J-S15008-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JONATHON HAMLETTE,

Appellant No. 1790 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 20, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006120-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 13, 2016

Appellant, Jonathon Hamlette, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

of an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 

imposed after a jury convicted him of second-degree murder and related 

offenses. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it denied his Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 motion to dismiss, and when it granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion to permit evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts 

under Pa.R.E. 404(b). After careful review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence and remand for a new trial. 

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial, 

as follows:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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The evidence adduced at trial established that on January 

24, 2010, the decedent, William Worthy, was stabbed twice, 

once in the heart, at the entrance to his residence, 2813 North 

Bambrey Street, at roughly 8:30[]am.

In the early hours of January 24, 2010, Sharma Sanford 

was near the corner of 25th Street and Lehigh Avenue in search 

of drugs, namely crack-cocaine. There, [Appellant] approached 

Ms. Sanford asked her if she “was looking to get high.” The two 

proceeded to 2813 North Bambrey Street to purchase crackcocaine. [Appellant] asked Ms. Sanford to purchase the drugs 

from William Worthy because, as told to Ms. Sanford, there had 

previously been an incident between [Appellant] and the 

decedent. Ms. Sanford was the only one to enter the residence, 

and she purchased the drugs from the decedent; [Appellant] and 

Ms. Sanford proceeded to a residence on Oakdale Street. 

[Appellant] told Ms. Sanford that the Oakdale Street residence 

was his home and, once they entered, they proceeded to walk 

through the living room toward the basement. In the basement,

Ms. Sanford saw a single bed. Both proceeded to smoke the 

drugs which they had recently purchased. Ms. Sanford testified 

that she became uncomfortable and wanted to leave after 

smoking the drugs. Along with being in an unfamiliar place with 

a person whom she had just met, Ms. Sanford testified that her 

uneasiness was also rooted in the weapon, a knife, which 

[Appellant] had on a shelf near him. Upon leaving, Ms. Sanford 

saw [Appellant] take the knife from the shelf and place it in his 

back pocket. [Appellant] and Ms. Sanford left the Oakdale 

Street residence, headed to another residence on Bonsall Street, 

and then back to the decedent's residence at 2813 North 

Bambrey Street to smoke more drugs.

When the two arrived, Ms. Sanford was once again the 

only one to enter the residence to purchase additional drugs. 

Mr. Worthy let Ms. Sanford in, took her to the second floor, and 

sold her the drugs. After Ms. Sanford purchased the singular 

bag which she and [Appellant] were going to share, Ms. Sanford 

removed a portion of the drugs from the baggie for herself. 

Within the residence were three people, William Worthy and two 

ladies, one of whom was asleep in another room. Shortly 

thereafter, there was a knock at the door and Ms. Sanford told 

Mr. Worthy that the person at the door was probably Johnny2

and that he should let him in. Mr. Worthy went to the door and 

let [Appellant] in, and both men went to the second floor. When 
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[Appellant] was upstairs, Ms. Sanford gave [Appellant] the 

drugs.

______________________

2 When they first met, [Appellant] told Ms. Sanford that his 

name was Johnny. 

______________________

Ms. Sanford testified that [Appellant] remarked to Mr. 

Worthy that the amount of drugs in the bag was light and then 

asked Mr. Worthy if he would give [Appellant] more drugs. Mr. 

Worthy declined and, after the group smoked what they had in 

the second-floor room, [Appellant] asked to speak to Mr. Worthy 

privately downstairs. After a few minutes, Ms. Sanford heard 

tussling and went to the top of the stairs. Ms. Sanford testified 

that she saw Mr. Worthy struggling with someone, but she could 

not tell who the other person was. Ms. Sanford ran back into the 

second-floor room to grab the other two ladies. While she was 

in the second-floor room, Ms. Sanford heard Mr. Worthy yell out, 

“He stabbed me. He got me for three bags.”3 Ms. Sanford left 

the second-floor room and went downstairs to aid Mr. Worthy up 

the stairs. As Mr. Worthy was walking upstairs, he started 

removing his shirt. Once upstairs, Ms. Sanford saw a wound in 

Mr. Worthy’s chest which was “gushing out” blood. Ms. Sanford 

was questioned about both the statement she later gave to 

homicide detectives and her testimony at the preliminary 

hearing. On both occasions, Ms. Sanford said that the person 

tussling with Mr. Worthy was [Appellant]. According to Ms. 

Sanford, those two statements were wrong because she just 

assumed that it was [Appellant] tussling with Mr. Worthy 

because he was the last person speaking to Mr. Worthy at the 

door before Mr. Worthy was stabbed.4

______________________

3

Jay Cunningham also testified. She was the [] third 

female at the residence. She testified that she heard Mr. 

Worthy scream out twice, “He stabbed me.” However, Ms. 

Cunningham failed to identify [Appellant] at a lineup and in 

court as the male who was at 2813 North Bambrey Street. 

4 Dr. Edwin Lieberman testified as an expert in forensic 

pathology. Dr. Lieberman testified that the decedent, 

William Worthy, died of a stab wound to the chest. 
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______________________

Davina Phillips, the lady who had previously been asleep in 

another room in the house, placed a call to 911. Officer Joseph 

Stallbaum was the first officer to respond to the scene. Officer 

Stallbaum approached the residence and saw Ms. Sanford and 

Ms. Phillips standing near the entrance to the residence. Mr. 

Stallbaum went to the second-floor room to survey Mr. Worthy's 

condition. Once medical support arrived, Mr. Stallbaum went 

downstairs to speak to both ladies. Ms. Sanford detailed to 

Officer Stallbaum [Appellant’s] clothing, name, and physical 

features. She also told him the address to which [Appellant] had 

probably fled; Officer Stallbaum then relayed this flash 

information to police dispatch and to the next officer arriving on 

the scene, Officer Eric Cohn. Officer Cohn went to the 2500 

block of West Oakdale Street to find [Appellant]. In the 

meantime, Officer Stallbaum secured the scene and waited for 

Officer Cohn to relay any results regarding his search for 

[Appellant]. After Officer Cohn surveyed the 2500 block of West 

Oakdale Street and did not find a person matching the 

description of [Appellant], Officer Cohn came back to 2813 North 

Bambrey Street to escort Ms. Sanford and Ms. Phillips to the 

Homicide Division. 

On the way to Homicide, Ms. Sanford told Officer Cohn that 

the suspect, whom she called Johnny, also was known to hang 

out at a property located at 2744 North Bonsall Street and that 

[Appellant] worked at a barbershop, called Ernie's Upper Cuts, 

which is located at 25th Street and Lehigh Avenue. The property 

on Bonsall Street is located just a few blocks from the crime 

scene. Officer Cohn drove past the suspect's place of 

employment, a barbershop at 25th Street and Lehigh Avenue, 

and the 2744 North Bonsall Street property. Ms. Sanford did not 

see [Appellant] during this canvass. As a result, Officer Cohn 

took both ladies to Homicide. 

Officer Ryan Clement testified that he was patrolling on the 

morning in question in an adjoining district. With the flash 

information previously provided at the outset of his shift, Officer 

Clement noticed [Appellant] at a gas station located at the 

corner of Broad and Thompson Streets. Officer Clement rolled 

down his vehicle window and asked [Appellant] where he was 

coming from; [Appellant] responded that he was previously at 

his brother's house, located at 24th and Oakdale Streets. Based 

on this response, Officer Clement exited his vehicle and asked 
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[Appellant] if he had any identification; [Appellant] responded 

that he did not but stated to Officer Clement that his name was 

John, Johnny or Jonathon. Officer Clement called into his district 

dispatch to have someone contact the homicide detectives from 

the 39th district to determine whether the witness was available 

for a show-up. 

Officer Cohn and Detective Nordo transported Ms. Sanford to 

the 1700 block of 17th Street to see if she could identify 

[Appellant] as the perpetrator. Ms. Sanford identified 

[Appellant] as the actor in the robbery-stabbing. 

...

Officer Edward Fidler of the Crime Scene Unit testified 

regarding the evidence recovered at the crime scene. ... Officer 

Fidler found blood both inside and outside 2813 North Bambrey 

street. Inside the property were droplets of blood spanning the 

distance from the area near the first floor door up to the second 

floor room. The blood found outside was located on the sidewalk 

up the block near the corner. Officer Fidler testified that the 

blood outside the residence appeared to be aspirated blood, 

meaning blood which had been spit up by someone on the 

sidewalk. According to Officer Fidler, the blood outside the 

residence contained saliva and air bubbles and was shaped in a 

manner to suggest that the blood had been projected, rather 

than dripped, to the ground. All the blood samples were 

collected, placed on a property receipt and sent to the Forensic 

Laboratory for testing. 

Lynn Haimowitz testified as an expert in DNA analysis and 

forensic science. Ms. Haimowitz detailed the results of the 

report which analyzed three blood samples from within 2813 

North Bambrey Street and two samples outside - the first on the 

porch and the second on the sidewalk in front of 2805 North 

Bambrey Street. Comparing the DNA profiles developed from 

the blood against two buccal swabs from the decedent and 

[Appellant], two of the three samples within the residence were 

determined, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, to be 

that of the decedent. The third sample found inside 2813 North 

Bambrey Street resulted in no DNA. As for the two samples 

found outside the residence, both samples produced a partial 

DNA profile from the same unknown male, the person being 

neither the decedent nor [Appellant]. 
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 12/30/14, at 3-8 (citations to the record 

omitted).

Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of second-degree 

murder and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC). Appellant was 

acquitted of first-degree murder. On May 20, 2014, the court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of life imprisonment, without the possibility 

of parole. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and also complied with 

the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. The trial court subsequently filed a detailed Rule 

1925(a) opinion. Herein, Appellant presents two issues for our review:

[(1)] Did the [trial] court commit[] an abuse of discretion by 

denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss?

[(2)] Did the [trial] court commit an abuse of discretion by 

granting the Commonwealth’s [Rule] 404(b) motion?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant first challenges the court’s denial of his pretrial, Rule 600 

motion to dismiss the charges against him. Our scope and standard of 

review for such claims is well-settled:

In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial 

court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is 

abused.

The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 
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the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court 

is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. 

Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the 

protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. 

...

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a 

manner consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. 

In considering these matters ..., courts must carefully factor into 

the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 

accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous 

law enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en 

banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc)).

Rule 600(A)(2)(a) requires that trial commence within 365 days of the 

filing of the written complaint.1

The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial 

must commence under [Rule 600]. It is calculated by 

adding 365 days (the time for commencing trial under 

[Rule 600]) to the date on which the criminal complaint is 

filed. As discussed herein, the mechanical run date can be 

modified or extended by adding to the date any periods of 

time in which delay is caused by the defendant. Once the 

mechanical run date is modified accordingly, it then 

becomes an adjusted run date.

____________________________________________

1 Rule 600 was revised in 2012, and the current version of the rule became 

effective on July 1, 2013, prior to Appellant’s filing of his pretrial motion to 

dismiss.
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If the defendant's trial commences prior to the adjusted run 

date, we need go no further.

Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102 (internal citation and footnote omitted).

Here, the Commonwealth filed two written criminal complaints against 

Appellant; the first was filed on January 24, 2010, and withdrawn on 

November 10, 2010. A second criminal complaint was filed on May 17, 

2013. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

calculating the mechanical run date from the date on which the 

Commonwealth filed the second criminal complaint, rather than from the 

date on which the first complaint was filed. 

[W]hen a trial court is faced with multiple identical criminal 

complaints, it must first determine whether the Commonwealth 

intended to evade Rule 600's timeliness requirements by 

withdrawing or having nolle prossed the charges. If the 

prosecution attempted to circumvent Rule 600, then the 

mechanical run date starts from the filing of the initial complaint, 

and the time between the dismissal of one complaint and the refiling of the second complaint is counted against the 

Commonwealth. However, where the prosecution has not 

attempted to end run around the rule, and a competent 

authority properly dismissed the case, the court must next 

decide if the Commonwealth was duly diligent in its prosecution 

of the matter. Where the prosecution was diligent, the inquiry 

ends and the appropriate run date for purposes of Rule 600 

begins when the Commonwealth files the subsequent complaint.

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1141 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc).

Appellant does not argue that the Commonwealth withdrew the initial 

complaint in an attempt to evade Rule 600. Instead, he contends that the 

Commonwealth did not act with due diligence in prosecuting that complaint 
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and, thus, the mechanical run date must commence from the filing of the 

first complaint. After careful review, we disagree. 

The trial court set forth the pertinent procedural history underlying 

Appellant’s Rule 600 claim, as follows:

[T]he criminal complaint was filed the day of the murder, 

January 24th, 2010; after several continuances, the listing for 

November 10, 2010 was listed as “must be tried, no further 

continuances”; the Commonwealth withdrew the complaint on 

November 10, 2010; the Defendant was arrested again on April 

18, 2013; and the criminal complaint in this case was refiled on 

May 17, 2013.

Detective Donald Marano (Homicide Unit) testified at the pretrial 

motion hearing. Detective Marano was the lead detective 

handling the case.... On three separate dates - March 23, May 

19 and September 15 of 2010 - the Commonwealth requested 

continuances in the case because the only person capable of 

identifying [Appellant], Ms. Sanford, failed to appear. 

Detective Marano testified that Ms. Sanford failed to 

appear for the three listed court dates. According to Detective 

Marano, efforts to locate Ms. Sanford were sparse between 

March 23, 2010 and November 5, 2010, five days before the 

final listing. One of the few steps attempted by the police 

occurred on May 19, 2010, the second listed hearing date. On 

May 19, 2010, two detectives, Detectives Byard and Kane, 

traveled to a Sellersville, Bucks County address on record for Ms. 

Sanford to transport her to the proceeding and to serve a 

subpoena. When the detectives told Ms. Sanford that they 

would be transporting her to the preliminary hearing, Ms. 

Sanford refused allegedly because of the lack of a child seat in 

the police car for her infant child. Detective Marano testified at 

this hearing regarding the statements Ms. Sanford made to both 

detectives during this incident. The only other activity prior to 

November 5, 2010 was one other trip, made by Detective 

Marano at some point prior to the September 15th hearing, 

wherein he traveled to Sellersville to locate Ms. Sanford at a 

rehab in the area. Detective Marano did not know if Ms. Sanford 

ever received a subpoena for the September 15, 2010 hearing. 
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Roughly a month before the November 10, 2010 hearing, 

Detective Marano was informed by the prior Assistant District 

Attorney handling this case that Ms. Sanford had left her two 

messages on her voicemail. Both voicemail messages were 

played for the court. In essence, the voicemail messages 

evidenced Ms. Sanford's intent to avoid testifying. The first 

voicemail message left by Ms. Sanford was not time-stamped, 

but it was referenced in Ms. Sanford's second voicemail. The 

second voicemail was time-stamped; the message was left on 

September 15, 2010.

Five days before the last scheduled hearing, the Honorable 

Benjamin Lerner signed an order declaring Mr. [sic] Sanford a 

material witness. On November 8, 2010, Detective Marano 

placed phone calls with four separate numbers that were listed 

for Ms. Sanford. Detective Marano left messages at two of the 

numbers, but the calls were never returned. On November 9, 

2010, Detective Marano, along with Detective Kane, traveled to 

the Sellersville residence where the detectives had previously 

found Ms. Sanford. Interviews with residents and workers of the 

complex determined that Ms. Sanford had vacated her 

apartment five weeks prior. The detectives spoke with the 

apartment manager who informed them that Ms. Sanford was 

working at Doylestown Hospital, to the best of his knowledge. 

The detectives traveled to Doylestown Hospital; at the hospital[,] 

the detectives learned that Ms. Sanford had been offered 

employment, but failed to show up for one day of work. From 

there, the detectives traveled to the home belonging to Ms. 

Sanford's mother. The detectives also traveled to areas where 

Ms. Sanford was known to be when in the midst of her drug 

affliction. 

Detective Marano prepared wanted posters and had them 

sent to three separate districts. Detective Marano also flagged 

Ms. Sanford's criminal record, attached a[] [National Crime 

Information Center (NCIC)] person of interest flag to the missing 

person report for her in another database, and placed the 

wanted posters on two fugitive walls in the precinct waiting area. 

On November 10, 2010, the detectives again went to the 

residence of Ms. Sanford's mother to see if Ms. Sanford had 

shown up. All results were negative and the case was withdrawn 

on November 10, 2010. 

[On] or about April 9, 2013, Officer Alex Montanez noticed 

the wanted poster and spoke with one of the detectives from the 
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homicide unit; on April 12, 2013, Officer Montanez found Ms. 

Sanford and brought her in on the material witness warrant. 

TCO at 8-11 (footnotes and citations to the record omitted).

Appellant avers that the above-stated facts show that the 

Commonwealth failed to take “even the most basic of steps” to locate Ms. 

Sanford. Appellant’s Brief at 22. He discusses several “reasonable and 

conventional means” that the Commonwealth could have undertaken to 

secure Ms. Sanford’s presence at the preliminary hearing, such as those 

done in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 591 A.2d 734 (Pa. Super. 1991), and 

Commonwealth v. Laurie, 483 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super. 1984). In Ingram, 

we held that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence where police 

officers attempted to serve an arrest warrant at Ingram’s last known 

address; talked with his mother about the possibility that Ingram had left 

town; entered Ingram’s name into criminal databases; and had officers look 

for Ingram while on daily patrol in his neighborhood. Id. at 737. In Laurie, 

we concluded that police acted diligently in attempting to locate and arrest 

Laurie where they immediately obtained an arrest warrant; contacted 

numerous members of Laurie’s family; contacted utility companies when 

discovering Laurie may have relocated to a different state; placed an 

advertisement with a photograph and physical description of Laurie in local 

newspapers where police officers thought he may be; and placed Laurie’s 

name in the NCIC and the Philadelphia Crime Information Center (PCIC) to 

“circulate throughout the country and state that [Laurie was] wanted in 

Pennsylvania.” Id. at 891. 
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Appellant claims that the present case is distinguishable from Ingram 

and Laurie. He stresses that here, the Commonwealth did not immediately 

file a “material witness petition” for Ms. Sanford’s arrest; it did not contact 

utility companies or the probation office to find Ms. Sanford; and it did not 

have police visit “locations where [Ms. Sanford] might be found....” 

Appellant’s Brief at 25, 26. Appellant asserts that instead of undertaking a 

diligent search for Ms. Sanford, the Commonwealth relied “solely on the 

serendipitous chance that [Ms. Sanford] would be apprehended as a result of 

the addition of her name to computer [databases] and the hanging of a 

wanted poster.” Id. at 26. Appellant also attacks the efforts made to locate 

Ms. Sanford in the years between the withdrawal of the initial complaint and 

the refiling of the second complaint. He argues that, “[o]ther than 

testimony that police visited specific addresses prior to the dismissal of the 

first complaint, [the] Commonwealth presented no evidence that it did so 

thereafter.” Id. Appellant maintains that “at its core, the evidence 

presented at the Rule 600 hearing demonstrated that the Commonwealth did 

not exercise due diligence.” Id. 

In response, the Commonwealth first emphasizes that in Ingram and 

Laurie, the Commonwealth was searching for a criminal defendant, against 

whom charges had been filed. To the contrary, here, the Commonwealth 

was attempting to find a witness. As the Commonwealth explains, this 

distinction undercuts Appellant’s argument that the Commonwealth should 

have immediately obtained an arrest warrant for Ms. Sanford:
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Ms. Sanford was a witness, not a criminal. She was the sole 

identifying witness; she did not stab the victim in the heart. 

That the police did not immediately obtain a material witness 

warrant and take her into custody at the first sign that she was 

reluctant to testify was eminently reasonable, and properly 

informed the trial court’s ruling. See [] Peterson, 19 A.3d [at] 

1137 ... (due diligence requires the Commonwealth to “put forth 

reasonable effort,” not “perfect vigilance and punctilious care”).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. The Commonwealth also notes that placing an 

advertisement in the newspaper with Ms. Sanford’s photograph and/or 

identifying information may “have endangered Ms. Sanford, who was a 

witness, not an accused....” Id. at 24 n.4.

Additionally, the Commonwealth avers that the majority of Appellant’s 

argument incorrectly focuses on what the Commonwealth should have done, 

rather than what it did do. As this Court stated in Laurie, “the focus of our 

inquiry is on what was done, not with what should have been done.” 

Laurie, 483 A.2d at 892. Upon examining the efforts undertaken by the 

Commonwealth to locate Ms. Sanford and prosecute the initial criminal 

complaint against Appellant, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. In 

particular, police officers went to Ms. Sanford’s home before the hearing on 

May 19, 2010, yet Ms. Sanford refused to accompany them to court. Before 

the next scheduled hearing date on September 15, 2010, a detective went to 

a rehabilitation facility to find Ms. Sanford, but was unable to locate her. Ms. 

Sanford called the district attorney and left two messages on or before the 

September 15th hearing stating that she intended to avoid testifying. 
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Before the next scheduled hearing on November 10, 2010, the 

Commonwealth increased its efforts to locate Ms. Sanford. Namely, it 

obtained a material witness warrant to take Ms. Sanders into custody; called 

various phone numbers listed for her; visited Ms. Sanford’s residence and 

her place of employment; interviewed residents and workers of her 

apartment complex, as well as the apartment manager; spoke with Ms. 

Sanford’s mother; and traveled to areas where Ms. Sanford was known to 

frequent when she was using narcotics. Additionally, police flagged Ms. 

Sanford’s criminal record, put notices in criminal databases indicating that 

she was a person of interest, and placed wanted posters in several precincts. 

Based on these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that the Commonwealth acted with due diligence in prosecuting 

the initial criminal complaint against Appellant. It was beyond the 

Commonwealth’s control that Ms. Sanford was reluctant to testify and 

evaded the Commonwealth’s attempts to locate her and secure her presence 

at the preliminary hearing. Because the Commonwealth exercised due 

diligence before withdrawing the initial complaint, it is irrelevant whether it 

acted diligently between that withdrawal and the refiling of the second 

complaint. See Peterson, 19 A.3d at 1141 (“Where the Commonwealth 

exercises due diligence in prosecuting the original complaint, the time period 

between the dismissal of the first complaint and the re-filing of the second 

complaint is irrelevant for purposes of Rule 600 and the Commonwealth is 

only required to re-file within the applicable statute of limitations.”). 
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Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Appellant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by granting the 

Commonwealth’s pretrial motion to admit evidence of his prior bad acts 

under Pa.R.E. 404(b). That rule states, in pertinent part:

(b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other 

act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order 

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for 

another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this 

evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the 

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2). 

It is well-settled that,

[o]n appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court, 

our standard of review is limited. A trial court's decision will not 

be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth

v. Bishop, 936 A.2d 1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498 (Pa. Super. 2005)). 

“Abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but 

rather where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where 

the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action 

is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(quoting Commonwealth v. King, 959 A.2d 405, 411 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 

Additionally, in regard to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence,

our Supreme Court has explained:
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Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal 

activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in 

conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity. 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of prior bad acts may be 

admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such 

as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, and absence of mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). 

In determining whether evidence of other prior bad acts is 

admissible, the trial court is obliged to balance the probative 

value of such evidence against its prejudicial impact. 

Commonwealth v. Powell, 598 Pa. 224, 956 A.2d 406, 419 

(2008).

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009).

At the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to introduce 

prior bad acts evidence, the Commonwealth explained the two prior bad acts 

it sought to introduce. First, it described a knife attack by Appellant on 

Jacob Bowling, which occurred approximately one month before the stabbing 

of Mr. Worthy. The Commonwealth explained that attack, and the 

similarities between it and the present case, as follows:

[The Commonwealth]: Mr. Bowling was staying at an apartment 

with a friend and [Appellant] and Mr. Bowling’s friend had a 

verbal argument and Mr. Bowling intervened and basically 

quashed the argument.

At that point, [Appellant] left. Mr. Bowling woke up and he 

was being stabbed about his torso with a knife by [Appellant]. 

He jumps up to try to get away from [Appellant] and [Appellant] 

stabs him in the heart. So Mr. Bowling is also stabbed in the 

heart. [Appellant] flees. Mr. Bowling convinces someone in the 

apartment to take him for help. ... [H]e wakes up several days 

later in the hospital.

So that’s the 2009 stabbing, exactly one month prior to 

the murder in this case. Mr. Bowling’s injuries are also 

consistent with a small knife having been used.

So for [the stabbing of Mr. Bowling in] 2009 and [the 

stabbing of Mr. Worthy in] 2010, we have an argument. The 
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victim intervenes on behalf of the person [Appellant] is arguing 

with. [Appellant] stabs the victim in the chest with a small knife. 

And in both cases it’s not just stabbing him in the chest, it’s 

stabbing the victim in the heart, thereby causing either death or 

serious bodily injury in both of those circumstances.

N.T. Hearing, 5/6/14, at 35-37.

The second prior bad act the Commonwealth sought to introduce was 

a knife attack on Sonya Cabiness that occurred approximately two years 

after the stabbing of Mr. Worthy. The Commonwealth described that prior 

bad act, and its similarities to the present case, as follows:

[The Commonwealth:] With respect to the 2012 incident, the 

victim in that case is the then[-]girlfriend of [Appellant]. Her 

name is Sonya Cabiness.... [Appellant] and she have a verbal 

dispute. She attempts to walk away from him. He grabs her by 

the jacket and stabs her in the chest and then says, “That’s 

right, bitch, I will kill you.” He fled the scene and the victim 

called 911 and reported the crime. 

In that case also, a small knife was used to stab Ms. 

Cabiness in the chest. She did not sustain serious bodily injury 

as a result of that stabbing. 

Id. at 37.2

____________________________________________

2 We note that the testimony that Mr. Bowling and Ms. Cabiness gave at trial 

differed from the Commonwealth’s description of their attacks in several key 

regards. For instance, Ms. Cabiness did not testify that she was stabbed in 

the chest or heart during Appellant’s assault; instead, she stated that when 

Appellant attacked her, he swung his arm “towards the middle of her chest 

slightly on the right side of her body” causing “a little slash” on her chest. 

N.T. Trial, 5/16/14, at 102-103. Additionally, while Mr. Bowling testified that

the knife Appellant used was “[a] steak knife[,]” it was not a small knife as 

the Commonwealth asserted. Id. at 123. Mr. Bowling stated that it was 

“[o]ne of the long ones[,]” and with his hands approximated the knife to be 

about 18 inches long. Id. While we point out the differences between the 

Commonwealth’s offer of proof at the pretrial hearing, and the testimony 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Commonwealth argued before the trial court, and reiterates on 

appeal, that the prior bad acts evidence involving Mr. Bowling and Ms. 

Cabiness was admissible to prove Appellant’s identity as the individual who 

stabbed Mr. Worthy, and also to show Appellant’s intent to kill Mr. Worthy. 

The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and granted its motion to 

admit the testimony of Mr. Bowling and Ms. Cabiness for these purposes. 

See N.T. Trial, 5/16/14, at 97 (trial court’s instructing jury that Mr. 

Bowling’s and Ms. Cabiness’ testimony was being offered for the limited 

purposes of showing that Appellant was “the person who stabbed William 

Worthy and to prove ... his intent in stabbing Mr. Worthy”). 

Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

deciding to admit this prior bad acts evidence for the purpose of proving his 

identity as the person who stabbed Mr. Worthy. In Commonwealth v. 

Shively, 424 A.2d 1257 (Pa. 1981), our Supreme Court held that evidence 

of prior crimes may be admissible,

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

actually presented at trial, Appellant did not object at trial or seek the 

court’s reconsideration of the admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence in 

light of Mr. Bowling’s and Ms. Cabiness’ trial testimony. He also does not 

argue on appeal that the court should have precluded the prior bad acts 

evidence upon hearing the testimony of these two witnesses at trial. 

Instead, he frames his issue as a challenge to the court’s pretrial ruling on 

the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, and only discusses the prior bad acts 

evidence as summarized by the Commonwealth during the pretrial 

proceeding. Thus, we will limit our review to the record of the pretrial 

hearing. 
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to prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in 

method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused. 

Here, much more is demanded than the mere repeated 

commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated 

burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so unusual and 

distinctive as to be like a signature.

Id. at 1259 (citation omitted). “Required, therefore, is such a high 

correlation in the details of the crimes that proof that a person committed 

one of them makes it very unlikely that anyone else committed the others.” 

Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In comparing the methods and circumstances of separate 

crimes, a court must necessarily look for similarities in a number 

of factors, including: (1) the manner in which the crimes were 

committed; (2) weapons used; (3) ostensible purpose of the 

crime; (4) location; and (5) type of victims. Remoteness in time 

between the crimes is also factored, although its probative value 

has been held inversely proportional to the degree of similarity 

between crimes. 

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the Commonwealth argued at the pretrial hearing that the 

manner in which the crimes were committed was similar because all were “a 

close personal encounter between [Appellant] and somebody following a 

verbal altercation.” N.T. Hearing, 5/6/14, at 38-39. The Commonwealth 

stressed that in all three cases, the weapon used was a knife. Id. at 39. In 

regard to location, the Commonwealth argued that 

[i]n all of these cases, the incident happen[ed] either ... inside ... 

where the victim was staying or residing, or very close to the 

victim’s residence. [Ms.] Cabiness was stabbed just outside of 

her home. She was attempting to get away from [Appellant]. 

She was stabbed on the street. Mr. Bowling and Mr. Worthy 
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were both stabbed ... in the place where they were residing at 

the time. 

Id. The Commonwealth also discussed the similarities between the victims 

in each incident, stating that they all “share something in common, which is 

they are people that challenged [Appellant] in some way during a verbal 

altercation and [Appellant] responds by use of deadly force.” Id. 

While we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant’s three 

offenses do have some similarities, we cannot overlook the significant 

differences in the stabbing attacks. First, the manner in which each attack 

occurred varied. For instance, in Mr. Bowling’s stabbing, Appellant left after 

the argument, and later returned to stab Mr. Bowling. This is markedly 

different from Appellant’s stabbing of Mr. Worthy and Ms. Cabiness in the 

midst of altercations with them. Additionally, Mr. Bowling was stabbed while 

he was sleeping, while Mr. Worthy and Ms. Cabiness were stabbed during 

physical scuffles with Appellant. 

Further, as Appellant points out, the altercation between Appellant and 

Mr. Worthy began over drugs, yet there was no indication that drugs were 

involved in either of the other disputes. Instead, Appellant’s argument with 

Ms. Cabiness involved a domestic issue, and Mr. Bowling was not even 

arguing with Appellant at all – instead, he broke up a fight between 

Appellant and a third-party.

We also point out that the injuries sustained by Mr. Bowling and Mr. 

Worthy were significantly different than the single, non-serious injury 

inflicted upon Ms. Cabiness. While the trial court emphasized that all three 
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victims were “stabbed in the chest by [a] knife[,]” Ms. Cabiness only 

suffered one single superficial wound, while Mr. Worthy and Mr. Bowling 

were stabbed at least twice and were both seriously wounded.

In regard to the location of the three attacks, the Commonwealth’s 

argument that the stabbings are similar because they occurred in, or near, a 

residence of some sort is weak, at best. Ms. Cabiness was attacked on the 

street, Mr. Bowling was stabbed in his friend’s apartment, and Mr. Worthy 

was stabbed in his own home. Moreover, as Appellant points out, the 

incidents “took place in different areas across Philadelphia.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 37. Thus, the locations of Appellant’s attacks varied.

There are also notable differences in the purposes of the three attacks. 

The Commonwealth alleged that Appellant stabbed Mr. Worthy during the 

course of a drug-related robbery. See N.T. Trial, 5/13/14, at 139-140 

(Commonwealth’s stating in opening remarks that Appellant killed Mr. 

Worthy during a robbery). Ms. Cabiness, however, was stabbed during a 

domestic dispute and, apparently, Mr. Bowling was stabbed simply in 

retaliation for his breaking up an altercation between Appellant and another 

individual. Thus, Appellant’s purposes for the stabbings were distinct –

robbery, domestic dispute, and retaliation. Relatedly, his victims were 

dissimilar; Ms. Cabiness was his girlfriend, Mr. Bowling was essentially an 

acquaintance of Appellant, and Mr. Worthy was a drug dealer who sold 

Appellant crack cocaine. 
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Finally, the remoteness in time between Appellant’s attack on Mr. 

Bowling and Mr. Worthy, and his assault of Ms. Cabiness, was approximately 

two years, which weighs in favor of excluding that prior bad act. 

In sum, the three attacks have significant differences. Namely, there 

was a delay between Appellant’s argument in the presence of Mr. Bowling 

and his attack on Mr. Bowling later that night. In that case, Appellant 

entered the apartment in which Mr. Bowling was staying, and stabbed Mr. 

Bowling while he was sleeping. Appellant’s motive in that attack appeared 

to be retaliation for Mr. Bowling’s involvement in Appellant’s altercation with 

a third-party. In Mr. Worthy’s attack a month later, Appellant was 

attempting to rob Mr. Worthy, in Mr. Worthy’s own home, after a drug-sale 

gone wrong. Appellant argued with Mr. Worthy, the two men physically 

scuffled, and Appellant stabbed Mr. Worthy in the midst of the altercation. 

Two years later, Appellant had a domestic dispute with Ms. Cabiness on the 

street and inflicted a single, non-serious knife wound to her chest. 

These substantial differences compel us to conclude that Appellant’s 

attacks do not demonstrate “any particular distinctive pattern of behavior 

by” Appellant. Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 102 (Pa. Super. 

2012). While to be sure, Appellant committed “crimes of the same class” by 

stabbing each victim in the chest, our Supreme Court made clear in Shively

that “much more is demanded” for prior bad acts evidence to meet the 

identity exception of Rule 404(b). Shively, 424 A.2d at 1259; see also 

Ross, 57 A.3d at 102 (concluding that the commission of several physical 
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and/or sexual assaults, accompanied by the use of foreign objects, merely 

demonstrated, at most, “the commission of crimes or conduct ‘of the same 

general class[,]’” and were “far from satisfying the Shively standard of 

being so “unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature”). Thus, the court 

erred by admitting evidence of these prior bad acts for the purpose of 

proving Appellant’s identity as the person who stabbed Mr. Worthy.

Next, we must assess whether the prior bad acts evidence was 

admissible to prove Appellant’s intent. The Commonwealth argues that 

because Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, which requires 

proof of intent to kill, the court properly admitted the prior bad acts evidence 

because “[t]he Bowling and Cabiness stabbings prove that [Appellant] did 

not accidentally stab the victim in the heart, but that he could, where he 

desired, intentionally plunge a short knife into the victim’s heart or refrain 

from doing so. The evidence therefore made it far more likely that he 

intended to kill the victim when he stabbed him in the heart, and far less 

likely that it was an unintended result.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 37. 

Appellant, however, contends that the prior bad acts evidence was 

irrelevant to prove intent because: (1) he did not assert a defense of 

accident, mistake, or lack of intent; and (2) the requisite intent to kill was 

demonstrated by the fact that a deadly weapon was used on a vital part of 

the victim’s body. In support of his argument, Appellant relies on Ross, 

where we rejected a similar argument as that made by the Commonwealth 

herein. Specifically, the Commonwealth in Ross contended “that because 
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Ross was charged with first-degree murder, which requires intentional 

conduct, that his state of mind was at issue.” Id. at 101. This Court 

disagreed “that intent was at issue” in Ross, explaining:

Intent is a mental state that can be inferred from conduct. 

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 301 Pa. Super. 121, 447 A.2d 

272, 274 (1982). Given the circumstances surrounding Miller’s 

murder, including the mutilation of the body, the use of duct 

tape, and the bite mark on her breast, there can be no question 

that this was an intentional killing. Ross’ only defense was that 

he was not the perpetrator, and he did not raise any defense of 

accident, mistake, or lack of required intent. Accordingly, prior 

bad acts testimony should not have been permitted with regard 

to intent.

Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).

Here, as in Ross, Appellant claimed that he was not the person who 

stabbed Mr. Worthy; he did not aver that he stabbed Mr. Worthy accidentally 

or without the intent to kill. Indeed, such an argument would have been 

futile considering that Mr. Worthy was clearly stabbed with a deadly weapon 

(a knife) in a vital part of his body (the heart), thereby allowing the jury to 

infer that his attacker had the intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. 

Packard, 767 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating “specific intent 

[to kill] may reasonably be inferred from an accused’s use of a deadly 

weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body”) (citation omitted).3 Therefore, 

____________________________________________

3

In any event, even if the prior bad acts evidence was admissible to prove 

intent, we would conclude that the prejudicial impact of that evidence 

outweighed the minimal probative value it held, considering that it was 

cumulative evidence of Appellant’s intent to kill.
J-S15008-16

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as we concluded in Ross, Appellant’s intent was not at issue in the present 

case. Consequently, the court erred by admitting evidence of Appellant’s 

prior bad acts to demonstrate his intent to kill.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

determined that the prior bad acts evidence was admissible to prove 

Appellant’s identity and/or intent. While we typically would go on to assess 

whether the admission of this evidence was harmless error, the 

Commonwealth does not meaningfully develop any argument in that regard, 

presumably because the circumstantial evidence against Appellant was not 

exceptionally strong. Accordingly, the Commonwealth has failed to 

demonstrate that a new trial is not warranted. See Commonwealth v. 

Brooker, 103 A.3d 325, 332 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating it is the 

Commonwealth’s burden to establish that the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt). Therefore, we reverse Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

and remand for a new trial, where the prior bad acts evidence shall not be 

admitted against Appellant.

Judgment of sentence reversed. Case remanded for further 

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2016