e resulting movement of 50,000 National Guard and 22,000 active-duty 

troops in response to Katrina was the largest deployment of military capability within the United States since the Civil War. Th e National Guard and active-duty military response provided 

critical humanitarian relief that saved lives and eased the suff ering of thousands. 

Many of the state and federal requests for military support, however, lacked adequate specifi city. Th e responses to the requests for military support oft en were poorly coordinated with 

each other, if at all. Th e deployments of the National Guard troops were not well coordinated 

with the active-duty forces. One result was that local, state, and federal offi cials had diff ering 

perceptions of the numbers of federal troops that would be arriving, the missions they would 

be performing, who was in command of the military forces, and who should be in command. 

Discussion

Severe Weather Execute Order

On August 19, one week prior to Hurricane Katrina’s initial landfall on the Atlantic coast of 

Florida, the Secretary of Defense delegated to NORTHCOM the authority to deploy certain 

DOD assets as necessary to prepare for a hurricane. NORTHCOM holds responsibility for 

command and control over military operations conducted in defense of the continental 

United States, and in support of civil authorities, responding directly to the Secretary of Defense. Previously, all authority to deploy any such DOD assets had rested exclusively with the 

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff , who serve as the uniformed advisors to 

the Secretary. However, recognizing that 2005 was forecast to be “a well above-average hurricane season” with “an above-average probability of a major hurricane landfall in the United 

States,” the Secretary and the Joint Staff wanted to provide additional fl exibility in advance of 

the hurricane season, and on Friday, August 19, issued the “Severe Weather Execute Order.”86

Th e order authorized the commander of NORTHCOM to “provide support to FEMA for 

planning and conducting disaster response operations in aff ected areas” for the duration of 

the 2005 hurricane season. Th is order granted approval for NORTHCOM to take two actions prior to a hurricane’s landfall:

1. NORTHCOM was able to deploy DCOs and their staff s. Under the NRP, 

DCOs serve as DOD representatives to the JFO – the locally established operations center where federal, state, and local offi cials coordinate response activities. Th e DCO processes requests for military assistance, and ordinarily serves 

as the local commander of supporting military forces.87

2. NORTHCOM was able to designate military installations for other uses, 

such as operational staging areas where FEMA could store commodities in 

preparation for distribution, or for ports.

Colonel Darryl Roberson, the Assistant Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Antiterrorism 

and Homeland Defense, told the Committee: “It was unprecedented to allow NORTHCOM 

commander to move those kinds of assets in the [continental United States] without the 

[Secretary of Defense] being specifi cally notifi ed on each occasion. So it was a big deal, and 

it proved to be very helpful, and allowed us to respond in a much quicker fashion than 

would normally have been the case last year.”88
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Colonel Don Harrington, the permanent National Guard/DOD Liaison to FEMA, who helped 

develop the order aft er serving in that capacity through the hurricane season of 2004, reported 

that it resulted in a much earlier deployment of DCOs. “It takes a while ... to track down the 

SecDef [Secretary of Defense], get him to sign off on it, whether he’s in China or wherever.”89

NORTHCOM ordered DCOs to deploy to Mississippi and Louisiana on Sunday, August 

28, one day prior to Katrina’s second landfall.90 However, in anticipation of formal orders,

both offi cers deployed on Saturday and began to coordinate with FEMA personnel.91 Additionally, NORTHCOM designated Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi (85 miles east 

of Jackson, Mississippi), and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana (200 miles northwest of 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana), as staging areas in response to FEMA requests.92

The Pentagon: Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff

In the civilian leadership at the Pentagon, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, Paul McHale, has responsibility for domestic operations and disaster assistance.93

Colonel Richard Chavez was his Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support. On August 23, 

Colonel Chavez learned of what would become Hurricane Katrina when the National Hurricane Center began tracking Tropical Depression 12. In consultation with Assistant Secretary McHale, he began standard hurricane preparations by assessing the availability of three 

key assets: Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), emergency medical capabilities, and FEMA staging 

bases.94 Colonel Chavez presented his fi ndings to the Secretary of Defense on August 28, the 

day before landfall. Although Tropical Depression 12 had become Hurricane Katrina, and 

had swelled from Category 1 to Category 5 status by that time, DOD did not alter the scope 

of the inventory.95

Th e Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary has not developed or implemented formal policies 

and procedures regarding that offi ce’s role in preparing the Department for a civil-support 

mission, let alone one of catastrophic magnitude. For example, Colonel Chavez conducted 

these preparations on his own initiative, having derived these criteria from experience rather than from codifi ed DOD guidance. Indeed, he said his offi ce had intended to formalize 

these anticipatory actions into a pre-storm checklist, and now plans, as a result of Katrina, 

to expand the scope of the inventory to include other foreseeable needs such as shallowdraft boats.96 As Katrina demonstrated, DOD needs to have procedures and plans to more 

fully prepare for catastrophic events. 

Within the Joint Staff , the offi ce dedicated to supporting civil authorities is the Offi ce 

of the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), then led by Brigadier General Terry 

Scherling.97 Th e JDOMS began “24-7” monitoring of the situation in the Gulf of Mexico on 

Sunday, August 28, also activating a Crisis Action Team to process requests from FEMA.98

Because DOD reports solely to the President, DOD treats FEMA mission assignments as 

Requests for Assistance, then considers whether the request may be supported, examining 

such issues as legality, possible harm to civilians, and the eff ect on readiness for overseas 

missions. JDOMS received relatively few requests prior to landfall. FEMA requested two 

staging bases, and that DCOs and their staff s be deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Th ese requests were granted by NORTHCOM on the authority delegated by the Severe 

Weather Execute Order. 99 FEMA’s single request requiring JDOMS approval was received 

by DOD on Sunday at 5 p.m., requesting air and ground transportation “to support life 

saving and life sustaining missions.”100 As will be discussed below, JDOMS processed the 

request the following day, 12 hours aft er landfall.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

Having begun tracking Katrina as Tropical Depression 12 on August 23,101 NORTHCOM 

issued a Warning Order on August 25, directing the Army, Navy, and Air Force to prepare 
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478

to “provide the necessary resources to conduct disaster relief operations consistent with 

defense priorities.”102

Th e NORTHCOM Operations Directorate began conducting teleconferences – which 

included FEMA, First and Fift h Armies, and supporting commands of the Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force103 – on August 24 in preparation for the initial landfall in Florida, 

continuing the teleconferences daily as the storm progressed into the Gulf. Before landfall, 

the conversations focused on evacuation plans for military bases, protection of military 

infrastructure, and the initial requests received from FEMA for staging bases and Defense 

Coordinating Offi cers and Elements.104

Prior to landfall, logistics experts at NORTHCOM were aware of FEMA’s activities in 

positioning commodities. As in previous hurricanes, the planners listened in on daily videoteleconferences during which FEMA described its preparations in pre-positioning food, water, and ice.105 Th ey anticipated that they might be called upon to provide strategic airlift .106

In addition, NORTHCOM planners had participated in the Hurricane Pam exercise in July 

2004, and so were aware of the possible need for a “large-scale evacuation of personnel out 

of the city.”107 But because DOD had not been asked by FEMA to take on any responsibilities in the preparations, the Army planners, under the NRP, had no “direct relationship” 

with FEMA.108 Th ey were in “listen only mode.”109

Army Commanders: First Army

Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Commanding General of First U.S. Army, was 

responsible for Army forces east of the Mississippi River. He had served in that position 

through the destructive hurricane season of 2004, and was aware of the likely requests for 

DOD assistance post-landfall. According to General Honoré, First Army had begun tracking the tropical wave that would become Katrina on August 8,110 well before it appeared as 

a tropical depression on the Pentagon’s screen. On August 24, as Tropical Depression 12 

became Tropical Storm Katrina, First Army issued a Warning Order, followed on August 

25 by a Planning Order, deploying the DCO and his staff to Florida and ordering equivalent 

elements to prepare to deploy to Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi.111

General Honoré recognized early response as essential to saving lives, and from experience 

knew that equipment such as helicopters, boats, and communications equipment would 

be required. He wanted the necessary equipment and personnel identifi ed and alerted in 

advance so as to expedite their eventual deployment. Th e process would involve multiple 

entities: NORTHCOM as the commander of military operations, Joint Forces Command as 

the provider of resources to NORTHCOM, and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon to ultimately 

authorize the deployment. 

To initiate this process, General Honoré sent a message to NORTHCOM at about 1 p.m. on 

Sunday, August 28, requesting by 7 p.m. an assessment of the resources it considered necessary.112 His immediate superior, Army Forces Command, sent an identical request to Joint 

Forces Command requesting a response by 2 a.m. Monday.113 Aft er receiving General Honoré’s request, NORTHCOM forwarded an identical message to the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. 

In addition to forwarding the formal message, Major General Richard Rowe, Operations 

Director at NORTHCOM, recognized the urgency of the request and informally directed 

his staff to anticipate the need for military support: “[First Army] has forwarded request for 

capabilities. ...We need to get [the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command] thinking about 

types of support that may be needed – joint solutions.”114 General Scherling, the Director 

of Military Support on the Joint Staff , responded to his e-mail. “Good plan, Sir,” she wrote. 

“Th is sounds VERY catastrophic.”115
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Nonetheless, according to General Rowe, “Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff did 

not do anything.” Th e Joint Staff did not even want to receive this message prior to landfall, 

he said, because a specifi c requirement had not yet been identifi ed, and under DOD’s role 

in the NRP, DOD was not to respond until a request had been processed through FEMA: 

“Th ey believe perhaps the likelihood of having to provide this kind of ... joint capabilities is 

not likely.”116 He reported to General Honoré that he was unable to provide the requested 

information, even 12 hours aft er Katrina’s landfall in Louisiana: “Somewhat hamstrung by 

JDOMS desire to wait” for requests for assistance, he wrote.117

Army Commanders: Fifth Army

Fift h Army held responsibility over Army forces west of the Mississippi River, which included Louisiana. Colonel Tony Daskevich deployed from Fift h Army as DCO to Louisiana, 

departing at noon on Saturday prior to the offi cial NORTHCOM orders. Th e order, however, instructed him to deploy without the full complement of staff , or Defense Coordinating 

Element, that would normally have accompanied him, and instead to deploy two planners. 

He explained that the decision to deploy only two planners was based on uncertainty as to 

Katrina’s path and limited lodging space in Baton Rouge.118 To give his staff the fl exibility to 

join him once the storm had passed and he had established his role in Baton Rouge, he sent 

the Element staff to Houston.119 Although he was concerned that they would not be available to assist him in the immediate aft ermath, his Mississippi counterpart, Colonel Damon 

Penn, reassured him that “it takes a full 48 hours of assessment before they even start discussing DOD participation. I think you’re in good shape.”120

Upon arriving in Baton Rouge Saturday night, August 27, Colonel Daskevich met with the 

senior FEMA offi cials in Louisiana, William Lokey and Scott Wells. Th ey discussed the 

weather predictions and the potential severity of Katrina’s impact. Th ere was no discussion 

of specifi c mission assignments to DOD, although there was a general discussion of what 

assets DOD might be able to provide.121 At the time of his arrival, Colonel Daskevich, who 

had recently taken part in training on the NRP, understood that DOD planned to operate 

on a “pull” system, following its established role wherein DOD is to respond to requests 

rather than to provide assets prior to identifi cation of a specifi c need.122 Sunday morning, 

Colonel Daskevich met with Major General Bennett Landreneau, the head of Louisiana’s 

National Guard, and again, received no specifi c requests for DOD assistance.123

Navy Commanders 

As Katrina approached the Gulf Coast on Sunday, August 28, the helicopter landing ship

USS Bataan lay in port in Ingleside, Texas, following an exercise in the Caribbean Sea. Th e 

Bataan off ers a large fl at deck, refueling capacity, vast hanger space for cargo transport, and 

substantial medical facilities. Vice Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander of the Second 

Fleet, based in Norfolk, Virginia, placed the Bataan on alert, and off ered it as an asset to 

NORTHCOM.124 USS Bataan left port by midday, and, aft er re-embarking the helicopters 

– two medium-lift utility MH-60s and three heavy-lift MH-53s – moved to position herself 

behind Katrina as it came ashore. 

Additionally, the Navy followed standard pre-landfall procedure by moving ships in the 

storm’s path out to sea. Five supply and logistics vessels left New Orleans for the Gulf of 

Mexico, remaining close enough to provide assistance as soon as Katrina passed. Aircraft 

departed from the Gulf Coast for protection, but Construction Battalion engineers (“Seabees”) in Gulfport, Mississippi, equipped with heavy-lift ing vehicles and trained to build or 

rebuild structures quickly, sheltered from the storm locally in order to respond quickly if 

required.125 In Baltimore, Maryland, the hospital ship USNS Comfort began preparations for 

deployment on Sunday.126
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480

Marine Corps Commanders

New Orleans is home to the headquarters of the Marine Corps Reserve Forces and its warfi ghting component, the Fourth Marine Division, commanded by Major General Douglas 

O’Dell. General O’Dell evacuated his headquarters on Friday, August 26, to avoid the 

approaching storm.127 Beginning Saturday, August 27, he began examining what Marine 

forces might be required for the response.

Realizing that transportation assets were the most diffi cult to move quickly and would be the 

linchpin if a fast response were required, he conducted assessments of the most important 

of these “enablers”: amphibious vehicles; motor transport in the event that infantry were 

deployed or a large evacuation were required; and a command-and-control element to receive 

and direct forces. Th e assessment was complete by mid-day Monday, shortly aft er landfall.128

Realizing that his logistics and engineering equipment might also be required, Lieutenant 

General James Amos, Commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force – a total of almost 

50,000 troops – directed an assessment of resources such as bulldozers, trucks, road graders, mobile hospitals, and associated personnel.129 “Th is is 35 years of being a Marine and 

it’s what we call anticipating a mission,”130 he stated, explaining his recognition that Katrina 

would be of devastating severity and that 

the Marines’ assistance would assuredly 

be required.

U.S. Transportation Command

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) holds responsibility for ground, 

air, and sea logistical and transportation 

support to military operations, and is assigned a supporting role to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) in patient evacuation operations. 

As is standard practice in advance of a 

hurricane, TRANSCOM alerted numerous heavy-transport aircraft at bases 

throughout the country in the event that 

mass transportation of supplies, personnel, or evacuees would be required. Th e 

aircraft were alerted on Sunday, August 

28, and included C-5s and C-17s at 

Dover, Travis, Charleston, and McCord 

Air Force Bases.131 Additionally, TRANSCOM alerted two Contingency Response Wings,132

whose mission is to deploy to a damaged airfi eld, and rapidly repair the runway, lighting, 

navigation, and communications systems to restore aircraft operations. 

Immediate Response After Landfall

Situational Awareness

Like the rest of the federal government, for at least 24 hours aft er landfall, DOD had poor 

awareness of the extent of devastation in Louisiana and Mississippi. Th roughout Monday, 

the day of landfall, DOD personnel remained in “wait-and-see mode.” In Katrina, this 

period of damage assessment took much longer than usual. Many of the fi rst responders 

were immobilized by damage or fl ooding, and communications systems were incapacitated. 

As a result, DOD personnel relied on media reports; nearly all interviewed by the ComGeneral Honoré arriving on 

USS Bataan

U.S. Navy photo
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481

mittee said that by Monday evening they had concluded from various media reports that 

New Orleans had “dodged a bullet.”133 Th ey were not aware either of the levee breaches and 

overtopping, or the extensive fl ooding that followed.

 Th e challenge of obtaining rapid and reliable information about hurricane damage is not 

new. According to what was then known as the General Accounting Offi ce (GAO), “In the 

case of [1992’s] Hurricane Andrew, it was several days before the local authorities realized 

how bad the situation was and how much assistance was needed.” Th e GAO recommended 

“supporting state and federal agencies should not waste time waiting for accurate assessments but use their experience to push obviously needed assistance toward devastated communities before citizens begin to die for lack of it.”134

Initial Request for Assistance: Two Helicopters

At 7 p.m. Monday, the Joint Directorate of Military Support (JDOMS) issued the fi rst offi cial order for military support to the response, directing the deployment of two helicopters 

to meet FEMA’s request for two helicopters to support initial surveys of the storm damage 

and the most urgent requirements by Rapid Needs Assessment teams. Th e order also provided general guidance to the armed services: “Be prepared to provide additional personnel, units, equipment, airlift , and/or other support as requested by FEMA and approved by 

SecDef.”135 Colonel Roberta Woods, Deputy Director of Logistics at NORTHCOM, interpreted this order on Monday evening to mean that beyond the two helicopters, NORTHCOM and the services were to think ahead as to what they might provide: “At that time, 

again, we still had...no specifi c requirements to meet, no mission assignments, or word of 

mission assignments at that time.”136

Th e First Air Cavalry Brigade in Fort Hood, TX, received orders to provide the two helicopters early Tuesday morning, and the aircraft were in Baton Rouge by 1 p.m.137 Th ey had 

launched within hours of receiving orders, but the JDOMS sent its orders 12 hours aft er 

landfall, and 24 hours aft er having received the request.138 However, FEMA had requested 

that these two helicopters begin operations “8/30/2005 Tuesday,” so they arrived on the 

day FEMA requested.139 Th e lack of situational awareness early in the response may have 

contributed to a delay; other witnesses have attributed the time of response to Department 

bureaucracy and a “cultural reluctance” to commit Department assets to civil support missions unless absolutely necessary. 

DOD Culture and Bureaucracy May Have Impeded the Process Initially

Assistant Secretary McHale disputed that idea, saying that although, prior to the 21st 

century, DOD’s traditional role placed a primary focus on overseas missions, “September 

11 made it very clear that homeland defense and civil support missions were ... equal to or 

of even greater importance than other more traditional missions.” He maintained that “if 

[resistance within the Department] ever had existed, [it] had ceased to exist in terms of the 

recognition of the importance of homeland defense and civil support missions.”140

Some DHS offi cials have asserted that they were frustrated by how long it took DOD to 

approve requests for assistance,141 and have suggested that a delay in processing the large requests for assistance from DOD – the logistics request approved September 2, and a second 

set of requests approved September 5 – slowed the response eff ort. Some FEMA witnesses 

also said that they would have liked “things to happen faster” in terms of DOD’s bringing in 

assets for the response.142

In its own analysis, the White House asserted that DOD’s “21-step” approval process 

– which included converting a mission assignment into a Request for Assistance and 

reviewing the request for legality and appropriateness, among other things – was “overly 

bureaucratic” and “resulted in critical needs not being met.”143 FEMA Deputy Federal Coor-
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482

dinating Offi cer (FCO) in Louisiana Scott Wells and other witnesses144 described the process 

of gaining assistance from DOD as a “negotiation” in which DOD, along with the other 

government entities, collaborates in dividing up what needs to be done and by whom.145

Colonel Chavez testifi ed that FEMA offi cials did not always have a good understanding of 

what assets and resources DOD could provide to best accomplish a mission and of DOD’s 

processes for responding to FEMA’s requests for assistance.146

Top DOD offi cials vigorously disputed the assertion that their approval process slowed 

the arrival of DOD assets. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

during the Katrina response, said, “I don’t know if we have a 21-step process or not. If we 

do, it’s one that takes 21 seconds to complete.”147 General Myers said DOD would “never” 

wait to start planning to execute a mission until formal orders were signed, saying such an 

approach would be “incongruous” with DOD culture.148 Assistant Secretary McHale concurred, saying, “I can tell you, in a crisis, there are no 21 steps for approval.”149

But some military offi cers reported encountering diffi culties in responding to FEMA’s early 

requests. Captain Michael McDaniel, the lead Navy liaison to FEMA, described his experience in processing the helicopter request: “JDOMS is notorious or has been notorious, 

‘Well, you can’t ask for it that way. You need to do it like this.’ Well, tell me how I need to 

ask for it, you know? I just need some helicopter support down there.”150 Colonel Harrington, the lead DOD and National Guard Liaison to FEMA, agreed that “Yes, there were 

some delays over there for diff erent reasons, and that created some angst,” 151 adding:

I think it’s just a cultural thing, all the way up. From last year, it was both 

JDOMS, [Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense], 

and the SecDef. It was the entire – and even Northern Command to a degree, 

even though Northern Command was a little more proactive. Just a cultural 

reluctance that they want to make sure that mission analysis is done and all the 

options are explored before you come to DOD.152

Prior to landfall, General Honoré had asked General Rowe, NORTHCOM Director of 

Operations, to identify certain assets for the response, including helicopters, boats, and 

communications equipment, but 12 hours aft er landfall General Rowe replied that he was 

“somewhat hamstrung by JDOMS desire to wait for [Requests for Assistance]”153 and could 

not provide these critical assets to General Honoré. To the Committee, General Rowe 

explained: “I think the primary resistance is the organizational resistance and absence of a 

detailed, approved plan.”154

“It’s hard to get them to do anything where there is a chance of failure,” Wells said, adding 

that DOD wants “to know 80 to 90 percent of the information before they will commit an 

asset to work with you.”155 Wells asserted that DOD “could have played a bigger role. Th ey 

could have played a faster and a bigger role.”156

While FEMA and DHS offi cials have complained that DOD did not do enough, and was 

slow to process requests, this investigation has found that, in fact, FEMA originated very few 

requests in this early period. In one instance, DOD received complaints from DHS about 

actions it did take. As discussed above, the Navy had ordered the helicopter carrier USS

Bataan to sail towards New Orleans behind the storm, and to prepare to provide assistance. 

However, on Monday aft ernoon, a senior DOD representative to DHS reported to Assistant 

Secretary McHale’s staff that “folks over here [are] hopping mad about the news of the Navy 

ship that announced their deployment without evident legal authority.”157 Th e USS Bataan, 

the military’s most signifi cant pre-landfall deployment, with helicopters prepared to assist 

with search and rescue, was challenged by DHS. Th e Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of De-
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483

fense for Homeland Defense had to reassure DHS that USS Bataan was simply pre-positioning, and in fact would not engage in the response without the proper request and authorization.158 Bataan’s helicopters launched on Tuesday, becoming the fi rst active-duty aircraft to 

assist with search and rescue.

Th e Committee has found that the JDOMS was slow in approving the initial request for helicopter support in Louisiana. Th e record shows that the time required to process this initial 

request was not consistent with the scale of the disaster. Th is timeline and the testimony of 

witnesses both within and outside of DOD indicates that, while the extent of the damage may 

not have been known, both a traditional treatment of civil support as a secondary mission 

and a bureaucratic process slowed the response within the Department. Th e expeditious 

response by the helicopters themselves demonstrates that the Army was ready to mobilize, 

but that in this case, orders slowed the response. As will be seen, however, any reluctance and 

bureaucracy gave way beginning Tuesday, as top DOD offi cials took steps to expedite the 

responsiveness and bypass the ordinary approval process in moving assets forward.

The Pentagon: Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Joint Staff

During the fi rst two days aft er landfall, then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 

England exercised primary authority over the Department’s response because the Secretary 

was traveling with the President.159 Deputy Secretary England described the level of accurate information in the Pentagon for the fi rst 24 hours as “no input except what was on 

the news;”160 his primary source of information was the television. He said he attempted to 

contact FEMA Director Michael Brown and other DHS offi cials early Monday morning, but 

was unsuccessful.161

Assistant Secretary McHale’s offi ce received a situation report at 5 p.m. Monday which included information indicating that the Industrial Canal and the 17th Street Canal levees had 

breached and that “much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater.”162 Assistant 

Secretary McHale’s offi ce attempted to contact the Army Corps of Engineers that evening and in the early hours of the next morning regarding these and other reports of levee 

breaches, but even into Tuesday morning, the Corps was unable to confi rm whether the 

levees had been breached or overtopped, and whether any such damage could be repaired.163

At 1:47 p.m. on Tuesday aft ernoon, DHS transmitted to DOD a report that the Army Corps 

had confi rmed the breach at the 17th Street levee164 and at 3:15 p.m., Assistant Secretary 

McHale’s offi ce received an e-mail detailing the Army Corps’s intentions for repairing the 

breach.165

Assistant Secretary McHale acknowledged that damage assessment was one area of the military response that should be improved, particularly aft er reviewing the lessons of Hurricane 

Andrew: “One of the fundamental lessons learned ... from Katrina is the need to have available immediate wide-area surveillance capabilities in order to more accurately and rapidly 

determine how much damage has been experienced.”166

On Tuesday morning, Assistant Secretary McHale instructed his Principal Deputy, Peter 

Verga, to encourage DHS to appoint a Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO). Th e NRP dictates 

that in catastrophic incidents, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to designate a PFO to 

coordinate the overall federal response,167 and given the now-apparent scale of the disaster, 

a PFO would be critical to managing the necessary response eff orts. Assistant Secretary 

McHale said:
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484

It was becoming increasingly clear that the damage was so severe that we would 

likely have a declaration of a major disaster and that a principal federal offi cial ... 

was going to be a central element of leadership in terms of the federal response. 

... I, therefore, thought that having a named PFO would be an important initial 

step in triggering the capabilities available under the National Response Plan. 

So I directed Peter Verga to call DHS and ... serve as a catalyst for the consideration to urge the appointment of a principal federal offi cial ... because the PFO, 

once appointed, would become a critical enabler of follow-on DOD capabilities. 

By the end of that day, Mike Brown was appointed the PFO.168

Furthermore, General Honoré had deployed to the Gulf Coast from Georgia, and NORTHCOM was preparing to designate him as the commander of active-duty military forces committed to the response. Another motivation underlying DOD’s suggestion to DHS that it 

name a PFO appears to be concern within the Pentagon over the potential interpretation of 

the presence of a three-star general that the military was assuming control over the disaster 

response. An internal DOD e-mail indicates concern over a uniformed offi cer “being senior 

person on the ground.” Th e message also indicates a preference that General Honoré report 

to a civilian offi cial, and DOD maintain the appropriate posture of the military playing a 

supporting role.169

It is not clear what role Verga’s phone call played in Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff ’s decision to appoint a PFO; Assistant Secretary McHale stated in testimony, 

“All I know for sure is we did make that recommendation and that, by the end of the day, a 

PFO ... had been appointed.”170

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

As discussed in Chapter 12 (Federal Preparations), NORTHCOM Operations Directorate had been conducting daily interagency teleconferences since August 24 to coordinate 

the military response.171 By 1:30 p.m. Mountain Time Monday, damage assessments were 

beginning, but were not conclusive.172 NORTHCOM’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, 

Captain Brett Markham, told the Committee that “we relied heavily, on the 29th, on 

our National Technical Means”173 (sensory equipment managed by national intelligence 

agencies to collect information for the benefi t of the entire federal government). He said 

that some information – including a graphic representation of fl ooding received from the 

National Geospatial Agency174 – was collected on August 29,175 but that it didn’t present a 

suffi ciently clear picture.176 Colonel Wesley McClellan, a senior member of NORTHCOM’s 

Interagency Coordination Group, which comprises numerous interagency representatives, said that it also lacked damage assessment information, and was unable to specify 

the types of support needed from DOD.177 Like his counterparts at the Pentagon, Admiral 

Keating, the NORTHCOM Commander, also woke up on Tuesday believing that “New 

Orleans dodged a bullet.”178 However, as the extent of the damage became clear on Tuesday, 

NORTHCOM staff clearly saw the need for military assistance, but was frustrated by the 

paucity of requests for assistance. Brigadier General Harold Moulton, who later in the week 

deployed from NORTHCOM to establish a command-and-control headquarters in New 

Orleans, described the growing frustration that developed as the damage became apparent: 

Th e National Response Plan process establishes a sequence which goes from 

local asking for help from the state, state asking for help from the federal 

government, the federal looking around and choosing which appropriate spot 

through the mission assignment process to eventually get into. ... Th at whole 

concept seemed to be, for lack of a better term, frustrating for this staff and for 
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485

Admiral Keating as they were trying to fi gure out how to respond to this compelling human tragedy that they could see unfolding on TV.179

Colonel Daskevich, who had deployed from Oklahoma on Saturday to serve as the DCO 

– NORTHCOM’s direct representative – in Baton Rouge, reported to the State Emergency 

Operations Center at 4:30 a.m. Monday.180 He also spent most of Monday struggling to gain 

an accurate picture of the situation, and acknowledged that from Baton Rouge, he in fact 

had very little awareness of the developments in New Orleans. Colonel Daskevich appears 

to have received a report of levee failure on Monday.181 However, because he was unfamiliar with the signifi cance of the levees, he did not recognize the potential implications 

of this limited information.182 “Th e hunt for information in the fi rst 24, 48 hours aft er the 

storm was a challenge,” he said.183 Having deployed with only one additional staff member, 

as ordered by NORTHCOM, Colonel Daskevich acknowledged that a lack of manpower, 

communications equipment, and operating space within the State Emergency Operations 

Center rendered it “extraordinarily demanding to try to keep up with all of the information 

fl ow and, or course, to actually do business” during the fi rst several days.184

The “Blank Check”

Whatever you can think of and get it moving yesterday, carriers, helos, trucks, 

amphibs, LCACs [Landing Craft Air Cushion], C-17s, C-130s, hospital ships, 

medical teams – whatever. Overkill is better than undershoot. POTUS [President of the Untied States] is coming back to D.C. tonight just for this.185

–Admiral Ed Giambastiani, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , to Admiral Keating, 

Commander of U.S. Northern Command, August 30, 2005.

Th ough offi cials had begun to learn more about the extent of the damage, through Tuesday 

morning the Department remained in a posture as dictated by the NRP, to allow FEMA to 

coordinate the response.186 At the same time, senior offi cials within the Department responsible for homeland defense were becoming concerned that they were not receiving requests 

from FEMA, and that awaiting such requests could further delay the movement of military 

assets. Assistant Secretary McHale, who that morning met with Deputy Secretary England, 

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Myers to discuss the hurricane and the Department’s response during the daily morning briefi ng, said that notwithstanding media reports 

“that were less sobering than the scope of the actual damage,” the leadership recognized that 

the Department needed to mobilize its assets for the support requests they anticipated:

We were much more focused and concerned than the published reports of the 

damage might have justifi ed. In part that was because certain key individuals 

expressed a deep concern that the damage was more severe than was being 

reported and so there was a collective sense that Hurricane Katrina was likely 

to be equal to or greater in damage than that of Hurricane Andrew in 1992.187

Yet offi cials within the Pentagon were surprised at the silence from FEMA. First thing in 

the morning, General Myers inquired from his Operations Directorate how many requests 

the Joint Staff had received, “and the answer was, We hadn’t got any.” A resulting discussion with the Deputy Secretary, then, led to the conclusion that “We need to start leaning 

forward – they’re going to need some Department of Defense assets.” 188

During a meeting at 7:30 a.m. Central Time, Deputy Secretary England informed senior 

Pentagon offi cials, including representatives of the military services and the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , of the Department’s commitment to quickly provide to the 
Chapter 26

486

NORTHCOM Commander whatever assets were needed to support the overall hurricane 

response, and urged all commanders to “lean forward” to be able to quickly meet requests 

for assistance.189 In a subsequent call that morning to Admiral Keating, Deputy Secretary 

England made clear that NORTHCOM would be provided any asset Admiral Keating 

deemed necessary.

Deputy Secretary England reported to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: 

We are leaning forward on all fronts. I have authorized all local commanders 

to provide their assistance and have authorized NORTHCOM and the Chairman to take all appropriate measures to push forward available DOD assets 

that could be useful to FEMA.190

In a meeting at 3:40 p.m.,191 General Myers then instructed his service chiefs to work together with NORTHCOM in determining necessary assets, telling them to pre-position resources in anticipation of a request for assistance from FEMA, if they thought it prudent.192

To expedite the deployment process, he instructed the services to proceed on the authority 

of this vocal command – Secretary England’s direct instruction to Admiral Keating, and his 

own guidance to the service chiefs – and that the necessary paperwork would follow later.193

“Th ink large,” he told them.194

A vocal command of this magnitude is extremely rare in DOD. For the purpose of ensuring 

legality, availability of resources, and documentation of the chain of command, all deployments are normally processed rigorously through specifi c written orders and electronic 

tracking systems. Deputy Secretary England’s command represented an extraordinary 

delegation of military judgment, on the assurance that Admiral Keating would keep the 

Department informed. It was a “blank check,”195 Deputy Secretary England said. Assistant 

Secretary McHale elaborated: “What was communicated ... was what we in the military call 

‘commander’s intent.’ Th e message from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, consistent with 

the counsel provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was to act with a sense of urgency 

and to minimize paperwork and bureaucracy to the greatest extent possible.”196 As Admiral 

Keating understood the direction, “We’re moving anything we think FEMA will need. No 

obstacles from DOD or Joint Staff .”197 While DOD’s inherent authorities to respond had not 

changed, and it was understood that all the necessary paperwork would follow, the decision refl ected an extraordinary delegation to the military commanders. Assistant Secretary 

McHale said, “Th e climate in the decision-making process in this department could not 

have been more proactive than it was.” 198

Although individual commanders had already begun moving assets and conducting predeployment preparations, many witnesses have credited these actions with fundamentally 

shift ing the overall response of DOD, particularly at the departmental level, into a proactive 

mode. Captain McDaniel, who represented the Navy to FEMA, said:

Th e pendulum swung from one extreme to the other through this. I mean, it 

went from having to pry Secretary Rumsfeld’s fi ngers off of a helicopter package ... and this 100-pound [sic] gorilla just goes, “Okay, we’ve got it.” Boom, 

and then the fl oodgates open.199

Colonel Harrington agreed that the “cultural reluctance” had now been overcome, and that 

attitudes within the Department “dramatically shift ed” as “things got a little crazy.”200

On Wednesday morning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued guidance to Joint Forces 

Command (which maintains control of most military assets within the United States until 

they are assigned to Combatant Commanders such as NORTHCOM), consistent with his 
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487

guidance to the service chiefs on Tuesday: “(1) Continue to lean forward; (2) Remind services to work through Joint Task Force components; and (3) Be aggressive but don’t get in 

FEMA’s way.”201 Forces had begun to deploy in large numbers to the region, some requested 

by NORTHCOM, and many others volunteering on their own initiative. Th e initial result 

was a “wide open barn door,” according to General Rowe, with NORTHCOM having diffi culty tracking self-deployed assets.202

“Our primary concern for Wednesday will be search and rescue” Admiral Keating informed 

his staff . “Temperature index likely to exceed 100F in New Orleans. Folks that survived 

certain to need water, then food, then shelter.”203 However, offi cials at the Pentagon were 

surprised to have so few requests from DHS in the fi rst few days aft er landfall.204 (See Chapter 23 for information on the assistance-request system.) 

Colonel Darryl Roberson, Assistant Deputy Director for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense in the Joint Staff , described his frustration at not being asked to do more sooner:

I will tell you that I personally felt very frustrated that we had not been called 

in earlier. We had assets available. We were all leaning forward. We knew we 

were going to receive them. We responded, in my opinion, in an unprecedented manner to everything that we got. I am absolutely convinced in my heart 

that it is a good-news story that DOD came to the rescue. Th at may sound 

strong. Obviously I’m biased. But in my mind, DOD saved the day to a large 

extent, and it was because of what we did. My frustration comes from the fact 

that I think we could have done it earlier if we had been asked.205

Assistant Secretary McHale expressed a similar frustration, stating that throughout the fi rst 

week, he believed that FEMA’s requests for assistance were still not commensurate with the 

scale of the catastrophe and the types of eff orts that would be required of DOD, and that 

even “by Saturday it was clear that the [requests] we had received, reviewed, and approved 

were pretty narrow in scope.”206 Yet on the message conveyed by Deputy Secretary England, 

military forces converged upon the Gulf Coast.

Mobilization of Military Forces

Despite an overall lack of awareness within the Department about conditions in Louisiana 

and Mississippi, a number of military commanders within the services took action, pursuant to their own command authority, to prepare assets for potential requests for assistance. 

In general, it is possible to characterize commanders’ actions throughout the fi rst week as 

one of three types: (1) preparation and mobilization into the Joint Operating Area in 

coordination with NORTHCOM; (2) mobilization into the Joint Operating Area, but without full coordination with NORTHCOM; and (3) individual preparations conducted within 

the services, without specifi c orders to do so. To characterize the response most broadly, 

commanders took action consistent with the guidance of Deputy Secretary England and 

General Myers, making all reasonable eff orts to pre-position assets or prepare for their 

deployment. And indeed, the overwhelming majority of deployments occurred prior to a 

request by DHS or FEMA. As will be discussed below, the lack of expected requests in fact 

led the Department to draft requests for FEMA, in recognition that such military assistance 

was required, but that FEMA had either failed to ascertain the requirements, or had inadequately expressed the requirements to DOD. 

However, the original intent of the Secretary’s vocal order was that despite the lack of 

paperwork, all deployments and preparations were to be undertaken in coordination with 

NORTHCOM to ensure that Admiral Keating had knowledge of all forces operating in the 
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region, and to maximize the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of the military response. Th e Committee has found that preparations in the early stages led to a faster response when the requests and orders fi nally came, and the pre-positioning of assets was essential to responding 

to immediate needs. Yet not all deployments were coordinated with NORTHCOM, possibly 

detracting from the unifi ed eff ort as intended by offi cials, and ultimately causing NORTHCOM to deploy a headquarters “to get our arms around this Title 10 force structure that’s 

now just basically all merging on the same local area,”207 as described by the headquarters 

commander, General Moulton.

A NORTHCOM execute order at 10 p.m. Central Time expanded the geographic reach of 

commanders’ ability to provide assistance under the Immediate Response Authority. Whereas this authority was previously limited to a commander’s immediate vicinity, it now granted 

commanders located anywhere within the Joint Operating Area authority to provide assistance anywhere in the region, provided they coordinated with NORTHCOM through Joint 

Task Force Katrina.208 Th e combination of this order with the vocal direction from Deputy 

Secretary England and General Myers broadened the authority of military commanders to 

operate domestically, and was an extraordinary departure from the Department’s ordinary 

procedures. Because the Deputy Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had encouraged commanders to use their inherent authority to pre-position assets into the disaster area 

(while coordinating with NORTHCOM), this order now permitted any pre-positioned unit 

to provide assistance using the expanded immediate response authority. 

Navy 

Th e Committee found that, overall, the Navy showed a strong willingness to push assets 

into response eff orts, ultimately sending more than 20 ships and 100 aircraft into the Gulf 

of Mexico, oft en in advance of a request or an order. Th e Navy provided a wide variety of 

mobile platforms for landing and servicing aircraft , treating patients, transporting enormous quantities of cargo and commodities, in addition to land-based assets which included 

engineering battalions of Seabees and logistics support.209 But more than other services’ assets, which may oft en arrive by air in a matter of hours, the mobility of the Navy’s primary 

assets is limited by the “time-distance” problem: An immutable factor in a ship’s ability to 

arrive on scene is the distance it must travel and its maximum steaming speed. In this case, 

the presence of the helicopter carrier USS Bataan in the Gulf of Mexico prior to Katrina 

proved extremely fortunate, for many of the ships had to steam from Norfolk, Virginia, and 

with the combined preparation and steaming time, did not arrive in the Gulf until Saturday 

and Sunday.210 But preparations for the ships’ deployment began shortly aft er landfall, even 

as the initial lack of damage assessments created an information vacuum. 

In accordance with standard practice for hurricanes, Second Fleet Commander Vice Admiral 

Mark Fitzgerald placed a group of three amphibious-warfare ships in port in Norfolk, VA, on 

24-hour alert for possible deployment.211 Th ese three ships – the USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, and USS Tortuga – had been previously designated as the Expeditionary Strike Group 

(ESG) to respond to contingencies on the East Coast or in the Atlantic Ocean.212 Th e ESG 

has large-deck vessels for landing helicopters, “well-decks” for retrieving amphibious landing 

craft , signifi cant hangar and deck space for supplies, refueling capacity for helicopters, and facilities to provide showers, food, and water for both victims and response personnel. Admiral 

Fitzgerald also contacted Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivien Crea, on Tuesday morning, and 

“off ered help” from the Navy. He credits this channel of coordination as essential to the events 

of the fi rst week; he had diffi culty communicating with General Honoré and with NORTHCOM because of the initial focus on National Guard and Army land-based missions.213 Ad-
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489

miral Crea confi rmed that, “Th e Navy was very proactive in sending things down. We didn’t 

have to ask them. ... Th ey started diverting ships and aircraft that direction.”214

Meanwhile, having been stationed in the Gulf of Mexico at the conclusion of a previously 

scheduled exercise held prior to Katrina, the USS Bataan followed Katrina, and by Tuesday 

morning was within 150 to 200 miles of New Orleans.215 Watching the news, the vessel’s 

commanders began identifying ways to help. At 3 p.m. CT, the Bataan received orders from 

Second Fleet to send helicopters into New Orleans to conduct search and rescue missions 

in coordination with Coast Guard District Eight.216 Th e Navy and Marine Corps helicopters were in the air by 5 p.m., and reported to the Coast Guard Air Station commander,217

that, as the designated On-Scene Commander, held responsibility for coordinating all air 

search-and-rescue assets. Th ey were joined by two Navy SH-3 helicopters from Pensacola 

that arrived unannounced at the Coast Guard station, off ering their services.218 In all, USS

Bataan’s aircraft rescued, evacuated, or transported over 2,000 persons.219

Fleet Forces Command and Second Fleet identifi ed Rear Admiral Joseph Kilkenny, Commander of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, to represent the Navy on the 

proposed Joint Task Force Katrina under General Honoré.220 Th e Task Force was formally 

established late Tuesday night; Admiral Kilkenny fl ew to Naval Air Station Pensacola 

Wednesday morning,221 where he began coordinating the deployment of Navy helicopters to the region.222 Admiral Kilkenny echoed Admiral Fitzgerald’s statement that General Honoré was diffi cult to reach during the fi rst few days, but that he was able to report 

back on his actions through Second Fleet;223 Admiral Kilkenny said that he knew General 

Honoré’s general intentions to focus on the immediate saving of lives through search and 

rescue, and could proceed by simply coordinating with Second Fleet.224

At 3 p.m. CT Tuesday, Fleet Forces Command had directed Second Fleet to launch the ESG. 

USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, and USS Tortuga left Norfolk, Virginia, on Wednesday, 

scheduled to arrive off the Louisiana coast on Sunday aft ernoon.225 Th ey carried a standard 

load of equipment called the Disaster Relief Kit. Th e kit included supplies such as bulldozers, medical supplies, water purifi cation, and other equipment.226 Fleet Forces Command 

then deployed the aircraft carrier Truman (without orders from NORTHCOM) in order 

to provide fuel and deck space for the rapidly increasing fl eet of helicopters. Th e aircraft 

carrier departed Norfolk on Th ursday. On Friday NORTHCOM submitted a Request For 

Forces to the Joint Staff asking that Truman be committed to the response.227 Th e Truman 

was tasked with supporting the Joint Task Force upon its arrival off the coast of Biloxi, MS, 

on Sunday, September 4.228

On Th ursday, Admiral Crea requested that Second Fleet assist with clearing channels in 

order to reopen shipping lanes into New Orleans and the Mississippi River, one of the 

nation’s most critical commercial routes, as quickly as possible.229 USS Grapple deployed the 

same day, assisting with salvage operations in Pascagoula, MS, on September 6. Th e minecountermeasures ship USNS Altair deployed from Ingleside, TX, on Friday, September 2, 

and commenced port clearance operations on Saturday, September 3, arriving alongside 

the pier in New Orleans the same day.230 With the channel clear, the Tortuga was able to 

proceed up the river on Sunday, followed by the Iwo Jima on Monday, September 5. 

In addition to serving as General Honoré’s headquarters for the Joint Task Force in New 

Orleans, USS Iwo Jima provided showers, food, and rest for the fi rst responders who had 

operated in the devastated city for a week. As the ship’s captain described in an e-mail on 

September 6: 

We are one [of] the few full service airports in the area and have been operating aircraft ... for almost 15 hours each day. We are also one of the only air 
Chapter 26

490

conditioned facilities within a 10 mile radius and ... we are also the only hot 

shower within miles. All day long we have been accommodating local policemen, fi remen, state troopers, National Guard, 82nd Airborne division personnel with hot showers and hot food.231

Numerous other ships and forces deployed, including the High Speed Vessel USS Swift, to 

replenish USS Bataan with disaster relief supplies, three Logistics Support vessels, and four 

amphibious hover-landing craft to transport supplies into New Orleans.232 Th e hospital ship 

USNS Comfort had begun its preparations on Sunday before landfall; because its specialized 

personnel and equipment required additional preparation time, it deployed from Baltimore, 

MD, on Friday, September 2, arriving in Pascagoula, MS, on September 9.233

Th e Navy also deployed medium-lift and heavy-lift helicopters from 15 squadrons throughout the country. In addition to those already operating from the USS Bataan, a total of 50 

rotary- wing aircraft deployed from Jacksonville, Norfolk, Corpus Christi, and San Diego,234

to assist with search and rescue, evacuation, and logistical operations. (See Chapter 21, 

Search and Rescue) Th e heavy-lift H-53 aircraft assisted the levee-repair operations, dropping sandbags into the breaches.235

Army

General Honoré, based at Fort Gillem, GA, as Commanding General of First Army, planned 

to deploy to the Gulf Coast as soon as the storm had cleared. Although he had not been 

ordered to do so, he wanted to establish himself in the area to be positioned advantageously 

as the response progressed: “My thought was ‘get there,’ because the fi rst rule of war is 

you’ve got to get there,” he said.236 His authority as an Army commander permitted him 

to move from one military installation to another provided that such a movement could 

be considered training. Th us, he created an “Exercise Katrina,” and in coordination with 

NORTHCOM and his superior offi cer at Army Forces Command, planned his move to 

Camp Shelby, an Army facility in southern Mississippi. 

General Honoré explained that it was not in his nature to wait for a Request for Assistance 

or deployment orders prior to moving: “Th at is a response, sometimes, by folks to say, ‘Let’s 

wait until they ask for something.’ But in this case, we’ve got a case where we need to save 

life and limb. We can’t wait for a [Request for Assistance] or shouldn’t be waiting for one. If 

there’s capability, we need to start moving.”237

General Honoré informed NORTHCOM and Admiral Keating of his plan to deploy to 

Camp Shelby on Monday aft ernoon,238 but because Katrina continued to track northward 

from the Gulf Coast, he could not move until Tuesday morning.239 He arrived at 11 a.m. 

CT240 and surveyed the base and the surrounding region of Gulfport and Biloxi, which 

looked to him like they “had been hit by a nuclear weapon.”241 General Honoré had previously received NORTHCOM’s warning order to “be prepared to establish [Joint Task Force] 

Katrina covering the states of LA, MS, AL, FL, KY, TN, and GA for command and control of 

consequence management operations resulting from the severe weather caused by Hurricane 

Katrina.”242 (A Warning Order instructs a commander to take all necessary preparations so as 

to be able to react immediately to a likely forthcoming Deployment Order or Execute Order). 

A NORTHCOM Execute Order, sent at 4 p.m. CT, alerted him to establish the Joint Task 

Force “on order.”243 At 10 p.m. CT, he received that order, offi cially converting his training 

mission into an operational mission.244 General Honoré assumed control over all active-duty 

forces then and subsequently involved in the response within the above states, now designated as the Joint Operating Area; he would report to NORTHCOM. 
Military Operations

491

With General Honoré now in command of an area which bridged the areas of responsibility of First Army and Fift h Army, Fift h Army wanted to provide assistance to him. Colonel Daskevich, the DCO for Louisiana, lacked the necessary personnel and equipment to 

eff ectively cope with the constant fl ow of information and demands for his assistance from 

numerous levels and organizations. Fift h Army Deputy Commander Brigadier General 

Mark Graham deployed from Fort Hood on Wednesday to provide more senior DOD 

representation in Baton Rouge, and to handle the requests from higher levels. Bringing a 

small headquarters planning staff , he arrived at the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center 

at 5 p.m. CT and in a meeting with Governor Blanco, Louisiana Adjutant General Bennett 

Landreneau, and General Honoré was soon assigned the task of planning and coordinating 

the evacuation of New Orleans. 245

Preparing for Deployment of Federal Troops

Of the vast quantity and range of military forces which deployed to the Katrina response, from 

ships and aircraft to medical teams and amphibious-assault craft , one deployment is distinguished from all others – one for which no FEMA mission assignment was issued, and which 

did not originate from a decision within DOD. On Saturday, September 3, the President 

ordered 7,200 troops from the high-alert units of the Army and the Marine Corps to deploy 

to Louisiana and Mississippi for the general purpose of humanitarian assistance. Although the 

Committee has not been provided access to documents and individuals explaining the reason 

for this deployment, the next section in this chapter will further discuss the events leading up 

to the deployment, beginning with Governor Blanco’s plea to President Bush on the night of 

August 29 for “everything you have got” and continuing through further requests and discussions between Louisiana, NORTHCOM, and Washington, D.C. Th e following will present 

the preparations conducted by the Army and the Marine Corps, which began, as might be 

expected of prudent commanders, with planning for assistance that might be required, despite 

lack of specifi c guidance. Although the preparations within the Army and the Marine Corps 

proceeded on very similar timetables, the Committee has been unable to establish whether 

these preparations were conducted in coordination with or based on guidance from NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff , or the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, or whether the 

services were preparing individually to react to the growing crisis in New Orleans. 

82nd Airborne Division

Th e 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by Major General William Caldwell and based at 

Fort Bragg, NC, includes a combat unit known as the Division Ready Brigade, which consists of about 3,700 soldiers, is maintained on a high state of readiness, and has an advance 

element prepared to deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours of receiving orders.246

Beginning Tuesday, the Division’s planning cell identifi ed the assets that might be required 

to assist in the hurricane response, reviewed standing procedures for hurricane preparation, and consulted with an experienced DCO on the NRP and the standard procedures for 

providing assistance to civil authorities. Wednesday evening, Forces Command ordered 

that the Army “be prepared to provide a brigade-size force to operate distribution centers, 

and/or if appropriate authorization were received, conduct crowd control and security in 

the vicinity of New Orleans.”247

General Caldwell considered this guidance to be vague, and merely a codifi cation of the general guidance provided by Forces Command in preparation for hurricane season, but issued 

an internal warning order to the Division Ready Brigade, increasing the state of readiness. 

Although the Division usually keeps an advance team of only 120 soldiers on two-hour recall, 

General Caldwell ordered all 5,000 soldiers to stand by in two-hour response mode.248
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492

Aft er receiving a call Friday morning from the Commander of Forces Command, which to 

him signaled a high likelihood of involvement, General Caldwell directed his staff to commence an exercise simulating a rapid deployment, combining all elements of the brigade 

– aviation, infantry, logistics, communications, and certain types of support. He also coordinated with Lieutenant General Robert Dale of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), based at Scott Air Force Base in St. Louis, MO, to pre-position four C-17 transport 

aircraft at Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina, in preparation for the deployment. 249

Friday evening, Forces Command issued warning orders 

indicating that a deployment was likely, the fi rst specifi c 

indication to General Caldwell that the Division Ready 

Brigade would, on short notice, be required to assist with 

the distribution of commodities, crowd control, and 

security in New Orleans.250

On Saturday morning the President announced the 

deployment in an address to the nation: 

Today I ordered the Department of Defense to 

deploy additional active-duty forces to the region. 

Over the next 24 to 72 hours, more than 7,000 

additional troops from the 82nd Airborne, from 

the 1st Cavalry, the 1st Marine Expeditionary 

Force, and the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force 

will arrive in the aff ected areas. Th ese forces will 

be on the ground and operating under the direct 

command of General Russ Honoré.251

Th is public announcement was the fi rst word that General Caldwell received that his brigade would deploy, 

although offi cial orders from Forces Command arrived 

early in the aft ernoon.252 General Caldwell contacted 

General Honoré, who told him: “[G]et here as fast as you 

can.” General Honoré also asked General Caldwell to 

bring a substantial command-and-control capability, by 

which he meant the appropriate personnel, equipment, 

and communications assets to plan, direct, and coordinate the numerous missions required of them. General 

Caldwell adjusted his deployment package correspondingly, adding several headquarters elements to enable the 

coordination and integration of ground forces, aviation 

units, and support personnel.253

Th e deployment began within hours; General Caldwell arrived in New Orleans seven hours 

aft er the President’s announcement. “Fix the airport, and fi x New Orleans” was General 

Honoré’s guidance. Over the next two days, the 82nd Airborne presence swelled to more 

than 3,000 soldiers, many of whom arrived in a convoy of nearly 1,400 vehicles from Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina.254

General Caldwell then learned further from General Honoré that his mission was, fi rst, to 

conduct search and rescue, then to provide humanitarian assistance, and third to provide 

presence. In its initial days, the 82nd Airborne assisted in restoring order at New Orleans 

International Airport and at the Convention Center, which continued to be a focal point for 

evacuees throughout the city, simply through their presence, and established connections 

Soldiers heading for the 

Gulf Coast

Army National Guard photo
Military Operations

493

with the New Orleans Police Department. “I think the biggest, I’ll be honest, [thing] we 

probably did was to give them a sense of assurance that everybody is there to help you,” As 

General Caldwell said.255 Beginning Sunday, the 82nd Airborne worked with the National 

Guard in dividing the city into search sectors, and on Monday amplifi ed FEMA’s search efforts by providing helicopters, boats, trucks, and additional troops to the Urban Search and 

Rescue (USAR) teams.256

First Cavalry Division

Th e First Air Cavalry Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division in Fort Hood, TX, which consists of 

an aviation unit of UH-60 utility helicopters and CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters and a battalion 

of 1,500 troops, had begun “prudent planning” prior to landfall. Th e fi rst order for two UH60s arrived on Tuesday morning as a result of FEMA’s request to support the Rapid Needs 

Assessment teams in Louisiana. Later that day, the brigade received orders for six additional 

aircraft , which departed for New Orleans on Wednesday and joined the Louisiana National 

Guard search-and-rescue eff orts based at the Superdome.257 (See Chapter 21.)

On Wednesday, the brigade received a warning order to prepare a command-and-control 

headquarters element for Title 10 (federalized National Guard) forces,258 a conduit for communications and planning consisting of 50 soldiers. Accordingly, the brigade commander, 

Colonel Dan Shanahan, departed to Naval Air Station Belle Chasse in New Orleans on 

Th ursday evening, reporting to Joint Task Force Katrina as an aviation task force in command 

of Army aviation units, and coordinating with the Coast Guard.259 A medical evacuation unit 

of nine helicopters arrived from Fort Benning, GA, joining search-and-rescue eff orts, evacuation, and distribution of food and water.By September 11, 50 aircraft were operating in 

Colonel Shanahan’s task force, although there was “always a need for more aircraft .”260

Th e Second Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division also received warning orders 

from Forces Command.261 Like General Caldwell, Brigade Commander Colonel Bryan 

Roberts described the message’s guidance as very general, but he ordered his staff to begin 

preparing approximately 300 light and heavy vehicles for deployment. Th eir vehicles were 

undergoing maintenance following their recent return from Iraq, and so needed a 72-hour 

period to ready for deployment. Colonel Roberts understood that the mission would likely 

involve search and rescue, evacuation, debris removal, traffi c control, and distribution of 

commodities. Colonel Roberts believed the soldiers were well-versed in these tasks because 

they had performed similar missions in their overseas commitments.262

Colonel Roberts fl ew to New Orleans International Airport on Friday in order to survey the 

area where he expected the team to stage.263 He returned to Fort Hood Saturday morning; 

by the time he arrived, the President had announced that the 1st Cavalry Division would 

deploy that day along with the 82nd Airborne.264 He arrived with his advance element on 

Sunday and reported to General Caldwell. Colonel Roberts’s unit began to arrive on Monday, with 1,638 troops on-site by Tuesday.

Th e 1st Cavalry operated primarily in Algiers Parish, on the south bank of the Mississippi 

River, conducting door-to-door search-and-rescue operations. Evacuation was to be voluntary only. Soldiers received guidance to knock on doors, and off er food, water, and assistance, and were all briefed on the Rules on the Use of Force,265 which explained the implications of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits federal military forces from engaging in 

law-enforcement duties. Th e rules stated, “Force will be used only as last resort. If you must 

use force to fulfi ll your duties, use the minimum force required.”266 Th e 133rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas National Guard was embedded within the brigade in order to 

provide law-enforcement capability to the brigade as it patrolled the parish.267
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494

Marine Corps

II Marine Expeditionary Force and 4th Marine Division 

Much like the Army commands described above, commands within the Marine Corps 

planned, beginning mid-week, for the deployment of troops that were the most prepared and 

set at the highest level of alert posture. Unlike the Army, however, the Marines took additional preparatory actions for a major troop deployment, including positioning a headquarters command element in New Orleans, and sending engineering equipment via Navy ships. 

Indeed, evidence before the Committee suggests that the Marines may have ordered a signifi -

cant portion of their troops and assets to deploy prior to the President’s order on Saturday.

Lieutenant General James Amos, Commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force based 

at Camp Lejeune, NC, called together his Planning Team immediately aft er landfall on 

Monday. Having begun to identify engineering equipment and aircraft in the preceding 

days, he now instructed his staff to plan for a major deployment of air and ground forces.268

As with the Norfolk-based naval units, there were initially no orders from NORTHCOM or 

the Joint Staff directing these Marine units to deploy. But mid-day Tuesday, aft er the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had urged the services to be proactive in moving forces forward, 

General Amos received a Warning Order from his superior offi cer, the Commander of 

Marine Forces Atlantic, directing him to prepare to deploy the helicopters his staff had 

already identifi ed.269

On Th ursday, General Amos deployed helicopters and transport aircraft to Naval Air Station Pensacola in preparation for a variety of support missions.270 Expecting that tasking 

would soon be forthcoming for “lots of Marines,” he loaded his engineering equipment 

onto the USS Iwo Jima Strike Group on Th ursday271 and sent an advance party to establish a 

command-and-control headquarters at Naval Air Station Belle Chasse.272 In anticipation of 

a deployment order he “put them [the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU), an infantry battalion of 1,200 Marines] on their packs” in preparation to deploy as early as Friday.273

At the time, the 24 MEU was the Marine equivalent of the Army’s Division Ready Brigade, 

postured at the highest state of readiness and prepared to deploy anywhere in the world. 

Evidence and testimony received by the Committee suggest that the Marine deployments 

were not fully coordinated within DOD, and that NORTHCOM was not fully aware of 

Marine Corps eff orts in the Gulf. General Amos e-mailed General Honoré on Th ursday 

morning, writing that he was sending helicopters and engineering equipment. “What can I 

do for you?” he asked.274 General Honoré responded, “HELLO BROTHER GET HERE AS 

FAST AS YOU CAN.”275 Friday morning, when General Amos told General Honoré of his 

intentions to send a command-and-control suite to New Orleans, General Honoré replied: 

“[It’s] hitting fan get here fast as you can.”276 Th at day General Amos fl ew fi ve aircraft to 

Belle Chasse carrying 150 Marines – the majority of the battalion’s command element – 

along with a mobile communications suite, capable of establishing a command-and-control 

headquarters anywhere in the world.277 An e-mail to General Rowe of NORTHCOM from 

one of his planners shows that the Marines’ preparatory movements were not coordinated 

with NORTHCOM: “Th ey do not have orders to move out yet but they are inside our [Joint 

Operating Area] w/out [Joint Task Force Katrina] or [NORTHCOM visibility].”278

General O’Dell stated that a plan was already in place for the full deployment of Marines: “I 

knew it was General Amos’s intention to deploy 24 MEU.”279 As General Amos confi rmed, 

“I anticipated them leaving on Friday. I fi gured the [deployment] order was going to be 

signed on Friday.”280 Th e Committee received evidence that at least a preliminary or partial 

deployment order was signed on Friday.281 On that date, Marine Forces Atlantic directed that 

a Marine task force, to consist of a broad range of air and ground amphibious assault assets 

from the 24 MEU and the Marine Reserve Forces, begin deploying on Friday, September 2, 
Military Operations

495

and fully deploy no later than Saturday, September 3.282 Th e troops were to deploy to Naval 

Air Station Belle Chasse, using their authority to reposition from one military base to another (as General Honoré had done in his initial movement to Camp Shelby) and to prepare 

to support General Honoré. Once established at Belle Chasse, they would be able to provide 

support on the expanded Immediate Response Authority granted by NORTHCOM. 

Under these authorities, the deployment order appears to have been given in the spirit of 

General Myers’s guidance encouraging the services to pre-position assets to enable their 

rapid employment when requested by FEMA. However, the deployment does not appear 

to have been fully coordinated within DOD. In particular, unlike all other troop deployments into the area under NORTHCOM’s command, there had been no corresponding 

request for forces from NORTHCOM. General Rowe stated that although he knew General 

Amos and General Honoré were communicating, he was unaware of the specifi c exchanges 

leading up to the order: “Th at’s one part of the help that I will have to give you that we did 

not ask for. However, I am aware that General Amos and General Honoré corresponded. 

General Honoré shared that with me, that General Honoré at that point said the help would 

be appreciated.”283

Furthermore, this urgent need for the deployment of Marine troops does not appear to have 

been fully communicated to other DOD offi cials considering whether there was a need to 

deploy active-duty troops. 

Th e next day, Saturday, September 3, the President issued a broad order for the deployment of active-duty ground troops. Because General Amos had anticipated the deployment 

for several days, with his Marines “sitting on their packs,” they were “ready to go. ... I was 

determined that when we got the Execute Order, we were going to darken the skies with 

C-130s and get them down there as quickly as we can.”284 Over the next 28 hours, aircraft 

ferried 1,250 troops, now reporting to General O’Dell,285 who had been appointed as Marine 

Component Commander for the Joint Task Force, reporting directly to General Honoré. 

General O’Dell confi rmed that the Friday order from Marine Forces Atlantic was subsumed 

into the President’s order on Saturday: “Prior to the President’s order, for planning, I knew that 

we would have elements of my division as I’ve described and 24 MEU from Camp Lejeune ... 

available.” Most signifi cantly, he added that the only thing that the President’s order changed 

about the Marines’ plans was that an element from the West Coast joined the 24 MEU.286

Th e forces initially operated in southwestern Mississippi, and then moved to St. Bernard 

Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans to perform door-to-door search and 

rescue missions. Th e West Coast-based Marines of the 11 MEU, however, were an unexpected capability. General O’Dell explained that he had not incorporated them into his 

plans, and that it was a challenge for him to provide them appropriate tasking and operating space: “We had to fi nd work for them. We really had to look to fi nd work for them.”287

Ultimately, he said, the 11 MEU was tasked with debris removal in Slidell, Louisiana, where 

their eff orts were initially welcomed, “but toward the end of the ten-day period, they were 

picking up sticks in granny’s yard.”288

U.S. Air Force and U.S. Transportation Command

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) holds responsibility for ground, air, and sea 

logistical and transportation support to military operations, and is assigned a supporting 

role to the Department of Health and Human Services in patient evacuation operations. 

Th e command had alerted C-17 and C-5 transport aircraft on August 28; the crews were in 

three-hour standby status. According to Brigadier General Paul Selva, Director of Opera-
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tions, TRANSCOM again followed its standard practice 12 hours aft er landfall, alerting 

eight additional aircraft .289

Th e fi rst mission received was to transport eight Swift Water rescue teams from Travis and 

March Air Force Bases in California to Louisiana for surface search and rescue.290 Although 

Deputy Secretary England approved the request by 11 a.m. on Tuesday, TRANSCOM still 

had to locate a suitable airfi eld to receive these heavy-lift aircraft . Colonel Glen Joerger was 

assigned on Monday as the TRANSCOM liaison to FEMA in Washington, D.C., and arranged 

for Contingency Response Groups – on alert since Sunday – to deploy to re-open the New 

Orleans and Gulfport airports; both had been fl ooded, and their lighting and communications 

systems had suff ered damage.291 As a result, it was determined that the aircraft would land at 

Lafayette Regional Airport while the larger fi elds were reopened. Th e Response Groups evaluated the condition, restoring lighting, communications, and navigation systems, and performing maintenance on departing planes. By Tuesday evening, the airports were reopened, and 

the TRANSCOM aircraft were able to land with the Swift Water teams.292

Some witnesses attributed the timeline of this mission to a delay within DOD in approving 

the mission assignment for the aircraft . And although the request was initiated during the 

period in which DOD’s culture of reluctance is said to have slowed the approval process, the 

record shows that DOD personnel began work on this assignment on Monday, August 29, 

and that any delay was introduced by the diffi culty in fi nding a suitable landing fi eld rather 

than by the approval process itself.

On Th ursday evening, September 1, DOD received a mission assignment to airlift evacuees 

from New Orleans to Houston.293 Th e Joint Staff processed the request on Friday, but the fi rst 

evacuation airlift from the New Orleans International Airport had already occurred by 8 a.m. 

Th ursday morning.294 Th e TRANSCOM operations at the airport actually involved three separate missions, according to Colonel Joerger: patient evacuation, citizen evacuation, and cargo 

delivery.295 TRANSCOM provided 15 transport aircraft – fi ve C-17s, C-5s, and C-130s each 

– for the evacuation of patients as part of the National Disaster Medical System296 (National 

Disaster Medical System is an interagency system to evacuate patients and individuals with 

critical needs from hospitals in the event of an emergency). (See Chapter 22.) TRANSCOM 

evacuated 21,000 people from New Orleans by air between Th ursday and Saturday.297

TRANSCOM also played a major role in the deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division. Once 

the deployment appeared likely to the division commander, TRANSCOM pre-positioned four 

C-17s at Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina on Friday aft ernoon.298 When the President 

ordered the troops to deploy on Saturday morning, TRANSCOM diverted additional aircraft 

to Pope, enabling the movement of personnel, vehicles, helicopters, and supplies, to New 

Orleans International Airport within hours of the President’s order.299

Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North

Th ough General Honoré initially deployed as commander of the First Army, with only a 

small staff , his command eventually grew to more than 22,000 personnel from all branches 

of the armed services.300 Th e Joint Task Force Katrina command structure grew more complex by the day, incorporating additional command elements as additional assets from the 

diff erent services were absorbed into the Task Force. Admiral Kilkenny arrived on Wednesday as the Commander of the Navy component and General O’Dell took command of the 

Marine component on Saturday; additionally Major General M. Scott Mayes, Commander 

of the First Air Force, based at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, arrived late in the week 

to take command of the Air Force assets and to coordinate control of the airspace with the 

Federal Aviation Association.301
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It became apparent to NORTHCOM that additional measures were necessary to maintain 

command and control over the many active-duty assets and to coordinate with the evergrowing number of National Guard forces. Admiral Keating, for instance, reported that 

he had little sense of National Guard capabilities beyond simply the numbers of troops 

being deployed.302 As for active-duty troops, he reported that aft er the President ordered 

7,200 troops to mobilize, 8,800 actually deployed,303 many of whom were included based on 

personal requests from General Honoré to his fellow generals. As a result, NORTHCOM 

had diffi culty maintaining an operational picture of the total military involvement. General 

Rowe complained in an e-mail to General Honoré, that he was “getting killed by the ‘good 

ideas fl owing.’ ... Right now I have an unexplained 13th Corps support command fl owing 

– about a thousand more 82nd Abn division than we asked for, odd Navy comms pieces. 

Unexplained marines. Services are killing me off of buddy deals.”304

Once NORTHCOM had assumed control of the active-duty military response on Tuesday, 

headquarters deployed planning and coordination elements. But on Friday, NORTHCOM 

decided to deploy Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North, a NORTHCOM entity designed to rapidly deploy a command and control element, led by General Moulton. 305

General Moulton arrived with a staff of 38 in New Orleans Saturday morning, just prior 

to the deployment of the 7,200 active-duty troops. He established his headquarters at the 

Naval Air Station. His fi rst task was to integrate National Guard forces with active-duty 

ground troops to take advantage of the National Guard’s law enforcement capabilities because the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits active-duty troops from engaging in law enforcement.306 Th ey also had to coordinate the numerous assets devoted to the search-and-rescue 

mission, which was currently operating under diff erent commands and following diff erent 

procedures. Th e Standing Joint Force Headquarters established a common search-and-rescue grid and assigned responsibilities to the various entities involved. 

Finally, General Moulton transitioned from search-and-rescue coordination to broader 

planning of the federal response for Coast Guard Vice Admiral Th ad Allen, the Deputy 

Principal Federal Offi cial, who later replaced Michael Brown as Principal Federal Offi cial 

(PFO). General Honoré assigned General Moulton, together with General Graham from 

Fift h Army, to provide the PFO with operational planning assistance in incorporating DOD 

resources into the overall eff ort.307

Logistics 

In disaster response, commodities fl ow into an area called the Federal Operational Staging 

Area. Oft en, this is a DOD facility.308 Under the NRP, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for procuring water and ice. Th e Army Corps contracts with vendors to purchase these 

goods, directing these vendors to deliver the commodities to the Operational Staging Area.

As for food, the other major commodity, FEMA typically requests military Meals Ready to 

Eat (MREs), which are ultimately supplied by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). FEMA 

assigns the General Services Administration (GSA) to arrange to have the MREs delivered 

to the Operational Staging Areas.309

A FEMA representative, usually from the aff ected FEMA region, manages these Operational 

Staging Areas. Based on priorities established by the state, the FEMA representative directs 

the movement of commodities from the staging area to locations in the state called Points of 

Distribution (PODs).310 State and local personnel, oft en supervised by the National Guard, 

distribute goods at the PODs to the people who need them. 

NORTHCOM had begun planning for large-scale logistics missions prior to Katrina’s landfall. Aft er landfall, NORTHCOM’s logisticians were involved in the evacuation of patients, 
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and were “heavily involved” in the evacuation of people from the Superdome.311 However, 

prior to Friday, September 2, NORTHCOM was aware of, but not heavily involved with, 

FEMA’s actions in moving commodities into the Gulf Coast. 

Although DOD had been called upon to assist in the movement of commodities in past 

hurricanes, including Hurricane Ivan along the Gulf Coast in 2004, NORTHCOM’s planners did not know before Friday that there was a need for them to become more involved 

in that issue in the Katrina response.312 Nor did the planners, a subset of the NORTHCOM 

organization, believe they could become more actively involved without a request to do so 

from FEMA.313 Said a senior NORTHCOM planner, “We didn’t have details at that point in 

time, or real authority to gather those details.”314

On Th ursday, September 1, FEMA began asking DOD to take on responsibilities beyond those 

it had been called upon to fulfi ll in past disasters. For example, FEMA requested that DOD 

“provide airlift capability to transport” people being evacuated from New Orleans to Houston, 

Texas, with a cost estimate of $20 million.315 On that same day, FEMA also asked DOD to assist 

in the logistics of moving food and water to New Orleans and elsewhere on the Gulf Coast.316

As the magnitude of the disaster was becoming clearer, there was growing concern among 

FEMA offi cials that Gulf Coast residents’ basic needs for food and water were not being 

met, and that FEMA’s logistics operation was becoming overwhelmed and would be unable 

to meet them. 

Late Tuesday night or early Wednesday morning,317 FEMA Director Michael Brown discussed with FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in Louisiana, William Lokey, the 

need to expand DOD’s role in the response, including logistics.318 Brown said he raised this 

issue with personnel in the White House and urged them to declare an insurrection and 

federalize the entire response eff ort.319 However, the Committee found no evidence that 

Brown’s desire to have DOD play a larger role in logistics was communicated by FEMA offi cials to DOD offi cials until Th ursday, September 1.320

On Th ursday, Ed Buikema, the Acting Director of the Response Division at FEMA, approached Ken Burris, the Acting Director of Operations, and said that FEMA needed DOD’s 

help with commodities, supplies, and logistics321 because the high water made it ”very 

diffi cult delivering supplies and commodities,”322 because of DOD’s human and material 

resources,323 and because of the reports of civil disturbance “playing out on television.”324

Buikema’s view was that “DOD is very well equipped to not only deliver things in diffi cult 

situations, but also to provide the security that is commensurate to delivering that kind of 

service.”325 Burris agreed.326 Although FEMA moved more truckloads of commodities in the 

days following landfall than they did for all four major hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004,327

Burris thought that it still wasn’t enough to “keep up with the consumption rate.”328

Lokey thought the request was necessary, less as a response to a specifi c set of challenging 

circumstances, than as a catch-all to cover all aspects of a rapidly changing and generally 

overwhelming situation.329 According to him, this request was to “cover the eventualities 

... because ... what we were faced with was well beyond anything I felt our system could 

handle.”330 Although Lokey’s view was that DOD did not need to take over all logistics,331

then-FEMA Director Brown says that was exactly what he wanted DOD to do.332

Aft er speaking with Buikema on Th ursday morning,333 Burris called Colonel Chavez in the 

Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.334 Burris told Colonel 

Chavez that “Th e FEMA logistics capability has been overwhelmed,” and that he “wants 

DOD to take over logistics operations in Louisiana and Mississippi.”335 Colonel Chavez 

viewed this request as extraordinary because it appeared FEMA was asking DOD to take 
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499

over its job.336 Colonel Chavez says he asked Burris, “is this really what you want us to do, 

take over the function? He indicated that that is indeed what they wanted to do.”337 Colonel 

Chavez told Burris that the request “would require a Secretary DHS to Secretary DOD call 

to initiate and signifi cant General Counsel input.”338

Th e NRP stipulates that DOD is a supporting agency to all 15 ESFs. Th us, they are 

on notice that they may be called upon to assist civilian authorities in a variety of ways. However, in this instance, the civilian agency – FEMA – was asking DOD to take over a role it had 

not traditionally played in disaster response, and which is not listed as one of DOD’s support 

functions in any of the listed ESFs.339 Th us, Colonel Chavez’s surprise is understandable. 

Aft er conferring with Colonel Chavez, Burris modifi ed his request to state that FEMA 

wanted DOD to “provide the support and planning and execution of the full logistical 

support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA.”340 Burris 

also conveyed the information to DHS Secretary Chertoff so he could make the request to 

Secretary Rumsfeld.341

Meanwhile, DOD sought clarifi cation from offi cials at FEMA and from the Homeland Security Operations Center at DHS about the meaning of “full logistics support.”342 As details 

of the potential mission were being collected, Secretary Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary 

McHale conferred with General Duncan McNabb, the Logistics Director for the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff .343 In the Secretary’s offi ce, Assistant Secretary McHale asked General McNabb 

whether DOD could perform this mission. “We can,” General McNabb told him. 344

On Friday, September 2, FEMA sent the mission assignment to DOD. It stated:

Assistance Requested: FEMA request[s] that DOD provide planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, 

fuel and medical supplies in support of the Katrina [disaster] in Louisiana and 

Mississippi.345

When DOD performs work pursuant to an approved FEMA mission assignment, DOD 

is reimbursed for the amount it costs DOD to perform that work up to the total amount 

“obligated” or authorized by FEMA. FEMA authorized spending $1 billion for this assignment.346 Both FEMA and DOD viewed the billion-dollar total as an estimate, but one large 

enough to give DOD authority “to do what needed to be done” to get commodities moving 

into the Gulf Coast. 347

In the words of Assistant Secretary McHale, it “may well have been the single most complex 

civil support mission in the history of the U.S. military.”348 Ultimately, for reasons discussed below, DOD did not take over all logistics operations from FEMA, although they did 

provide signifi cant assistance. DOD plans to or has sought reimbursement from FEMA for 

only $118 million of the $1 billion dollars obligated under this mission assignment.349

Th e Secretary of Defense approved the request orally on Friday, September 2,350 and Assistant Secretary McHale notifi ed DHS Deputy Secretary Jackson of the approval on Friday in 

an e-mail.351

On Saturday, September 3, the paperwork was approved, and DOD issued its order directing 

the commander of NORTHCOM, Admiral Keating, to “plan and develop a concept of operations to execute logistical support operations in aff ected states of Louisiana and Mississippi.”352

On Friday, September 2, before the mission assignment was offi cially approved,353 NORTHCOM’s planning staff began gathering information in “excruciating detail” about what 

orders FEMA had already placed with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), “how many 
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500

trucks are lined up, how many trucks have left , how many trucks have been loaded.”354 Th ey 

started calling the operational staging areas and collecting detailed information from the 

FEMA representatives on the ground there.355

Th ey learned that, unlike DOD, FEMA did not have “detailed supply accountability and 

the in-transit visibility of assets.”356 Th ere was no tracking methodology, and no one within 

FEMA “owned” the complete commodities-movement process.357 Th ey also learned that 

the DLA was sourcing the MREs from only two facilities,358 where loading was additionally 

constrained by space limitations and material-handling equipment.359

Commodities Crisis in Mississippi

NORTHCOM planners had little time to study FEMA’s logistics system in Louisiana 

because of a developing crisis in Mississippi. “We have got to get food and water [there],” 

Colonel Damon Penn, the DCO in Mississippi told Colonel Roberta Woods, Chief of Plans 

and Operations in NORTHCOM’s Logistics Division on Friday, September 2.360

Although the logistics mission assignment was broad, DOD’s logisticians knew from experience that they had to prioritize, and quickly.361 Colonel Woods described how she and 

her staff , using their knowledge of the DLA distribution system, worked to speed food to 

Mississippi:

I know the food’s been ordered [from DLA]. I know precisely how many 

thousands of cases have been ordered ... and I know how many have left the 

warehouse.

We discover that trucks that were inbound to Mississippi have not arrived in 

Mississippi but have been diverted to Louisiana. So ... using that [billion dollar] mission assignment... [we] make the call ... to use airlift to get some of 

those MREs into Mississippi. ... We coordinate airlift of about 50,000 cases of 

MREs into Mississippi. 

We put in the requirement to TRANSCOM to airlift . We put in the requirement to DLA to prepare the stocks for airlift . And on Saturday aft ernoon, 

evening, the 3rd, I think about 10,000 cases are fl own into Gulfport, and on 

Sunday, the 4th, 40,000 cases are fl own in.

Simultaneously now DLA is gathering more trucks to pick up MREs and have 

trucks begin delivering and – and that’s the shot in the arm. Th at surge of 

assets got Mississippi out of crisis mode and got routine fl ow into both Mississippi and Louisiana.362

NORTHCOM planners also retooled the way FEMA procured and transported commodities. 

Previously, the DLA, which supplied MREs, loaded them onto trucks that had to be arranged 

by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).363 Th e new structure gave DLA authority 

to contract for those trucks on its own, improving the fl ow of commodities to Mississippi.364

Distribution of Commodities in Louisiana and Mississippi

As they gathered data on how FEMA’s logistics system worked, the DOD planners were still 

unsure how much of the system DOD was being asked to assume and whether FEMA was 

going to back out of logistics completely.365 Although DOD planners believed the last stage 

of commodities distribution would remain in the hands of the National Guard, they were 

not sure whether FEMA would remain in control of the operating staging areas366 – Camp 

Beauregard, Louisiana, and the three Mississippi locations – all of which stand between the 

warehouse and the state-controlled points of distribution in the supply chain. By Saturday, 
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501

September 3, DOD developed a plan for how DOD would run operations at those staging 

areas traditionally run by FEMA.367

As part of developing the plan, a DOD offi cial was tasked to “map” the commodities distribution system in Louisiana and Mississippi. Th is is how he described the process in Louisiana as of Tuesday, September 6:

In LA, trucks arriving at the FOSA are redirected to one of 20 State Receiving 

Points and from there, redirected to local Distribution Sites where the MREs, water, and ice are provided to the people of Louisiana. Th e Beauregard FOSA keeps 

records of how many trucks are directed to each State Receiving point. ... FEMA 

management at the FOSA provides C2 [command and control, in this case over 

the movement of commodities into and out of the site] of the supplies and equitably distributes based on the requirements at each State Receiving Point.368

Th e DOD offi cial explained why he saw no need for federal active-duty troops to take over 

handing out commodities at the end of the distribution chain: “Unloading capabilities vary 

signifi cantly at fi nal distribution sites but at that point in the supply chain it doesn’t make 

much diff erence. MREs could be issued from the back of the trailer if required.”369

DOD never had to take over for FEMA at the Operational Staging areas. Th e commodities 

situation was stabilized in Mississippi by the large movement of food by air, and commodities distribution never turned into a crisis in Louisiana.370 NORTHCOM’s Colonel Woods 

described DOD’s role as “very much a cooperative eff ort. FEMA stayed in – in the chain 

and in the processes, and we – we put shots in the arm, is what we did.”371

Th us, although DOD provided an important contribution to improving FEMA’s logistics 

operations, they did not – as was originally requested – “take over” those operations from 

FEMA. DOD’s contribution was to quickly bring to bear its expertise in planning and executing commodities movements. It was not to deploy large numbers of active duty troops 

to run the supply chain. In fact, large numbers of National Guard troops already deployed 

performed the bulk of the distribution work. 

Katrina demonstrated that DOD has well-developed expertise in logistics management, but 

there is no reason that FEMA could not develop a similar level of profi ciency. 

The Second Large Group of Requests For Assistance

An extraordinary number of military assets were deployed by DOD, including assets 

deployed by Presidential order and by the individual services, with the expectation their 

capabilities would be required. When Assistant Secretary McHale notifi ed DHS Deputy Secretary Jackson that the Secretary of Defense had approved the logistics mission assignment, 

he added that DOD possibly would be able to do even more.372 Given the level of devastation on the Gulf Coast, it was clear to Assistant Secretary McHale that “a much greater 

level of DOD activity was going to be required.”373 On the morning of Saturday, September 

3, shortly before the President announced his decision to deploy 7,200 active duty troops 

to Louisiana, Assistant Secretary McHale and Deputy Secretary Jackson met at the White 

House. According to Deputy Secretary Jackson, the President wanted “to get these troops 

on the ground as fast as possible, and we were determined to get the additional support 

missions defi ned with clarity and the assets that might be needed to be brought along with 

them to move them as quickly as possible.”374
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502

Meanwhile, the President had announced the deployment, and the Army and Marine forces 

had begun to mobilize. Deputy Secretary Jackson and Assistant Secretary McHale met later 

that day with Deputy Secretary England at the Pentagon to begin “aggregating and classifying and categorizing what types of mission assignment activities we thought were needed by 

DOD.375 Assistant Secretary McHale reported that they then “drew up a list of approximately 10 mission areas” in which DOD help had not yet been, but was likely to be, requested.376

Th e intent, according to Deputy Secretary Jackson, was to formulate “what are we trying 

to accomplish, what do we need to get done, how are we going to do it?”377 On Saturday, 

September 3, and the following day, DOD and DHS offi cials “at very senior levels”378 draft ed 

a group of new DOD mission assignments:379

• conduct search-and-rescue operations,

• perform security-capabilities assessment and provide security-capabilities 

advice and technical assistance, 

• collect and evacuate live persons to temporary processing centers,

• collect and remove bodies of deceased persons,

• restore fl ood-control systems, 

• transport and distribute ice, water, food and medical supplies,380

• disease prevention and control, 

• planning for the quarantine of areas within New Orleans,

• quartering and sustaining of FEMA headquarters support element and relief 

workers,

• health and medical support, 

• debris removal, 

• restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes (land and water), 

• geospatial-surveillance products and evaluations, 

• logistical support at key air and sea distribution nodes, 

• temporary housing, and 

• long-range communications between headquarters nodes and fi refi ghting.381

Between Saturday, September 3, and Monday, September 5, as the Army and Marine troops 

converged upon Louisiana by air and land from Texas, North Carolina, and California, DHS 

and DOD offi cials draft ed and refi ned seven separate Requests For Assistance derived from 

the broader aggregated request.382 Th ese seven requests, totaling an estimated cost of $805 

million,383 were approved by the Secretary of Defense the evening of September 5.384 Th e next 

morning, Tuesday, September 6, as the convoys of troops from the 82nd Airborne Division 

closed on New Orleans,385 DHS Deputy Secretary Jackson sent an e-mail to Assistant Secretary 

McHale thanking him “for your help with the RFAs and all other things. Very grateful.”386

As Assistant Secretary McHale and Admiral Keating both said, many of the requests in the 

second DHS set “already were in active execution” on September 5, when they were offi cially 

approved by the Secretary of Defense.387 Deputy Secretary Jackson described the process as 

“one of the best examples of cutting through bureaucratic red tape and getting on with the 

job that I participated in during the course of these fi rst several weeks.”388

Th is investigation has shown that DOD was moving assets in many respects before they 

were either requested by FEMA or approved by the Secretary of Defense. Th e record indi-
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503

cates that DOD logisticians were gathering information and developing a plan to execute 

the logistics mission assignment on Friday, September 2, prior to its oral approval by the 

Secretary of Defense later that same day, and prior to its formal approval on Saturday, September 3. In addition, DOD was already involved in search-and-rescue operations,389 evacuation operations,390 health and medical support,391 geospatial surveillance,392 and logistical 

support at key air and sea transportation nodes,393 restoring fl ood control systems,394 and 

transporting commodities.395

FEMA witnesses corroborated DOD’s claim that DOD was working on the requests for 

assistance in advance of formal approval.396 FEMA, DHS, and state witnesses also praised 

DOD for its work in response to requests from FEMA.397 Even Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana, Scott Wells, who criticized DOD for taking too long to approve 

mission assignments, said that DOD never failed to complete a mission assignment in 

timely fashion.398 Wells’ superior in Louisiana, Lokey, went further, stating “I do not think 

any military people I was working with were delaying doing anything but leaning extremely 

far forward.”399 Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour described the MREs fl own in with the 

assistance of Department of Defense personnel as a “godsend.”400

Mississippi

On August 26, in advance of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour issued 

Executive Order 939, activating the National Guard under the command of Major General 

Harold A. Cross.”401 Th e Mississippi National Guard has fi ve primary missions in hurricane 

response: (1) search and rescue; (2) law-enforcement operations; (3) commodity distribution; 

(4) casualty evacuation; and (5) debris removal from roads and along major power grids.402

General Cross called up several National Guard units, including engineering and militarypolice units, which deployed to Camp Shelby, 70 miles north of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, 

and Camp McCain, in north central Mississippi, by Sunday, August 28, the day before 

landfall. About 175 other soldiers were positioned in Mississippi’s three coastal counties of 

Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson to assist in preparation for and immediate response to the 

storm. Th at day General Cross began to order 10 more units into action. By landfall the next 

day, 3,088 Mississippi service members had been activated, remaining units had been placed 

on alert, and requests for assistance from other states had been identifi ed.403

Th ough search-and-rescue and evacuation operations continued during and immediately 

aft er landfall, the bulk of the forces were ordered to the coast once the winds died down early Monday evening. When the level of devastation became apparent, General Cross ordered 

all remaining Mississippi National Guard troops into action and executed pre-planned 

assistance agreements from other states. General Cross also requested assistance from other 

states under Emergency Mutual Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements.404

Th rough EMAC, the National Guard was able to pull together a division-size force of over 

14,000 soldiers and airmen from 40 states, including Mississippi, by September 4.405 Total 

out-of-state force numbers peaked at nearly 12,000 by September 12, resulting in a combined force of over 16,000.406

Governor Barbour “emphatically” said that he never saw a need for federal troops and was 

never directly asked to federalize the Mississippi National Guard.407 General Cross also 

stated that he never requested federal troops.408 However, U.S. military personnel stationed 

at bases in Mississippi participated in the federal response to Katrina.409
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By Wednesday evening, August 31, the National Guard began assisting with commodity 

distribution and began airlift ing supplies to stranded residents.410 Colonel Benjamin “Joe”

Spraggins, Director of the Harrison County Emergency Management Agency, singled out 

this aspect of the National Guard’s response for praise.411

In the storm’s aft ermath, the National Guard also had to contend with false alarms, which 

diverted crucial forces, as General Cross explained: 

But the fi rst couple of days. ... I had a need to get patrols out in communities and towns where there was looting reports. By the way, a lot of this was 

paranoia. People would call in saying they’re looting this town, they’re breaking into the hospital and la, la, la. And I would send MPs up there and no such 

thing was happening. And then we got a couple of reports of trucks being hijacked and we would send helicopter reconnaissance and MPs to that location 

and you’d see trucks stopped but they weren’t being hijacked, they were just 

refusing to drive without a military escort.412

General Cross said his forces also supported local law enforcement:

We didn’t go in and take charge anywhere. We would go in and report to the 

sheriff or the police chief or the mayor and say, “Where do you need us?” And 

my standing orders were that you were to have at least one sworn offi cer with 

each squad of MPs so that they actually do the arrest.413

In an aft er-action report, the Mississippi National Guard said it had:

• cleared over 3,900 miles of roadway;

• directly or indirectly assisted in over 600 rescues;

• airlift ed 1.2 million MREs, 1 million gallons of water and critical medicines;

• conducted over 3,000 presence patrols, assisting in 65 arrests for crimes ranging from looting to domestic-abuse violations; and

• distributed by ground and distribution points over 39 million pounds of ice, 

5.4 million gallons of water, and 2.7 million MREs in 37 counties. 414

Deployments of National Guard and Active-Duty Military Troops 

Th e obligations and duties of the Guard in time of war should be carefully 

defi ned, and a system established by law under which the method of procedure 

of raising volunteer forces should be prescribed in advance. It is utterly 

impossible in the excitement and haste of impending war to do this satisfactorily if the arrangements have not been made long beforehand. 

 –Th eodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1901.415

Summary

In the aft ernoon of Monday, August 29, several hours aft er Katrina’s landfall, Governor 

Blanco telephoned President Bush. “We need your help,” the Governor told the 

President. “We need everything you’ve got.”416 Based on their conversation, the Governor 

believed the President had “every intention to send all of the resources and assistance within 

the power of the federal government.”417 Yet although over the next several days Governor 

Blanco made at least two more personal pleas to the President, by phone and in person 

aboard Air Force One, asking for a total of 40,000 federal troops, it was not until Saturday, 
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September 3, fi ve full days aft er landfall, that the President ordered 7,200 Army and Marine 

ground forces to Louisiana. 

One of the key questions about the response to Katrina is, “Why did it take so long for the 

President to respond to the Governor’s requests for federal troops?”418

Unfortunately, much of the story of the President’s decisions remains opaque. Th e White 

House refused to permit the Committee to interview White House personnel about the 

President’s decision or the actions of the White House staff . DOD instructed its personnel 

not to discuss communications with the White House. Because the Committee has been 

unable to develop a complete and accurate record regarding these decisions, it is unable to 

make any fi ndings regarding the President’s decision to order deployment of federal active-duty troops on Saturday, September 3, including the reasons why the President did not 

order that deployment sooner. 

Nevertheless, the Committee has extensively interviewed Louisiana, DOD, and National 

Guard offi cials about their own decisions and actions. From their recollections, the Committee has been able to assemble a picture of a rapid but uncoordinated military response to 

the various requests for assistance. 

Two more specifi c fi ndings also have emerged. First, the large numbers of National Guard 

troops deploying into Louisiana were a major factor in DOD’s decision not to deploy additional active-duty troops into Louisiana prior to the President’s deployment order.

Second, the diff erence in opinion between state and federal offi cials about whether more 

active-duty military ground troops should have been deployed sooner appears to stem, in 

part, from the lack of coordination in the formulation and consideration of the various state 

and federal requests for military support. Requests for troops were made to the EMAC and 

the National Guard Bureau within DOD. Requests for troops also were made directly to the 

President, White House offi cials, and the commander of the military forces in Louisiana, 

General Honoré. Other requests for military assistance were made through FEMA according 

to the process set forth in the NRP for requesting DOD support. Many of the state and federal 

requests for military support lacked adequate specifi city as to the missions to be performed or 

the capabilities being requested. Th e responses to the requests for military support oft en were 

poorly coordinated with each other. One result from this lack of specifi city and coordination 

at all levels was that local, state, and federal offi cials had diff ering perceptions of the numbers 

of federal troops that would be arriving, the missions they would be performing, who was in 

command of the military forces, and who should be in command of those forces. 

Discussion

Th e Constitution of the United States provides for two distinct chains of command for military forces within the United States: state governors command and control the state militias; 

and the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. Th e NRP 

recognizes that either of these two military forces may be called upon for support in the event 

of a disaster or emergency: the National Guard, under the command of the governor; federal 

active-duty forces, under the command of DOD; and, ultimately, the President. Th e NRP 

provides for two distinct avenues for requesting these two types of military assistance. 

Under the NRP, a state may request federal military support through FEMA, the agency 

responsible for coordinating requests for federal disaster support. Although FEMA may direct 

other federal agencies to perform a “mission assignment,” because the Secretary of Defense is 

the only federal offi cial, other than the President, who may issue an order deploying U.S. military forces, DOD considers a FEMA mission assignment to be a “request for assistance.” DOD 

evaluates each FEMA request for assistance to determine if the request is appropriately tasked 
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506

to DOD and whether DOD has the ability and assets to perform the request. If DOD approves 

the request, the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, issues an order to the military to provide 

the requested assistance to FEMA. 

Within FEMA, the Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) is responsible for coordinating the 

requests for support made to the various federal agencies, including DOD.419 Th e FCO is stationed at the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), which is the temporary federal facility established aft er a 

disaster for the coordination of federal, state, and local response activities.420 Th e FCO, among 

others, works with the DOD Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO), who is also stationed at the 

JFO and is responsible for coordinating and processing all requests for assistance to DOD.421

Unless DOD establishes a diff erent command structure for a particular disaster – which it will 

usually do for a major event like Katrina – the DCO will also be the on-site commander in 

charge of the DOD response. 

FEMA issued 93 requests for specifi c federal military assets and capabilities to DOD; in general, DOD quickly and eff ectively responded to these requests.422 None of these requests, however, involved large numbers of ground troops.423 Th e DCO in Louisiana “did not ever receive 

any specifi c request for large-scale federal forces that came from the state.”424 Rather, requests 

for large numbers of military troops were made directly to the President, other high-ranking 

Administration offi cials, and the military commander in the fi eld. 

Th e lack of specifi city in these requests for federal military support, and the failure to coordinate their consideration through the coordination mechanisms used for the other requests for military assistance, was one of the sources of ongoing confusion and uncertainty 

regarding the scope and timing of the military response. Th e proliferation of processes used 

to request National Guard troops was yet another source of confusion. 

In most circumstances – unless they are “federalized” for a specifi c purpose – National Guard 

forces will be operating under the command of the governors of the states. Typically, in a 

disaster, state National Guard troops will be called up or activated to full-time duty by a governor into “state active-duty” status, meaning they are under the command of the governor, 

performing state missions, such as humanitarian relief or law enforcement, and are paid for 

by state funds.

National Guard troops may also be under the control of a governor when activated under 

32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (“Title 32” status). Th is provision allows the National Guard troops to be 

activated by DOD to perform training or “other duty,” with federal pay and benefi ts, yet remain under the control of the governor. Such “other duty” may include disaster-relief work 

or law enforcement. For example, Title 32 was used to provide federal pay and benefi ts to 

the National Guard troops who temporarily provided additional security to a number of 

airports aft er the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.425

National Guard troops under the command of a governor, either in state active duty or Title 

32 status, are not subject to the prohibitions in the Posse Comitatus Act against the use of 

any part of the military for law enforcement.426 In Katrina, the fl exibility to use the National 

Guard to perform law enforcement was a signifi cant motive for the primary reliance on the 

National Guard rather than active-duty military troops. Th e retention of this fl exibility was 

also one of the major reasons Governor Blanco resisted attempts to “federalize” her National Guard troops – i.e., place those troops into active-duty status and under the President’s 

command.

Th e President may directly activate the National Guard, or “federalize” National Guard 

troops already in state active duty or Title 32 status, under a variety of circumstances. Under 

the Insurrection Act, the President may place the National Guard into federal service to sup-
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press an insurrection against a state government, at the request of the state; enforce 

federal laws in the event of “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or 

rebellion against the authority of the United 

States”; or to prevent an interference within 

the state of a constitutional right.427 Similarly, 10 U.S.C. §12406 provides the President the authority to call into federal service 

the members of the National Guard in the 

event of an invasion by a foreign nation, a 

rebellion, or if the President is “unable with 

the regular forces to execute the laws of the 

United States.”428 Th e Insurrection Act was 

recently invoked in 1992, at the request of 

the Governor of California, to quell the Los 

Angeles riots, and in 1989, in response to 

reports of looting in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin 

Islands, in the wake of Hurricane Hugo.429

Th e President may also employ active-duty 

troops under the Insurrection Act. DOD 

has prepared guidance for the use of activeduty troops to perform law enforcement 

missions, entitled “Military Assistance 

for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).” Th e 

MACDIS guidance governs “planning and 

response by the DOD Components for military assistance to federal, state, and local 

government ... and their law enforcement 

agencies for ... civil disturbance operations, 

including response to terrorist incidents.”430

National Guard troops called into federal 

service under these authorities operate 

under the command of the President, receive federal pay or benefi ts, and are not subject 

to the prohibitions in the Posse Comitatus Act against the use of federal troops to perform 

law-enforcement activities. National Guard troops called into federal active duty under 

other authorities, however, are subject to the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions. Th ese other 

authorities permit the President to call up the National Guard in time of war, a declared 

national emergency, or when otherwise authorized by law.

Th e NRP states that National Guard forces under the command of the governor, either under 

state active duty or Title 32 status, “are providing support to the Governor of their state and 

are not part of federal military response eff orts.”431 Accordingly, unlike requests for military 

assets under the control of DOD, requests for National Guard troops not under the control of 

the governor are not coordinated and processed through either the FCO or the DCO.432

In those instances in which National Guard troops from outside an aff ected state are needed 

for disaster response, a governor may use the EMAC to obtain those troops from other 

states. Th e EMAC is a congressionally approved interstate compact that permits a state to 

request and receive whatever type of assistance it might need from another state, including 

state National Guard forces, to respond to a domestic emergency.433

National Guard helicopters 

fl ying medical evacuations

U.S. Air Force photo
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During Katrina, Louisiana began requesting National Guard assets through the EMAC 

process on Friday, August 26, three days before landfall. Th e fi rst EMAC support – National 

Guard helicopters from Oklahoma – arrived in Louisiana on Monday, August 29, the day 

of landfall. On Tuesday, August 30, more helicopters from Texas and Oklahoma and about 

230 ground troops from Florida, Georgia, and Texas arrived through the EMAC process.434

In Katrina, the EMAC process proved neither suitable nor capable to handle the type of 

large-scale deployments of troops needed in the Gulf region. Th e EMAC was never intended 

or designed to coordinate large military troop deployments. As a result, both Louisiana and 

Mississippi turned to the National Guard Bureau to “expedite” the deployment of National 

Guard troops from other states. Th e National Guard Bureau is the DOD entity responsible 

for advising the Army and Air Force on National Guard matters and communicating with 

state governments including state National Guards.435 Although the National Guard Bureau 

successfully expedited these troop deployments, they were not well coordinated with the 

other military responses, thereby contributing to the confusion as to the scope and eff ectiveness of the overall military response. 

Th e National Guard Bureau’s application for Title 32 status for these troops recognized the 

unsuitability of the state-to-state EMAC process for this type of large-scale military deployment. On September 5, the Bureau requested DOD to grant Title 32 status for all of “the 

National Guard forces currently responding to Hurricane Katrina” under the EMAC compact, retroactive to August 29, the day of landfall.436 “Th e escalation from what was a local 

and regional response to one of national scope, and international attention, risks exceeding 

the capability and intent of the EMAC,” the Bureau wrote.437 “Th is development compels the 

transition of National Guard forces from State Active Duty (SAD) status under the EMAC 

to a federally funded status. Title 32 maintains DOD’s fl exibility to utilize federally funded 

National Guard troops in a federal response and support-to-law enforcement role without 

Posse Comitatus raising issues.” Th e Bureau stated this change was imperative, as the EMAC 

arrangement was not “sustainable” or a “practical solution” for the maintenance of a military 

force this size.438 On September 7, DOD granted the request for Title 32 status and funding.439

Prior to and shortly aft er Katrina’s landfall, federal offi cials also recognized the possibility 

that military forces may be required for law enforcement. On August 28, the Vice President’s Counsel, David Addington, wrote to William Haynes, the DOD General Counsel: 

“Given the potential massive size of the problem there could be civil unrest during the aftermath ... you might want to have an [Insurrection Act] proclamation ... in the can in case 

it is needed.”440 On the morning of Wednesday, August 31, as the media reported a deterioration in civil order in New Orleans, Northern Command’s Operations Director, General 

Rowe, advised Pentagon offi cials, “recommend looking at ‘what if’ MACDIS required.”441

Later that morning, the Joint Director of Military Support described to General Rowe the 

statutory and Constitutional authorities governing the use of armed forces for law enforcement. She told General Rowe that she planned to advise “senior leadership” that such action could be taken by the President invoking the Insurrection Act following either a state 

request through the Department of Justice, or a unilateral decision by the President.442

Th e following discussion presents the record developed by the Committee regarding the 

State of Louisiana’s requests for large-scale deployments of troops and the responses to 

those requests. 

Tuesday, August 30: Governor Blanco asks General Landreneau, Adjutant 

General of the Louisiana National Guard, to request federal military assistance

As Governor Blanco toured New Orleans by helicopter and visited the Superdome Tuesday 

aft ernoon, the need for massive federal assistance became clear and urgent. Floodwaters 
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were spreading and rising throughout the city. Th e crowd of people at the Superdome was 

growing by the thousands, as residents fl ooded out of their homes fl ocked to dry ground 

and people “plucked off the roofs” from around the city were deposited there as well.443 Tensions rose too, due to concerns over food, water, security, and the fate of separated family 

members. Th e Governor determined that the people stranded there had to be evacuated “as 

soon as possible.” She asked Major General Bennett Landreneau, the Adjutant General of 

the Louisiana National Guard, for information about the location of the buses to be used 

for the evacuation, and instructed him to “ask for all available assistance from the National 

Guard and the United States Government, specifi cally federal military assistance.”444

Tuesday, August 30: General Landreneau speaks to General Honoré and to 

General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau

According to General Landreneau, he quickly relayed Governor Blanco’s request for 

military troops to General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and then to 

General Honoré, who later that day was appointed Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, consisting of all the active-duty military forces in the Gulf Coast region responding to 

Katrina.445 Both General Honoré and General Blum, however, stated that General Landreneau fi rst asked them for troops on Wednesday, August 31.446

Although the Governor’s timeline indicates that she spoke with General Landreneau 

regarding the need for troops following her aft ernoon visit to the Superdome, General Landreneau stated that in a telephone conversation with General Honoré on Tuesday morning he “conveyed the Governor’s desire for federal troops, in particular an Army division 

headquarters to plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of New Orleans.”447 General 

Landreneau stated that on that same day he asked General Blum to help obtain thousands 

of National Guard troops for relief eff orts in Louisiana.448

General Honoré recalled that he fi rst spoke with General Landreneau sometime Tuesday 

evening. Although General Landreneau mentioned the need to evacuate the Superdome, 

his main concern was the search and rescue eff orts, which required helicopters, not ground 

troops.449 According to General Honoré, General Landreneau said he had already spoken 

to General Blum, who had assured him that “a lot of ground capacity was on the way.”450

General Honoré stated that General Landreneau did not make any “particular request” for a 

large deployment of federal active-duty troops. 451

Although General Blum recalled that he spoke with General Landreneau on Tuesday 

evening, he was unable to recall whether General Landreneau made a specifi c request for 

troops at that time.452

Although recollections diff er as to whether General Landreneau specifi cally requested 

military assistance during either of these conversations on Tuesday, it is nonetheless clear 

that as of this date the state had established two new avenues, in addition to the traditional 

processes through the EMAC and the DCO, for requesting military support: (1) through 

General Blum and the National Guard Bureau, and (2) through General Honoré, the Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina. Th ere were now four separate avenues for requests for 

military support; there would be little coordination among them. 

Early hours, Wednesday, August 31: Louisiana National Guard Offi cers discuss with General Landreneau the need for more troops

Prior to and during landfall, Louisiana National Guard Brigadier General Gary Jones and 

the rest of his contingent had been stationed at Jackson Barracks, the headquarters of the 
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Louisiana National Guard in New Orleans, but by late Monday rising fl oodwaters forced 

him and his contingent to relocate to dry ground at the Superdome. 

By late Tuesday, as it became apparent the Superdome would need to be evacuated, the 

senior Louisiana National Guard offi cers at the Superdome became concerned whether they 

had suffi cient manpower to undertake this additional responsibility.453 Sometime between 2 

a.m. and 4 a.m. on Wednesday,454 General Jones, his deputy Brigadier General Brod Veillon, 

and Colonel Steve Dabadie, Chief of Staff of the Louisiana National Guard, consulted with 

General Landreneau in Baton Rouge. General Jones recalled the conversation: 

And I told General Landreneau that I felt like taking on the mission of evacuating all those people, in addition to the security missions and the engineer 

missions, and so forth, I had, was probably beyond the capability, not of my 

troops, but of my planning staff to execute, the people I had on the ground. 

And I asked for some support. And what he told me was they planned on 

asking for an active-duty division headquarters to come in and take over the 

evacuation. But he also gave me a key piece of information in that. And that 

was, there ain’t going to be nobody get there until they get there. Until you get 

relieved of that mission, that is your mission. So from that point on I took that 

mission, and that’s how we got it. And we never did give it up, because no one 

else ever stepped up to the plate to pick that thing up.455

Colonel Dabadie similarly remembered that General Landreneau agreed with the need for 

an active “division headquarters” unit – meaning a team of one or two dozen active duty 

personnel with expertise in planning, command, and logistics – for coordination and execution of evacuation. 456

According to General Veillon, General Landreneau had also said, “I am ahead of you. I have already called General Blum and we have additional assets that will be arriving in the morning.”457

7:21 a.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Landreneau asks the National 

Guard Bureau to expedite the deployment process for National Guard troops 

from other states

By Wednesday morning, Louisiana offi cials recognized that the EMAC process was inadequate for this catastrophe. General Landreneau telephoned General Blum and asked for his 

help in expediting the EMAC process to send 5,000 National Guard soldiers to Louisiana. 

General Blum related the conversation:

He said that he needed 5,000 soldiers more to help, and I’m going to tell you 

at this point, it was clear in his voice that it was pretty imminent need ... [H]e 

communicated some emotion over the phone that he needed it, and he needed 

it now and that he reiterated that the armory at Jackson Barracks had fl ooded 

and that the Louisiana National Guard command and control had been relocated to the Superdome parking lot and that the Superdome is being cut off by 

rising water, it’s becoming an island.458

Within minutes of General Landreneau’s phone call, the Army National Guard began 

calling and e-mailing the Adjutant Generals of the National Guards across the country to 

alert them of the urgent need for National Guard military police, engineers, and high-water 

trucks.459 On a noon video-teleconference with the Adjutant Generals from all of the states, 

General Blum reiterated the immediate need for these National Guard capabilities. 

Th e National Guard Bureau’s improvised process proved extremely eff ective in mobilizing 

tens of thousands of National Guard troops and assets. Th e process that began Wednesday 
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morning resulted in the deployment of over 30,000 National Guard troops within approximately 96 hours.460 Partially as a result of their rapid deployment, however, most of the 

National Guard troops dispatched to Louisiana through this process did not know what 

their mission would be or where it would be performed until they arrived in Louisiana. Th e 

deployment process was “P for plenty,” according to General Vaughn. “Th ere was not a lot 

of preciseness.”461

Table 1: Activated National Guard Personnel Serving in Louisiana and Mississippi 462

Date Number Serving in Louisiana Number Serving in Mississippi

Louisiana 

National Guard 

Personnel

National Guard 

Personnel from 

Other States

Total

Mississippi 

National Guard 

Personnel

National Guard 

Personnel from 

Other States

Total

Aug. 30 5,804 178 5,982 3,822 16 3,838

Aug. 31 5,804 663 6,467 3,822 1,149 4,971

Sept. 1 5,804 2,555 8,359 3,823 2,861 6,684

Sept. 2 6,779 5,445 12,224 3,823 3,719 7,542

Sept. 3 6,779 10,635 17,414 3,823 6,314 10,137

Sept. 4 6,779 12,404 19,183 4,017 9,399 13,416

Sept. 5 6,779 16,162 22,941 4,017 10,999 15,016

Sept. 6 6,779 20,510 27,289 4,023 11,095 15,118

Sept. 7 6,779 22,589 29,368 4,023 11,388 15,411

Sept. 8 6,779 23,476 30,255 4,023 11,506 15,529

Source: Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, January 24, 2006, p. 12.

Although the National Guard Bureau’s mission was to expedite the EMAC process, the 

deployments initiated from the Bureau were not well coordinated with the EMAC process. 

As the National Guard Bureau’s Draft Aft er Action Review found, National Guard forces 

were deployed “piece meal” into and out of Louisiana and Mississippi, and in many cases 

the Bureau’s process overlapped the EMAC process, “causing confusion and duplicated 

eff orts.”463 Th e review concluded, “the large-scale and sustained operations required for this 

disaster requires a more systematic approach.”464

Even at the outset of the deployment process, the National Guard Bureau recognized the 

need for the National Guard to deploy a robust command and control capability along with 

the large number of troops that would be fl owing into the state. General Blum immediately 

determined that additional command and control capability was needed in both Louisiana 

and Mississippi because National Guard combat brigades from each of those states were 

in Iraq.465 Headquarters elements from the 35th Infantry Division in Kansas deployed into 

Louisiana and from the 38th Infantry Division in Indiana deployed into Mississippi.466

“Both of these divisions had served in Bosnia and Kosovo and knew how to do Ph.D. level 
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command and control elements,” Lt. Gen Blum explained.467 Th ey began arriving in theater 

on Friday, September 2.468 General Blum stated that command and control improved immediately aft erwards. 

Once they were on the ground, the command and control improved 100 percent in less than 

24 hours. I mean, it started coming together. Th at’s the only place where I wish I had been 

a little faster on the trigger shooting those guys downrange, because they brought a great 

capability that was very well needed, because frankly, the guys that were there were getting 

tired. It was like bringing in, you know, the relief team.469

Th e National Guard deployment process was not well coordinated with the command of 

the active-duty military forces either. Assistant Secretary McHale testifi ed to the Congress, 

“Military command and control was workable, but not unifi ed. National Guard planning, 

though superbly executed, was not well integrated with the Joint Staff in NORTHCOM.”470

Senior DOD offi cers also expressed concern that the rapid, poorly coordinated state-to-state 

EMAC deployments, in eff ect “preempted” a large part of DOD’s role to coordinate the overall military response in the event of a domestic catastrophe. General Rowe, Director of Operations at NORTHCOM, observed that although this process provided “incredible amounts of 

manpower,” there was no integration or tasking of these forces until they arrived in the state. 

“It’s a heck of a way to do military business,” General Rowe commented. 471 Admiral Keating, 

Commander of NORTHCOM, stated that in a catastrophic event NORTHCOM, on behalf of 

DOD, should have a greater control over the deployment process.472 Former Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Chairman General Myers agreed with both of these observations. 473

9:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Honoré meets with General Landreneau and General Jones at the Superdome

General Honoré arrived at the Superdome at around 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday to assess 

the deteriorating conditions.474 “When I got there Wednesday morning,” General Honoré 

recalled, “it was hell.”475

General Honoré informed General Landreneau about some of the military assets that were 

en route, including U.S. Navy ships, but there was no discussion of ground troops at this 

meeting.476 General Honoré then met with New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, and Scott Wells, 

the FEMA Deputy FCO in Louisiana. Wells was the senior FEMA representative at the 

Superdome, reporting to William Lokey. Th ey discussed how to evacuate the Superdome. 

Wells asked General Honoré if he could take the lead for the evacuation. According to 

Wells, General Honoré replied, “Whoa, wait a minute, I need to get my people here and 

then we’ll talk later.”477

As this exchange between Wells and General Honoré refl ects, neither FEMA nor Louisiana 

offi cials had a clear understanding of General Honoré’s role and capabilities. Phil Parr, the 

head of one of FEMA’s emergency-response teams that was sent into Louisiana, was under 

the incorrect impression that General Honoré had been placed in charge of the Superdome 

evacuation.478 He also was disappointed that General Honoré had not brought more troops: 

“He had no troops on the ground to do what needed to be done early on.”479

State offi cials also did not have a clear understanding of the capabilities under General 

Honoré’s command. General Landreneau stated, “I was expecting troops to arrive.”480 Other 

Louisiana National Guard offi cers echoed this expectation.481

General Honoré acknowledged that others may have misinterpreted his initial presence 

as the vanguard of a much larger military deployment of ground troops. General Honoré 
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explained, however, that this was not a classic military operation, where a commanding 

general appears at the battlefront only in the presence of a large number of troops: 

In a classic military operation, I would have sat here in Atlanta and put a brigadier 

or a major general in Camp Shelby and maybe send a brigadier to New Orleans 

and to Biloxi. Th at’s the classic. Th e general will sit back, get the feeds in from the 

troops. ... So in this case, I reversed a paradigm. I left my staff at home and went 

forward on the battlefi eld, which may have given a perception to people when 

they saw me that all the federal troops were there, which was not the case. And 

I never [pretended] that that was the fact when I got there, but people come up 

with their own assumptions. Well, damn, if the general is here, his troops must be 

outside the city. ... Th is is a humanitarian operation, not an attack on a foreign 

country where it gets secured and then the general comes in.482

Immediately aft er he found out that General Landreneau had made a direct request to 

General Honoré for federal military troops, Wells explained to Colonel Jeff Smith, General 

Landreneau’s deputy at the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, how this direct request to General Honoré disrupted the “unifi ed command” the 

state and FEMA were trying to achieve – i.e., a coordinated process for requesting assistance 

and directing response activities: 

And I said, the state does not go to DOD directly, you’re supposed to come to 

[FEMA], we will go to DOD to get whatever support you need. ... Th at breaks 

– that not only violates protocol, but it breaks the whole unifi ed-command 

approach, when you go out to another agency and then this three-star general 

just shows up.483

Morning, Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco calls the White House to 

ask for “signifi cant resources” 

According to the Governor’s timeline: 

Governor Blanco places an urgent morning call to the White House in an effort to reach President Bush and express the need for signifi cant resources. She 

is unable to reach President Bush or his Chief of Staff , Andrew Card. A later 

phone call reaches Maggie Grant in the White House Offi ce of Intergovernmental Aff airs. Th e Governor receives a call from Homeland Security Advisor 

Frances Townsend. Andrew Card returns her call too, and she requests his 

help in getting the promised FEMA buses into the New Orleans area.484

As the following events demonstrate, the transmission of the state’s request for resources 

directly to the White House does not appear to have expedited the response to the state, at 

least with respect to federal military resources. White House offi cials did not understand 

what the Governor was requesting. Th ere also appears to have been poor coordination 

between the White House and FEMA. Even aft er the Governor clarifi ed the nature of her 

request directly with the President – that she wanted federal troops but not “federalization” 

– Brown continued to advocate to the White House that the response be “federalized.” 

Additionally, Brown does not appear to have consulted with DOD regarding the need for 

federalization, either prior to or aft er advocating that position to the White House. 

12:43 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: U.S. Senator David Vitter of Louisiana 

informs Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel to Governor Blanco, of a conversation with Karl Rove, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , regarding Rove’s 

comments on “federalization”
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In addition to former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, it appears that Governor 

Blanco’s request to White House Homeland Security Advisor Townsend was passed along 

to Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove. Senator Vitter relayed to Ryder that Rove “understands 

that the Governor is asking to federalize the evacuation piece.”485 Th e Committee has been 

unable to determine what Rove’s understanding at this time may have been regarding the 

Governor’s request – whether he believed the Governor was seeking federal assistance in 

evacuating the Superdome, or seeking federal control of the evacuation. 

2:30 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco tells President Bush she 

does not want “federalization” 

According to Ryder, immediately aft er he relayed Sen. Vitter’s conversation with Rove to 

Governor Blanco, the Governor telephoned President Bush to clarify her request – she 

wanted federal assistance, but did not want to give up her command of the National Guard 

troops within the state. 486

According to Ryder’s notes, the Governor made it clear she did not want to “federalize” the 

evacuation. “I’m not asking for federalization,” the Governor told the President. “It’s not a 

federalization request.”487 Rather, the Governor told the President she wanted “to be a partner in a unifi ed command.”488 Under a “unifi ed command,” the Governor would remain 

in command of the National Guard troops, and the President would be in command of the 

active-duty forces. Ryder also reported that the Governor also told the President, “We have 

a communication problem and [it] needs improvement.”489 Th e Governor repeated her request for federal military assistance.490 At the Committee’s hearing, when asked whether she 

was seeking National Guard or active-duty troops, Governor Blanco replied, “It was both. 

We needed troops.”491

Mid-aft ernoon, Wednesday, August 31: FEMA offi cials consider federalization 

At about the same time that the Governor informed the President that she did not want federalization, senior FEMA offi cials began discussing it. Lokey recalled a conversation with Brown: 

I remember going to Michael Brown and saying, this is beyond me, this is beyond FEMA, this is beyond the state. We need to, and I used the term, we need 

to federalize this or get a massive military invasion in here to get some help. 

And Mike said, “I’ll talk to headquarters. I’ll talk to DHS about that and I’ll talk 

to the attorneys.”492

Lokey told the Committee staff he did not understand what he meant when he used the 

term “federalization”: 

I don’t exactly know what I meant. What I meant was that – what I was talking 

about was turning this over to somebody that can manage something this size. 

I’ve never done something like this. I was trying my best. I wasn’t doing very 

good at it. So that was just a term I used.493

 Brown confi rmed Lokey’s account. 494 On Wednesday, Brown concluded that FEMA, 

state, and local capabilities were inadequate. He stated that Louisiana, “for whatever reason 

– culture, their system, their lack of resources,” was “dysfunctional.”495 In Brown’s view, the 

inability to establish a unifi ed command was evidence of this dysfunction:

Th ere was not a unifi ed command yet. Th e Governor was overwhelmed, and 

the Governor didn’t have a good decision-making process set up around her 

where she could make decisions; bless her heart. I mean, it really bugged me. 

She had too many people coming in telling her what she needed to do, from 
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U.S. Senators all the way down to, I mean, I don’t know who they were, just 

showing up in her little room coming in just hodgepodge saying, you need to 

be doing this and that and everything else. 

And you just can’t have that. You need to have a unifi ed command where that stuff comes 

in and gets sorted out, and then [LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director] Jeff Smith or somebody 

comes in and says, Governor, here are your decision points, you need to go to X, or Y, or Z 

and make those.496

Brown stated that he recommended the entire response be “federalized,” meaning that the 

President invoke the Insurrection Act and place the National Guard under the control of 

the active-duty forces:

Because at that time, we’re looking at these stories of shootings and looting and 

everything else going on, and I’m fearful that’s spiraling out of control, and 

I want active-duty troops that are ready, willing and able to kill in that area, 

because we can’t do search and rescue with that kind of stuff going on.497

Brown stated that he telephoned either White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card or Deputy 

Chief of Staff Joe Hagin to recommend federalization of the response in Louisiana. “I had 

conversations that said, Andy, we need to federalize this thing.”498

Although Brown told the Committee that for the next 72 hours he was a “strong advocate” 

of this position499 – i.e., that a “massive military” involvement was necessary, including active-duty ground troops that were “ready, willing and able to kill” – there is scant evidence 

that he or anyone else in FEMA discussed this view with DOD. It appears that he did not 

discuss this issue with General Honoré, who told the Committee that nobody had ever 

expressed to him any need for active-duty ground troops.500 Furthermore, it apparently was 

not until the next day, Th ursday, September 1, that FEMA began discussing with DOD the 

need for DOD to take over the logistics mission.501

Assistant Secretary McHale stated that possibly as early as Wednesday, offi cials in the Pentagon began considering what role the military should play in restoring order, and whether 

active-duty troops should be used for law enforcement activities in addition to the 4,200 

National Guard military police who were already deploying to the region.502 On Saturday, 

September 3, the President ordered the deployment of 7,200 active-duty troops from the 

Army and the Marine Corps to Louisiana. Assistant Secretary McHale explained that they 

were sent “not for the purposes of law enforcement, but for ... humanitarian relief. It was 

clear, however, that ... they would be available and readily deployable for law enforcementrelated missions if the President, under the Insurrection Act, were to use his statutory and 

Constitutional authority, to reassign those units for purposes of enforcing constitutional 

rights or other provisions of federal law.”503

Mid-aft ernoon, Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco tells FEMA Director Brown and Louisiana Federal Coordinating Offi cer Lokey she does not 

want federalization 

According to Lokey, “within an hour” of his conversation with Brown about federalization, 

Governor Blanco requested to see him. “What’s this about you taking over my disaster?” she 

asked Lokey.504 Governor Blanco later explained that she objected to federalization because 

it could have subjected the state’s National Guard troops to the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition against federal troops conducting law enforcement activities.505 “I did not want the 

Guard federalized,” Governor Blanco testifi ed. “It’s very important for a governor to be able 

to retain control of the National Guard precisely for its law enforcement capabilities.”506
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Louisiana offi cials also believed there was no need to federalize the Guard. “Let me remind 

you the state is still sovereign,” a member of the Governor’s staff told Lokey and Brown. 

“We can handle it,” General Landreneau added. 507 “Fine, good,” Brown said.508

 6 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco asks General Honoré to 

coordinate the evacuation of New Orleans.

Late Wednesday aft ernoon, General Honoré arrived at the State Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge, and met with Governor Blanco and General Landreneau. Th ey 

discussed the state’s priority missions, particularly search and rescue and the evacuation of 

New Orleans and the surrounding area. FEMA Director Brown was also present.509 “Federalization” was not discussed. Governor Blanco asked General Honoré “to coordinate the 

evacuation eff orts in New Orleans, so that General Landreneau can concentrate on saving 

lives, search and rescue, and law and order issues.”510

In the midst of this discussion, General Graham, Deputy Commander of Fift h U.S. Army, 

arrived at the EOC, aft er driving seven hours from his headquarters in San Antonio, TX. 

General Graham brought with him 24 other personnel from Fift h Army headquarters for 

the purpose of providing support to the DCO in Baton Rouge. 511 Shortly aft er General Graham joined the discussion about the state’s priorities, General Honoré turned to him and 

said, “Mark, evacuate the City of New Orleans and the Greater New Orleans area.” “Yes, 

sir,” General Graham replied.512

Again, the principal participants in these conversations expressed diff ering perceptions and 

expectations as to the numbers and types of military troops that would be following. Governor Blanco and General Landreneau appear to have been under the impression that General 

Honoré would use a large number of federal troops to conduct the evacuation; General 

Honoré believed large numbers of additional active-duty troops were not needed for this 

mission. At the very least, the persistence of these diff ering expectations and perceptions 

amongst these principals appears to indicate a failure in communication among the principals and among the various organizations they represented. 

According to the Governor’s timeline, the Governor asked General Honoré “if he brought 

a large number of soldiers, and learns that he arrived with only a small support staff . Th e 

evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has 

not arrived.”513

General Landreneau told the Committee, “Th e Governor was very clear that she needed 

troops on the ground, that she needed a federal assistance. ... She said she needed – she was 

using the number 40,000 and she was saying she needed soldiers, she needed boots on the 

ground.”514 General Landreneau added, however, that the Governor never specifi ed which 

type of troops she was seeking. “I don’t recall her ever defi ning or diff erentiating between 

active or National Guard. She wanted the help.”515

General Landreneau recalled General Honoré “stating that he was aware that the National 

Guard EMAC forces were going to be fl owing into the state.”516 “I don’t recall the Governor 

ever saying that’s not good enough,” General Landreneau stated.517

Similarly, General Honoré did not recall the Governor’s making any specifi c request for 

more federal ground troops.518 Nor did General Honoré believe additional federal ground 

troops were necessary to meet the state’s priorities. “Th e National Guard was fl owing a lot 

of troops in there. And at the point in time, the priority mission was search and rescue.”519

General Honoré believed that for the search-and-rescue mission he needed “thousands of 

helicopters, not troops,” and that for the Superdome evacuation mission he needed buses. 
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Based on this assessment of the resources needed to accomplish these missions, General 

Honoré did not request additional federal ground troops.520

Likewise, General Graham did not believe he needed additional troops. “I needed buses,” 

General Graham said.521 Shortly aft er enough buses were located, General Graham and his 

team coordinated the eff orts of the Louisiana National Guard, Louisiana State Police, and 

other supporting agencies – whose personnel were already present – to actually conduct 

evacuations of the Superdome, the I-10 overpass, and the Convention Center. 

 6:05 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Richard Rowe, NORTHCOM, 

informs General Honoré that Governor Blanco is asking for federal activeduty troops

In an e-mail sent at 6:05 p.m., Major General Richard Rowe, Director of Operations at 

NORTHCOM, sought General Honoré’s views on the Governor’s requests for “federal troops”:

Th ere should be calls coming your way. Th ere is a desire to concentrate National 

Guardsmen into [New Orleans] for [law-enforcement]/security tasks. Governor 

has asked that federal troops pick up rest of the tasks being uncovered by Guard 

in state. Th oughts? What does this mean in terms of scale? Type capabilities?522

 6:23 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Honoré’s staff informs General 

Rowe there are enough National Guard troops 

Replying to General Rowe, Colonel James Hickey, General Honoré’s Executive Offi cer, 

wrote that “[We] think there are enough ARNG [Army National Guard] Soldiers and volunteers to perform all these missions,” but that General Honoré would try to obtain more 

information about the state’s request while in Baton Rouge that evening.523

8:40 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: DOD puts ground troops on alert 

At 8:40 p.m., Army Forces Command put several of its forces with rapid-deployment ability on 

high alert (“Be Prepared to Deploy” status):524 the 82nd Airborne Division of XVIII Airborne 

Corps, which describes its mission as, “Within 18 hours of notifi cation, the 82nd Airborne Division strategically deploys, conducts forcible entry parachute assault and secures key objectives 

for follow-on military operations in support of U.S. national interests;”525 and the 1st Cavalry 

Division of III Corps, which describes itself as the “Army’s largest division and only armored 

contingency force, ready to deploy anywhere in the world on a moment’s notice.”526

Th ursday, September 1: President Bush meets with Secretary of Defense 

Rumsfeld and General Blum to discuss the military response 527

Th e Committee has been unable to obtain any details about this meeting. 

11:46 a.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Honoré tells General Rowe National Guard troops are suffi cient

Aft er meeting with Governor Blanco and General Landreneau the previous evening, General Honoré again informed General Rowe that he did not believe additional federal ground 

troops were necessary. Personally responding to General Rowe, General Honoré wrote:

PUSH BACK. I WILL SEE GOV TODAY. WILL SHOW HER FLOW OF NG 

TROOPS. NG HAS GROUND FIGHT IN HAND WITH [24,000] IN NEXT 

R6 HOURS.528
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General Blum confi rmed that he and General Honoré were in agreement that the number of 

National Guard troops in the state and on the way was adequate: 

When I went down there on one of my trips, and we actually sat down on two 

buckets under a tree and we had a conversation, I mean, between the two of 

us saying hey, this is what I got coming down here, Russ, and he’s going, It 

sounds right; it sounds good.529

1:46 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Honoré urges Marines to “GET 

HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN” 

Early Th ursday aft ernoon, General Honoré exchanged e-mail messages with General James 

Amos, Commander, II Marine Expeditionary Force, urging him to get to the New Orleans 

area as quickly as possible, along with the various assets he had placed aboard Navy amphibious ships that were steaming toward the Gulf Coast region. “HELLO BROTHER. GET 

HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN,” General Honoré wrote.530 General Honoré explained to 

the Committee that he desired the capability that the Marines were bringing which included 

search-and-rescue helicopters, airspace command and control, and ground troops to assist 

with search and rescue and delivery of food and water. 531

At the Committee’s hearing, Senator Levin asked whether General Honoré’s request for 

the Marines to deploy into New Orleans was inconsistent with the “push back” to the 

Governor’s request for more active-duty troops. Admiral Keating, Commander of NORTHCOM, responded that it was his understanding the Governor was seeking military police, 

for which active-duty troops would have been unsuitable due to the restrictions in the Posse 

Comitatus Act, whereas General Honoré was seeking the particular capabilities the Marines could bring, such as helicopters and troops to conduct search and rescue.532 However, 

General Rowe’s e-mail of the previous day indicated that the Governor was seeking federal 

active-duty troops to perform non-law-enforcement activities so the National Guard troops 

could concentrate on law-enforcement activities. 

General Honoré stated that there “wasn’t a big cry for federal ground troops” at the time 

he wrote the e-mail,533 but that on Friday, he believed additional active-duty ground forces 

would be helpful.534 Th e record therefore remains unclear why the Marines were preparing 

to deploy ground troops at the same time that DOD offi cers were stating there was a suffi cient number of National Guard troops on the ground. 

1:50 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Rowe tells General Honoré the offi -

cial DOD guidance is to use National Guard forces to the fullest extent possible

Continuing the e-mail chain regarding the Governor’s general desire for federal troops, 

General Rowe reports back to General Honoré:

Guidance is “guard” in NO and “guard” to fullest extent possible for tasks in 

LA and MS. NGB [National Guard Bureau] supports. EMAC working. OSD 

[Offi ce of Secretary of Defense] and CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff ] 

agree with this.535

Th is DOD position is refl ected in the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which in the fi rst instance relies upon the National Guard and military reserves for 

civil-support missions.536 “Th e National Guard has more than three centuries of experience 

in dealing with domestic response,” Assistant Secretary McHale explained. “It makes sense 

to use active-duty military forces primarily for overseas missions, war fi ghting missions, and 

to rely on Reserve component capabilities, most especially the National Guard, for homeland defense and civil support.”537
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Th e Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Myers, confi rmed that this e-mail accurately refl ected DOD’s view, at the time, that in light of the large numbers of National Guard 

troops fl owing into the region, there was not a need for additional active-duty troops.538

 3:30 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: Governor Blanco meets with General 

Honoré 

Th e Governor’s timeline does not mention this meeting;539 General Honoré does not recall 

any request for federal troops at this meeting.540

 7:45 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, U.S. 

Coast Guard, urges Governor Blanco to federalize the response 

Early Th ursday evening, Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard 

District, recommended to the Governor that she “federalize” the response. Terry Ryder, 

Executive Counsel to Governor Blanco, described Admiral Duncan’s advice:

He had been in the fi eld with his folks on helicopters. He had one change of 

clothes. Many of the people – his house was under water. ... He was having to 

use a Coast Guard credit card to buy water. He was mad at Mike Brown. Th at 

is why he was there. He ran into the Governor. While he is talking to the Governor, he does tell her ... we need to get armed people on the street. He advised 

her to federalize, which that time was kind of clear he wanted to bring in the 

Department of Defense people forces.541

Th e record is not clear whether Admiral Duncan was recommending that additional DOD 

forces be brought in or, in addition, that the state National Guard troops be placed under 

federal command, as is suggested by the term “federalize.” 

9:20 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Blum urges Governor Blanco not 

to federalize the response 

On Th ursday evening Governor Blanco met with General Blum. Th ey discussed troop levels 

and the appropriate command-and-control structure for the military forces in the state. Th e 

Governor told General Blum that although she was “very happy” with the response of the 

National Guard, she was still not satisfi ed because she needed an additional 30,000 troops 

– to make a total of 40,000 troops within the state – and very few active-duty forces had arrived.542 General Blum committed to work with General Landreneau to get the capabilities 

that the state needed, although General Blum did not believe that would necessarily entail 

30,000 more ground troops.543

General Blum also recommended against placing the state National Guard forces under federal control. General Blum told the Governor and her staff that federalization was “not necessary to receive more federal assets,” and “would have signifi cantly limited [the state’s] capacity 

to conduct law-enforcement missions.”544 He recommended the continuation of the joint 

command structure, whereby General Landreneau would continue to command the National 

Guard forces, and General Honoré would continue to command the active-duty forces. 

Early mid-morning, Friday, September 2: Department of Defense offi cials 

discuss how to obtain greater federal control over the response in Louisiana 

Th e Administration spent much of Friday, September 2, searching for ways to assert greater 

federal control over the response in Louisiana.545 Th ese eff orts began with a series of meetings at the Pentagon involving Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff General Myers, Assistant Secretary McHale, and Lieutenant General James Conway, 
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Director of Operations for the Joint Staff . According to DOD documents, the discussions 

concerned various options for gaining greater federal control over the military forces in 

Louisiana, including the National Guard forces. Th ese options included use of the Insurrection Act and the designation of a single military offi cer to be in command of both the 

National Guard and active duty forces – a so-called “dual hat” commander.546

On several recent occasions prior to Katrina, DOD and several states had used a dual-hat 

commander to integrate the operations of the National Guard and active-duty forces. 

Th e single dual-hat offi cer reported to the Governor when exercising command and control 

over the National Guard forces, and to the President when exercising command and control over the active-duty forces. Th is structure was employed at the 2004 Democratic and 

Republican National Conventions, and the 2004 G-8 Summit, where both active-duty and 

National Guard forces worked together to provide security. 

Although the Committee was not able to interview White House offi cials about the President’s actions or decisions, the military advantages of the dual-hat command structure – an 

integrated command structure for all of the military forces in the region – appear to have 

been a signifi cant motivation underlying DOD’s support for the proposal. Both General 

Myers and Assistant Secretary McHale advocated the dual-hat approach. For General Myers, establishing a single chain of command for all military forces was “a basic tenet of how 

we like to do our business.”547 At the time, Assistant Secretary McHale also supported the 

proposal because it would provide a more integrated command structure. According to 

Assistant Secretary McHale, he recommended the dual-hat command to the Secretary of 

Defense, who “reviewed that recommendation, concurred in that recommendation, and 

took it to the President for the President’s consideration.”548

Late morning, Friday, September 2: President Bush and Governor Blanco 

discuss the deployment of federal troops 

President Bush arrived aboard Air Force One at the New Orleans Louis Armstrong Airport 

late Friday morning. Mayor Nagin, FEMA Director Brown, General Blum, White House 

Chief of Staff Card, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin, Louisiana Senators Landrieu 

and Vitter, and several Louisiana congressmen were present for an initial meeting with the 

President and Governor Blanco. Aft er the initial meeting, President Bush and Governor 

Blanco met privately.549

Aboard Air Force One, late Friday morning, September 2: Mayor Nagin 

recommends the federal government assume control

During the initial meeting aboard Air Force One, Mayor Nagin recommended that General 

Honoré be placed in charge.550 Mayor Nagin testifi ed: 

I probably was a bit pushy at that meeting, because in the midst of all the 

rhetoric that was going on around the table, I stopped everyone and basically 

said, “Mr. President, Madame Governor, if the two of you don’t get together 

on this issue, more people are going to die in this city, and you need to resolve 

this immediately.” And they said yes. And I said, “Well, everybody else in this 

room, let’s leave and let them work this out right now.”551

Aboard Air Force One, late Friday morning, September 2: Governor Blanco 

asks President Bush for more troops and rejects federalization 

Still aboard Air Force One, Governor Blanco, President Bush, and Deputy White House 

Chief of Staff Hagen met privately for about 30 to 45 minutes. Governor Blanco again 
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521

pressed the President for federal troops, as only about 13,000 of the 40,000 troops that she 

had requested had arrived. “I needed people,” the Governor testifi ed.552 Th e President raised 

the issue whether the National Guard forces should be placed under federal command; the 

Governor made her position “very clear” that she did not want to give up her authority over 

the National Guard. “I told the President that the proper way to do business would be for 

me as governor to retain control of the National Guard and for him to simply send troops 

in.”553 Th e Governor told the President that if she changed her mind, she’d let him know 

within 24 hours.554

Approximately a week later, the New Orleans Times-Picayune reported what happened at 

that meeting as follows:

Aft er the session with Blanco, the President invited Nagin into his offi ce and 

told the mayor that he was “ready to move today” on the troop deployments 

and had off ered two command options to Blanco, Nagin said. Th e mayor did 

not identify the options. However, the President said Blanco wanted 24 hours to 

make a decision, according to Nagin, who later roasted the governor in national 

TV interviews for the delay: “It would have been great if we could have left Air 

Force One, walked outside, and told the world that we had this all worked out,” 

Nagin told an interviewer. “It didn’t happen, and more people died.”555

Th e Committee has attempted to determine whether the deployment of federal troops 

was delayed in order to give the Governor time to reconsider her position on the Administration’s proposal. On Friday, September 2, active-duty ground forces were prepared to 

deploy,556 but the President did not issue the deployment order until late Saturday morning. 

Both the White House557 and the Governor’s offi ce558 deny that this decision to deploy these 

or other active-duty ground troops was delayed by the President’s request or the Governor’s 

refusal to accede. General Blum, who was aboard Air Force One Friday morning as well, has 

said that this was also his impression.559

General Myers told the Committee that from a military perspective, it was necessary to 

establish the command-and-control structure before a sizeable number of troops would be 

deployed.560 Th en-FEMA Director Brown told the Committee that he and other Administration offi cials told the Governor that troops could be deployed more quickly if there 

were a more unifi ed military command – i.e. all under federal control – but the President’s 

request for greater authority over the military forces within the state was not part of any 

type of “carrot and stick” approach toward the Governor.561 Because the White House has 

refused to permit White House offi cials to be interviewed by the Committee, and DOD offi cials have refused to discuss their conversations with White House offi cials, the Committee’s record on this issue is incomplete. 

Late aft ernoon, Friday, September 2: Pentagon offi cials continue to discuss 

options for assuming greater command of the response.

Th roughout Friday, DOD offi cials continued to analyze various options for strengthening 

the federal response. Th ese options included (1) invoking the Insurrection Act as a basis for 

asserting federal control over all of the military forces in the region, (2) appointing an activeduty offi cer to be “dual-hat” commander of both the National Guard and active duty forces, 

and (3) “Beef up FEMA,” presumably meaning provide additional support to FEMA.562

11:32 p.m., Friday, September 2: White House faxes “dual-hat” proposal to 

Governor Blanco 
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Late Friday night, the White House faxed to the Governor a proposal, accompanied by a 

draft letter prepared for the Governor to transmit to the President, that would have established General Honoré as a dual-hat offi cer, providing him with command and control over 

the Louisiana National Guard, reporting to the Governor, while retaining command and 

control over active-duty forces in Louisiana, reporting through the DOD chain of command to the President. 

Th e White House dual-hat proposal faxed to the Governor diff ered from the dual-hat commands used for the G-8 Summit and the 2004 political conventions in that in those previous 

instances, the dual-hat commander was a state National Guard offi cer who was placed into 

active-duty (Title 10) status for the purpose of also exercising command and control over the 

active-duty forces. Th e President’s dual-hat proposal to Governor Blanco would have placed 

an active-duty offi cer rather than a National Guard federal offi cer in the dual-hat position. 

Th is active-duty offi cer would have exercised command and control over both the activeduty forces, acting under a chain of command that reported to the President, and command 

and control of the National Guard forces, reporting to Governor Blanco. Th e proposal also 

provided that in the event of a confl ict, the federal chain of command would prevail. 

Terry Ryder, the Governor’s Executive Counsel, received the fax when it arrived at the Executive Mansion in Baton Rouge, near midnight:

What happens is that fax comes in and I looked at it and realized it was an 

arrangement which was in the direction of so called federalization. ... I immediately called the Governor. ... I believe I told her I wanted to pull all of her 

senior advisors together immediately, and this is probably about midnight, to 

have them all look at it and to get back to her aft er we read that in the MOU. 

... I woke them all up and brought them back to the OEP and we all read it, 

brainstormed for a while, and at some point ...we called the Governor back 

and said, “Governor, this is the so called federalization and this is what it 

does,” and in that conversation with Landreneau, with [former FEMA Director 

James Lee]Witt, we refreshed our recollection on Gen. Blum’s conversation on 

the night before.563

Andy Kopplin, Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff , told the Committee the Governor’s immediate reaction: 

Th e Governor said, I’m not signing anything in the middle of the night. You 

guys do a thorough review of the issues surrounding it. ... If it could save lives 

and deliver more resources, that’s something that I would want to do.564

Later that night, Kopplin spoke to White House Chief of Staff Card. According to Kopplin, 

Card said, “Th ey’d like the Governor to sign this letter asking for this [agreement].” Kopplin also said, “He indicated that it would improve coordination and speed the delivery of 

federal assets.”565

Card and General Blum also spoke to Governor Blanco.566 Governor Blanco told General 

Blum that she “certainly didn’t want to make midnight decisions, even though I happened 

to be very wide awake.”567 When asked whether she felt “under pressure at that point, as 

compared to the conversation with the President earlier in the day,” Governor Blanco answered, “Well, it was a very diff erent kind of pressure, but I still told him no. ... I was very 

defi nitive, sir. Th ere was never a question in my mind as to the lines of authority.”568

General Blum related that Governor Blanco never wavered from the position that she remained in charge of the National Guard forces in Louisiana:
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523

Th e bottom line of it is there were many off ers and overtures made to the Governor on command and control, but they all centered on a Federal offi cer being 

in charge of the Governor’s National Guard, and that was rejected. It was offered by several messengers, and it was sent in various forms or variations. But 

the option was always – the bottom part of the option, the overriding piece of 

the option never deviated from it will be a federal offi cer that will be in charge 

of your National Guard and the federal troops that are there, and the Governor 

rejected the off er.569

 8:56 a.m., Saturday, September 3: Governor Blanco telephones White House 

Chief of Staff Card to reject the dual-hat proposal

“In retrospect,” Assistant Secretary McHale testifi ed, “I’m glad that we did not invoke 

either a dual-hatted commander or the statutory authority under the Insurrection Act.” He 

explained that “in a crisis environment, I think it’s almost inevitable that a president and a 

governor will have diff erences of opinion. To put an offi cer in the crossfi re between the two 

of them I think is untenable.”570

11 a.m., Saturday, September 3: Th e President announces the deployment of 

7,200 active-duty forces from the 82nd Airborne, 1st Cavalry, and II Marine 

Expeditionary Force 571

Th ese active-duty forces were placed under the command of General Honoré, and the 

National Guard forces remained under the command of Governor Blanco and General 

Landreneau. 

Governor Blanco testifi ed that she never needed these federal troops for law enforcement: “I had the National Guard for that.”572 Assistant Secretary McHale stated that DOD 

considered that these troops would be a contingency if additional forces were required to 

supplement the National Guard Military Police for law enforcement. But the President did 

not invoke the Insurrection Act, and the active-duty troops were never called to perform 

law enforcement. Rather they performed numerous other humanitarian missions, including door-to-door search and rescue, debris removal, and logistics support. Moreover, their 

mere presence had a reassuring eff ect, according to many witnesses. “Th at was a recognition by people that the administration and the nation was responding,” said Colonel Terry 

Ebbert, the Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans.573

Two days later, Admiral Keating expressed his confi dence in the dual-command structure 

for the National Guard and active-duty forces. In response to a question about “what advantage or disadvantage federalizing the operation would have meant,” Admiral Keating stated:

From our perspective it would not have provided an advantage over our current situation. I think this is a topic of, I know it’s a topic of discussion between 

the President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and Secretary 

Chertoff , but from this headquarters through General Honoré. ... We’re satisfi ed with the current command and control arrangement where the Governors of Mississippi and Louisiana exercised their constitutional prerogative of 

control of the National Guard, and Russ Honoré as Joint Task Force Katrina’s 

commander has command of the active-duty forces.574
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Conclusion

To a large degree, the divergence of opinion between state and federal offi cials on the federal military response to troop-deployment requests appears to be the result of the ad-hoc 

processes by which the large-scale requests for troops were made and evaluated. Th e process 

envisioned by the NRP for requesting DOD assistance was not used for the large-scale 

requests for military troops. Instead, these requests were made through a variety of other 

channels, both state and federal. Th e requests were not specifi c; the responses were not 

coordinated. Communication among all of the entities involved in this issue ranged from 

poor to non-existent. It therefore is no surprise that there has never been a “meeting of the 

minds” on DOD’s responsiveness to the state requests.

Th e Katrina response, as detailed in this section, indicates the need for better coordination 

between the states and the principal federal agencies involved in coordinating the military 

response – DOD, DHS, and FEMA. Th is response also indicates the need to better coordinate the responses of the military forces under the diff erent state and federal commands 

– the National Guard and the active duty forces – especially in a catastrophic event. 

Recommendations: 

• Th e Department of Defense (DOD) and the state governors should develop 

an integrated plan for the employment of National Guard units and personnel 

in state status when large-scale military support is requested by a state to respond to a catastrophic incident or disaster. Th e plan should include a process 

for identifi cation of National Guard units with the capabilities required to 

respond to the incident or disaster, and should take into account the availability of National Guard units for mobilization for national-defense missions. Th e 

plan should include expedited procedures for requesting and approving federal 

funding under Title 32, United States Code, for National Guard forces employed in accordance with the plan, and procedures for DOD and governors, 

during a catastrophe, to coordinate the process of matching units and capabilities of National Guard forces with the requirements of governors. 

• All DOD support activities should be coordinated with the other federal support activities provided under the framework of the National Response Plan in 

the event of an emergency or disaster. Th e entire spectrum of potential DOD 

support activities should be integrated into the overall planning and preparedness activities led by the Department of Homeland Security at the federal, state, 

and local levels. 

Department of Defense Conclusion

Th e Department’s contributions to the Katrina response fl ow directly from its professional, 

sustained emphasis on education, training, retention, and rigorous adherence to standards, 

coupled with a budget and resources unparalleled across the government. Military culture 

also played a role, as many offi cials reported to the Committee that their eff orts in response 

to Katrina were the most rewarding and satisfying missions of their oft en extensive careers. 

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Ellis of the Ohio National Guard commanded a battalion that 

deployed to the Superdome during the fi rst week, and reported:

Like all commanders, my soldiers were there about seven days before they had 

their fi rst shower. Th ey never once complained while they were there, and to 

see the professionalism and the dedication that those young soldiers displayed 
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525

throughout that diffi cult time makes me immensely proud to have been a part 

of that.575

However, as with all agencies and all levels of government, Katrina exposed weaknesses of, 

and raised questions about, the military’s mechanisms for responding to disasters. Given 

DOD’s unmatched power and size, and its unique Constitutional status, these questions 

merit careful consideration. 

To what extent should the nation rely upon the Department of Defense in disaster response? 

Th e Department of Homeland Security was created, in part, to respond to domestic emergencies, but Katrina revealed that in critical missions, particularly in logistics, search and rescue, 

and command and control, it was unprepared to address a catastrophe of Katrina’s magnitude. At the same time, Department of Defense, since September 11, 2001, and since establishing U.S. Northern Command, has revised its mission to refl ect a greater focus on homeland 

defense. Its capabilities in this arena have therefore grown more robust. But Assistant Secretary McHale cautioned against placing too much reliance upon the military’s capabilities:

I would urge you to think simultaneously about speed and the fundamental 

public policy missions, public policy questions associated with the role of the 

military within domestic American society and constitutional government. ... 

We have to balance not only what the military is capable of doing, questions of 

speed and resources, but what the military ought to be doing consistent with the 

historically constrained role of the military within domestic American society.576

Is it wiser to further develop these capabilities in DHS? If DOD’s resources were already 

engaged in an overseas mission, military support might not be available to the extent that it 

was during Katrina. In that case, a more capable DHS would be preferable, especially since 

many of the missions DOD performed were not uniquely military. DHS could adopt 

military models of logistics, training, career development, and centralized incident management to improve its ability to function independently. 

At the same time, when military assistance is required, to what degree should we rely on a 

system in which specifi c assets are requested? Aft er-action reviews stressed, just as they had 

following Hurricane Andrew, that DOD must not wait for requests to push assets forward. 

But Katrina revealed a tension between a system of planned, coordinated movement, and the 

value of commanders’ initiative in moving in advance of orders. Initiative, in this case, proved 

essential to the swift deployment of resources, but it also contributed to an uncoordinated 

response, in which strategic commanders lacked clear visibility over the force structure. 

Katrina also revealed tension between gubernatorial and Presidential executive powers, underlying a delicate federalist balance: should governors retain full control of their National 

Guard forces aft er catastrophic events? Th e governors of the two most seriously aff ected 

states here answered “yes” unequivocally.577 Yet at the height of the crisis, the President 

and senior military and civilian DOD leaders grew concerned that the scale of the military 

response – both the size of the National Guard force and the addition of federal activeduty ground troops – required a single commander. Governor Blanco’s rejection of their 

proposed solution, however, has led DOD offi cials to realize that unity of command, long a 

staple of military operations, can also prove inconsistent with states’ Constitutional powers. 

Th e fi nal resolution was to achieve unity of eff ort through the close coordination of federal 

and state-controlled military forces. But as has been widely documented, numerous factors challenged this coordination. While the Committee has not determined that a lack of 

coordination impaired the eff ectiveness of the military response to Katrina, many leaders 

agree that we must establish mechanisms now to ensure unity of eff ort between the Guard 
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526

and active-duty forces the next time they are called for such a common cause. Only through 

forethought, planning, and consensus among the agencies and levels of government can we 

ensure that we do not encounter a political or leadership crisis in a catastrophe that may be 

even more destructive, and provide less warning, than Katrina.

1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, p. 

8 [hereinaft er NRP].

2 Committee staff interview of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 85.

3 NRP, p. 43.

4 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 88.

5 National Academy of Public Administration, Th e Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response, 

Jan. 1997, pp. 18, 123-126.

6 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, p. 35.

7 NRP, p. 8.

8 National Emergency Managers Association, “What is EMAC?” http://www.emacweb.org/?9. Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

9 National Emergency Managers Association, “How does EMAC Work?” http://www.emacweb.org/?142. Accessed on Apr. 

19, 2006.

10 P.L. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877, and 3879-3880.

11 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 63.

12 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

13 See: NRP.

14 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

15 Committee staff interview of Col. Don Harrington, U.S. Army, Military Liaison to FEMA, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 6-8.

16 Committee staff interview of Col. Anthony F. Daskevich II, U.S. Army, Louisiana Defense Coordinating Offi cer, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 10.

17 NRP, p. 42.

18 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 15.

19 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 134.

20 Committee staff interview of Clair Blong, Liaison to U.S. Northern Command, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, 

transcript p. 9.

21 Blong interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 93.

22 NRP, p. 10; 10 U.S.C. § 162.

23 NRP, p. ESF–v.

24 NRP, p. ESF #1–4.

25 NRP, p. ESF #2–12.

26 NRP, pp. ESF #3–5 through 3–8.

27 NRP, p. ESF #4–4.

28 NRP, pp. ESF #5–1 through 5–6.

29 NRP, p. ESF #6–6.

30 NRP, pp. ESF #7–1 through 7–6.

31 NRP, p. ESF #8–9.

32 NRP, p. ESF #9–6.

33 NRP, p. ESF #10–10.

34 NRP, p. ESF #11–10.

35 NRP, p. ESF #12–4.

36 NRP, p. ESF #13–6.
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37 NRP, p. ESF #14–5.

38 NRP, p. ESF #15–5.

39 31 U.S.C. § 1535.

40 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.

41 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335.

42 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies, Mar. 21, 

1983, p. 15.

43 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

44 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, July 11, 2003, p. 11.

45 10 U.S.C. §§ 111, 3013, 3062, 3203-3207, 4301, 5013, 5062, 8013, 8062, 8201.

46 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré, U.S. Army, Commanding General, First U.S. Army, conducted 

on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 14.

47 Paul Wolfowitz, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and others, “Reporting ‘Immediate Response’ Requests from Civil Authorities,” Apr. 25, 2005. Provided to Committee; U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 

Number 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA),” Jan. 15, 1993, pp. 7-8 [hereinaft er DOD Directive 3025.1, 

MSCA].

48 Paul Wolfowitz, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and others, “Implementation Guidance 

Regarding the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,” May 25, 2003. Provided to Committee.

49 NRP, p. 9.

50 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 90, 109.

51 DOD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, pp. 5-7.

52 NRP, p. 10; 10 U.S.C. § 162.

53 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense 

Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006.

54 Offi ce of Management and Budget, A Review of Existing Authorities and Procedures for Using Military Assets in Fighting 

Wildfi res, May 17, 2004, p. 7.

55 Committee staff interview of Col. Darryl Roberson, U.S. Air Force, Assistant Deputy Director, Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 4

56 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Terry Scherling, U.S. Air Force, Director of the Joint Staff , National Guard 

Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript p. 8.

57 DOD Memorandum, Implementation Guidance Regarding the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, Mar. 25, 2003, p. 1.

58 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.12, “Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS),” Feb. 4, 

1994, pp. 3-5 and 8 [hereinaft er DOD Directive 3025.12, MACDIS].

59 DOD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, p. 2; U.S. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.15, “Military Assistance to 

Civil Authorities,” Feb. 18, 1997, p. 5; DOD Directive 3025.12, MACDIS, p. 6.

60 Joint Staff Washington, Message, “Transfer of the Army Director of Military Support Mission to the Joint Staff ,” May 

2003. Provided to Committee.

61 DOD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, p. 4.

62 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “11: New Name, Future, Focus.” http://www.jfcom.mil/about/History/abthist6.htm. Accessed on Apr. 20, 2006. 

63 U.S. Northern Command, “U.S. Northern Command: History.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/history.htm. Accessed on April 20, 2006.

64 U.S. Northern Command, “U.S. Northern Command: History.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/history.htm. Accessed on April 20, 2006. 

 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Feb. 6, 2006.

65 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, pp. 2-3

66 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, U.S. Army, Commander, 82nd Airborne Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 28, 2006, transcript p. 8; Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, 

National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 110-111.

67 10 U.S.C. § 111.

68 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, 8013.
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69 10 U.S.C. §§ 162, 164.

70 U.S. Department of Defense, “Unifi ed Command Plan: Th e World with Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility.” http://

www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifi edcommand/. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

71 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic 

Military Missions, July 11, 2003, p. 5; U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 

2005, p. 8.

72 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, July 11, 2003, p. 11.

73 U.S. Northern Command, “About Us.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

74 U.S. Northern Command, “Joint Task Force Alaska.” http://northcom.mil/about_us/JTF_Alaska.htm. Accessed on Feb. 

28, 2006; U.S. Northern Command, “Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_

us/JFHQ_NCR.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006; U.S. Northern Command, “Standing Joint Force Headquarters North.” 

http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/SJFHQN.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

75 U.S. Northern Command, “About Us.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

76 Testimony of Adm. Timothy Keating, U.S. Navy, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006.

77 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, 2005. http://www.dtic.mil/jel.doddict/data/o/03883.

html. Accessed on May 4, 2006. 

78 Col. David Rhodes, e-mail to Tom Eldridge, Dan Berkovitz, Brian Lepore and Eric Andersen, Senate Committee staff 

members, Feb. 16, 2006, 6:33 p.m.

79 U.S. Department of Defense, “EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 29, 2005. 

80 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 118; U.S. Northern Command, message to Joint Staff Washington, “Request 

for Forces,” Aug. 30, 2005, 1745 Z, p. 1-4. Provided to Committee (Z corresponds to Zulu time, the military designation for 

Greenwich Mean Time. It refers to the time at the prime meridian.); 10 U.S.C. § 162; Committee staff interview of Margaret 

Kruse, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, record of interview pp. 1-2. 

81 NRP, p. 42.

82 NRP, p. 42.

83 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 49 (Between Aug. 29 and Sept. 10, 2005, 72,000 military personnel were deployed 

to the Gulf Coast area: 50,000 National Guardsmen from every state and territory as well as the District of Columbia and 

22,000 active-duty troops.).

84 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 40-41.

85 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, 

Nov. 2, 2005, pp. 1-2. Provided to Committee. 

86 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Message to Commander, U.S. Northern Command and others, “Severe Weather 

Execute Order (EXORD) for DOD Support to FEMA (FEMA),” Aug. 19, 2005, 2300 Z. Provided to Committee.

87 NRP, p. 37. Also, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26, Aug. 2, 2005, p. GL-7. 

(“A military or civilian offi cial who has been designated by the Department of Defense to exercise some delegated authority 

of the Department of Defense executive agent to coordinate military support to civil authorities activities.”).

88 Col. Roberson interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 29.

89 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 8.

90 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “Mod 3 to EXORD Katrina,” 

Aug. 28, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee.

91 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 27; Col. Damon C. Penn, e-mail to Col. Mark Fields and Col. Anthony 

Daskevich, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:07 p.m. Col. Anthony Daskevich deployed the day before from the Fift h U.S. Army in Fort Sill, 

Oklahoma, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, arriving at the temporary FEMA offi ce by 6:30 p.m. Saturday, August 27. On the 

same day, Col. Damon Penn deployed from First Army and arrived in Jackson, Mississippi by 10 p.m. 

92 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “Mod 2 to EXORD Katrina,” 

Aug. 27, 2005, 2230 Z; U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “Mod 3 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee.

93 U.S. Department of Defense, “Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense OASD(HD) 

DCIP.” http://www.dod-ap.msiac.dmso.mil/oasd.htm. Accessed on Mar. 1, 2006 (“Th e Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) is the overall supervisor of homeland defense (HD) activities for the Department 

of Defense. Th e ASD(HD) will oversee HD activities, develop policies, conduct analysis, provide advice, and make 

recommendations on HD, support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management matters 

within the Department.”). 

94 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce of 
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the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 36.

95 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 41. However, Col. Chavez did state in his interview that Katrina demonstrated 

the value of examining the availability of other assets; for example, having learned the value of an immediate employment 

of watercraft for the purpose of performing water rescues, Chavez stated that he intends to include low-draft and shallowdraft boats among his pre-landfall assessments during the coming year’s hurricane season. Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 

2005, p. 27.

96 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 27.

97 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26, “Homeland Security,” Aug. 2, 2005, p. IV–10.

98 Col. Roberson interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 31-32.

99 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 2 to EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 27, 2005, 2230 Z; U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 3 to EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee. Brig. Gen. Scherling said 

that Katrina showed that additional assets might have been useful had they been deployed earlier, and that consideration 

was being given to broadening the Order for next year’s season: 

Th ere are certain types of capabilities that certainly should be considered, and the fi rst thing that we want 

to do is gain situational awareness, so we want to have the ability to go in and assess a situation. We want 

to be able to save lives. And so, you want the capability to have search and rescue. And then, you want to 

be able to go in and stabilize the situation where you probably need potentially the Corps of Engineers 

and many of the things that are somewhat outlined broadly in the emergency support functions of the 

National Response Plan. 

Maj. Gen. Scherling interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 81.

100 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 3212EM-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

101 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 1. Provided to Committee.

102 U.S. Northern Command, Message to U.S. Joint Forces Command and others, “WARNORD FOUR/Tropical Storm 

Katrina,” Aug. 25, 2005, 0014 Z. Provided to Committee.

103 Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Muir, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief, Current Operations, J33, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 11-12.

104 Col. Muir interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 14.

105 Committee staff interview of Col. Roberta Woods, U.S. Army, Chief, Plans and Operations Division, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 14, 37-38.

106 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 12.

107 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 14.

108 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 38, 12 (“Pre-incident we don’t have any set actions that we take because we 

must respond to an approved mission assignment. So it’s monitoring, trying to anticipate where there might be shortfalls 

and advise as – as appropriate if we see indications of shortfalls.”).

109 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 38.

110 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 10.

111 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided to 

Committee. 

112 First U.S. Army, Message to U.S. Northern Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) ISO possible DSCA operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005, 1656 Z. Lt. Gen. Honoré requested assets as follows: 24 hours aft er 

landfall: satellite phones, light or utility helicopters for reconnaissance, damage assessment, and command/control shallowdraft boats for Search and Rescue and supply transportation. 48 hours aft er landfall: medium lift aviation for transportation 

of supplies and personnel medical units for Search and Rescue and evacuation, engineer units for construction, utility and 

transportation, power generators, military police units, high-water trucks.

113 U.S. Army Forces Command, Message to U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) is possible DSCA operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005.

114 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to NC-JOC – Director – OMB, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:31 p.m. Provided to Committee.

115 Maj. Gen. Terry Scherling, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rowe, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:41 p.m. Provided to Committee.

116 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Director of Operations, J3, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 31.

117 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré and Lt. Gen. Joseph Inge, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:46 p.m. Provided 

to Committee.

118 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 28.

119 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 30.
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120 Col. Damon Penn, e-mail to Col. Anthony Daskevich, Aug. 28, 2005, 8:16 a.m. Provided to Committee.

121 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 24-25; Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript pp. 81-84.

122 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 39-40.

123 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 46-47. He and the leadership of Fift h Army decided to deploy the rest of his 

staff Sunday morning, but as the storm’s path was still unclear, they sent the staff to Houston to await further direction. Col. 

Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 30.

124 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005 (untranscribed). It is important to note that as a Fleet Commander, he did 

not possess the authority to command an operational mission; as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, all Fleet-commanded missions must be classifi ed as either training or equipping. Because NORTHCOM had not yet designated the 

Gulf as a Joint Operational Area, and because FEMA had not requested Navy assistance, Bataan’s movement on Aug. 

28 was classifi ed as training. But she proved to be one of the earliest, and therefore, most essential assets available in the 

critical fi rst days aft er landfall. 

125 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, briefi ng slides, “Hurricane Katrina Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support 

Relief from the Sea, Air and Land,” Nov. 14, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee. 

126 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, briefi ng slides, “Hurricane Katrina Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support 

Relief from the Sea, Air and Land,” Nov. 14, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee.

127 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript p. 12.

128 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 16-18. It is important to note that he did not activate or move units into 

the gulf region prior to landfall or prior to receiving an order from NORTHCOM, but merely assessed availabilities and 

placed units on alert within the Marine Corps, similar to the process Lt. Gen. Honoré sought to achieve with his request 

message to NORTHCOM.

129 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. James Amos, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Second Marine Expeditionary 

Force, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript, p. 9.

130 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 11.

131 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Paul Selva, U.S. Air Force, Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript p. 13.

132 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 4. Provided to Committee.

133 Committee staff interview of Adm. Timothy Keating, U.S. Navy, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense 

Command and U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted by Senator Susan Collins, Feb. 3, 

2006, (untranscribed). Admiral Keating “woke up Tuesday morning saying New Orleans dodged a bullet.” McHale 

interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 34. “At that point, the magnitude of the disaster was still unknown, Hurricane Katrina made 

landfall on Monday, August 29. Th e news reports that we had all read on the following morning prior to the meeting 

that is the subject of my testimony were consistently inaccurate. If you take a look at Th e Washington Post or other publications, it’s clear that for reasons that I think we understand a little better now but have not yet fully explained, initial

media reports were more optimistic than warranted. Th ere were references in news stories to having dodged the bullet. 

Th is is not a criticism of the media coverage. Th is was a huge storm, the scope of the damage was vast, and situational 

awareness was not yet clear. In any event, we went into the meeting on Tuesday morning with media reports that were 

less sobering than the scope of the actual damage.”

134 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain, e-mail to 5th Bde, 87th Div, S-3 Ops and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 4:03 p.m. Lt. Gen. Honoré 

was among the recipients and “DoD Force Protection Lessons Learned: Hurricane Andrew, 24 August 1992, South Florida” 

was attached. Provided to Committee.

135 Joint Staff , Message to U.S. Northern Command, “DOD Support to FEMA,” Aug. 29, 2005, 2300 Z. Provided to Committee. (Authorized by Brig. Gen. Scherling.). 

136 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 28.

137 Committee staff interview of Col. Dan Shanahan, U.S. Army, Commander, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006 (not yet transcribed).

138 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 3212EM-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

139 FEMA, Mission Assignment Task Order Form, Aug. 28, 2005.

140 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 12.

141 See e.g.: Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 

21, 2005, transcript p. 168. See also: Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 183 (“I think the process from beginning to end 

probably takes longer than it should.”). However, Mr. Buikema was basing his statement that he was frustrated on a false 

premise, i.e., that the billion dollar logistics request was not “done” until Sept. 5. In fact, as discussed above, it was approved 

on Sept. 2. Buikema admitted that he “lost visibility” of this particular request and so had diffi culty accounting for what 

he perceived caused a delay in its approval, but he still had an “instinct” that DOD was the cause for the delay. Buikema 

interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 171.
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531

142 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 213.

143 U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 54 [hereinaft er, Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned] (“From the time a request is initiated until the military force or capability is delivered to 

the disaster site requires a 21-step process.”). Th e source for this statement is the U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Center 

for Operational Analysis, “Incident Command Request Briefi ng,” Nov. 1, 2005. Th at PowerPoint briefi ng includes a slide 

depicting the DOD approval process, and includes the statement “21 steps to get a truck.” Th e White House, Hurricane 

Katrina Lessons Learned, p. 54. Th e report then states that DOD’s processes resulted in “critical needs not being met” citing 

a written statement by Mayor-President Melvin “Kip” Holden submitted for a hearing before the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs Committee on Sept. 28, 2005. Upon review, the statement by Mayor-President Holden does not 

support the factual assertion made by the Townsend Report because it does not relate to DOD.

144 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 130-134. (One-billion dollar request was “negotiated with DOD”)

145 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 124.

146 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 

147-150; Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 30 (DOD liaison offi cers helped FEMA offi cials “with the verbiage of the 

mission assignment.”).

147 Committee staff interview of Gen. Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff , U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 28, 2006, transcript p. 77. 

148 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 79.

149 McHale, Senate Committee Hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

150 Committee staff interview of Capt. Michael McDaniel, U.S. Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer to 

FEMA, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 156.

151 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 27-28.

152 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006.

153 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré and Lt. Gen. Joseph Inge, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:46 p.m. Provided 

to Committee.

154 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 31.

155 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 123.

156 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 124.

157 Michael Ritchie, e-mail to Anthony Capra, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:14 p.m. Provided to Committee.

158 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Anthony Capra and Michael Ritchie, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:35 p.m. Provided to Committee 

(“Does not fi t policy for Immediate Response.”).

159 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 29.

160 Committee staff interview of Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted by Senator Susan Collins on 

Feb. 3, 2006 (untranscribed). 

161 England interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

162 Anthony Capra, e-mail to Paul McHale, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. Provided to Committee.

163 Col. David Rhodes, e-mail to Tom Eldridge and Dan Berkovitz, Senate Committee staff members, May 3, 2006, 5:28 

p.m. 

164 Anthony Capra, e-mail to POL DoD HD Coordination Group and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 1:47 p.m. Provided to Committee.

165 Mark Roupas, e-mail to Paul McHale, Aug. 30, 2005, 3:15 p.m. Provided to Committee. It is unclear what constituted 

confi rmation of the breach to Assistant Secretary McHale’s offi ce. Col. Chavez stated that Assistant Secretary McHale’s offi ce received confi rmation from the Corps at sunrise Wednesday morning. Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 85.

166 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 97.

167 NRP, p. 33.

168 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 131-132.

169 Capt. Frank Th orp, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Walter Sharp, Aug. 30, 2005, 8:15 p.m. Provided to Committee.

170 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, before 

the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard 

of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, Oct. 27, 2005.
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532

171 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 1.

172 NC JOC-Director-OMB, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe and Rear Adm. Gene Brooks, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. Provided to Committee.

173 Committee staff interview of Capt. Brett Markham, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, 

transcript pp. 61-62.

174 Committee staff interview of Capt. Brett Markham, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, 

transcript p. 5.

175 Capt. Markham interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 4-5.

176 Capt. Markham interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 7-8.

177 Committee staff interview of Col. Wesley McClellan, U.S. Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison to FEMA, U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 18. 

178 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

179 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Moulton, U.S. Air Force, Director, Standing Joint Headquarters-North, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 5, 2005, transcript pp. 69-70.

180 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 69.

181 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 79.

182 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 78-80.

183 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 85.

184 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 68-69.

185 Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, e-mail to Adm. Timothy Keating, Aug. 30, 2005, 4:59 p.m. Provided to Committee.

186 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Tony Capra, Aug. 30, 2005, 8:25 a.m. Provided to Committee (“We need to keep these 

actions in the proper lane to avoid confusion and duplication of eff ort. FEMA is the lead and is the conduit for all Federal 

response coordination, planning and execution.”).

187 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 34-35.

188 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 9.

189 Col. David Rhodes, e-mail to Eric Andersen and Brian Lepore, Senate Committee staff members, Mar. 28, 2006, 4:25 

p.m.; McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 30.

190 Gordon England, memorandum to SECDEF [Donald Rumsfeld], Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

191 Offi ce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , “Meetings Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Sept. 7, 2005. Provided to 

Committee.

192 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 9-10 (“And so with a verbal order from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I 

called all the service chiefs, and I ask them...what we’ve got to do is...we gotta lean forward. We know we’re going to get 

asked to do things, so you services know what you provide and these kind of things, so work with Northern Command; 

make sure what you’re doing is smart, but start to lean forward. And if you need to preposition or move stuff , start to move 

and preposition stuff , because you know we’re going to get...the requests.”).

193 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

194 Offi ce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , “Meetings Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Sept. 7, 2005. Provided to 

Committee.

195 England interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

196 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 37.

197 Adm. Timothy Keating, e-mail to Gen. Richard B. Myers and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:24 p.m. Provided to Committee.

198 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 30-31.

199 Capt. McDaniel interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 69.

200 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 81.

201 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2006, p. 5. Provided to Committee.

202 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 42. 

203 Adm. Timothy Keating, e-mail to Brig. Gen. Frank Helmick and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 9:18 p.m. Provided to Committee.

204 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 14-15 (“During that week, before ...we had received a modest number of requests 

for assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. During that period of time, when the Department of Defense 

were prepared to review and approve a greater number of RFAs covering a wider range of missions than those we actually 
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533

received – in short, we were leaning forward in anticipation of RFAs from Department of Homeland Security, but because 

of the magnitude of the event and the complexity of some of the mission requirements, the RFAs had not yet begun to appear in large numbers...during that fi rst week, the RFAs we had received were fairly specifi c and modest in scope.”).

205 Col. Roberson interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 114.

206 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 14-15, 39.

207 Brig. Gen. Moulton interview, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 43.

208 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 6 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 31, 2005, 0300 Z. Provided to Committee.

209 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina, Navy Mission: Providing Rescue & Civil Support Relief from the 

Sea, Air and Land, Aft ermath. Provided to Committee; JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided 

to Committee.

210 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 1.

211 Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005.

212 Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005. 

213 Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005.

214 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Vivien Crea, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area and 

Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, conducted on Jan. 3, 2006, transcript p. 40. 

215 Committee staff interview of Capt. Richard Snyder, U.S. Navy, Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan, conducted on Nov. 14, 

2005 (untranscribed); JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee.

216 Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

217 Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

218 Committee staff interview of Capt. Bruce Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Coast Guard Air Station New 

Orleans, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005 (untranscribed). Evidence suggests that DOD had debated whether USS Bataan was 

authorized to provide assistance with its helicopters prior to being requested or ordered. Col. Chavez wrote in an e-mail to 

a DOD liaison at DHS that although Vice Adm. Fitzgerald had publicly announced the availability of USS Bataan and her 

helicopters, the ship’s captain does not have the authority to assist unless specifi cally ordered: “Does not fi t policy for Immediate Response.” Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Tony Capra, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:35 p.m. Provided to Committee.

219 Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

220 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Joseph Kilkenny, U.S. Navy, former Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, JTF Katrina, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005 (untranscribed).

221 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 11. Provided to Committee.

222 Rear Adm. Kilkenny interview, Nov. 30, 2005. 

223 Rear Adm. Kilkenny interview, Nov. 30, 2005; Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005.

224 Rear Adm. Kilkenny interview, Nov. 30, 2005. 

225 JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

226 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Reuben Bookert, U.S. Navy, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, 

U.S. Second Fleet, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005 (untranscribed). 

227 U.S. Northern Command, message to Joint Staff , “Request for Forces,” Sept. 2, 2005, 0530 Z. Provided to Committee. 

Th e message also requested the USS Whidbey Island and four logistics ships from Military Sealift Command. 

228 JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee.

229 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, p. 41.

230 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, “Hurricane Katrina, Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief from the 

Sea, Air and Land,” p. 9. Provided to Committee.

231 Rear Adm. Anthony Winns, e-mail to Lt. Gen. James Conway, Sept. 15, 2005, 1:20 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

232 Insung Lee, e-mail to HSOC.SWO and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 11:50 a.m. Provided to Committee.

233 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, “Hurricane Katrina, Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief from the 

Sea, Air and Land,” p. 9. Provided to Committee.

234 Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Th omas Quinn, U.S. Navy, Director of Operations, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic, 

conducted on Nov. 15, 2005 (untranscribed).

235 Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, e-mail to Adm. Michael Mullen, Sept. 2, 2005, 5:53 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

236 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 48.

237 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 46.

238 Col. Tom Muir, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. Provided to Committee.
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534

239 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 33.

240 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, “Hurricane Katrina Chronology.” Provided to 

Committee.

241 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 29.

242 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 4 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005, 0200 Z. Provided to Committee.

243 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 5 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005, 2100 Z. Provided to Committee.

244 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided to 

Committee.

245 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 24-27.

246 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 8. 

247 U.S. Forces Command, Message to III Corps and XVIII Corps, “FORSCOM Frago #8 Provides Support of BDE Size 

Forces ISO Hurricane Katrina Relief Operations,” Sept. 1, 2005, 0039 Z. Provided to Committee.

248 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 20.

249 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 25-26. Notes from the Forces Command teleconference at 8 a.m. correspond to this time frame, and state that the command was “just waiting for the trigger to deploy,” and that a phased deployment plan was in place to commit the Brigade to the response. U.S. Forces Command, notes of FORSCOM Teleconference, 

Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

250 Col. Michael Okita, e-mail to Maj. Gen. William Caldwell and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:02 a.m. Provided to Committee. 

According to Maj. Gen. Caldwell, “It was no longer be prepared now, it was on order. When you change to an on order, 

that means you need to plan on it occurring at some time in the future. It doesn’t mean it will, but it just says you need now 

to plan on it. And they said, on order deploy your Division Headquarters [approx. 180 people] and a Brigade Task Force 

[approx. 3,200 people] in support of JTF Katrina...with the purpose of operating distribution centers, crowd control and 

security, in the New Orleans area.” Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 23-24.

251 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” radio address, 

Sept. 3, 2005, 10:06 a.m. ET. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

252 U.S. Forces Command, Message to Commanders of III Corps and others, “FORSCOM Exorder Deploys Units in Support of JTF-KAT,” Sept. 3, 2005, 1729 Z. Provided to Committee.

253 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 31-32.

254 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 36 (“Th e fact that we moved that force and did not kill, maim or injure a 

single person is absolutely incredible. Th ey went from a cold start. I don’t keep 1,383 vehicles prepped and ready to go on a 

key moment’s notice. I keep about – I’d have to guess, about 180 to 240. So we literally were going across the Division grabbing vehicles, people, because we just realized the great need for command and control, logistics support, medical support, 

so we put that all on the road.”).

255 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 49.

256 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 50-53.

257 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006. 

258 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 8 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Sept. 2, 3005, 0015 Z. Provided to Committee.

259 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006. 

260 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006. 

261 U.S. Forces Command, Message to III Corps and XVIII Corps, “Frago 8,” contained in e-mail from First Army Joint 

Operations Center Watch Team to LTG Honoré and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 4:23 p.m. Provided to Committee.

262 Committee staff interview of Col. Bryan Roberts, U.S. Army, Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry 

Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006 (untranscribed). 

263 Col. Roberts interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

264 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” radio address, 

Sept. 3, 2005, 10:06 a.m. ET. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

265 Col. Roberts interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

266 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Review Task Force, “Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force,” Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

267 Col. Roberts interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

268 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 10.

269 Second Marine Expeditionary Force, Hurricane Katrina Timeline. Provided to Committee; Lt. Gen. Amos interview, 
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535

Dec. 14, 2005, p. 14.

270 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 15-16; Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

Timeline, What Marine forces were deployed, when were they deployed, and on what authority were they deployed? Provided to Committee (states that on Sept. 1, multiple aircraft “self-deploy to NAS Pensacola, FL”).

271 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 21.

272 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 22. “JTF Katrina Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005” confi rms that as 

of 7 a.m. Friday, “SPMAGTF assessment team in Belle Chase. ADVON COB today. CE 03 Sept. 130 Pax CE total,” and also 

“Reserve AAV platoon closed on ISB Gulf Port, MS. BPT posture.” JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005. 

Provided to Committee.

273 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 75.

274 Lt. Gen. James Amos, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Honoré, via First Army JOC Watch Battle Captain, Sept. 1, 2005, 8:25 a.m. 

Provided to Committee.

275 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Amos, via 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain, Sept. 1, 2005, 7:48 p.m. Provided to 

Committee.

276 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Lt. Gen. James Amos, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:08 a.m. Provided to Committee.

277 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 23-24.

278 Capt. Robert Reininger, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Sept. 2, 2005, 6:35 a.m. Provided to Committee.

279 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 28.

280 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 75.

281 Marine Forces Atlantic, Message to Commanding General, II MEF and Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, “COMMARFORLANT Deployment order,” Sept. 2, 2005, 1850 Z. Provided to Committee. 

282 Par. 3.A.2 of the COMMARFORLANT Deployment order states: “Concept of op. COMMARFORLANT requests 

ROMMARFORRES to ID, Prep, and deploy aviation assets into ISB NAS Pensacola, FL and det AAV vic Gulfport, MS for 

further movement into aff ected areas iso SPMAGTF GC. COMMARFORLANT dir CG II MEF to ID, prep and deploy 

a SPMAGTF iso comdr JTF Katrina HA/DR operations in and around the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 

Florida. SPMAGTF deploys via sea, land, and hcptr NLT 03 Sep 05.” Marine Forces Atlantic, Message to Commanding 

General, II MEF and Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, “COMMARFORLANT Deployment order,” Sept. 2, 2005, 

1850 Z. Provided to Committee.

283 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 80.

284 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 25.

285 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 27-28.

286 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 32.

287 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 33.

288 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 34.

289 Brig. Gen. Selva interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 12-15.

290 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee.

291 Committee staff interview of Col. Glen Joerger, U.S. Air Force, Former Vice Commander, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover 

Air Force Base, pre-designated Director of Mobility Forces, Air Mobility Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript p. 15.

292 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 17.

293 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-14, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee.

294 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 27.

295 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 20.

296 William Lokey, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Edward Buikema, Nicol Andrews and Th omas Bossert, Aug. 31, 2005, 12:30 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0004688.

297 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 28.

298 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 25-26.

299 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 34.

300 McHale, Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

301 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, U.S. Army, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Paul Sullivan, Sept. 1, 2005, 7:28 a.m.; Capt. Robert Reininger, 

U.S. Coast Guard, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:54 a.m.

302 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

303 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 84.
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536

304 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:47 p.m. Provided to Committee.

305 Brig. Gen. Moulton interview, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 24. NORTHCOM directed the deployment in message “Mod 12 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Sept. 3, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee. 

306 He and his Louisiana National Guard counterpart, Brig. Gen. Hunt Downer, who had taken on the task of Reception, 

Staging, Onward Movement and Integration of Guard forces, derived a draft solution of the problem: “So we sort of, on 

the back of a napkin, if you will, drew up a basic construct, which is we would try to take over some of the key mission sets 

to then probably utilize National Guard forces for those missions that Title 10 guys could not do.” Brig. Gen. Moulton 

interview, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 42.

307 Brig. Gen. Moulton interview, Dec. 5, 2005, pp. 52-53.

308 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 54.

309 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 54-55.

310 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 54-55.

311 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 40. Woods and her staff were “aware of a need to get food into the Superdome,” 

but did not interpret that as something the NORTHCOM staff had to work because they understood it was being worked at 

the state and JTF level. Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 40.

312 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 18, 40.

313 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 20 (“Our ability to support is dependent upon a mission assignment which gives 

us that authority to provide the support.”).

314 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 41.

315 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-14, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

316 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-12, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee (requesting “DOD/NG 

(EMAC) provide 50,000 MRE’s/Water to people located in the vicinity of the LA Superdome NLT [not later than] daybreak 

01 Sept. 05. Also provide 1,000 MREs/water to people located in the vicinity of Clover Leaf” in the amount of $100,000.00); 

FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-13, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0000525 

(requesting “DOD/NG (EMAC) to air drop food (MRE) & water along Gulf Coast areas aff ected by Hurricane Katrina and 

City of New Orleans” in the amount of $300,000.00). Th ese mission assignments are diff erent from the one billion dollar 

mission assignment to have DOD take over logistics discussed below. Th e 50,000 cases of MREs delivered to Mississippi 

on Sept. 3-4, 2005 were delivered pursuant to the one billion dollar assignment, not these two assignments. Col. Woods 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 46-47, 75-76.

317 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 133, 140.

318 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134. Lokey said that’s when he told Brown, “that we needed to get help.” 

319 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 198-

199.

320 For example, Ken Burris, FEMA’s acting director of operations, told staff in his interview that, prior to Buikema’s 

visit that Th ursday morning, he did not believe DOD needed to play a larger role in logistics. Committee staff interview 

of Ken Burris, Chief of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, transcript p. 82. Col. Al Jones, a defense liaison 

who was assigned permanently to assist Brown and was with him on Th ursday when Brown met with General Honoré 

stated that Brown told Honoré DOD “could possibly” help with logistics. Committee staff interview of Col. Al Jones, 

U.S. Army, Senior Army Advisor, Georgia Army National Guard, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 36. Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale said that he spoke with Brown on Wednesday, August 31, and 

that Brown did not mention that he wanted DOD to take over FEMA’s logistics function. Committee staff interview of 

the Hon. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted 

on Feb. 17, 2005 (untranscribed).

321 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 156-157.

322 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 166.

323 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 169.

324 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 169.

325 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 170.

326 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 82. Initially, Burris stated that FEMA wanted DOD to “take over the process of 

distributing [commodities] into the forward operating areas.” Source: Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 117; however, aft er 

reviewing the actual mission assignment, Burris stated that DOD was being asked to assume FEMA’s responsibility. Source: 

Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 124.

327 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 137.

328 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 112. 

329 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 138.

330 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134.
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331 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 137 (“At the time this took place, we did not need that help from them ... As a matter 

of fact, I’m not sure they ever took over that.”).

332 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 186 (“as I recall the meeting, it was more I want you to do logistics. I want you just 

to take over logistics completely”). Aside from Brown’s statements in his staff interview, we have not found corroborating 

evidence that Brown made a request to Honoré on Wednesday that DOD take over all logistics. General Honoré did not 

mention it in connection with his staff interview when he discussed what he said was a brief “sidebar” meeting with Brown 

on this date. Source: Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 103. Honoré also does not include any meeting with Brown 

in his timeline of events for Wednesday August 31, but he does include a meeting with Brown the next day, Sept. 1, 2005. 

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided 

to Committee. In addition, Brown testifi ed to staff that he thought he met with Honoré on a diff erent day than August 31, 

the day he had a telephone conversation with the General. Source: Brown interview, Jan. 23, 3005, p. 181. Th us, Brown may 

have made his request for logistics assistance the next day. Th is is consistent with the recollection of Col. Al Jones, who 

testifi ed to Committee staff that Brown mentioned logistics to Honoré in a meeting with him on Th ursday, Sept. 1, 2005. 

However, Jones remembered that Brown said DOD “could possibly” help with logistics, which is a diff erent recollection 

from Brown’s. Source: Col. Jones interview, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 36. In light of this confl icting testimony, we have not been able 

to resolve when Brown fi rst raised this issue with DOD offi cials or what specifi c request he made when he did raise it. 

333 Although a number of witnesses testifi ed that this exchange and other events related to this assignment took place on 

Th ursday, Sept. 1, the documentary evidence we have reviewed (cited below) suggests it may have taken place on Friday, 

Sept. 2.

334 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, pp. 82, 84.

335 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Th omas Kuster, Sept. 2, 2005, 9:38 a.m. Provided to Committee. In his staff interview, 

Chavez recalled the request as “take over all logistical operations for FEMA.” Source: Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, 

pp. 118-119. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale recalled the initial request as “full logistics 

support throughout the entire area of responsibility.” Source: McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

336 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 121.

337 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 133.

338 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Th omas Kuster, Sept. 2, 2005, 9:38 a.m. Provided to Committee; Col. Chavez interview, 

Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 119, 121.

339 ESF-1 – Transportation, for example, includes as a “function” that DOD “Provides military transportation capacity 

from the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to move essential resources and assist in the contracting for 

civilian airlift when requested and approval by the Secretary of Defense.” NRP, p. ESF #1–4.

340 Captain Mike McDaniel, e-mail to the DOD Joint Directorate of Military Support and others, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:48 a.m. 

(“I received a hard copy of an e-mail from Mr. Ken Burris just now with the following wording:

Gentlemen,

Th is is the request that was made of DOD this morning. I spoke with Col. Chaves [sic] in the Dep Sec offi ce of DOD that instructed me that the request must come from Secretary to Secretary.

‘FEMA request that DOD provide the support the planning and execution of the full logistical support to 

the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA.’

We currently have DOD lashed up with our Response Division to make this happen and our DOD reps 

are moving forward.

Mr. Burris indicated to me that the wording was very important.”). 

See also: Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 134 (“From that point on, again, there were a number of e-mails, as 

we saw ... that went between Mr. Burris and Chertoff saying that the Secretaries should talk. Whatever happened in the 

interim, the next e-mail I got from Ken Burris and phone call was okay, I’m revising the request for assistance, and the 

request for assistance now stated that DOD provide support to FEMA for procurement and distribution of ice, food, water, fuel, and medical supplies.”). Col. Chavez thought it was signifi cant that the request submitted on Friday requested 

DOD’s “support” in the Katrina response in “specifi c areas” rather than the initial request which requested that DOD 

take over logistics from FEMA. Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 122-123. 

341 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 83. We have not been able to establish whether Secretary Chertoff called Secretary 

of Defense Rumsfeld. However, an e-mail establishes that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul 

McHale spoke with Chertoff ’s Deputy Michael Jackson, so the matter ultimately may have been handled at a level below 

the Secretaries. Paul McHale, e-mail to Michael Jackson, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:41 p.m. Provided to Committee (“Th ought you 

might be interested in reading this follow-up to our conversation.”).

342 McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006; Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

343 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, 

Nov. 2, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee; Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 118.

344 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 118, 114.

345 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-19, Sept. 2, 2005.

346 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-19, Sept. 2, 2005. As discussed below, this amount was an estimate. 
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347 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 82-83. Although some amount of this assignment was de-obligated, this had no 

eff ect on DOD’s logistics operation. Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 83; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 134, 137 

(Assignment was to “cover the eventualities.”).

348 Written Statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 8; McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

349 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD FEMA Mission Assignment Summary,” as of Feb. 28, 2006, p. 1. Provided to Committee. Although FEMA de-obligated $500 million dollars from this mission and then re-obligated the same amount, we 

have not been able to discern any eff ect on DOD’s activities in carrying out the mission from those fi scal decisions.

350 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 43-45; McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

351 Paul McHale, e-mail to Michael Jackson, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:41 p.m. Provided to Committee (“Michael – Th ought you 

might be interested in reading this follow-up to our conversation. SECDEF has agreed to support your RFA for broad 

logistics support, throughout the entire four state AOR. We’re working on the specifi c language – and a planning staff to 

implement it. We may actually be able to do more than you have requested. We will get back to you with written confi rmation tomorrow AM. Keep up the good work. Paul”).

352 U.S. Department of Defense, “MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina,” signed by Peter 

F. Verga, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and others, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

MOD 8 ordered NORTHCOM to begin logistical support operations, “upon CJCS approval of CONOPS.”

353 On that Friday morning, Gary Moore, the Director of Logistics for FEMA, spoke with Col. Roberta Woods, Chief of 

Plans and Operations in NORTHCOM’s Logistics Division in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and said, “Robbie I need help. 

... We need help with commodity distribution: food, water, ice. ... We’re sending a mission assignment to ... DOD for 

this.” Woods’ impression was that the Moore’s request was “Pretty much open-ended, start to fi nish.” Source: Col. Woods 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 36. Woods said that this call was a major turning point. “Th at’s when life changed for me personally and for the bulk of the J4 staff .” Source: Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 36. Woods asked Moore, “Who do I 

talk to ... to fi gure out what’s going on and what’s needed?” Source: Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 43. She got the 

information and “immediately began doing detailed tracking as best we could, understanding processes, systems. I mean, 

we were ... massively in the information gathering mode at this time because we had not had direct access to information. 

We had sort of eavesdropped.” Source: Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 44. 

354 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 44.

355 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 57.

356 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 51.

357 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 52.

358 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 46.

359 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 59; Brig. Gen. Mike Lally, e-mail to Brig. Gen. Paul Selva, Sept. 4, 2005, 12:34 

p.m. Provided to Committee (discussing diffi culties of having too many aircraft converge on Norfolk. Virginia to airlift 

MREs because it was diffi cult to put the MREs on pallets “in this short amount of time”).

360 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 46, 53-53.

361 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 62 (“And ... that’s what ... our experience ... in military logistics taught us, is 

you prioritize. Everything can’t be all the same equal importance right now because it requires all the same kinds of transportation.”).

362 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 46-48.

363 NRP; Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 50. 

364 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 50.

365 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 45 (“We tried to grasp the magnitude of the task, you know, what is it you really 

want us to do, because FEMA did not step out. And ... for a little while, we were in the is FEMA going to completely back 

out and DOD has it all, or is FEMA staying and we’re just going to assist?”). See also: JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005, 7 p.m. Provided to Committee.

366 NORTHCOM’s logistics staff thought it likely that the distribution infrastructure at the state level – in other words, after the operational staging area managed by FEMA – “would remain in place to execute that piece of the task.” Source: Col. 

Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 63. Admiral Keating said NORTHCOM did not want to take over distributing commodities for the last part of the distribution chain because DOD could not legally command National Guard forces involved in 

that task. Source: Admiral Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. Col. Jones, the military advisor to PFO Brown, who was involved 

with developing DOD’s commodities distribution plan during the fi rst weekend aft er the storm, told the Committee that 

the National Guard advised they would remain in control of distribution from the PODs. Source: Col. Jones interview, Mar. 

2, 2006, p. 40.

367 Rear Adm. Steven Maas, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Robert Dail, Sept. 3, 2005, 2:59 p.m. Provided to Committee; Col. Roberta 

Woods, e-mail to Col. James Hodge, Sept. 5, 2005, 8:24 p.m. Provided to Committee (“NORTHCOM Headquarters have 

responsibility for distribution management from the depot (either DLA or USACE contract, etc) to the Forward Operational Staging Area [FOSA] – that’s from the strategic level into the J[oint] O[perating] A[rea]. J[oint] T[ask] F[orce]-Katrina 
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539

... has responsibility for management at the FOSA (in coordination with FEMA) down to the state designated distribution 

points. (Th at’s the operational level.) Th e state has responsibility for the tactical level distribution to individuals.”).

368 Col. James Hodge, e-mail to Rear Adm. Steven Maas, Sept. 6, 2005, 9:18 p.m. Provided to Committee.

369 Col. James Hodge, e-mail to Rear Adm. Steven Maas, Sept. 6, 2005, 9:18 p.m. Provided to Committee. See also: Lt. Gen. 

Robert Dail, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Duncan McNabb, Sept. 3, 2005, 11:56 a.m. Provided to Committee (DOD “will not execute 

‘tactical distribution’.”).

370 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 91 (“I don’t recall distribution of supplies being I’ll call it, a red item. Maybe an amber 

item, but it was working. We had the op – we had the staging area at Beauregard working; we had an oversight feeding that 

[was] working, and then we were putting stuff forward. Now, from that point forward, we had problems. But people were 

getting food, people were getting water, people in the Superdome got food and water every day.”).

371 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 45-46.

372 Paul McHale, e-mail to Michael Jackson, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:41 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

373 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 16.

374 Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on 

Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 25.

375 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 26.

376 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 15-16.

377 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 26-27.

378 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 16. Edward Buikema, the acting Director of FEMA’s Response Division was present 

at the meeting and described England’s view of whether DOD was willing to take on large portions of the response eff ort: 

“He was – he was more than willing to help out, as I recall. He was very positive, very much no resistance. It was a very 

frank discussion. As I mentioned, Deputy Secretary Jackson was there. I was there, but just observing more than anything, 

but it was a positive, very positive discussion.” Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 259. Th e colloquy continued, “Q: So 

people at the top level seemed to want to get this done. A: Yes, sir.” 

379 Col. Darryl Roberson, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003817; Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 160-162.

380 Th is requirement appears redundant vis a vis the earlier $1 billion logistics mission assignment, and indeed, one draft 

version of this mission assignment indicates “portions of which may already be covered on MS-DOD 19,” the logistics mission assignment. Col. Darryl Roberson, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003817.

381 Paul McHale, e-mail to Matthew Broderick and others, Sept. 5, 2005, 5:07 p.m. Provided to Committee (including 

e-mail chain among DHS and DOD offi cials regarding the large FEMA Mission Assignment attached to this e-mail); 

Col. Darryl Roberson, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-HSOC-0004-0003817 (enclosing a very similar list that appears to have been draft ed earlier in the process but which 

contains substantially the same list of missions, and which states “Sir, there was a meeting this evening with representatives 

of DHS, FEMA, OSD, JS, and COE to craft a RFA/mission statement that would refl ect the increased responsibilities DoD 

is taking on with Hurricane Katrina. Th e following two products [one an organization chart and one a list of the missions 

described above] have been agreed to at the ASD level.”).

382 Th is original list was approved by the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security in the evening on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2005. Source: Matthew Broderick, e-mail to Gail Kulisch and Admiral Timothy Sullivan, Sept. 4, 2005, 12:30 

p.m. Provided to Committee (referencing the attachment and stating, “Results are a series of meetings between both Dep 

Secs and lower level staffi ng actions”). On Sunday, Sept. 4, Deputy Secretary England sent a memorandum to the Secretary 

of Defense setting forth the draft in written text. Source: Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of 

Staff , memorandum to Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff , and Admiral Keating, Sept. 4, 2005, 1:30 p.m. 

Provided to Committee (“If you agree with the draft it will be sent to DHS to be put on the normal RFA form. It will then be 

processed and appear in an orders book for your fi nal approval.”). Th e Secretary of Defense, who was traveling to the Gulf 

Coast when he received this memorandum via facsimile, “responded favorably to the substantive content of this document” 

but instructed that the various requests be broken out into “more logical and operationally eff ective component parts” because “the topics included ... related resources.” Source: McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 19. McHale stated that there was 

“no resistance on the part of this department to the underlying substance of the RFA.” Rather, “Th e Secretary instructed me 

to disaggregate a very brief, very broad single RFA into more logical and operationally eff ective component parts so that 

mission areas that were discretely defi ned would not be illogically folded into a single document.” 

383 Written Statement of McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 9.

384 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 20. See also: Frank DiFalco, e-mail to Ken Burris, Sept. 5, 2005, 7:28 p.m. Provided to 

Committee (“please process the attached RFAs and submit to DOD this evening.”). Although we cannot pinpoint the time 

of approval, these two sources indicate that the Secretary of Defense approved the RFAs aft er 7:28 p.m. the evening of Sept. 

5, 2005, although he vocally approved them earlier. Paul McHale, e-mail to Frank DiFalco, Sept. 5, 2005, 7:37 p.m. Provided 

to Committee (“SecDef gave VOCO to the draft RFA we sent you.”).

385 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 36.

386 Michael Jackson, e-mail to Paul McHale, Sept. 6, 2005, 11:17 a.m. Provided to Committee.
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387 Written Statement of McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 9; Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

388 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 27-28.

389 Th e USS Bataan launched helicopters for search and rescue and logistics missions at 6 p.m. ET, Tues. Aug 30, 2005, in 

coordination with U.S. Coast Guard District Eight. Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

390 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 25-28, 44-45.

391 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 11. Provided to Committee (indicates Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005.: Aeromedical Evacuation mission (47 patients).).

392 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2006, p. 8. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Friday, Sept. 2: “Navy P-3 conduct streaming video mission to assess hurricane impact.”).

393 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2006, p. 7. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Th ursday, Sep 1: “468,000 MREs shipped.”).

394 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 13-16; U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline 

(Draft ), p. 15. Provided to Committee (indicates that on Friday, Sept. 2, 2005: “Navy CH-53 helos dumping sand bags [in] 

levee breaches.”).

395 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 17. Provided to Committee (indicates that on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2005: “Slingload of MRE’s are made along the Gulf Coast.”).

396 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 135 (Q: So they were already helping with this [the one billion dollar logistics request]? A: Oh heavens, yes. Oh, yes.).

397 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 136 (“But what I will speak to is Col. [Daskevich] and his people. Th ey busted 

their ass to do anything I asked them to do. Our bureaucratic processes are slow.”). Lokey described DOD’s assistance 

in evacuating the Superdome, stating “Th ey did the planning for it and their people – they had people down at the bus 

distribution, or the collection points, staging areas, and at the Dome, they were helping organize the National Guard 

folks and the other folks on scene, lined the people up and get them on the buses. Th ey did it for us and I thought they 

did an excellent job.” Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 140. See also: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 205 (“Honoré’s a 

guy, he makes things happen. ... He was picking up garbage, he was rescuing people, he was doing all sorts of stuff that 

he had the people and the stuff to do.”). 

 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Friday, Sept. 2: “Navy P-3 conduct streaming video mission to assess hurricane impact.”).

 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Th ursday, Sept. 1: “468,000 MREs shipped.”).

 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 15. Provided to Committee (indicates 

that on Friday, Sept. 2, 2005: “Navy CH-53 helos dumping sand bags in levee breaches.”).

 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 17. Provided to Committee (indicates 

that on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2005: “Slingload of MRE’s are made along the Gulf Coast.”).

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 135.

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 136 (“But what I will speak to is Col. [Daskevich] and his people. Th ey busted their ass to 

do anything I asked them to do. Our bureaucratic processes are slow”). Lokey described DOD’s assistance in evacuating the 

Superdome, stating “Th ey did the planning for it and their people – they had people down at the bus distribution, or the 

collection points, staging areas, and at the Dome, they were helping organize the National Guard folks and the other folks 

on scene, lined the people up and get them on the buses. Th ey did it for us and I thought they did an excellent job.” Source: 

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 140. See also: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 205 (“he makes things happen, and quite 

frankly, when he started making things happen, I didn’t care because he was making things happen and he was picking 

up garbage, he was rescuing people, he was doing all sorts of stuff that he had the people and the stuff to do.”); Buikema 

interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 181 (“I believe they did” fulfi ll all mission assignments that FEMA gave them; “In terms of the 

communications and cooperation between us, it was good ... it was good.”); Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, U.S. Army, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript p. 78 (“I believe he [Brig. 

Gen. Graham] was helping a lot.”).

398 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 122, 123.

399 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 135.

400 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006 (“Ultimately, the United States military provided us 1.5 million MREs that – I remember them fl ying in C-17s, if I remember 

right, there at Gulfport, Biloxi, and started unloading tens of thousands of cases of MREs. Again, I don’t know whether to 

attribute that to FEMA being agile or the military just fi lling in for them, but for us, it was a godsend.”).

401 Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, Executive Order 939, Aug. 26, 2005; Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, 

Adjutant General, Mississippi Army and Air National Guard, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 

the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

402 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 
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541

1. Provided to Committee.

403 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Cross, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

404 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Cross, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

405 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 

9. Provided to Committee.

406 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 

7. Provided to Committee.

407 Gov. Barbour, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

408 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Harold Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi Army and Air National Guard, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript p. 12.

409 Th ese forces included the Seabee base in Gulfport, Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, and Columbus Air Force Base. 

General Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 15.

410 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Cross, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

411 Committee staff interview of Col. Joe Spraggins, U.S. Air Force, Director, Harrison County Emergency Management 

Agency, MS, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript pp. 131-132.

412 Maj. Gen. Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 38-39.

413 Maj. Gen. Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 41.

414 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 

4. Provided to Committee.

415 Th eodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1901. 14 Messages and Papers of the President 6672.

416 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Gov. Kathleen Babineaux 

Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 7 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce of 

the Governor, Governor’s Timeline]. See also: Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt, and Th om Shanker, “Political Issues Snarled Plans 

for Troop Aid,” Th e New York Times, Sept. 9, 2005, Section A, p. 1. 

417 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 7.

418 See: Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt, and Th om Shanker, “Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid,” Th e New York 

Times, Sept. 9, 2005, , p. 1; Robert Travis Scott, “Politics delayed troops dispatch to N.O.,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, 

Dec. 11, 2005, p. 1; Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, “Th e Steady Buildup to a City’s Chaos; Confusion Reigned 

At Every Level of Government,” Th e Washington Post, Sept. 11, 2005, p. A01; Nicole Gaouette, and others, “Katrina’s 

Aft ermath, Th e Response; Put to Katrina’s Test; Aft er 9/11, a master plan for disasters was drawn. It didn’t weather the 

storm,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 11, 2005, p. 1.

419 NRP, p. 34.

420 Th e National Response Plan (NRP) describes the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) as “a multiagency coordination center established locally. It provides a central location for coordination of Federal, State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and privatesector organizations with primary responsibility for threat response and incident support. Th e JFO enables the eff ective and 

effi cient coordination of Federal incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions.” NRP, p. 28. 

421 Th e NRP designates the Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO) as “DOD’s single point of contact in the JFO,” and 

assigns him the responsibility to “coordinate and process” requests for assistance, “orchestrate the accomplishment of 

approved mission assignments,” and “refer problematic or contentious issues” to higher military authorities. NRP, p. 

42. Th e NRP excepts three types of requests for assistance from the requirement to coordinate through the Defense Coordinating Offi cer: (1) requests to the Army Corps of Engineers, which itself is considered a primary supporting agency 

under the Plan; (2) requests to the Army and Air National Guard, which under the NRP “are not part of Federal military 

response eff orts”; and (3) requests for support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for law enforcement and domestic 

counterterrorism activities. Th e NRP states that the DCO “may continue to perform all duties” in the NRP even if a Joint 

Task Force is established. NRP, p. 42. 

422 McHale, House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 27, 2005.

423 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 132.

424 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 132. William Lokey, the FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, also stated 

FEMA did not make requests for large numbers of troops. Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 224. 

425 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, by Steve 

Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, Jan. 24, 2006, p. CRS–8.

426 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301, 12302, 12304. Th e Congressional Research Service states that in the event of a catastrophic 

natural disaster, 10 U.S.C. § 12302 – which permits the President to activate the National Guard “in time of war or of 

national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law” – “would probably be the authority 

that would be most useful for calling large numbers of National Guard personnel and other reservists to federal active 
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duty for an extended period of time. ... Historically, however, 10 U.S.C. § 12302 has only been used for national security 

purposes and it could be controversial to use this authority for disaster relief purposes.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, by Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy 

Belasco, Jan. 24, 2006, p. CRS-10.

427 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335. 

428 10 U.S.C. § 12406. Th is section requires such an order to be issued through the governors of the aff ected states. 

429 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal 

Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Sept. 16, 2005, p. CRS-3.

430 DOD Directive 3025.12, MACDIS.

431 NRP, p. 42.

432 Th e National Response Plan states:

Nothing in this plan alters or impedes the ability of federal, State, local, or tribal departments and 

agencies to carry out their specifi c authorities or perform their responsibilities under all applicable laws, 

Executive orders, and directives. Additionally, nothing in this plan in intended to impact or impede the 

ability of any Federal department or agency head to take an issue of concern directly to the President, 

the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for National Security, or any other member of the President’s staff . NRP, p. 2. 

433 Article II of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Articles of Agreement states: 

Th e prompt, full, and eff ective utilization of resources of the participating states, including any resources onhand or available from the Federal Government or any other source, that are essential to the 

safety, care and welfare of the people in the event of any emergency or disaster declared by a party state, 

shall be the underlying principle on which all articles of this compact shall be understood.

National Emergency Management Association, “EMAC Articles of Agreement.” http://www.emacweb.org/?146. Accessed on May 18, 2006.

434 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005; National Guard Bureau, 

Hurricane Katrina Update Brief, Sept. 11, 2005, 11 a.m. Provided to Committee.

435 10 U.S.C. §§ 10501, 10502. Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 23.

436 Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, through Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense), Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee. 

437 Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, through Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense), Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee.

438 Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, through Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense), Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee.

439 Gordon England, memorandum for Secretary of the Army and Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Sept. 7, 2005. 

Provided to Committee. 

440 David S. Addington, e-mail to William J. Haynes, Aug. 28, 2005, 8:41 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

000007. Mr. Addington recommended that Mr. Haynes prepare a “Proclamation to Disperse,” whereby the President 

would “immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably within their abodes” (10 U.S.C. §334), and 

executive orders for 10 U.S.C. 332, “Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority,” and 10 U.S.C. §334, 

“Interference with State and Federal Law.”

441 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Th omas Miller, Aug. 31, 2005, 7:46, a.m. Provided to Committee. 

442 Maj. Gen. Terry Scherling, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rowe and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:25 a.m. Provided to Committee.

443 Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, and Lt. Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on 

Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 102.

444 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9.

445 For an explanation of Lt. Gen. Honoré’s activities prior to being designated Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, 

see prior text regarding the “First Army” and “Army Commanders.”

446 See: National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 13. 

Provided to Committee (second entry for “31 August Wednesday”: “CNGB asks to talk with MG Landreneau, TAG 

LA”). Lt. Gen. Blum’s recollection and the NGB timeline is consistent with notes dated at 7:21 a.m. on Wednesday the 

31st taken by National Guard Bureau Major Karl Konzelman, of a conversation between Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Army 

National Guard Director Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, and Lt. Gen. Blum, as well as the recollection of Lt. Gen. Vaughn. 

Major Konzelman’s notes are reprinted in: U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 

and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2006, p. 206 [hereinaft er U.S. House, A Failure of Initiative]. See also: Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, U.S. Army, 

Director, Army National Guard, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, transcript pp. 22-23. 

447 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, U.S. Army, Adjutant General, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, 
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Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s 

Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006. In his interview with the Committee staff , Maj. Gen. Landreneau said he requested 

an active-duty division. “I told him that we felt like we needed active-duty support in the state. I felt like we needed an 

active-duty division to help us – to help with the planning and execution of the movement of displaced persons out of 

New Orleans.” Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 9. Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s testimony that he 

requested an active-duty headquarters element rather than an entire division is consistent with the recollections of other 

LANG offi cers, see below. Maj. Gen. Landreneau also told the Committee staff he informed FEMA Director Brown and 

FCO Lokey of his request to Lt. Gen. Honoré for a headquarters division of active-duty troops. Brown “turned to his 

staff and said we need to make sure we log that request and that it’s properly funneled through the right request chain.” 

Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 56-57. Neither Brown nor Lokey could recall that conversation or any other conversation in which Maj. Gen. Landreneau requested federal active-duty troops. Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 98 (Q. “At any time, did General Landreneau relate to you any request that he made to General 

Honoré for Federal troops?” A. “I don’t recall it.”); Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 188 (Q. “Do you remember the fi rst 

time you learned of a request for signifi cant numbers of troops, National Guard or Federal active-duty?” A. “You know, 

counsel, I don’t.”); Compare with: Committee staff interview of Col. Steven Dabadie, Former Chief of Staff , Louisiana 

National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 118 (“He told me that the fi rst conversation that he had shortly 

aft er I talked to him was with General Honoré, and they talked about a division headquarters and tasking that division 

headquarters with planning, coordinating, executing evacuation.”).

448 “I told him the need for troops and that I needed his [help] with the EMAC [Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact] push, and gave him an assessment of what I thought we needed at that time. ... At that time that we were 

talking about 10,000 or more, and then I called him back later and I said it’s going to be more.” General Landreneau 

interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 12-14. See also: Task Force Pelican, Louisiana National Guard Timeline of Signifi cant Events 

Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 6 (sixth entry for “30 Aug 05”: “Requested additional EMAC assistance through 

NGB”). Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s testimony that he fi rst sought assistance from the National Guard Bureau on Tuesday, 

August 30, is consistent with the recollections of Lt. Gen. Honoré and three of his subordinate offi cers in the Louisiana 

National Guard: Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, the Commander of the LANG’s Joint Task Force Pelican, Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General for the Louisiana National Guard and Commander of the Louisiana Air National Guard, 

and Col. Steve Dabadie, Chief of Staff for Maj. Gen. Landreneau. (All witnesses interviewed by the Committee were 

instructed not to discuss their testimony with other potential witnesses and agreed to abide by this instruction.) 

Maj. Gen. Landreneau also stated that in a subsequent conversation he relayed the substance of his conversation with Lt. 

Gen. Blum to Lt. Gen. Honoré. Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, General Honoré. Source: General 

Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 12. As a result of diff ering recollections, the Committee is unable to determine 

whether Maj. Gen. Landreneau had more than one conversation with Lt. Gen. Honoré on Tuesday, or the precise time 

when any such conversation occurred.

449 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 72-74. 

450 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 67.

451 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 67, 75. Lt. Gen. Honoré also said he told Maj. Gen. Landreneau that 

“We had about 5,000 troops that possibly could be ready to deploy,” including the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st 

Cavalry Division of the 5th Army. Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 67. Maj. Gen. Landreneau recalled this 

conversation occurring on Wednesday, August 31, when Lt. Gen. Honoré arrived at the Superdome. Source: Maj. Gen. 

Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 8-9. 

452 Referring to the NGB’s timeline, which reports a request for 5,000 troops from Maj. Gen. Landreneau fi rst occurring 

early Wednesday morning, Lt. Gen. Blum stated, “I talked to him at home one night before that, which probably was 

Tuesday night, but I don’t see that in here [the NGB timeline], because this is generated from my operations center, not 

from my home phone.” Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 33. 

453 Louisiana National Guard Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon recounted how his concerns over security became magnifi ed 

when the rising waters fl ooded the generator providing power to the Superdome:

About 11 on Tuesday night, they came to us and said, “Boys, the water is rising. Th e generator has 

about a foot to go. You will lose the generator when the water tops the wall.” I asked the man, “What 

happens when we lose a generator?” He said, “All the lights go out.” I said, “Every light in the Dome?” 

“Every light.” So I knew the Dome would go dark, and I was concerned at that point for what we were 

going to do if the whole place went black.

Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General – Air, Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 58. 

454 A number of witnesses, including Col. Dabadie, provided confl icting and inconsistent accounts of when this conversation and other conversations about the need for additional troops occurred. Col. Dabadie interview, Jan. 12, 2006, 

pp. 99-103, 107. Th e Committee cannot rule out the possibility that there was more than one related conversation on this 

subject at diff erent times from early Tuesday to early Wednesday. Th e weight of the evidence and testimony indicates 

that this particular conversation occurred in the wee hours of Wednesday morning. 

455 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander/Army, Louisiana Army 

National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 92-93, 139-40. 

456 Col. Dabadie interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 99-100. According to Col. Dabadie, “a little bit aft er” that conversation, Maj. 

Gen. Landreneau told him that he had asked Lt. Gen. Honoré “about a division type headquarters.” Col. Dabadie added: 
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“And I think that is kind of where General Graham came into the picture, and then the rest of the forces were National 

Guard – conversation with General Blum and the rest of the forces were National Guard through EMAC.” Col. Dabadie 

interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 102-103, 118. 

457 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 191. 

458 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 34. Referring to notes taken by his assistant, Major Karl Konzelman of the 

Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, Director of the Army National Guard, provided a similar 

recollection of this conversation. Lt. Gen. Vaughn understood Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s primary need was for additional 

security forces. Source: Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 23. Major General Harold Cross, the Adjutant General 

of the Mississippi National Guard, called General Blum about the same time, and also asked the National Guard Bureau to 

expedite the EMAC process for Mississippi. Source: Maj. Gen. Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 12-14. See also: Maj. Gen. 

Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 49-50; Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 49.

459 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 36. 

460 National Guard Bureau, Hurricane Katrina Update Brief, Sept. 10, 2005, 10 a.m. Provided to Committee. 

461 Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 31. Th e Committee asked Lt. Gen. Vaughn: 

Q: Is it correct to characterize the process as follows, that initially General Landreneau, when he called and 

said I need 5,000 that he was saying this is big, I’m going to need a lot; I don’t know exactly what I’m going 

to need, but I’m going to need a lot. And then, on the Guard’s end, you interpreted that ... [t]hey’re going 

to need a lot, let’s just send whatever we’ve got in, and we’ll refi ne it? Was that what you were doing?

LT. GEN. VAUGHN: I think that’s right on the money. I think it’s exactly like that. 

Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 33. 

462 National Guard Bureau, Hurricane Katrina Update Brief, Sept. 10, 2005, 10 a.m. Provided to Committee.

463 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 6. Provided 

to Committee. 

464 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 6. Provided 

to Committee.

465 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 54. 

466 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 20. Provided 

to Committee. 

467 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 54 

468 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 20. Provided 

to Committee. 

469 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 54-55.

470 McHale, House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 27, 2005. 

471 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 125-126.

472 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

473 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006. 

474 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, “Hurricane Katrina Chronology.” Provided 

to Committee.

475 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 71-72.

476 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 43-44.

477 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 121; Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 76-77. Although Gen. Honoré 

talks about evacuation planning, he does not state that he was asked to take over the evacuation.

478 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript p. 47.

479 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 69. Th ere were similar uninformed expectations in FEMA headquarters. Col. Don 

Harrington, the lead DOD liaison to FEMA, was asked whether at FEMA there was “any expectation that [Lt. Gen. Honoré] 

would be bringing a large number of forces with him?” “Yes, yes,” Col Harrington responded and then explained: 

I had to kind of let them know that the troop presence he brought, he didn’t control the Guard. Th ey had 

to understand that. But that he was not necessarily going to bring a huge number of troops initially. You 

know, he had to get an assessment, and plus you had a large number of National Guard troops.

Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 100.

480 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 44.

481 Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, and Lt. Col. Jacques 

Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 270-271. 
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545

482 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 131-134. 

483 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 67. Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux of the Louisiana National Guard, the Joint Director 

of Military Support during Katrina, responded to Mr. Wells’s concern, as raised by Committee staff during the interview, 

by stating that it was Mayor Nagin, not Lt. Gen. Honoré, who was at all times in charge of the evacuation of the Superdome 

and New Orleans: 

Mayor Nagin was also there and Col. Ebert, who is his emergency operations manager – I think Col. 

Ebert’s title is Director of Homeland Security for New Orleans – were both also involved in that meeting. ... So it was, once again, not a break in protocol. It was a civilian entity, a civilian representative 

trying to facilitate the evacuation of his city. And General Landreneau and General Honoré were both 

there in any attempt to facilitate that. Basically a unifi ed command system; a meeting amongst commanders of certain areas to facilitate DOD support, both National Guard and active component. 

Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 2006, pp. 267-269. 

484 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9.

485 Committee staff interview of Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 

2006, transcript pp. 192-194. Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Governor Blanco, recalled a similar conversation with 

Senator Vitter: 

Either Mr. Ryder or Senator Vitter mentioned to me Senator Vitter wanted to visit with the Governor 

about his conversation with Mr. Rove about federalization in regard to the Governor’s conversation 

that morning with Ms. Townsend, the Homeland Security advisor. And the question was, did the 

Governor’s request for additional federal assistance constitute a request for federalization, because that 

was the way it had been reported to the Senator per his – at some point, whether it was Senator Vitter 

fi rst or Terry or – well, I talked to both Terry, and I talked to Senator Vitter about that. 

Committee staff interview of Andy Kopplin, former Chief of Staff , Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript p. 122. 

486 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 202.

487 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203.

488 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203. Andy Kopplin, Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff , expounded on the 

Governor’s comments regarding the appropriate command structure for the response. Aft er receiving Senator Vitter’s 

question whether the Governor’s request for additional federal assistance constituted a request for federalization, 

Kopplin sought the advice of Col. Smith, the Deputy Director of LOHSEP, on the consequences of federalization: 

I think the conclusions were fairly clear that the Governor’s request, which was for additional federal 

assistance to help in particular with the evacuation, would not benefi t from federalization but, in fact, 

the law enforcement functions of the guard could, in fact be compromised. ... So the Governor took 

immediate action to clarify by placing a second call of the day looking for the President. Th is time, she 

got him, and she made the point that she’s looking for assistance, that she needed assistance, but the 

unifi ed command she felt was the appropriate structure to continue to use.

Kopplin interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 122-125.

489 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203.

490 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203. Th e Governor’s timeline characterizes the conversation between the Governor 

and the President as follows:

She stresses to him that the situation is extremely grave and asks for additional resources. Governor 

Blanco also specifi cally stresses that she wants to continue to be his partner in a unity of eff ort as is called 

for under the National Response Plan. To relay the urgency and magnitude of the need at that point in 

time, the Governor tells the President she estimates 40,000 troops would be needed, and again reiterates 

her frustration about the FEMA buses. 

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10.

491 Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Blanco, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006.

492 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 71. Lokey provided a similar recollection at another point during the interview: 

I went to Brown and said, we’ve got to do something, sir. Th is is more than we can do. Our programs 

aren’t designed for this. Our resources aren’t there, so whatever. ... We had to do something, and the only 

group I know that knows how to do stuff that big and has done it before was the United States military. 

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 91. 

493 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 88-89.

494 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 198.

495 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 113. 

496 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 115-116. Dolph Diemont, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s representative 

at the state EOC, described how Brown communicated his frustration to the federal staff at the EOC: 
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When he came in and they closed the door he turned beet red and said this is unacceptable. You guys are 

all incompetent. Th is is not going the way we want. We’ve got to change it. You know, I don’t know what 

the hell’s going on. You know, screaming and yelling at us, at everybody. It was hard to take because we 

were pouring our hearts out, trying to get the job done, and instead of encouragement, we got that kind of 

– it was ... demoralizing. 

Committee staff interview of Dolph Diemont, Region X Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of 

Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript 

p. 80.

497 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 114. 

498 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 114-115. 

499 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 123. 

500 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 141.

501 Th is point is discussed in the Logistics portion earlier in this chapter.

502 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 57-62.

503 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 61. Lt. Gen. Inge, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command, 

stated in a press conference following the President’s deployment orders on Sept. 3, 2005, that the Title 10 Troops “will not 

take on a law enforcement role [nor] have they been directed in any way to do so. Th ey will provide security. Th ey will ... be 

available to relieve National Guard soldiers who are in state status should there be a requirement for National Guard guys to 

do law enforcement. ... I am not aware of any discussion of waiver of Posse Comitatus that’s taken place.” Lt. Gen. Joseph 

Inge, U.S. Northern Command, “Defense Department Briefi ng on Ongoing DoD Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news 

briefi ng, Sept. 3, 2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050903-3849.html. Accessed on May 16, 2006. 

504 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 71.

505 Th e Posse Comitatus Act restrictions do not apply if the National Guard troops are activated under the Insurrection 

Act. See: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch, 

by Jennifer Elsea, June 6, 2005. 

506 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

507 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 72.

508 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 72. Although Lokey recalled the state’s reaction as unambiguously negative, Brown 

interpreted it diff erently: “Th ere was enough ambiguity that I thought we might actually be able to pull it off , that she might 

actually agree to this. And she did say...she needed more time; she needed to talk to her staff about it, which I fully understood and respected, but I really thought I had kind of made some inroads there.” Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 201.

509 FEMA Director Brown telephoned Lt. Gen. Honoré prior to his arrival in Baton Rouge. According to Brown, “[Lt. Gen. 

Honoré] already had a litany of things he wanted to do, and I had to back him down and say, “I may want all of those things 

done, but until we get federalized or however we work this out, I’m still in control, and you need to let me know what you 

want to do.” Source: Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 

2006. Maj. Gen. Landreneau recalled a similar conversation aft er General Honoré arrived at the EOC in Baton Rouge. According to Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Brown told General Honoré “that he was the primary federal offi cial, P.F.O., and General 

Honoré was not going to anything in the way of marshalling resources or doing anything without his concurrence.” “Yes, 

sir,” Lt. Gen. Honoré replied. Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 54. In his second interview with the 

Committee, Brown related that he was not dissatisfi ed with Lt. Gen. Honoré’s performance; in fact, Brown believed that Lt. 

Gen. Honoré was doing an excellent job of operating within DOD’s role under the unifi ed command. Rather, according to 

Brown, he engaged in this colloquy with Lt. Gen. Honoré in order to strengthen the unifi ed command that Lt. Gen. Honoré 

and Maj. Gen. Landreneau were attempting to establish. Source: Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 118-119.

510 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10. Lt. Gen. Honoré stated that the Governor’s timeline fairly 

refl ected the substance of this conversation. Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 121-122.

511 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 22-26. 

512 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 27-28. General Graham had begun his assignment at the 5th Army headquarters on August 15. From that time until his assignment in Hurricane Katrina, General Graham’s duties had focused on 

the 5th Army’s transition to its newly focused mission of homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities. Brig. 

Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 5-10, 24-26. 

513 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Col. Curtis and Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 

2006, pp. 270-271.

514 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 57-58.

515 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 58.

516 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 58.

517 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 61.

518 Col. Anthony Daskevich, the Defense Coordinating Offi cer in Baton Rouge also was present at this meeting and re-
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547

called that the Governor did not make a specifi c request for additional federal ground troops. Source: Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 130-132. General Graham also stated that the Governor did not make any request for federal troops 

during the part of the conversation in which he was present. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 29-30.

519 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 103-105. 

520 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 130. At another point during the Committee’s interview Lt. Gen. Honoré 

identifi ed several other types of assets that DOD provided during that fi rst week: 

We knew we needed helicopters. We knew we needed COMs [communications] capability. We knew we 

needed MEDEVAC. And these started to fl ow...Th is is Wednesday morning, and we’re doing this without 

an open request. We’ve got no request for any specifi c capability, but what we have done is an assessment 

that these types of capabilities could be used, and started to fl ow them. 

Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 123-124. 

Lt. Gen. Honoré addressed why he did not call on the 82nd Airborne Division for the deployment of a large number of 

ground troops on day one: “Th e type of capability we needed wasn’t necessarily the 82nd. Th ey’d jump in and secure for 

us, recon for us. Th e type of capability we needed at that time was evacuation capability. ... I don’t recall any serious conversation on why we didn’t have the 82nd Airborne there on day one.” Source: Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, 

p. 127. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Katrina, told the Committee that another 

consideration was the primary mission of the 82nd Airborne was to be prepared for potential overseas missions. Source: 

Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 33-34. Col. Don Harrington, the DOD liaison to FEMA, explained, “Th ere is a 

reticence, too, to deploy the 82nd down range. It’s not something really – keep in mind, that next year, the [terrorists] 

may take advantage of this. You know, that’s a very big concern. So do you want to kick everybody out in, what I call the 

Hindenburg disaster mode? Everybody goes out, the Hindenburg is burning. Everybody goes down range, and you don’t 

realize that some people may be taking advantage of that.” Source: Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 101. Assistant Secretary McHale commented, “We don’t want to turn the 82nd Airborne into a fi rst responder, always available on 

a moment’s notice for law enforcement activity throughout the United States. To be prepared for such a mission would 

require a change in the training and equipment of the 82nd. It would also produce a signifi cant change in the historically 

defi ned role of the military within domestic American society.” Source: McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 90-91.

521 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 143-145.

522 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Col. James Hickey, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:05 p.m. Provided to Committee. General 

Honore was cc’d on the e-mail and the subject was “LA Security mission.” Col. Hickey was General Honoré’s executive 

offi cer. In the context of this e-mail, the term federal troops appears to refer to federal troops that are not National Guard 

troops – in other words, active-duty troops. 

523 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Col. James Hickey, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:05 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

524 U.S. Army Forces Command, Message to Commander, First Army, and others, “FORSCOM FRAGO #8,” Sept. 1, 2005, 

0039 Z. Provided to Committee. See also: JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

525 82nd Airborne Division, “82nd Airborne Division Mission.” http://www.bragg.army.mil/82dv/Mission.html. Accessed on Apr. 13, 2006. 

526 1st Cavalry Division , ”Reorganization.” http://pao.hood.army.mil/1stcavdiv/index.htm. Accessed on Apr. 13, 2006.

527 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina Major Events Timeline, Draft , Dec. 28, 2005, 12:52 p.m. Provided to 

Committee.

528 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rowe, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:46 a.m. Provided to Committee; Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 139.

529 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 78. 

530 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Lt. Gen. James Amos, Sept. 1, 2005, 1:46 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

531 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 288.

532 Adm. Keating, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

533 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 139.

534 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 250-251.

535 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, Sept. 1, 2005, 1:50 p.m. Provided to Committee. Approximately 15 minutes later, Lt. Gen. Honoré responded, “GOT IT.” 

536 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, p. 35. 

537 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 56. 

538 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 30-31. Gen. Myers stated that DOD continued to hold this view on Friday 

aft ernoon, even aft er the Governor made an additional request to the President for more federal troops on Friday morning 

aboard Air Force One. Nonetheless, according to Gen. Myers, DOD sent additional troops requested by the Governor. Th e 

troops already were on high alert status, Gen. Myers noted, “so you said okay, if the Governor thinks we need more, we’ll 

send more.” Source: Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 39. Lt. Gen. Blum, who met with both the President and the 

Governor on that Friday, stated, “It was clear in my mind that by 3:00 on Sept. 2 that there were suffi cient forces in Louisiana to manage the security condition, to complete the search and rescue operation, and that the Governor of Louisiana 
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548

agree to that assessment and personally expressed it to me as well as Mayor Nagin.” Source: Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 

19, 2005, p. 72.

539 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 11-12; Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 183-184.

540 “I don’t recall a specifi c request from the governor for Title X troops at that time.” Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 

2006, p. 184.

541 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 213-215.

542 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 57; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 12.

543 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 57.

544 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 12. Lt. Gen. Blum told the Committee that this description of 

his views is “entirely consistent with my recollection.” Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 68.

545 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 125.

546 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, 

Oct. 31, 2005, p. 9; Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, Nov. 2, 2005, p. 9. Earlier that morning the President met with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Lt. Gen. 

Blum to receive “a hurricane status brief.” U.S. Department of Defense, Draft Hurricane Katrina Major Events Timeline, 

Dec. 28, 2005, 12:52 p.m. Provided to Committee.

547 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 43; England interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

548 McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

549 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 14.

550 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 

2006. When asked by the Committee whether he was advocating that the National Guard be federalized, Mayor Nagin 

replied, “It was just a question of who had fi nal authority. I’m not sure of the details of what they were debating.” Source: 

Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. It is not clear what “fi nal authority” would have meant other than 

federal control of the National Guard, since the mayor, as head of the local government, was the incident commander. 

“He’s the civilian, the lead civilian authority in charge of that municipality. He is really the only one that can control that

operation.” Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 2006, pp. 268-269. See also: Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 1, 2006 (affi rming role as incident commander for New Orleans). 

551 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. Governor Blanco testifi ed, “the Mayor was not in our meeting that I had with the President, per se. ... At that point in time, Mayor Nagin had not been in good communication 

with us. You know, the communication system had fallen down.” Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

552 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. Th e Governor also sent a letter to the President on Sept. 2, 

requesting additional federal troops and other resources: 

Based on our initial assessment, I have previously requested signifi cant federal support to include: an 

additional 40,000 troops; trailers of water, ice and food; commercial buses; base camps; staging areas; 

amphibious personnel carriers; deployable morgues; urban search and rescue teams; airlift ; temporary 

housing; and communications systems. Even if these initial requests had been fully honored, these assets would not be suffi cient to address our critical, immediate needs.

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to President George W. Bush, Sept. 2, 2005. 

553 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. Th e Governor’s timeline elaborated:

Th e Governor has a private conversation with President Bush about the command structure of the operations, and reiterates her need for a signifi cant number of federal troops. Th e President asks Governor 

Blanco to put her troops, the Louisiana National Guard and EMAC National Guard, under control of 

a Department of Defense appointed General. By the time of Friday’s conversation, the situation has 

evolved and the immediate needs on the ground are far diff erent than the needs when federal troops 

were fi rst requested earlier in the week. 

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 14.

554 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

555 Robert Travis Scott, “Politics delayed troops dispatch,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 11, 2005, National, p. 1.

556 In particular, elements of the 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) were prepared to deploy and could have deployed on Friday. Lt. Gen. Amos told the Committee:

I anticipated [the Special Air Contingency Marine Air Ground Task Force] leaving on Friday. I fi gured 

the DEP [deploy] order was going to be signed on Friday. ... I kind of expected the DEP order was going to happen on Friday, and that’s because all the news was reporting the President was going to make 

an announcement on one of his public things while he was going around New Orleans. ... So I expected 

them to actually start moving out on Friday. So I put them on their what we call, aff ectionately, put 

them on their packs probably – I either did that Wednesday aft ernoon, the 31st, or the fi rst.

Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 75.
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549

557 White House Briefi ng to Committee, given by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland 

Security, Dec. 12, 2005.

558 Th e Governor’s timeline addresses this issue:

Erroneous reports have been circulated that she denied federal troops or delayed help for 24-hours. Th e 

facts are clear and evidence confi rms that the Governor requests early and oft en the need for additional 

federal military presence, including a federal military presence and assets. At no time does anyone 

from the federal government tell her that federal troops are withheld because the existing structure was 

inadequate. In fact, the new proposal is fi rst presented to her aboard Air Force One on Friday, four days 

aft er the storm struck on Monday, and the President never suggests that federal troops were reliant on 

this new structure nor did he convey that the joint command structure is insuffi cient.

Source: Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 15. Regarding the Mayor’s charge that the Governor’s 

position delayed the deployment of federal troops and impeded the overall response in Louisiana, the Governor testifi ed, 

“I will tell you at that point in time, Mayor Nagin had not been in good communication with us. You know the communication system had fallen down.” Source: Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

559 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 100-101. 

560 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 38-43.

561 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 121. 

562 Th omas Kuster, e-mail to Col. Richard Chavez, Sept. 2, 2005, 5:31 p.m. Provided to Committee.

563 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 237-238. Witt was serving as a consultant to the Governor. 

564 Kopplin interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 159-160.

565 Kopplin interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 153.

566 According to Governor Blanco, “It was Blum, Blum, Blum, and then Card came in on the third.” Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

567 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. Th e Governor’s timeline summarizes these exchanges:

Close to midnight on Friday, Gov. Blanco receives phone calls from Gen. Steve Blum, just aft er his return to DC, and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who want to discuss with her their proposed 

organizational restructuring. She hears them out, but continues to believe, given the stabilization now 

underway and the massive National Guard buildup on the ground, that bringing in the federal forces 

and putting them under the command of Gen. Honoré to coordinate with Gen. Landreneau who leads 

the Guard forces is the most eff ective solution.

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 15. 

568 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

569 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 83-86.

570 McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

571 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” radio address, 

Sept. 3, 2005, 10:06 a.m. ET. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html Accessed on May 16, 2006.

572 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

573 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 

Security, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 170-171.

574 Adm. Timothy J. Keating, “Defense Department Briefi ng on Ongoing DoD Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news 

briefi ng, Sept. 5, 2005. http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050905-3851.html. Accessed on May 16, 2006. At a 

press conference on Tuesday, Sept. 6, Gen. Myers was asked whether the response would have been quicker had it been 

federalized:

GEN. MYERS: I think the response by the National Guard, which is under state authority in both Louisiana and Mississippi, and I assume Alabama and Florida as well, was, I think, very quick. I think if you asked the TAGs of that state, I think

they responded very quickly.

Sec. Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, “Defense Department Operational Update Briefi ng,” news briefi ng, Sept. 6, 

2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050906-secdef3862.html. Accessed on May 16, 2006.

575 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Gordon Ellis, U.S. Army, former Commander of First Battalion, 148th Infantry, 

Ohio National Guard, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript pp. 88-89.

576 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 88, 110.

577 Gov. Barbour, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006 (“I made very plain from day one that we didn’t ... need the 

federal government to run our National Guard. ... I was very emphatic it was the wrong thing to do.”); Gov. Blanco, Senate 

Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006 (“It’s very important for a governor to be able to retain control of the National Guard 

precisely for its law enforcement capabilities.”).