1 Tex. R. App. P . 47.4. NO. 07-03-0085-CV IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL A MARCH 27, 2003

______________________________ IN THE INTEREST O F H.D.S.H. , A MINOR CHILD

_________________________________ FROM THE 2 23RD DIST RICT COURT OF GRAY COUNT Y; NO. 32,230; HON ORABLE LEE WATERS, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION 1 Appellant, the mother of H.D. S.H., filed a notice of appeal from t he trial cour t’s order terminating her

parental ri ghts and appoint ing inter venors, theminor child’s foster parents,
as permanent managing conservators. The order was sig ned on November 21, 2002, and the notice of appeal was filed on February 10, 2003. Pending befo re this C ourt is appellant’s motion to extend the time for fili ng an affidavit of indi gency and for appointment2

of cou nsel on appeal. Based up on the rationale expressed herein, we dism iss th e purported appeal for want of jur isdiction.
Init ially, we note that even if not rai sed by the parties, this Court is obligated to sua sponte determine its jurisdictio n. Welch v. McDo ugal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1994, writdenied). Sin ce September 1, 2001, an appeal fro m a final order terminating the parent-child relationsh ip and appointing anothe r as managin g conservator

is acceler

ated and governed by the rules for accelerated app eals in civil cases. See Tex. Fam. CodeAnn. § 263.405(a) (Vernon 2002). Rule 26.1(b) of the Texas Rul es of Appellate Procedure provides that in an accelerated appeal, the notice of appe al must be filed wit hin 20 days after theorder is s igned. Moreover, neither a motion for new trial,
a request for fi ndings of fact and co nclusions of law, nor any other post-trial motion will extend the deadl ine for filing a notice of appeal un der Rule 26.1( b). See § 263.405(c).
The termination or

der was s igned on November 21, 2002; howev er, the notice of appeal was not

filed until F ebruary 10, 2003. Pursuant to Rule 42.3(a) of the Texas Rul es of Appellate Procedure, by l etter dated Mar ch 11, 2003, this Courtrequested th at appellant show cause why

the appeal should not be dismiss ed for want of jurisdiction. In response, appellant

filed a motion to r

einstate the appeal and a response t o our Rule 42.3 (a) notice. By affidavit accompany ing her moti on, appellant’sformer couns el ass erts that on December

17, 2002, appellant

advised hi m that she did not wish to pu rsue an appeal based on an agreement r eached with the intervenors. However, on January 15, 2003,2 Subchapter E is entitled “Final Order For Child Under Depart ment Care” and section 263.401( d) describes a final order a s one that: (1) requi res that a chi ld be returned to its parent; (2) names a relative of the child or another per son as managing conservator; (3) appoints the departm ent managing conse rvator w ithout terminati ng the parent-chil d relationshi p; and (4) appoints a rel ative, another suitabl e person, or t he department as managing cons ervator an d terminates the parent-chil d relationshi p. 3 almost two months followi ng the termina tion order, counsel asserts that appellant notifie d him that she wi shed to appeal. I n support of the current moti on, counsel arg ues that the 2001 amendments to th e Fa mily Code, which made appeals from termination orders accelerated, should not apply because the underly ing suit w as filed and pending prior to the effective date of the ame ndments. Intervenors filed a r eply to appel lant’s motion contending thatsection 263.405 a pplies to any order rendered after September 1, 2001. We agree w ith intervenors and point out that th e historica l and statutory notes follow ing section 263.405 provide that the 20 01 amendmen ts apply onlyto an appeal of a final order under subchapter E 2 file d on o r aft er th e effec tive date regardless of when suit was filed. Thus, because the termi nation order w as filed more than o ne year after the effective date
o f the 2 001 ame ndm ents , app ella nt’s noti ce of appe al was d ue wit hin 2 0 days and he r notice of appeal filed on February 10, 2003, is untimely . We are not unsympathet ic to appellant’s predicament and recognize that the Supreme C ourt has dir ected us to constr ue the Rules of Appell ate Procedure reasonably and liberally so that the rig ht to appeal is not lostby imposin g requi rement s not absolutely necessary

to effect the purpose of a rule. Verburgt v. Dorne r, 959 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1997). However, regar ding our j urisdicti on, we4

are prohibited from en larging the time for perfecti ng an appeal i n a civi l case. Tex . R. App. P. 2; s ee In re T.W., 89 S.W .3d 641, 642 (Tex.App.–A marillo 2002, no pet.); see generally Denton County v. Huther, 43 S.W.3d 665 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (dis missing
an accelerated ap peal for want of jurisdic tion wher

e appellants fail ed to file their notice of appeal within 20 days after the date the order was signed). Accordingl y, the purpor ted appeal is di smissed for want of jurisdic tion.
Don H. Reavis Justice