J. S53041/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

CHARLES GIGGETTS, : No. 2773 EDA 2016

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, May 13, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0007804-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2017

Charles Giggetts appeals from the May 13, 2016 judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, robbery, and 

robbery of a motor vehicle.1 For the following reasons, we vacate the 

judgment of sentence and remand this matter for resentencing; appellant’s 

convictions are affirmed in all other respects.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

On April 18, 2013, at approximately 6:45 a.m., 

Complainant Lisa McLawler stopped to get gasoline 

at a Sunoco Gas Station on the corner of City Avenue

and Conshohocken State Road in Philadelphia. As 

she was filling her 2010 Chrysler Sebring with 

gasoline, she heard her car door close. She never 

heard it open. When she turned around, a man was 

in her vehicle. She started screaming for him to get 

out. In a statement to police, she described the 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 3701, and 3702, respectively.
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assailant as a black man, dark skin, facial hair, full 

beard, he appeared to be wearing a hoodie or some 

type of sweatshirt. She testified that he was an 

“older gentleman,” not the teenager-type. 

The Complainant had left her keys in the car 

and the driver’s side window down. She reached 

into the car through the window and started blaring 

the horn to draw attention. The man sped off in the 

vehicle as she was still reaching into it. As he did, 

he dragged her a lengthy distance, running over her 

right foot, causing her to propel forward and slam 

face first onto the pavement of the Sunoco station. 

She testified that she sustained multiple sprains and 

severe bruising, a large cut on her foot, and burns 

down the right side of her body from her breast to 

her hip. She had a hematoma the size of a tennis 

ball on her left hip that did not heal for 

approximately three months. As a result of this 

incident, she has chronic back pain and is no longer 

able to wear high heels.

The Complainant had her iPad, cell phone, and 

handbag containing multiple credit cards in her 

vehicle. She immediately put a hold on all of her 

accounts within the first hour of the incident. One of 

her credit cards was used and another transaction 

was attempted, but did not go through because of 

the hold. She received a call that her handbag was 

at the Upper Darby Post Office approximately one 

week after the incident. Her identification cards and 

debit cards were no longer in her handbag. 

Corporal Kenneth Wilson, Pennsylvania State 

Police, recovered the stolen vehicle within 

thirty minutes of the carjacking at 7:15 a.m., 

abandoned on Lenape Road in Philadelphia, 

approximately a quarter-mile from the Sunoco Gas 

Station. 

Trooper Andrew Martin, Pennsylvania State 

Police, responded to the Sunoco Gas Station and 

obtained video footage of the incident from the 

station. A description of the suspect was generated 
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based on the video: black, non-Hispanic male, 

approximately 6 feet, wearing a gray hoodie, blue 

jeans, and distinct sneakers with red trim, red 

tongue, and red laces. The suspect walked with a 

gait, i.e. he would swing his right foot as he walked 

with his left.

Trooper Martin was informed of an 

unauthorized use of the Complainant’s credit card 

approximately thirty to forty-five minutes after the 

carjacking at a Citgo Gas Station at 4626 Lancaster 

Avenue. He provided the attendee with the credit 

card information and obtained a video of the person 

who attempted to use the card. The video was 

played for the jury. A man fitting the description of 

the assailant is seen at the pump where the credit 

card was used. He was driving a silver Hyundai 

Santa Fe with a “distinctive rack on the top.” 

Records showed that [appellant] was the owner of 

that vehicle.

Trooper Michael Clarke was off-duty at the 

same Citgo Gas Station at 7:00 p.m. on April 19, 

2013, the day after the incident, when he observed a 

man matching the description of the assailant, 

identified as [appellant], in a silver Hyundai Santa Fe 

with a distinctive roof rack. He had seen the videos 

from the Sunoco Gas Station where the carjacking 

occurred and the Citgo Gas Station where the 

Complainant’s credit card was used when he was 

on-duty earlier that day.

Trooper Clarke approached [appellant]. When 

he did, [appellant] stated he had “cards,” “[$]10 to 

$20 to fill your tank up.” Trooper Clarke told 

[appellant] he was going to the ATM and contacted 

his supervisor. He observed [appellant] deal with 

five or six other people and fill up their tanks with 

credit cards in exchange for cash as he waited for 

officers to arrive. 

Trooper Christopher Holdeman responded to 

the Citgo based on the tip from Trooper Clarke. He 

surveilled the Hyundai Santa Fe for two minutes. 
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The vehicle moved from the front of the gas station 

around the corner. The driver, later identified as 

[appellant], exited the vehicle and started walking 

toward the convenience store at the station. 

[Appellant] was wearing the same black shoes with 

red shoelaces visible in the video of the carjacking. 

Trooper Holdeman exited his vehicle and 

identified himself. [Appellant] turned and ran 

westbound through the parking lot of the gas station 

toward an alley. After a brief chase, [appellant] was 

apprehended. A number of stolen identification 

cards and credit cards were recovered from 

[appellant’s] person. [Complainant’s] identification 

cards and credit cards, including the TD Bank card 

used at the Citgo Gas Station on April 18, 2013, 

were recovered in the center console of [appellant’s] 

Hyundai Santa Fe.

. . . .

John Milo, Forensic DNA Scientist for the 

Pennsylvania State Police, testified that the following 

swabs were taken from the vehicle: two swabs of 

the steering wheel, one swab of the rear-view 

mirror, one swab of the inside door latch, one swab 

of the door latch, one swab of the driver’s seat 

adjustment bar, and one swab of the gear shifter. 

He was able to obtain viable DNA from the top half 

and bottom half of the steering wheel. 

The DNA profile obtained from the swab of the 

top of the steering wheel was a mixture of three 

individuals. A major component consisted of two 

individuals. The DNA mixture profile was 480 trillion 

times more likely to occur under the scenario that it 

is a mixture of DNA originating from [appellant], 

Complainant [] and one random, unrelated person as 

opposed to the scenario that it originated from a 

mixture of DNA from two random, unrelated people 

in the African-American population; 200 quadrillion 

times more likely to occur under the scenario that it 

is a mixture of DNA originating from [appellant], the 

Complainant, and one random, unrelated person as 
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opposed to the scenario that it originated from a 

mixture of DNA from two random, unrelated people 

in the Caucasian population; and 26 quadrillion times 

more likely to occur under the scenario that it is a 

mixture of DNA originating from [appellant], the 

Complainant, and one random, unrelated person as 

opposed to the scenario that it originated from a 

mixture of DNA from two random, unrelated people 

in the Hispanic population. 

Trial court opinion, 11/7/16 at 1-5 (citations to notes of testimony omitted; 

quotation marks in original).

Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with multiple crimes 

in connection with this incident. On March 15, 2016, appellant proceeded to 

a jury trial before the Honorable Rose Marie DeFino-Nastasi. The jury found 

appellant guilty of aggravated assault, robbery, and robbery of a motor 

vehicle on March 18, 2016. On May 13, 2016, the trial court sentenced 

appellant to 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for robbery and 10 years’ 

probation for aggravated assault. The trial court found that appellant’s 

robbery of a motor vehicle conviction merged with robbery for sentencing 

purposes. (Sentencing order, 5/13/16; certified record at no. 38.) On 

May 19, 2016, appellant filed a post-sentence motion challenging, 

inter alia, the weight of the evidence. Thereafter, on May 23, 2016, 

appellant filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of his sentence. 
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The trial court denied appellant’s motions on August 1, 2016. This timely 

appeal followed on August 30, 2016.2

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 

IT FOUND APPELLANT [] GUILTY OF 

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ROBBERY AND 

ROBBERY OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AS THERE 

WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE 

THESE CRIMES BEYOND A REASONABLE 

DOUBT[?]

B. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 

IT FOUND APPELLANT [] GUILTY OF 

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ROBBERY AND 

ROBBERY OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, AS THE 

VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE[?]

C. [WHETHER] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN 

IT SENTENCED APPELLANT [] TO A TERM OF 

INCARCERATION WHICH WAS MANIFESTLY 

EXCESSIVE, AS IT DEPARTED FROM THE 

PENNSYLVANIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

AND WAS IN EXCESS OF THE MANDATORY 

MINIMUM SENTENCE[?]

Appellant’s brief at 2.3

 

2 The record reflects that on September 1, 2016, the trial court ordered 

appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in 

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 30 days. Appellant filed a timely 

Rule 1925(b) statement on September 15, 2016, and supplemental 

statements on September 21 and 30, 2016. Thereafter, on November 7, 

2016, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

3

For the ease of our discussion, we have elected to address appellant’s 

claims in a slightly different order than presented in his brief.
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We begin by addressing appellant’s claim that he was sentenced 

beyond the statutory maximum for the crime of robbery, which implicates 

the legality of his sentence. (See appellant’s brief at 20.) “The 

determination as to whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a 

question of law; our standard of review in cases dealing with questions of 

law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Stradley, 50 A.3d 769, 772 (Pa.Super. 

2012) (citation omitted). Instantly, both the Commonwealth and the trial 

court concede that this case should be remanded for resentencing because 

the sentence imposed for robbery was beyond the statutory maximum. 

(Commonwealth’s brief at 13; see also trial court opinion, 11/7/16 at 10.) 

We agree.

The record reflects that appellant was previously convicted of 

third-degree murder and was subject to mandatory minimum sentencing 

provisions as a second-strike offender. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714. As noted, 

the trial court sentenced appellant to 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for 

robbery, which clearly exceeds the statutory maximum of 20 years’ 

imprisonment for a first-degree felony. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1). The 

trial court acknowledged the excessive nature of appellant’s sentence in its 

November 7, 2016 opinion, noting that it mistakenly believed that 

appellant’s robbery of a motor vehicle conviction merged with his robbery 

conviction and that it “intended to sentence [appellant] to an aggregate

sentence of fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years plus ten (10) years[’] 
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probation.” (Trial court opinion, 11/7/16 at 1 n.1 (emphasis added).) 

Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s May 13, 2016 judgment of sentence and 

remand this matter for resentencing.

Appellant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 

his convictions for aggravated assault, robbery, and robbery of a motor 

vehicle. (Appellant’s brief at 14.) We disagree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted 

at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to 

prove every element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may 

not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of 

doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010).

A person will be found guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to 

cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). 

Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury which creates a substantial 

risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or 

protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
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organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. A person will be found guilty of robbery “if, in 

the course of committing a theft, he . . . inflicts serious bodily injury upon 

another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i). Likewise, a person will be found 

guilty of robbery of a motor vehicle, a felony of the first degree, “if he steals 

or takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of that person 

or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3702(a).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the verdict winner, we find that there is overwhelming 

evidence to support appellant’s convictions in this matter. The evidence 

introduced at trial established that on the morning of April 18, 2013, 

appellant carjacked the victim as she was pumping gas and proceeded to 

drag her body a substantial distance across the parking lot when she tried to 

intervene. (Notes of testimony, 3/16/16 at 36-38, 52-53.) The record 

reflects that the victim suffered substantial bodily injuries, including multiple 

sprains and a tennis-ball-sized hematoma on her left hip. (Id. at 38-42.) At

trial, the Commonwealth introduced video surveillance of the incident, which

depicted an individual matching appellant’s age and description, wearing 

distinctive black-and-red shoes, and walking with a notable gait. (Id. at 

71-72, 78-81.) A second video introduced at trial placed appellant at a 

second gas station approximately 45 minutes later using one of the victim’s 

credit cards. (Id. at 83-94.) The record further reflects that appellant was
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apprehended the following day, wearing the identical shoes as those seen in 

the first video and in possession of the victim’s identification and credit 

cards. (Id. at 202-213.) Subsequent tests determined that appellant’s DNA 

matched DNA found on the victim’s steering wheel. (Id. at 96-98, 

149-162.) Based on the foregoing, we find that appellant’s claim that there 

was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault, 

robbery, and robbery of a motor vehicle must fail.

In his final claim, appellant argues that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence because “[the victim] had no idea whatsoever who 

assaulted her and robbed her of her motor vehicle.” (Appellant’s brief at 

17.) “An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin, 

985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 

1051 (2010).

[W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim 

below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review 

is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused 

its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Our supreme court has long recognized that,

[b]ecause the trial judge has had the opportunity to 

hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate 

court will give the gravest consideration to the 
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findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge 

when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of 

the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a 

new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the 

verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in 

the interest of justice. 

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by 

the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a 

new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a 

trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he 

term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate 

conclusion within the framework of the law, and is 

not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the 

will of the judge. Discretion must be exercised on 

the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, 

personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. 

Discretion is abused where the course pursued 

represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or 

where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and 

emphasis omitted).

Instantly, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 

court in rejecting appellant’s weight claim. (See trial court opinion, 11/7/16 

at 9-10.) “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 
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2007). Here, the jury evidently found that the video surveillance recordings, 

DNA evidence, and the fact that the victim’s property was discovered in 

appellant’s possession weighed heavily in favor of its determination that 

appellant was the person who committed the offenses in question, and 

elected not to believe appellant’s version of the events. We are precluded 

from reweighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the 

fact-finder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the May 13, 2016 judgment of 

sentence and remand this matter for resentencing. Appellant’s convictions 

are affirmed in all other respects.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Convictions affirmed in all other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/11/2017