United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Projection Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Challenges Remain in 

Developing 

Capabilities for Naval 

Surface Fire Support 

November 2006 

 

GAO-07-115 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2006

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Challenges Remain in Developing 

Capabilities for Naval Surface Fire 

Support 

Highlights of GAO-07-115, a report to 

Subcommittee on Projection Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and 

Marine Corps have studied ways to 

better protect landing forces. As 

new operational concepts evolved,

the Marine Corps identified

requirements for naval surface fire 

support and the Navy began 

developing two systems to meet 

these needs—the Extended Range 

Munition for existing classes of

ships and the future Zumwalt class 

destroyer. 

GAO was asked to address (1) 

whether requirements for fire 

support have been established and 

(2) the Navy’s progress on the 

Extended Range Munition,

Zumwalt class destroyer, and 

follow-on systems. GAO also 

analyzed whether these Navy

systems fulfill the requirements and 

whether gaps remain. 

To address these objectives GAO 

analyzed key documents on

requirements and programs and 

held discussions with officials from

the Navy and Marine Corps as well

as other interested organizations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Department of Defense clarify 

requirements for volume of fire,

clarify Navy and Marine Corps 

roles in managing resources, 

comprehensively review the 

Extended Range Munition program, 

and assign responsibility for 

assessing the gap in command and

control. DOD concurred with the 

first and third recommendations,

and partially concurred with the 

others. 

In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps 

began to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities

needed for naval surface fire support. However, quantifiable measures are 

still lacking for volume of fire—the delivery of a large quantity of munitions 

simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a target. Until 

further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to 

assess whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take.

The Navy’s Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have

cost more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will 

deliver fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to technical 

challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed the original 

cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy has delayed 

delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition’s path for 

development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and 

munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program, and while a 

comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing studies that 

could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land attack 

munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The primary 

reason for reduced capabilities are cost pressures created by the Navy’s 

original concept of revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. 

The Navy plans to begin construction of the first two ships in the Zumwalt

class in fiscal year 2008. 

The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command 

and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather; 

engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging targets 

that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of the 

joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt

class destroyer offer significant capabilities in some scenarios, they do not 

provide enough capability to meet all fire support needs. The Navy, through 

its surface warfare directorate, has begun analyzing the three engagement 

gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to analyze the gap in 

command and control, which is essential for target assignment and 

information. Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in programs to fill

remaining gaps should also involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as 

the Marine Corps representative. The expeditionary warfare directorate does 

not have a formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, 

and managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-115.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 5

Agreement on Requirements Took over a Decade and Did Not 

Address Quantitative Measures for Volume of Fire 7 

Naval Surface Fire Support Systems Have Experienced Cost and 

Schedule Growth and Will Deliver Less Capability Than 

Originally Planned 12 

Needs for Naval Surface Fire Support Exceed Projected 

Capabilities 24

Conclusions 28

Recommendations for Executive Action 29 

Agency Comments and Our Review 30 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 32 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 34 

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 38 

Tables 

Table 1: Basis for Evolving Requirements 8 

Table 2: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements 10 

Table 3: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Extended Range 

Munition 14

Table 4: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Zumwalt Class 

Destroyer 19

Figures 

Figure 1: Fires Triad Illustration 5 

Figure 2: Extended Range Munition 13 

Figure 3: Cost and Schedule Growth in the Extended Range 

Munition Program 16 

Figure 4: Reductions to Ship Quantities Planned for Naval Surface 

Fire Support 18 

Page i GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 5: Advanced Technologies on the Zumwalt Class Guided 

Missile Destroyer 21 

Figure 6: Cost and Quantity Change in the Zumwalt Class 

Destroyer Program 23 

Abbreviations 

CEP Circular error probable 

CG(X) Experimental guided-missile cruiser 

DD Destroyer 

DDG Guided missile destroyer

DD(X) Experimental destroyer

ERM Extended Range Munition 

RDT&E Research, development, test, and evaluation 

SC Surface combatant 

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Page ii GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

November 30, 2006 

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Projection Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Projection Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has shifted its focus away from 

warfare on the open ocean and toward operations in coastal waters. In 

support of this new focus, the Marine Corps has developed new concepts

for landing forces ashore in a hostile environment from ships at sea. These 

maneuvers—referred to as expeditionary operations—increase the Marine 

Corps’s reliance on sea-based fire support. According to the Navy and 

Marine Corps, ship-based guns and missiles, or naval surface fire support, 

are essential for advancing landing forces to their objectives and 

protecting them from enemy attack.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has shifted its focus away from 

warfare on the open ocean and toward operations in coastal waters. In 

support of this new focus, the Marine Corps has developed new concepts

for landing forces ashore in a hostile environment from ships at sea. These 

maneuvers—referred to as expeditionary operations—increase the Marine 

Corps’s reliance on sea-based fire support. According to the Navy and 

Marine Corps, ship-based guns and missiles, or naval surface fire support, 

are essential for advancing landing forces to their objectives and 

protecting them from enemy attack.

From 1992 to the present, the Marine Corps has been working to set 

requirements for naval surface fire support that reflect evolving operating 

concepts. The Navy has been developing systems to meet these 

requirements including the Extended Range Munition, a precision-guided 

munition with increased range fired from an improved gun on an existing

class of ships, and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer, an entirely new 

surface ship designed with advanced capabilities specifically for naval 

surface fire support. When these systems began development, they were 

expected to begin to be fielded by 2001 and 2008, respectively. Current 

plans call for fielding to begin in 2011 and 2014. In response to your 

request, this report addresses (1) whether well-defined requirements for 

naval surface fire support have been established and (2) the Navy’s 

progress in developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition, the 

Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. We also analyzed 

whether the Navy’s systems currently under development fulfill the 

established requirements, and the actions being taken to address any 

remaining gaps. 

From 1992 to the present, the Marine Corps has been working to set 

requirements for naval surface fire support that reflect evolving operating 

concepts. The Navy has been developing systems to meet these 

requirements including the Extended Range Munition, a precision-guided 

munition with increased range fired from an improved gun on an existing

class of ships, and the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer, an entirely new 

surface ship designed with advanced capabilities specifically for naval 

surface fire support. When these systems began development, they were 

expected to begin to be fielded by 2001 and 2008, respectively. Current 

plans call for fielding to begin in 2011 and 2014. In response to your 

request, this report addresses (1) whether well-defined requirements for 

naval surface fire support have been established and (2) the Navy’s 

progress in developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition, the 

Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. We also analyzed 

whether the Navy’s systems currently under development fulfill the 

established requirements, and the actions being taken to address any 

remaining gaps. 

To determine whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire 

support have been established, we analyzed documentation on the stated 

needs and operational concepts for ship-based fire support including 

doctrinal publications and capabilities documents. To supplement our 

To determine whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire 

support have been established, we analyzed documentation on the stated 

needs and operational concepts for ship-based fire support including 

doctrinal publications and capabilities documents. To supplement our 

Page 1 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
analysis, we held discussions with a number of Marine Corps and Navy 

offices including those responsible for creating requirements, such as the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the Chief of Naval 

Operations’s Surface Warfare Division. To assess the Navy’s progress in 

developing and fielding systems to meet these requirements, we held 

discussions and reviewed documents at the program offices responsible 

for acquiring the Extended Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, 

and other weapon systems. We also drew from our prior work on these 

systems. In analyzing whether the systems selected meet requirements for 

naval surface fire support, we reviewed reports and documentation 

produced by or in cooperation with the Navy and Marine Corps, such as 

the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals

Initial Capabilities Document, as well as the capabilities development 

documents for the systems themselves. To supplement this information 

and address the actions taken to close remaining gaps, we met with 

officials from joint and service organizations in the requirements 

community. For more information on the methodology used in this report 

see appendix I. We conducted our analysis from February 2006 to 

November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

In December 2005, an agreement was reached that defined requirements 

for naval surface fire support in such areas as range and accuracy, but did 

not include quantifiable measures for volume of fire. The Marine Corps 

derived these requirements over a decade as its thinking on expeditionary

operations evolved. From 1996 to 2002, the Marine Corps communicated 

requirements derived from these concepts to the Navy in a series of 

letters. These letters included descriptions of desired capabilities like 

volume of fire, which the Marine Corps defines as the delivery of a large 

quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress 

or destroy a target, as well as specific requirements for range and 

accuracy. These capabilities and requirements formed the basis of the 

needs identified in the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary 

Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document approved in 

December 2005 through the joint requirements process. While this 

document identifies a need for volume of fire as defined by the Marine 

Corps, a set of specific requirements like those for range or accuracy do 

not yet exist. Requirements for volume of fire are complicated by the 

variance in effects desired from mission to mission, although this is a 

challenge in other warfare areas as well. In addition, there is not yet a

clear understanding of how the capabilities offered by precision munitions 

can be utilized for volume fires in a cost effective manner. 

Results in Brief 

Page 2 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Developing and fielding the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class 

destroyer has required more funding and time than anticipated and may 

not offer the capabilities originally promised, while the development of 

follow-on systems has just begun. The cost to develop the Extended Range 

Munition is expected to exceed the original estimate by over 550 percent 

and fielding of an initial capability has been delayed by nearly 11 years, 

largely due to the failure to recognize and plan for technical challenges. 

While the program’s current approach seeks to improve reliability of key 

components, the viability of the program remains in question until realistic 

plans for testing, producing, and fielding the munition are approved and 

the munition’s design is demonstrated through testing. Oversight of the 

program was recently changed from the Navy to the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, who has not yet held a 

comprehensive review of the program. Cost challenges, stemming 

primarily from unrealistic expectations, have led the Navy over time to 

reduce ship capabilities and procurement quantities from the Zumwalt 

class destroyer program. Specifically, the Navy has reduced each ship’s 

land-attack munitions by 50 percent and decreased ship quantities from 32 

to 7. These reductions have further increased the Navy’s reliance on the 

less capable Extended Range Munition for naval surface fire support. The 

Navy continues to develop Zumwalt class technologies and design and 

plans to begin construction of the first two ships in fiscal year 2008. To 

provide capabilities for naval surface fire support beyond the Extended 

Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy has begun 

development of prototypes for the electromagnetic railgun and 

multipurpose loitering missile. Further progress on these systems is 

dependent on continued analysis of the capabilities required, identification 

of system requirements, and advances in technology. 

Despite the new capabilities promised by the Extended Range Munition 

and Zumwalt class destroyer, needs for naval surface fire support exceed

projected capabilities. Recently, the Joint Fires initial capabilities 

document assessed future fire support needs for operations in the littorals1

and identified capability gaps in command and control, engaging moving 

targets in poor weather, engaging targets when collateral damage is a 

concern, and engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. While the 

identification of gaps by such a study is not unusual, it is important that 

 1

 The littoral includes an area extending from a transition point in the open ocean, to more

constrictive and shallower waters, to the shore, and onward to those inland areas that can 

be attacked, supported, and defended from the sea. 

Page 3 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
the gaps be properly analyzed so that informed decisions can be made on 

whether to accept the gaps or how best to close them. Three issues exist 

that could inhibit the analysis of gaps identified in capabilities for naval 

surface fire support. The uncertainty inherent in the Marine Corps’s 

current requirements for volume of fire is one such issue. Any decision to 

allocate limited resources to fill this gap would benefit from clarification 

of these requirements. In addition, the Navy’s Expeditionary Warfare 

Division, charged with establishing capabilities and requirements for naval 

surface fire support, has not had a formal role in managing requirements 

and allocating resources for the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt

class destroyer, increasing the risk that naval surface fire support 

capabilities may not align with the requirements and operating concepts of 

expeditionary warfare. Also, while the Navy is analyzing gaps for engaging

targets, it has not identified a lead organization for analyzing gaps in 

command and control. 

We are making four recommendations to assist the Navy and Marine Corps 

in clarifying requirements and developing systems for naval surface fire 

support. Specifically we are recommending that (1) the Navy and Marine 

Corps define requirements and operational concepts for volume of fire to 

clarify the effects desired and inform the selection and acquisition of fire 

support programs; (2) the Chief of Naval Operations’s Expeditionary 

Warfare Division, as the division in charge of expeditionary warfare 

requirements and liaison with the Marine Corps, be given a formal role in 

developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing 

resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support; (3) the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, as 

decision authority for the Extended Range Munition, conduct a 

comprehensive review of the program to validate plans for future 

development and acquisition; and (4) the gap in command and control of 

joint fires for littoral operations be assigned to the appropriate

organization and coordinated with the Navy’s work on engagement gaps.

In comments to a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

concurred with our recommendations to clarify requirements and 

concepts for volume of fire and conduct a review of the Extended Range 

Munition program. The department partially concurred with our 

recommendation to give Expeditionary Warfare a formal role in 

developing and managing systems for naval surface fire support, stating 

that a review of existing roles and regulations would be conducted and

changes made if necessary. The department also partially concurred with 

our recommendation to assign an organization to address the gap in

command and control of joint fires in the littorals, stating that means to 

Page 4 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
address this gap would be investigated later, after initial analysis of 

engagement gaps is completed. We are concerned that deferring command 

and control to a later analysis continues a history of inattention to this 

area. 

The Marine Corps has been developing new concepts for expeditionary 

operations that are characterized by an increase in mobility, flexibility, 

and depth of operations. To successfully conduct these operations, the 

Marine Corps relies on a “fires triad” composed of land-based artillery and 

mortars, attack planes and helicopters, and sea-based surface ships to 

destroy or suppress enemy forces. Figure 1 shows the fires triad concept.

Background 

Figure 1: Fires Triad Illustration

Types

of

fire support

Surface ships

Artillery and mortars

Aircraft

Source: GAO (presentation).

The systems within the fires triad are considered complementary. For 

example, while surface ships provide the majority of supporting fires for 

ground forces during the early phases of expeditionary operations, landbased artillery and mortars assume a greater role in later phases as more 

of these assets are placed ashore. Some legs of the triad offer capabilities 

others cannot. The guns of artillery and surface ships are more capable of

providing volume of fire—large amounts of sustained fire to suppress or 

destroy a target—while aircraft are used for long-range precision strikes or 

attacks on moving targets. Regardless of each system’s capabilities or 

contributions, all components of the triad are considered necessary for 

success. 

The sea-based portion of the triad is referred to as naval surface fire 

support and is traditionally provided by the guns and missiles onboard 

Page 5 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Navy surface ships. For decades the Navy had provided this capability 

with the 16-inch guns of the Iowa class battleships that were eventually

taken out of service due to the high cost of their operations and 

maintenance. With the decommissioning of the last Iowa class battleship 

in 1992, the Navy was left with only the short-range (13 nautical miles2

) 5-

inch guns on destroyers and cruisers to provide naval surface fire support. 

According to the Navy, new and improved coastal defense systems 

deployed by potential adversaries required that Navy ships protect 

themselves by coming no closer than 25 nautical miles to shore, rendering

the existing 5-inch guns ineffective for fire support. In May 1992, the Navy 

approved a mission need statement for naval surface fire support that 

recognized this gap in capabilities and called for new or improved systems 

that could provide increased range, lethality, and accuracy. Since that 

time, the Navy and Marine Corps have conducted a number of studies to 

identify possible solutions for this gap and to clarify the needs and 

requirements associated with naval surface fire support. 

In 1994, the Navy developed a plan to improve naval surface fire support 

by upgrading existing 5-inch guns on Arleigh Burke class destroyers and 

Ticonderoga class cruisers and developing a new 5-inch guided munition 

for near-term capabilities, and considered options for long-term 

capabilities as it developed concepts for a new surface combatant ship. 

Eventually, these concepts evolved into the Extended Range Munition and 

the Zumwalt class destroyer programs. The establishment of basic 

requirements by the Marine Corps supported efforts to develop these 

systems. Marine Corps analysis concluded that since ground-based 

artillery would be unavailable during the initial stages of an expeditionary 

operation, naval surface fire support must provide, at a minimum, the 

same range, accuracy, and lethality as current artillery systems. In 1995, 

the Navy began to incorporate this analysis into its plans for acquiring new 

weapons systems by approving an initial range requirement of 41 to 63 

nautical miles, assuming a 25 nautical mile stand-off range. As Marine 

Corps thinking on expeditionary operations evolved over the next decade, 

more requirements would be added.

 2

 A nautical mile is equal to about 1.85 kilometers. 

Page 6 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
For over 10 years the Marine Corps worked with the Navy to develop 

requirements for naval surface fire support that align with the concept of

expeditionary operations. It was not until December 2005 that, as a result 

of the joint requirements process, an agreement was reached. This 

agreement provides the basis for meeting the fire support needs of the 

warfighter through a variety of solutions by attempting to define the 

effects required. One issue the agreement has not resolved is the lack of a

clear definition for volume of fire. According to the Marine Corps, volume 

fires are necessary to execute expeditionary operations, but quantifiable

volume fires requirements have not been established due to the variance in 

effects desired from mission to mission and the planned use of precision 

munitions. Clearer requirements would inform the acquisition of planned

systems and aid in determining capabilities of any future systems. 

Although the Marine Corps further defined its needs for naval surface fire 

support over the last 10 years, it only recently reached agreement with the 

Navy on a new set of requirements through the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System, a joint process for establishing 

requirements. This process resulted in the Joint Fires in Support of 

Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities 

Document, which incorporated and validated the Marine Corps’s 

requirements for naval surface fire support. These requirements are based 

on the concept of expeditionary operations that the service has been 

developing since 1992. Table 1 describes the documents and events central

to creation of this concept. 

Agreement on 

Requirements Took 

over a Decade and 

Did Not Address 

Quantitative Measures 

for Volume of Fire 

Validated Requirements for 

Naval Surface Fire Support 

Are Derived from Marine 

Corps Concepts for 

Expeditionary Operations 

Page 7 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Table 1: Basis for Evolving Requirements

Year Events

1992 • Gap in fire support left by decommissioning of battleships. 

• Publication of ...from the Sea shifts the emphasis of Marine Corps and Navy operations from confronting the 

Soviet threat at sea to the use of expeditionary forces in the littorals. 

1994 • Navy completes first analysis of how to fill gap in naval surface fire support. 

• Publication of Forward...from the Sea further refines Navy concept of expeditionary operations in the 

littorals. 

1995 • Navy and Marine Corps agree to an initial range requirement of 41 to 63 nautical miles. 

1996 • Operational Maneuver from the Sea presents Marine Corps concepts on expeditionary warfare including the 

reliance on sea-basing. 

• First Marine Corps letter derives naval surface fire support requirements from concepts presented in 

Operational Maneuver from the Sea. 

1997 • Publication of Ship to Objective Maneuver establishes the concept of multiple, independent maneuver forces 

attacking their targets directly instead of pausing to establish a foothold and attacking as a combined force. 

1999 • Second Marine Corps letter on naval surface fire support requirements expands discussion of Marine

Corps’s needs. 

2000 • Navy releases guidance on how ship design can support Marine Corps’s requirements. 

2001 • Marine Corps publishes Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare a capstone document that encapsulates and 

revalidates previous concepts and doctrine on expeditionary warfare. 

2002 • Third Marine Corps letter on naval surface fire support requirements presents requirements across near-,

mid-, and far-terms for evolutionary acquisition. 

2003 • The Marine Corps drafts a memorandum of agreement on requirements, but Navy does not agree to 

memorandum.

2005 • Agreement reached on requirements for naval surface fire support. 

Sources: Navy and Marine Corps (data); GAO (presentation). 

According to the concept created by the Marine Corps, the fundamental 

aspect that defines expeditionary operations—sea-based forces operating 

with increased depth and mobility in multiple dispersed units—establishes 

certain requirements for naval surface fire support. Since land-based 

artillery is restricted by the need for a large presence ashore, and air-based 

fire support can be restricted by weather conditions, the importance of 

sea-based naval surface fire support increases. The depth of operations 

envisioned requires ship-based guns and other systems with considerable 

range, while the speed and mobility envisioned demand rapid response 

times. Fire support for expeditionary forces also requires accuracy and

precision, to increase the probability that targets are destroyed or disabled 

and reduce the possibility of marines being killed when calling for 

munitions to land close to their own positions. Sustainability and lethality 

are needed as well to compensate for the firepower removed from Marine 

units to preserve their speed and agility. According to the Marine Corps, 

volume of fire, defined as large quantities of munitions delivered over time 

Page 8 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target, is also necessary to 

immobilize or destroy the enemy and enable maneuver. These 

requirements surpass the abilities of the Navy’s existing 13 nautical mile 

range 5-inch guns, necessitating the development and fielding of new 

weapons systems or the acceptance of risks in executing expeditionary 

operations. 

The Marine Corps quantified many of the requirements for naval surface 

fire support to better communicate them to the Navy and aid in the 

development of new systems. While an initial range requirement was 

established in 1995, the Marine Corps identified a number of additional 

requirements for naval surface fire support that clarify the needs for 

expeditionary operations. These requirements were identified in a series 

of three letters from 1996 to 2002, with the last letter describing 

requirements in terms of desired near-, mid-, and far-term capabilities. The 

Marine Corps also provided rationale for its needs by providing an 

explanation of each of the requirements. Table 2 lists the requirements as 

described in the last of these letters. The Marine Corps sought to use these 

letters to establish a more formal agreement on the needs for naval surface 

fire support, and even drafted a memorandum of agreement in 2003. While 

the Navy did not sign this memorandum, many of the requirements 

presented in the letters were used in the development of systems and 

technologies to provide fire support. Agreement was reached when the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which oversees requirements 

development for all four services, approved the Joint Fires in Support of 

Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document

in December 2005. This document incorporated and validated Marine 

Corps requirements for naval surface fire support. 

Page 9 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Table 2: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements 

 

Near-Term 

(2004-2005) 

Mid-Term 

(2006-2009) 

Far-Term 

(2010-2019) 

System response Thresholda2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes 2.5 minutes

Objective Limits of technology Limits of technology Limits of technology 

Range: naval guns Threshold 41 nm 63 nm 97 nm 

Objective 63 nm 97 nm Limits of technology 

Range: other systems Threshold 200 nm 200 nm 262 nm 

Objective 222 nm 222 nm Limits of technology 

Accuracy and precision Threshold 50 m CEPb 50 m CEP 50 m CEP 

Objective 20 m CEP 20 m CEP 20 m CEP 

Target acquisition Threshold 50 nm 63 nm 97 nm 

Objective 63 nm 97 nm Limits of technology 

Ordnance effects • Destroy or suppress point, area, and moving targets including personnel and material, and destroy 

hardened targets 

• Provide smoke, illumination, and incendiary effects 

Volume of fire • Volume fires are equally important to precision 

• Needed for mass fires, suppression, combined arms effects, and close fire support 

• Sufficient quantities are maintained to sustain desired effects over time 

Sustainment • All systems sustainable via under way replenishment 

Source: Marine Corps.

Note: As defined by Marine Corps March 2002 “Hanlon Letter” and approved by the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council in December 2005. 

a

Threshold refers to minimally acceptable performance and objective refers to desired performance. 

b

Circular error probable. 

Requirements for Volume 

of Fire Remain Unclear 

While some of the Marine Corps requirements for naval surface fire 

support have been quantified, validated, and applied to Navy systems in 

development, the requirement for volume of fire remains less defined. The 

Marine Corps has consistently maintained the need for these fires and has 

described their use under the concept of expeditionary operations. The 

Marine Corps defines volume of fire as large quantities of munitions 

delivered over time or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target. This

definition establishes two types of volume fires: suppression, which 

requires a large quantity of munitions delivered on a target or group of 

targets in an area over a period of time, and destruction, where a large

quantity of munitions are delivered simultaneously with as much accuracy

as possible. Marine Corps officials have also identified an increasing need 

for multiple simultaneous suppression or destruction missions to support 

Page 10 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
dispersed units. While the Marine Corps’s letters on naval surface fire 

support provide definitions of these missions, the requirements provided 

do not offer quantitative measures of effectiveness or success for all the 

key elements of volume of fire. The firing rate of weapon systems and their 

ability to deliver multiple rounds simultaneously are highlighted as 

important, but other factors—such as the amount of time or munitions 

typically required for suppression, or the number of simultaneous 

engagements to be supported—remain undefined.

Marine Corps and Navy officials have stated that the advent of precision 

munitions for naval surface fire support further complicates requirements 

and definitions for volume of fire. Currently, volume fires are provided by 

ground-based artillery and mortars firing large amounts of inexpensive, 

unguided munitions. Due to the perceived benefits of precision in airdelivered weapons and the need to deliver naval surface fire support from 

greater distances due to shore-based threats, the Navy has been 

developing guided munitions for fire support. These munitions have the 

potential to deliver far greater precision and lethality than unguided 

munitions, but the high cost of procurement—up to $54,500 per round for 

the Extended Range Munition against $1,633 for the current 5-inch 

projectile3

—could preclude the Navy from deploying them in the large 

quantities posited for volume fires. Marine Corps officials have stated that

the concept of providing volume of fire with precision munitions is 

currently being analyzed and that changes to the way volume fires are 

employed could be possible. For instance, as the lethality and precision of

munitions increase, it may be possible to change the way targets are 

selected and use fewer rounds to achieve volume effects. Officials state, 

however, that there are still scenarios in which large sustained quantities 

of munitions are necessary. 

The ambiguity surrounding volume of fire, especially when such missions 

are executed with precision weapons, has a direct impact on the 

procurement of munitions for naval surface fire support. The Navy uses an 

estimating process, known as the non-nuclear ordnance requirements 

process, to assist in determining the number of munitions needed to 

support the warfighter. According to Navy officials, to accurately estimate 

the number of rounds needed for volume fires the model requires—but 

does not have—a definition of the effects desired from volume fires. In 

 3

 The $1,633 represents the fiscal year 2008 price of the Navy’s unguided 5-inch high 

explosive projectile and its propelling charge. 

Page 11 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
addition, the process does not currently account for the new capabilities 

offered by the precision weapons under development for naval fires. 

Without the Marine Corps’s definition of these effects, the model will 

produce inaccurate or unrealistic estimates of the number of rounds 

needed. Navy officials identified other shortcomings in both the 

information provided by the Navy and Marine Corps and in the 

assumptions used to model naval surface fire support procurement 

quantities. For instance, the model does not provide enough fidelity in the

distance to targets or properly account for the number of precision rounds 

carried in each ship. The Marine Corps, through the Expeditionary 

Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, is working

with the Navy to refine the data provided to the non-nuclear ordnance 

requirements process as well as the assumptions made within the process 

itself. 

The inability to quantify requirements for volume of fire also affects the 

ability of the Navy to develop systems to meet the Marine Corps’s needs. 

The Marine Corps has stated that the effects desired from volume of fire 

varies from mission to mission and therefore is difficult to quantify. 

However, the variance in desired effects from scenario to scenario is a 

challenge in other warfare areas as well. In the absence of requirements 

that define at least minimum capabilities for common scenarios, such as 

the duration and quantity of fire needed to suppress a target, it may be 

difficult to develop cost effective systems that meet Marine Corps needs. 

The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have required 

additional funding and time for development and will not be fielded in the 

quantities initially planned. Development of the Extended Range Munition 

has been delayed by nearly 11 years due to technical and programmatic 

challenges, resulting in cost growth of over 550 percent from initial 

estimates. The Navy continues to face challenges related to the 

affordability and viability of its plan ahead that must be overcome in order 

to field the munition. Optimistic estimates and consequent cost increases

in the Zumwalt class destroyer program have resulted in reductions to 

both ship quantities and munition capacities per ship, both of which will 

seriously impact capabilities available to support future expeditionary 

operations. Candidate technologies to provide future naval surface fire 

support capabilities are currently in development as science and 

technology programs, and have not yet completed the requirements 

documentation and other steps necessary to enter the acquisition process. 

Naval Surface Fire 

Support Systems 

Have Experienced 

Cost and Schedule 

Growth and Will 

Deliver Less 

Capability Than 

Originally Planned 

Page 12 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
The Extended Range Figure 2: Extended Range Munition 

Munition Has Experienced 

Cost Overruns and 

Schedule Delays and 

Continues to Face Risk 

Source: Raytheon, © 2006 Raytheon.

After 10 years in development, the Extended Range Munition continues to experience challenges

with technology and design, which could jeopardize near term capabilities for naval surface fire

support.

The Extended Range Munition is a precision guided munition fired from a 

modified 5-inch gun and is designed to provide accurate fire support for 

ground forces to an objective range of 63 nautical miles. In order to fire 

the munition, elements of the existing 5-inch gun design including the gun 

barrel, magazine, ammunition handling, and gun initialization systems 

were modified. In addition to changes in the gun, the Navy has also 

developed a naval fires control system, which will be used to receive, 

process, and execute warfighter fire mission requests for the gun system. 

The Navy is installing the modified 5-inch guns, each with a magazine 

capacity of 232 Extended Range Munition rounds, and fires control 

systems onboard 32 Arleigh Burke class destroyers (DDG 81 through DDG

112), but has abandoned plans to equip 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers with 

all the capabilities needed to fire the new munitions. Table 3 summarizes 

major events that have occurred in the Extended Range Munition program. 

Page 13 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Table 3: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Extended Range Munition 

Year Events

1996 • Operational requirements for an extended range munition are approved that reflect Marine Corps range and 

accuracy needs. 

• Program begins with system design and demonstration as opposed to concept and technology development. 

• Navy contracts with Texas Instruments in Dallas, Texas, for development and testing of a 5-inch precision munition.

1997 • Raytheon acquires Texas Instruments. 

1999 • Raytheon relocates development of the program to Tucson, Arizona, resulting in workforce disruption and delays. 

• Design of components changes as contractor learns effects of fluctuating pressures subjected to the munition when

fired. 

2001 • Planned initial operating capability not achieved; currently planned for 2011. 

2002 • Navy alters requirements triggering a change from submunition to unitary warhead. 

• Redesign continues. 

2003 • Critical design review completed based on design of developmental test rounds—design of production ready 

munition remains incomplete.

• Land-Based Flight Test 1 fails due to guidance and tail fin issues. 

• Gun environment instability continues until gun pressures are stabilized in 2004. 

2004 • Navy partially halts work on the program due to budget, schedule, and performance issues. 

• Navy awards second, separate demonstration contract for an alternate munition and discusses a competition for 

future contracts. 

• Navy partially restarts the program for work in specific areas. 

2005 • Engineering Flight Test A succeeds in demonstrating launch and guided flight of the munition. 

• Engineering Flight Test B fails due to an issue with the guidance system. 

• Land-Based Flight Test 2 fails due to canard and rocket motor issues. 

• Land-Based Flight Test 3 fails due to a manufacturing issue.

• Land-Based Flight Tests 4 and 6 fail due to canard issues. 

• Land-Based Flight Test 5 succeeds in demonstrating launch and guided flight of the munition. 

• Proposed munition quantities increase with Marine Corps involvement. 

2006 • Navy ceases funding for alternate munition due to test failures—effort continues through funding added by 

Congress. 

• Program costs trigger a change in acquisition category resulting in a shift in oversight to Undersecretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Sources: Contractor and Navy (data); GAO (presentation). 

Despite the progress on the gun and fire control systems, development of 

the munition has been more challenging than initially anticipated. When 

the program began in 1996, the Navy planned to use several components 

from the previously developed 5-inch semi-active laser guided projectile 

Page 14 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
and assumed that few changes to these components were necessary. Navy 

officials then approved an accelerated schedule that began directly with 

development and demonstration of the system design.4

 In the late 1990’s, 

the program began to experience technical problems with the explosive

used to propel the munition from the gun, resulting in damage to munition 

components. These problems resulted in the need to redesign certain 

components. Additional design changes occurred in 2002 when warhead 

requirements were altered by the Navy. Although work on the program 

was partially halted from February to May 2004 due to poor testing 

performance and cost and schedule growth, the contractor continued to 

redesign components in several areas, such as the rocket motor, tail fins, 

and guidance system, in order to improve performance. After redesign of

individual munition components, testing of the munition resumed. 

Beginning in February 2005, the contractor sought to demonstrate the 

munition’s reliability through a series of seven land-based flight tests. Five 

of these tests failed due to component issues; two of these failures have 

been traced to a lack of quality controls with suppliers. 

The Navy’s decision to accelerate the program’s schedule by entering 

directly into system design and demonstration increased cost and 

schedule risk in the munition’s development. Our work on best practices 

has shown that a critical first step in developing systems is to fully 

demonstrate technologies before system development begins, thereby 

reducing program risk and creating confidence that technologies will work 

as expected.5

 The Navy chose to accept this technical and design risk by 

allowing the Extended Range Munition to enter system design directly. 

Since a knowledge-based process was not effectively utilized early in the 

program, the Navy could not provide an accurate estimate for the 

resources needed for development. 

Challenges to date have resulted in schedule delays and significant cost 

growth. Figure 3 shows the total estimated cost and schedule growth in 

the program since 1996.

 4

 The Defense Department’s framework for managing acquisition programs, presented in

DOD Instruction 5000.2, establishes 5 program phases: concept refinement, technology 

demonstration, system development and demonstration, production and deployment, and 

operations and support. A program may be authorized to enter into the acquisition system 

at any point consistent with phase specific entrance criteria and statutory requirements. 

5

 For more information see GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology

Development Can Improve Weapon Systems Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington,

DC: July 30, 1999). 

Page 15 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 3: Cost and Schedule Growth in the Extended Range Munition Program

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1996 2006

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Current schedule

estimate

Original schedule

estimate

Base year 1996 (dollars in millions) Number of years

Production

R&D

Source: Navy (data), GAO (presentation).

438

86

775

475

5

16

Time to operating capability

The Navy originally estimated that development of the munition would 

require $86 million. Currently, the Navy projects that development will 

require a total of $475 million.6

 Increases in production costs are due in 

part to a decision to increase procurement of the munition from 8,500 

rounds to 15,000 rounds. In August 2006, oversight of the program was 

elevated by requiring that major programmatic decisions, such as approval

of the Navy’s estimate for resources needed for completion and the 

strategy for development and testing, be approved by the Undersecretary

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics rather than the 

Navy. While this restructuring has elevated oversight, a comprehensive 

review of the program by the Undersecretary has not been performed. 

As a result of challenges in developing the munition, the Navy sought 

possible alternatives to the Extended Range Munition and awarded a 

second, separate demonstration contract in May 2004 for the Ballistic 

 6

 All amounts shown as base year 1996 dollars.

Page 16 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Trajectory Extended Range Munition. The munition’s rocket motor caused 

test failures and led the Navy to conclude that any further efforts to 

develop the munition for competition would not be worthwhile. According

to a Navy official, the Navy concluded that the Extended Range Munition 

was a more viable option for fielding a tactical round by fiscal year 2011 

and is no longer requesting funding for the Ballistic Trajectory Extended 

Range Munition. Instead, the Navy has chosen to modify the current 

contract and continue development of the Extended Range Munition. Navy 

officials state a competition could still occur in 2011 for production of the

Extended Range Munition. 

While the Navy intends to begin fielding the Extended Range Munition in 

2011, major risks remain. The program faces technical challenges in 

demonstrating the munition’s guidance components as well as successfully 

completing component testing and ensuring reliability of the munition. 

Even though the program had two successful land-based tests in 2005, the 

Navy has yet to repeat such demonstrations and does not plan to begin 

shipboard testing until 2010. The Navy currently plans to conduct 40 landbased guided flight tests prior to the shipboard event. According to 

program officials, the Navy continues to evaluate plans and identify 

resources required for completing development of the munition. Program 

officials are considering alternative plans for testing the munition’s 

reliability through additional component and land-based flight tests. Until 

these plans are completed and approved through a comprehensive review

by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics, uncertainty remains on whether the Navy’s revised strategy 

follows a knowledge-based approach and aligns the program’s available 

resources with the Navy’s goal to begin fielding in 2011. 

Affordability Concerns in 

the Zumwalt Class 

Destroyer Program Have 

Led to Reductions in Naval 

Surface Fire Support 

Capabilities and 

Procurement Quantities 

The Zumwalt class destroyer will deliver far fewer quantities of ships and 

munitions for naval surface fire support than envisioned 10 years ago. The 

primary reason for this reduced capability is that the Navy’s concept for 

the Zumwalt class destroyer promised revolutionary performance at an

unrealistically low cost. In 2001, the Department of Defense recognized 

that additional time and money were required to develop and field the 

destroyer and concluded that a new approach was necessary. Through a 

series of decisions, the Navy restructured the program by adding time for 

technology development, trading naval surface fire support capability for 

lower costs, and reducing the planned number of ships. At the same time, 

other ship capabilities were maintained or even expanded, leading to 

increased cost and additional technical risk. The capability trades and 

quantity reductions in the Zumwalt class destroyer program increase the 

Page 17 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Navy’s dependence on the less capable Extended Range Munition (ERM) 

to provide naval surface fire support, as shown in figure 4.7

Figure 4: Reductions to Ship Quantities Planned for Naval Surface Fire Support 

Source: Navy (data), GAO (presentation).

32

32

22

32

7

Zumwalt class destroyers

Arleigh Burke class destroyers with ERM capability

Ticonderoga class cruisers with ERM capability

1996 (86 ships) 2006 (39 ships)

The Zumwalt class destroyer program represents the Navy’s solution for 

addressing a mission need identified in 1994 for a 21st century surface 

combatant capable of, among other things, projecting sustained naval 

surface fire support for amphibious and other ground forces. The program 

was derived from a concept for a tailored capability ship identified as the 

Maritime Fire Support Ship. This concept featured significant naval fires 

capabilities—including two advanced 155 millimeter gun systems capable 

 7

 The Department of Defense notes that the Zumwalt class destroyer’s planned capacity for 

land attack munitions—and its ability to replenish munitions while underway—offered 

sufficient capability to meet current programmatic and operational requirements for naval

surface fire support. While the ship may meet requirements as they are currently stated, 

decreases to munition capacity on the order of 50 percent—especially when coupled with 

ship quantity reductions from 32 to 7—lessen the contribution of the Zumwalt class 

destroyer in performing naval surface fire support and result in a greater reliance on other

fire support systems.

Page 18 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
of firing a land attack munition up to 100 nautical miles—as well as robust 

surface and subsurface warfare capabilities, reduced signatures, and 

reduced crewing compared to that of current ship classes. The Navy used

the characteristics of the Maritime Fire Support Ship to serve as a basis for 

developing requirements for the DD 21 land attack destroyer. These 

requirements were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

in 1997 and featured robust capabilities related to naval surface fire 

support including threshold quantities of 2 advanced gun systems, 1200 

munitions capable of long range land attack, and 128 missile launch cells. 

When sized to these capabilities, DD 21 was expected to displace over 

17,000 long tons. Requirements also included ambitious targets for 

reduced manning and a low radar cross section. DD 21 plans, along with 

other Zumwalt class program events, are shown in table 4.

Table 4: Major Events in the Acquisition of the Zumwalt Class Destroyer 

Year Event

1994 • Navy identifies need for a new 21st century surface combatant (SC 21) to provide naval surface fire support. 

1997 • Analysis for SC 21 found that using a family of ships—as opposed to one ship—built on a common hull offered 

advantages. 

• Navy approves minimum requirements for DD 21 including 2 advanced gun systems, 1200 land attack munitions, 

and 128 missile cells. 

• Plans for DD 21 include 32 ships with an average unit cost not to exceed $921 million (FY96$) and an initial 

operational capability of fiscal year 2008 (Acquisition Program Baseline – January 1998). 

1999 • DD 21 program costs increase to account for development of software and key systems including the volume 

search radar, advanced gun system, and integrated power system. 

• DD 21 program plans revised to include 32 ships with an average unit cost not to exceed $956 million (FY96$) 

(Acquisition Program Baseline – March 1999). 

2001 • DD 21 program restructured to emphasize technology development and affordability. 

• Program renamed DD(X) and designated within a family of future surface combatants including a future cruiser and 

littoral combat ship. 

2002 • Marine Corps releases a memorandum with a requirement for each DD(X) to be equipped with 2 advanced gun 

systems and 900 to 1200 land attack munitions. 

• Navy completes its review of requirements for future surface combatants and recommends a force structure of 16 

DD(X) each with 2 advanced gun systems, 900 land attack munitions, and 96 missile cells. 

• Navy recognizes the need for an additional $7.6 billion to complete DD(X) technology development, testing, and 

evaluation efforts. 

2003 • Chief of Naval Operations directs that DD(X) capabilities include 2 advanced gun systems, 600 land attack 

munitions, and a minimum of 80 missile cells. 

• Navy modifies DD(X) radar design, increasing air defense capability while adding development risk. 

Page 19 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Year Event

2004 • DD(X) program restructured to include a quantity of 8 ships, an average unit cost not to exceed $2.6 billion 

(FY96$), and an initial operational capability of fiscal year 2013 (Acquisition Program Baseline—April 2004). 

• DD(X) operational requirements approved which reflect minimum naval surface fire support capabilities outlined by 

the Chief of Naval Operations in June 2003 and incorporate the Marine Corps requirements for range, accuracy, 

and system response time. 

2005 • Navy approves a DD(X) system design, which includes 2 advanced gun systems with 300 rounds each, a 

convertible storeroom capable of holding an additional 320 land attack munitions, and 80 missile cells. 

• Navy approves new plans for the DD(X) program including a procurement quantity of 10 ships, an average unit cost 

not to exceed $3.1 billion (FY96$), and an initial operational capability of fiscal year 2014 (Acquisition Program 

Baseline—November 2005). 

• Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics authorizes detail design and construction of 8

ships. 

• Navy pursues further cost reductions and eliminates the 320 round capable convertible storeroom, saving

approximately $19 million in procurement costs per ship. 

2006 • Navy outlines its 30 year shipbuilding plan in a report to Congress, which identifies plans to construct 7 DD(X) 

destroyers. 

• DD(X) program renamed DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyer. 

• Congress authorizes split funding of two lead ships but states that procurement costs for the two ships should not 

rise above $6.528 billion. 

Sources: Navy (data); GAO (presentation). 

In 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed concerns that the 

program’s cost estimate was unrealistic and that the program was not 

adequately funded.8

 Although originally envisioned as a tailored capability 

ship, DD 21 requirements outlined a multimission ship featuring several 

revolutionary technologies. These concerns prompted the Navy to 

restructure the program and revisit its planned family of ships concept. As 

a result, the Navy revised its family of ships approach to include a future 

destroyer named DD(X), a future cruiser known as CG(X), and a new 

littoral combat ship. This approach sought to take advantage of 

commonality among the three programs in an effort to mitigate risk in 

 8

 Since 2001, the Navy has taken some actions to improve the realism of cost estimates, 

although we have also reported on additional measures the Navy could take. See GAO,

Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding 

Plan, GAO-06-587T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006) and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 

Improved Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy

Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005). 

Page 20 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
technology development.9

 Figure 5 shows the different technologies 

introduced through the DD 21 and DD(X) programs. 

Figure 5: Advanced Technologies on the Zumwalt Class Guided Missile Destroyer 

Dual band radar

Autonomic fire 

suppression system

Integrated

power system

Infrared suppression

Integrated composite 

deckhouse and apertures

Advanced gun system

Total ship-computing 

environment

Peripheral vertical 

launch system

Tumblehome hull 

form

Integrated undersea

warfare system

Source: Navy (data), GAO (presentation).

The DD 21 and DD(X) programs introduced several revolutionary technologies, many of which remain 

in development. 

The Navy’s Surface Combatant Spiral Development Review in 2002 

recommended a multimission DD(X) configured with 2 advanced gun

systems, 900 land attack munitions, and 96 missile launch cells as the most 

cost-effective basis for developing DD(X) requirements. These capability 

reductions were expected to decrease the ship’s cost by reducing the 

destroyer’s weight from nearly 17,000 long tons expected for DD 21 to 

approximately 15,700 long tons. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval 

Operations directed that the size of DD(X) be reduced to 14,000 long tons

while retaining multimission capability. To achieve these goals, the Navy 

 9

 For more information on Zumwalt class destroyer technology development, see GAO,

Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-752R (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2005) 

and GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program, 

GAO-04-973 (Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2004). 

Page 21 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
reduced planned DD(X) land attack munitions to 600 and decreased 

minimum requirements for missile launch cells to 80 per ship. In an effort 

to address Marine Corps concerns regarding the reduced naval surface fire 

support capabilities offered by DD(X) as compared to DD 21, the Navy 

modified the DD(X) design to include a convertible storeroom capable of

holding an additional 320 land attack munitions. The Chief of Naval 

Operations also directed the Navy to revisit its plan for developing a

volume search radar for the DD(X) design. According to Navy officials, 

undertaking development of a less technologically mature, but potentially 

more powerful volume search radar for DD(X) was worthwhile because it

would help preserve a competitive industrial base in advance of CG(X) 

development. The change would also add air defense capability to DD(X), 

giving the ship capability that exceeds performance requirements. 

Achieving these benefits, however, would require the Navy to delay testing

for the volume search radar and commit nearly $20 million in additional 

research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the DD(X) 

program to manage the significant technical risk associated with 

developing the more challenging technology. One month following the 

Chief of Naval Operations’s directive, the Navy modified the ship’s radar 

development contract to accommodate the higher risk volume search 

radar approach. 

In 2004, the Department of Defense approved new program goals and 

operational requirements for the DD(X) program that reflected a plan to

procure fewer ships, projecting less naval surface fire support capability 

than DD 21. Figure 6 shows how program costs and quantities have 

changed over time. 

Page 22 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 6: Cost and Quantity Change in the Zumwalt Class Destroyer Program 

0

4,000

8,000

12,000

16,000

20,000

24,000

28,000

32,000

1998 2006

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1998 2006

Base year 1996 (dollars in millions) Planned number of ships

Procurement cost

RDT&E cost

Source: Navy (data), GAO (presentation).

28,798

2,020

22,591

8,404

32

7

Continuing cost pressures in the program led the Navy to reevaluate

DD(X) capabilities, technologies, and design as part of a comprehensive 

cost reduction effort. As part of this effort, the Navy eliminated the DD(X) 

convertible storeroom from the ship’s design. Although yielding 

approximately $19 million in procurement savings per ship, this decision 

reduced the ship’s naval surface fire support capability by almost 35 

percent. Other DD(X) capabilities and technologies including the ship’s 

dual band radar (volume search radar and multifunction radar), integrated

computing environment, and reduced signature features were not 

significantly affected during this process. According to Navy officials, 

contractor estimates have identified $265 million in procurement savings 

achieved for each Zumwalt class destroyer. 

In 2006, the Navy changed the name of the DD(X) program to DDG 1000 

Zumwalt class destroyer and reduced planned ship quantities to 7. 

Although this decision reflected the practical realities of recognizing more 

realistic costs, these reductions nevertheless increase the Navy’s reliance 

on successful outcomes in the Extended Range Munition program in order 

to complete future naval surface fire support missions. This reliance is 

further compounded by Navy decisions that have reduced the number of 

Page 23 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
land attack munitions each Zumwalt class ship is capable of carrying. 

However, because the Extended Range Munition offers less range and 

capability than the DD(X) long-range land attack munition, the Navy may 

be forced to accept additional risk in certain fire support missions. 

Currently, the Navy plans to field the Extended Range Munition on 32 

Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which will be supplemented with 7 

Zumwalt class ships carrying long-range land-attack munitions. 

The Navy has begun science and technology efforts for the 

electromagnetic railgun and multipurpose loitering missile, but has not 

approved development or fielding of these systems as formal acquisition 

programs. The Office of Naval Research is leading efforts to develop and 

test a prototype of the electromagnetic railgun and estimates that the 

system will require approximately $216 million to complete its initial 

demonstration phase in support of fielding around 2025. The 

electromagnetic railgun is one of four key naval prototype efforts within 

the Office of Naval Research, which together represent 50 percent of the 

agency’s fiscal year 2007 proposed investment in leap-ahead innovations.

Naval Sea Systems Command is managing preliminary tests and the 

development effort of the Affordable Weapon System, which is one 

candidate for the multipurpose loitering missile concept. The project has 

received approximately $155 million to date in support of these efforts. 

While neither the electromagnetic railgun nor the multipurpose loitering 

missile have been formally chosen as programs for acquisition, these 

systems provide the Navy and Marine Corps with potential options for 

future naval surface fire support capabilities. Further analysis by the Navy 

and the Department of Defense will determine whether these technologies 

are feasible and if these systems are needed. 

Based on the 2005 Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in 

Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, the Extended 

Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer will not provide the full 

range of capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. Analysis 

performed for the initial capabilities document studied the capabilities of 

systems across the services to provide fire support in the littorals and 

identified 4 capability gaps—command and control of joint fires, engaging 

moving targets, minimized collateral damage, and achieving volume fires 

effects. While the Navy has initiated efforts to address remaining naval 

surface fire support needs, it faces challenges in further defining 

requirements for volume of fire, shaping acquisition outcomes to meet the 

Navy Has Begun 

Development of Some 

Candidate Systems for 

Future Naval Surface Fire 

Support Capabilities 

Needs for Naval 

Surface Fire Support 

Exceed Projected 

Capabilities 

Page 24 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
needs of the expeditionary warfighter, and managing command and 

control issues related to fire support. 

Extended Range Munition 

and Zumwalt Class 

Destroyer Offer Significant 

Naval Surface Fire Support 

Capability, but Cannot 

Meet All the Needs of 

Future Warfighters 

In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed and 

validated the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the 

Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, which describes some of the fire 

support needs of the warfighter for the next decade as well as the gaps 

that exist in meeting these needs. Needs were defined by collecting 

guidance, tasks, conditions, and standards for fire support from each of 

the services, including those presented by the Marine Corps’s letters on 

naval surface fire support. Gaps in capability were identified by analyzing 

the ability of current and planned systems throughout the fires triad, 

including the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer, to 

fulfill the defined needs. As could be expected from any analysis of current 

versus desired capabilities, the initial capabilities document identified a 

number of gaps. The document lists the gaps in order of priority as 1) the 

ability to transmit and receive targeting information to enable command 

and control of fire support, 2) engaging moving targets in poor weather, 3) 

providing fire support when collateral damage or casualties in friendly 

forces is a concern, and 4) providing volume fires to achieve suppression 

of enemy targets. 

While the initial capabilities document approaches fire support needs and 

capabilities from a joint perspective—meaning that the need for fire 

support and the systems providing it can come from the Navy, Marine 

Corps, Army, or Air Force—it does address naval surface fire support 

systems specifically. The Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class 

destroyer were treated as planned systems within the analysis, as they are 

expected to become available within the 2005 to 2015 time period 

considered in the study. The analysis conducted for the initial capabilities 

document revealed that if these systems are implemented as currently 

planned they will provide the warfighter with improved capabilities to 

engage certain targets, especially in restricted conditions such as poor 

weather. However, they do not provide enough additional capability to 

close any of the four gaps. Future systems for naval surface fire support, 

such as the electromagnetic rail gun and the multipurpose loitering 

missile, were not considered as they will not be available until after 2015. 

The analysis performed for the initial capabilities document discussed a 

number of weaknesses in current and planned naval surface fire support 

systems. For instance, the analysis determined that Navy ships cannot take

full advantage of targeting information communicated from other systems 

Page 25 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
affecting their ability to provide accurate fire support, especially when 

collateral damage is a concern. Munitions currently in use or development 

also lack the ability to hit moving targets, as they have neither the sensors 

to detect moving targets nor the ability to update the location of targets 

while in flight. The need for volume fires is not fully met by the Extended 

Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer either, and multiple, 

simultaneous calls for volume fire provide a challenge as well. Officials 

state that this gap in volume of fire persists despite the low number of 

calls for suppression anticipated by the analysis—5 targets or 0.3 percent

of the total fires called for in the scenarios analyzed—due to the 

reductions made in munitions available for naval surface fire support and 

uncertainty about the effects expected. 

Risks Remain in the Navy’s 

Approach for Addressing 

Future Needs in Naval 

Surface Fire Support 

The Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals

Initial Capabilities Document provides greater definition for volume of 

fire than articulated in earlier Marine Corps’s correspondence on naval

surface fire support, presenting new measures of effectiveness for 

suppression. The document establishes a minimum capability needed to 

fill the gap in volume fires for suppression that includes measures of 

effectiveness for probability of damage against targets and a number of 

targets to suppress as well as capabilities like range and rate of fire. 

However, these desired minimum capabilities still lack a measure for the 

duration of fire, or how long targets need to be suppressed or fired upon to 

cause the stated amount of damage, and the amount of munitions needed 

to cause these effects. Instead of providing measures for these capabilities, 

the document reiterates previous analyses by stating that more specific 

volume requirements are dependant on the situation. Initial capabilities 

documents, like the Joint Fires document, do not generally establish 

requirements but only suggest capabilities. A set of requirements that 

quantitatively captures all the capabilities potentially needed is a 

necessary precursor for the Department of Defense to determine whether 

and how to address any resultant capability gap regarding volume fires. 

Requirements for Volume of 

Fires Need Further Definition 

Page 26 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Navy processes for defining requirements and allocating resources for 

naval surface fire support systems may result in acquisition outcomes that 

do not align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter. The Navy’s

Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with developing capabilities 

and requirements for naval surface fire support. However, this division has 

not had a formal oversight role in the Extended Range Munition and 

Zumwalt class destroyer programs. Instead, the Navy has assigned 

management of requirements and resources for these programs to its 

Surface Warfare division, which is charged with developing capabilities 

and requirements for destroyers and other surface ships.10 This approach 

places the Navy at risk for making investment decisions in its naval 

surface fire support programs without fully understanding the potential

impacts on operating concepts for expeditionary warfare. 

Current Navy Practices for 

Managing Resources and 

Requirements Increase Risk 

That Warfighter Needs Will Go 

Unaddressed 

For example, quantity requirements in the Extended Range Munition 

program were initially established by the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division. 

However, a 2005 report from the Department of Defense’s Office of the

Inspector General identified the Navy’s Expeditionary Warfare Division as 

responsible for both analyzing warfighting requirements for the Extended 

Range Munition and validating planned procurement quantities in the 

program. On the basis of the Inspector General’s report the planned 

quantities of the Extended Range Munition increased by over 75 percent in

order to meet Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. In 

another example, resources and requirements for the Navy’s multimission 

Zumwalt class destroyer are principally managed by the Navy’s Surface 

Warfare Division. Cost challenges within the program have required the

Navy to reduce planned capabilities on the ship as well as procurement 

quantities, which has significantly reduced the Zumwalt class’s ability and 

availability to provide naval surface fire support. This process of cost and 

capability trades has been managed by the Navy’s Surface Warfare 

Division, not by the customer—represented by the Navy’s Expeditionary 

Warfare Division—who depends on the delivered capabilities. As a result, 

current naval surface fire support capabilities of the Zumwalt class 

destroyer may not be aligned with the priorities of the expeditionary 

warfighter. 

 10 In contrast, the Expeditionary Warfare Division is charged with determining 

requirements and resources for amphibious and mine warfare ships, but the Navy 

instruction defines a formal role for the Surface Warfare Division in determinations for 

these ships as well. 

Page 27 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has designated the Navy as the 

lead component to analyze the four gaps. The Navy, through its Surface 

Warfare Division, has already begun the analysis for the three engagement 

gaps presented in the initial capabilities document. However, no 

organization has been chosen to analyze the first gap in capability, which 

identified issues in fire support command and control. Any attempt to 

close this gap could have consequences for systems developed to engage 

targets, as they rely on the command and control architecture for target 

assignment and information. 

Management of Command and 

Control Issues is Unresolved 

Since the retirement of the battleships in 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps 

have worked to develop capabilities for naval surface fire support. The 

Navy and Marine Corps chose to pursue an approach in which the 

Extended Range Munition would provide near-term capabilities and the 

Zumwalt class destroyer would provide capabilities over the medium 

term. However, this investment strategy was defined by low levels of 

technical knowledge and poor estimates of the financial resources that 

would be needed to acquire this capability. As a result, the acquisition of 

systems for naval surface fire support has been plagued by technical and 

budgetary challenges that have delayed the fielding of any significant 

capability. 

Conclusions 

The recent joint analysis of fire support for forces operating in the littorals

has been an important and constructive process in generating agreement 

and improving the knowledge base required to reconcile needs and assets. 

Yet, more work needs to be done to reconcile these differences, as 

evidenced by the gaps identified in the joint analysis. The presence of gaps

in capabilities should be expected from any analysis of current resources, 

and it does not necessarily follow that all gaps must be closed with more 

resources. However, if gaps are to remain in place, this result should be 

the product of deliberate analysis and decision making that takes into 

account the views of the warfighter. At this point, there are several issues

whose resolution will enable the kind of analysis needed to fully reconcile 

naval surface fire support needs with fire support assets. 

First, although the Marine Corps has quantified many of its requirements 

for naval surface fire support in a way that allows the Navy to guide 

development of its systems, volume of fire remains ill-defined. While the 

Marine Corps maintains the importance of volume fires, the failure to even 

roughly quantify needs within thresholds and objectives leads to the 

absence of this capability in the systems the Navy develops as well as 

difficulty in planning munition procurement. By working with the Navy 

Page 28 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
and other services to better define the effects required and to create 

operational concepts for a system or combination of systems that could 

achieve volume effects, the Marine Corps may be able to better provide 

this capability to warfighters in future conflicts. 

Second, although the Navy and Marine Corps have reached an 

understanding on naval surface fire support requirements as a whole, 

translation of this understanding to the capabilities and quantities of 

individual systems must yet be reached. Over the past 10 years, the 

decisions made on individual systems such as the Extended Range 

Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer have reduced the capabilities 

the Navy plans to make available to provide fire support for the Marine 

Corps’s operations. These decisions were reached without providing a 

formal role for the Navy’s Expeditionary Warfare Division in deciding the 

requirements and resources allocated to platforms that provide naval 

surface fire support, increasing risk that acquisition outcomes will not 

align with the priorities of the expeditionary warfighter. 

Third, because of challenges posed by the development of the Extended 

Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy is now in a 

position in which it will rely more heavily on Extended Range Munition to 

provide fire support than originally planned. This program still faces 

significant development risks, a fact recognized by the decision of the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to 

elevate oversight of the program. 

Finally, while the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division has begun the analysis 

of gaps related to engaging targets, no office has been selected to analyze 

the gap in command and control of fire support in the littorals. To ensure 

that current and future systems provide a fire support function within the 

larger command and control network, it is important that this gap be 

analyzed in conjunction with the other identified capability gaps in joint 

fire support. 

To improve the Department’s efforts to address naval surface fire support 

needs, we are making the following four recommendations: 

• To determine the desired effects for volume of fire, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy and Marine Corps to define 

quantitative requirements and operational concepts on use of volume 

fires, especially when using precision weapons for suppression or 

simultaneous strikes. This analysis should be used to 1) inform and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 29 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
update the non-nuclear ordnance requirements process used to 

determine procurement objectives for these munitions and 2) clarify 

the capability gap for volume fires as identified in the Initial 

Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary 

Operations in the Littorals. 

• In order to ensure that the systems providing naval surface fire support 

are aligned with the requirements and operating concepts of the forces 

they assist, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations’s Expeditionary Warfare 

Division, as the division charged with establishing capabilities and 

requirements for naval surface fire support and liaison to the Marine 

Corps, a formal role in developing requirements, determining 

capabilities, and managing resources for Navy systems responsible for 

providing naval surface fire support. 

• In light of the changes to the schedule, budget requirements, and 

design of the Extended Range Munition program, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, as the program’s milestone 

decision authority, conduct a comprehensive review of the program to 

validate progress and acquisition plans that will incorporate results 

from current and planned program studies and direct changes as 

necessary. 

• Given the importance of command and control in coordinating fire 

support, especially in the complex environment imposed by joint 

operations in the littorals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Navy to designate the appropriate organization for managing 

an analysis of alternatives related to this gap and ensure that the results 

of this analysis are coordinated with solutions for identified 

engagement gaps. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the 

recommendation to define quantitative requirements and operational 

concepts on the use of volume fires as well as the recommendation to 

conduct a comprehensive review of the Extended Range Munition 

program. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Review

DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to provide a formal 

role to the Expeditionary Warfare Division in decisions regarding naval 

surface fire support, stating that the department will review the existing 

role of the Director, Expeditionary Warfare and relevant Navy directives

Page 30 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
and make adjustments if necessary. It also stated that the role of 

Expeditionary Warfare was recently formalized for the munitions 

requirements and procurement process, but that the guns and launchers 

which fire these munitions are the responsibility of the Surface Warfare 

Division. In conducting its review, we believe the department should be 

mindful that naval surface fire support capability is not limited to 

munitions but also includes guns, ships, and other systems. 

DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to address the 

command and control gap identified by the Initial Capabilities Document 

for Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals, 

but indicated that full analysis of this gap will be deferred and not 

coordinated with the initial analysis of engagement gaps. This is surprising 

given that the initial capabilities document identified correcting 

weaknesses in command and control as the highest priority in its analysis. 

We are concerned that deferring command and control to a later analysis 

continues a history of inattention to this area. 

DOD’s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. The 

department also provided technical comments which were incorporated 

into the report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the 

Navy; and interested congressional committees. We will also provide 

copies to others on request. We will also make copies available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. GAO Staff who made contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Paul L. Francis 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 31 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess whether well-defined requirements for naval surface fire support 

have been established, we reviewed current and historical Navy, Marine 

Corps, and joint force documents that identify requirements related to 

naval surface fire support and that explain operational concepts for 

expeditionary warfare. We analyzed and compared these documents to 

determine 1) when the joint services reached formal agreement on naval 

surface fire support requirements, 2) how these requirements align with 

the Marine Corps’s key operating concepts for expeditionary warfare, and 

3) the degree to which these requirements include clear, quantitative 

measures of performance. To supplement this analysis, we further 

discussed these issues with Navy, Marine Corps, and joint force officials 

responsible for establishing naval surface fire support requirements. We 

also interviewed Navy program officials responsible for developing and 

procuring the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer to 

understand how naval surface fire support requirements have been 

incorporated into these programs. 

To assess the Navy’s progress in developing and fielding the Extended 

Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and future systems for 

naval surface fire support, we analyzed key program documentation 

including performance requirements, cost estimates, budget submissions, 

acquisition strategies, development and demonstration contracts, and 

testing plans and results. We also drew from our prior work related to best 

practices and development and cost challenges in the Extended Range

Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer programs. In addition, we reviewed 

Department of Defense reports related to these and other programs for 

naval surface fire support. To supplement our analysis, we interviewed 

Navy and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials responsible for 

managing resources and requirements in naval surface fire support 

programs. We also discussed program challenges and risks with the 

acquisition managers, contractors, and testing community associated with 

each system. 

To determine whether current Navy systems in development will fulfill 

naval surface fire support requirements, we comparatively analyzed the 

joint services’ most recent requirements document related to naval surface 

fire support—the Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Fires in 

Support of Expeditionary Operations in the Littorals—with the validated

performance requirements for the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt 

class destroyer. To identify actions taken to address situations where 

naval surface fire support requirements may not fully align with the 

capabilities planned for these systems, we interviewed officials from the 

Navy, Marine Corps, joint services, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Page 32 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the 

Navy’s Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions; the Marine 

Corps’s Combat Development Command and Plans, Policies, and 

Operations offices; the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare 

Systems; and the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer 

program offices. We also met with officials from the Department of 

Defense’s Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, the Naval Surface Warfare 

Center—Dahlgren Division, the Office of Naval Research, Affordable 

Weapon System project office, the Defense Contract Management Agency, 

Raytheon Missile Systems, BAE Systems, and Alliant Techsystems. 

We conducted our analysis from February 2006 to November 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 33 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft report may differ 

from those in this report. 

Page 34 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-07-115 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 38 GAO-07-115

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841 

Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director; 

J. Kristopher Keener; Christopher R. Durbin; Ryan Consaul; and Lily Chin.

Defense Acquisitions

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120520) 
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