2020 IL App (3d) 190159

Opinion filed July 16, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

LANDMARKS ILLINOIS, NATIONAL )

TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, ) 

ROCK ISLAND PRESERVATION SOCIETY, ) 

MOLINE PRESERVATION SOCIETY, ) 

BROADWAY HISTORIC DISTRICT ) 

ASSOCIATION, FREDERICK SHAW, and ) 

DIANE OESTREICH, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

THE ROCK ISLAND COUNTY BOARD, and ) 

THE ROCK ISLAND COUNTY PUBLIC ) 

BUILDING COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

Defendants-Appellees. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 14th Judicial Circuit, 

Rock Island County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-19-0159 

Circuit No. 2019-CH-40 

Honorable 

Jodi M. Hoos, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

 JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Carter and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 This action was brought to halt the demolition of the Rock Island County courthouse 

(courthouse), which the plaintiffs claim the defendants are attempting to accomplish in violation 

of the law. The courthouse was constructed in 1896 and opened in 1897. After constructing new 

courtrooms and other judicial facilities as an annex to the nearby Rock Island County jail
2 

(Annex), defendants Rock Island County Board (the Board) and Rock Island County Public 

Building Commission (PBC) entered into an intergovernmental agreement to demolish the 

courthouse. In order to complete the demolition project, the defendants must obtain a permit from 

the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) to discharge stormwater associated with the 

demolition site. 

¶ 2 The Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR), which has filed an amicus brief in 

support of the plaintiffs’ position in this appeal, has determined that the courthouse is eligible for 

listing on the National Register of Historic Places and is therefore a “historic resource” triggering 

the protections of the Illinois State Agency Historic Resources Preservation Act (Preservation 

Act) (20 ILCS 3420/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Pursuant to the Preservation Act’s requirements, the 

IDNR initiated a consultation process with the IEPA to discuss alternatives to the proposed 

demolition that could eliminate, minimize, or mitigate the adverse impact that the demolition 

would have upon a historic resource. The IDNR directed the defendants to halt the planned 

demolition until that consultation process has been completed. The defendants defied the IDNR’s

directive and announced their intention to proceed with the demolition immediately.

¶ 3 Plaintiffs Landmarks Illinois, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Rock 

Island Preservation Society, the Moline Preservation Society, the Broadway Historic District 

Association, Frederick Shaw (Shaw), and Diane Oestreich (Oestreich) are local and national 

organizations and individuals “who appreciate (or whose members appreciate) the cultural, 

aesthetic, and historic value of the Historic Courthouse.” Plaintiffs Illinois Landmarks and Shaw 

are also owners of bonds issued by the PBC for the construction of the Annex, the proceeds of 

which the defendants intend to use to finance the demolition. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in 

the circuit court of Rock Island County seeking declarative relief, a temporary restraining order 
3 

(TRO), and an injunction halting the demolition. They alleged that the defendants’ plan to 

demolish the courthouse violated two Illinois statutes—the Preservation Act and the Public 

Building Commission Act (Commission Act) (50 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West 2016))—and the 

PBC’s covenants with plaintiff bondholders Illinois Landmarks and Shaw. 

¶ 4 The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint under section 2-615 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)), arguing that the allegations in

the plaintiffs’ complaint failed as a matter of law because the planned demolition of the 

courthouse was immune from the Preservation Act, did not violate the Commission Act, and did 

not breach the PBC’s bond covenants with Illinois Landmarks and Shaw. The Board also moved 

to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)), 

arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims against the defendants. 

¶ 5 On March 19, 2019, the trial court issued an oral ruling denying the defendants’ section 

2-619 motion to dismiss for lack of standing but granting the defendants’ section 2-615 motions 

to dismiss all of the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim. The circuit court granted 

plaintiffs Illinois Landmarks and Shaw leave to replead their bond claims but barred any future 

claims seeking equitable relief under the Preservation Act or the Commission Act. The plaintiffs 

asked the trial court to keep the TRO in place for seven days while they decided whether to file 

an appeal. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request. Two days later, the plaintiffs filed an 

interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(d) (eff. 

Nov. 1, 2017)) and an emergency petition to stay the trial court’s order pending resolution of the 

appeal. 

¶ 6 On March 22, 2019, we granted the plaintiffs’ emergency petition for stay. That same 

day, the trial court issued a written order memorializing its dismissal of counts I, II, and III of the 
4 

plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. The trial court’s written order included a finding, pursuant 

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)), that “an appeal may be taken from its 

final judgment on counts I, II, and III because there [was] no just reason for delaying an appeal.” 

Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal appealing the court’s written judgment order 

and asked this Court to consolidate that appeal with their prior Rule 307(d) interlocutory appeal. 

¶ 7 On April 1, 2019, we granted plaintiffs’ Rule 307(d) petition and ordered that both the 

stay that we had previously entered and the TRO issued by the trial court would remain in full 

force and effect until we have issued a decision on the appeal at issue in this case.

¶ 8 FACTS

¶ 9 The following facts are taken from the allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint and 

documents attached to the complaint. The PBC was established by the Board on October 1, 1981, 

for the “sole purpose *** of exercising the powers and authority of [the Commission Act] to 

provide a good and sufficient jail for the use of Rock Island County.” In or around 1998, the 

PBC added courtrooms to the Rock Island County jail building in a facility that was referred to 

as the jail’s “Justice Center.” 

¶ 10 In 2013, the Board sought to build a new courthouse and administration center as an 

annex to the jail and Justice Center. Acknowledging that building a courthouse and county 

administration center was outside the scope of the PBC’s existing authorization, the Board 

planned a referendum asking local citizens to expand the PBC’s authority so that it could legally 

build the proposed Annex. An informational voter guide on the proposed referendum stated that 

the county could not use the existing PBC to build the proposed Annex because (1) “[w]hen this 

PBC was established in the 1980s, it was limited to just jail purposes.—That has severely limited 

[the county’s] ability to repair/replace the aging courthouse”; (2) “[a] Courthouse and County 
5 

Administration Center are outside the scope of the present PBC authorization”; and (3) “[i]t takes 

voter approval to expand the scope of the PBC.” On April 9, 2013, the Board placed the question 

of whether to expand the powers of the PBC beyond the provision of a jail to the electorate at a 

referendum. The ballot provision read: 

“Shall the County Board of Rock Island County be authorized to expand the 

purpose of the Rock Island County Building Commission, Rock Island County, 

Illinois, to include all the powers and authority prescribed by the Public Building 

Commission Act?” 

The referendum failed to pass, with 61% of voters voting against the proposal. 

 

¶ 11 Following the failure of the referendum, the Board passed a resolution on June 17, 2015, 

authorizing the PBC to build a new courthouse as an annex to the jail, which would include 

additional civil courtrooms, circuit clerk space, and a law library. The chief judge of the 

Fourteenth Judicial Circuit (Judge Walter Braud) subsequently appointed a special prosecutor to 

file a quo warranto lawsuit against the PBC within the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit (the 2015 

Litigation) in order to test whether the PBC had the authority to build the Annex pursuant to its 

original purpose of building a jail. 

¶ 12 In the 2015 Litigation, the circuit court of Henry County held that the Annex project was 

“within and consistent with” the PBC’s purpose of providing for a good and sufficient jail and 

was therefore within the scope of the PBC’s existing authority. In support of its ruling, the court 

found, inter alia, that (1) the PBC’s June 17, 2015, resolution for the construction of the Annex 

“is consistent with the previous actions taken by [the PBC] for the construction of the original 

Justice Center, which included the jail facilities and secure detention areas for transport and 

temporary confinement, and court security for proceedings in both civil and criminal matters”; 
6 

(2) the June 17, 2015, resolution “does not expand upon that purpose, but on the contrary, 

enhances it and is therefore a proper exercise of the authority under which the [PBC] was formed 

in 1981”; and (3) the June 17, 2015, resolution “does not contemplate a totally separate structure, 

but rather, one that is totally integrated and connected to the existing structure.” No appeal was 

taken from the circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 13 Although the circuit court’s order terminating the 2015 Litigation interpreted the PBC’s 

purpose, it did not address the defendants’ compliance with section 14(a)(2) of the Commission 

Act. That section provides that, where a public building commission selects and designates an 

“area” as the “site *** to be [used] for the erection, alteration or improvement of a building or 

buildings,” and the original resolution for the creation of the commission has been adopted by 

the governing body of the county, “the site or sites selected *** are subject to approval” either by 

three-fourths of the of the members of the governing body of the county seat or through an 

election referendum. 50 ILCS 20/14(a)(2) (West 2016).1

 Nor did the 2015 Litigation address 

whether the PBC had the authority to demolish the prior courthouse. That is not surprising 

because, at the time of the 2015 Litigation, no one had proposed that the PBC could or should 

demolish the old courthouse; the only issue presented in the 2015 Litigation was whether 

building the Annex was within the scope of the original resolution creating the PBC. 

¶ 14 In February 2016, the PBC issued public revenue bonds for the purpose of acquiring, 

constructing, improving, altering, equipping, repairing, maintaining, operating, and securing the 

Justice Center, including the construction of the Annex. 

1 The defendants did not seek approval of the Rock Island City Council (the governing body of 

the Rock Island County seat) before proceeding with the Annex project. 
7 

¶ 15 In July 2017, the Board passed a resolution finding that the courthouse was in a 

functional state of decrepitude. It also found that the county lacked the funds to rehabilitate the 

courthouse and that the county had not identified any realistic way to preserve the courthouse. 

The courthouse is located approximately 40 feet from the Justice Center and Annex. The Board 

found that demolishing the courthouse was “necessary for the maintenance and security” of the 

Justice Center and Annex. 

¶ 16 On July 17, 2017, the Board and the PBC entered into an intergovernmental agreement 

that provided that the courthouse’s current state of decrepitude and its lack of security posed a 

risk to the safety and maintenance of the adjacent Justice Center and Annex, as well as to those 

using it. For that reason, the Board found that the demolition of the courthouse fell within the 

“[p]roject scope requirements” of the Annex project. The intergovernmental agreement stated

that the county shall direct the PBC to demolish the courthouse once all county offices and 

functions ceased being conducted from the courthouse, “as approved by resolution passed by the 

*** Board.” Demolition was defined to include “the improvement of the site as necessary to 

protect the new Courthouse.” Regarding the county and PBC’s obligations under the 

Commission Act, the intergovernmental agreement found that the area for the PBC’s existing 

work on the Annex would be expanded to cover the location of the courthouse. The PBC would 

pay for the design of the demolition plan and site improvement, including all costs of 

construction and demolition, from funds available to it. If the PBC found that it lacked sufficient 

funds to accomplish this, it had the discretion to notify the county administrator, at which point 

the intergovernmental agreement would become ineffective. 

¶ 17 On November 9, 2017, Chief Judge Braud announced his intention to ask the PBC to 

demolish the courthouse using excess proceeds from the bonds that had been issued to finance 
8 

the Annex. The chief judge stated that if the PBC refused to “do what [he thought] need[ed] to be 

done,” he would issue “an administrative order to say, you will tear it down.” The chief judge 

maintained that he could issue such an order based on his authority as chief judge to “manage 

courthouses,” which, he indicated, meant that “he can build them, he can erect them, and he can 

tear them down.” 

¶ 18 On November 13, 2017, Chief Judge Braud sent a letter to the Board outlining his 

proposal and asking the Board to “respond favorably to [his] proposal on or before January 1, 

2018.” The chief judge indicated that “any delay past January 1 [would have] a cost associated 

with it, not in your favor,” because the chief judge would reallocate the $1.6 million in PBC 

bond funds he had set aside for the demolition. In his letter, the chief judge reiterated what he 

had said to the media one week earlier, namely, that he had the authority to administratively 

order the courthouse razed, but he preferred not to resort to “litigation to force [the Board and 

PBC] to pay for razing” the courthouse. 

¶ 19 On July 17, 2018, the Board approved the demolition of the courthouse and contracted 

with the PBC to undertake the demolition. The courthouse is adjacent to, but not within, the 

existing Justice Center and Annex. (As noted above, the courthouse is located approximately 40 

feet from the Annex.) The defendants did not seek or obtain approval from the Rock Island City 

Council or Rock Island voters for a new site before agreeing to undertake the demolition of the 

courthouse. 

¶ 20 On December 7, 2018, the PBC’s contractor, Missman Inc., wrote to the IDNR informing 

the agency that “[t]he [PBC] is now proposing the demolition of the Rock Island County Court 

House located at 210 15th Street in Rock Island” and is “requesting a determination as to 

whether the project has satisfied all applicable requirements of Illinois law with respect to 
9 

Historic Preservation.” On December 11, 2018, the defendants submitted a revised application to 

the IEPA for a permit to discharge stormwater associated with the demolition site, which the 

defendants were required to secure before proceeding with the demolition of the courthouse.2

The IEPA permit application form required the applicant to certify that it had submitted the 

project proposal to the “Historic Preservation Agency” (which the General Assembly has folded 

into the IDNR as part of the recent amendments to the Preservation Act) in compliance with 

Illinois law. The IEPA’s website states that no stormwater permits will be effective until a 

project has received “sign-off” from IDNR that the project complies with historic preservation 

laws. 

¶ 21 On December 11, 2018, the IDNR advised the PBC that the courthouse is a “historic 

resource” within the meaning of the Preservation Act and that the PBC’s proposed demolition 

would result in an adverse impact on a historical resource and was therefore subject to review 

under section 4 of the Preservation Act. The IDNR stated that the PBC should participate in the 

statutorily mandated consultation process between IDNR and IEPA to determine if there was a 

way to avoid the adverse effect (i.e., the demolition). The IDNR also directed the PBC not to 

conduct any demolition activities until the process prescribed by the Preservation Act was 

complete. However, on December 13, 2018, the PBC informed the IDNR that it did not believe 

that the courthouse was subject to the executive demands of the IDNR and that it planned to 

proceed with the demolition.

¶ 22 On January 25, 2019, Chief Judge Braud issued an administrative order directing the 

defendants to demolish the courthouse pursuant to his administrative authority as chief judge. In 

2 Under the terms of the IEPA’s general stormwater permit, an applicant submits a notice of 

intent (NOI) to use the permit, and the applicant may proceed to discharge stormwater 30 days after 

submitting the NOI unless the IEPA informs the applicant otherwise. 
10 

his administrative order, Chief Judge Braud made findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Specifically, Chief Judge Braud found that, given the close proximity of the courthouse to the 

Annex, it posed a security risk to judicial personnel and to those visiting the Annex. The chief 

judge also found that the courthouse’s condition of disrepair posed risks to those who would be 

in the area of the courthouse. The chief judge issued the administrative order without notice, 

without conducting a hearing, and without affording any party the opportunity to present 

evidence or legal argument. On February 8, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a petition to intervene in the 

administrative action and a motion to vacate the court’s administrative order. The Rock Island 

County Circuit Clerk’s office refused to accept the plaintiffs’ petition to intervene and motion to 

vacate, stating that there was no pending case in which the plaintiffs could intervene. 

¶ 23 On February 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their verified complaint in this action seeking a 

TRO halting the demolition of the courthouse. The complaint alleged that (1) the proposed 

demolition is subject to the Preservation Act and would violate that Act (count I), (2) the 

proposed demolition project violates the site approval requirements in the Commission Act

(count II) and falls outside the limited purpose of the PBC (count III), and (3) the PBC’s plan to 

use excess bond proceeds from the Annex project to pay for the demolition of the courthouse 

violates the Commission Act (count IV) and the PBC’s covenants with bondholders (counts V

through VI), which require the PBC to deposit all excess bond proceeds into a sinking fund 

dedicated solely to the retirement of the bonds. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the 

plaintiffs’ complaint under section 2-615. The Board also filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss 

the complaint for lack of standing. 

¶ 24 On March 8, 2019, the circuit court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and directed 

the defendants to refrain from demolishing the courthouse until the circuit court addressed the 
11 

defendants’ pending motions to dismiss. The circuit court held that the plaintiffs had 

demonstrated (1) a “clearly ascertainable right in need of protection,” (2) “irreparable harm” in 

the absence of a TRO, (3) that there was “no adequate remedy at law,” and (4) that plaintiffs had 

demonstrated a “likelihood of success” for purposes of obtaining a TRO. 

¶ 25 On March 19, 2019, after hearing arguments from the parties, the circuit court orally 

granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to section 2-615 

of the Code. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim under the Preservation Act (count I) 

because it found that the Preservation Act exempted local government agencies and their officers 

from its requirements and because IEPA’s granting a permit for stormwater drainage did not 

constitute an “undertaking” by a state agency subject to the Preservation Act. 

¶ 26 The trial court also dismissed counts II and III of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which asserted 

claims under the Commission Act. In dismissing count II, the court held that the PBC had the 

authority to demolish the courthouse under section 14(c) of the Commission Act, which 

authorizes a public building commission to “demolish, repair, alter, or improve any building or 

buildings within the area” that the commission had previously selected for a building project. In 

dismissing count III, the trial court found that the demolition of the courthouse would not 

constitute an unauthorized enlargement of the PBC’s purpose, even though the courthouse was 

not structurally connected to the jail or part of the physical site including the jail and the Annex, 

because (1) the 2015 Litigation had already determined that the PBC’s construction of the Annex 

(which included a new courthouse) was within the PBC’s purpose and authority to build a jail 

and (2) “common sense tells you if it is the purpose of the commission to building [sic] the new 

courthouse, how is it not the same purpose to tear the old one down?” 
12 

¶ 27 The trial court also dismissed counts IV through VI of the plaintiffs’ complaint (the bond 

agreement counts). Count IV alleged that the defendants had violated the Commission Act by 

using excess proceeds from the sale of the Annex bonds to finance the demolition of the 

courthouse and the construction of a park instead of transferring those monies into the sinking 

fund after the Annex was constructed and declared ready for occupancy. In count V, the plaintiff 

bondholders alleged that the PBC had breached the bond agreements by modifying the terms of 

the bond resolution to allow bond proceeds to be used to finance a demolition project separate 

and apart from the Annex project set forth the transaction documents. In count VI, the plaintiff 

bondholders alleged that the PBC had breached the bond agreements and associated transaction 

documents by misappropriating bond proceeds for a separate project rather than depositing such 

proceeds in the bond and interest fund. 

¶ 28 The court dismissed counts I, II, and III (claims brought under the Preservation Act and 

the Commission Act) with prejudice and dismissed counts IV through VI (the bond contract 

counts) without prejudice. Although the court granted the plaintiffs leave to replead the bond 

contract counts, it barred them from repleading any claims relating to the purpose of the PBC 

under the Commission Act. The circuit court dissolved the existing TRO because it determined 

that counts IV through VI, if repleaded, would have an adequate remedy at law. 

¶ 29 The plaintiffs orally moved the court to reconsider its order vacating the TRO and asked 

the court to leave the TRO in place for seven days while the plaintiffs decided whether to take an 

appeal. The defendants objected. The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion. 

¶ 30 On March 21, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s ruling 

dissolving the TRO pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(d) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) (appeal 

No. 3-19-0146), and an emergency petition to stay the circuit court’s March 19, 2019, order in its 
13 

entirety pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) pending appeal on the 

merits of the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint. On March 22, 2019, we granted 

the plaintiffs’ emergency petition to stay pending appeal. 

¶ 31 That same day, the circuit court entered a final written order memorializing its March 19, 

2019, oral ruling. The circuit court’s order included a written finding, pursuant to 304(a), that 

“an appeal may be taken from its final judgment on counts I, II, and III because there is no just 

reason for delaying an appeal.” Later that day, after the circuit court entered its written ruling 

(including its special finding pursuant to Rule 304(a)), plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal in 

this case (appeal No. 3-19-0159). 

¶ 32 On April 1, 2019, we granted plaintiffs’ Rule 307(d) petition and ordered that both the 

stay we had previously entered and the TRO issued by the circuit court shall remain “in full force 

and effect” until we have issued a decision in the instant appeal. 

¶ 33 ANALYSIS

¶ 34 The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss 

because the defendants’ proposed demolition of the courthouse violates both the Preservation 

Act and the Commission Act. Before reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ statutory claims, we 

must address two threshold issues raised by the defendants. The defendants contend that our 

appellate court “may” lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the circuit court 

did not issue its Rule 304(a) finding of immediate appealability until after the plaintiffs filed 

their initial notice of interlocutory appeal under Rule 307(d). In addition, the defendants maintain 

that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims in the circuit court. We address each of 

these issues in turn. 

¶ 35 1. Appellate Jurisdiction
14 

¶ 36 The defendants suggest that our appellate court “may lack jurisdiction” to decide this 

appeal under Rule 304 because the plaintiffs did not obtain a Rule 304(a) finding from the trial 

court until after they filed their notice of interlocutory appeal under Rule 307(d). The filing of an 

interlocutory appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to change or modify the interlocutory 

order that is on appeal or to make any ruling that would affect the subject matter or substance of 

that interlocutory order. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 162 

(1998); Brownlow v. Richards, 328 Ill. App. 3d 833, 836-37 (2002). The Board argues that the 

trial court’s addition of Rule 304(a) language to its written judgment order after the plaintiffs 

filed their Rule 307(d) notice of interlocutory appeal in this case “substantively altered the nature 

of the pending Rule 307 appeal” because it enabled the plaintiffs to obtain the relief from the 

appellate court that they had sought in the Rule 307 appeal, i.e., a stay of the trial court’s 

dismissal order or a TRO preventing the demolition of the courthouse pending the disposition of 

an interlocutory appeal under Rule 304(a). The Board argues that the plaintiffs could not have 

obtained any such relief from the appellate court at the time they filed the Rule 307 appeal 

because they had not yet obtained a Rule 304(a) finding of appealability from the circuit court at 

that time. From this premise, the defendants argue that (1) the circuit court “may have lacked 

jurisdiction” to enter the Rule 304(a) finding in its March 22, 2019, Order” because the plaintiffs 

“may have already divested the Circuit Court of jurisdiction by filing a Rule 307(d) appeal,” 

(2) the trial court’s written order containing the Rule 304(a) finding is a therefore a nullity, and

(3) this court therefore lacks jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Rule 304. 

¶ 37 We do not find these arguments to be persuasive. Although the filing of a notice of 

appeal transfers jurisdiction from the trial court to the appellate court instanter, “the trial court 

retains jurisdiction on matters collateral or supplemental to the judgment” (In re N.L., 2014 IL 
15 

App (3d) 140172, ¶ 23), and “orders entered after the filing of the notice of appeal are valid if the 

substantive issues on appeal are not altered so as to present a new case to the reviewing court” 

(emphasis added) (R.W. Dunteman Co., 181 Ill. 2d at 162; see also N.L., 2014 IL App (3d) 

140172, ¶ 23; In re Estate of Goodlett, 225 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587 (1992); Chavin v. General 

Employment Enterprises, Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 398, 405 (1991)). Here, the trial court’s March 

22, 2019, written judgment order did not alter the substance of its March 19, 2019, oral ruling 

(which was the subject of the plaintiffs’ prior Rule 307(d) appeal) in any way. To the contrary, 

the trial court’s written order merely memorialized and confirmed its prior oral rulings.

Specifically, the March 22, 2019, written order confirmed the dissolving of the TRO, the 

dismissal of counts I through III of the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, and the dismissal of 

counts IV through VI of the complaint without prejudice. Contrary to the Board’s contention, the 

trial court’s inclusion of Rule 304(a) language in the written judgment order did not 

substantively alter the nature of the court’s prior judgment in any way. It merely rendered the 

court’s preexisting judgment immediately appealable under Rule 304(a). The defendants cite no 

authorities holding or suggesting that the mere entry of a finding of appealability under Rule 

304(a), without more, substantively alters a preexisting interlocutory order that was previously 

appealed pursuant to a different rule. Nor have we found any such authority. 

¶ 38 In sum, the trial court’s written order did not alter the substance or subject matter of the 

pending Rule 307(d) appeal in any way, much less present a “new case” to our appellate court. 

The trial court’s finding of immediate appealability under Rule 304(a) was therefore valid and 

within the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction. Accordingly, we find that we have jurisdiction 

decide the plaintiffs’ appeal under Rule 304. 

¶ 39 2. Standing 
16 

¶ 40 The defendant Board further maintains that the plaintiffs “lack standing to challenge 

whether the *** Board’s decision to demolish the [c]ourthouse violates either the *** 

Preservation Act or the *** [Commission Act].” According to the Board, private organizations 

like Landmarks Illinois, Rock Island Preservation Society, and Moline Preservation Society do 

not have a legally cognizable interest in the demolition of the courthouse and therefore lack 

standing to challenge the demolition. Moreover, the Board argues that the plaintiffs do not have 

“taxpayer standing” to challenge the Board’s decision because none of the plaintiffs is alleged to

have paid taxes in Rock Island County.3

 

¶ 41 A party has standing to bring a claim only when that party has a real interest in the 

outcome of the controversy. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City 

of Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000); see also Hill v. Butler, 107 Ill. App. 3d 721, 725 (1982) 

(“The concept of standing to bring suit requires that parties before the court seeking relief have a 

sufficiently protectable interest pursuant to statute or common law which is alleged to be 

injured.”). A self-proclaimed concern about a matter of public interest does not grant standing, 

no matter how sincere. Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 

164, 175 (1988); Lombard Historical Comm’n v. Village of Lombard, 366 Ill. App. 3d 715, 717 

(2006). However, members of the public have a protectable interest in ensuring that public 

3

 On February 22, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to file a proposed verified amended complaint that

added Oestreich as a party and identified her as a Rock Island County taxpayer. The defendants argue that 

Oestreich is not a proper party to this appeal because the trial court never issued an order granting the 

plaintiffs’ motion. However, the trial court’s March 15, 2019, order granting the TRO listed Oestreich as 

a party in the case caption and temporarily enjoined the defendants from carrying out any demolition 

activities “with regard to the building identified in Plaintiffs’ Verified Amended Complaint as the Historic 

Courthouse.” This suggests that the trial court allowed the plaintiffs to file its verified amended complaint 

adding Oestreich as a party. In any event, the plaintiffs have not argued, either before the trial court or on 

appeal, that their standing to file the instant lawsuit derives from any plaintiff’s status as a Rock Island 

County taxpayer.
17 

officials follow the requirements of public statutes. Lombard Historical Comm’n, 366 Ill. App. 

3d at 718; Hill, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 725. 

¶ 42 Lack of standing is an affirmative defense. Lombard Historical Comm’n, 366 Ill. App. 3d 

at 718; Hill, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 725; Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 

462, 494 (1988). Accordingly, a plaintiff need not allege facts establishing standing; rather, it is 

the defendant’s burden to plead and prove lack of standing. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, 

189 Ill. 2d at 206. Here, the Board challenged the plaintiffs’ standing in its motion to dismiss the 

plaintiffs’ complaint under section 2-619 of the Code. The trial court rejected the Board’s 

argument and found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. In ruling on a section 2-

619 motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff’s complaint and all 

inferences that can reasonably be drawn in plaintiff’s favor. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, 

189 Ill. 2d at 206; Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 166 Ill. 2d 72, 85 (1995). 

The court should grant the motion only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 

support a cause of action. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, 189 Ill. 2d at 206. Our review of a 

trial court’s disposition of a section 2-619 motion is de novo. Id.; Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554, 

557 (1999). 

¶ 43 We agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims under 

the Preservation Act and the Commission Act. As an initial matter, members of the public, 

including private parties, have a protectable interest in ensuring that public officials follow the 

requirements of public statutes. Lombard Historical Comm’n, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 718; Hill, 107 

Ill. App. 3d at 725. Thus, the private party plaintiffs in this case, including both the individuals 

and the associations named as plaintiffs, have standing to challenge the Board’s demolition of a 

publicly owned courthouse where such demolition is alleged to violate the requirements of the 
18 

Preservation Act and the Commission Act. See Lombard Historical Comm’n, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 

718 (holding that the Lombard Historical Commission, The Friends of the Du Page Theatre, and 

an individual had standing to challenge the Village of Lombard’s (Village) plan to demolish the 

Du Page Theatre, where the Village owned the theatre and the plaintiffs alleged that the 

demolition would violate a Village ordinance); 4 Hill, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 725 (ruling that, where 

the object of a mandamus action is the enforcement of a public right, a private plaintiff has 

standing to bring the action due to his “interest[ ] as a citizen in having the laws properly 

executed” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

¶ 44 Moreover, certain of the plaintiffs have standing for additional reasons. Two of the 

plaintiffs, Landmarks Illinois and Shaw, are bondholders. Section 16 of the Commission Act

provides that bondholders may, “[b]y civil action, sue to enjoin any acts or things which may be 

unlawful, or in violation of any of the rights of the bondholder” or 

“[b]y mandamus, injunction or other civil action, compel the Commission, and the 

member or members, officers, agents or employees thereof, to perform each and 

every term, provision and covenant contained in any resolution, trust agreement 

or contract with or for the benefit of such bondholder, and to require the carrying 

out of any or all such covenants and agreements of the Commission and the 

4

 The Board attempts to distinguish Lombard Historical Comm’n on the ground that the plaintiffs 

in that case were held to have standing as taxpayers of the Village of Lombard, whereas in this case “there 

is no Plaintiff alleged to be a taxpayer of Rock Island County.” However, the court in Lombard addressed 

taxpayer standing as an alternative basis for standing in addition to a private party’s protectable interest in 

ensuring that public officials follow the requirements of public statutes. Id. at 718. It did not hold that the 

later interest was dependent on any plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer. See also Hill, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 725.

But even assuming arguendo that only taxpayers may assert a protectable interest in ensuring that public 

officials follow the law, that would not eliminate the plaintiffs’ standing in this case. In their verified 

amended complaint, which the trial court implicitly granted, the plaintiffs added Oestreich as a plaintiff

and alleged that she paid taxes to the Village of Rock Island. 
19 

fulfillment of all duties imposed upon the Commission by this Act.” 50 ILCS 

20/16 (West 2016). 

In this case, plaintiffs Landmarks Illinois and Shaw have alleged that the defendants’ planned 

demolition of the courthouse would violate the terms of their bond agreements with the 

defendants because the defendants have misappropriated excess bonds from the Annex project to 

fund the demolition. Thus, plaintiffs Landmarks Illinois and Shaw have alleged that the 

demolition of the courthouse would cause them to suffer an injury in fact to a legally recognized 

interest, both under the terms of the bond agreements themselves and under section 16 the 

Commission Act. As bondholders, Landmarks Illinois and Shaw have standing to file suit to 

prevent the planned demolition and to compel the defendants to discharge their obligations under 

the bond agreements and the Commission Act. 

¶ 45 In addition, the National Trust for Historic Preservation (National Trust), a 

congressionally chartered not-for-profit corporation, has standing to challenge the defendants’ 

demolition of the courthouse pursuant to the federal Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities 

Act (16 U.S.C. § 468 et seq. (2012)). In that statute, Congress gave the National Trust broad 

authority to sue in State courts to prevent the unlawful demolition of buildings it “deems of 

national historic significance,” even buildings that have not been officially designated as national 

landmarks, and even when the demolition would violate state law, rather than federal law. 

Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois, 125 Ill. 2d at 176-77. In Landmarks, our supreme 

court found that the National Trust had standing to bring a declaratory judgment action against 

the City of Chicago (City) and a private owner of a building to challenge the City’s rescinding of 

the building’s landmark status. Id. 
20 

¶ 46 The Board argues that Landmarks is distinguishable because, in Landmarks, the building 

at issue was at one time included in the National Register of Historic Places, whereas, in this 

case, there is no allegation in the complaint that the National Trust has deemed the courthouse to 

be of national historic significance. (The plaintiffs have merely alleged that IDNR has 

determined that the courthouse is eligible for listing in the National Register.) However, 

Landmarks does not hold or imply that the National Trust has standing to file a lawsuit to 

prevent the destruction of a historic building only if it has previously listed the building on the 

National Registry of Historic Places. To the contrary, in Landmarks, our supreme court 

recognized that: (1) Congress “intended the National Trust’s functions to be extremely broad”; 

(2) Congress created the National Trust, in part, “to preserve for public use historic sites, 

buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the 

Unites States”; and (3) “in order to perform its congressionally mandated functions, the National 

Trust must be allowed to maintain suits in State courts to prevent unlawful destruction of 

buildings it deems of national historic significance,” even if those buildings do not have national 

landmark status. (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 176-77. By 

joining the lawsuit at issue in this case, the National Trust has shown that it deems the 

courthouse to be of historic significance. That is all that is required to confer standing on the 

National Trust under 16 U.S.C. § 468. Id. Such standing includes the right to sue the defendants 

to halt the proposed demolition of the courthouse and to enforce the requirements of the 

Preservation Act and the Commission Act.

5

 

5 The plaintiffs further argue that all of the private party plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 

demolition under the Preservation Act because section 4(c) of the Preservation Act grants “private 

organizations” the right to participate in the statutorily mandated consultation process in an effort to 

obviate harm to a historically significant building, and the plaintiffs “have standing to protect that 

statutory right.” In Landmarks, our supreme court rejected a similar argument with respect to a municipal 

ordinance that provided a similar right of participation. See Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois, 
21 

¶ 47 3. Plaintiffs’ Claim Under the Preservation Act

¶ 48 In count I of their complaint, the plaintiffs’ alleged that the demolition of the courthouse 

is subject to the Preservation Act and may not proceed until the IDNR and IEPA have completed 

the consultation process prescribed by the Preservation Act. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ 

claim and dismissed count I with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. The plaintiffs 

contend that this was error and urge us to reverse the trial court’s dismissal of their claim under 

the Preservation Act.

¶ 49 A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint 

based upon defects that are apparent on the face of the complaint. Heastie v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 

515, 531 (2007); Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 54. In determining whether a 

complaint is legally sufficient, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, draw all 

reasonable inferences from the well-pleaded facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and construe 

the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 

531; Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); Board of Directors of 

Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass’n v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d 419, 424 (1999). The 

dispositive question is whether the allegations of the complaint, when considered in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be 

granted. Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill. 2d at 424. A trial court should not dismiss a claim under 

125 Ill. 2d at 175 (“we [are not] prepared to recognize as a basis for standing an alleged right to 

participate in a public hearing for participation’s sake, at least where, as here, a municipality has 

bestowed that alleged procedural right apparently not as a legal entitlement but as a tool to assist the 

municipality in performing its legislative function”). Because we find that the plaintiffs have standing for 

other reasons, we need not determine whether the legislature intended the right of participation it granted 

to private parties under the Preservation Act to be a legal entitlement sufficient to confer standing on such 

parties. 
22 

section 2-615 “unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle 

the plaintiff to recovery.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 531; Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 429. 

¶ 50 The purpose of the Preservation Act is to provide Illinois state government leadership in 

preserving, restoring, and maintaining certain historic resources of the State. 20 ILCS 3420/1 

(West 2016). Toward that end, the Preservation Act requires state agencies, in consultation with 

the Director of Natural Resources, to “institute procedures to ensure that State projects consider 

the preservation and enhancement of both State owned and non-State-owned historic resources.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. The Preservation Act defines a “historic resource” as “any property which 

is either publicly or privately held” and that meets one of four specified criteria, including that 

the property is eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places as determined by the 

Director of Natural Resources. Id. § 3(c).

¶ 51 The Preservation Act’s requirements apply to any “undertaking” that will potentially 

affect the character or use of a historic property. Id. §§ 3(f), 4. The Act defines an “undertaking” 

as “any project, activity or program that can result in changes in the character or use of historic 

property, if any historic property is located in the area of potential effects,” where such project, 

activity, or program is “under the direct or undirect jurisdiction of a State agency or licensed or 

assisted by a State agency.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 3(f). Under the statute, an “undertaking” 

includes, but it not limited to, actions “(1) directly undertaken by a State agency; (2) supported in 

whole or in part through State *** funding assistance; or (3) carried out pursuant to a State 

lease, permit, license, certificate, approval, or other form of entitlement or permission.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. 

¶ 52 The Act imposes various mandatory procedural requirements upon such state agency 

“undertakings.” First, written notice of the project must be given to the Director of Natural 
23 

Resources either by the state permitting agency or by the recipients of the state agency’s funds, 

permits, or licenses. Id. § 4(a); see also 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.200(a) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). 

Such written notice must be given to the director before the state agency approves the final 

design or plan of any undertaking, funds the undertaking, or takes any action of approval or 

entitlement as to any private undertaking. 20 ILCS 3420/4(a) (West 2016); 17 Adm. Code 

§ 4180.200 (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). 

¶ 53 Within 30 days of receiving notice of the proposed undertaking and any documentation 

that the director deems necessary, the director must review and comment to the state agency on 

the likelihood that the undertaking will have an “adverse effect” on the historic resource. 20 

ILCS 3420/4(b) (West 2016). An “adverse effect” includes the destruction of the historic 

resource. Id. § 3(d)(1). If the director determines that there will be no adverse effect, he must 

inform the state agency to that effect and the project may proceed. 17 Ill. Adm. Code 

§ 4180.300(b) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). However, if the director finds that an undertaking will 

adversely affect a historic resource, the state agency shall consult with the director and shall 

discuss alternatives to the proposed undertaking that could eliminate, minimize, or mitigate the 

undertaking’s adverse effect. 20 ILCS 3420/4(c) (West 2016); see also 17 Ill. Adm. Code 

§§ 4180.300(c), 4180.350(a) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). During the consultation process, the state 

agency must explore all feasible and prudent plans that eliminate, minimize, or mitigate adverse 

effects on historic resources. 20 ILCS 3420/4(c) (West 2016); see also 17 Ill. Adm. Code 

§ 4180.350(a) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). Permittees, representatives of national, state, or local units of 

government, and other interested parties may participate in the consultation process. 20 ILCS 

3420/4(c) (West 2016); 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.350(b) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). The consultation 

process may involve on-site inspections and public informational meetings pursuant to IDHR 
24 

regulations. 20 ILCS 3420/4(c) (West 2016); see also 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.350(b) (eff. Jan. 

25, 1993). 

¶ 54 If the director and the state agency agree that there is a feasible and prudent alternative 

that eliminates, minimizes, or mitigates the adverse effect of the undertaking, or if they agree that 

there is no such alternative, the director must prepare a memorandum of agreement describing 

the alternatives or stating the finding. 20 ILCS 3420/4(d) (West 2016); see also 17 Ill. Adm.

Code § 4180.350(d) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). The state agency may proceed with the undertaking 

once the Memorandum has been signed by both the Director and the state agency. 20 ILCS 

3420/4(d) (West 2016). 

¶ 55 If the director and the state agency fail to agree on the existence of a feasible and prudent 

alternative that eliminates, minimizes, or mitigates the adverse effect of an undertaking on a 

historic resource, the state agency must hold a public meeting in the county where the 

undertaking is proposed within 60 days. 20 ILCS 3420/4(e) (West 2016); see also 17 Ill. Adm.

Code §§ 4180.400, 4180.450 (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). If the director and the state agency do not agree 

on a feasible and prudent alternative within 14 days following conclusion of the public meeting, 

the proposed undertaking must be submitted to the Historic Preservation Mediation Committee 

(Committee). 20 ILCS 3420/4(e) (West 2016); see also 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.500(b) (eff. 

Jan. 25, 1993). Within 30 days after submission of the proposed undertaking to the Committee, 

the Committee must meet with the director and the state agency to review each alternative and to 

evaluate whether a feasible and prudent alternative exists. 20 ILCS 3420/4(f) (West 2016); see 

also 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.500(c) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). In the event that the director and the 

state agency continue to disagree, the Committee must provide a statement of findings or 

comments setting forth an alternative to the proposed undertaking or finding that there is no 
25 

feasible or prudent alternative. 20 ILCS 3420/4(f) (West 2016). The state agency must consider 

the written comments of the Committee and must respond in writing before proceeding with the 

undertaking. Id.; see also 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.500(c) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). 

¶ 56 In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged in their complaint that (1) the demolition of the 

courthouse may not proceed until the PBC has obtained a state agency permit (specifically, a 

stormwater drainage permit from the IEPA), (2) the courthouse is a “historic resource” because 

the IDNR has determined that it is eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, 

and (3) the IDNR has concluded that the proposed demolition threatens the courthouse. These 

allegations are sufficient to state a claim that the proposed demolition is a state agency 

“undertaking” subject to the requirements of the Preservation Act. 20 ILCS 3420/3(f) (West 

2016) (defining a state agency “[u]ndertaking” as “any project, activity, or program that can 

result in changes in the character or use of historic property” where such project, activity, or 

program is “carried out pursuant to a State *** permit *** or other form of entitlement or 

permission”). Accordingly, the demolition of the courthouse may not proceed until the 

Preservation Act’s procedural requirements, including the Act’s mandatory consultation process, 

have been completed. 

¶ 57 The plaintiffs have further alleged that (1) through its contractor, the PBC asked the 

IDNR to provide a “determination as to whether the [proposed demolition] project has satisfied 

all applicable requirements of Illinois law with respect to Historic Preservation”; (2) four days 

later (well within the 30-day time period prescribed by section 4(b) of the Preservation Act), the 

IDNR advised the PBC that the courthouse is a “historic resource” within the meaning of the 

Preservation Act, that the PBC’s proposed demolition would result in an adverse impact on a 

historical resource and was therefore subject to review under section 4 of the Preservation Act, 
26 

and that the PBC should participate in the statutorily mandated consultation process between 

IDNR and IEPA to determine if there was a way to avoid the adverse impact (i.e., the 

demolition); (3) The IDNR also directed the PBC not to conduct any demolition activities until 

the consultation process prescribed by the Preservation Act was complete; and (4) two days later, 

the PBC informed the IDNR that it did not believe that the courthouse was subject to the 

executive demands of the IDNR and that it planned to proceed with demolition. These 

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for a threatened violation of the Preservation Act.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing count I of the plaintiffs’ complaint to enjoin the 

demolition pending the completion of the Preservation Act’s mandatory consultation process. 

¶ 58 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for several reasons, none of which has 

merit. First, the trial court noted that the Preservation Act expressly exempts “units of local 

government and their officers” from its definition of “State agency.” From this, the trial court 

concluded that the defendants in this case, both of whom are units of local government, are not 

required to follow the Preservation Act’s requirements. Similarly, the defendants argue that, 

although section 4 of the Preservation Act imposes consultation obligations upon the IDNR and 

any state agency that approves or licenses certain “undertakings,” it imposes no obligations upon 

nonstate actors like the defendants. Interested parties other than state agencies may, but are not 

required to, take part in the consultation process prescribed by the Preservation Act. 20 ILCS 

3420/4(c) (West 2016); 17 Ill. Adm. Code § 4180.350(b) (eff. Jan. 25, 1993). Thus, the 

defendants contend, the statute creates no private right of action against nonstate actors, and 

nonstate parties cannot be liable for violations of the Preservation Act and may not be sued under 

the Preservation Act. 
27 

¶ 59 We disagree. While it is true that the Preservation Act exempts “units of local 

government and their officers” from its definition of “State agency,”6 that does not mean that 

units of local government may not participate in “undertakings” that are subject to the Act’s 

requirements. To the contrary, section 3(f) of the Preservation Act unambiguously defines an 

“undertaking” as “any project, activity or program that can result in changes in the character or 

use of historic property” where such project, activity, or program is “licensed or assisted by a 

State agency,” including actions “carried out pursuant to a State *** permit *** or other form of 

entitlement or permission.” (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 3420/3(f) (West 2016). “Undertakings” 

conducted by units of local government like the PBC are not excluded from this definition. To 

the contrary, the legislature’s use of the broadly inclusive phrase “any project, activity, or 

program” plainly evinces its intent to include “undertakings” conducted by units of local 

government. Where the language of a statute is clear, we may not read into its exceptions, 

limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express, and we will give it effect as written. 

Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 212 Ill. 2d 237, 251 (2004); In re 

County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 373 Ill. App. 3d 679, 685 (2007). Accordingly, 

an “undertaking” under the statute (which includes any project requiring a state agency permit 

that threatens a historic resource) may not commence until the Preservation Act’s consultation 

requirements have been satisfied, regardless of whether it is carried out by the state, by a private 

party, or, as here, by a unit of local government. 

¶ 60 We have reached this conclusion based upon the Preservation Act’s plain and 

unambiguous language. However, we note that we would reach the same conclusion even if we 

6 Section 3(b) of the Preservation Act defines “[a]gency” as having “the same meaning as in 

Section 1-20 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act” (20 ILCS 3420/3(b) (West 2016)), which 

excludes “units of local government and their officers” (5 ILCS 100/1-20 (West 2016)). 
28 

were to find the Preservation Act to be ambiguous as to this issue. In its amicus brief, the IDNR 

argues that the defendants’ proposed demolition of the courthouse is an “undertaking” under the 

Preservation Act because it would be carried out pursuant to a state permit (i.e., the IEPA’s water 

discharge permit). The IDNR notes that applying the Preservation Act to all “undertakings” 

conducted pursuant to State permits, even those conducted by units of local government, is 

consistent with the IDNR’s longstanding practice. Because the IDNR is the state agency charged 

with administering and enforcing the Preservation Act, its interpretation of an ambiguous 

provision in the Preservation Act is entitled to substantial weight and deference. Crittenden v. 

Cook County Comm’n on Human Rights, 2013 IL 114876, ¶ 19; People ex rel. Birkett v. City of 

Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 46 (2002); Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional 

Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 97-98 (1992). 7

 That is so even if the IDNR has articulated its 

interpretation for the first time in an amicus brief (instead of a formal rulemaking proceeding or 

agency adjudication), unless there is reason to believe that the interpretation is merely a post hoc, 

self-interested litigation position that does not reflect the agency’s considered judgment on the 

matter or the interpretation conflicts with prior agency decisions or clearly conflicts with the 

statute at issue. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012); see also Chase 

Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195 (2011); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997). 

None of those circumstances exist here. As the IDNR notes, the interpretation of the Preservation 

Act advanced in its legal brief is consistent with the IDNR’s past practice. The defendants do not 

deny this. Accordingly, the IDNR’s position in this case represent its considered judgment rather 

than a post hoc, self-interested litigation position. Further, as noted above, the IDNR’s position is 

7 The defendants argue that the plaintiffs forfeited this argument by not raising it before the trial 

court. However, forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not on the court, and a reviewing court may 

ignore forfeiture in order to achieve a just result. In re Amanda H., 2017 IL App (3d) 150164, ¶ 33. 
29 

consistent with the Act’s plain language. Thus, even if there were some ambiguity about the 

Preservation Act’s application to the demolition as issue in this case, which there is not, we 

would defer to the IDNR’s interpretation that the Preservation Act applies. 

¶ 61 We also reject the defendants’ argument that they may not be enjoined from violating the 

Preservation Act’s requirements. In this case, the IDNR timely advised the PBC that the 

courthouse is a “historic resource” within the meaning of the Preservation Act and that that the 

PBC’s proposed demolition would result in an adverse impact on a historical resource and was 

therefore subject to review under section 4 of the Preservation Act. The IDNR also directed the 

PBC not to conduct any demolition activities until statutorily mandated consultation process 

between IDNR and IEPA was completed, and it and encouraged the PBC to participate in that 

consultation process (as contemplated by the Preservation Act). Nevertheless, despite initially 

notifying the IDNR (through its contractor/agent) of the proposed demolition and seeking the 

IDNR’s input as to the Preservation Act’s requirements, the PBC ignored the IDNR’s directive 

and planned to conduct the demolition before the consultation process had been completed, in 

clear violation of the Preservation Act. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs properly sued to 

enjoin the defendants from demolishing a publicly owned historic resource before the statutorily

required consultation between IDNR and IEPA had occurred. The issuance of an injunction is 

proper to prevent public officials, including units of local government and their officers, from 

taking actions that are outside the scope of their authority or otherwise unlawful. Village of 

Westmont v. Lenihan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1060 (1998); see also Lindsey v. Board of 

Education of the City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 3d 413, 422 (1984). Here, defendants intend to 

defy the IDNR’s directive that they halt the proposed demolition of the courthouse until the 

consultation process mandated by the Preservation Act has taken place. The defendant’s plan to 
30 

demolish the building in defiance of the IDNR’s directive would circumvent, and therefore 

thwart, the Preservation Act’s mandatory procedural requirements that govern the undertaking at 

issue in this case. If the demolition planned by the defendants in this case cannot be enjoined 

until the statute’s consultation requirements have been satisfied, then those requirements would 

be rendered so toothless as to be meaningless. 

¶ 62 Moreover, it is significant that the plaintiffs are seeking only injunctive relief, not tort 

damages. They are merely seeking to enforce their protectable right to ensure that the public 

entity defendants do not act in a manner that would frustrate the proper operation of the law. 

Accordingly, the plaintiffs do not need to demonstrate that the Preservation Act creates an 

implied right of action for damages in order to proceed with their claims for injunctive relief. See 

generally, Village of Westmont, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1060; Lindsey, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 422; 

Lombard Historical Comm’n, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 718; Hill, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 725; Noyola v. 

Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121 (1997). 

¶ 63 The defendants concede that no published Illinois cases address whether nonstate agency 

defendants may be enjoined from destroying a historic building pending the conclusion of the 

Preservation Act’s mandatory consultation process where, as here, that process is alleged to have 

been properly instituted by the IDNR. In arguing for that proposition, the defendants rely upon 

three federal cases applying the National Historical Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 U.S.C. 

§ 306108), which the defendants assert is “analogous” to the Preservation Act. The cases cited 

by the defendants, all of which were decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit, hold that only federal agencies may be sued for violating the NHPA. See 

Preservation Coalition of Erie County v. Federal Transit Adm’n, 356 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 

2004); Western Mohegan Tribe & Nation of New York v. New York, 246 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2001); 
31 

Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents & Associates, Inc. v. Brown, 875 F.2d 453, 457-58 (2d 

Cir. 1989). However, federal decisions applying the NHPA are split on the question of whether 

parties other than federal agencies may be enjoined from harming a historic property protected 

by the NHPA pending the completion of consultation and review procedures mandated by the 

NHPA. In contrast to the Second Circuit cases cited by the defendants, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a federal district court order enjoining a unit of local 

government from destroying a building under circumstances similar to those presented here. 

Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1983) (affirming 

district court’s order permanently enjoining the demolition of a protected building by the Town 

of Dover Redevelopment Authority, which owned the building, until such time as the federal 

Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted a historical and cultural resource 

review of the building pursuant to NHPA); see also D.C. Federation of Civic Ass’ns v. Adams, 

571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that the court would be willing to enjoin nonagency 

actions if it were not ruling that the agency had in fact complied with the NHPA). 

¶ 64 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for an additional reason. Specifically, 

the trial court held that the proposed demolition in this case does not constitute an “undertaking” 

under the Preservation Act because the IEPA would merely be approving “how they decide to 

run the water when [the courthouse] is ultimately taken down” and would not be approving the 

demolition itself. That was error. As noted above, the Preservation Act plainly defines an 

“[u]ndertaking” to include “any project, activity or program that can result in changes in the 

character or use of historic property” where such project, activity, or program is “licensed or 

assisted by a State agency,” including actions “carried out pursuant to a State *** permit *** or 

other form of entitlement or permission.” (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 3420/3(f) (West 2016). 
32 

The Preservation Act does not require that the permit authorize the ultimate proposed 

undertaking (such as the actual demolition of the building in this case). Rather, the Preservation

Act’s provisions are triggered whenever an “undertaking” is “carried out pursuant to a State *** 

permit.” Id. Here, the demolition project will be “carried out pursuant to” the IEPA’s storm water 

drainage permit because the defendants must obtain that permit in order to complete the 

demolition project. The Preservation Act therefore applies. The trial court’s conclusion that the 

Preservation Act applies only if the entire proposed project is subject to state agency approval 

represents an unduly narrow construction that contradicts the Preservation Act’s plain terms and 

would frustrate the Preservation Act’s expressed purposes.

¶ 65 Echoing the trial court’s reasoning, the defendants argue that (1) section 4(a) of the 

Preservation Act provides, in relevant part, that prior to the approval of the “final design or plan” 

of any undertaking by a state agency, “written notice of the project shall be given to the [IDNR] 

Director by the State agency or by the recipients of its *** permits or licenses” and (2) here, the 

IEPA is not affirmatively “approving” anything, much less the “final design and plan” of the 

demolition or the demolition site plan. The defendants maintain that, because of the unique 

nature of the IEPA permitting process, the IEPA does not need to affirmatively give permission 

for the PBC to use the water permit; rather, the PBC files a NOI to use the IEPA’s general 

stormwater drainage permit, and unless the IEPA informs the PBC within 30 days that it may not 

use the permit (which was not alleged to have happened in this case), the PBC may use the 

permit and proceed with demolition without any “sign off” from the IEPA. Moreover, the 

defendants argue that, because the PBC’s use of the water permit would not occur until after the 

demolition, the IEPA’s permitting authority in this case could have no effect on the actual 
33 

demolition. Thus, according to the defendants, the Preservation Act’s consulting requirements 

were not triggered by the IEPA’s permitting process in this case. 

¶ 66 We do not find these arguments to be persuasive. As noted above, by its plain terms, the 

Preservation Act applies to any project that threatens a historic resource where the project is 

“carried out pursuant to” a state permit. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that proposed 

demolition at issue here must be carried out pursuant to a state permit because the demolition 

necessitates “a permit from the *** IEPA *** to discharge storm water associated with the 

construction site.” The plaintiffs attached to their complaint the IEPA’s permit form, which 

contains a section for the applicant to certify that the project has been submitted to the “Historic 

Preservation Agency.” The plaintiffs also provided URL of the “Construction Permit 

Requirements” listed on the IEPA’s website that state that IEPA permit applicants are not 

authorized to proceed as if they have a permit until “the project has received sign-off from IDNR 

and IHPA that the project complies with *** historic preservation laws.” See NPDES Permit for 

Construction Activities, Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, https://www2.illinois.gov/epa/topics/forms/ 

water-permits/storm-water/Pages/construction.aspx (last visited July 9, 2020) 

[https://perma.cc/6R6S-443T] (stating that, unless the permit applicant receives a notice of 

incompleteness letter from the IEPA, the permit applicant receives coverage under the 

stormwater general NPDES permit automatically, and operators are authorized to discharge 

stormwater from construction sites under the terms and conditions of the permit 30 days after the 

date the NOI is received by the Agency, “provided the project has received sign-off from IDNR 

and IHPA that the project complies with endangered species and historic preservation laws and 

the appropriate application fee has been received by the Agency”). Accordingly, the plaintiffs 

have sufficiently alleged that the IEPA’s permitting process triggers the application of the 
34 

Preservation Act to the demolition at issue in this case. The defendants’ argument that the

defendants may use the IEPA permit and proceed with the demolition without receiving any 

affirmative “approval” from the IEPA, IDNR, or other state agency is belied by the documents 

that the plaintiffs submitted with their complaint. Moreover, the fact that the IEPA’s permission 

is presumed upon the filing of a NOI by the permit applicant unless the IEPA says otherwise (or 

unless the applicant fails to obtain the IDNR’s authorization pursuant to the Preservation Act) 

does not change the fact that IEPA permission is required for the “undertaking” at issue. At most, 

the arguments raised by the defendants present an issue of fact that may not be appropriately 

resolved on a motion to dismiss. 

¶ 67 As an additional reason for its dismissal, the trial court suggested that the plaintiffs’ 

interpretation of Preservation Act was so broad that it would “overtake the statute” and lead to 

absurd results. The court noted that, if it were to find that merely applying for the type of permit 

issued by the IEPA would trigger the Preservation Act, than the Preservation Act would apply to 

“[e]very individual who had to get a permit to remove their shed from their back yard or get a 

permit to take something down that happened to be in the way” and “whenever the County was 

building a road and *** had to get a particular permit for something that occurred afterwards.” 

These concerns are grossly exaggerated, however, because the Preservation Act would apply in 

such cases only if the project at issue both threatens a historic resource and requires a permit 

from a state agency to proceed. Obviously, removing a shed from one’s backyard is unlikely to 

do either of these things, and the vast majority of permits relating to road construction will not 

involve threats to historic resources. Thus, we find the trial court’s concerns to be unfounded. 

¶ 68 The defendants further argue that using the Preservation Act to “override” Chief Judge 

Braud’s administrative order directing the defendants to demolish the courthouse would infringe 
35 

upon the chief judge’s constitutional authority and violate the separation of powers. The Illinois 

Constitution provides the chief judge with “general administrative authority over his court,” 

including “the authority to provide *** for appropriate times and places of holding court.” Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. VI, § 7(c). The defendants argue that this includes the authority to demolish the 

adjacent dilapidated and vacant courthouse, if, as both the chief judge and the Board found, such 

demolition is necessary to ensure that the new judicial facilities in the Annex are safe and 

suitable to carry out the courts’ judicial functions. According to the defendants, if the IDNR (an 

agency of the executive branch) were able to contravene these decisions by Chief Judge Braud 

and the Board, it would infringe the powers of both the judicial and legislative branches, thereby 

offending separation of powers principles. 

¶ 69 The Illinois Constitution provides that no branch of government shall exercise powers 

properly belonging to another. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. In addition, separation of powers 

principles mandate that “[a] statute cannot conflict with court rules or unduly infringe upon 

inherent judicial powers.” Morawicz v. Hynes, 401 Ill. App. 3d 142, 150 (2010); see also People 

v. Bainter, 126 Ill. 2d 292, 302-03 (1989). Moreover, there is “no basis to doubt the inherent 

power of the courts to protect themselves and require production of the facilities, personnel and 

resources reasonably necessary to enable them to perform their judicial functions with efficiency, 

independence and dignity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knuepfer v. Fawell, 96 Ill. 2d 

284, 292 (1983). However, because “the public interest requires that the three branches in our 

system of government work cooperatively and in harmony,” these inherent powers of the 

judiciary must be exercised “sparingly” and only in “exigent circumstances,” particularly when 

the exercise of judicial power would intrude on the prerogatives of the executive or legislative 

branches of government. Id.
36 

¶ 70 Chief Judge Braud’s administrative order cannot prevent the application of the 

Preservation Act’s requirements to the proposed demolition of the courthouse in this case. As an 

initial matter, contrary to the defendants’ assertion, the IDNR’s initiation of the consultation 

process required by the Preservation Act and its directive to the defendants’ to halt the 

demolition pending the completion of that process was not an attempt to “override” the chief 

judge’s order. The chief judge’s order was not issued until after the IDNR directed the 

defendants to stop the demolition. Thus, if anything, the chief judge’s order was an attempt to 

override the actions the IDNR took pursuant to the Preservation Act. 

¶ 71 Moreover, it is unlikely that a chief judge’s constitutional authority to determine the 

“appropriate times and places to hold court” includes the authority to demolish a publicly owned 

building where court is not held. Nor does a court’s authority to “protect [itself]” and to “require 

production of the facilities, personnel and resources reasonably necessary to enable [it] to 

perform [its] judicial functions with efficiency, independence and dignity” include the power to 

order a nonjudicial branch of government to destroy a historical resource that is not owned or 

used by the judiciary, and to declare the demolition immune from the Preservation Act or from 

other applicable laws on the basis of separation of powers. Such an overly expansive

construction of judicial powers would infringe upon the rightful authority of the legislative and 

executive branches. 

¶ 72 But even assuming arguendo that Chief Judge Braud would have had the inherent 

authority under certain circumstances to order the demolition of a historically significant former 

courthouse to promote the safety of the Annex, the manner in which he exercised his purported 

authority in this case was unlawful. Chief Judge Braud’s administrative order was procedurally 

deficient. “[I]t is essential that any such administrative orders be entered only after a hearing of 
37 

which adequate notice is given and at which all interested parties are afforded an opportunity to 

present their views.” Id. at 294-95. That did not occur here. Chief Judge Braud issued his 

administrative order requiring the demolition of the courthouse in this case without conducting a 

hearing, without allowing plaintiffs or other interested parties to intervene or to challenge the 

administrative order in any way, and without even considering courthouse’s historic status or the 

application of the Preservation Act. Accordingly, the chief judge’s administrative order was 

improperly issued. 

¶ 73 Because the inherent powers of the judiciary must be exercised “sparingly” and only in 

“exigent circumstances,” particularly when the exercise of judicial power would intrude on the 

prerogatives of the executive or legislative branches of government, the most prudent course of 

action would have been for the chief judge to have refrained from issuing an administrative order 

to demolish the courthouse until the relatively brief consultation process mandated by the 

Preservation Act had run its course. In any event, the chief judge was required to hold a proper 

hearing on the matter before ordering the demolition. Because the chief judge failed to do so in 

this case, we need not defer to his demolition order. Under the circumstances presented here, 

halting the demolition pending the completion of the consultation process prescribed by the 

Preservation Act would not violate the separation of powers or be otherwise improper. 

¶ 74 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim under the 

Preservation Act, and we remand for further proceedings on that claim. Pursuant to our authority 

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), we direct the trial court on 

remand to reinstate and extend the TRO until the consultation process required by the 

Preservation Act has been completed. 

¶ 75 4. The Plaintiffs’ Commission Act Claims
38 

¶ 76 The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants’ plans to demolish the courthouse would 

violate the Commission Act in two respects. In count II of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege 

that the defendants have resolved to demolish the courthouse without satisfying the Commission 

Act’s requirements for the approval of a new “site” (i.e., without obtaining approval of the 

demolition either by three-fourths of the Rock Island City Council or by a majority of voters in a 

referendum, as required by section 14(a)(1) of the Commission Act (50 ILCS 14(a)(1) (West 

2016)). In count III of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the demolition of the courthouse 

would constitute an illegal and unwarranted expansion of the Commission Act’s purpose to 

“provide a good and sufficient jail.” The trial court dismissed both counts pursuant to section 2-

615 for failure to state a claim. We will address each claim in turn.

¶ 77 A. Whether the Proposed Demolition Comports With the Commission Act’s Site 

 Approval Requirements

¶ 78 The Commission Act grants a public building commission the power “[t]o select, locate, 

and designate *** one or more areas *** as the site or sites to be acquired for the erection, 

alteration or improvement of a building or buildings, public improvement or other facilities.” 50 

ILCS 20/14(a) (West 2016). Where the original resolution for the creation of the public 

commission has been adopted by the governing body of the county, as here, “the site or sites 

selected *** are subject to approval by a majority of the members of the governing body of the 

county and to approval by 3/4 of the members of the governing body of the county seat.” Id. 

§ 14(a)(2).

¶ 79 “[I]f such site or sites so selected *** are not approved by 3/4 of the members of the 

governing body of the county seat the Commission may by resolution request that the approval 

of the site or sites so selected *** be submitted to a referendum at the next general election in 
39 

accordance with the general election law.” Id. If a majority of the electors voting on the 

proposition vote in favor of the proposition, the site or sites so selected shall be approved. Id.

The Commission Act further provides that, “[e]xcept where approval of the site or sites has been 

obtained by referendum, the area or areas may be enlarged by the Board of Commissioners, 

from time to time, as the need therefor arises.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 

¶ 80 The Commission Act also gives a public building commission the power “[t]o demolish, 

repair, alter or improve any building or buildings within the area or areas” and to “maintain and 

operate” any new buildings it constructs with the area or areas so as to effectuate the purposes of 

the Commission Act. Id. § 14(c).

¶ 81 Applying these statutory provisions, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants may not 

demolish the courthouse without first obtaining approval of a new “site” in the manner 

prescribed by section 14(a)(1) of the Commission Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs maintain that 

the demolition must be approved by the Board and by either a majority of voters in a referendum 

or three-fourths of the members of the governing body of the county seat, i.e., the Rock Island 

City Council (Council). Neither the voters nor the Council have approved the proposed 

demolition in this case. Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to an injunction 

barring the demolition pursuant to the Commission Act. 

¶ 82 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and dismissed count II of their complaint 

with prejudice under the Commission Act because it found that section 14(c) of the Commission 

Act authorized the PBC to “demolish *** any building or buildings” within the “area” of a 

previously approved site without having to seek and obtain approval for a new “site” pursuant to 

section 14(a) of the Commission Act.
40 

¶ 83 We agree. Although the Commission Act requires a PBC to obtain approval for a new 

“site or sites to be acquired for the erection, alteration, or improvement of a building or 

buildings, public improvement or other facilities,” the Commission Act clearly indicates that, 

once a project “site” has been selected, acquired, and properly approved under section 14(a), the 

project “area” “may be enlarged *** as the need arises” unilaterally by the Board, without the 

need for the Board to seek prior approval of such enlargement from the Council, the public, or 

any other entity, unless the initial approval of the site was obtained by referendum. Id. § 14(a)(2). 

The plaintiffs have not alleged that the initial approval of the project site for the provision of a 

new jail was obtained by referendum. Nor have they alleged that the Annex Project was 

approved by referendum. To the contrary, they concede that it was not.8

 Accordingly, even 

assuming that the initial project “area” for work on the jail and Annex needed to be “enlarged” in 

order to cover the adjacent courthouse, the Board was clearly authorized to make such an 

enlargement pursuant to the Commission Act. Id. § 14(a)(2). And, once the Board enlarges the 

work area, the Commission Act expressly authorizes it to “demolish” any building in the 

enlarged area. Id. § 14(c). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed count II of the plaintiffs’ 

complaint because the demolition proposed in this case would not violate the Commission Act.

8 The plaintiffs argue that the defendants were “statutorily required to” (but did not) seek 

approval for the Annex project through a referendum because they failed to obtain approval for that 

project from a supermajority of the Council, as required by section 14(a)(2) of the Commission Act. The 

plaintiffs maintain that, “[b]y claiming authority to enlarge an area that needed to be approved through a 

referendum—but was not—the *** PBC attempts to bootstrap one statutory violation to permit another.” 

This argument presumes that the Annex project required prior approval of a new “site” under the 

Commission Act. That presumption seems dubious because it is undisputed that the Annex building is 

contiguous with the jail. In any event, the plaintiffs did not allege facts in their complaint supporting their 

legal conclusion that Council or voter approval of a new site was required before the PBC was authorized 

to enlarge the initial project area to include the building of the Annex. The plaintiffs point to the PBC’s 

June 17, 2015 resolution approving the “site” to be acquired, altered, and improved by the PBC for the 

Annex project. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, however, this does not constitute an admission by the 

PBC that the Annex project “site” required prior approval of the Council or the public. To the contrary, 

the fact that the PBC approved the new area for the Annex project unilaterally on June 17, 2015, without 

seeking such approval suggests that the PBC believed otherwise. 
41 

¶ 84 The plaintiffs argue that, because the Commission Act uses the terms “site” and “area” 

interchangeably throughout section 14 (and because the terms are not defined in the Commission 

Act), the legislature must have intended the two terms to mean the same thing. From this, the 

plaintiffs’ reason that the Board may not begin working in a new “area” without obtaining prior 

approval for a new “site” in the manner prescribed by section 14(a). This argument proves too 

much. If “site” and “area” mean the same thing, then section 14(a) must be read as authorizing 

the Board to enlarge a previously approved “site” unilaterally without getting further approval 

from the Council or from voters. Otherwise, on plaintiffs’ reading, the provision in section 

14(a)(2) authorizing the Board to enlarge an “area” unilaterally as the need arises would have no 

application and would effectively be read out of the statute. If the Board could enlarge the 

site/area only by satisfying section 14(a)’s new site approval requirements, then section 

14(a)(2)’s provision allowing the Board to “enlarge” the site/area would be rendered superfluous 

at best and meaningless at worst. We will not interpret the Commission Act in this manner. See 

Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001) (ruling that a reviewing court must 

read a statute as a whole and “construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence, if 

possible, is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous [citation], avoiding an 

interpretation which would render any portion of the statute meaningless or void”); see also 

Board of Education of Gardner-South Wilmington High School District 73 v. Village of Gardner, 

2014 IL App (3d) 130364, ¶ 16. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the courthouse 

(which is located only 40 feet from the Annex) is not within the site/area of either the jail or the 
42 

Annex, the Board had the authority to enlarge the preexisting site/area to encompass the 

courthouse.9

¶ 85 B. Whether the Demolition of the Courthouse Is Within the PBC’s Existing 

 Purpose 

¶ 86 The PBC was established by the Board on October 1, 1981, for the “sole purpose *** of 

exercising the powers and authority of [the Commission Act] to provide a good and sufficient 

jail for the use of Rock Island County.” In count III of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that 

the PBC’s proposed demolition of the courthouse is outside of this express and limited purpose. 

The Commission Act provides that a public building commission’s purpose may by expanded 

only after such expansion has been approved by voters. 

“The purpose of a public building commission created by the county board of any county 

may not be expanded until the question of expanding the purpose of the public building 

commission has been submitted to the electors of the county at a regular election and 

approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question.” 50 ILCS 20/4a (West 

2016) 

In this case, the voters were never asked to decide whether the Commission Act’s existing 

purpose of providing a good and sufficient jail should be expanded to include demolishing the 

historic courthouse. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, the proposed demolition would be an improper 

expansion of the PBC’s purpose in violation the Commission Act. 

9 Because we find that the Board had the authority to enlarge the preexisting site/area under 

section 14(a)(2) without obtaining prior approval of the Council or the public, we do not need to address 

the defendants’ alternative argument that the Board did not need to obtain the Council’s prior approval 

because the project at issue was intended for use by the County. 
43 

¶ 87 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and dismissed count III of the plaintiffs’ 

complaint under section 2-615 for failure to state a claim. The trial court concluded that “[t]his 

issue was already decided” in the 2015 Litigation “when it was determined that the [A]nnex was 

under the umbrella of the PBC’s purpose” because “[c]ommon sense tells you if it is the purpose 

of the commission to build[ ] the new courthouse, how is it not the same purpose to tear the old 

one down?” The court further reasoned that “[t]o determine otherwise *** would require 

counties to create multiple commission boards,” one “to erect every building they wanted to” and 

“a subsequent board to tear down the building that it replaced.” The court ruled that “[c]ertainly 

that’s not what the legislature had in mind.” 

¶ 88 Given the circuit court of Henry County’s ruling in the 2015 Litigation, we have no 

choice but to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of count III in this case. The quo warranto

judgment does not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in this case as to the question 

whether the demolition of the courthouse is within the PBC’s purpose because the issue of 

demolishing the courthouse was not decided and was not and could not have been raised in the 

quo warranto litigation).

10 Nevertheless, the quo warranto judgment does preclude the plaintiffs 

from arguing that the building of the Annex was outside of the PBC’s existing purpose to build a 

good and sufficient jail for the county of Rock Island. See In re Petition to Create Emmett10 Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent 

jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, 

constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.” 

J & R. Carrozza Plumbing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 307 Ill. App. 3d 220, 223 (1999). To establish 

res judicata, a party must show, inter alia, that the former adjudication involved the same cause of action 

and same subject matter of the later case. Id.; see also River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 295 Ill. 

App 3d 90 (1998); Hannigan v. Hoffmeister, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1075-76 (1992). Collateral estoppel 

precludes the relitigation of a factual or legal issue decided in a prior adjudication only if, inter alia, 

(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the issue in the current action, (2) the issue 

was “necessarily determined” in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to 

contest the issue in the prior adjudication. City of Chicago v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 

2014 IL App (1st) 121507WC, ¶ 51. 
44 

Chalmers Fire Protection District, 58 Ill. App. 3d 897, 904 (1978) (judgment in a quo warranto

proceeding that a fire protection district was legally created was res judicata and therefore barred 

petitioners in a subsequent lawsuit from challenging the legality of the district’s existence, even 

though those petitioners were not parties in the prior quo warranto action); see also People 

ex rel. Lewis v. Whittaker, 254 Ill. 537, 541-42 (1912). Because the quo warranto judgment was 

not appealed, it may not be challenged here. 

¶ 89 In its July 17, 2018, “Resolution of Authority to Enter Into An Intergovernmental 

Agreement” with the PBC to demolish the courthouse, the Board made legislative findings that 

(1) “the *** courthouse is currently in a state of functional decrepitude with insufficient County 

funds to rehabilitate it,” (2) “to date[,] no realistic solution for the preservation of the courthouse 

has been identified,” and (3) “the future demolition of the *** courthouse is necessary for the 

maintenance and security of the Justice Center and the Justice Center Annex project.”

“[L]egislative fact finding authority is broad and should be accorded great deference by the 

judiciary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 231 

Ill. 2d 62, 75 (2008). Courts are not empowered to adjudicate the accuracy of legislative 

findings, and the legislature is not required to convince a reviewing court of the correctness of its 

judgment. Id. Courts grant the same level of deference to legislative fact findings done by 

municipalities in municipal ordinances. Independent Voters of Illinois Independent Precinct 

Organization v. Ahmad ̧ 2014 IL App (1st) 123629, ¶¶ 38, 41. Further, “the county board is itself 

the judge of the necessity of building” and maintaining a county courthouse. County of Coles v. 

Goehring, 209 Ill. 142, 166 (1904) (deference to a county board’s decision). Because the quo 

warranto proceeding determined that the building of the Annex was within the PBC’s purpose of 

building a good and sufficient jail, the Board’s legislative finding that the demolition of the 
45 

“decrepit[ ] courthouse is necessary for the maintenance and security of the Justice Center Annex 

project” (a finding that is entitled to deference) establishes that the demolition of the courthouse 

is within the PBC’s existing purpose. 

¶ 90 We consider the Henry County circuit court’s quo warranto judgment to be indefensible, 

and if that judgment had been appealed, we would have reversed it. As a matter of simple logic, 

we find it difficult to understand how the purpose of building a jail includes the purpose of 

building a courthouse (which is what the Annex essentially is). Moreover, the circuit court of 

Henry County expressly found that the building of the Annex “enhanced” the PBC’s existing 

purpose of building a jail. By definition, that means that the building of the Annex was not 

already included in the PBC’s existing purpose. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enhance (last visited July 10, 2020) 

[https://perma.cc/EX6Q-X5AX] (defining “enhance” as “heighten, increase”). We find the 

circuit court’s expansion of the PBC’s purpose to include the building of a new courthouse 

particularly inappropriate here because (1) the Board had already acknowledged that the PBC 

lacked the authority to build a new courthouse under its initial purpose of providing a good and 

sufficient jail for Rock Island County and (2) the Board therefore put the matter to the voters via 

referendum (in order to follow the requirements of the Commission Act) and the voters

overwhelmingly rejected the proposal to expand the PBC’s purpose to build a courthouse. 

However, because the quo warranto judgment was never appealed, and because of the Board’s 

subsequent legislative findings, we are constrained to affirm the dismissal of count III. EmmettChalmers Fire Protection District, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 904; People ex rel. Lewis, 254 Ill. at 541-

42. 
46 

¶ 91 In addition, we note that the Board also made a legislative finding that the demolition of 

the courthouse was necessary for the maintenance and security of the “Justice Center” itself, 

which includes the jail building and some courthouses and other judicial facilities inside that 

building. Maintaining the jail building and keeping it safe and secure would fall within the 

PBC’s initial purpose of providing a good and sufficient jail, even without the highly 

questionable 2015 quo warranto judgment. Moreover, maintaining and securing the Justice 

Center (which was built to effectuate the purposes of the Commission Act), as well as 

demolishing other buildings within the expanded “area” of the Justice Center, falls within the 

PBC’s statutory authority under the Commission Act. 50 ILCS 20/14(c) (West 2016). 

Accordingly, under the circumstances presented in this case, the plaintiffs can prove no set of 

facts that would entitle them to relief on count III of their complaint. Dismissal of that count was 

therefore proper.

¶ 92 CONCLUSION

¶ 93 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock 

Island County dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims under the Commission Act (counts II and III). We 

reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim under the Preservation Act (count I) and 

remand for further proceedings on that claim. We direct the trial court on remand to enter a TRO 

barring the demolition of the courthouse until the consultation process required by the 

Preservation Act has been completed. 

¶ 94 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.