GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

August 22, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve 

In 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most comprehensive 

restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. Soon 

thereafter, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report titled Strengthening 

U.S. Global Defense Posture.

1

 This report defined the key tenets of the integrated 

global presence and basing strategy, which outlines troop and basing adjustments 

overseas. Although the strategy is intended to make the overseas posture of the 

United States more flexible and efficient, it will require new facilities costing billions 

of dollars, some of the cost to be borne by the United States and some by other 

nations. 

As plans for overseas basing began to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee 

expressed concern about the use of military construction funds for projects at 

overseas bases that may soon be obsolete or closed because of changes being 

considered by DOD and the military services. Accordingly, the Senate report 

accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed 

DOD2

 to prepare detailed, comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure 

requirements at U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands.3 

DOD was required to provide a baseline report on these plans with yearly updates on 

their status and their implementation along with annual military construction budget 

submissions through 2008. Subsequently, the House conference report 

accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation bill also directed the 

department to prepare comprehensive master plans with yearly updates through 

fiscal year 2009.4

 The Senate report directed the master plans to identify precise 

facility requirements and the status of properties being returned to host nations. 

Additionally, the Senate report stated that the plans should identify funding 

 

1

Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 

2004). 

2

In fulfilling this requirement, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the overseas regional 

commands to prepare comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility. 

3

S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003). 

4

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003). 
Page 2 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

 

requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities between the United 

States and host nations. The Senate report also directed us to monitor the master 

plans developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to 

provide the congressional defense committees with assessment reports each year. 

This is our third report that responds to the reporting requirements contained in the 

fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report. Our prior 

work5

 found that although DOD’s overseas master plans provided a more complete 

picture of future overseas defense infrastructure and funding requirements than was 

available in other DOD documents, opportunities existed for the plans to provide 

more complete, clear, and consistent information and to present a more definitive 

picture of future requirements. For this report, we assessed the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) most recent guidance6

 to overseas regional commands 

and its use in developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to Congress on 

April 27, 2006.7

 This report discusses the extent to which the 20068 overseas master 

plans (1) complied with reporting requirements and provided information in a 

complete, clear, and consistent manner; (2) reflected how U.S. overseas defense 

basing strategies and requirements have changed since last year; and (3) reflected the 

challenges DOD faces in the implementation of the plans. 

To address our objectives, we met with OSD officials to discuss the level of guidance 

available to the commands to facilitate consistent preparation of overseas master 

plans, and we analyzed whether the guidance meets the requirements for information 

contained in congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO. We also visited 

overseas regional commands—the Pacific Command (PACOM), including U.S. Forces 

Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan; European Command (EUCOM); and Central 

Command (CENTCOM)—to see selected installations and military construction 

projects firsthand and to discuss OSD’s guidance and the various factors that can 

5

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for 

Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005), and 

Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development of 

Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004). 

6

DOD, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Update of Overseas 

Master Plans (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2005). OSD also issued guidance in February and October 

2004 to aid the overseas regional commands in developing their plans last year. 

7

Last year, OSD provided Congress the overseas master plans along with its fiscal year 2006 military 

construction budget proposal in early March 2005. This year’s master plans were submitted on 

April 27, 2006, later than when the annual budget submissions went to Congress, at least in part 

because of OSD’s efforts to incorporate last minute changes in basing plans, such as those in Iceland 

and Italy. OSD made the plans available to us on May 2, 2006, which did not provide us sufficient time 

to fully assess the plans or provide a draft report to Congress by May 15 as we have done in the past. 

8

We refer to the plans in the year that they were issued to Congress. The content of the plans issued in 

2006 covers fiscal years 2007 through 2011. 
Page 3 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

 

affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and costs overseas.9

 Once the master plans 

were issued, we reviewed them to determine how the plans have changed since last 

year and the extent to which they complied with the reporting requirements. We 

assessed whether the plans provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent 

manner, and we discussed with OSD and command officials whether improvements 

in the guidance and reporting were needed. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. See enclosure I for more 

information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief 

The 2006 master plans generally exceeded the reporting requirements established by 

Congress and—by addressing most of our recommendations for improving the plans 

from last year—they are more complete, clear, and consistent than last year’s plans, 

although limitations exist in the information provided on fiscal year 2007 funding 

required for individual military construction projects. Whereas last year none of the 

regional commands fully identified their precise facility requirements and costs as 

specified in the reporting mandate, all of the commands provided precise facility 

requirements for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 in their master plans. However, the 

plans submitted to Congress did not provide estimated costs for individual military 

construction projects for fiscal year 2007 as specified by OSD guidance because of, 

according to a senior OSD official, the difficulty of including the cost estimates that 

had not yet been finalized during DOD’s budget process. Consequently, the master 

plans must be matched with the fiscal year 2007 military construction budget request 

to obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and cost requirements for fiscal 

year 2007. Although not required, we believe the plans could be more complete and 

useful to decision makers if they also explained, where applicable, how each 

implementation is being or has the potential to be affected by other defense plans and 

activities that are likely to affect future facility and funding requirements in a region. 

In 2005, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facilities Structure of the 

United States10 recommended that the entire effort of overseas basing be integrated 

into one overarching design that is coordinated and synchronized with all ongoing 

initiatives. Although overseas command officials told us that their plans were 

coordinated with other defense plans and activities, only PACOM’s plan explained 

how its implementation could be affected by another activity—a potential decrease in 

host nation support when the Government of Japan provides resources to help fund 

9

For the purposes of this report, we did not include Southern Command in our analysis because this 

command has significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands in the Pacific, 

Europe, and Central Asia. 

10U.S. Congress, Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facilities Structure of the United 

States Final Report (Arlington, Va.: Aug. 15, 2005). The commission was established in 2003 by Pub. L. 

No. 108-132 § 128 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 111 note) to evaluate the current and proposed 

overseas basing structure for U.S. military forces. 
Page 4 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

 

the relocation of approximately 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. EUCOM 

and CENTCOM plans did not address other relevant and related plans and activities.11

 

For example, EUCOM’s master plan did not explain the potential impact of base 

realignment and closure implementation on the movement of troops from Germany 

to bases in the United States. This omission is due primarily to OSD guidance that 

stipulated the plans were to address overseas locations and to exclude the 50 states 

and U.S. territories. Without explanations of the linkage between the overseas 

master plans with other defense plans and activities, it is difficult to determine their 

impact on U.S. defense infrastructure and funding requirements overseas. 

The 2006 master plans reflected changes in overseas basing strategies and 

requirements that occurred since last year. It was apparent that OSD and the regional 

commands worked to incorporate key changes associated with the continuing 

evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategies into the plans before they were provided 

to Congress. For example, EUCOM added requirements for facilities in Romania and 

Bulgaria to its master plan based on agreements with those countries to allow DOD 

use of their facilities, and CENTCOM removed infrastructure requirements from its 

master plan that were planned for Uzbekistan after its government requested that 

U.S. forces leave. In some instances, basing decisions were made after the plans 

were prepared—such as the realignment at Keflavik, Iceland, and La Maddelena, 

Italy—but OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to reflect those 

decisions before the plans were submitted to Congress. Even with these efforts to 

update the plans as changes occurred and decisions were made, the evolution of U.S. 

overseas military basing strategies and requirements continues. Changes occurring 

after the most recent plans were submitted to Congress will have to be reflected in 

next year’s plans, and OSD and the regional commands could be faced with more 

changes in the future. 

This year, the master plans provided a much better description of the challenges DOD 

faces in implementing the master plans. For example, all of the plans addressed the 

uncertainties associated with host nations and recent agreements, and generally dealt 

with environmental concerns and training limitations, where they existed. An 

exception involves the fact that PACOM’s plan did not describe the limitations on 

training in South Korea and Japan. If these training limitations are not addressed, 

senior command officials told us, they could cause the United States to either train in 

other locations or to downsize or relocate. As a result of this omission, PACOM’s 

plan does not provide decisionmakers a complete picture of the challenges that could 

affect its implementation and potential changes in infrastructure and funding 

requirements needed to address training limitations in the Pacific region. 

We are making two recommendations to improve future master plans for changing 

defense infrastructure overseas. Specifically, we are recommending that OSD 

(1) revise its guidance to require overseas commands to explain how other relevant 

11Like last year, CENTCOM’s plan excluded any detailed discussion of facilities in Iraq since DOD does 

not consider them permanent bases. 
Page 5 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

 

and related defense plans and activities affect implementation of their master plans in 

terms of infrastructure and funding requirements and (2) ensure that PACOM 

explains how it plans to address existing training limitations and the potential effects 

on infrastructure and funding requirements. In written comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD partially agreed with our recommendations and indicated that it would 

address these issues in a risk assessment framework in future master plans. We 

discuss DOD’s comments in detail later in this report. 

Background 

Military construction appropriations fund the planning, design, construction, 

alteration, and improvement of military facilities worldwide. As of fiscal year 2005, 

DOD reportedly had 3,376 installations total, with 737 installations located overseas.12 

Operational control of the U.S. combat forces and installations is assigned to the 

nation’s five geographic, unified overseas regional commands, which are responsible 

for the security environment as directed by the national security strategy and the 

national military strategy. Composed of forces from two or more services, PACOM, 

EUCOM, and CENTCOM span numerous countries and even continents and 

encompass areas with economically, politically, and socially diverse regions, as 

shown in figure 1. 

12These numbers do not include U.S. facilities in Iraq. 
Page 6 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 1: PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM Geographic Areas of Responsibility 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Special Operations Command does not have a specific geographic area of responsibility because it is a 

functional overseas regional command with lead responsibility for waging war on terrorism. The command also 

provides special operations forces to support the overseas regional commanders’ security plans and is a tenant 

unit on bases and funds special operations forces-specific items—such as hangars for aircraft—out of military 

construction appropriations, and uses operation and maintenance appropriations for support items, such as 

special operations-specific computers. 

The United States has a large portion of its military personnel deployed abroad at any 

given time; however, this number varies with the frequency and types of military 

operations and deployment demands. Currently, just more than 119,000 troops are 

regularly stationed in Europe. Most of these are U.S. Army forces (62,600) stationed 

mainly in Germany, with smaller numbers elsewhere in Europe and some in Africa. 

Nearly 100,000 military personnel are located in East Asia, divided between Japan, 

South Korea, and on the waters of the Pacific. Additionally, the ongoing global war 

on terrorism has resulted in the deployment of much larger numbers of forces in 

theaters of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Page 7 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a defense 

strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global threats. As part of its 

transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas basing requirements to allow 

for greater U.S. military flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats 

worldwide. U.S. military presence overseas has been converting from a posture 

established on familiar terrain to counter a known threat to one that is intended to be 

capable of projecting forces from strategic locations into relatively unknown areas in 

an uncertain threat environment. In September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report, which addressed, among other issues, reorienting the U.S. 

military global posture. The report called for developing a permanent basing system 

that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world as well as 

providing temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to 

train and operate in the absence of permanent ranges and bases. 

In August 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most 

comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the 

Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no longer needed to meet Cold 

War threats, as well as bring home many U.S. forces while stationing more flexible, 

deployable capabilities in strategic locations around the world. The Integrated 

Global Presence and Basing Strategy is the culmination of various DOD studies, 

including the overseas basing and requirements study, the overseas presence study, 

and the U.S. global posture study. The military construction appropriation request 

for fiscal year 2007 included approximately $16.7 billion for military construction and 

family housing, of which nearly $1.3 billion (7.6 percent) is designated for specific 

overseas locations, mostly comprising enduring installations, and not for new and 

emerging requirements outside existing basing structures.13

Congressional Requirement for 

Detailed Comprehensive Master Plans

In previous years, the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate 

Appropriations Committee had expressed concern that the overseas basing structure 

had not been updated to reflect the new realities of the post-Cold War world. The 

Committee had also expressed concern about the use of military construction budget 

authority for projects at bases that may soon be obsolete because of changes being 

considered in overseas presence and basing. Consequently, in Senate Report 108-82, 

the Senate Appropriations Committee directed DOD to prepare detailed, 

comprehensive master plans for the changing infrastructure requirements for U.S. 

military facilities in each of its overseas regional commands. Subsequently, the 

House conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction appropriation 

bill also directed the department to submit comprehensive master plans. According 

to the Senate report, at a minimum, the plans are to identify precise facility 

 

13In our estimates for military construction and family housing for overseas locations, we included U.S. 

territories and possessions in the Pacific, such as Guam and Wake Island. However, we excluded 

worldwide classified and unspecified appropriations from our total because these categories may 

include domestic military construction and family housing. 
Page 8 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

requirements and the status of properties being returned to host nations. In addition, 

the report stated that the plans should identify funding requirements and the division 

of funding responsibilities between the United States and cognizant host nations. The 

Senate report also directed DOD to provide congressional defense committees a 

report on the status and implementation of those plans with each yearly military 

construction budget submission through fiscal year 2008. The first report was due 

with the fiscal year 2006 military construction budget submission and is to be 

updated each succeeding year to reflect changes to the plans involving specific 

construction projects being added, canceled, or modified, or funding for those 

projects being redirected to other needs, and justification for such changes.14 The 

Senate report also directed GAO to monitor the comprehensive master plans being 

developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the 

congressional defense committees with a report each year giving an assessment of 

the status of the plans. 

Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics has been tasked with responding to this legislative requirement. In 

turn, the Under Secretary assigned the overseas regional commands responsibility for 

preparing detailed, comprehensive master plans for their areas of responsibility. 

Prior GAO Work

In our prior work,15 we found that while DOD’s completion of overseas master plans 

provided a more complete picture of future facility and funding requirements for 

changing U.S. defense infrastructure overseas than is available in other DOD reports, 

documents, and annual budget requests, opportunities existed to improve the 

guidance and term definitions to help overseas regional commands provide more 

complete, clear, and consistent information and present a more definitive picture of 

infrastructure and funding requirements, particularly for new locations, in the future. 

We found limitations in information that could be provided because of three key 

factors: ongoing negotiations with host nations, continuing evolution of U.S. 

overseas basing strategy, and differences commands had in interpretation of OSD 

guidance. In addition, addressing the extent to which residual value issues could 

affect U.S. funding requirements was an open and continuing recommendation from 

our prior report. Additionally, we reported that without more complete, clear, and 

consistent reporting of various items—host nation agreements and funding levels, 

including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding levels and sources in addition to 

military construction funds; environmental remediation and restoration issues; 

population levels; and facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. 

territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific—across future master plans, users 

do not have the best data available to facilitate their annual review and oversight. 

Also, we reported that without the detailed reporting of individual construction 

projects as EUCOM did in its plan and the anticipated strategic end state of the 

 

14See footnote 7. 

15See footnote 5. 
Page 9 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

command’s overseas basing infrastructure as of 2010 as CENTCOM did in its plan, 

Congress and other users would not have the best available and consistent data on 

which to track progress and changes from year to year and between commands. In 

many of these instances, providing supplementary narrative explanation of the 

assumptions used or reasons data were omitted could improve the usefulness of the 

comprehensive master plans. 

2006 Master Plans Exceeded Most Reporting 

Requirements and Are More Complete, 

Clear, and Consistent Than Last Year’s Plans 

While prior overseas master plans generally exceeded the reporting requirements 

established by Congress, OSD has further improved the plans by issuing guidance in 

2005 to require overseas regional commands to provide additional information and 

address most of our prior recommendations. As a result, the 2006 plans are not only 

more complete, clear, and consistent than last year’s plans, they are also more 

refined, focusing first on the mission and then on the infrastructure requirements 

needed to support the mission. However, the plans do not provide cost estimates for 

individual military construction projects planned for fiscal year 2007 and generally do 

not explain how their implementation is being or has the potential to be affected by 

other relevant and related defense plans and activities. 

OSD 2005 Guidance Helped to Further 

Improve the Overseas Master Plans

To improve the overseas master plans and address some of our prior 

recommendations, OSD provided additional guidance on October 5, 2005, to the 

regional commands in preparing this year’s plans.16 Among other things, the guidance 

specifically required the overseas regional commands to 

• explain any significant variances in population levels and usage of terminology 

related to the three base categories—main operating bases, forward operating 

sites, and cooperative security locations; 

• address the desired strategic end state of overseas basing infrastructure using 

an “as of” date within the range of 2011 and 2015 (OSD provided the 

commands the discretion in choosing an end date between 2011 and 2015); 

• report host nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2007 and at 

the aggregate level for fiscal years 2008 through 2011; 

 

16See footnote 6. 
Page 10 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

• report U.S. funding sources, including precise facility requirements and costs 

for fiscal year 2007, facility requirements and total funding for fiscal years 

2008 through 2011, and a single, rolled-up figure for sustainment funding; and 

• report environmental remediation issues per DOD Instruction 4715.8.17

OSD 2005 guidance did not address our prior recommendations to require that 

PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, 

Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific and on residual value 

issues. In comments on our 2005 report, DOD stated that Hawaii and U.S. territories 

in the Pacific were no different from other U.S. facilities within the continental 

United States and that it was inappropriate to include them in the overseas master 

plans. However, considering the upcoming move of approximately 8,000 U.S Marines 

from Okinawa to Guam, we continue to believe that the inclusion of Guam, Hawaii, 

U.S. territories, and other insular areas will provide a more complete picture of 

PACOM’s infrastructure requirements and associated costs in the Pacific. The 

omission of these locations from PACOM’s plan provides Congress and other users 

an incomplete picture of the changing U.S. military presence in the Pacific and only a 

portion of the infrastructure and funding requirements associated with these changes. 

Also, as we reported last year, residual value was excluded from OSD’s guidance 

because it is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nations, 

which is limited for most categories of military facilities and is often reduced by 

actual or anticipated environmental remediation costs. Consequently, according to a 

senior DOD official, residual value cannot be readily predicted and therefore should 

not be assumed in the master plans. However, since these issues vary by host nation 

and may not be clear to all users of the plans, we continue to believe OSD should 

require commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues with obtaining residual value 

from each host nation and report the implications for U.S. funding requirements. 

This Year’s Plans Are More 

Complete, Clear, and Consistent

The 2006 master plans are not only more complete, clear, and consistent than last 

year’s plans, they are also more refined, focusing first on the mission and then on the 

infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. For example, see the 

following: 

• Base categories. Whereas last year there appeared to be differences in 

interpretation and usage of terminology related to forward operating sites and 

cooperative security locations, this year all of the commands categorized their 

installations into applicable base categories of main operating base, 

cooperative security location, and forward operating sites, which provided 

users a clearer picture of the infrastructure plans and requirements at these 

 

17Department of Defense, Environmental Remediation for DOD Activities Overseas, DOD Instruction 

4715.8 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 1998). 
Page 11 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

 

sites. The commands also supplemented the information on base categories 

with detailed data on the installations’ capabilities, overall mission, 

population, and types of equipment and facilities located at each site. 

• End state date. This year, all of the commands identified a strategic end 

state date for overseas basing infrastructure using an “as of” date within a 

range between 2011 and 2015, which provided users a more complete and 

clearer basis for tracking progress in meeting the commands’ infrastructure 

objectives for their areas of responsibility. Last year, only CENTCOM reported 

an anticipated strategic end state date of 2010 for its basing infrastructure. 

• Host nation funding levels. This year, all of the commands reported host 

nation funding levels at the project level for fiscal year 2007 and at the 

aggregate level for fiscal years 2008 through 2011, which provided users a 

better basis to determine the extent to which reported host nation funding 

levels are realistic or complete. Also, PACOM identified host nation funding 

for its bilateral agreements in South Korea, such as the Land Partnership Plan 

and the Yongsan relocation plan.18 While PACOM did not include host nation 

estimates for projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, it 

clearly explained the ongoing nature of bilateral agreements with the 

Government of Japan and reported that host nation contributions related to 

realignments in Okinawa will be reflected in future master plans once bilateral 

agreements are finalized. EUCOM provided information for two bilateral 

agreements, as well as information on North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

contributions. CENTCOM also provided host nation estimates and explained 

that discussions with various countries about host nation funding were 

ongoing. Last year, none of the commands provided complete data for host 

nation funding levels and PACOM’s schedule of host nation funding did not 

fully incorporate projects and funding levels initiated through special bilateral 

agreements with host nations. 

• Facility requirements and costs. Whereas last year only one of the regional 

commands fully identified its precise facility requirements and costs as 

specified in the reporting mandate, this year all of the commands provided 

facility requirements for fiscal years 2007 through 201119 and estimated facility 

sustainment costs for fiscal year 2007. However, although specified in OSD 

guidance, the master plans provided to Congress did not provide cost 

18As discussed in our prior report, within the provisions of the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan 

relocation plan, USFK intends to strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating 

installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison located in the Seoul metropolitan 

area, to two major hubs in the central and southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the 

consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase readiness, efficiencies, and cost 

savings; enhance quality of life; provide a less intrusive presence; and increase training opportunities. 

19CENTCOM also included information on proposed military construction projects and estimated costs 

for fiscal year 2012 in its 2006 master plan. 
Page 12 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

 

estimates for individual military construction projects planned for fiscal year 

2007. According to a senior OSD official responsible for overseeing the 

development of the plans, reconciling the estimated costs while the budget 

proposal was evolving proved to be too difficult to capture each project’s 

estimated costs in the master plans. Accordingly, the master plans must be 

matched with the fiscal year 2007 military construction budget request to 

obtain a complete picture of the precise facility and cost requirements for 

fiscal year 2007. 

• Environmental remediation issues. This year, EUCOM and PACOM 

addressed the extent of their environmental issues, while CENTCOM did not 

indicate to what extent it may be confronted with environmental issues. For 

example, EUCOM reported that there were no environmental remediation 

projects per DOD Instruction 4715.8 programmed for fiscal years 2007 through 

2011. PACOM also reported that there were no environmental restoration 

issues in Japan and noted that USFK was in the process of coordinating with 

the Government of South Korea on remediation of vacated U.S. bases.20 While 

CENTCOM’s master plan did not mention any environmental issues, a senior 

command official said there were no environmental issues to report. Last 

year, none of the regional commands identified environmental remediation 

and restoration requirements or issues in their master plans, which made it 

difficult for users to compare and comprehend how environment-related 

activities and costs have varied, and how these costs may affect planned U.S. 

funding levels. 

The 2006 plans are also more refined, focusing first on the mission and then on the 

infrastructure requirements needed to support the mission. For example, in 

CENTCOM’s master plan, the descriptions of each forward operating site focus first 

on the mission and then on requirements by providing the type of mission the site has 

(such as providing logistical support), the unit that it could host, and its role in the 

region (such as supporting the war against terrorism or strengthening capabilities for 

rapid and flexible response in the Central Asian states), as well as identifying the 

requirements for equipment and facilities to support the mission at the site. All of the 

plans provide similar information for their main operating bases, cooperative security 

locations, and forward operating sites. 

20On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of facilities and areas that have been vacated 

by the command to the Government of South Korea. USFK’s plan includes a number of measures 

designed to address issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S. environmental surveys of these 

vacated facilities and areas. For example, the plan calls for the United States to remedy known, 

imminent, and substantial endangerments to human health and safety. The United States will also 

remove underground fuel storage tanks to preclude future leaks and initiate a technology process for 

skimming fuel from the groundwater at locations where this contamination was found. USFK expects 

that the plan will accelerate the return of vacated facilities and areas to the Government of South 

Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other locations. 
Page 13 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

Limited Explanation of the Impacts 

of Other Defense Plans and Activities

Despite improvements to the plans since last year, the 2006 master plans do not 

always explain how their implementation could be affected by other relevant and 

related defense plans and activities because there is not a requirement for them to do 

so. In 2005, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the 

United States recommended that the entire effort of overseas basing be integrated 

into one overarching design that is coordinated and synchronized with all ongoing 

initiatives. Further, in a statement to the House Armed Services Committee on 

June 20, 2006, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, and the Vice Director 

of Strategic Plans and Policies stated that one of the key themes the department uses 

to guide its thinking on force posture changes is to act both within and across 

regions. According to these officials, global force management allows the 

department to adapt to increasingly global challenges, relationships, and capability 

needs by establishing cross-regional priorities. 

Overseas regional command officials told us that generally, the development of their 

2006 master plans were coordinated with other DOD plans and activities. However, 

only PACOM’s plan gave some indication of how its implementation could be 

affected by another activity—the potential decrease in traditional Japanese funding 

which could be used to help pay for the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam, as 

discussed above. EUCOM’s master plan did not explain the potential impact of 

implementing base realignment and closure recommendations on the movement of 

troops from Germany to bases in the United States. EUCOM and Army officials told 

us that any delay in the implementation of base realignment and closure 

recommendations would cause them to delay the movement of Army service 

members and their families if facilities were not available at receiving installations in 

the United States. This would delay the closings of Army installations in Europe and 

increase costs to operate those installations while they remain open. However, 

EUCOM’s master plan did not address this matter. Also, while CENTCOM officials 

emphasized that infrastructure requirements in their master plan directly supported 

and responded to ongoing operations in Iraq, CENTCOM’s master plan only made 

general references to operations in Iraq and did not fully explain the potential impact 

of such operations on other installations and facility requirements outside of Iraq in 

its area of responsibility. 

These omissions were due primarily to OSD guidance that stipulates the plans are to 

address overseas locations only. OSD guidance does not require regional commands 

to take into consideration facilities’ requirements and plans in the 50 states, U.S. 

territories, or at locations where U.S. troops are deployed temporarily and funded 

outside of traditional military construction appropriations, such as is the case in Iraq. 

Without such explanations and linkage, it is difficult to determine the extent to which 

the master plans are coordinated and synchronized with other defense plans and 

activities and the impacts these other activities have on the master plans in terms of 

infrastructure and funding requirements. 
Page 14 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

2006 Master Plans Reflected 

Recent Changes in Overseas Basing 

Strategies and Requirements 

OSD and the regional commands incorporated key changes associated with the 

continuing evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements into 

this year’s master plans before they were provided to Congress. Even with these 

efforts, changes occurring after the 2006 plans were submitted to Congress will have 

to be reflected in next year’s plans, and it is likely that the department could face 

more changes in the future. 

While the plans are driven by periodic changes in U.S. overseas basing strategies and 

requirements, OSD and the regional commands incorporated these key changes into 

the 2006 master plans before they were provided to Congress. As a part of DOD’s 

efforts to establish a U.S. presence in Eastern Europe through a network of forward 

operating sites and cooperative security locations, the United States signed individual 

agreements with the governments of Romania and of Bulgaria in December 2005 and 

April 2006, respectively, which will allow DOD access to their facilities and training 

sites. In both instances, EUCOM’s master plan provided significant details, such as 

the mission, planned capabilities, equipment and aircraft, population, and in some 

instances the funding requirements to transition the camp into full operating 

capacity, based on the results of these recent agreements. In addition, CENTCOM 

removed infrastructure requirements that were planned for Uzbekistan from its 

master plan. In late 2005, following the United States’ criticism of human rights 

abuses, the Uzbekistan government requested that all U.S. government forces 

withdraw from Karshi-Khanabad air base. According to senior CENTCOM officials, 

these forces were relocated to other locations in its area of responsibility, which 

affected infrastructure and funding requirements at the receiving locations. 

In some instances, basing decisions were made after the plans were prepared, but 

OSD and the regional commands updated the plans to reflect those decisions before 

the plans were submitted to Congress. For example, after the EUCOM plan was 

prepared, the department decided to realign the Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland, 

and the Naval Support Activity La Maddelena, Italy—for both of which EUCOM had 

included infrastructure and funding requirements in its plan. Historically, these 

installations existed to meet Cold War security threats. However, because of the 

realities of the new century’s security environment, DOD determined that the 

capabilities provided by these installations were no longer required. While this effort 

helped to provide Congress with the most current available data at the time, it also 

contributed to DOD providing Congress copies of this year’s master plans nearly 2 

months after its fiscal year 2007 military construction budget submission, instead of 

simultaneously as specified in the House conference report and Senate report 

accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bills. 

Even with these efforts to update the plans as changes occurred and decisions were 

made, the evolution of U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements 

continues. U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to 
Page 15 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

evolve simultaneously with the implementation of associated plans and activities 

encompassed in the integrated global basing strategy, base realignment and closure, 

Army’s modularity plans, and war on terrorism. In the 2006 master plans, OSD 

recognizes that further changes will result as it continues to implement the global 

defense posture decisions. For example, it anticipates that the department will 

return about 30 percent of its current overseas sites (22 percent of its overseas assets 

in terms of plant replacement value) to host nations over the next 10 years. 

Accordingly, OSD and the regional commands will be faced with more changes in the 

future, and it remains difficult for such changes to be included in the master plans 

and for DOD to provide a definitive picture of infrastructure and funding 

requirements. Changes occurring after the most recent plans were submitted to 

Congress will have to be reflected in next year’s plans. 

2006 Master Plans Addressed Several 

Challenges, but PACOM’s Plan Did 

Not Mention Training Limitations 

As noted, the 2006 master plans addressed a number of challenges that DOD faces in 

the implementation of the master plans—such as uncertainties with host nation 

relations and environmental concerns—but PACOM’s plan did not address training 

limitations in South Korea and Japan. In our prior reports, we explained how some of 

these challenges could have a significant impact on infrastructure and funding 

requirements and, because the prior plans did not always describe such challenges 

and their potential effects, that Congress lacked a complete picture it needed to 

evaluate the annual military construction funding request. This year, the plans 

provided a much better description of challenges and the potential impacts on 

implementation. 

This Year’s Plans Provided Better 

Descriptions of Host Nation Relations

All of the regional commands describe to varying degrees the status of recent 

negotiations and agreements with host nations in their 2006 master plans. Last year, 

we found that none of the commands fully explained the status or challenges for 

finalizing host nation agreements and recommended that the commands briefly 

explain the status of negotiations with host nations to provide more complete and 

clearer plans. These agreements depend largely on the political environment and 

economic conditions in host nations and can affect the extent of host nation 

support—access to facilities or funding—to U.S. forces. Accordingly, the resulting 

agreements may increase or decrease U.S.-funded costs for future infrastructure 

changes. This year, we found the following: 
Page 16 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

• PACOM’s master plan provided substantial information describing the results 

of the Defense Policy Review Initiative21 with the Government of Japan, such 

as the transfer of a carrier air wing, collocation of United States and Japanese 

air command and control at Yokota Air Base, and the reduction of U.S. forces 

on Okinawa. In addition, USFK provided details on significant past and 

current realignment efforts, including the Government of South Korea’s 

approval of the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan relocation plan and 

coordination on the transfer of U.S.-vacated bases. 

• EUCOM’s master plan provided specific information on efforts to consolidate 

missions because of limitations on training and military activities, in addition 

to identifying a possible closure of a main operating base in its area of 

responsibility. 

• CENTCOM’s master plan discussed efforts to solicit host nation contributions 

and the amount of coordination and support that is needed from DOD, the 

State Department, and Congress. The plan also reflected the results of 

agreements with host nations, which have established cooperative security 

locations and forward operating sites in strategic areas of the world such as 

North Africa and Central Asia. 

This Year’s Plans Provided Better 

Descriptions of Environmental Issues 

As discussed, EUCOM and PACOM addressed the extent of their environmental 

issues in their 2006 master plans, while CENTCOM gave no indication concerning 

environmental issues in its master plan. Last year, none of the regional commands 

identified environmental remediation and restoration issues in their master plans. 

This year, EUCOM reported that there were no environmental restoration and 

remediation projects programmed for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. PACOM 

reported that U.S. Forces Japan had no environmental restoration and remediation 

requirements and that USFK was coordinating with the Government of South Korea 

on remediation of vacated U.S. bases. Although CENTCOM did not report any 

environmental issues, a senior CENTCOM official said there were no environmental 

issues in the command’s area of responsibility. 

 

21The Defense Policy Review Initiative, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japanese 

governments, established a framework for the future U.S. force structure in Japan. According to DOD, 

this effort assessed the security environment in the region and bilaterally determined the required 

roles, missions, capabilities, and force structure. The interim agreement plan was signed in October 

2005. 
Page 17 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

PACOM’s 2006 Plan Did Not 

Describe Training Limitations

While the 2006 master plans generally addressed the other challenges that DOD faces 

in the implementation of the master plans, Congress still does not have a complete 

picture of the challenges that DOD faces in implementing the master plans, which 

could affect their implementation because PACOM’s plan did not describe the 

challenges DOD faces in addressing training limitations in South Korea and Japan. 

Senior command officials told us that training limitations could cause the United 

States to pursue alternatives, such as either to train in other locations or to downsize 

or relocate, which could affect funding and facility requirements included in overseas 

basing plans. Further, we reported last year that similar challenges could have a 

significant impact on funding requirements but that the plans did not always describe 

the status and the potential impact of such challenges on future basing plans and 

funding requirements. This year, EUCOM’s master plan addressed known training 

limitations in its region by identifying a specific instance in which a realignment 

action was not successful in part because of training limitations, and explaining that 

EUCOM was in the process of exploring further options to meet its requirements. 

CENTCOM officials told us that their focus was on ongoing operations and that 

training was not an issue in its region. 

While PACOM’s master plan provided extensive details on other challenges, it did not 

describe the challenges the command faces in addressing training limitations in South 

Korea and Japan, although senior officials told us that these limitations could cause 

the United States to pursue alternatives, such as to either train in other locations or 

to downsize or relocate, which could affect overseas basing plans. Specifically, we 

found that PACOM master plan did not address the following: 

• The Seventh Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain combat 

capability in the long term due to lack of adequate air-to-surface ranges, 

according to senior Air Force and USFK officials. For decades, the 

Government of South Korea has attempted to relocate the Koon-Ni range, 

which had served as the primary air-to-ground range for the Seventh Air Force. 

Last year the air and ground range management of the Koon-Ni training range 

was transferred to the Government of South Korea, which closed the range in 

August 2005. While there is an agreement with the Government of South 

Korea to train at other ranges, according to senior Air Force and USFK 

officials, the other ranges do not provide electronic scoring capabilities 

necessary to meet the Air Force’s air-to-surface training requirements. As a 

result, the Air Force has been using ranges in Japan and Alaska to meet its 

training requirements, which results in additional transportation costs to the 

U.S. government. While South Korea has agreed to upgrade its ranges, senior 

Air Force officials said that the Seventh Air Force will be able to maintain its 

combat capability only in the short term if the issue is not addressed. 

• The Eighth Army in South Korea needs rail links or high-speed roads to 

facilitate transportation of troops and equipment between Camp Humphreys, 
Page 18 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

which is located south of Seoul, to major training areas located in the northern 

part of the country, according to senior USFK officials. While this is not a 

significant problem at this time, it remains a necessity to complete a 

successful realignment of U.S. forces in South Korea. According to senior 

USFK officials, a vital component of the training capability in South Korea 

depends upon having access to a rail head or a high-speed road that can 

deliver troops and equipment from Camp Humphreys to major training areas 

in the northern part of South Korea. 

• There are limited combat arms training ranges and facilities in Japan, 

according to senior U.S. Forces Japan and Pacific Air Forces officials. These 

officials said that even though they have received increased range time at 

Japanese training facilities, training opportunities still remain insufficient in 

Japan to meet their training requirements. 

As discussed above, the Air Force in South Korea may be unable to maintain combat 

capability in the future because of a lack of access to modernized air-to-surface 

ranges, insufficient opportunities to meet training requirements in Japan, and the 

need of the Army in South Korea for rail links or high-speed roads to facilitate 

transportation of troops and equipment between Camp Humphreys to the major 

training areas in the northern part of South Korea. While these training issues were 

readily identified by USFK, U.S. Forces Japan, and PACOM officials, none of these 

issues were recognized as a challenge in PACOM’s master plan. We believe that 

identifying these issues would provide Congress an awareness of potential challenges 

to training U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea, which are likely to affect facility 

requirements and funding in these countries. 

Conclusions 

U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements continue to evolve 

simultaneously with the implementation of associated plans and activities 

encompassed in the integrated global basing strategy, base realignment and closure, 

Army’s modularity plans, and the war on terrorism, and it remains difficult for such 

changes to be included in the master plans and for DOD to provide a definitive 

picture of infrastructure and funding requirements. To the department’s credit, this 

year’s overseas master plans provide more complete, clear, and consistent 

information than last year’s plans. Still, until overseas regional commands link their 

master plans with other relevant and related defense plans and activities, including 

those involving base realignment and closure implementation and Iraq operations, 

and until PACOM addresses training limitations in its master plan, Congress and 

other users will lack complete information on the magnitude of U.S. defense 

infrastructure and funding requirements overseas. 

Since we have previously recommended that overseas regional commands address 

residual value issues and that PACOM provide information on facility requirements 

and funding levels for Guam, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the 
Page 19 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

Pacific in our prior reports, we are not including them in this report. However, since 

they have not been addressed, we consider them open and therefore the department 

should implement them. 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

To further enhance future comprehensive master plans and facilitate annual review 

and oversight by Congress and other users, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to (1) revise OSD’s guidance to require overseas commands to explain how 

other relevant and related defense plans and activities, including those involving base 

realignment and closure implementation and Iraq operations, affect implementation 

of their master plans in terms of infrastructure and funding requirements and 

(2) ensure that PACOM explains how it plans to address existing training limitations 

in its area of responsibility and the potential effects of those limitations on 

infrastructure and funding requirements. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

In comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment partially concurred with both recommendations. In 

commenting on our recommendations to require overseas commands to explain how 

other relevant and related defense plans and activities and existing training 

limitations affect implementation of their master plans, he agreed with our 

recommendations’ intent and stated that the department’s preference was to address 

these issues in a risk assessment framework. Specifically, he stated that future 

guidance would require overseas commands to identify and discuss risks to their 

plans—such as those that would directly affect execution and could result from 

political, financial, base realignment and closure, training, and other issues—as well 

as steps taken to mitigate the risks. We have no basis to question this approach and 

plan to evaluate its effectiveness in our next annual review of DOD’s overseas master 

plans. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense further stated that nonprogrammed and 

nonvalidated training limitations experienced by service components were not 

appropriate for inclusion and would not be addressed in the overseas commands’ risk 

assessment for their master plans. We agree. While we are not aware of any 

nonprogrammed and nonvalidated training limitations, our report discusses only 

those training limitations raised by senior command officials during our review. We 

assume that if there is a need to make a distinction between nonvalidated versus 

validated training limitations, OSD and the overseas commands would work together 

to identify those validated limitations that should be addressed in their master plans. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense’s comments are reprinted in enclosure II. 

- - - - - 
Page 20 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, 

and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; overseas regional 

commanders; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be 

made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no 

charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-5581 or holmanb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. The GAO 

staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in enclosure III. 

Barry W. Holman, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 21 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Chair 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction and 

 Veterans’ Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Page 22 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

The Honorable James T. Walsh 

Chairman 

The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and 

 Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Enclosure I Enclosure I

Page 23 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans complied with 

congressional reporting requirements and provided information in a complete, clear, 

and consistent manner, we compared the overseas master plans with the reporting 

requirements in the congressional mandate, and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) guidance, which incorporated our prior recommendations. In order 

to identify improvements to the overseas master plan, we compared and contrasted 

the 2005 and 2006 plans. We assessed the quantity and quality of one plan’s 

responses for each of the data elements and compared them to equivalent responses 

in the other plans to form conclusions as to the completeness, clarity, and 

consistency of plans. We also discussed with Department of Defense (DOD) officials 

our observations and recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and 

whether improvements in the guidance and reporting were needed. To determine 

whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed, we assessed the 

plans to identify those elements and properties that provided information in the most 

complete, clear, and consistent manner. 

To determine the extent to which the 2006 overseas master plans reflected how U.S. 

overseas defense basing strategies and requirements have changed since last year, we 

interviewed cognizant officials from DOD about the various changes that were 

identified within the plans. We met with officials from OSD and each of the following 

commands and agencies: U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Army Pacific; Commander, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Forces 

Korea; U.S. Eighth Army; Seventh Air Force; Commander, Naval Forces Korea; Army 

Installation Management Agency Korea Regional Office; Army Corps of Engineers Far 

East District; DOD Education Activity; U.S. Forces Korea Status of Forces Agreement 

Office; U.S. Forces Korea Judge Advocate Office; U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army Japan; 

U.S. Air Forces Japan; Commander, Naval Forces Japan; U.S. Marine Forces Japan; 

U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command-Japan; Naval Facilities Engineering 

Command-Italy; U.S. Air Force Europe; Army Installation Management Agency 

Europe Regional Office; U.S. Central Command; and Special Operations Command. 

In general, we discussed the reporting requirements contained in OSD’s guidance, 

host nation agreements and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources, 

environmental remediation and restoration issues, property returns to host nations, 

and training requirements. In addition, we compared and contrasted the 2005 and 

2006 overseas master plans to each other in order to identify changes in overseas 

defense basing strategies and requirements. We also analyzed available reports, 

documents, policies, directives, international agreements, guidance, and media 

articles to keep abreast of ongoing changes in overseas defense basing strategies and 

requirements. During our overseas visits, to see firsthand the condition of facilities 

and status of selected construction projects, we visited and toured the facilities at 

Camp Schwab, Camp Hansen, Camp Foster, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, 

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Yokota 

Air Base, Japan; Camp Humphreys, South Korea; Army Garrison Grafenwöhr, Bitburg 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Page 24 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 

Annex, Spangdahlem Air Base, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Naval Support 

Activity Capodichino (Naples), Italy. 

To determine the extent to which the 2006 master plans reflected the challenges DOD 

faces in the implementation of the plans, we met with officials from the 

aforementioned agencies and discussed challenges involving various topics, host 

nation relations and funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental 

remediation and restoration issues, property returns to host nations, and training 

limitations. We compared and contrasted the 2005 and 2006 overseas master plans to 

each other to determine the extent to which improvements were made in identifying 

key challenges for each command. We also analyzed available reports, documents, 

policies, directives, international agreements, guidance, and media articles pertaining 

to challenges that may affect DOD’s implementation of the overseas master plans. 

While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning efforts were 

not specifically included in the master plans provided in response to the 

congressional mandates and detailed data were not available for inclusion in this 

report. In addition, we did not include Southern Command in our analysis because 

this command has significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other regional 

commands in the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Enclosure II Enclosure II

Comments from the Department of Defense 

Page 25 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure
Enclosure II Enclosure II 

Page 26 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure 
Enclosure III Enclosure III

Page 27 GAO-06-913R Defense Infrastructure

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Barry W. Holman, (202) 512-5581 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the person named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director; Nelsie Alcoser; 

Thom Barger; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Roger Tomlinson also made major 

contributions to this report. 

(350740) 
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