UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KAMRAN REZAPOUR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,

Chief District Judge. (3:13-cr-00215-FDW-1)

Submitted: April 28, 2016 Decided: May 11, 2016

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George J.F. Werner, Ybor City, Florida, for Appellant. Jill 

Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kamran Rezapour waived indictment and pled guilty to one 

count of wire fraud and two counts of selling misbranded drugs. 

The district court sentenced Rezapour to 108 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Rezapour argues the district court 

erred in accepting his plea because the factual basis was 

insufficient to support his wire fraud conviction, and that 

counsel was ineffective. We affirm.

Because Rezapour did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, 

we review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the plea for 

plain error. See United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th 

Cir. 2014). “Thus, we may reverse only on a finding that (1) 

there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected 

substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” United States v. Moore, 810 F.3d 932, 939 (4th 

Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The requirement that a plea be supported by a factual basis 

“ensures that the court make clear exactly what a defendant 

admits to, and whether those admissions are factually sufficient 

to constitute the alleged crime.” United States v. Moussaoui, 

591 F.3d 263, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991)). “The trial court 

has wide discretion when determining whether a factual basis 
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exists” and “need only be subjectively satisfied that there is a 

sufficient factual basis for a conclusion that the defendant 

committed all of the elements of the offense.” Id. at 300 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]o convict a person of . . . wire fraud, the government 

must show that the defendant (1) devised or intended to devise a 

scheme to defraud and (2) used . . . wire communications in 

furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 

473, 477 (4th Cir. 2012). The first element of this offense

requires that the defendant possess “the specific intent to 

deprive one of something of value through a misrepresentation or 

other similar dishonest method.” Id. at 478. The 

misrepresentation must also be material, that is, it must 

“ha[ve] a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of 

influencing its target.” Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

At the plea hearing, the Government explained the elements 

of wire fraud, and Rezapour testified that he understood them 

and that he was guilty of this offense. Rezapour also 

stipulated to a factual basis that contained facts indicating 

that he used the internet to induce potential customers to 

purchase his products by misrepresenting those products as “all 

natural” and free from the side effects of prescription 

medication. Although Rezapour now argues that these 
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misrepresentations were not material, this claim is belied by 

the factual stipulation accompanying his plea, which indicates 

that his advertising touted the supposed “all natural” nature of 

his products as a major reason to purchase them rather than 

their prescription counterparts. The factual basis also 

described the deceptive means by which Rezapour and his supplier 

smuggled these ingredients into the United States, indicating 

that Rezapour was aware of their nature. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the district court did not err, plainly or 

otherwise, in finding that the factual basis adequately 

supported Rezapour’s plea.* 

Rezapour also argues that counsel was ineffective for

failing to conduct an adequate investigation and by giving him 

erroneous advice regarding his guilty plea. Unless an 

attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of 

the record, ineffective assistance claims are not generally 

addressed on direct appeal. Instead, such claims should be 

 * To the extent Rezapour argues that the district court was 

required to weigh the underlying evidence rather than accept his 

admissions as true, this argument is meritless. See United 

States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178-79 n.6 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The 

court need not satisfy itself that a jury would find the 

defendant guilty, or even that defendant is guilty by a 

preponderance of the evidence. The district court must assure 

itself simply that the conduct to which the defendant admits is 

in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which he 

is pleading guilty.” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)). 
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raised in a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), 

in order to permit sufficient development of the record. United 

States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). The 

present record does not indicate that counsel was ineffective. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Rezapour’s ineffective assistance 

claims should be raised, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED