*

The HONORABLE RICHARD H. KYLE, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-2040

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Terrance Morris; Ricardo Morris; *

Rosalind Morris, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Western District of Missouri

*

Jarrett Lanpher; Robert Schweitzer, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

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Submitted: December 11, 2008

Filed: April 24, 2009

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Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, Circuit Judge, and KYLE,*

 District Judge.

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LOKEN, Chief Judge.

At 11 p.m. on July 28, 2003, Richard Schiele was shot in his Kansas City home

by two assailants. Schiele identified Ricardo Morris as one of the assailants to Police

Officer Jarrett Lanpher. Based on this identification, and some corroboration by other

witnesses, Lanpher obtained a warrant to search the nearby home where brothers

Terrance and Ricardo Morris lived with their mother, Rosalind. The warrant search
1

The HONORABLE FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR., Chief Judge of the United

States District for the Western District of Missouri.

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yielded no evidence, and the brothers were absolved of any role in the shooting.

Another officer kicked Terrance in the face while executing the warrant. 

Rosalind and her sons filed this § 1983 complaint against the Kansas City

Board of Police Commissioners and five police officers. The district court1

 granted

summary judgment dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim against Lanpher and his

supervisor, Sergeant Robert Schweitzer. Morris v. Lanpher, 2007 WL 869498, at *5

(W.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2007). One year later, a jury found in favor of the other officer

on the excessive force claims. The Morrises appeal only the dismissal of the Fourth

Amendment claim. They contend that the affidavit Lanpher submitted in obtaining

the search warrant contained deliberate falsehoods and recklessly disregarded the

truth. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm.

I.

After the shooting, Schiele did not identify his assailants before being taken to

a hospital. Lanpher interviewed Schiele at the hospital the next evening. Schiele said

he lived with a man named Jason, who was helping him remodel houses. Schiele

described the assailants as “two black males.” Lanpher’s interview report then states:

The victim was asked if he knew anyone who would have done this he

immediately thought that Jason had something to do with the attack and

that the two dudes he hangs with w[]ere the one[]s who did the actual

attack. He stated he knew the two dudes went by “Dink” and “Mont.”

He stated he did not know them personally but knew Jason went to their

house all the time around the corner. The victim was asked if he would

be able to identify the subjects who attacked him and he stated, “Yes.”

Ricardo and Terrance Morris have been known since birth as “Dink” and “Mont.” 
-3-

Some three hours later, Lanpher interviewed Schiele’s roommate, Jason

Lancaster, then in custody on other charges. Lancaster denied any part in the shooting

and said he visited Schiele in the hospital earlier that day. Schiele told Lancaster “two

black dudes shot him, one of them was stocky and the other a short dude.” Schiele

said “it might have been the two dudes who live in the 2nd house on the north side of

62nd Street,” who Lancaster knew only as “Dink” and “Mont.” Lancaster said he went

to their house before visiting Schiele that day, as neighbors had reported, but no one

was home. Lanpher’s interview report states:

Lancaster was then shown a photo Line-up consisting of six black males

all similar in appearance, which included a photograph of Ricardo

Morris . . . in the number six position. Morris resides at 1318 E. 62nd

Street, which was identified by neighbors as the residence that Lancaster

had visited on his ATV earlier in the day. Lancaster identified Morris as

the subject he knew as “Dink.”

The next morning, Lanpher visited Schiele at the hospital and showed him the same

six-photo line-up. Lanpher’s report states, “The victim viewed the line-up and

identified Morris as one of the suspect[]s who shot him.” 

That afternoon, Lanpher prepared an affidavit applying for a warrant to search

1318 E. 62nd Street for “Clothing, handguns, rifles, ammunition, spent shell casings,

trace evidence, flashlights.” After reciting the victim’s description of the shooting,

and what neighbors reported hearing and seeing at the time, the affidavit recited:

Neighbors identified 1318 E. 62nd Street as the house that the victim’s

friend hung out with. A computer check was conducted and a photo

line-up was shown to the victim, which included a resident of 1318 E.

62nd Street. The victim identified this subject as the one he wrestled

with and shot him. The subject who lives with the victim also identified

the subject.
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A Jackson County judge issued the warrant. Lanpher was present when a Tactical

Entry Team executed the warrant. Nothing was seized.

II.

Qualified immunity protects public officials from damage actions if their

conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would

have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A police officer in

applying for a search warrant is entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fourth

Amendment damage claim if his conduct was objectively reasonable. “Only where

the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official

belief in its existence unreasonable . . . will the shield of immunity be lost.” Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986). Officer Lanpher satisfies that standard in this

case. His affidavit recited that he heard Schiele identify “Dink” and “Mont” as

possible assailants, gathered evidence identifying Dink and Mont and linking them to

Lancaster and to 1318 E. 62nd Street, and saw both Schiele and Lancaster identify

Ricardo Morris as “Dink,” one of the assailants, from a photo line-up. The affidavit

clearly was not “lacking in indicia of probable cause.” See Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135

F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 1998). 

The Morrises argue that Lanpher is not entitled to qualified immunity for a

different reason -- because his warrant application “deliberately omitted material and

exculpatory information and included falsehoods.” The principle is sound. “A

warrant based upon an affidavit containing ‘deliberate falsehood’ or ‘reckless

disregard for the truth’ violates the Fourth Amendment” and subjects the police officer

to § 1983 liability. Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1996), quoting

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). Truthful in this context means that the

information put forth is “believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 165.
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The district court rejected this contention based upon its review of the extensive

summary judgment record. After summarizing the many omissions and falsehoods

asserted by the Morrises, the court explained:

The Court finds, however, that most of the alleged omissions and

falsehoods . . . are either immaterial, not supported by the record, or

merely conclusions or attorney argument. Whatever the victim’s level

of knowledge regarding the Morris family, the victim identified the

suspects as “Dink” and “Mont” -- the undisputed nicknames of Plaintiffs

Ricardo and Terrance Morris. The materials found in the victim’s home

do not automatically cast doubt as to the victim’s identification of

suspects. Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant Lanpher made false claims

regarding what neighbors told him are merely conclusions that are

unsupported by any facts in the record. . . . Furthermore, the omissions

of the victim’s roommate’s activities and statements are largely

immaterial in that the roommate was also a suspect in the shooting, and

the roommate’s statements do not prevent suspicion of the Morris

brothers, given the victim’s identification of them. 2007 WL 869498, at

*5. 

After careful review of the record, we agree with the district court’s analysis.

The Morrises bore “the burden of proving the intentional or reckless inclusion of false

statements in a warrant affidavit.” United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1443 (8th Cir.

1995). When Lanpher made a properly supported motion for summary judgment on

the ground of qualified immunity, they “may not respond simply with general attacks

upon the defendant’s credibility, but rather must identify affirmative evidence from

which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of proving the

pertinent motive.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998). The Morrises

presented no evidence Lanpher had a personal stake in the matter that might cause him

to act other than as an impartial criminal investigator. Compare Moody v. St. Charles

County, 23 F.3d 1410 (8th Cir. 1994). They offered no specific, nonconclusory

evidence that Lanpher believed his affidavit was false, or recklessly misconstrued

Schiele’s identification. Significantly, they presented no affidavit or deposition
-6-

testimony by victim Schiele or by roommate Lancaster contradicting their photo lineup identifications. Compare Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2000).

Indeed, that the recitals in the warrant affidavit aligned closely with Lanpher’s

contemporaneous interview reports is strong evidence that Lanpher believed that

Schiele had identified one of his attackers, or at least accepted the identification as

true for purposes of further investigation. While we construe disputed facts in the

non-moving parties’ favor, we may not infer bad motive absent even a scintilla of

material fact supporting that inference. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the Morrises failed to submit probative

evidence that Lanpher’s warrant affidavit contained deliberate falsehoods or a reckless

disregard of the truth, and that an affidavit “supplemented by the omitted information,

would not have been sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” Riehm v.

Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 966 (8th Cir. 2008); see Bagby, 98 F.3d at 1099 (“qualified

immunity is appropriate if defendant has been accused of submitting a recklessly false

affidavit and if a corrected affidavit would still provide probable cause to arrest or

search”). Accordingly, summary judgment was proper.

Without an underlying constitutional violation by Lanpher, the Morrises’

§ 1983 claim against Schweitzer for failure to supervise necessarily fails. See

Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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