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Additional Views 

Senator George V. Voinovich 

I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman and their investigative staff for producing a 

thorough examination of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

It is clear there were serious and regrettable defi ciencies in the response at every level of 

government during the days leading up to and following the unprecedented catastrophe 

in the Gulf Coast. Th is country can and must improve its capabilities in preparing for and 

responding to future disasters, whether natural or man-made. 

Th e Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs has produced a 

substantial report, which I am confi dent will contribute positively to the future of emergency management. I wholeheartedly agree with the following recommendations detailed in 

the report: 

• Commitment to emergency management across federal, state, and local governments must be strengthened;

• Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must develop a true all-hazards focus and strike the appropriate balance between addressing terrorism 

and natural disasters; 

• A stronger regional DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

framework is necessary; 

• Collaboration and coordination must be improved among federal agencies 

and between federal, state, and local governments; 

• FEMA – or the proposed National Preparedness and Response Authority 

(NPRA) – must have capable and qualifi ed leadership with a robust and welltrained workforce; and

• Our nation’s plans and systems for responding to disasters and catastrophes 

should be improved and clarifi ed to establish clear lines of authority, roles, and 

responsibilities by all appropriate federal, state, and local parties. 

While I concur with many of the Chairman and Ranking Member’s fi ndings and recommendations, I appreciate the opportunity to express my diff ering opinion on several key matters. 

I believe too much emphasis has been placed upon reconsidering the organizational structure of FEMA. Whether FEMA is an independent, Cabinet-level agency or reorganized 

within DHS is not the most critical factor. Th e key to FEMA’s eff ectiveness is ensuring the 

agency has capable and qualifi ed leadership, is fully staff ed with a well-trained and experienced workforce, and has the necessary budgetary resources. As this Report details, FEMA 

did not have the appropriate leadership, staffi ng levels, or budgetary resources necessary for 

optimal readiness prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

Th is Report declares that FEMA is beyond repair. I do not share that assessment. Nor do I 

agree at this time that reorganizing and renaming FEMA is the answer. I am concerned that 

yet another reorganization of FEMA and DHS would be disruptive and could cause more 

harm than good. Instead of “moving boxes around” yet again, I believe this Committee 

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should focus its oversight authority and legislative eff orts on ensuring that DHS and 

FEMA are working as eff ectively as possible to strengthen institutional capabilities, assemble the appropriate leadership team with the optimal staffi ng levels, and make the best use 

of budgetary resources. 

In the past months, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff , Acting FEMA Director R. David Paulison, and Under Secretary for Preparedness George Foresman have assured this Committee 

that they are rehabilitating FEMA and improving preparedness and response capabilities 

throughout DHS for the impending hurricane season and beyond. DHS is already implementing many of the recommendations in this Committee’s Report. However, Secretary 

Chertoff does not support the Report’s reorganization proposal. As a former government 

executive, I believe the Secretary’s views are critical and deserve serious consideration in 

this matter. Congress must hold DHS accountable for its performance, but should refrain 

from micromanaging the agency. 

Much attention has been paid in this Report to the link between the emergency preparedness and response functions within DHS. While I agree these two functions are necessarily 

interdependent, I am not presently convinced the agency must be reorganized to achieve 

coordination. When Secretary Chertoff conducted his management review of the agency 

last year, he determined that the preparedness and response offi ces should be separated 

– but work together closely – because the two functions require diff erent core competencies. 

Th erefore, he proposed creating a Preparedness Directorate to focus exclusively on grants, 

training, and exercises; while allowing FEMA to focus entirely on its response and recovery 

missions. Th e new Preparedness Directorate became operational only months ago, in October 2005, following Hurricane Katrina. Th erefore, I believe judgments regarding the current 

structure of the preparedness and response functions within DHS are premature. 

I also have reservations regarding the proposed dual-reporting structure for the Director 

of NPRA. Th e chain of command recommended in this report would allow the Director 

of the proposed NPRA to bypass the DHS Secretary and report directly to the President. 

Following the leadership failures during Hurricane Katrina, a dual-reporting structure is a 

tempting recommendation, but one that would ultimately harm accountability and the effectiveness and coherence of the chain of command. If the DHS Secretary is to be held fully 

accountable for the actions of his Department, the NPRA Director should not be allowed to 

circumvent the Secretary’s authority, even during times of crisis. 

Overall, it seems that the recommendations in this Report could entail shift ing an increased 

burden to the federal government for emergency management, which has historically been 

recognized as a shared responsibility between federal, state, and local governments. In 

an environment of limited federal budgetary resources, I would urge that where possible, 

improvements in emergency preparedness and response capabilities should primarily be 

achieved through better management, training, coordination, and leveraging of existing 

resources at all levels of government. 

I feel strongly that we in Congress have an obligation to exercise our oversight capacity to 

ensure our nation develops a more robust and eff ective emergency-management system in 

order to prevent future devastation and suff ering on the scale of Hurricane Katrina. I support the spirit in which this Report is off ered, however, I would caution my colleagues that 

Congress should avoid being overly prescriptive toward the Executive Branch or the States. 

Certain recommendations in this report denote a specifi city with which I am uncomfortable. 

In total, I believe the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee have produced a 

solid Report, and I greatly appreciate their eff orts. I hope the Congress and the AdministraAdditional Views
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tion can work cooperatively in the coming months to identify and implement the appropriate modifi cations to improve our nation’s disaster preparedness and response capabilities.

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared