### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 14, 200 6

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . WI LLI AM THOMAS BRANCH

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-D- 3001 Mark J. F ishb urn, Jud ge

No. M2005- 01125-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jul y 10, 2006

Following a jury trial, Def endant, William Thomas Bra nch, wa s found g uiltyof the off ense of rape of a c hild, a Class A felony

. The trial c ourt sentenc ed De fenda nt as a Rang e I , standard of fende r, to f if te e n y e ars . In h is a

pp e a l, D e fe nd a nt a

rg ues that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his conviction, and that the trial court e rre d in its i nstructions to the jury

. After a thoroug h revie w of the
re c or d, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J., jo ine d; D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J

. , c o n c u rr e d i n r e s u l t s o n l y. Ross E. Alderman, District Public Def ender ; Emma Rae Te nnent, Assistant Publi c De fende r; Clark B. Thornton, Assistant P ublic Def ender ; and Katie Weiss, Assistant Publi c Defe n d er, N ashville, Tenne ssee, f

or the a ppellant, Will iam Thomas B ranc h.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . Bl e ds oe , Ass ist a nt Att orne y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. (Torry ) Johns on I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Jeffr ey De v as her, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

The min o r v i ct im will be refe rre d to by his init ials, C.G. Taronda Gar rett, the victim’s mothe r, te sti fi e d th a t C. G. is a n o nly c hil d, a ndMs. Ga

rr e tt o ft e n arranged ti me f or C.G . to vis it family members so that he could pl ay with other children. Ms. Gar rett said that her U ncle Car l and Def en d an t , h er uncle’s long -term pa rtner, lived ne x t door to her g randmother . On the day of the of fe ns e , M s. Ga

rr e tt a ndC.G . s pe nt the da y wi th M s. Ga rr e tt’ s g rand mothe r, a ndC.G . p la y e d w ith Def endant’ s g randsons, De vonta and Roder rick B ranc h. Ms. G arr ett said she had pla ns to attend a party that night, and C.G. asked her if he could spend the night at his g reat-uncle’ s house so that he-2-

could continue playing w ith Defe ndant’s g randsons. Ms. Ga rre tt said she ag ree d, altho u g h she tho ug ht at th e tim e that he r u nc le wa s g oin g to b e ho me that ni g ht.

Ms. Garr ett said that she ar rived at her grandmother’s house the next morning bef ore 11:00 a.m., and C.G. was play ing outside. Ms. G arr ett, C.G., and Ms. G arr ett’s gra n d m o t h er att ended
c hu rc h s e rv ic e s, a nd the n Ms. Ga rr e tt an d C.G . re turne d to the ir ho me . Ms. G arr e tt s a id that sh e did not notice anything wrong with he r son. That afte rnoon, Ms. G arr ett rec eived a telephone c all from Devonta’ s and Roderrick’s mother, Y olanda B ranc h, who told Ms. Garre tt that her son, D e v onta, had de sc ri be d a n in c ide nt i nv olv ing De fe nd a nt andC.G . w hic h h a d o c c ur re d th e nig ht b e fo re . M s. Gar rett asked C.G. to tell her what happene d. After her c onversation with C .G., Ms. Gar rett ca lled C.G.’s fathe r and othe r fa milymembers to ask the ir advice about how to handle the situation. On Monday , Ms. Garr ett reported the incident to the police

. C.G ., wh o w a s n ine y e ars olda t th e tim e of tr ia l, te sti fi e d tha t he wa s sev e n y e ars olda ndin the first g rade when the of fense occur

red. C.G. said that Def

endant lived with C.G.’ s g reat-uncle, and C. G

. s p e n t th e n ig h t a t h is g r e a t- u n c le ’ s h o u s e o n th e d a y o f th e o f f e n s e s o th a t h e c o u ldplay with Defe ndant’s g randsons. The children watche d cartoons on the television set in the living room of De fenda nt’s house. C.G. said that Def endant put a movie into the VCR about “two boy s kissing and stuff.” C.G. told Def endant, “that’s nasty ,” because he did not like the m ovie. Def endant sat on the couc h and watched the movie.

C. G., De vo nta , a ndRod e rric k w e nt i nto De fe nd a nt’ s b e dr oo m a ndfo un d s ome c on do ms. C.G. said that he did not know what c ondoms were at t h e time. He and his friends filled some of the condoms up with wa t er , t u rn i n g them into water ba lloons. C.G. said that at some point that afte rnoon or e vening , Def endant laid down on his be d, pulled his pants down, and put a c ondom on his “ private pa

rt .” C.G . s a id that De fe nd a nt mov e d his ha nd up a nd do wn on his “ private pa rt ” wh ile C

. G. wa t ch ed

. C

. G. s ai d t h at h e d i d n o tk n o w w h at De fe n d an twa s d o i n g.

L ater , C.G., Devonta, Roder rick, a nd Def

en d an t we re in the living room. De fenda nt was sitti ng on the couc h. C.G. said that he stood in front of Def endant and pulled his pants down. C.G. said that he wa nted to see what “it” felt like beca use he had seen “it” on the movie. C.G. said that Def endant “ sucked [his] private pa rt” for a sec ond, and then C.G. ba cked a way fr om Defe ndant be c a us e it f

e lt “ na sty .” C.G . s a id that he “ did n’ t li ke it. ” C.G

. sa id that De fe nd a nt did no t to uc h w ith his hands either himself or C.G. during the i ncident. C.G. then clarified that Defenda nt masturbated in his bedroom afte r the incide nt of fellatio.

Def endant told C.G. the nex t morning not to tell his mother what happene d. C.G. said that he did not talk to his mot her a bout the incident until after Ms. B ranc h telephoned.

On cr oss-examination, C.G. said that he did not remember talking to a

counselor a

bout the inc ide nt, or

te lli ng the c ou ns e lor

that D e vo nta or Rod e rric k, ins te a d of De fe nd a nt, pu t the mov ie int o the VCR . H e a ls o d id n o t r e me mb e r te ll in g th e c o u n s e lo r th a t D e f e n d a n t h a d p u t h is mo uth on Devonta’ s and Roderrick’s private parts as well as C.G.’s. C.G. denied at trial that Defe ndant had-3-

inappropriately

touched a ny one else the night of the offe nse, but he said that the other two boy s were in the living room whe n the incident occ urre d.

Br ett Gipson, a dete ctive with the Metro N ashville Police Depa rtment, testified that he wa s assig ned to investig ate the incident. Detec tive Gipson interviewe d Devonta and Roderrick B ranc h at their re spective sc hools, but he did not interview C.G. Detec tive Gipson said that the Depa rtment of Children’s services routinely interviewe d victims as y oung as C.G. During a sea rch of De fe nd a nt’ s h ome , p oli c e of fi c e rs dis c ov e re d two mov ie s dep ic tin g ho mos e xua l a c tiv ity , a ndbo th used and pa ckag ed condoms, but no phy sical evide nce suc h as semen. Detec tive Gipson interviewe d De fe nd a nt i n his un mark e d patr ol c ar w hil e oth e r o ff ic e rs se arc he d h is h ou se . D e te c tiv e Gi ps on sa id that he re a d D e fe nd a nt h is Miranda ri g hts , an d De fe nd a nt exe c ute d a wr itt e n wa ive r of tho se ri g hts

. D e f e n d a n t ’ s t ap e r e c o r d e d s t a t e m e n tw a s p l a ye d t o th e j u r y.

I n his statement, Def

enda n t i n i t ially

denied that he had inappr opriately touched C.G. Def endant sa id that he had dr unk “quite a bit,” “ up into a half-g allon” of Cana dian Mist liquor, that nig ht anddidno t r e me mbe r a nythi ng that ha pp e ne d. De fe nd a nt did no t re me mbe r pu tti ng a mov ie int o th e VC R or mas tur batin g in f

ro nt o f C .G . D e fe nd a nt, ho we ve r, a c kn ow le dg e d th a t hi s g rand so ns a ndC.G . pla y e d with wate r- fi lle d co nd oms that nig ht. Ul tim a te ly , De fe nd a nt s a id, “ Th is is the first time anything like that ha ppened to me,” and “it’s not g oing to ha ppen anymore.” Defen d an t ac k n owledg ed that the incide nt “was a spur-of- the-moment thing .” He stated that he kn e w the inc ide nt h app e ne d, bu t he c ou ld n ot r e me mbe r the de ta ils

.
De te c tiv e Gi ps on sa id that C. G. didno t un de rg o a ph y sic a l e xami natio n b e c a us e the of fe ns e was re ported more than thirty -six hours af ter it occ urre d, and C.G. did n o t d i splay any signs of p h ys i c a l i n

j u r y. Carlin Giles, a c ounselor with the Na shville Chil d Advoca cy Center at the time of the offe nse, wa s called a s a defense witness. Ms. Giles testified that she inter viewed C.G. a bout a wee k afte r the off

ense. Ms. Giles sa id that s h e avoided the use of lea ding que stions during a minor victim’s forensic interview, a nd she enc ourag ed the c hild to d es cr i b e what happened in his or her own words. Ms. Giles said that C.G. initially portray ed himself as a

witness to the event r ather than a participant, but he eventually disclosed t hat Defenda nt had “sucked” his private part. Ms. Giles
sa id that sh e wa s su rp ri se d th e se ve n- y e ar- oldvic tim us e d th e wo rd“ su c ke d, ” bu t in oth e r r e sp e c ts, C. G. did not displ ay

a sig nificant unde rstanding about what ha d happene d to him. Ms. Gil es acknow ledg ed that C.G. told her that De fenda nt had per formed or al sex on Devonta, and that Roderric k put the movie into the VCR. Ms. G iles acknow ledg ed that her interview summary did not
re fl e c t th a t C. G. ha d d isc los e d to he r that D e fe nd a nt m a stu rb a te d in fr on t of him

. II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
Def endant’ s challeng e to the suff iciency of the c onv i ct i ng evidenc e esse ntially questions C.G .’ s c r e d i b i l i t y a s a w i t n e s s b a s e d o n t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s b e t w e e n h i s t e s t i m o n y a t tr i a l a nd his response s during Ms. Giles’ interview . W h en a def endant c halleng es the suff iciency of the-4-

c on vic tin g e vid e nc e , w e mus t r e vie w the e vid e nce in a lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on in de te rm ini ng wh e the r a ratio na l trie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d a ll the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S.307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789, 61 L . Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Onc e a jury finds a def

endant guilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is remove d and re place d with a pre sumption of guilt. State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991) . The de fe nd a nt h a s the bu rd e n of ove rc omi ng thi s pre su mpt ion , an d the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate view of the e vidence along with all r easona ble infer ence s which may be dra wn from that
e v id e n c e

. Id .; St at e v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The jury is presumed to have resolved all conflicts and draw n any rea sonable infere nces in f avor of the State. Sta te v . She ffi e ld , 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) . Questions conce rning the cr edibilityof wit n es s es , the weig ht and value to be given the evidenc e, and all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of fac t and not this court. State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . These r ules are applicable to findings of g uilt predicate d upon direc t evidence , circ umstantial ev i d en ce , or a combination of both direc t and circ umstantial evidence

. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. Def endant wa s convicted of the offense of rape of a child which is define d as “the unlawful
se xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f a

vic tim by the de fe nd a nt, or

the de fe nd a nt b y

the vic tim , if

su c h v ic tim

is l e ss that thirteen (13) y ear s of ag e.” T.C.A. § 39-13-522( a). “Sexual pe netration” includes fe l l ati o, “howe ver slig ht.” Id . § 39-13-501( 7).

We a cknowledg e that Ms. G iles’ testimony highlig hted certain inconsistencies between C.G.’s description of the events leading up to the offe nse during his interview and the description prese nted at trial. Howeve r, all questions involving the cr edibilityof the witness, a nd the re solution of any conflicts, are left to the trier of fac t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The jury

is in a position t o view a w itness, hear his or her te stimony , and obser ve the witness’s demeanor on the stand. B y it s v er dict, the jury

obviouslyacc redited the victim’s te sti mon y

. De sp ite c e rt a in inc on sis te nc ie s in C.G .’ s de sc ri pti on of the e ve nts that ni g ht, the vic tim clea rly testified that Def

endant pe rformed ora l se x on him in the Defe ndant’s living r oom, and that he wa s se ve n y e ars olda t th e ti me of the of fe ns e . C. G. ’s te sti mon y a t tria l, t og e the r w ith Def endant’ s statement to the police, pr ovide more tha n sufficie nt evidence to sustain the conviction.

Ba sed on our r eview of

the re cord, w e conc lude that a r ational trier of fac t could conclude be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t De fe nd a nt is g uil ty of the of fe ns e of ra

pe of a c hil d. De fe nd a nt i s not entitled to relief on this issue.

III . J ur y I nst r uc ti ons
Def endant a rg ues t hat t he trial c ourt’s instructions to the jury failed to c lear ly

define the mens
rea requ i re m en t fo r the sexual penetr ation element of the offe nse of r ape of

a child. De fenda nt
c on te nd s th a t by

inc lud ing the me nta l state of re c kle ssn e ss in its c ha rg e , the ins truc tio ns se rv e d to lessen the State’ s burden of proof be cause the eleme n t o f s ex u al penetr ation require s either a n i n t en t i o n al o ra k n o wi n g mens rea . The State a rg ues that De fenda nt has waive d this iss ue by not-5-

objecting to the trial court’ s jury instructions, and by

failing to raise the issue of improper jury instructions in his m otion for new trial. Reg ardle ss of whether or not Def endant waived this issue, we f ind no error

in the trial court’ s instructions to the jury in the case sub judice

.
I n criminal ca ses, a defe ndant has a rig ht to a corr ect and complete char g e of the law. Sta te v. Garrison , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 26 , 4 32 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . The ma te ri a l ele me nts of the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e sh ou ld be desc ribed a nd define d in co n n ec t i o n with that offense

. State v. Duc ker , 27 S.W .3d 889, 899 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Craven , 764 S.W .2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1989). The failure to do so deprives the de fe nd a nt o f the c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht to a jury tr ia l a ndsu bje c ts the e rr on e ou s ju ry ins truc tio n to harmless e rror

analy sis. Garrison , 40 S.W .3d at 433-34. A jury instruction, however , must be revie wed in its entirety and re ad as a whole rather than in isolation. State v. Leach , 148 S.W .3d 42, 58 (Tenn. 2004) . “An instruc t i o n should be consider ed pre judicially err oneous only

if the jury char g e, when re ad as a whole, f ails to fairly

submit t he leg al issues or misleads the jury as to the applicable law.” State v. Faulkne r , 1 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 , 5 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Vann , 976 S.W .2d 93, 101 (Tenn. 1998) ).

The trial c ourt in the ca se sub judice ins truc te d th e jury a s f oll ow s:
Cou nt o ne , ra

pe of a c hil d; any

pe rs on wh o c omm its the of fe ns e of ra pe of a c hil d is g uil ty of a c ri me . F or

y ou to f indthe de fe nd a nt g uil ty

of thi s o ff e ns e , th e Sta te mus t have pr oven bey ond a re asonable doubt the exis tence of t h e fo l lowing e ssential elements: one, that the defe ndant had unlawful sexual pe netration of [C .G.] or [ C.G.] had unlawf

ul sex ual pene tration of the defe ndant; and two, that [C .G.] was less than t h i r t e e n ye ar s o f

a g e ; a n d t h r e e , t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n ta c t e d e i t h e r

i n t e n t i o n a l l y, k n o w i n g l y o r

r e c k l e s s l y.
The trial c ourt then def

ined t h e cu l p able menta l states of intentional, knowing ly and
re c kle ssl y a s f oll ow s:

I nte nti on a lly , a s u se d in the of fe ns e of ra

pe of a c hil d, me a ns that th e de fe nd a nt a c ts with a consc ious objective or desire to eng ag e in sexual conduct with [C.G.] and that the de fe nd a nt’ s a c ts [s ic ] wa s a c on sc iou s o bje c tiv e or

de sir e that a

pe ne tr a tio n r e su lt f r o m th e s e xu a l c o n ta c t –

c o n d u c t w ith [C

. G

. ]. Knowing ly , as used in the of fense of ra

pe of a child, means that the de fenda nt was
a wa re that he wa s e ng a g ing in sex ual con du c t w ith [C.G .], that he is a wa re his conduct is re asonably

certain to result in the pene tration of [C.G.] , or the pe netration of him by [C .G.], and that [C .G.] was less than thirteen y ear s of ag e.

Re c kle ssl y , a s u se d in the of fe ns e of ra pe of a c hil d, me a ns that th e de fe nd a nt a c ts
rec kles s l y wh en he is awa re of , but consciously

disreg ards a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that [C .G.] is l ess than thirtee n y ear s of ag e, and that penetra t ion wi ll o c c ur a s a re su lt o f the se xua l c on du c t.-6-

Rely ing primarily

on State v. W

eltha W omack , N o

. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 2 3 3 2

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 5 WL 17428 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J an. 4, 2005), no perm. to appeal filed , Def endant a rg ues that the trial court’s instructions errone ously failed to distinguish betwee n the sepa rate mental states require d for the e lement of sexual penetr ation and t h e el em en t of the victim’s ag e. I n W eltha W omack , the trial court included the mental state of re cklessness within its instruc tions to the jury
on the of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d r ape . B e c a us e a g g ra vate d r ape is a natur e of

the c on du c t of

fe ns e r e q u irin g p r o o f th a t th e d e f e n d a n t a c te d e ith e r in te n ti o n a ll y o r k n o w ing ly , the W omack court conclude d that the inclusion of rec klessness in the def inition of applicable menta l states lessened the State’s burde n of proof as to the element of sexual pe netration. Under the fac ts pr esente d in that
case , the W

omack c ou rt c on c lud e d that the ins tr

uc tio n e rr or

wa s n ot h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt and re verse d the def endant’ s conviction.

We b e g in b y

no tin g that th e of

fe ns e of ra pe of a c hil d d oe s no t sp e c if

y a me nta l st a te in i ts
s tatu to r y definition. See T. C.A . § 39 -1 3- 52 2. Whe re a statut ory de fi nit ion “ do e s n ot p la inl y dis pe ns e wi th a

me nta l e le me nt, int e nt, kn ow le dg e or re c kle ssn e ss su ff

ic e s to e sta

bli sh the c ulp able mental state.” T.C.A. § 39-11-301( c). See, e .g. State v. Barney , 986 S.W .2d 545, 550 (Tenn. 1999) (“ R ap e o f ach i l d re q u i re s s ex u al p en et ra t i o n o f t h e v i ct i m , an d t h e m en t al s t at e re q u i re d m ayra n ge fr om int e nti on a l to kn ow in g or re c kle ss. ” ); Sta te v . H ill , 954 S.W .2d 725, 729 (Tenn. 1997) (“O bviously , the ac t for wh i ch the defenda nt is indi cted, ‘ unlawfully sexual[ ly ] penetrat[ing]’ a pe rs on un de r the a g e of thi rt e e n, is c omm itt able on ly if the princ ipa l a c tor ’s mens rea is i nte nti on a l, knowing or re ckless”)

.
I n Tenne ssee, the c ul p ab l e m en t al states ar e def ined in relation to three possible conduc t elements of an offe nse, which ma y be found sing ly

or in combi n at i on with one another within an offe nse’s statutory

definition. See T.C.A. § 39-11-302. The se “c onduct eleme nts” incl u de the nature of the conduct, the circumstances sur rounding the conduc t, and the re sult of the conduct. See T.C.A. § 39-11-201( a)( 1). The f irst element, natur e of the conduct, involves the pr oscribed a ct or the
manner in which the def

endant a cts; the second e lement, circ umstances of the offe nse, re fer s to a situatio n w hic h r e la te s to the de fe nd a nt’ s c ulp abil ity ; and the thi rde le me nt, re su lt o f the c on du c t, require s that the defe ndant’s conduc t must at least be a phy sical cause of the ha rmful re sult. W

eltha W omack , 2005 WL

17428, at *8.

Ba sed upon the statutory definit i o n o f culpable me ntal states, “intentional” r efe rs to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the c onduct; “knowing ” re fer s to the nature of the conduc t, the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct, or the re sult of the conduct; and “re ckless” r efe rs to the result of the c onduct or to the c ircumstance s surrounding the conduc t, but not t o t h e n at u re of the conduct. See T.C.A. § 39-11-302( a), ( b), and ( c).

I n Sta te v . Ch e ste r W

ay ne W alt e rs , No. M2003-03019-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2726034, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, No. 30, 2004), perm. to app. denie d (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005) a pa ne l of thi s Co urt c on c lud e d th a t th e of fe ns e of ra pe of a c hil d co ntains a ll thr e e c on du c t e le me nts

. See also State v . Leon Tucker , No. M2005-008 3 9 -CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 547991, at *12 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar . 7, 2006), no perm. to appeal filed . The e lement of unlaw ful sexual-7-

penetr ation contains two conduc t elements: nature of the conduct and result of the conduct. Chester W ay ne W alt e rs , 2004 WL

2726034, at *13. A victim’s ag e is a c ircumstance surro u nding the conduct. Id

. (c i t i n g State v. De ji A. Ogundiya , No. M2002-03099-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 315138, at 6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, F eb. 19, 2004), no perm. to appeal filed ). Apply ing the fore g oing to the ca se sub judice , the re quisite culpable menta l states for unlaw ful sexual penetration, bo th a natur e -o f- c on du c t a ndre s u l t

- o f

- c o n d uc t of

fe ns e , is e ith e r i nte nti on a l or kn ow ing ; th e re qu isi te culpable me ntal states pertaining to the of victim’s a g e, a cir cumstance of the off ense, a re know ing
or re c kle ss.

Ba sed on the for eg oing, w e find n o er ro r in the trial court’ s instructions to the jury on the offe nse of r ape of

a child. T h e i nitial charg e to the jury setting f orth the material elements of the offe nse of r ape of a child did not assign a specific mental state to the e lements. The tria l court
se pa rate ly de fi ne d th e me nta l st a te s o f i nte nti on a lly , kno wi ng ly , a ndre c kle ssly and co rr e c tly identified t h e m aterial element to which the individual mental state related. The instruc tion sp e c if ic a lly lim ite d th e re c kle ss mens rea to the circ umstances of the offe nse. I n the ca se sub judice , the e nti re c ha

rg e to the jury

on the of fe ns e of ra pe of a c hil d f a ir ly de fi ne d th e iss ue s o f l a w a nddid not misl ead the jury

. See Frederick Leon Tucker , 2006 WL 547991, at *13 (finding no err or in trial court’s instruc tions to t he jury on the offe nse of r ape of a child whe n no specific mental state wa s assig ned to t he def

inition of rape of

child, and the tria l court sepa rate ly define d the mental states of intentionally , knowing ly , and re cklessly ). De fenda nt is not entit led to relief on this iss ue.
CO NC LU SION

Af te r a tho ro ug h r e vie w, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE