A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster 

Management Activities in Response to 

Hurricane Katrina 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews

OIG-06-32 March 2006

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

March 31, 2006 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared by our office as 

part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the 

department. 

This report assesses the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) performance as it 

conducted its disaster management responsibilities in response to Hurricane Katrina. We examined 

whether the laws, regulations, policies, procedures, plans, guidelines, and resources were adequate 

and operational, and whether FEMA's organizational structure enhanced or hindered its emergency 

management capabilities. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 

Table of Contents 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................1 

Background.......................................................................................................................................4 

 Hurricane Katrina’s Devastation......................................................................................................4 

 Preparing for the Storm....................................................................................................................5 

 Initial Response................................................................................................................................6 

 Initial Recovery..............................................................................................................................13 

 Framework for Federal Disaster Response....................................................................................13 

Results of Review ..........................................................................................................................18 

Difficulty Adapting to New Response Plans........................................................................18 

 States Had Varied Success Implementing Incident Command System Structures and 

 Establishing Unified Command.....................................................................................................19 

 FEMA and DHS Were Adjusting to the National Response Plan.................................................23 

 Need to Solidify Role of ESF-5, Emergency Management...........................................................31 

 ESF-6, FEMA’s Coordination Efforts with Other Governmental and 

 Nongovernmental Partners.............................................................................................................34 

 New Capabilities and Improved Coordination Necessary for ESF-9 ............................................52 

 ESF-15 Structure and State Coordination Need Improvement......................................................56 

 National Guard and Active Duty Troops Provide Valuable Support but 

 Improved Coordination with FEMA Is Needed.............................................................................62 

FEMA Provided Record Levels of Support but Delivery Structure 

Needs Improvement.....................................................................................................................65 

 Visibility and Improvements to Resource Ordering and Delivery Process Required ...................66 

 Unreliable Disaster Communications During the Initial Response ...............................................77 

 FEMA Does Not Have Staff or Plans Adequate to Meet Its Human Capital Needs during 

 Catastrophic Disasters....................................................................................................................81 

 Individual Assistance.....................................................................................................................87 

 FEMA’s Efforts to Augment Staff and Call Center Capacity .......................................................87 

 Housing Area Command Concept .................................................................................................94 

 Delivery of FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program..........................................................97 

 Delivery of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program ........................................................................106 
Table of Contents 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

FEMA Needs to Improve Readiness....................................................................................109 

 FEMA’s Organization and Capacity to Respond to Disasters.....................................................110 

 Grant Program Changes Contributed to Weakened Relationship with States.............................112 

 Organizational Staffing Requires Better Management................................................................118 

 Despite Expanded Training Delivery, Some FEMA Training Needs Are Unmet.......................120 

 FEMA Planning Efforts Were Incomplete and Insufficient ........................................................123 

 Long-term Deterioration in FEMA’s Exercise Program .............................................................128 

 FEMA Should Strengthen Remediation Measures for “Lessons Learned”.................................132 

Future Considerations...............................................................................................................134 

 Working Toward All-Hazards Preparedness ...............................................................................135 

 Developing DHS Culture in Carrying Out Emergency Management Responsibilities...............140 

 Stafford Act Authorities Are Sufficient, Long-term Recovery Issues Need to be Addressed ....143 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis......................................................................145 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Hurricane Katrina Timeline................................................................................146 

 Appendix B: FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs ..........................................................4149 

 Appendix C: FEMA’s Public Assistance Program and Eligible Work ...................................156 

 Appendix D: The National Incident Management System ......................................................159 

 Appendix E: The National Response Plan...............................................................................163 

 Appendix F: Comparison of PFO and FCO Duties Under the National Response Plan.........165 

 Appendix G: National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster........................................166 

 Appendix H: FEMA Consolidated Shelter Report...................................................................168 

 Appendix I: Disaster Recovery Centers: Location Map........................................................170 

 Appendix J: Disaster Recovery Centers: Hours of Operation ...............................................171 

 Appendix K: Agencies Receiving Mission Assignments ........................................................173 

 Appendix L: Mission Assignment Descriptions......................................................................174 

 Appendix M: Call Center Staff Compared to Number of Calls ...............................................178 

 Appendix N: Average Length of Disaster Victim Calls ..........................................................179 

 Appendix O: FEMA Referrals to Other Assistance Providers.................................................180 

 Appendix P: DHS Organizational Charts................................................................................181 

 Appendix Q: FEMA Ten-Year Timeline .................................................................................183 

 Appendix R: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .....................................................................185 

 Appendix S: Recommendations ..............................................................................................187 

 Appendix T: Management Response to Draft Report .............................................................193 
Table of Contents 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

 Appendix U: Major Contributors to This Report.....................................................................209 

 Appendix V: Report Distribution.............................................................................................210 

Abbreviations 

 ADD Automated Deployment Database 

 CORE Cadre of On-Call Response Employees 

 DAE Disaster Assistance Employee 

 DHS Department of Homeland Security 

 EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

 EMPG Emergency Management Performance Grants 

 EOC Emergency Operations Center 

 EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response 

 ESF Emergency Support Function 

 FCO Federal Coordinating Officer 

 FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

 FY Fiscal Year 

 HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center 

 HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 

 ICS Incident Command System 

 IHP Individuals and Households Program 

 IIMG Interagency Incident Management Group 

 JFO Joint Field Office 

 MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support 

 MRE Meal Ready-to-Eat 

 NDMS National Disaster Medical System 

 NEMB-CAP National Emergency Management Baseline Capabilities Assurance Program 

 NPSC National Processing Service Center 

 NRCC National Response Coordination Center 

 NIMS National Incident Management System 

 NRP National Response Plan 

 ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness 

 OIG Office of Inspector General 

 PFO Principal Federal Official 

 RAMP Remedial Action Management Program 

 RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center 

 SBA Small Business Administration 

 US&R Urban Search and Rescue 

 VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 1 

Executive Summary 

The federal government, in particular the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), received widespread criticism for a slow and ineffective 

response to Hurricane Katrina. Much of the criticism is warranted. Hurricane 

Katrina’s high winds and storm surge caused devastating loss of life and 

substantial property damage in Mississippi and in Louisiana. In the city of 

New Orleans several breaches of the levee system compounded losses. The 

hurricane caused significant damage in Alabama also. Although FEMA and 

other agencies deployed emergency responders and resources in advance of 

the storm and supported state efforts to evacuate people and conduct other 

final preparations, most were overwhelmed the first week after landfall. 

We conducted a review of FEMA’s activities in response to Hurricane 

Katrina, which details FEMA’s responsibilities for three of the four major 

phases of disaster management – preparedness, response, and recovery – 

during the first five weeks of the federal response. In addition, we evaluated 

FEMA’s preparedness and readiness efforts over the past ten years to 

determine its organizational capability and posture prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

Under the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)1

 and the National Response Plan (NRP), 

FEMA provides disaster assistance to individuals and communities and 

coordinates emergency support functions for emergency management; mass 

care, housing, and human services; urban search and rescue; long-term 

recovery; and external affairs. We reviewed whether FEMA's authorities, 

plans and procedures, organizational structure, and resources were adequate 

and effective. Appendix R summarizes the scope and methodology of this 

review. 

Within the past two years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

published two watershed planning documents – the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) and the NRP – that restructure how federal, 

 

1

 P.L. No. 93-288 (1974)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§5121–5206 and other scattered sections) 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 2 

state, and local government agencies and emergency responders conduct 

disaster preparation, response, and recovery activities. Changes needed to 

implement both documents, however, were still underway when Hurricane 

Katrina made landfall. FEMA’s initial response was significantly impeded by 

the adjustments it was making in implementing its responsibilities under the 

NRP. 

The response demonstrated some positive features of the incident command 

structure under NIMS, which FEMA and state staff led in Mississippi and 

Alabama. It also highlighted severe deficiencies and multiple areas where 

FEMA and DHS headquarters must make adjustments to the NRP, such as the 

use of incident designations, the role of the Principal Federal Official (PFO), 

and the responsibilities of emergency support function coordinators. 

When compared to other disasters, FEMA provided record levels of support to 

Hurricane Katrina victims, states, and emergency responders. However, a 

lack of visibility in the resource ordering process, difficulty deploying 

sufficient numbers of trained personnel, unreliable communication systems, 

and insufficient management controls for some assistance programs 

demonstrate a need for improved response support capabilities and more 

effective delivery mechanisms for assistance. 

FEMA’s efforts to support state emergency management and to prepare for 

federal response and recovery in natural disasters were insufficient for an 

event of Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. Difficulties experienced during the 

response directly correlate with weaknesses in FEMA’s grant programs, 

staffing, training, catastrophic planning, and remediation of issues identified 

during previous disasters and exercises. As FEMA’s role in administering 

grants and conducting exercises for natural hazards preparedness has 

diminished, new mechanisms are needed to enhance capability and sustain its 

relationships with states and first responders. 

Finally, the integration of FEMA, all hazards preparedness, and disaster 

response and recovery capabilities within DHS requires additional attention. 

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DHS’ prevention and 

preparedness for terrorism have overshadowed that for natural hazards, both 

in perception and in application. Although an “all-hazards” approach can 

address preparedness needs common to both man-made and natural events, 

DHS must ensure that all four phases of emergency management – 

preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation – are managed throughout 

the department on an all-hazards basis. Coordination and consultation among 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 3 

DHS components and with the states is essential to guide, advise, develop, 

and monitor all-hazards capability and responder effectiveness. 

We make 38 recommendations to the Director of FEMA, Under Secretary for 

Preparedness, Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, and Director of the Office 

of Operations Coordination. We are recommending that DHS headquarters 

and FEMA establish measurable expectations of FEMA’s response; provide 

the necessary financial, technical, and staff support to meet them; and assess 

FEMA’s readiness. In addition, we make recommendations aimed at 

clarifying how DHS headquarters, FEMA, and other DHS components will 

implement aspects of the NRP, and address improvements to FEMA’s 

infrastructure for resource ordering and tracking; personnel deployment; 

disaster communications; and disaster application handling. To improve 

disaster preparedness, we are recommending that FEMA complete 

catastrophic, surge, and workforce plans; add training; strengthen its remedial 

action program; and, build relationships with the states in concert with the 

Preparedness Directorate and DHS Public Affairs. Finally, we are 

recommending several modifications to how FEMA manages disaster 

assistance, including testing programs before their use and housing displaced 

persons. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 4 

Background 

Hurricane Katrina’s Devastation 

After first making landfall in Florida as a Category 1 hurricane on 

August 25, 2005, Hurricane Katrina crossed the Gulf of Mexico and grew in 

intensity before making a second landfall in Louisiana as a strong Category 3 

hurricane on August 29, 2005.2 As the storm passed and assistance started 

moving into the area, New Orleans’ levee system sustained several breaches, 

failed, and submerged much of the city under water, exacerbating what was 

already a major disaster. 

While FEMA and other federal, state, and local entities pre-staged 

commodities and personnel in and around the region to respond to Hurricane 

Katrina, the magnitude of the storm and its catastrophic effects completely 

overwhelmed FEMA’s disaster response system and resources, and those of 

state and local governments. In addition, differences in disaster response and 

emergency management capabilities across states resulted in varied levels of 

response success. 

Hurricane Katrina left damage in catastrophic proportions along the Gulf 

Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The hardest hit communities 

lost all infrastructure: electricity; water and sewer; roads and bridges; 

communication systems including telephone lines, cell phone towers, radio 

capabilities, and many satellite antennae; and, in some instances, basic 

governmental operations including law enforcement. Many local first 

responders were also victims. 

Hurricane Katrina caused 1,326 deaths – 1,096 in Louisiana, 228 in 

Mississippi, and 2 in Alabama.3

 More than 700,000 people were displaced 

 

2

 The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale classifies hurricanes by wind intensity in order to predict the damage and flooding 

the storm will likely cause upon landfall. A Category 3 hurricane has sustained winds of 111–130 miles per hour and a 

predicted storm surge of 9–12 feet, causing flooding and some structural damage. A Category 4 hurricane has sustained 

winds of 131–155 miles per hour and a predicted storm surge of 13–18 feet. The most intense hurricane, Category 5, has 

sustained winds over 156 miles per hour and a predicted storm surge over 19 feet. A Category 5 hurricane can cause 

complete roof failure, building failure, utility loss, and major flooding damage. Initial reports indicated that Hurricane 

Katrina made landfall as a Category 4 storm, particularly due to the level of damage left by the storm; however, on 

December 20, 2005, the National Hurricane Center reported that aircraft data showed Hurricane Katrina actually made 

landfall in Louisiana as a high-end Category 3 hurricane. 

3

 Data from www.firstgov.gov, Frequently Asked Questions – Hurricane Katrina’s effects, accessed January 30, 2006. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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from the Gulf Coast region as a result of Hurricane Katrina. More than 

273,000 people were displaced and evacuated to shelters. An estimated 

300,000 homes were destroyed, or received major or minor damage in 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In Mississippi alone, 780 homes and 

413 mobile homes were reported destroyed; 6,482 homes and 808 mobile 

homes sustained major damage; and 42,444 homes and 18,243 mobile homes 

had minor damage as of September 17, 2005.4

 Major disaster declarations 

covered over 90,000 square miles of the affected Gulf Coast area. 

Preparing for the Storm 

The National Hurricane Center tracked Hurricane Katrina as it gained 

intensity and crossed the Gulf of Mexico, and issued multiple dire warnings 

regarding its severity. By 5:00 PM eastern daylight time on August 26, 2005, 

the National Hurricane Center predicted that Hurricane Katrina’s track had 

shifted and was headed for southeast Louisiana and New Orleans, where 

landfall was expected as a Category 4 storm. Eleven members of FEMA’s 

Hurricane Liaison Team were at the National Hurricane Center in Miami, 

Florida, to monitor the storm and storm advisories by August 27, 2005.5

 In 

addition, federal emergency declarations were issued for Louisiana on 

August 27, 2005, and for Mississippi and Alabama on August 28, 2005, 

authorizing FEMA to begin pre-positioning commodities and emergency 

management personnel. 

Even before the storm shifted, FEMA activated its National Response 

Coordination Center (NRCC) in Washington, DC, and Regional Response 

Coordination Centers (RRCC) in Atlanta, Georgia, and Denton, Texas.6 They 

tracked the storm and began preparations to coordinate the response. State 

emergency management officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana also 

activated their Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and began preparing for 

a second landfall. In addition, the NRCC, RRCCs, and state EOCs activated 

all 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) plus the Defense Coordinating 

Officer (a military liaison) specified in the NRP. 

 

4

 Mississippi Defense Coordinating Element Situation Report 17, September 17, 2005. These totals do not include 

numbers from two of the hardest hit counties in Mississippi. 

5

 See Appendix A for a timeline of Hurricane Katrina’s storm track and key decisions and events of the response. 6

 For a discussion of FEMA’s headquarters and regional structure, see the FEMA’s Organization and Capacity to 

Respond to Disasters section of this report. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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FEMA deployed its Emergency Response Team-National to Louisiana’s EOC 

in Baton Rouge, and Emergency Response Teams-Advanced to the state 

EOCs in Jackson, Mississippi, and Clanton, Alabama. FEMA Emergency 

Response Teams began coordinating with the states to preposition both 

commodities and personnel in the area to respond as soon as storm conditions 

subsided and it was safe for responders to enter the affected area. In addition, 

FEMA activated and pre-positioned multiple response teams to locations near 

the forecasted affected areas. It pre-staged three Urban Search and Rescue 

(US&R) task forces in Louisiana and two in Mississippi. Mobile emergency 

operations vehicles and Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) 

personnel, who are capable of providing communications equipment and other 

support, were deployed and pre-staged near each state’s EOC. In addition, 

many National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams, including Disaster 

Medical Assistance Teams, Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams, 

and Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams were activated and pre-staged in 

the region for deployment as soon as conditions permitted. 

FEMA activated federal operational staging areas and mobilization centers to 

accept delivery of commodities and dispense them to local distribution points 

within the affected areas. Quantities of ice, water, meals ready-to-eat 

(MREs), and other commodities were pre-staged at Meridian Naval Air 

Station in Mississippi; Maxwell Air Force Base and Craig Field in Alabama; 

and Camp Beauregard, Barksdale Air Force Base, and the New Orleans 

Superdome in Louisiana, in addition to staging areas in Florida, Georgia, and 

Texas. Also, the three affected states identified pre-staged commodities, 

particularly ice, left over from the Hurricane Dennis response.7

 

Initial Response 

As soon as conditions permitted, life saving and life sustaining efforts began, 

and Rapid Needs Assessment teams assessed damage in the affected areas. In 

many areas, roads and bridges were destroyed, making air or water the only 

means available to reach stranded victims, conduct initial damage 

assessments, and get emergency management response personnel into the 

area. 

The communications infrastructure – phone lines, cell phone towers, and radio 

and satellite antennae – was destroyed in many areas. This significantly 

 

7

 Hurricane Dennis was declared a major disaster in Alabama on July 10, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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impacted the ability of emergency responders to get situational and 

operational information to state or federal personnel outside the affected areas. 

It took days to establish an accurate picture of the disaster’s magnitude and 

devastation. 

FEMA’s national US&R task forces, the U.S. Coast Guard, National Guard 

troops, active duty federal troops, and state and local first responders 

performed search and rescue missions, and rescued an estimated 50,000 

victims. U.S. Coast Guard personnel conducted over 30,000 rescues during 

the first week after landfall – more rescues than it performed in all of 2004. 

NDMS activated and deployed over 80 teams to support response efforts. 

Medical Needs Assessment Teams from FEMA Regions IV and VI were 

deployed to assess medical needs in the affected area. Over 50 Disaster 

Medical Assistance Teams were deployed. All 11 Disaster Mortuary 

Operational Response Teams plus 2 Disaster Portable Mortuary Units 

deployed to assist in body recovery and identification operations. Three 

National Medical Response Teams, five Veterinary Medical Assistance 

Teams, and three International Medical Surgical Response Teams were 

activated also. In addition, four Management Support Teams provided 

logistical, managerial, and operational support for NDMS teams in the 

affected area. NDMS also supported search and rescue operations by 

evacuating over 2,500 people with special needs. 

In addition, FEMA began moving pre-staged trucks of water, ice, and MREs 

from federal operational staging areas into the disaster area and to various 

points of distribution. Additional commodities were ordered for daily 

delivery; however, it took time to establish an operational delivery system to 

supply adequate quantities of commodities to support victims and first 

responders. Also, FEMA personnel and state and local responders expressed 

confusion and frustration because FEMA’s logistics system lacks an asset 

visibility program. As a result, FEMA personnel and state and local 

responders did not know what type or quantity of commodities was on the 

way or even when resources would arrive. 

Alabama

FEMA’s Emergency Response Team-Advanced was on the ground and 

operating at the EOC in Clanton, Alabama by August 26, 2005. In Alabama, 

FEMA had the benefit of existing pre-positioned assets, commodities, and an 

operational Joint Field Office (JFO) because of Hurricane Dennis, which 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 8 

struck Alabama earlier in the summer. As a result, FEMA was able to 

mobilize operations quickly at the JFO in response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Alabama’s two most southern counties were the hardest hit and sustained 

major damage. Communications infrastructure was destroyed and officials in 

these counties experienced difficulty communicating their needs to the JFO 

for the first two days after landfall. The state sent a communications vehicle, 

and FEMA sent a MERS unit to the area to provide communications support 

and other response assistance. 

FEMA and state officials told us the response went well in Alabama. Both 

conducted joint integrated action planning to coordinate and manage 

Alabama’s response efforts. In addition, Alabama was able to release its 

Defense Coordinating Officer on August 31, 2005, because Department of 

Defense support was not needed in Alabama. This allowed additional 

Department of Defense resources to shift into Mississippi. 

Mississippi

Mississippi’s six southern most counties were left with catastrophic damage. 

Winds and storm surge from Hurricane Katrina destroyed basic infrastructure 

along approximately 26 miles of Mississippi’s coast from Biloxi to Waveland. 

Neighborhoods, schools, and business districts in the three coastal counties 

were destroyed as well. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 9 

1) Debris pile in Waveland, MS, 10/14/05; 2) Temporary school structure 

established in Waveland, MS, 10/14/05; 3) Neighborhood street and 

debris in Waveland, MS, 10/14/05; 4) Neighborhood street and debris in 

Gulfport, MS, 10/14/05

1 2

3

4

FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and Mississippi’s State 

Coordinating Officer immediately established joint integrated operations. 

FEMA and state or local counterparts integrated, worked side-by-side, and 

addressed issues as they occurred. Pre-existing relationships, established by 

federal, state, and local entities during the response to Hurricane Dennis and 

preparedness exercises, facilitated the integration of Hurricane Katrina 

response personnel. 

FEMA, state, and local emergency management responders operated jointly at 

an interim operating facility in Biloxi, which later became the Area Field 

Office, and at the JFO in Jackson. FEMA established branches and divisions 

within its Operations Section. Division supervisors were empowered to act 

and, in conjunction with local counterparts, determined needs for their 

division. Those needs were reported to the branch director, who determined 

what the branch could meet, and then unmet needs were forwarded to the 

Operations Section Chief at the JFO. Needs that could not be filled by the 

JFO were mission assigned or contracted to other federal agencies. 

FEMA and state officials expressed frustration with the rate and quantity of 

commodities delivered to Mississippi as well as with the lack of asset 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 10 

visibility for the logistics process. Officials indicated they had ordered water, 

ice, and MREs in quantities far greater than what was delivered, yet when 

they attempted to determine where additional quantities were in the process, 

they were told the commodities were “in the pipeline.” According to FEMA 

field officials, on average, Mississippi received less than 50 percent of the 

commodities it requested between August 27, 2005, and September 5, 2005. 

While FEMA should address asset visibility, a number of factors outside of 

FEMA’s control affect its ability to deliver requested commodities, including 

the reasonableness of field requests, supplier inventories, and the availability 

of transportation resources. Even so, the effectiveness of a response is 

dependent upon the ability to anticipate and address potential shortfalls 

through adequate contingency planning. 

The communications infrastructure was destroyed in areas of Mississippi. 

FEMA deployed a MERS detachment to the Gulfport area, containing satellite 

equipment and a satellite link, to establish communications and provide 

support. We were told that without MERS, there would have been no 

communications in the area. FEMA officials said it took about three days 

after landfall to fully grasp the magnitude of the destruction. 

Louisiana

Hurricane Katrina’s winds and storm surge caused severe damage in a number 

of Louisiana parishes; however, the majority of the damage in the city of New 

Orleans was a result of several breaches in the city’s levee system after 

landfall. Because of the breaches much of the city was submerged, and 

dewatering efforts placed Louisiana’s response and recovery behind 

Mississippi. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 11 

 

1

2

3

4

1) Damaged house in Plaquemines parish in Louisiana, 10/23/05; 2) New 

Orleans, LA – Lower Ninth Ward, 10/24/05; 3) Damaged house in New 

Orleans, LA, 10/24/05; 4) Neighborhood street and debris in New Orleans’ 

Lower Ninth Ward, 10/24/05

The Superdome in New Orleans was designated as a shelter of last resort. 

Louisiana state officials told us that its use as a shelter was intended only for 

citizens who had special needs and were medically unable to evacuate the city 

prior to Katrina’s landfall. After the levees breached, additional victims 

began appearing at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and other locations 

around the city. 

Prior to landfall, FEMA pre-staged five trucks of water and two trucks of 

MREs at the Superdome. In addition, we were told, a few trucks of 

commodities were delivered to the Superdome after landfall. However, the 

unexpected large number of evacuees arriving at the Superdome and other 

locations within the city was not anticipated nor adequately planned for by 

state and local authorities. The limited commodities quickly became depleted, 

people with special needs were not addressed, various stages of civil unrest 

ensued, and FEMA responders pulled out of the Superdome until order and 

security could be restored. 

Under mission assignments from FEMA, the Departments of Defense and 

Transportation provided support for the evacuation of victims from New 

Orleans. Over four days beginning August 31, 2005, more than 22,000 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 12 

evacuees were transported from the Superdome, the Convention Center, and 

other locations in the city to shelters in Texas and other states. 

FEMA officials experienced difficulty establishing joint, integrated operations 

with Louisiana’s emergency management personnel. Limited space at 

Louisiana’s EOC prevented some FEMA and state personnel from colocating, and FEMA established an interim operating facility at a separate 

location where most FEMA personnel operated until the JFO was established. 

FEMA’s FCO and Louisiana’s State Coordinating Officer did not establish 

joint operational objectives and priorities until September 11, 2005. In 

addition, Louisiana’s limited number of trained emergency managers 

impacted the integration of FEMA with state and local counterparts. 

New Orleans: A Uniquely Vulnerable City

Because the greater New Orleans metropolitan area sits in the tidal lowlands 

of Lake Pontchartrain and is generally bordered on its southern side by the 

Mississippi River, its near sea level elevation makes it uniquely susceptible to 

flooding. Levees and floodwalls built around the city were expected to 

greatly reduce the threat of flooding from hurricane-induced storm surges, 

waves, and rainfalls. However, the levees kept natural silt deposits from the 

Mississippi River from replenishing the delta, causing Louisiana’s coastal 

wetlands to wash away and the city of New Orleans to sink even deeper, 

which when combined with rising sea levels, increased the region’s 

vulnerability to flooding. 

New Orleans’ location also creates unique evacuation issues. For example, 

only two main highways provide evacuation routes inland and out of the New 

Orleans area; one route leads through Mississippi. Should both Mississippi 

and Louisiana need to evacuate simultaneously, significant congestion 

problems would occur, and shelters in Mississippi would become 

overwhelmed in trying to care for evacuees from two states. While Louisiana 

and Mississippi had an agreement in place to convert all traffic lanes to a 

northbound direction on specified evacuation routes, the plan’s effectiveness 

was dependent on Louisiana beginning to evacuate a day before Mississippi. 

Both states began evacuating on the same day prior to Hurricane Katrina’s 

landfall. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 13 

Initial Recovery 

FEMA’s primary programs to assist individuals and states recover from the 

effects of a disaster are the Individual and Public Assistance programs. 

For Hurricane Katrina, an individual or household could receive a maximum 

of $26,200 of Individual and Household Program (IHP) assistance from 

FEMA. IHP has two major components: housing assistance and other needs 

assistance.8 Housing assistance is 100 percent federally funded and 

administered and provides assistance for temporary rental lodging, home 

repairs, and home replacement. Other needs assistance is a cost-shared 

partnership between FEMA and the states. It assists with the reimbursement 

of medical and dental costs, funeral and burial costs, transportation, and 

personal property items. As of September 30, 2005, FEMA had received 

1,557,937 registrations for IHP assistance from residents of the three affected 

states. It made 1,380,564 applicant referrals for assistance under the housing 

assistance component and awarded $2,401,735,486. It also made 784,887 

referrals under the other needs assistance component and awarded 

$68,793,970. 

FEMA’s Public Assistance program provides supplemental federal disaster 

grants for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly 

owned facilities and the facilities of certain private non-profit organizations.9

 

The program reimburses eligible emergency related activities such as debris 

removal and emergency protective measures. As of October 1, 2005, FEMA 

had received a total of 430 projects and obligated more than $962 million to 

the three affected states. 

Framework for Federal Disaster Response 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in substantial changes to 

how the federal government prepares for, responds to, and recovers from 

natural disasters. The Homeland Security Act of 200210 created DHS and 

realigned FEMA, previously independent, as part of the department within the 

 

8

 See Appendix B for a description of FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs. 

9

 See Appendix C for a description of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program and eligible work under the program. 

10 P.L. 107-296 (November 25, 2002). 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate.11 FEMA gained some 

capabilities, such as the NDMS from the Department of Health and Human 

Services, but did not retain others, such as the administration of selected 

preparedness grants. Further, the Homeland Security Act and Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” 

called for a new, unified, all-hazards framework and plan for responding to 

terrorism, natural disasters, special events, and emergencies. 

As required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, DHS developed 

NIMS as a framework to help emergency managers and responders from 

different jurisdictions and disciplines work together more effectively during 

disasters and emergencies. To the extent possible, disasters are managed 

locally; as most responses do not exceed the capabilities of the local 

government. However, some incidents require multiple jurisdictions or levels 

of government to provide an adequate response. To aid cooperation, the 

NIMS standardizes the concepts and processes for incident command and 

management, resource management, training and certification, and 

communications. Appendix D provides greater detail on the command and 

management aspects of NIMS, including Incident Command Structure. DHS 

published NIMS on March 1, 2004. Jurisdictions are required to comply fully 

with its guidelines by September 30, 2006, in order to remain eligible for DHS 

preparedness grants. 

DHS designed the NRP to fit the NIMS framework and to synthesize previous 

federal plans including those for natural hazards, biological and radiological 

hazards, and terrorist events.12 The NRP addresses events such as Hurricane 

Katrina – events that involve multiple geographic areas; cause casualties and 

displace persons; disrupt critical infrastructure and essential public services; 

 

11 A DHS reorganization that took effect after Hurricane Katrina eliminated the Emergency Preparedness & Response 

Directorate, organizationally placing FEMA directly under the DHS Secretary. The reorganization created a DHS 

Preparedness Directorate distinct from FEMA, which absorbed some of FEMA’s Preparedness Division. These and 

other organizational changes were planned as part of the Second Stage Review. The review examined elements of DHS 

in order to recommend ways to better manage risk in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence; prioritize policies 

and operational missions according to this risk-based approach; and establish a series of preventive and protective steps 

that would increase security at multiple levels. The results of the review were announced on July 13, 2005, and were 

reflected in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, P.L. No. 109-90 (October 18, 2005). 

FEMA’s Preparedness Division remained intact at the time of Hurricane Katrina, and is therefore referred to as such in 

this report. 

12 The NRP superseded the Initial National Response Plan, the Federal Response Plan, the Domestic Terrorism Concept 

of Operations Plan, and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan on April 14, 2005. The NRP outlines the 

authorities and responsibilities for coordinating domestic incident management based on 70 statutes, regulations, 

executive orders, and presidential directives. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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overwhelm the response capabilities of state, local, tribal, and private-sector 

officials; and require a short or no-notice federal response. The NRP consists 

of a base plan plus 31 annexes describing ESFs, incident-specific response, 

and administrative support processes. For further background on the NRP, 

see Appendix E. 

FEMA has or shares lead responsibility for 9 of the 31 annexes and has 

supporting roles for many others. These assign FEMA responsibility for 

overall coordination of disaster relief efforts across federal, state, and 

volunteer organizations. Specific responsibilities FEMA fulfills under the 

NRP include: 

• Federal Coordinating Officers: For disasters declared under the 

Stafford Act, the President appoints an FCO from FEMA’s cadre to act 

on his behalf in orchestrating the federal response effort in the affected 

state. The FCO manages and coordinates the application of programs 

and funds under the Stafford Act, including mission assignments and 

resource allocation. 

• ESF-5: Emergency Management: As ESF-5 coordinator and its 

primary agency, FEMA staffs the core management and administrative 

functions in support of the JFO, RRCC, NRCC, and Emergency 

Response Teams. FEMA staffs incident command functions including 

the section chiefs for operations, logistics, planning, and finance and 

administration. FEMA also provides the staff and information 

technology support to process federal mission assignments. 

• ESF-6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services: FEMA coordinates 

ESF-6 and serves as its primary agency jointly with the American Red 

Cross (Red Cross). ESF-6 supports disaster victims with feeding, 

sheltering, Disaster Welfare Inquiry, and first aid; short and long-term 

housing; implementation of the Individuals and Households Program; 

Crisis Counseling; Disaster Unemployment Assistance; Disaster Legal 

Services; and voluntary agency coordination and donations 

management. 

• ESF-9: Urban Search and Rescue: FEMA’s National US&R Response 

System provides specialized collapsed structure search and rescue 

operations and life-saving assistance to victims. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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• ESF-14: Long-term Community Recovery and Mitigation: This ESF 

applies available federal programs to support disaster mitigation and 

permanent restoration of infrastructure, housing, and the local 

economy.13 

• ESF-15: External Affairs: DHS Public Affairs coordinates ESF-15, 

and FEMA serves as its primary agency. ESF-15 works to provide 

accurate, coordinated, and timely information to the public, the 

government, the media, and the private sector. 

Like the NRP, the Stafford Act determines FEMA’s role in disaster 

preparedness, response, and recovery. The provisions of the Stafford Act 

establish processes and programs for providing federal assistance to state, 

local, and tribal governments; individuals; and qualified private nonprofit 

organizations. Federal assistance may include technical assistance, the 

provision of goods and services, and financial assistance including direct 

payments, grants, loans, and insurance. FEMA coordinates and issues much 

of the assistance under the Stafford Act, but other federal agencies also 

provide assistance. For example, the Small Business Administration (SBA) 

manages and funds the Disaster Loan Program for renters, homeowners, and 

businesses. 

In order for FEMA to make federal assistance under the Stafford Act 

available, states initiate a request for an emergency or major disaster 

declaration that is reviewed by FEMA for approval of the President. 

Emergency declarations typically authorize federal programs for emergencytype assistance, such as debris removal, while major disaster declarations 

afford a broader range of federal assistance. Funding is capped at $5 million 

per emergency declaration; this restriction does not apply to major disaster 

declarations. The Stafford Act also permits FEMA to anticipate declarations 

and pre-stage federal personnel and resources when a disaster that threatens 

human health and safety is imminent but not yet declared. However, FEMA 

cannot provide federal assistance until an emergency or major disaster 

declaration is made. 

States are required to activate their emergency plans as a prerequisite to 

requesting federal assistance under the Stafford Act. Authority to declare 

evacuations and enforce state and local laws are state and local concerns. 

 

13 Because our scope focuses on the period of August 24 to September 30, 2005, and prior, we did not conduct a 

performance review of FEMA’s long-term recovery and mitigation efforts for Hurricane Katrina. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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During Hurricane Katrina, all three governors deployed their National Guard 

units and emergency management staff – the Alabama Emergency 

Management Agency, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and the 

Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. 

Additional state and local resources include police, fire, public health and 

medical and other personnel; private sector support, and state mutual aid 

agreements. For example, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are all 

signatories to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), 

which allows each to request, receive, and reimburse other states for resources 

such as personnel and commodities.14 During Hurricane Katrina, the majority 

of assistance requested through EMAC was for National Guard resources and 

law enforcement personnel. Other types of requests included medical team 

support, search and rescue resources and commodities such as ice and water. 

Before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, FEMA was providing assistance to states 

for 38 previously declared disasters. In preparation for Hurricane Katrina, the 

President signed emergency declarations authorizing federal public assistance 

for emergency protective measures and debris removal for Louisiana on 

August 27, 2005, and for Alabama and Mississippi on August 28, 2005. On 

August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the President signed major 

disaster declarations for all three states to provide Individual Assistance and 

Public Assistance to selected parishes and counties. The declarations were 

revised multiple times to expand the number of declared localities and types 

of assistance available, and to reduce the percent of assistance funded by state 

cost sharing. As of September 30, 2005, 44 states and the District of 

Columbia also received emergency declarations to support Hurricane Katrina 

evacuees. 

The chart below illustrates the number of major disaster and emergency 

declarations issued under the Stafford Act from fiscal year (FY) 1995 to FY 

2005. 

 

14 EMAC is a mutual aid agreement between states, which enables assistance between states during times of disaster or 

emergency. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Major Disaster and Emergency Declarations 

under the Stafford Act

29

72

49

61 53

41 50 42

62 65

45

67

7

19

15 16

2

2

5

5

3

1

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Fiscal Year

Number of Declarations

Major Disaster Declarations Emergency Declarations

Results of Review 

Difficulty Adapting to New Response Plans 

In the past two years, DHS published two watershed planning documents – 

the NIMS and the NRP – that restructure how federal, state, and local 

government agencies and emergency responders conduct disaster preparation, 

response, and recovery activities. Changes needed to implement both 

documents, including developing specific procedures and plans, training, and 

testing, were still underway when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The 

response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated some positive effects from 

implementing the incident command structure under NIMS, which FEMA and 

state staff led in Mississippi and Alabama. It also highlighted severe 

deficiencies and multiple areas where FEMA and DHS headquarters must 

make adjustments to the NRP, such as the use of incident designations, the 

role of the PFO, and the responsibilities of ESF coordinators. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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States Had Varied Success Implementing Incident Command System 

Structures and Establishing Unified Command 

Incident command system (ICS) structures and unified command were 

implemented with varying levels of success in Mississippi, Alabama, and 

Louisiana during the response to Hurricane Katrina. Mississippi immediately 

implemented a comprehensive ICS structure and integrated federal, state, and 

local personnel at all levels in a unified command. Alabama implemented an 

ICS structure, but at a smaller scale because Hurricane Katrina did not cause 

the level of damage in Alabama that it did in Mississippi and Louisiana. 

Louisiana experienced difficulty with fully implementing an ICS structure and 

establishing a unified command with federal, state, and local officials. 

Mississippi

FEMA’s FCO and Mississippi’s State Coordinating Officer immediately 

established a unified command with a comprehensive ICS structure. Prior to 

landfall, FEMA’s Emergency Response Team-Advanced arrived at the state’s 

EOC and began coordinating commodities and personnel for the response. 

FEMA and state officials told us that after landfall, federal, state, and local 

counterparts integrated and worked side-by-side to manage the response. As 

issues occurred, all were able to immediately address the issue and 

recommend solutions. Joint incident action planning meetings with federal 

and state counterparts from all response sections facilitated planning 

objectives, priorities, and operations for each operational period. 

Due to the magnitude of the damage, the Operations Section established three 

geographic branches, each containing multiple divisions, within Mississippi. 

Branch I included the six most severely damaged coastal counties. Within 

Branch I, each county was a separate division. Branches II and III consisted 

of divisions covering two or more counties each. Because FEMA did not 

have enough personnel to staff all division supervisor positions, personnel 

from the U.S. Forest Service filled some division supervisor positions. In 

addition, FEMA established a federal operational staging area in each branch 

to facilitate the distribution of commodities and other resources in the affected 

area. 

FEMA and state emergency management officials in Mississippi recognized 

early on that a forward location in the disaster area would be necessary so an 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Area Field Office was established in Biloxi. Federal, state, and local 

personnel were pushed forward into the disaster area, and they were 

empowered to act. Division supervisors within the affected area determined 

their requirements and requests that could not be filled by the state were 

passed to the Branch. The requests were then passed to the JFO if they could 

not be filled at the Branch level, and sent forward within the ICS structure 

until filled. 

The ICS structure established in Mississippi included geographic branches 

and divisions, and authority was delegated to personnel at the division level. 

In addition to establishing a unified command with federal, state, and local 

response personnel, the structure allowed FEMA, state, and local emergency 

management officials to manage Hurricane Katrina response efforts even 

though existing resources were overwhelmed according to FEMA and state 

officials. 

Alabama

In comparison to Mississippi, Alabama’s ICS structure was much smaller, 

showing the flexibility and scalability of the ICS system. Only two coastal 

counties in Alabama received significant damage from Hurricane Katrina. 

Damage to other counties was not as severe as Mississippi’s. As a result, 

Alabama’s ICS structure was much less complex. For example, Alabama did 

not have a need to establish branches or divisions in order to adequately 

coordinate a response. 

In addition, FEMA and Alabama Emergency Management Agency personnel 

worked from the beginning to establish joint objectives and priorities. Joint 

incident action plans were developed also. Alabama’s FCO recognized that 

Department of Defense assistance would not be required and, two days after 

landfall, released the Defense Coordinating Element so it could move to 

Mississippi for future support operations. 

Louisiana

Louisiana had great difficulty establishing an integrated command structure, 

and never fully achieved a unified command with FEMA. FEMA’s 

Emergency Response Team-National arrived at Louisiana’s EOC in Baton 

Rouge before landfall and attempted to integrate with Louisiana’s Office of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness personnel. However, 

extremely limited space at Louisiana’s EOC prevented some FEMA and state 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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personnel from co-locating. Instead, FEMA established an interim operating 

facility at a separate location, where most FEMA personnel operated until the 

JFO was established on September 12, 2005. Although the JFO was 

operational, state operations personnel continued working at the state EOC 

rather than co-locating with FEMA at the JFO. Therefore, a few FEMA 

Operations Section personnel continued to work out of the EOC to facilitate 

and pre-screen Louisiana’s requests for assistance until state operations 

personnel moved to the JFO. 

FEMA immediately established positions based on an ICS structure; however, 

FEMA and state officials told us that because Louisiana had a limited number 

of trained emergency management staff, the state was not able to provide a 

counterpart to all federal positions. FEMA officials in Louisiana told us that 

state emergency management personnel were concerned exclusively with 

evacuations and did not assign staff to work with FEMA to plan initial 

response efforts for Louisiana. FEMA officials indicated that its personnel 

prepared initial plans for commodity and medical needs, and they had to pull a 

state employee to begin US&R planning. While FEMA does not usually 

coordinate with local officials, FEMA sent liaisons into the affected Louisiana 

parishes and attempted to establish a unified command with local officials and 

the National Guard. However, at the local level in the affected parishes, 

federal and local counterparts did not coordinate to establish a unified 

command in most cases according to FEMA officials in Louisiana. In 

addition, FEMA’s FCO and Louisiana’s State Coordinating Officer did not 

establish joint priorities and objectives for the response until 

September 11, 2005.15 

Louisiana’s ICS structure did not include geographic branches or divisions 

within the Operations Section. A forward operational area was not established 

in New Orleans until September 5, 2005, when the Deputy PFO arrived in 

Louisiana. According to FEMA officials, the PFO cell, which later became an 

Area Field Office, operated as a satellite of the JFO in Baton Rouge. While 

the Area Field Office was assigned an area of responsibility covering several 

parishes in the New Orleans area, personnel on the ground there were not 

delegated authority, as was the case with division supervisors in Mississippi. 

In contrast to Mississippi, the New Orleans Area Field Office received its 

action plans and operations from Baton Rouge rather than determining the 

needs for the area and sending requests for assistance through the JFO. The 

 

15 Louisiana Defense Coordinating Officer Situation Report, September 11, 2005, at 1900 hrs. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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limited ICS structure and lack of unified command in Louisiana significantly 

undercut its response efforts. 

Multiagency Coordination Entities Duplicated Support Efforts

FEMA’s NRCC in Washington, DC, and RRCCs at FEMA Regional Offices 

in Atlanta, Georgia, and Denton, Texas, acted as multiagency coordination 

entities during the Hurricane Katrina response. In addition to FEMA 

personnel, the NRCC and RRCCs included personnel from other components 

within DHS plus personnel from other federal agencies, all performing 

functions in support of the various emergency support functions. 

Each entity coordinated policy and provided strategic guidance and situational 

information to personnel operating in the incident area. Each also worked to 

locate sources for needed resources and determine how best to allocate limited 

resources to address and balance requirements across Mississippi, Alabama, 

and Louisiana. Often these efforts were duplicative. 

Emergency Response Teams-National and Advanced also acted as 

multiagency coordination entities during the initial Hurricane Katrina 

response. These teams deployed to each state prior to landfall and began 

coordination efforts for the response. After landfall, the teams were in place 

and could immediately begin addressing issues and coordinating the response. 

The NRCC, RRCCs, and Emergency Response Teams have the same 

organizational structure. However, as issues developed, all three entities 

began working to resolve the issue rather than allowing the issue to be worked 

at the field level first by the Emergency Response Teams-National and 

Advanced, and then elevated to the regional or national level as necessary. 

Instead efforts were duplicated, resulting in the need for multiple conference 

calls among the three entities to resolve an issue. 

Given the complexity of the response effort and issues presented by Hurricane 

Katrina, DHS headquarters and FEMA must establish a defined use for 

multiagency coordination entities that expedites the resolution of issues, 

facilitates incident management, coordinates policy, and provides strategic 

guidance and direction to support incident management activities at the most 

appropriate operation level. Doing so will avoid the unnecessary and time 

consuming coordination and posturing that resulted in response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 
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FEMA and DHS Were Adjusting to the National Response Plan 

During the response, several significant departures from NRP protocols 

occurred: (1) DHS’ actions to apply NRP protocols for Incidents of National 

Significance and catastrophic incidents were ambiguous; (2) DHS defined a 

new, operational role for the PFO by assigning the PFO both FCO and 

Disaster Recovery Manager authorities; and, (3) the Interagency Incident 

Management Group (IIMG) took an operational role not prescribed in the 

NRP. As a backdrop to these changes, FEMA had not yet developed or 

implemented policies and training for roles and responsibilities necessary to 

supplement the NRP. Further, a number of agencies that were assigned 

emergency support functions under existing NRP authorities believed it was 

necessary to revise their operational protocols and procedures during the 

response. 

The implementation of the NRP occurred on an aggressive schedule. DHS’ 

Secretary officially released the NRP for implementation on January 6, 2005. 

The plan phased in training and plan modification requirements over 120 

days, superseding its predecessor response plans on April 14, 2005. However, 

some training and plan modifications were not complete when Hurricane 

Katrina occurred. For the remainder of the NRP’s first year, DHS planned to 

assess NRP coordinating structures, processes, and protocols. The 

assessments will culminate in a one-year review and recommendations to the 

Secretary on necessary NRP revisions. An initial review of the NRP, 

scheduled for December 2005, is not yet complete. We would anticipate that 

lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina would be used to make necessary 

revisions to the NRP. 

The NRP made significant changes to the Federal Response Plan, the plan that 

had shaped FEMA’s and the federal government’s response to most disasters. 

We received mixed reaction to how the NRP affected the federal response to 

Hurricane Katrina. Some senior officials at FEMA and DHS headquarters 

commented the NRP was used to the greatest extent possible since its 

implementation, and that training to transition to the NRP was well conducted. 

Other FEMA headquarters officials disagreed, stating that the NRP contained 

unrealistic requirements and unclear language, and asserted that executing the 

plan’s new concepts and components created confusion. State officials also 

told us the NRP was unclear and not well understood; but overall, their 

consensus was that it did not have a positive or negative effect on the state and 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Page 24 

local response because most were familiar with the NRP’s predecessor, the 

Federal Response Plan. 

Two NRP Designations Had Little Effect on Response Operations

A key concept in the all-hazards NRP is the distinction between events that 

occur every day and are addressed by the responsible jurisdiction or 

governmental authority and those that are considered “Incidents of National 

Significance.” Incidents of National Significance are major events that must 

be addressed by the combined effort of federal, state, local, tribal, private 

sector, and nongovernmental entities. They involve situations including: 

• Acts or credible threats of terrorism involving a response by more than 

one federal agency; 

• Federal support to states during a catastrophic incident or disaster 

declared under the Stafford Act; 

• Federal response to special events such as National Security Special 

Events (e.g., national political conventions); 

• Federal-to-federal support requested of DHS by another agency; and, 

• Direction from the President for DHS to manage response to an 

incident. 

According to the NRP, all declared emergencies and major disasters by the 

President under the Stafford Act are Incidents of National Significance. DHS’ 

Secretary may also designate Incidents of National Significance, which are 

not Stafford Act declarations. Between April 14, 2005, when the NRP 

superseded other plans, and Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, FEMA responded to 

19 declared disasters (all NRP Incidents of National Significance). 

The President approved emergency declarations for all three states prior to 

Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, making them Incidents of National Significance. 

However, confusion arose when DHS’ Secretary formally declared Hurricane 

Katrina an Incident of National Significance on August 30, 2005. It was 

unclear what federal resources would be made available under the 

August 30, 2005, designation. The announcement did not significantly alter 

the response operation, but calls into question whether senior officials were 

knowledgeable of NRP authorities and protocols. 

As a whole, the NRP does not require a formal statement of activation, but 

parts of the plan such as the Catastrophic Incident Annex do. This annex 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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coordinates an accelerated, proactive federal response to a no-notice or shortnotice catastrophic mass victim or mass evacuation incident, and is activated 

by DHS’ Secretary. No one we interviewed could definitively state whether 

DHS activated the Catastrophic Incident Annex for Hurricane Katrina. 

Irrespective, FEMA and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) 

activated federal departments and the Red Cross. Federal resources that the 

annex would have afforded were deployed before landfall. 

A more detailed Catastrophic Incident Supplement supports the annex with a 

time-phased deployment matrix of federal resources and assets, including 

special teams, equipment, supplies, and transportation to provide critical life 

saving support and incident containment. The Catastrophic Incident 

Supplement was still in draft when Hurricane Katrina made landfall and was 

not approved until September 2005. The supplement identifies 131 actions 

that agencies must take within 96 hours after an incident for a natural hazard 

event. Of these actions, DHS is responsible for or supports 79. Our analysis 

demonstrated that all FEMA teams listed in the supplement had initiated 

deployment actions as required by the “push” concept of operations for 

natural hazards before landfall. In most instances, more FEMA teams and 

resources than referenced in the supplement were deployed. Extra teams sent 

included Urban Search and Rescue Teams, Deployable Mortuary Operational 

Response Teams, and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams. During our 

analysis, we also note apparent discrepancies between the Execution Schedule 

(Annex 1) and the accompanying Transportation Support Schedule (Annex 2) 

of the supplement. For example, as currently written, Annex 2 does not 

provide for the transportation support of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 

for natural hazard and biological events, but for chemical, radiological, 

nuclear, and high yield explosive events, the annex provides transportation 

support for 14 such teams. 

Overlap Between the Interagency Incident Management Group and the 

Homeland Security Operations Center

Hurricane Katrina reinforced the lesson from Top Officials 3 exercise that the 

role of the IIMG needs better definition. According to the NRP, the IIMG is a 

federal, headquarters-level, multiagency coordination entity that assembles on 

an as-needed basis to provide strategic incident management planning, 

coordination, and decision-making support for the DHS Secretary and White 

House. However, during Top Officials 3 exercise, IIMG members adopted a 

less strategic role and, although not formally, we recommended: 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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“The roles and responsibilities of the HSOC and the IIMG should be 

clarified. ...Under the NRP, a key role of the IIMG is to provide 

decision-making support to top and senior officials during an incident. 

However, rather than provide policy advice to top officials during the 

exercise, the IIMG was under pressure from senior federal officials to 

provide situational information and address lower level coordination 

issues that should have been part of HSOC’s role.”16 

Co-located with the HSOC, during Hurricane Katrina the IIMG established 

operational hours, fulfilled requests for situational information, and created 

routine reports. IIMG members we interviewed said that the senior officials 

on the IIMG served as a reporting cell to DHS leadership and the White 

House, running parallel functions with the HSOC. Doubling the headquarterslevel information collection effort to include both the HSOC and the IIMG 

burdened response operations at the JFO and the NRCC, which began hiring 

contractors to manage information requests. 

DHS needs to consider revising the respective roles of the IIMG and HSOC. 

The disaster response role of the IIMG is not new; it replaces the Catastrophic 

Disaster Response Group that served as the policy-level interagency 

coordination entity under the Federal Response Plan. The NRCC and JFO 

also fulfill roles that previously existed under that plan. DHS should clarify 

how it intends to integrate these entities with the HSOC, which has the 

primary role of collecting operational and situational information for DHS 

headquarters. 

Recommendation #1: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Director of the 

Office of Operations Coordination, clarify the National Response Plan 

guidelines for federal, headquarters-level collection and synthesis of 

situational and operational information, with the intent of eliminating 

duplication of effort between the Interagency Incident Management Group 

and Homeland Security Operations Center. 

Role of the Principal Federal Official Requires Clarification

The NRP describes several key leadership positions during a disaster 

response. In addition to the role of DHS’ Secretary, positions include: 

 

16 A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise, Report Number OIG-06-07, November 2005, page 15. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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• Federal Coordinating Officer: The President designates an FCO as the 

lead federal official to coordinate federal resource support for each 

emergency or major disaster declared under the Stafford Act.17 FEMA 

maintains a standing roster, or cadre, of FCOs who have undergone a 

rigorous agency-wide certification program with preparation for allhazard events including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. 

Additionally, FCOs must participate in actual disasters or full-scale 

exercises as part of the certification program. 

• Principal Federal Official: The DHS Secretary serves as or formally 

appoints a PFO as needed.18 According to the NRP, the PFO 

facilitates federal support to the established incident command 

structure and coordinates overall federal incident management and 

assistance to officials such as the FCO acting under their disaster 

response authorities. The PFO does not direct or replace the incident 

command structure. The PFO provides a primary point of contact and 

local situational awareness for DHS’ Secretary, a channel for media 

and public communications, and an interface with state, local, and 

other federal officials. DHS’ roster of PFO designees includes senior 

officials from several DHS components, the Environmental Protection 

Agency, and the Departments of Treasury, Health and Human 

Services, and Justice. As of July 2005, over 100 candidates had 

received DHS’ one-day PFO orientation training. However, neither 

PFO designated by DHS’ Secretary had attended the training. 

• Federal Resource Coordinator: DHS appoints the Federal Resource 

Coordinator to perform a function similar to the FCO in disasters not 

declared under the Stafford Act. In those situations, the Federal 

Resource Coordinator coordinates support through interagency 

agreements and memorandums of understanding. The Federal 

Resource Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the timely 

delivery of resources to the requesting agency. Members of the FCO 

cadre generally serve as Federal Resource Coordinators. 

 

17 42 U.S.C. §5143, Coordinating Officers. 

18 For certain scenarios, DHS’ Secretary may pre-designate a PFO to facilitate federal domestic incident planning and 

coordination at the local level outside the context of a specific threat or incident. When the Secretary of Homeland 

Security activates the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement, the Secretary designates the PFO within an hour of 

the incident, and the FEMA Regional Director serves as the interim PFO until the designated PFO arrives on the scene. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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• Disaster Recovery Manager: When the President issues an emergency 

or major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act, FEMA Regional 

Directors serve as or designate Disaster Recovery Managers to 

exercise all the authority of the Regional Director in administering the 

financial aspects of assistance authorized under the Stafford Act. 

Disaster Recovery Managers oversee the delivery of Stafford Act 

programs, determine funding requirements, execute the FEMA/State 

Agreement, issue mission assignments, and obligate money from the 

Disaster Relief Fund.19 In many cases, the FCO also serves as the 

Disaster Recovery Manager. 

When both a PFO and an FCO are assigned to a specific incident, as was the 

case during Hurricane Katrina, the FCO will coordinate with the PFO and 

work closely with representatives of other federal agencies. For a side-by-side 

comparison of duties of both the FCO and PFO, as outlined in the NRP, see 

Appendix F. For natural disasters, DHS’ Secretary may not designate a PFO, 

in which case the FCO designated by the President serves as the lead federal 

official. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the PFO element of the NRP was only 

tested during terrorism-related events rather than natural disasters, in exercises 

such as Top Officials 3, and National Special Security Events. The response 

to Hurricane Katrina was the first operational use of the PFO. 

On August 30, 2005, DHS’ Secretary designated the Under Secretary of 

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) as the PFO for Hurricane 

Katrina. The majority of state and federal officials we interviewed said that 

the Under Secretary’s execution of the PFO role matched the non-directive, 

coordination duties described in the NRP. However, when the Secretary 

appointed Vice Admiral Allen as PFO on September 9, 2005, the PFO took a 

greater role in directing the federal response, which was contrary to the PFO’s 

role as outlined in the NRP.20 

As the PFO assumed a greater role in the response operations, the new lines of 

command and authority created confusion. For example, a state official told 

us the PFO was coordinating directly with local government officials without 

the knowledge of the state. In addition, the PFO duplicated planning and 

reporting activities in the JFO. In New Orleans, the Deputy PFO cell was 

 

19 The Regional Director is responsible for executing the FEMA/State Agreement even if not serving as the Disaster 

Recovery Manager. 

20 We also observed a gravitation of the PFO towards a more operational rather than coordination role during the Top 

Officials 3 exercise. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 29 

established and FEMA had an Area Field Office; it was unclear who was 

responsible for federal operations in New Orleans. Further, the Louisiana JFO 

operations section identified instances where the PFO submitted action 

request forms to the JFO operations section on behalf of the state while at the 

same time the state was submitting the same action request form. Also, the 

PFO cell issued action request forms directly to emergency support function 

leads, in conflict with the JFO operations section. In Louisiana, the JFO staff 

and PFO cell spent a significant amount of energy establishing and clarifying 

respective roles and responsibilities. 

Effective September 21, 2005, the Acting Under Secretary for EP&R 

designated the PFO as FCO for the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and 

Louisiana.21 This action sanctioned the shift toward a greater directive role 

for the PFO in the response. Several officials commented that the eventual 

blending of PFO and FCO authorities suggests an unnecessary division within 

the NRP. Others added that the FCO’s statutory authorities as the 

representative of the President fully encompass the PFO role. Further, if one 

justification for a PFO is to reduce the non-operational burden of the FCO, 

such as public and media relations, combining the roles defeats the purpose. 

Moreover, inconsistent use of PFOs for some affected states and not others 

added to the confusion.22 For example, one FEMA region delegated Disaster 

Recovery Manager authority to the PFO/FCO while another region did not, 

which provided different financial authorities and responsibilities in Louisiana 

than in Mississippi and Alabama. 

Many senior FEMA officials viewed consolidating roles as necessary in 

Louisiana, but were neutral on the subject in Alabama. Both state and FEMA 

officials said it had a less than positive effect in Mississippi. They disagreed 

with the change because the consolidation created regional leadership for the 

response when many issues were state-specific, such as the type of damage 

and long-term housing. State officials said that a single federal official should 

not hold responsibilities for more than one state and that consolidation 

delayed the approval of Mississippi requests to add additional counties and 

types of disaster assistance for weeks. 

 

21 70 Fed. Reg. 57308 and 57309 (September 30, 2005). 

22 Although Hurricane Katrina affected the state of Florida, the PFO designation did not extend to Florida. Additionally, 

a PFO was designated for Hurricane Ophelia (North Carolina) and Hurricane Rita (Texas and Louisiana) but not for 

Hurricane Wilma (Florida). 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 30 

Recommendation #2: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, clarify the roles of the Principal Federal Official, the Federal 

Coordinating Officer, the Federal Resource Coordinator, and the Disaster 

Recovery Manager to provide a clear distinction for the types and levels of 

response activities that warrant a combination or modification to those roles; 

develop procedures for the timely activation of each role; and, ensure that 

these officials be provided with the necessary training to complement their 

qualifications for serving in these positions. 

Structures and Procedures for Emergency Support Functions Were in 

Development

Although the concept of emergency support functions is not new, the 

structures of certain ESFs are. The following table lists the ESFs and agencies 

responsible for their functions under the NRP. The NRP created new ESFs 

for public safety and security (ESF-13), long-term community recovery and 

mitigation (ESF-14), and external affairs (ESF-15). Also, it substantially 

revised the scope of ESF-5 from information and planning to encompass all 

emergency management and expanded ESF-6 to mass care, housing, and 

human services. The following sections discuss FEMA’s role as a coordinator 

or primary agency for ESF-5, ESF-6, ESF-9, and ESF-15. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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Emergency Support Functions Under the Federal and National Response Plans

Federal 

Response Plan 

National 

Response Plan 

Then 

E 

S 

F Now ESF Coordinator Primary Agency 

Transportation 1 Transportation Department of Transportation Department of Transportation 

Communications 2 Communications DHS (National Communications 

System) 

DHS (National Communications 

System) 

Public Works & 

Engineering 

3 Public Works & 

Engineering 

Department of Defense (U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers) 

Department of Defense (U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers) 

DHS (FEMA) 

Firefighting 4 Firefighting Department of Agriculture 

(Forest Service) 

Department of Agriculture (Forest 

Service) 

Information & 

Planning 

5 Emergency 

Management 

DHS (FEMA) DHS (FEMA) 

Mass Care 6 Mass Care, Housing, 

& Human Services 

DHS (FEMA) DHS (FEMA) 

American Red Cross 

Resource Support 7 Resource Support General Services Administration General Services Administration 

Health & Medical 

Services 

8 Public Health & 

Medical Services 

Department of Health & Human 

Services 

Department of Health & Human 

Services 

Urban Search & 

Rescue 

9 Urban Search & 

Rescue 

DHS (FEMA) DHS (FEMA) 

Hazardous 

Materials 

10 Oil & Hazardous 

Materials Response 

Environmental Protection 

Agency 

Environmental Protection Agency 

DHS (U.S. Coast Guard) 

Food 11 Agriculture & 

Natural Resources 

Department of Agriculture Department of Agriculture 

Department of the Interior 

Energy 12 Energy Department of Energy Department of Energy 

No such function 13 Public Safety & 

Security 

DHS 

Department of Justice 

DHS 

Department of Justice 

No such function 14 Long-term 

Community 

Recovery & 

Mitigation 

DHS (FEMA) Department of Agriculture 

Department of Commerce 

DHS (FEMA) 

Department of Health & Human 

Services 

Department of Housing & Urban 

Development 

Department of the Treasury 

Small Business Administration 

No such function 15 External Affairs DHS (Public Affairs) DHS (FEMA) 

Need to Solidify Role of ESF-5, Emergency Management 

Hurricane Katrina highlighted issues as to whether there is a need for ESF-5, 

Emergency Management. Unlike the other 14 functions, which have 

established desks at the NRCC, RRCCs, and JFOs, ESF-5 did not staff a desk, 

appoint coordinators, or organize below the incident commander and section 

chiefs. FEMA and DHS staff performed ESF-5 activities as described by the 

NRP, such as activating, staffing, and running the NRCC, RRCCs, JFOs, and 

emergency response teams. However, FEMA had performed those roles 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 32 

without a specific emergency support function designation under the Federal 

Response Plan. 

Several FEMA managers questioned the need for ESF-5 as it is currently 

written in the NRP. Under the Federal Response Plan, FEMA was the lead for 

ESF-5 and performed information and planning activities such as collecting, 

analyzing, processing, and disseminating information, and providing support 

for planning and decision-making at all levels of government during a 

disaster. 

The NRP altered this structure by adding information-processing and 

decision-making support roles for the HSOC, IIMG, and ESF-15. Further, by 

folding in plans for response to terrorist events, the NRP envisioned responses 

in which FEMA would not manage overall response efforts. NRP planners 

told us this concerned state and local emergency managers, who believed 

emergency management was not going to have a defined role within the new 

plan. Therefore, DHS transformed ESF-5 to encompass all emergency 

management, not just information and planning. 

ESF-5’s responsibilities under the NRP involve “supporting overall activities 

of the federal government for domestic incident management.” The NRP 

provides a list of responsibilities under FEMA’s ESF-5 purview, 

predominately coordination, management, staffing, and support functions. 

During a response, ESF-5 activates federal emergency assets including the 

other ESFs; coordinates operations with state, regional, local, and tribal 

entities; coordinates use of remote sensing, reconnaissance, and Geographic 

Information System support; and staffs the NRCC, RRCCs, JFOs, and other 

components within the federal incident command structure. ESF-5 response 

tasks also include incident action planning and situational reporting. 

FEMA staff performed all these functions during Hurricane Katrina and 

submitted daily situational reports with summaries of ESF-5 work. However, 

we were unable to determine who within FEMA claimed responsibility for 

ESF-5 coordination at its headquarters or field locations. 

FEMA staff that created ESF-5 for the NRP said it was hastily designed, is 

incomplete, and has not been fully implemented. A detailed standard 

operating procedure is in development and should define emergency 

management’s function, identify key participants, list the skills and assets they 

provide, and clarify how these elements synthesize under the NRP. Once a 

more comprehensive document has been released, FEMA must ensure all 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 33 

employees receive training to minimize confusion over the roles and 

responsibilities of ESF-5. 

Information and Reporting Problems

In redesigning ESF-5, the NRP changed the processes for collecting and 

disseminating disaster information. Even though ESF-5 retains responsibility 

for information and reporting, the HSOC and ESF-15, External Affairs, also 

have roles. During Hurricane Katrina, physical difficulties with the 

communications infrastructure were compounded by an inadequate structure 

for collecting and disseminating disaster information. Staff in operations, 

logistics, and ESF sections, such as mass care and external affairs, had 

difficulty obtaining complete, timely, and accurate information on response 

efforts. 

According to the NRP, overall federal responsibility for disaster information 

collection and sharing belongs to DHS’ HSOC. The NRCC, FEMA’s 

operational and informational center and part of ESF-5, is an important 

information resource for the HSOC. The NRP describes the NRCC as an 

HSOC component. The NRCC activated staffing and contributed to DHS 

situation reports, executive summaries, official briefings, the National 

Situation Update, the National Situation Report, and HSOC spot reports. 

Information requests from the HSOC and the IIMG consumed the NRCC’s 

planning section, which decided to hire contractors after the second week of 

the disaster to handle the sheer volume. Working with the NRCC, FEMA’s 

Operations Center maintains an on-going situational watch, assists in report 

distribution, and publishes incident reports. 

The HSOC, NRCC, and FEMA Operations Center were part of a larger 

network of responding entities that generated thousands of reports related to 

Hurricane Katrina. Despite these multiple levels of reporting, critical, timely, 

and accurate information did not consistently reach FEMA and DHS 

leadership. For example, DHS’ Secretary and key FEMA officials said that 

they did not learn of the first breach of the New Orleans levees until almost 24 

hours after it occurred. FEMA staff learned of the breach the morning of 

August 29, 2005, at the FEMA Operations Center and, separately, through 

Public Affairs staff that afternoon. The HSOC also received the report 

through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. However, the information was 

not included in the DHS Situation Report until the morning of 

August 30, 2005, and in the FEMA National Situation Update and National 

Situation Report until August 31, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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One change implemented by FEMA for its response to Hurricane Wilma in 

October 2005 was to pre-position staff as forward observers for information 

collection. Other changes are needed, and involve other DHS components 

such as the HSOC in addition to FEMA. First, DHS needs to standardize its 

format and methodology for collecting and reporting information. One 

possible explanation for why the FEMA Operations Center had no record of 

forwarding the reported levee breach is that the center follows a draft 2001 

notifications manual that has not been updated to describe its relationship with 

the HSOC or compliance with NIMS. 

Second, DHS should establish a common information management system to 

consolidate and publish disaster information including incident reports, 

contact information, duty logs, and resources. During Hurricane Katrina, this 

information was fragmented and dispersed among multiple systems. The 

HSOC’s Homeland Security Information Network published all DHS situation 

reports on its secure internet-based system but had an incomplete library of 

other reports, including HSOC Spot Reports. In addition, each state, the 

National Guard Bureau, and multiple Department of Defense groups, 

including Northern Command and Joint Task Force-Katrina, published 

incident reports. Duty logs, plans containing contact information, and 

resource information were not readily accessible. State incident, resource, and 

planning data, stored in commercially available software such as E-Team, 

were not compatible for exchange with FEMA information software. 

Recommendation #3: We recommend that the Director of the Office of 

Operations Coordination for the Department of Homeland Security, in 

coordination with the Chief Information Officer, design an information 

management system that allows users to track and share information more 

openly and efficiently; and, standardize the format and methodology for 

collecting and reporting information. 

ESF-6, FEMA’s Coordination Efforts with Other Governmental and 

Nongovernmental Partners 

FEMA made major efforts to coordinate with other agencies and improve its 

ability to provide housing resources in its response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Some of its efforts were more effective than others. For example, FEMA and 

the Red Cross experienced difficulty in identifying the number and location of 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 35 

evacuees because both held different expectations for coordinating the mass 

care function. FEMA was slow in identifying and establishing its direct 

housing mission, so alternative housing resources, such as cruise ships, were 

initially used. Also, it was hard for FEMA to staff its Disaster Recovery 

Centers with experienced personnel. However, better coordination between 

FEMA and voluntary organizations did exist and the use of the Coordinated 

Assistance Network afforded more efficient and effective service coordination 

among voluntary, as well as governmental, agencies during the disaster. 

Initial Activation

Under the NRP, FEMA is designated as the coordinator for ESF-6. Both it 

and the Red Cross are primary agencies – the Red Cross for mass care 

functions and FEMA for housing and human services functions.23 Both 

support governmental and nongovernmental efforts to address non-medical 

needs of individuals and families affected by an Incident of National 

Significance or other disaster event.24 

ESF-6 was activated August 27, 2005, and its desk at the NRCC was staffed. 

FEMA readied approximately 40 Community Relations staff for deployment 

to Orlando, Florida on August 27, 2005, and placed an additional 40 on 

alert.25 The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) 

convened an interagency conference call and planning for Disaster Recovery 

Centers began.26 By August 28, 2005, FEMA’s housing taskforce was in 

Louisiana and had started contingency planning for potential shortfalls in 

sheltering. 

 

23 All other voluntary organizations are positioned under the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster as 

support agencies. Other ESF-6 support agencies include: the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human 

Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, 

Veterans Affairs, General Services Administration, Office of Personnel Management, Small Business Administration, 

Social Security Administration, U.S. Postal Service, and Corporation for National and Community Service. 24 Mass care includes activities to provide sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid; housing addresses both shorter 

and longer-term needs of displaced disaster victims; and human services covers a range of programs, such as crisis 

counseling, benefit processing for FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program, disaster unemployment, and identifies 

support for persons with special needs. 

25 The Community Relations function resides with ESF-15, External Affairs. 

26 The National VOAD is a membership organization composed of approximately 40 organizations that provide services 

following disasters and is responsible for sharing information with its members regarding the severity of the disaster, 

needs identified, and actions taken to address these needs. See Appendix G for a list of some of the VOADs that 

provided assistance and services in response to the hurricanes that affected the Gulf Coast region. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 36 

By August 30, 2005, FEMA was planning to deploy 50 strike teams to address 

interim and temporary housing solutions and another 50 teams to shelters to 

register disaster victims. It worked with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to 

develop a contingency plan for the construction of temporary shelters for up to 

50,000 disaster victims. At FEMA headquarters, a consolidated management 

cell was formed to ensure consistency in Individual Assistance program 

implementation across current and anticipated JFO locations within the three 

affected areas. In addition, FEMA activated four contracts, estimated at $400 

million, for Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contactors to support 

its temporary housing assistance program and other resource implementation 

such as establishing Disaster Recovery Centers and training sites. Predeployment training of Individual Assistance personnel began in Orlando, 

Florida, on August 31, 2005. 

Red Cross Mass Care Activities

Prior to landfall and before ESF-6 activation, the Red Cross established 30 

shelters, placed 15 shelters on standby, and sent 12 emergency response 

vehicles as well as 3,000 clean up and comfort kits to Florida. In preparation 

for the second landfall, the Red Cross identified sites in Louisiana and worked 

with the Southern Baptist Convention to open 15 kitchens with a capacity to 

serve 25,000 meals per day at each site, and identified 10 additional sites to 

provide the same capability. Approximately 228,000 meals were sent to 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana and 227,000 to Montgomery, Alabama. The Red 

Cross assigned 100 emergency response vehicles, with an additional 100 to be 

assigned depending on where landfall occurred. 

Sheltering and Number of Evacuees

FEMA worked with the Red Cross and states to coordinate assistance and the 

movement of evacuees as shelters became operational for both general and 

special needs populations. The day before landfall, 13 shelters were open: 9 

in Mississippi housing 15 people and 4 in Louisiana housing 830 people. The 

number of shelters and evacuees surged significantly on August 29, 2005, to 

204 Red Cross shelters and 30,046 evacuees in five states.27 However, FEMA 

estimated the total number of Red Cross and non-Red Cross-shelters was 240, 

housing 51,852 evacuees. 

 

27 On August 29, 2005, 38 shelters were open in Alabama housing 2,134; 13 in Florida housing 711; 68 in Mississippi 

housing 7,834; 11 in Texas housing 739; and 74 in Louisiana housing 18,628. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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On August 31, 2005, ESF-6 processed a request to the Department of Defense 

to provide 800 personnel to assist with sheltering and feeding disaster victims 

in Louisiana and Mississippi. Also, a request was made of FEMA Logistics to 

source and acquire 700,000 additional MREs for delivery to the Red Cross to 

support shelter operations, but FEMA had sourcing and logistical problems in 

fulfilling that request. It took FEMA six days to fulfill all of the Red Cross’ 

requests for MREs. 

FEMA worked with the Red Cross and with states to identify and open 

multiple shelter locations throughout the United States but both had great 

difficulty confirming the number of people in shelters and tracking the 

number of evacuees and those being housed at unofficial shelter locations. 

For example, by September 4, 2005, FEMA had identified 499 shelters 

housing a population of 120,509 but later estimated the number of shelters to 

be 419, with a population of 273,100 evacuees. See Appendix H for an 

estimate of the number of shelters and shelter population by state from 

August 26, 2005 to September 30, 2005.28 

FEMA continued to track evacuees to assure more reliable information was 

available on the number and destination of evacuees so that it could notify the 

Red Cross to arrange for sheltering. However, FEMA continued to have 

difficulties in obtaining reliable information on where evacuees were located 

and when they would arrive. 

By September 12, 2005, FEMA was working to transition evacuees from 

shelters into temporary or interim housing by an October 1, 2005, target date. 

However, 853 shelters in 18 states were still housing an estimated 80,289 

evacuees on September 26, 2005. Given the widespread evacuation of 

residents to states throughout the nation, the target date was difficult for 

FEMA and its governmental and nongovernmental partners to achieve, and 

may have been an unrealistic expectation. 

 

28 FEMA used multiple sources of information and data to establish what it viewed as reliable numbers for shelters, 

evacuees, and host states. We reviewed this information as reported by FEMA field offices, FEMA headquarters, and 

ESF-6, to develop the chart listed in Appendix H. The data used in our report may not reflect the actual total number of 

shelters, locations, evacuees, or host states on any given date. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 38 

ESF-6 Total Shelters & Shelter Population 

Date Shelters Population 

08/29/05 204 30,046 

08/30/05 252 42,059 

09/02/05 351 122,759 

09/04/0529 419 273,100 

09/06/05 735 234,321 

09/08/05 774 246,834 

09/10/05 604 134,608 

09/12/0530 679 140,711 

09/14/05 1,034 122,639 

09/16/05 926 97,795 

09/18/05 949 89,445 

09/20/05 643 73,244 

09/22/05 717 60,888 

09/24/05 814 79,774 

09/26/05 853 80,289 

Identifying the number and location of evacuees, as well as the need for 

shelters, was initially difficult for FEMA in its ESF-6 role. As Hurricane 

Katrina was the first activation of ESF-6 under the NRP, the roles and 

responsibilities that had been more defined under the Federal Response Plan 

for the mass care function, were not yet clearly defined or established under 

the NRP. Both FEMA and the Red Cross must work together, along with 

other governmental and nongovernmental organizations within the ESF-6 

structure, to define the expectations each has for its role and area of 

responsibility. For example, a senior Red Cross official told us it is 

responsible for the coordination and reporting only of Red Cross mass care 

operations. FEMA, on the other hand, said it was relying heavily on the Red 

Cross to coordinate mass care operations and reporting that was inclusive of 

other ESF-6 support agencies. Establishing a working group, in coordination 

and consultation with all ESF-6 primary and support agencies, to serve as a 

forum to resolve coordination issues experienced during Hurricane Katrina is 

prudent and would assist in defining roles and realizing expectations. 

Recommendation #4: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish an ESF-6 working group to define 

the explicit roles and responsibilities for each agency, develop standard 

operating procedures, and implement a concept of operations plan for 

response activities that address all levels of disasters. 

 

29 FEMA estimate of number of shelters and shelter population, DHS Situation Report Number 19, September 4, 2005. 30 FEMA verifying shelter totals, DHS Situation Report Number 35, September 12, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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Hotels and Motels

The Red Cross expanded its financial assistance and hotel and motel housing 

programs in response to Hurricane Katrina. To qualify for financial 

assistance, clients must have had a pre-disaster address in an affected area that 

was verified by the Red Cross. In addition, FEMA would make referrals to 

the Red Cross. As of September 30, 2005, over 1,223,099 rooms had been 

provided and the Red Cross had funded more than $65 million for this 

program – all from funding donated to the organization. 

The vast majority of evacuee stays in hotels and motels facilitated by the Red 

Cross under the Hurricane Katrina Special Accommodations Program were 

done through an agreement with Corporate Lodging Consultants, Inc. During 

our review, FEMA and the Red Cross worked out a reimbursement contract as 

the response created additional demands and longer-term housing needs than 

what the Red Cross traditionally provides. FEMA may reimburse the Red 

Cross for housing disaster victims in hotels, motels, or other housing 

resources when extraordinary expenses outside of the Red Cross’ normal 

programs occur. On October 20, 2005, the Red Cross and FEMA established 

a contract, for approximately $250 million, for reimbursing the costs of shelter 

and emergency pharmaceutical prescription assistance to evacuees. 

As of October 24, 2005, Corporate Lodging Consultants, Inc. estimated that 

approximately 200,000 evacuees were housed under this program in 

approximately 65,000 rooms in nearly 10,000 hotels and motels nationwide.31 

The Hurricane Katrina Special Accommodations Program, which the Red 

Cross carried out on behalf of the federal government, transitioned to FEMA 

on October 25, 2005. FEMA established its own contract with Corporate 

Lodging Consultants, Inc. and the program continued to cover the cost of 

evacuee short-term stays in motels or hotels, where other accommodations 

were not available.32 FEMA was also working with evacuees to find safe and 

affordable longer-term housing. 

 

31 Corporate Lodging Consultants, Inc. website, October 24, 2005. 

32 The DHS OIG Office of Gulf Coast Hurricane Oversight reviewed FEMA’s contract management processes for 

awarding and administering a task order to provide emergency lodging to Hurricane Katrina evacuees. See DHS OIG, 

Management Advisory Report on Invoices Submitted under Order HSFEHQ-06-F-0047 by Corporate Lodging 

Consultants, Inc., Report Number GC-HQ-06-09, February 2006. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 40 

Disaster Welfare Information

The intent of the Disaster Welfare Information concept of operations for ESF6 is to collect and provide information on individuals who live in an affected 

disaster area to family members and friends outside of the disaster area. The 

Red Cross, in collaboration with Microsoft Corporation, established the 

Family Links Website to provide this service. It includes records from the 

previous Red Cross Family Links website and many other websites. Family 

Links attempts to provide the most current and accurate information available. 

However, due to the relocation and movement of Hurricane Katrina evacuees, 

location information on the website was not always complete, current, or 

correct. Evacuees were able to provide information on their location, and 

concerned family members and friends could search the list of those already 

registered. This website was available online for evacuee searches through 

February 28, 2006. As of September 25, 2005, 276,439 evacuees had reported 

their status and 28,237 concerned family members and friends had registered 

on line. In addition, calls were made to the Red Cross’ 1-877-LOVED1s 

number concerning the status of 167,682 names. 

FEMA’s Efforts to Identify and Establish Housing Resources

FEMA’s overall housing strategy for Hurricane Katrina was to use shelters, 

hotels, motels, cruise ships, tents, applicants staying with friends and relatives, 

tarping of roofs so applicants could remain in place where possible, and other 

available housing resources to address immediate housing needs of disaster 

victims. It would then transition victims to travel trailers and mobile homes, 

and finally to apartments to address longer-term housing needs. Some 

components of FEMA’s housing strategy were not well planned or 

coordinated, while other components to address and support the housing needs 

of displaced disaster victims were not as effective or efficient as FEMA had 

anticipated. 

Because of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation, FEMA made immediate housing 

decisions. For example, on August 31, 2005, it procured 20,000 manufactured 

housing units, for approximately $1 billion, to address anticipated housing 

needs and planned to purchase over 100,000 units. It also purchased 30 

mobile Disaster Recovery Centers to compliment its existing inventory and 30 

office trailers for use in implementing Individual Assistance field operations. 

By September 4, 2005, FEMA continued to assess available housing resources 

such as hotels, properties owned by federal agencies, and vacant lots at mobile 

home parks as well as the potential use of recently closed nursing homes and 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 41 

commercial cruise ships as options for temporary housing resources. The 

Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contactors were en route to 

Mississippi and two cruise ships, with a capacity to hold 5,200 passengers, 

were to arrive the following day in Galveston, Texas for use as interim 

housing for the elderly, persons with special needs, and families with small 

children who were in shelters. 

By September 5, 2005, FEMA’s Individual Assistance management cell had 

developed a strategy to address the immediate needs of disaster victims that 

included: deploying teams to register evacuees, activating expedited 

assistance, facilitating relocation of evacuees, using alternative means to 

verify program eligibility, and establishing a gradual transition to its standard 

operating procedures and program implementation once immediate needs had 

been addressed. By September 7, 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

was working with the private sector to identify privately owned rental 

resources nationwide that could be used to house displaced victims. In 

addition, the department made 3,000 vacant housing units in the affected 

region available and 30,000 housing units available nationwide. FEMA and 

the department also coordinated with faith-based organizations to match 

displaced residents with those housing resources. FEMA officials expressed 

to us the integral role the Department of Agriculture played in identifying and 

providing housing resources to displaced victims. 

The Corporation for National and Community Service and FEMA worked to 

develop a plan for the most effective use of national service resources in 

assisting disaster victims. Also, FEMA made requests of the Corporation for 

National and Community Service to help augment its Disaster Recovery 

Centers staff by providing casework, outreach, and other administrative 

services throughout the impacted area. 

Travel Trailers and Mobile Homes

By September 6, 2005, FEMA’s primary ESF-6 issues in Louisiana were to 

stabilize shelter operations and food distribution; in Mississippi it was 

supporting shelters and the relocation of evacuees as well as identifying 

emergency group sites for travel trailers; and in Alabama it was coordinating 

the installation of travel trailers on individual private sites and developing 

group sites. FEMA’s Housing Area Command stated it had identified 

sufficient sites to address the housing needs of displaced Alabama residents 

and would redirect resources to address the more affected states of Mississippi 

and Louisiana. In all states, 3,500 manufactured homes and 5,200 travel 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 42 

trailers, in various stages of production, were purchased from dealer lots. 

FEMA also began moving approximately 5,000 units from its inventory to 

staging areas, had 60,000 travel trailers being produced at the rate of 

approximately 120 per day, and awarded a contract for 1,500 modular 

structures. 

By September 10, 2005, staff at FEMA registration call centers began 

recording information for mobile and travel trailer pre-placement interviews. 

The first family to be placed in a travel trailer occurred 12 days after the 

disaster was declared. By September 12, 2005, construction started on a 500-

unit travel trailer site in Louisiana with an accelerated occupancy schedule of 

one week. Within the three affected states, there were 903 travel trailers 

occupied by September 15, 2005; an additional 1,306 (both travel trailers and 

mobile homes) were ready for occupancy; and 4,798 were positioned in 

various staging areas. The following day, only 910 units were occupied: 491 

in Louisiana; 107 in Mississippi; and 312 in Alabama. 

In Louisiana, the Housing Area Command was working to have 2,405 housing 

units ready for occupancy by the week of September 17, 2005, and an 

additional 3,408 units ready the following week. Construction began on a site 

in Baton Rouge on September 19, 2005, to place 580 travel trailers. The 

anticipated completion date for this project was September 29, 2005. As of 

October 1, 2005, only 4,128 units were occupied: 667 in Louisiana, 2,929 in 

Mississippi, and 532 in Alabama; and, an additional 5,446 units were ready 

for occupancy. FEMA, in working with its contractors, experienced difficulty 

in identifying acceptable sites to place units and was slow in identifying 

applicants to occupy units.33 For example, several sites initially identified by 

FEMA in Louisiana to place multiple units were not well coordinated with 

local officials, and local officials determined placement was not acceptable. 

Also, in several states there were issues with leasing existing parks. FEMA 

can pay only for minimum improvements and some parks required major 

renovations before being considered suitable for unit placement. 

Cruise Ships

In Alabama, FEMA’s use of a cruise ship was primarily focused on housing 

evacuees from Mississippi who were 65 years and older and in good health, 

single parents with children, and homeless individuals living in adverse 

 

33 The DHS OIG Office of Gulf Coast Hurricane Oversight is conducting ongoing work regarding housing issues. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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conditions.34 By September 5, 2005, the ship had a lower than anticipated 

occupancy rate. The lower rate may have been caused by the availability of 

shelters and tents in the area. Evacuees could commute more easily to work 

and were closer to their damaged homes by residing in these facilities rather 

than on the ship, as living on the ship meant a 45-minute commute for some. 

By September 19, 2005, FEMA was working to move more displaced persons 

on to the ship. In addition, it had been trying to move the ship from Mobile, 

Alabama to Pascagoula, Mississippi, as this would place the evacuees closer 

to home and work, but FEMA received resistance from Mobile’s port director 

because a docking fee would be lost should the ship move. As of 

September 30, 2005, the number of Mississippi residents aboard the cruise 

ship was 1,111, although the ship was capable of accommodating 1,848 

passengers. The ship moved to Pascagoula, Mississippi on October 29, 2005. 

On September 10, 2005, two cruise ships arrived in New Orleans, Louisiana, 

to provide housing to disaster victims, with a primary focus to house disaster 

victims and first responders or personnel essential to the recovery effort. On 

September 12, 2005, FEMA met with New Orleans and parish officials 

regarding the use of the ships for evacuees but the most critical need 

expressed to FEMA was to house essential city personnel, such as police and 

firefighters. Boarding began that day. The two ships provided immediate 

housing for essential emergency workers, created a base camp from which to 

operate, and also housed disaster victims. An additional 262 boarded on 

September 15, 2005, and pre-registration for an additional 866 began, 

bringing the total cruise ship occupants registered to approximately 3,366, 

with 1,430 on board. By September 18, 2005, a third cruise ship was in the 

New Orleans area and the total boarded population was 2,105. By 

October 1, 2005, 4,658 passengers were on all four ships in New Orleans and 

Chalmette, Louisiana, and Mobile, Alabama. 

During the first 30 days after the disaster, all four ships were only about 35 

percent occupied. At that occupancy rate, the cost to FEMA was 

approximately $3,363 per week, per evacuee, which was about three times 

higher than the existing per diem rate for federal government workers for the 

area. As of October 31, 2005, however, the occupancy increased 

significantly. In New Orleans, one ship with a capacity of 2,634 passengers 

had 2,118 on board (80 percent occupied); another ship with the same 

 

34 DHS OIG Office of Audits conducted an initial review of the decision to use cruise ships to provide housing for 

victims and first responders. DHS OIG, Memorandum to AIG for Hurricane Katrina Oversight, Hurricane Katrina 

Cruise Ships, November 4, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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capacity had 2,374 passengers (90 percent occupied); and the additional ship 

with a capacity of 1,020 had 862 passengers (85 percent occupied). The last 

of the four ships, with a capacity of 1,848 had 1,367 passengers (74 percent 

occupied). 

The use of high occupancy ships as an alternative resource to provide housing 

for disaster victims and personnel essential to the response and recovery effort 

was effective, but not necessarily efficient. For example, in Alabama, because 

other immediate housing resources were available in the affected area and 

provided evacuees with better accessibility to their work and damaged 

residences, the initial efficiency of the ships as an alternative housing resource 

was diminished. Future planning for the use of this resource should be 

focused more on accommodating the needs of disaster victims and should take 

into account other available housing resources to avoid potential duplication. 

Recommendation #5: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop alternative housing resource plans 

that include a review of all identified resources within an affected area, 

determine whether potential duplication exists, and efficiently deliver services 

that are accommodating to the disaster victim. 

Coordination with Voluntary Organizations

Voluntary organizations are FEMA’s partners in the provision of many mass 

care services for ESF-6, such as feeding and the bulk distribution of items to 

victims of disaster, and offer assistance that FEMA is unable to provide. For 

example, by September 23, 2005, both the Red Cross and the Salvation Army 

had provided over 16 million meals, 12 million snacks, established over 780 

fixed feeding sites, and used over 520 mobile feeding units in response to 

Hurricane Katrina.35 In addition, over 158,000 clean up kits and 287,000 

comforts kits had been distributed.36 

FEMA worked with the Department of Agriculture and ESF-6 to keep 

sufficient food supplied to shelters. In Louisiana, a mass feeding coordination 

group was established that included: ESF-11, FEMA, VOAD, the Red Cross, 

the Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the state. The 

group reviewed and updated resources, parish feeding needs, and meal 

capacity for hurricane victims and evacuees. By September 30, 2005, six 

 

35 ESF-6, data as of September 23, 2005. 

36 ESF-6, data as of September 26, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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kitchens were operational in Mississippi with a capacity to serve 100,000 

meals per day, 38 in Texas with a capacity of 185,000 meals per day, and 24 

in Louisiana with a capacity of 309,000 meals per day. As of 

December 15, 2005, the Red Cross, in coordination with the Southern Baptist 

Convention, had served more than 27 million hot meals and 25 million snacks 

to hurricane survivors in the Gulf Coast region. 

FEMA, working with National VOAD, was able to anticipate the proactive 

role some nongovernmental organizations would have in disaster response and 

recovery operations, and attempted to coordinate relationships with those 

organizations to provide assistance and alleviate the potential for duplication. 

Historically, volunteer and governmental agencies have sought to work 

together on behalf of disaster victims and to ensure that the most effective and 

efficient care is provided on their behalf. However, due to a wide-range of 

legal and practical challenges, a shared service coordination system was only 

developed last year. 

Although FEMA and the voluntary organizations experienced coordination 

issues, better VOAD communication and cooperation existed in response to 

Hurricane Katrina than in other disaster recovery efforts. For example, the 

use of the Coordinated Assistance Network was an improvement over the lack 

of coordination that existed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

The Coordinated Assistance Network was established through a memorandum 

of understanding in 2003 and was first piloted during the 2004 hurricane 

season in Florida.37 The goal of the Coordinated Assistance Network is to 

afford more efficient and effective service coordination among voluntary, as 

well as governmental, agencies during disaster events. It was designed as a 

communication mechanism for services providers and to identify any gaps or 

redundancies in services. The network allowed registered organizations to 

access information on available services and to share information on the levels 

of services delivered to individuals, families, or households. It also allowed 

disaster victims to explain their needs and register only once, as registration 

afforded disaster victims a registration with all service providers on the 

network. As of September 30, 2005, 5 organizations were using the network 

and 81,817 clients records were in the system. 

 

37 The following organizations signed this document: American National Red Cross, Salvation Army, Alliance of 

Information and Referral Systems, United Way of America, United Services Group, National VOAD, and Safe Horizon. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Inspection Services

When applicants apply for assistance from FEMA, the information provided is 

entered into the National Emergency Management Information System. 

Should an inspection be required to process the application, the system will 

generate an inspection request, which is then issued to one of FEMA’s 

contract inspection service providers to verify the personal and real property 

losses and damages of the applicant. Inspectors then visit the homes of 

applicants to verify disaster-related damages. After the inspection is 

completed, inspectors upload (or return) their findings to FEMA’s processing 

system so that an eligibility determination can be made. 

FEMA historically has attempted to complete this process within ten days 

after an application is made. Because of the disaster’s magnitude, it was 

difficult for FEMA to meet this performance standard. We were told 

inspectors faced limited accessibility to homes and encountered fuel and 

lodging shortages, which affected their ability to complete inspections in a 

timely manner. Because of the inaccessibility issues, FEMA initially used 

some inspectors to take applications from disaster evacuees in shelters. 

By September 2, 2005, 1,200 inspectors were positioned in all three states, 

and 47,698 inspections were issued, 37,000 of which were for homes in 

Louisiana. By September 10, 2005, however, the number of inspections 

issued had significantly increased to 406,730. There were 1,037 inspectors in 

the field and only 20,535 (5 percent) of the inspections were completed. 

Specifically, 293,132 inspections were issued in Louisiana and 7,517 (3 

percent) were completed; in Mississippi, 86,712 were issued and 3,543 (4 

percent) were completed; and in Alabama, 26,886 were issued and 9,475 (4 

percent) were completed. 

FEMA determined that the need for inspectors to register applicants in 

shelters was decreasing and that some affected areas were becoming 

accessible, so it deployed more inspectors to the field to conduct inspections. 

By September 17, 2005, 791,735 inspections were issued and 48,593 (6 

percent) had been uploaded; 1,591inspectors were in the field. As of 

September 20, 2005, 877,706 inspections were issued and FEMA’s contract 

inspectors had completed 94,949 inspections (11 percent); 2,016 inspectors 

were in the field. 
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Date Inspections 

Issued 

Inspections 

Returned 

Percentage 

Returned 

Inspectors in 

Field 

09/04/05 47,698 1,625 3% 1,200 

09/10/05 406,730 20,535 5% 1,037 

09/17/05 791,735 48,593 6% 1,591 

09/20/05 877,706 94,949 11% 2,016 

09/23/05 943,506 142,680 15% 2,196 

09/28/05 1,011,087 201,112 20% 2,099 

FEMA personnel expressed concern that the rate of returned inspections was 

low and slowing the housing transition process within the affected states. The 

slow return rate may have been attributed to several factors such as the initial 

inaccessibility to homes and the lack of inspectors to address the disaster’s 

sheer volume of homes requiring inspection. In addition, many disaster 

victims were dispersed throughout the United States and some were unable, or 

not easily available, to be present during the inspection of the damaged home. 

To address this issue, FEMA developed a procedure that would allow an 

inspection without the applicant’s presence. The applicant would sign 

applicable documents, such as the 90-69B and Authorized Agent Release 

forms.38 The applicant could then make arrangements with the inspector for 

someone else – either a relative or friend over 18 years of age – to accompany 

the inspector during the inspection. A FEMA Community Relations 

representative accompanied the inspector in cases where the applicant did not 

have a family member or friend to act as an authorized agent. By 

September 23, 2005, 943,506 inspections were issued, 142,680 inspections 

were completed, and 2,196 inspectors were in the field. By 

September 28, 2005, 1,011,087 inspections were issued, and 201,112 were 

completed, with 2,099 inspectors. 

Given the initial inaccessibility issues, FEMA was creative in using deployed 

contract inspectors to register disaster victims in shelters. FEMA was also 

resourceful in developing an alternative mechanism for inspection in cases 

where the applicant was not available or able to be present. However, several 

FEMA officials said once affected areas did become accessible, there were not 

enough contract inspectors available to perform inspections. 

 

38 FEMA Form 60-69B, Declaration and Release, is signed by all applicants to declare that a member of the household is 

a citizen, non-citizen national, or qualified alien of the United States, and other certifying statements from the applicant, 

such as the information provided in their application for FEMA assistance is true and correct to the best of their 

knowledge. 
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Disaster Recovery Centers

FEMA faced many challenges in establishing its Disaster Recovery Centers in 

response to Hurricane Katrina. Traditionally, centers are established in 

facilities near an affected area to serve the needs of disaster victims in that 

area. The intent is to provide one-stop access to federal, state, local, and 

voluntary organizations’ disaster assistance programs. By visiting a center, 

applicants may discuss their disaster-related needs, register for FEMA 

assistance, update any information initially provided during the registration 

process, inquire on the status of their application, and seek information from 

other disaster service providers. FEMA and the state work together to 

establish and manage the centers. 

Because of widespread damage and evacuation of the majority of disaster 

victims, FEMA’s standard process for site selection required a different 

approach. FEMA officials used the following assumptions in establishing the 

location of Disaster Recovery Centers: areas will be inaccessible longer and 

residents will not be able to return for an extended period of time. Centers 

were initially established in areas less affected by the disaster, where larger 

shelter populations existed or in areas where there was a significant influx of 

evacuees. FEMA thought this approach was more efficient in addressing 

disaster victim needs as accessibility was increased.39 

FEMA worked with the Red Cross and the states to identify multiple shelter 

locations, but all were having difficulty confirming the number of people in 

shelters and tracking the number of evacuees, and those housed at unofficial 

shelter locations. FEMA relied upon reports generated by the affected states 

and Red Cross to provide current information related to shelter populations. 

Because the number and location of evacuees was often uncertain and fluid, 

FEMA officials estimated the evacuated population by using previous New 

Orleans census data to factor in an average family size of 2.5 persons. 

Collectively, centers were operational seven days a week with slight 

deviations between locations.40 As additional centers were established, 

FEMA began targeting the more affected areas and used both fixed and 

mobile centers, as well as “sweep registration teams;” all of which assisted in 

 

39 See Appendix I for a map of FEMA’s Disaster Recovery Center locations. 40 See Appendix J for a list of Fixed Disaster Recovery Center locations and hours of operation. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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registering applicants for FEMA assistance.41 The use of sweep teams was an 

innovative adjustment that assisted in addressing the needs of the most 

affected populations. 

Disaster Recovery Centers were located in a variety of facilities: abandoned 

buildings, schools, churches, office buildings, and gymnasiums. Not all 

facilities, however, were compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act 

of 1990, which made accommodating applicants more difficult, and other 

centers were cramped and inhibited an applicant’s flow from one service 

provider to another. Also, there was an effort to co-locate centers with 

National Guard units in order to serve more affected areas. When co-location 

was not possible, FEMA used mobile centers to reach those areas. 

A total of 43 fixed and mobile centers were open and operational by 

September 20, 2005: 16 in Louisiana; 7 in Mississippi; 7 in Alabama; 10 in 

Texas; and 3 in Florida.42 In Louisiana, 20,448 residents had been assisted at 

the 13 operational fixed centers since opening. A total of 51 centers were 

open and operational on September 21, 2005: 21 in Louisiana; 10 in 

Mississippi; 7 in Alabama; 11 in Texas; and 2 in Florida. Between 

August 24, 2005, and September 30, 2005, 50 fixed centers were operational. 

The use of mobile centers was difficult to quantify because each became 

operational based on need. FEMA was unable to provide us with an estimate 

of the total population serviced at both fixed and mobile centers during this 

period. 

The Disaster Recovery Centers were staffed with representatives from federal, 

state, and local government agencies, non-profit organizations, voluntary 

agencies, and FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) and local hires. 

However, FEMA officials told us they had inadequate numbers of trained 

staff. They said the use of local hires had diminished over the years and 

should be better developed to help augment staff resources. They also 

expressed concern about a perceived limit on hiring DAEs, which hinders 

FEMA’s ability to surge in staff during disasters. 

To address the limitations, Disaster Recovery Center directors made important 

and independent decisions, ranging from the maintenance and upkeep of 

facilities to developing on-the-job training programs. During our fieldwork, a 

 

41 Sweep registration teams were comprised of FEMA personnel that visited shelters and special populations that could 

not reach a Disaster Recovery Center. 

42 Hurricane Katrina DHS Situation Report Number 50, September 20, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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center director explained how they developed a program to re-train new 

personnel because new hires had not received adequate training during 

FEMA’s accelerated orientation process. A number of Disaster Recovery 

Center directors do not view the accelerated process as efficient or effective 

because it did not facilitate or develop an ability to work independently. To 

expedite the transition between when new workers arrived at a center and 

when they were able to work independently, a shadowing system was used. 

The system paired a new hire with a more experienced worker. The pair 

worked together until the new hire was self-sufficient. The shadow system 

was a resourceful method to address training deficiencies, but it also strained 

limited staff resources, which decreased the number of staff available to assist 

disaster victims. 

Recommendation #6: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a more comprehensive training 

program to prepare existing and new personnel for Disaster Recovery Center 

assignments. 

Recommendation #7: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a more comprehensive program to 

recruit, train, and retain local hires for use in augmenting FEMA’s Disaster 

Assistance Employees and permanent staff. 

Additional FEMA Coordination with Governmental Organizations

Health and Human Services

FEMA coordinated with the Department of Heath and Human Services, to 

provide services from the Administration for Children and Families. This 

agency is responsible for federal programs that promote the economic and 

social well being of families, children, individuals, and communities. By 

September 19, 2005, Heath and Human Services deployed 5 teams, with 35 

staff each, to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas to assist with the recovery 

effort and also provided information on service programs such as contacts for 

welfare aid, emergency energy assistance, Head Start, and support for 

displaced and foster children in all the affected areas. 

Housing and Urban Development

By September 26, 2005, FEMA was working with the Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) on implementing an additional program to 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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provide housing assistance vouchers to eligible disaster victims and 

households. As not all applicants are eligible for FEMA’s housing assistance 

programs, the Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program was developed as 

a special voucher by HUD and FEMA for those displaced households who 

previously lived in a HUD Section 8 property, held a Section 8 voucher, or 

who were homeless. 

Applicants would first register with FEMA. Should the applicant not be 

eligible for FEMA’s housing assistance, FEMA would then transfer 

appropriate applicant qualification data and funding to HUD. Under the 

Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program, the family could relocate to an 

area of their choice within the United States that was not affected by the 

disaster. Once housing resources were rebuilt or repaired, families could then 

return to their home state. 

HUD’s program was to provide a temporary monthly rent subsidy to assist 

eligible displaced households obtain decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the 

privately owned rental market. The monthly rent subsidy would be based on 

the area’s fair market rent and available for a term not to exceed 18 months. 

Eligibility for the program was based on established criteria and the individual 

or family must have: (1) been evacuated from a Hurricane Katrina federallydeclared disaster area within Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama; (2) had their 

residence destroyed or made uninhabitable, as determined by FEMA; (3) 

registered with FEMA by December 31, 2005; and, (4) been either homeless 

or resided in a HUD-assisted dwelling unit immediately prior to evacuation. 

Under the program, the local public housing agency would assume 

responsibility to not only provide a monthly rent subsidy on behalf of the 

family, but also to actively assist the family locate an eligible unit, including 

coordinating both temporary shelter and transportation for the family, on an 

as-needed basis. When a unit was selected by the family and approved by the 

public housing agency, the owner and the public housing agencies would enter 

into a rent subsidy contract and the family and the owner would execute a 

lease. Under the program’s rent subsidy contract, the public housing agency 

would pay the security deposit and a monthly rent subsidy directly to the 

owner on behalf of the family. The public housing agency would also pay 

assistance for deposits for utilities directly to the utility companies on behalf 

of the family. However, by September 30, 2005, FEMA and HUD were still 

in the process of negotiating a number of logistical and reimbursement issues 

regarding how the program would be implemented. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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ESF-6 Lead Was Change and Challenge for FEMA

FEMA officials said being the coordinator and co-primary agency for ESF-6 

was a change and a challenge from its role and responsibilities under the 

Federal Response Plan. Under that plan, the Red Cross was the primary 

agency for the Mass Care Annex and FEMA was a support agency. Also, 

both FEMA and the Red Cross were support agencies for the Food Annex. 

Under the NRP, however, FEMA is responsible for coordinating the activities 

of ESF-6 designated support agencies, providing assistance with response 

activities and operations, and implementing its Individual Assistance 

programs and longer-term recovery assistance solutions. The mass care, 

housing, and human services functions performed within ESF-6 have both a 

response element, to address the urgent mass care needs of victims, and a 

recovery element, to support governmental and nongovernmental efforts in 

addressing longer-term needs of individuals and families affected by an event. 

FEMA officials stated repeatedly that it is not an emergency assistance 

provider. During the emergency response period of a disaster, FEMA relies 

upon organizations such as the Red Cross and National VOAD members to 

perform those activities. FEMA views its partnership with such organizations 

as invaluable as these organizations are the providers of emergency assistance 

to the most vulnerable and greatest need populations. As the NRP is a new 

construct, FEMA should better define its role and responsibilities for response 

activities as the coordinator and as a primary agency for ESF-6. It must also 

define and establish its expectations, and the expectations for other support 

agencies, so that they are clearly known and realized. 

New Capabilities and Improved Coordination Necessary for ESF-9 

FEMA US&R task forces, in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard, state and 

local first responders, and volunteers, rescued an estimated 50,000 victims 

stranded as a result of Hurricane Katrina. However, FEMA lacks water rescue 

capabilities within its national US&R task forces, and many US&R resources 

and operations were not coordinated by or through FEMA’s ESF-9 role. 

Increased water rescue capabilities and improved ESF-9 coordination are 

needed for FEMA to be more responsive to future catastrophic events that 

involve large-scale flooding and the mass evacuation of stranded persons. 
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Urban Search and Rescue Mission Was Effective Despite Resource 

Limitations

FEMA’s national US&R task forces worked under austere conditions to 

perform thousands of successful rescue missions, many of them water-based, 

even though FEMA has no existing capability for performing water rescues. 

As of September 30, 2005, FEMA’s 28 national US&R teams had rescued 

6,582 victims in Mississippi and Louisiana.43 

ESF-9 rapidly deploys national US&R task forces to provide specialized lifesaving assistance to state, local, and tribal governments for an Incident of 

National Significance. FEMA is the ESF-9 coordinator and primary agency, 

and its National US&R Response System consists of 28 US&R task forces 

based throughout the United States and sponsored by state and local 

government emergency response organizations. Each is staffed by local fire 

department and emergency services personnel highly trained in collapsed 

structure search and rescue operations; the NRP focuses on collapsed structure 

operations. While FEMA US&R handled collapsed structure rescues with 

success, the majority of disaster rescues during the Hurricane Katrina 

response were water-based. None of FEMA’s US&R task forces has water 

rescue capabilities. 

To establish immediate water rescue capabilities in the affected areas, FEMA 

relied on its support agencies, primarily the U.S. Coast Guard, to provide 

personnel and boats and aircraft for water-based search and rescue activities. 

In addition, state officials in Louisiana issued a request for volunteers to assist 

search and rescue efforts using their personal boats. Hundreds of volunteers 

responded. 

In addition, FEMA requested the assistance of eight swift water rescue task 

forces from California; however, getting these resources to Louisiana took 

time. Because California was not an EMAC participant at the time of the 

request, these task forces did not have the liability protections provided by 

 

43 A standard US&R task force complement consists of 70 specialists, plus search dogs, that are divided into six 

functional specialties: search, rescue, medical, hazardous materials (hazmat), logistics, and planning. To ensure a full, 

70-specialist complement can deploy to a disaster, the task forces generally roster 130 trained members. Once deployed 

to a disaster site, specialists divide into two, 35-member teams to provide around the clock coverage. The task force also 

deploys with a $1.4 million equipment cache that includes: listening devices and search cameras; heavy machinery such 

as cranes, bulldozers, and concrete cutting saws; a fully stocked mobile emergency room; decontamination equipment; 

and tents, cots, food, and water to sustain the task force for a 72-hour period. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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EMAC.44 FEMA’s Office of General Counsel assisted in ensuring the 

California task forces were able to operate in Louisiana with requisite liability 

coverage. In addition, the arrival of the task forces was further delayed due to 

the approval process necessary for obtaining Department of Defense airlift 

support. Once in Louisiana, the California task forces were able to begin 

immediate water rescue missions. Water rescue operations using the 

California task forces in Louisiana did not begin until August 31, 2005. 

While the California task forces and U.S. Coast Guard resources provided 

support for water-based search and rescue missions, FEMA US&R should 

consider establishing more formal arrangements to access water rescue 

capabilities, such as through the U.S. Coast Guard, additional DHS 

components, or with other federal departments and agencies, to ensure that 

resources will be available if needed in response to future Incidents of 

National Significance. As an alternative, FEMA US&R should consider 

developing its own water rescue capability. 

FEMA Lacked Sufficient Personnel to Fully Staff ESF-9

FEMA’s US&R section was limited in its ability to fully staff the ESF-9 

coordination function. FEMA headquarters US&R staff was over extended, 

with most personnel performing multiple functions, and was unable to send 

staff to the RRCCs or JFOs. Instead, seasoned task force members were 

pulled away from US&R operational duties to staff the ESF-9 coordination 

function at the RRCCs and JFOs. 

Urban Search and Rescue Coordination Efforts Need Improvement

As ESF-9 coordinator, FEMA is responsible for activating and coordinating 

national US&R assets. However, ESF-9 coordination activities were not 

scaled for large, geographically dispersed catastrophic events such as 

Hurricane Katrina. To improve its coordination of search and rescue efforts, 

FEMA may need to redistribute ESF-9 responsibilities or develop a surge plan 

to account for catastrophic situations requiring search and rescue capabilities 

not inherent to FEMA. 

As a result of the disaster’s magnitude, and subsequent levee breaches in New 

Orleans, a large number of US&R resources were needed quickly within the 

 

44 After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, any state not already a member of EMAC signed on as a member, including 

California. Due to its remote location, Hawaii does not participate in EMAC. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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area. Because US&R task forces came from locations across the United 

States, ESF-9 phased in FEMA US&R deployments; full strength was reached 

in Louisiana on August 31, 2005, and in Mississippi on September 1, 2005. 

Also, the majority of search and rescue personnel were not provided through 

ESF-9. In addition to state and local first responders and volunteers, U.S. 

Coast Guard, Department of Defense, National Guard, and EMAC resources 

augmented search and rescue efforts in the affected area. The U.S. Coast 

Guard performed 32,967 rescues as of September 6, 2005. 

Many US&R resources were not coordinated with or by FEMA in its role as 

ESF-9 coordinator. When providing ESF-9 status reports for DHS situation 

reports, FEMA reported only information concerning FEMA national US&R 

task forces. In addition, the NRCC Operations Section Chief tasked the U.S. 

Coast Guard with rescue missions directly, rather than going through ESF-9 to 

coordinate rescue operations. 

Lack of coordination resulted in duplicative searches. FEMA US&R task 

forces conducting secondary building searches found symbols indicating 

US&R resources in the area through EMAC had already searched the 

buildings. US&R officials indicated they had very little coordination with the 

EMAC resources in the field. EMAC was an extremely useful resource; 

however, FEMA and EMAC resources need better coordination among search 

and rescue task forces to avoid duplicative efforts. 

In addition, FEMA headquarters US&R officials indicated they did not fully 

understand the security support mission of ESF-13, Public Safety and 

Security, prior to Hurricane Katrina. Civil unrest in Louisiana and threats of 

civil unrest in Mississippi affected US&R operations as task forces had to 

provide their own force protection or rely on available National Guard or local 

law enforcement to protect task force members and equipment caches. A 

better understanding of the ESF-13 function may have resulted in FEMA 

coordinating with ESF-13 to provide security for US&R task forces rather 

than diverting US&R resources away from the search and rescue mission. 

In addition, FEMA US&R task forces experienced difficulty coordinating 

with state and local officials to obtain probable cause authority to forcibly 

enter a building to conduct secondary searches. In Louisiana, the Governor 

and the Mayor of New Orleans each had different approaches for establishing 

probable cause to search the 22,313 buildings in Orleans parish. Ultimately, 

the Governor gave specific direction on forcible entry for US&R on 

September 10, 2005. US&R task forces did not have a problem obtaining 
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proper authorities for forcible entry in Mississippi; this was not an issue in 

Alabama either. 

Some coordination of US&R efforts was achieved between the PFO and Joint 

Task Force-Katrina, but not until approximately a week after Hurricane 

Katrina’s landfall. As a result, Department of Defense and National Guard 

resources conducted a coordinated grid search of New Orleans. However, this 

coordination did not occur through FEMA’s ESF-9 coordination function. 

While the search and rescue mission was for the most part one of FEMA’s 

more effective resource implementation efforts, FEMA should review its 

current capabilities in coordination with other DHS components, such as the 

U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, and consider 

redistributing ESF-9 responsibilities. Or, it should consider developing its 

own water rescue capabilities and developing a surge plan for augmenting 

FEMA’s ESF-9 coordination capability during catastrophic events. 

Recommendation #8: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, review ESF-9 Annex capabilities for search and rescue and 

coordination within FEMA and other Department of Homeland Security 

components (such as U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection) 

or with other federal departments and agencies, and either redistribute ESF-9 

responsibilities or develop greater water rescue capabilities within FEMA. 

Recommendation #9: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, develop a surge plan and standard operating procedures for 

augmenting FEMA’s ESF-9 coordination capability during catastrophic 

events with resources such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border 

Protection personnel. 

ESF-15 Structure and State Coordination Need Improvement 

ESF-15, External Affairs, serves as the primary means of sharing information 

and developing a unified message for the government, disaster victims, and 

the public. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall, problems with the 

communications infrastructure along the Gulf Coast region and staffing 

shortages hampered ESF-15 operations on the ground, as was true for many 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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FEMA, state, and local responders. Additional difficulties encountered by 

ESF-15 were confusion over the function’s hierarchy and information flow, 

and its difficulty establishing a coordinated message with the State of 

Louisiana. 

Refining the ESF-15 Organization

ESF-15 is a direct result of After Action Reports developed from Hurricane 

Isabel in 2003 and combined FEMA components that informally coordinated 

with each other during past incidents. ESF-15 serves to provide 

“coordination, staff, and assets to carry out the external affairs mission of 

providing accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences, 

including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace.”45 

ESF-15 components include Public Affairs (media relations, public 

information), Community Relations (communications with victims and local 

officials), Congressional Affairs, International Affairs, State and Local 

Coordination/Intergovernmental Affairs, and Tribal Affairs. According to the 

NRP, state and local officials determine the level of federal External Affairs 

support required. 

Although FEMA staff conducted External Affairs operations during previous 

2005 disasters and exercises, Hurricane Katrina involved the first full use of 

ESF-15 under DHS’ coordination. The DHS Assistant Secretary for Public 

Affairs coordinates ESF-15 field operations to promote effective 

communications with the public, and maintains contact with the White House 

Office of Communications and the Homeland Security Council. The 

Assistant Secretary named the lead External Affairs Officer for Hurricane 

Katrina, who supported the JFO leadership in all external communications and 

coordinated public information at the incident site through management of the 

Joint Information Center components.46 Joint Information Centers for 

Hurricane Katrina were co-located with the JFOs, where public affairs 

personnel from responding organizations could conduct emergency 

communications, crisis communications, and public affairs functions. FEMA, 

as the primary agency for ESF-15, has the responsibility of identifying and 

deploying personnel and other resources to support the ESF and establishing 

the Joint Information Centers. Joint Information Centers were established in 

 

45 National Response Plan, Emergency Support Function #15 External Affairs, Draft Standard Operating Procedures, 

2005, p. 3. 

46 ICS allows multiple Joint Information Centers to be established during large incidents involving multiple jurisdictions. 
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Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and a forward Joint Information Center 

was added in New Orleans on September 12, 2005. 

For Hurricane Katrina, External Affairs personnel deployed to the state EOCs 

prior to landfall, and the ESF-15 desks at the NRCC and RRCCs were 

activated. DHS Public Affairs combined information from situation reports 

and conference calls to create a daily messaging template, complete with “Key 

Messages,” “Key Statistics,” media appearances by federal officials for that 

day, and media clips of quotes from officials about FEMA from the prior day. 

These tools helped the federal government to speak with one voice in the 

weeks and months following Hurricane Katrina and provided common 

operational awareness. 

ESF-15 components report to their respective Joint Information Center, which 

communicates issues and needs up to the DHS headquarters level. The Joint 

Information Center’s leadership maintains constant contact with other ESFs at 

the JFO, as well as headquarters. As inquiries flow up to the Joint 

Information Center leadership, the resulting information flows back down to 

all ESF-15 components, avoiding duplicative efforts and consolidating 

research efforts. 

Community Relations personnel, who have the most initial contact with 

victims and local officials at the incident site, also serve as a form of 

intelligence gathering, supplying the JFO and headquarters with information 

from the affected areas. The Assistant Secretary works with the lead External 

Affairs Officer and the PFO’s press secretary to coordinate key messages, 

with the lead External Affairs Officer reporting to and providing external 

affairs guidance to the on-site senior federal official. 

In response to Hurricane Katrina, information flow within ESF-15 did not 

function well during the initial weeks, but eventually improved with 

enhancements to its organizational structure, developed through trial and 

error. During a July 2005 summit, DHS Public Affairs and FEMA External 

Affairs personnel attempted to formalize the NRP’s description of ESF-15 

using a working draft of an ESF-15 standard operating procedures manual. 

While no formal standard operating procedures manual was completed during 

the summit, a resulting organizational chart helped to explain how ESF-15 

should work. The organizational chart served as ESF-15’s initial framework 

during Hurricane Katrina, but it still required additional revision during the 

first month of the response. 
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During the first days of the response, DHS Public Affairs decided to allow 

FEMA Public Affairs to take the lead in establishing the ESF-15 operation, 

but as the response progressed, DHS Public Affairs became more involved. 

The Assistant Secretary chose a FEMA Region I Public Affairs member to be 

the lead External Affairs Officer on September 4, 2005, and had this FEMA 

official head the ESF-15 operation based out of Louisiana’s Joint Information 

Center in Baton Rouge. Designating a FEMA official to represent the DHS 

ESF-15 leadership led to confusion over the ESF-15 reporting structure and 

whether FEMA field staff reported to DHS or FEMA Public Affairs 

headquarters. Adding to the confusion, the ESF-15 organizational chart 

developed in July 2005 excluded FEMA Public Affairs – a detail that had not 

yet been resolved. One DHS official referred to the “fundamental 

awkwardness” of having DHS in charge of something FEMA had historically 

controlled during disasters. This had to be sorted out in the midst of the 

largest response External Affairs had ever conducted. 

The PFO cell and interaction between the five External Affairs components 

added to the need for greater clarity in ESF-15 organization and information 

flow. There was ambiguity about how these relationships should function. 

FEMA Public Affairs, Community Relations, Congressional Affairs, and the 

rest function as independent offices during non-response operations and 

manage DAEs trained only for their specific cadres. ESF-15 had to resolve 

issues of how the five components should support each other; for example, the 

NRCC ESF-15 desk, staffed by Public Affairs, elected to limit support to 

Congressional Affairs information requests in order to manage its workload. 

External Affairs could benefit from reorganizing its components into a single 

FEMA Office of External Affairs so daily operations more closely reflect 

those experienced during an incident. 

Ultimately, DHS Public Affairs gave the Joint Information Center leadership 

the freedom to revise the organizational chart and clarify the appropriate 

information flow and reporting structures. The new chart added a PFO ESF15 liaison position to work with the PFO’s press secretary. Adding a liaison 

also helped the operations to improve their working relationship. The new 

chart recognized each Joint Information Center component as being equal in 

stature, with its own operations in each state. FEMA’s Office of Public 

Affairs was still absent, but it was decided that the office could be best used in 

a supporting capacity, providing services to free resources in the field for 

other duties. The ESF-15 NRCC desk served as an extension of this support, 

acting as a conduit for information, both coming in and going out, across 

FEMA. 
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Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the only NRP training for ESF-15 staff was a basic 

overview of the plan that did not explain details of Joint Information Center 

operations or the ESF-15 organization. Based on observations of the 

Hurricane Katrina response, ESF-15 staff began to develop more detailed 

training to orient participants from across the External Affairs disciplines. 

The first session was at FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute in 

February 2006. 

Recommendation #10: We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for 

Public Affairs, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, develop a definitive ESF-15 organizational chart that is 

scalable to the size of an incident, with a clear hierarchical structure and 

information flow. 

Recommendation #11: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency further develop and fully implement formal 

ESF-15 training, so all full-time employees and Disaster Assistance 

Employees have a comprehensive understanding of how to operate within its 

structure during an incident. 

State Coordination Needed to Establish a Unified Message

Alabama and Mississippi established joint operations with ESF-15. Federal 

External Affairs staff co-located at the state EOCs prior to landfall. Together, 

they worked continuously to maintain a unified message using joint federalstate press briefings, and later joint press releases. Both states had processes 

that facilitated an efficient information flow. The Mississippi state public 

information officer indicated satisfaction with the level of coordination 

between FEMA and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, as was 

the case with all local public information officers working with FEMA with 

whom she had contact. 

In Louisiana, federal External Affairs staff and state public affairs staff began 

the response with co-location and joint public information efforts. However, 

after a verbal altercation on August 31, 2005, between the Under Secretary for 

EP&R and a communications staff member from the Louisiana Governor’s 

office, Louisiana elected not to conduct external affairs jointly with ESF-15. 

The Governor held separate briefings and did not participate in the Louisiana 

Joint Information Center through most of September 2005. ESF-15 did 

establish a cooperative relationship with the public information officer for the 
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Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, which 

was secondary to the Governor’s office in coordinating Louisiana public 

affairs. The Louisiana Governor’s office joined the Joint Information Center 

at the end of September 2005, when the media moved from the state EOC to 

the Joint Information Center to cover federal briefings. Both federal and 

Louisiana officials felt they could have provided a more positive, unified 

image to the press and the public had they combined their efforts from the 

beginning. In particular, FEMA officials noted that the visible lack of 

cooperation helped to undermine public confidence in FEMA operations and 

diverted media attention from FEMA’s victim assistance efforts. 

The situation with Louisiana occurred despite ongoing efforts by FEMA’s 

Region VI to build its relationship with the state. An External Affairs official 

from that office participated in the Hurricane Pam planning exercise and 

assisted Louisiana in developing a media plan for inclusion in the Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan.47 Because the full plan had not yet 

been finalized, the state chose not to use the media portion, against the advice 

of a FEMA Region VI official to Louisiana’s Governor. One federal official 

pointed to that incident as an example of how FEMA’s training with state 

officials does not necessarily guarantee a smooth, joint operation during an 

actual incident. 

DHS Public Affairs is now completing the development of an outreach 

program to each state, as part of an effort to encourage state participation and 

leadership in ESF-15. It consists of a multi-day conference bringing together 

state and local public information officers with FEMA and DHS Public 

Affairs officials for discussions on the NRP and ESF-15, with a focus on state 

and local roles in External Affairs. The hope is that the program will build 

better working relationships between federal and state officials, give federal 

officials a better understanding of the available emergency management 

resources in each state, and give state officials a better understanding of how 

they fit into and can use ESF-15 during an incident. DHS staff said the first 

outreach session, held in July 2005 in Wisconsin, was well received, and 

 

47 In 2004, FEMA and Louisiana began a series of meetings to develop a detailed response plan for a catastrophic 

hurricane. Participating federal, state, and local staff responded to a simulated Category 3 hurricane named Pam in order 

to develop strategies for pre-deployment; search and rescue; shelter and temporary housing; commodity distribution; and 

public information, among other functions. A FEMA contractor produced the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan in January 2005. Subsequent meetings to address additional functions were postponed in 2005; they 

would have included strategies for external affairs, transportation, communications, feeding, security, and missing 

persons/family reunification. 
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participants’ input is being used to refine the program for eventual use across 

the country. 

Recommendation #12: We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Public 

Affairs for the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the 

Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, complete the 

development of and fully implement the DHS Public Affairs state outreach 

program. 

National Guard and Active Duty Troops Provide Valuable Support but 

Improved Coordination with FEMA is Needed 

National Guard and active duty military troops deployed in record numbers to 

support the Hurricane Katrina response, including assisting with search and 

rescue efforts, commodity distribution, communications, evacuations, 

security, and medical care in the affected areas. However, the Department of 

Defense approval process at times delayed the arrival of assistance and 

coordination with FEMA seemed to be lacking in some instances. 

National Guard and Active Duty Troops Deploy in Record Numbers to 

Support Hurricane Katrina Response Efforts

National Guard and active duty military troops provided support at 

unprecedented levels. Troops assisted with search and rescue efforts; 

distributed water, food, and ice to save and sustain the lives of victims and 

responders; provided fuel distribution in the affected area to allow for 

continued movement of personnel and commodities; reestablished basic 

communications; evacuated thousands of victims from the affected area to 

shelters in other states; provided medical care to victims; supported local law 

enforcement personnel to reestablish and maintain security in the affected 

areas; worked to rebuild damaged infrastructure; and assisted with debris 

clearance. Mission assignments accepted by the Department of Defense 

through September 30, 2005, total over $2.1 billion in assistance to 

Mississippi and Louisiana. 

At its peak, approximately 50,000 National Guard troops from 49 states, the 

District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and more than 

22,000 active duty military troops, were supporting response efforts in 

Mississippi and Louisiana. In comparison, 7,700 National Guard and 22,800 
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active duty military troops deployed to support the Hurricane Andrew 

response in 1992. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the largest domestic 

deployment of National Guard troops was 32,700 in support of the San 

Francisco (Loma Prieta), California earthquake response in 1989. 

State governors call their respective National Guard troops to state active 

duty.48 The state or FEMA requests assistance from National Guard troops 

through action requests or mission assignments. The Defense Coordinating 

Officer at the state EOC or at the JFO typically forwards requests for 

assistance to the National Guard. If a state’s National Guard assets are not 

sufficient to meet a required need, the state can request assistance from 

National Guard troops in other states through EMAC. Through EMAC, 

National Guard troops came from across the United States to support efforts in 

Mississippi and Louisiana. To equalize the pay and benefits of National 

Guard troops from multiple states, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved 

the use of Title 32 federal funds for National Guard personnel retroactive to 

August 29, 2005.49 

Through action requests or mission assignments initiated by the state or 

FEMA, or at the direction of the President, active duty military troops and 

Department of Defense assets can be requested to assist and support the 

response to a domestic incident.50 Action requests and mission assignments 

normally travel through the Defense Coordinating Officer at the state EOC or 

at the JFO to the Department of Defense for approval, assignment, and action. 

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits active duty military troops from 

performing law enforcement activities within the United States.51 However, it 

does not prohibit them from providing aid after domestic incidents, including 

search and rescue, medical care, and food distribution. Nor does it prohibit 

federal troops from providing support to civil authorities as required by 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5. Defense support to civil 

authorities can include providing intelligence, equipment, and training, as long 

as federal troops do not personally enforce the law.52 Federal troops deployed 

 

48 Initially, National Guard troops were operationally under the control of the governor and under the command of the 

adjutant general of Louisiana or Mississippi, but received pay and benefits according to their home state’s laws. 

49 Under Title 32 status, National Guard troops remain under the control of the state’s governor and under the command 

of the state’s adjutant general, but are paid with federal funds. Because they remain under the control of the state, 

National Guard troops under Title 32 can participate in law enforcement activities. 

50 The action request and mission assignment process will be discussed in detail later in the report. 51 18 U.S.C. §1385. 

52 10 U.S.C. §§371-382. 
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to support a state government remain under the control and command of the 

Department of Defense. Currently, the Secretary of Defense must approve 

requests for the use of Department of Defense assets and active duty troops 

for domestic incident response support. 

National Guard and Active Duty Troops Provide Critical Resources, but 

Improved Coordination with FEMA is Needed to Ensure Adequate 

Support

Within the Department of Defense, Northern Command has responsibility for 

military operations within the United States in the event of a domestic 

incident. For domestic incident response, the Department of Defense is set up 

to be largely independent in its operations. However, Department of Defense 

resources still need to be coordinated within the overall federal response to a 

domestic incident under the NRP. 

National Guard and active duty troops provided critical assistance with 

evacuation efforts from the Superdome and other areas of New Orleans. As 

the number of victims arriving at the Superdome in New Orleans increased 

following several levee breaches, various levels of civil unrest ensued within 

the Superdome. Several response teams were removed from the Superdome 

because their safety could not be guaranteed. National Guard troops 

supplemented local law enforcement personnel and played a key role in 

reestablishing order and maintaining security in the Superdome, thus allowing 

response teams to return and continue providing life-sustaining assistance. 

According to FEMA officials, the National Guard was the primary source of 

intelligence and situational awareness information for the Superdome. 

On August 30, 2005, Northern Command activated Joint Task Force-Katrina 

to coordinate the federal military response in support of the Hurricane Katrina 

response in Mississippi and Louisiana. Active duty troops with Joint Task 

Force-Katrina arrived in New Orleans on September 1, 2005, to support 

evacuation efforts from the Superdome. Coordination between FEMA and 

Joint Task Force-Katrina appeared to be lacking as several FEMA officials 

indicated they had no knowledge of Joint Task Force-Katrina’s presence in 

the affected area until federal troops began arriving. Initially, troops appeared 

to act independently, sometimes resulting in duplication of efforts, as when 

different search and rescue task forces searched the same area multiple times. 

However, the PFO actively engaged the Joint Task Force-Katrina Commander 

and the Adjutant General of Louisiana’s National Guard, and coordination 
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appeared to improve. Coordination among FEMA, Joint Task Force-Katrina, 

the National Guard, the Department of Transportation, and others resulted in 

the evacuation of more than 22,000 people from the Superdome in New 

Orleans to multiple locations in Texas and other states in approximately four 

days. In addition, Joint Task Force-Katrina and National Guard troops 

conducted a coordinated grid search of the City of New Orleans. Through 

coordination with the PFO, the Joint Task Force-Katrina Commander and the 

Adjutant General of Louisiana, New Orleans was divided into three sections, 

which were searched by members of the 5th Army, 82nd Airborne, and 

National Guard respectively. 

Some FEMA officials expressed frustration at the requirement for approval by 

the Secretary of Defense before Department of Defense resources could be 

used in support of a domestic incident response. In contrast, on-scene agency 

representatives from other federal agencies can approve mission assignments 

issued to them immediately. Officials indicated the Department of Defense 

approval process sometimes required 24 to 48 hours, creating delays for life 

saving and life sustaining missions. For example, on the evening of 

August 28, 2005, FEMA requested Department of Defense assistance to airlift 

eight California swift water rescue task forces to Louisiana. Because the 

Secretary of Defense must approve such requests, the order approving the 

airlift was not signed until August 30, 2005, and the task forces did not begin 

water rescue operations in Louisiana until August 31, 2005. 

Recommendation #13: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency address levels of coordination and 

expectations with Department of Defense entities under the NRP, including 

Northern Command and the Military Liaison, to facilitate coordination during 

responses to future domestic incidents. 

FEMA Provided Record Levels of Support but Delivery Structure 

Needs Improvement 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA provided record levels of 

support to victims and emergency responders. Life saving and life sustaining 

commodities and equipment were delivered to the affected areas; personnel 

increased significantly in a short period of time to support response efforts and 

provide assistance to victims; and assistance was provided quickly in record 

amounts, sometime through innovative means. However, a lack of asset 
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visibility in the resource ordering process, inexperienced and untrained 

personnel, unreliable communications, and insufficient internal management 

controls demonstrate a continued need for improvement in how FEMA 

supports its response activities and delivery of assistance. 

Visibility and Improvements to Resource Ordering and Delivery Process 

Required 

FEMA supplies commodities, equipment, personnel, and other resources to 

support emergency or disaster response efforts. In supporting requests for 

assistance and carrying out its logistics mission, FEMA is heavily dependent 

on factors outside of its control, such as other federal agencies, transportation 

contractors, accessibility to the affected area, and the receiving state’s 

capabilities. As a result, FEMA’s ability to track and source needed resources 

is key to fulfilling its mission. To ensure adequate support is available, 

FEMA should establish logistics performance measures and incorporate asset 

visibility, automation, and standardization into the resource ordering process. 

Logistics Readiness

FEMA’s ability to recognize that certain types of resources will be required 

immediately before and after a disaster is key to supplementing state and local 

response efforts. These resources include commodities such as food, water, 

ice, and baby formula; medical, veterinary, and search and rescue teams; 

supplies such as pharmaceuticals; and equipment such as generators. In order 

for FEMA to immediately provide some of these resources, it must maintain 

certain levels of these resources at all times. This allows FEMA to provide 

immediate assistance while standby contracts are activated, supply chains are 

established, and coordination with other logistics support agencies can be 

completed to address specific requirements. FEMA must strike a balance 

between a reasonable level of preparedness given varying state capabilities 

and the unpredictability, frequency, type, and magnitude of events requiring a 

federal response. In addition, FEMA must strike a balance between 

maintaining a reasonable level of preparedness and determining the prudent 

use of tax dollars to purchase, warehouse, and rotate commodities; purchase, 

warehouse, and maintain equipment; and, train and equip emergency teams in 

anticipation of major disasters or emergencies regardless of cause, size, or 

complexity. 
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On a day-to-day basis, FEMA headquarters operates seven logistics centers 

nationwide and one Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse facility. 

These logistics centers are used to warehouse equipment and supplies 

purchased with Disaster Relief Funds and issued to support responders and 

field facilities during emergencies or major disasters declared by the 

President. 

Also located at FEMA’s logistics centers are essential supplies and equipment 

needed by disaster victims and emergency responders during the initial 

response period. These resources include supplies, such as baby formula, 

diapers, blankets, cots, MREs, plastic sheeting, tents, and water; and 

equipment such as emergency generators, industrial ice making machines, 

mobile kitchen kits, portable toilets and showers, and refrigerated vans. After 

each disaster deployment, logistics center personnel refurbish and repackage 

equipment and supplies for reuse, and replenish commodity levels. An 

inventory of accountable property at each logistics center is maintained in 

FEMA’s Logistics Information Management System. Information systems 

and communication devices purchased with Disaster Relief Funds are returned 

to the Disaster Information Systems Clearinghouse located in Virginia after 

each disaster deployment to be refurbished and repackaged for reuse in other 

disaster operations. 

When events occur that may involve a federal response, FEMA logistics 

personnel begin operational logistics management activities at both the NRCC 

and the RRCC. After an initial situational assessment, a decision is made as 

to whether to move response supplies, equipment, and teams to a location 

closer to the incident area in order to decrease the response time to a validated 

request for federal assistance from the state. If the decision is made to move 

resources forward, a mobilization center is established near but not necessarily 

within the affected area. This mobilization center serves as a forward logistics 

center to house and maintain federal resources in anticipation of a validated 

request for federal assistance. All federal assets at mobilization centers 

remain under the NRCC Logistics Section’s control when the NRCC is 

activated and involved in brokering resources for the affected area. When the 

NRCC is not activated, mobilization centers operate under the oversight of the 

Logistics Response Center, which is an extension of the NRCC Logistics 

Section. The Logistics Response Center is tasked with processing logistics 

requests and arranging for transportation of the requested equipment, supplies, 
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or commodities to mobilization centers, large warehouses, and, at times, 

forward operational staging areas.53 

In order to perform the logistics mission, the NRCC or RRCC Logistics 

Section may request the support of the following ESFs: 

• ESF–1, Transportation: The Department of Transportation maintains a 

national transportation contract capable of providing ground, rail, 

marine, or aviation assets. If necessary, the Department of 

Transportation has the capability to contract for additional 

transportation resources. If commercial transportation is not available, 

the Department of Transportation may request Department of Defense 

support through the Defense Coordinating Officer or the Department 

of Defense liaison at the NRCC or RRCC. 

• ESF–3, Public Works and Engineering: The U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers maintains commodity contracts for ice and drinking water. 

• ESF–7, Resources Support: The General Services Administration, as 

the central procurement authority for the federal government, provides 

additional contracting support. 

FEMA activated the ESFs by issuing mission assignments to these federal 

agencies that were initially funded through a surge account. 

In addition to relying on other federal agencies to support its logistics mission, 

other factors outside of FEMA’s control significantly impact the overall 

logistics process to include accessibility to the affected area and state 

capabilities. High winds, flooded roadways, damaged infrastructure, 

primarily on the U.S. roadway system, and widespread debris hamper on-time 

deliveries of resources. Therefore, FEMA is exploring greater use of 

containerization for possible transportation via other means such as by rail and 

sea. Even so, the effectiveness of a response is dependent upon FEMA’s 

 

53 The Logistics Response Center was created after Hurricane Isabel (September 2003). Once requests reach the 

Logistics Response Center from the NRCC, the Logistics Response Center works closely with transportation staff to 

ensure that transportation taskers are issued to transport the requested resources. The Logistics Response Center is 

responsible for providing situational awareness of where requested resource quantities are in the supply chain. This 

status is based primarily on reports from the field (e.g. federal operational staging areas or mobilization centers) not an 

analysis of Logistics Response Center records. 
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ability to anticipate and address potential shortfalls through adequate 

contingency planning with other federal and state entities. 

In addition, states must be prepared to receive and distribute requested 

commodities and supplies once they arrive. Otherwise, commodities may sit 

unused for extended periods of time and take valuable and costly 

transportation resources out of service. Louisiana initially requested that 

FEMA transport commodities to the points of distribution until the state was 

able to take over this responsibility. 

Asset Visibility

In 2004, FEMA Logistics received approval from its headquarters to pilot an 

asset visibility system, which involved tracking equipment being placed on 

selected trucks to monitor its movement.54 Once surge funds became 

available in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina making landfall, it was 

estimated that 25 to 33 percent of the trucks were equipped with tracking 

units. FEMA logistics officials said that budgeted funds were simply not 

available to purchase the number of tracking units needed to equip all of the 

trucks used. However, due to software limitations of the tracking equipment, 

FEMA was unable to determine whether a truck had been offloaded or had 

changed cargo once it left its point of origin. Additionally, FEMA had to 

retrieve the tracking device from trailers that were not FEMA-owned. Once 

testing of the asset visibility system is complete, a decision will be made as to 

whether the system will be pursued. 

FEMA Direction and Expectations Are Needed to Establish Logistics 

Performance Measures

Historically, FEMA has established a 72-hour time period as the maximum 

amount of time for emergency response teams to arrive on scene. However, it 

is unclear whether this is responsive to the needs of a state and the needs of 

disaster victims. What is clear is that a 72-hour response time does not meet 

public expectations, as was vividly demonstrated by media accounts within 24 

hours after landfall. Shorter time periods, such as 60-hours, 48-hours, or even 

12-hours, have been mentioned; however, to meet this level of expectation, 

 

54 Stratix is the contractor supporting the Total Asset Visibility system. 
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several factors must be addressed.55 Once strategic performance measures 

and realistic expectations are established, other actions can be taken to support 

these response goals. 

In order to meet aggressive timelines, a FEMA logistics official said they need 

more control over logistic transportation resources, citing a study performed 

by the Logistics Management Institute following Hurricane Dennis.56 This 

would include the need for more FEMA-owned transportation resources. 

FEMA officials were repeatedly critical of contract transportation support, 

stating that contractors were frequently unresponsive and unreliable both in 

past disasters as well as during the response to Hurricane Katrina. For 

example, some truck drivers were slow and unresponsive to initiate deliveries, 

particularly over weekends and holidays.57 Some drivers were quick to turn 

back due to poor road or weather conditions; some claimed roads were closed 

when in actuality they were open. In one instance, a driver claimed to be en 

route but a tracking device indicated he was still in a parking lot where he was 

found asleep. One solution FEMA has explored has been to lease trailers so 

that an independent driver can just separate from a leased trailer. 

Another solution that might allow FEMA to meet more aggressive delivery 

timeframes would be to secure additional, strategically located warehouses to 

preposition or stockpile resources that exceed the capacity of existing logistics 

centers. Within the past two years, FEMA Logistics officials requested 

$500,000 to fund the cost of warehousing, stockpiling, and rotating perishable 

emergency commodities such as meals, water, and ice that is stored at cold 

storage facilities.58 Also, FEMA has been authorized to fund pre-identified 

warehouse facilities along the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic coasts.59 Following 

Hurricane Isabel, FEMA secured additional warehouse space in Georgia to 

store excess MREs (3 million) and water (2.7 million gallons). 

A third major consideration to be addressed is quantities of on-hand 

equipment, supplies, and commodities that should be immediately available. 

For example, quantity levels set by FEMA logistics officials in 1990 required 

 

55The only reference we identified regarding essential commodities was in a 2001 FEMA annual performance goal that 

referenced to a 12-hour goal (after a Presidential disaster declaration) for FEMA to meet the needs of disaster victims for 

water, food, and shelter. 

56 Logistics Management Institute, FEMA’s Logistics Response to Hurricane Dennis: Annotated Briefing, October 2005. 57 This was particularly true over Labor Day weekend, September 3-5, 2005, which was the first weekend after landfall. 

58 According to a senior FEMA Logistics official, a decision was made in conjunction with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to store ice at cold storage facilities instead of discarding it. 

59 Five major locations and ten additional sites were identified. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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enough commodities to support 30,000 people for 72 hours. FEMA logistics 

officials told us they maintain 10 million meals at two logistic centers; 

however, no one could tell us whether this quantity level was deemed 

sufficient or what period of time and population this quantity covers. 

Historical data and planning assumptions have also been used to gauge 

whether an adequate supply of commodities were on-hand. For example, 

based on 4 catastrophic events and 12 lower-level events, FEMA estimated 

that approximately 1 million meals a day would be required. Similarly, field 

estimates can be used to gauge potential need. However, in previous 

disasters, this has resulted in a surplus of commodities because according to 

FEMA logistics officials, the field places excessive or “uncontrolled” orders. 

Hurricane Katrina was no different. Ironically, some FEMA and state field 

personnel suggested they had to order twice as much to get half of what they 

needed primarily because they had no confidence in a system that had no asset 

visibility. One JFO published a commodity status report as of 

September 5, 2005, which indicated that between August 27, 2005, and 

September 5, 2005, they had received less than half of what they requested for 

ice, water, and MREs at all three of their commodity staging areas.60 In 

Louisiana, there was an excess of ice during Hurricane Katrina because 

planning assumptions were based on concern raised by New Orleans officials 

that the fatality count could reach 10,000 people, suggesting a significant 

number of disaster victims would still be in the impacted area. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers modeling is another way of predicting possible 

requirements, however this process is imprecise. During the Hurricane 

Katrina response, these models consistently indicated that significantly fewer 

commodities were needed. No analysis was performed to establish which 

ordering methodology was more precise. 

An alternative for not funding additional warehouse facilities has been to 

make greater use of surge account funds to move more commodities forward. 

However, as noted by FEMA’s Chief Operating Officer, the surge account is 

used to fund all of FEMA’s preparatory activities, not just logistics activities. 

 

60An additional report on the ice and water deliveries indicate that only 37 percent of ice requests were filled and 34 

percent of water requests were filled. The average daily request for ice during this time was 287 trucks and the average 

amount delivered was 106 trucks. Similarly, the average daily request for water during this time was 287 trucks and the 

average amount delivered was 97 trucks. One truck of ice is approximately 40,000 one-pound bags of ice. One truck of 

water equals 4,500 one-gallon bottles of water. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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FEMA’s dilemma during each response is whether this approach is a prudent 

use of limited funding. 

Recommendation #14: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, establish measurable response expectations and provide the 

necessary financial, technical, and staff support to meet those expectations. 

Resource Ordering Process

FEMA’s process for requesting, sourcing, and transporting resources is as 

follows: 

1. Resource requirements (commodities, equipment, or services) are 

identified at the lowest governmental level. 

2. The local jurisdiction attempts to fill the need from existing resources. 

If it does not have the resource, it will pass the requirement to the 

county or to the state. 

3. The state attempts to fill the requirement through existing resources, 

commercial sources, or through EMAC or mutual aid agreements. If 

the state cannot fill the need, it submits a request for federal assistance 

to FEMA. 

4. Once FEMA’s Operations Section receives a state request for federal 

assistance, it validates the request by ensuring that it is appropriate, 

reasonable, and submitted by the appropriate state officials, and 

determines if the request can be filled with on-hand resources. If the 

resource is not available, the requirement is passed to the Logistics 

Section or is tasked to a federal agency via the mission assignment 

process.61 

5. If passed to the Logistics Section, the Logistics Section Chief will: 

 

61 A mission assignment is a work order issued by FEMA to another federal agency directing completion of a specific 

task. Mission assignments may be given in anticipation of, or response to, a Presidential declaration of a major disaster 

or emergency; the process as outlined applies in either case. Mission assignments may result from either a state request 

for federal assistance, or from another federal request to support the overall federal response and recovery operation. 

Mission assignments address funding levels, the requirements of the task(s) to be performed, completion dates, and state 

cost-share requirements, if applicable. Generally, mission assignments are considered the action of last resort if a request 

cannot be addressed by FEMA with available resources or through some other contracting instrument. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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a. Fill the requirement from on-hand or in-stock resources located 

at a mobilization center, logistics center, or the Disaster 

Information Systems Clearinghouse; 

b. Prepare a requisition and recommend commercial sources for 

goods and services to the Finance/Administration Section as 

applicable; 

c. Address smaller requirements through a credit care purchase; 

or 

d. If the resource is still not readily available, the Logistics 

Section passes the requirement back to the Operations Section 

to issue as a possible mission assignment. 

6. Once a requirement is sourced, the Logistics Section arranges for the 

delivery of that resource to the specified location. 

Closer examination of steps 4 and 5 above highlight the effort involved in 

ordering resources. Requests for federal assistance are submitted to the 

FEMA Operations Section on an action request form. Action request forms 

were cataloged into a locally generated tracking log, evaluated by Operations 

Section personnel, and assigned a unique tracking number. If forwarded to 

the Logistics Section, another locally generated spreadsheet was used to 

catalog and track requests received from the operations sections.62 

In two JFOs we visited, when an action request form was received, a FEMA 

Form 60-1, Request for Supplies and Services, was prepared and attached to 

the action request form. In most cases, both documents were cross-referenced 

with each other for tracking purposes. The action request form and 

accompanying FEMA Form 60-1 were routed to the Logistics Section for 

disposition. If a resource purchase action was required, both forms were 

routed to the Comptroller for review and approval before a FEMA Form 40-1, 

Requisition and Commitment for Services and Supplies, was prepared. If a 

purchase action was approved, a FEMA Form 40-1 was prepared in the 

National Emergency Management Information System and routed through the 

various approval queues for funding obligation. 

During Hurricane Katrina, FEMA headquarters decided to centralize the 

ordering process for ice and water. Therefore, the JFO’s Operations or 

Logistics Section immediately forwarded action requests for these 

commodities to the Logistics Response Center. 

 

62 At one JFO, this tracking activity was paper-based. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Resource Ordering System Needs Improvement, Standardization, and 

Automation

We tested FEMA’s resource ordering process for ice, water, as well as food 

commodities referenced in action request forms for all three affected states. 

We anticipated being able to follow requests from intake through processing 

to delivery of the commodity to the mobilization center, staging area, or other 

designated location. We sampled 57 requests: 7 from Alabama, and 25 from 

both Mississippi and Louisiana. Of the 57 actions we sampled, only 3 

requests could be tracked through the entire process. 

There were various reasons why so few requests could be tracked through the 

established process. For example, in one field operation, the requests tracked 

by the operations section did not correspond to any of the requests for 

commodities to the Logistics Response Center. Rather, the logistics staff used 

a separate time-phased force deployment list process to project requirements 

for a three-day period.63 Otherwise, requirements were discussed during daily 

logistics conference calls. Requests processed by the other two JFOs 

demonstrate some commodities were purchased locally and not forwarded to 

the Logistics Response Center. Both situations, however, illustrate 

inconsistencies with FEMA’s processes for requesting commodities and an 

inability to determine where a requested item was within the resource ordering 

process. 

At FEMA headquarters, the Logistics Response Center received action request 

forms by varying means and sources such as facsimile, email, telephone, or 

through the NRCC or other FEMA logistics personnel. As a result, incoming 

requests for critical commodities could have been lost, mishandled, 

miscommunicated, or processed multiple times. For example, our efforts to 

manually search request forms and electronically sort data yielded few 

matches to requests from the JFOs. Based on our initial sample of 57 actions, 

only 17 appear to have reached the Logistics Response Center. Deficiencies 

in FEMA’s tracking system were also identified in the Special Remedial 

Action Management Program (RAMP) report from the 2004 hurricane 

season.64 An electronic taskers system is being developed to assist the 

 

63 The time-phased force deployment list is a logistics management and operational tool routinely used by federal 

response agencies in disasters to facilitate the orderly flow of critical response resources into a disaster area. It is a 

prioritized list of the most critical resource requirements developed in advance of an event. However, local officials 

must identify requirements for each event, survey resource availability within their jurisdiction, and then develop a 

priority list. 

64 See Special RAMP report dated November 29, 2004 issue LG-2 and LG-4. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Logistics Response Center catalog and track all requests. However, FEMA 

views this effort only as an interim solution. 

Logistics Response Center records identified transportation taskers for these 

requests but documents only account for three requests reaching the requested 

destination. In one instance, the delivery date was one day after the requested 

delivery date and two days after the request date. In the other two instances 

the delivery dates were 8 and 12 days respectively after the requested delivery 

date. When an action completes the request process, it may have over six 

unique tracking numbers, few of which are crossed referenced.65 FEMA lacks 

standardization in resource ordering, has an inefficient and ineffective system 

for tracking a request, and the same information is entered into at least three 

tracking systems that are not linked. 

Standard operating procedures are still in development due to a lack of firm 

direction from FEMA leadership and the restructuring of FEMA’s Logistics 

Section pursuant to NIMS and NRP. According to FEMA records, the lack of 

logistics procedures were identified in After Action Reports as far back as 

Hurricane Georges in 1998, and, more recently, after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001. Based on interviews and a review of FEMA tracking 

logs, steps taken to ensure that an action request was completed or resolved 

were either performed as time permitted or not performed at all. 

Without performing this critical step, there is no assurance that a requested 

activity was completed or resources were provided, and no data exists to 

measure the efficiency with which actions were taken or performed. Key 

factors within FEMA’s control for resource ordering and delivery were not 

well performed. FEMA needs a resource tracking system that is capable of 

documenting whether requested resources were delivered and the efficiency 

with which the resource was provided. This would allow FEMA to monitor 

both operational and contractor performance. 

Recommendation #15: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

 

65 Tracking numbers might include, a state tracking number (e.g. ETEAM or Web EOC tracking number), an internal 

RRCC tracking number (handwritten on the action request form because there is no field on the form for this), a 

Logistics Section 60-1 tracking number, an internal JFO tracking number (handwritten on the action request form 

because there is no field on the form for this), an internal Logistics Response Center number, and a transportation 

tracking number. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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for Policy, develop a means to standardize and streamline the resource 

ordering and tracking process. 

Recommendation #16: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop and implement a resource tracking 

system that is capable of documenting whether resources were delivered and 

the efficiency with which the resource was provided. 

Mission Assignment and Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

Activity

FEMA initiated over 68 actions before landfall to activate federal agencies 

and pre-position teams, commodities, and equipment in an effort to establish a 

readiness posture in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in the Gulf 

Coast region. FEMA records demonstrate these activities continued after 

emergency declarations were issued for all three states as 26 additional actions 

with federal agencies continued.66 In all, 438 separate mission assignments 

were issued involving 57 different federal departments, agencies and other 

organizations.67 

The peak mission assignment activity in Louisiana took place between 

August 29, 2005, and September 6, 2005; 72 percent of the mission 

assignments were written during this period. Louisiana submitted 47 requests 

for assistance through FEMA and 520 requests for assistance through EMAC. 

The peak activity in Mississippi took place between August 28, 2005, and 

September 10, 2005; 77 percent of the mission assignments were written. 

Mississippi submitted 44 requests for assistance through FEMA and 541 

requests for assistance through EMAC. 

The only significant mission assignment activity in Alabama took place on 

August 30, 2005, when 40 percent of the mission assignments were written. 

Alabama submitted six requests for assistance through FEMA and five 

requests for assistance through EMAC. Because FEMA did not consistently 

 

66 This count includes similar actions taken during the surge period after the emergency declaration was declared. 

Financial accounting requires that once a declaration is approved, activity must be charged to the declared event. This 

requires similar missions to those written during the surge period to be reissued under an approved declaration. For 

example, if the Environmental Protection Agency is activated under the surge account, once the emergency declaration is 

approved, FEMA is required to reactivate the Environmental Protection Agency under an emergency declaration fund 

code. 

67 See Appendix K for a comprehensive list of the 57 different federal departments, agencies, and other organizations. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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track mission assignments, we were unable to determine the status of these 

mission assignments. 

The following chart summarizes the mission assignment activity during our 

review period.68 

 Louisiana Mississippi Alabama 

Date of State’s Initial Request August 29, 2005 August 30, 2005 September 1, 2005

Total Missions Assignments 

Written69 156 237 45 

Mission Assignments Written in 

Support of the Federal Operation70 109 70% 193 81% 39 87% 

Mission Assignments Written at the 

Request of the State 

47 30% 44 19% 6 13% 

Unreliable Disaster Communications During the Initial Response 

Hurricane Katrina caused significant damages and outages in the 

telecommunications infrastructure. This impeded reporting and coordination, 

and significantly affected the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response 

efforts. Responsibility for the restoration of the communications 

infrastructure resides with the National Communications System, a 

component within DHS that coordinates ESF-2, Communications, which is 

separate from FEMA. However, FEMA plays a key role in communications 

by providing interim communications support to emergency managers and 

responders when the infrastructure cannot support the needs for operational 

capability and when field sites are established. FEMA needs to strengthen its 

capabilities to provide communications support during the initial disaster 

response when the infrastructure is most weakened and emergency responder 

teams are still establishing operations. 

The National Communications System, a component of DHS’ new 

Preparedness Directorate, administers programs that provide priority 

 

68 See Appendix L for a description of the types of missions assigned and the tasked agency for each affected state. 

69 We did not include mission assignments or mission assignment requests that were denied, cancelled, or otherwise not 

fully processed during our review period, missions assignments that were obligated and subsequently fully deobligated 

during our review period, and mission assignments that were written to adjust the original funding level, extend the 

performance period or modify the scope of work of the initial task during our review period. 

70 An in-depth examination of federal operation support mission assignments was not performed due to the focus and 

time limitations of this review. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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restoration of telecommunications services and priority access to services for 

emergency responders. These services include the Telecommunications 

Service Priority Program, Government Emergency Telecommunications 

Service, Wireless Priority Service, and Shared Resources High-Frequency 

Radio Program. For example, when wireless call channels become congested 

during emergencies, designated personnel may use the Wireless Priority 

Service to obtain the next available open call line. The National 

Communications System was activated as ESF-2 on August 27, 2005. Other 

DHS components with a role in disaster communications include DHS’ 

Science and Technology Directorate, which is responsible for adopting 

standards for improved, interoperable communications equipment.71 The 

Office of Science and Technology Policy maintains the National Plan for 

Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies, used in 

conjunction with the NRP. The operation of these elements during Hurricane 

Katrina is outside the scope of our review. 

The NRP designates FEMA as one of seven supporting agencies for ESF-2. 

FEMA’s role in ESF-2 includes supporting its own responders; supporting the 

JFO and video teleconferences; coordinating on-site use of federal radio 

frequencies; disseminating warnings; and coordinating with ESF-2 on the use 

of DHS telecommunications assets. FEMA provides this support primarily 

through its five MERS detachments. The MERS detachments support FEMA 

responders and the JFO with telecommunications assets and staffing, and also 

provide fuel, power, life support, and site setup. The NRP indicates that 

MERS units will provide communications support to augment federal, state, 

and local capability. 

For Hurricane Katrina, all five regional MERS detachments responded, 

supporting over 25 sites in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Four of the 

five detachments began deploying prior to landfall, while one had to withdraw 

from support of a Wyoming disaster before deploying. On August 27, 2005, 

the Denton, Texas MERS detachment arrived at Barksdale Air Force Base in 

Louisiana, and the Thomasville, Georgia MERS arrived in Jackson, 

Mississippi. A MERS team was already in New Orleans, Louisiana, 

dismantling the JFO supporting operations for Tropical Storm Cindy. As the 

response continued, MERS mobile emergency operations vehicles provided 

temporary workspace for FEMA responders. MERS also set up the JFOs, 

provided satellite and radio communications, and enabled approximately 1200 

 

71 See DHS OIG report, A Review of DHS’ Progress in Adopting and Enforcing Equipment Standards for First 

Responders, Report Number OIG-06-30, March 2006. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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video teleconferences. The MERS detachments provided support to FEMA 

responders, the PFO cell, state EOCs, and the city of New Orleans. 

Despite these efforts, emergency responders at some sites did not have 

sufficient communications during the first critical days after the storm. 

Officials in the two most southern counties in Alabama had difficulty 

communicating their needs to the JFO for the first two days after landfall. 

The state sent a communications vehicle, and FEMA sent a MERS unit to the 

area to provide communications support and other response assistance. 

Communications were also an issue in Mississippi. A MERS detachment was 

deployed to the Gulfport area with a mobile emergency operations vehicle 

containing satellite equipment and a satellite link. Officials said there would 

have been no communications in the area without MERS. FEMA US&R 

teams had difficulty maintaining communication with their task forces in the 

affected areas of Louisiana and Mississippi because their satellite 

communications equipment had to compete with the media and other first 

responders for satellite bandwidth. In Louisiana, the US&R team augmented 

their radio equipment with a repeater from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s 

Department until MERS units began providing support on September 2, 2005. 

At the conclusion of our fieldwork, MERS detachments had not completed 

collection of customer satisfaction surveys from the FCOs, but the PFO and 

FCO comments we obtained on MERS performance during Hurricane Katrina 

were unequivocally positive. The primary criticism made in prior surveys was 

that more MERS staff and equipment would help FEMA responders. FEMA 

staff needed additional capability. For example, the ESF-15 desk could not 

regularly communicate with staff in the Gulf Coast region, so FEMA staff 

acted as couriers when traveling between the state EOCs and affected 

localities during the initial days. Additionally, lack of communications 

capability prevented FEMA Public Affairs and “embedded” reporters from 

releasing search and rescue stories for days. 

In 2004 and 2005, FEMA’s MERS program and Chief Information Officer 

created a Disaster Support Initiative for communications that contains 14 

projects to enhance FEMA’s communications capability. The Office of 

Management and Budget provided partial funding for nine projects in 

December 2005. However, these projects provide a limited upgrade to 

existing capabilities. None of the project justifications provides analysis 

regarding what communications equipment or staffing FEMA needs to 

support a catastrophic disaster mission, but FEMA should undertake this 

effort. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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In terms of equipment, MERS projects in the initiative include replacing 

deteriorating 1980s-era communications support equipment; funding 

communications aspects of three incomplete projects; and acquiring the 

narrowband radios required to comply with 47 Code of Federal Regulations 

Part 300. A project in the initiative creates a backup facility to support 

FEMA’s use of Ku-band satellite communications. Ku-band satellite 

communications were clogged with commercial and first responder traffic 

during Hurricane Katrina, plus they are vulnerable to weather interference. 

The initiative projects do not discuss how FEMA will ensure that satellite or 

other communications are available during the first critical days of a response. 

Further, the projects do not discuss whether or how to augment the equipment 

deployed by other FEMA staff, such as US&R, NDMS, or External Affairs 

teams. 

In terms of staffing, FEMA should review the MERS allocation and add staff 

as needed. The most complete study of MERS staffing strength is from the 

1980s and sets the MERS allocation at 318 staff. After authorization cuts in 

the late 1990s, the MERS program has not been able to increase staff above 

the low 200s. While staff told us MERS supports federal responders, the NRP 

assigns an additional role to MERS to support state and local responders. 

MERS allocations have not changed to reflect this expectation. FEMA is 

currently revising a Disaster Support Initiative for workforce management, 

and as part of that effort, FEMA should assess its staffing needs for disaster 

communications. 

Recommendation #17: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Manager of the 

National Communications System, determine and fill requirements to provide 

emergency responders with communications equipment capable of performing 

in austere conditions. 

Recommendation #18: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency define the Mobile Emergency Response 

Support authorizations for equipment and staffing, including requirements for 

mission support during a catastrophic disaster, and fund and staff the 

detachments to meet requirements. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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FEMA Does Not Have Staff or Plans Adequate to Meet Its Human Capital 

Needs during Catastrophic Disasters 

FEMA has attempted to set baseline staffing levels for disasters of various 

size but these attempts have not resulted in a disaster workforce plan. Instead, 

FEMA maintains a reactive posture and responds to field requests for 

response and recovery staffing by organizing full-time personnel and by 

maintaining a cadre of temporary personnel available to deploy in a surge 

capacity. FEMA struggled to provide staff in response to Hurricane Katrina, 

lacking sufficient reserve staff and the automated support needed to deploy 

over 5,000 disaster personnel on short notice. It implemented several creative 

solutions and conducted rapid hiring to provide over 8,000 disaster response 

staff in support of state and local efforts. However, throughout the response 

FEMA had difficulty tracking and training its augmentation staff. 

The Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to draw upon temporary personnel for 

disaster operations. FEMA’s staffing model includes four categories of 

temporary employees: (1) DAE reservists; (2) local hires; (3) Disaster 

Temporary Employees; and, (4) Cadre of On-Call Response Employees 

(COREs). FEMA policies designate DAE reservists as short-term temporary 

employees, activated and charged with responding to a specific disaster. 

Experienced DAE reservists are deployed more frequently to disasters, while 

less experienced DAEs and local hires are added for a specific disaster 

response, and COREs have a four-year appointment to support disaster 

response activities. 

FEMA was not able to dedicate its full staffing strength to Hurricane Katrina 

for several reasons. First, it had to maintain response operations for disasters 

other than Hurricane Katrina. On August 31, 2005, FEMA had personnel 

assigned to the Hurricane Katrina response and 38 other disasters not related 

to Hurricane Katrina. It attempted to closeout previously declared disasters 

more quickly to make additional personnel available. However, FEMA was 

not able to dedicate all staff to Hurricane Katrina as during this response, 

Hurricane Ophelia in the Carolinas, Hurricane Rita in the Gulf Coast region, 

and flooding in the Northeast were declared disasters and required FEMA 

resources. FEMA had to divert personnel from Hurricane Katrina to respond 

to those other disasters. 

Second, an average of 30 percent of FEMA DAEs reported they were 

unavailable to respond to Hurricane Katrina or any other disaster during the 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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August 24, 2005, to September 30, 2005, timeframe. Disaster Workforce 

Management Section staff explained there are various reasons why DAEs may 

be unavailable, such as issues with health or family concerns. Third, some 

FEMA cadres were not at full strength or fully equipped. With only enough 

volunteer headquarters staff to fill the rosters of one and a quarter teams, the 

NRCC was short-staffed during Hurricane Katrina. The NRCC depended 

heavily on key managers to work shifts for two teams without relief. One 

NRCC manager said he had to release people during critical periods to avoid 

burnout. US&R and MERS teams were also short-staffed, as were many 

NDMS teams, which deployed smaller “strike teams” instead of full-sized 

teams. 

Several FEMA officials and mid-level managers told us that FEMA deployed 

more personnel in advance of Hurricane Katrina than ever before and more 

than what states requested. On August 29, 2005, FEMA had deployed almost 

1,700 DAEs plus permanent staff. By September 30, 2005, FEMA had 5,767 

DAEs on the rolls, having hired 1,778 DAEs in six weeks – an increase of 31 

percent. FEMA ultimately surged to approximately 7,333 DAEs deployed to 

the Gulf Coast. In addition, over 1,000 permanent full-time FEMA employees 

deployed, along with approximately 200 COREs. 

FEMA’s roster of reserve personnel, however, is not sufficient to address the 

staffing need presented by a catastrophic disaster of Hurricane Katrina’s scale. 

Immediately after the disaster, 46 percent of FEMA’s DAEs were listed as 

unavailable to deploy. FEMA deployed all available personnel in the 

immediate aftermath to assist with the disaster response, including personnel 

with Community Relations and Individual Assistance program skill sets. 

When these programs became operational, the experienced DAEs were 

already engaged in response activities and FEMA had to ask for assistance. In 

addition, ESF-15 needed more staff. Too few experienced External Affairs 

DAEs slowed operations at the Mississippi and Louisiana Joint Information 

Centers and FEMA headquarters; ESF-15 was unable to staff fully the New 

Orleans forward Joint Information Center for weeks. 

FEMA employed several methods to supplement field staff. For example, on 

August 30, 2005, FEMA circulated a memo throughout DHS requesting 

personnel to fill critical roles in Community Relations and Individual 

Assistance. Over 1,000 DHS employees deployed to support the response. 

The U.S. Fire Administration requested assistance for Community Relations 

in Mississippi and Louisiana, and over 4,000 firefighters responded. The 

deployed teams of firefighters complemented trained Community Relations 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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personnel and served as a force multiplier with their ability to reach victims in 

disaster areas that might have otherwise been inaccessible. 

FEMA wrote mission assignments to request additional staff from other 

federal agencies, such as SBA and the U.S. Postal Service. EMACs were 

used to assist in obtaining incident management teams from other states. 

Unlike the 2004 disasters, FEMA did not rely heavily on Citizen Corps 

volunteers, though some of those volunteers did assist in the response. FEMA 

administered the Citizen Corps program, which was subsequently transferred 

to DHS’ Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The use of other nonFEMA personnel, including from other DHS components and other federal 

agency employees, as well as fire fighters and other volunteers, was an ad hoc

response to the magnitude of the event, rather than based on any previously 

developed disaster workforce augmentation plan by FEMA, DHS 

headquarters, or other DHS components. 

Individuals who deployed as FEMA employees and augmentation staff were 

placed and tracked by FEMA’s Automated Deployment Database (ADD) 

system, a database that summarizes the availability and basic capabilities of 

reservists. The system is outdated and required significant manual 

intervention to deploy personnel and produce somewhat accurate reports. The 

ADD database only identifies reservists and is not capable of automatically 

deploying personnel as the name suggests. FEMA staff at its Mount Weather 

Deployment Support Office search the database listings, choose personnel to 

deploy, and make activation calls. This manual process occurs even though 

FEMA possesses a more modern system that uses automatic notifications. 

Once deployed by ADD, personnel are to travel to designated locations and 

check in for tracking purposes. 

The ADD tracking process is cumbersome. For Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 

added 17 staff at Mount Weather and at its headquarters to activate personnel 

under ADD. Activation calls were also set up in FEMA’s Human Resources 

Section and at facilities in Atlanta, Georgia, Chicago, Illinois, and Orlando, 

Florida, to log arrival calls of DAEs. This process was labor intensive and 

diverted personnel from other disaster response duties. 

During Hurricane Katrina, FEMA deployed strike teams to the Gulf Coast 

region to process disaster personnel as they arrived on site. Often employees 

would begin work and forget to check in with the Mount Weather Deployment 

Support Office. The strike teams were able to check in disaster personnel as 

they arrived and maintained records. Although these strike teams were 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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deployed to address weaknesses in ADD, it meant staff were unable to fulfill 

other duties during the disaster response. 

Despite deploying strike teams, there were still problems in tracking disaster 

employees when they transferred to different duty stations within the affected 

area. Network connectivity in the field was another problem due to the large 

number of users on the satellite bandwidth. 

During the 2004 hurricanes, FEMA recognized that the ADD database did not 

accurately reflect proficiency levels and training of many employees. The 

system also lacks a method for prioritizing or coordinating requests for staff 

among multiple field locations, which can lead to deploying and redeploying 

staff. We were told reservists place low priority on maintaining accurate 

ADD records of their deployment, and often manual and ad hoc methods are 

employed to manage deployment. An audit we issued in September 2005 

noted that the lack of integration among the ADD system, the Logistics 

Information Management System III, and the National Emergency 

Management Information System required significant personnel to 

coordinate.72 FEMA noted its ADD system is cumbersome, not user friendly, 

and not compatible with current technology. ADD also does not provide a 

consolidated view that determines whether an employee: (1) was deployed to 

a disaster location; (2) was en route but not yet arrived; (3) was sent by FEMA 

headquarters but not entered into ADD; or, (4) had arrived at the disaster 

location, and whether they had checked in with the region.73 

Ultimately, FEMA’s additional efforts to identify and track deployments only 

resulted in 85 to 90 percent visibility of its disaster workforce during 

Hurricane Katrina. An automated system to track all disaster personnel would 

improve FEMA’s resource visibility. 

Problems with Surge Capacity Training During Hurricane Katrina

FEMA needs to strengthen its ability to provide training for surge reservists 

activated during large-scale disasters. During the 2004 hurricanes, FEMA 

created a human resources center in Atlanta, Georgia, to centralize its hiring 

and training activities near field sites. However, the centralized process did 

 

72 “Emergency Preparedness and Response Could Better Integrate Information Technology with Incident Response and 

Recovery.” OIG-05-36, p. 21-22. 

73 For example, NDMS and US&R are usually activated by their respective program managers, and the managers are 

responsible for updating ADD. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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not sufficiently screen employees to ensure suitability for assigned tasks, did 

not provide clear job expectations, and did not provide adequate 

administrative support for the new staff. During Hurricane Katrina, these 

concerns resurfaced. 

Following the 2004 hurricane season, FEMA’s Disaster Field Training 

Operations updated its guidebook and incorporated changes to its standard 

operating procedures, including a surge-training checklist. However, the 

checklist is very general, and staff expressed concerns that there is still not an 

adequate plan for a catastrophic surge. Further, communication and 

coordination issues remained unresolved between FEMA’s Emergency 

Management Institute and the regional training manager, both of which are 

responsible for providing instructors and classes during a disaster. The new 

protocols were to be tested during Hurricane Dennis in early July 2005. 

However, this event did not serve as a sufficient test, as surge capacity was 

not required. Hurricane Katrina was the first opportunity to test the new 

protocols. 

Regional managers told us there were delays in surge training for Community 

Relations and Individual Assistance, with some newly hired personnel not 

receiving training until two weeks after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 

There was confusion over how many people would be at the training sessions, 

when they would arrive, and what they would be doing once training was 

completed. To compound the situation, there were too many people in the 

classes; hundreds attended classes rather than the usual 50, curtailing the 

ability of the new hires to ask questions or obtain additional information 

regarding assignment, expectation, and role and responsibilities. FEMA’s 

surge training plans were inadequate to prevent training delays – the large 

number of trainees within classes did not create an environment conducive to 

learning. In addition, FEMA had too few of its training staff deployed to 

support needs – 24 of 47 staff deployed. 

Disaster Support Initiatives Could Enhance Temporary Disaster Work 

Force System

Since 1992, FEMA amassed 12 studies on disaster workforce management 

without developing a final plan. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 

recognized deficiencies in its reserve cadre size, automated deployment and 

tracking systems, and surge training, and began two projects to remediate the 

deficiencies. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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First, from April to July 2005, FEMA halted hiring DAEs in an effort to 

remove inactive personnel from its roster and establish a baseline level for its 

DAEs. However, the temporary hiring freeze was grossly ill-timed because 

FEMA’s traditional hiring for the hurricane season was delayed, resulting in a 

lower number of DAEs available for deployment than there had been a year 

prior.74 

Second, FEMA staff proposed a Disaster Support Initiative to enhance the 

temporary disaster workforce system that includes disaster workforce 

planning and modernizing the automated workforce management system. 

Establishing the disaster workforce plans and staffing baselines has been 

difficult for FEMA. FEMA does not have a clear understanding of the size or 

number of disasters to which it should prepare to respond. Further, setting a 

baseline according to disaster history does not necessarily provide the surge 

capability that future catastrophic events may require. Maintaining excess 

reservists solely for catastrophic disasters involves significant administrative 

costs, and infrequently used reservists are more likely to seek permanent 

positions elsewhere. The Disaster Support Initiative would also be used for 

training, updating related policy manuals, and replacing the ADD database. 

FEMA is currently revising the initiative for resubmission to the Office of 

Management and Budget for funding approval. 

Recommendation #19: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a disaster workforce plan that 

accounts for standing capability for permanent, temporary, and reserve staff 

that is responsive to the needs demonstrated in response to previous disasters, 

and also develop a plan that is scalable to other events irrespective of cause, 

size, or complexity. 

Recommendation #20: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop and implement a system that 

automates and tracks the selection, deployment, training, and demobilization 

of responders. 

 

74 While DAE levels in 2005 were significantly lower than in 2004, they were in line with DAE levels in 2001, 2002, and 

2003. Due to a severe hurricane season, 2004 DAE levels were significantly higher than in prior years. Given forecasts 

of a severe 2005 hurricane season, it is reasonable to compare 2004 and 2005 DAE levels. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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Individual Assistance 

In April 2003, FEMA’s Recovery Division prepared a narrative justification 

for what it termed “over-target” requests for additional funding in FY 2005.75 

The funding would allow FEMA to enhance its base capability, which FEMA 

stated was deficient and not in keeping with standard business practices to 

effectively provide assistance to disaster victims. In the narrative FEMA 

foreshadowed, “The failure to provide funding to ensure scalable recovery 

capability will result in a crisis of unimaginable proportions not only for 

individual victims and their communities and States, but also for the country 

as a whole.” No additional funding was provided to FEMA in FY 2005 or 

FY 2006 to enhance its Recovery Division’s existing capability. 

Recognizing deficiencies in its business practices, processing systems, and 

ability to provide assistance to disaster victims in an efficient and effective 

manner, FEMA attempted to address these issues using existing resources. Its 

performance in response to Hurricane Katrina, however, highlighted those 

deficiencies and its ability to provide Individual Assistance to address the 

needs of disaster victims was not as effective or efficient as it had envisioned. 

FEMA’s Efforts to Augment Staff and Call Center Capacity 

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA could activate four internal centers, or 

NPSCs, to register disaster victims for individual assistance and make 

referrals to other assistance providers. These facilities were staffed with 

approximately 700 personnel to field applicant calls (registration intake), 

provide information on the status of applications (helpline), and process and 

perform case management activities on applications for assistance. 

In response to Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, which affected 

Florida during the 2004 hurricane season, FEMA faced challenges in 

augmenting its ability to handle the volume of applicant calls for assistance. It 

worked with the other governmental entities, such as the Internal Revenue 

Service, to establish additional registration intake capability, but maintained 

helpline and casework activities. In addition, FEMA began a major training 

effort the week of August 24, 2005, at each NPSC, to enhance capability for 

 

75 Over-target requests are funds FEMA requested of DHS to achieve additional capability over its existing baseline 

funding. Over-target funding for FY2005 was to provide a foundation for its program and process improvements to meet 

milestones it had set for FY2006–FY2009 to be more responsive to large-scale disasters; $3.9 million was requested. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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the 2005 hurricane season. Among all 4 NPSCs, approximately 426 agents 

were in training. 

Prior to landfall, FEMA contacted the Internal Revenue Service to activate 

four call centers, as outlined in an interagency agreement developed between 

the two agencies. In response to Hurricane Katrina, all FEMA internal NPSCs 

were operational on August 29, 2005, staffed with approximately 1,170 

personnel. One NPSC assumed around-the-clock operations.76 By 

September 1, 2005, all NPSCs were providing 24-hour services and the 

Internal Revenue Service call centers were also operational. Total registration 

intake staff was 1,613. 

On September 3, 2005, FEMA opened 2 additional call centers, and another 

on September 10, 2005; total staff increased to 3,375.77 Further, FEMA 

worked with the private sector to establish 7 additional call centers that 

became operational on September 14, 2005; total staff levels were 

approximately 8,199. Within 19 days, FEMA’s call center capability surged 

from a base capability of 4 call centers and 700 staff pre-landfall, to 19 sites 

and registration intake agent capability of over 10,000. By 

September 29, 2005, 12,185 were on staff to answer registration intake calls78

but FEMA maintained the majority of helpline and casework activities.79 

From August 24, 2005, to September 30, 2005, approximately 5,320,578 

registration intake and helpline calls reached FEMA’s call centers. Of those 

calls, 1,524,423 (29 percent) were deflected; 672,043 (12 percent) hung up; 

and FEMA answered 3,124,112 (59 percent) of the calls.80 During the same 

period, of the 3,097,888 registration intake calls that reached a call center, 

595,942 (19 percent) were deflected; 482,855 (16 percent) hung up; and 

2,019,091 (65 percent) were answered. The following demonstrates 

registration intake call activity that reached a call center, the calls answered, 

and the percent of those calls answered by the call center from 

August 24, 2005, to September 30, 2005. 

 

76 NPSC agents in training are not represented in the staff totals as the data we used only demonstrates staff scheduled to 

work registration intake, helpline, and casework. 

77 Also, one additional call center was established by FEMA in Virginia. 

78 See Appendix M for detailed information on registration intake and helpline volume, staffing levels, and call centers in 

operation from August 24, 2005, to September 30, 2005. 

79 One of the contractors, Cendera, performed helpline activities in addition to FEMA call centers. 

80 Deflected calls are calls that reach a call center, but are not answered because the waiting queue is full. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Registration Intake Calls Made and Answered 

Call Center Calls Made Calls Answered Percent Answered 

FEMA MD NPSC 421,756 203,375 48% 

FEMA TX NPSC 349,949 187,967 54% 

FEMA VA NPSCs 482,981 119,208 25% 

FEMA PR NPSC 266,209 112,858 42% 

FEMA IL 119,548 101,588 85% 

FEMA CA 113,980 89,475 79% 

FEMA FL 70,066 59,824 85% 

Contractor - Teletech 362,207 354,308 98% 

Contractor - Cendera 113,815 107,374 94% 

Contractor – IRS 797,377 683,114 86% 

Even with its internal efforts to augment call center sites and staff, a large 

number of calls continued to be deflected and not answered. For example, of 

the 134,919 registration calls made on September 11, 2005, 21,661 (16 

percent) were deflected; 32,875 (24 percent) hung up; and 80,383 (60 percent) 

were answered. By the following week, however, progress was being made as 

the call volume had significantly decreased and contractor support was 

operational. For example, of the 32,441 calls that reached a call center on 

September 18, 2005, 36 (0.11 percent) were deflected; 571 (1.76 percent) 

hung up; and 31,834 (98.13 percent) were answered. 

Initial Delays in Speaking with Agents

Many applicants experienced initial delays as their calls waited in queue 

before speaking with an agent. For example, from August 29, 2005, to 

September 11, 2005, applicants waited an average of ten minutes before 

speaking with an agent.81 After reaching an agent, the average call lasted 19 

minutes. From September 12, 2005, to September 25, 2005, applicants waited 

an average of 5 minutes to speak with an agent and the average call took 11 

minutes. By September 14, 2005, in an effort to reduce Helpline calls 

regarding document status, FEMA established an auto-dialer service to 

generate automated calls to provide applicants notification that their 

application was received. 

Registration Intake Versus Helpline

Registration intake call volume is higher immediately following a major 

disaster declaration and begins to taper off after several weeks. Applicants 

 

81 See Appendix N for detailed information on the average minutes applicants waited in queue and the length of call with 

agents. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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then begin calling FEMA’s helpline to change information initially provided 

or to seek information on the status of an application. By augmenting its staff 

with contractors, FEMA intended to use its more experienced staff to handle 

helpline calls and to process and manage applicant cases. However, due to the 

enormous call volume, excessive wait times, and deflection of calls initially 

experienced, FEMA temporarily used all call center resources to support 

registration intake. From September 2, 2005, to September 11, 2005, 

applicants calling FEMA’s helpline were provided answers to frequently 

asked questions and directed to FEMA’s website for more information, but no 

helpline calls were answered by agents. 

By September 12, 2005, agents resumed answering helpline calls, however the 

overwhelming majority of agents were only trained to register applicants for 

assistance and did not have the training and skills necessary to perform 

helpline or case management duties – only 1,200 NPSC staff had been trained 

to perform these duties. When helpline activities resumed, applicants 

continued to experience delays. For example, of 767,595 helpline calls that 

reached a call center from September 12, 1005, to September 18, 2005, 

476,016 (62 percent) were deflected; 57,497 (7.5 percent) hung up; and 

234,082 (30.5 percent) were answered. Of the 791,291 calls to helpline the 

following week, FEMA was only able to answer 507,417 (64 percent). 

By September 17, 2005, FEMA was in the process of training additional 

agents to handle helpline calls. FEMA’s progress in fielding applicant calls 

for assistance may have been affected by the additional calls it received in 

response to the September 24, 2005 disaster declaration for Hurricane Rita. 

FEMA’s enhanced resources quickly became finite given the second surge of 

calls for assistance. 

By focusing on enhancing registration intake capabilities, augmentation 

efforts for helpline and case management activities were not realized. 

FEMA’s overall performance in assisting applicants with helpline and 

management activities cannot be considered favorable or responsive; 

irrespective of the progress it had made registering applicants for assistance. 

Given the scale of this disaster and the sheer number of applicants seeking 

assistance from FEMA, initial efforts to augment call center sites and 

registration intake agents were admirable. But FEMA staff and resources 

need to be positioned to succeed. Additional investment is necessary to 

establish basic case management capabilities that are responsive to applicant 

needs. More resources must be afforded to FEMA and its efforts focused on 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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attaining subject matter expertise in all levels of applicant assistance and case 

management activities. 

Recommendation #21: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency provide training to additional National 

Processing Service Center staff and contractors to enhance FEMA’s capability 

to perform applicant assistance and case management activities responsive to 

the needs of applicants. 

On-Line Registrations

In addition to calling, applicants can apply for assistance on-line via 

FEMA.gov.82 According to FEMA, internet registrations accounted for over 

40 percent of initial registrations received as of September 19, 2005. By 

September 30, 2005, 704,086 on-line registrations were made, compared to 

853,851 through registration intake. 

Total Registrations Taken for FEMA’s Individuals and Households 

Program and Housing 08/28/05 to 09/30/05 

State 

Total Internet 

Registrations 

Total FEMA 

Registrations83 Total Registrations 

Louisiana 491,647 499,270 990,917 

Mississippi 185,095 279,367 464,462 

Alabama 27,344 75,214 102,558 

Total 704,086 853,851 1,557,937 

For several weeks after the major disaster was declared, however, many 

applicants experienced difficulty applying on-line. The system would “lock 

up” or “time out” during the application process and applicants could not tell 

whether the application was completed, sent, or received by FEMA. Some 

registered again and again, creating duplicate applications. For example, as of 

October 18, 2005, there were 1,645,784 total registrations made, 736,108 of 

them on-line. Of those, 96,866 (13 percent) were cancelled by FEMA as 

exact duplicate registrations and another 145,613 (20 percent) were flagged as 

potential exact duplicates. 

FEMA realized its information technology infrastructure was unable to 

support the number of applicants applying on-line, and on 

September 15, 2005, it doubled the on-line user capacity. At the same time, to 

lessen the number of potential duplicate applications, FEMA developed a 

 

82 Internet application via the FEMA.gov website was first made available by FEMA on October 5, 2004. 83 These are registrations taken by FEMA from calls made to its toll-free number. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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script to acknowledge a unique social security number. After completing an 

application through a certain point, the National Emergency Management 

Information System would acknowledge the application. In addition, if an 

applicant attempted another registration using the same social security 

number, a message indicating an existing application would appear. 

However, even with these adjustments, duplicate applications occurred. 

Using the internet as an additional resource to register assistance was 

innovative and enhanced FEMA’s ability to register disaster victims for 

assistance. However, the system was not adequately tested before its release 

and lacked sufficient infrastructure to avoid duplicate efforts on the part of 

applicants and additional work for NPSC staff. Problems with the system 

should be resolved before FEMA uses this capability during future disaster 

response efforts. 

Recommendation #22: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish and test the information 

technology infrastructure of the system to ensure support of user demands and 

develop internal controls to decrease the potential for duplicate applications. 

Significance of Call Volume and Registrations Taken

To place Hurricane Katrina registration activity into perspective, the following 

reflects the largest number of registrations taken by FEMA in one day over 

the last five calendar years. For example, after Hurricanes Charley, Frances, 

Ivan, and Jeanne in 2004, the highest daily registrations ever taken by FEMA 

were 44,800 as compared to 101,363 in response to Katrina.84 Total 

registrations taken in the past five calendars years demonstrate a significant 

increase in registrations taken by FEMA. 

 

84 FEMA Recovery Division, data as of September 16, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Registrations Taken in 

One Day 

Total Yearly 

Registrations 

Year Registrations Year Registrations 

2000 5,475 2000 215,707 

2001 9,355 2001 490,805 

2002 14,989 2002 609,884 

2003 13,636 2003 608,082 

2004 44,80085 2004 1,959,192 

2005 101,36386 2005 1,323,74287

We also compared registration totals six weeks after each declaration for 

Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, and determined the volume 

experienced in response to Hurricane Katrina was significant. Even with 

combining the four 2004 Florida hurricanes, FEMA registered 1,052,284 

applicants compared to 1,621,284 for Hurricane Katrina. Other significant 

disasters and total registrations taken by FEMA include: 1999 Hurricane 

Floyd – 161,027; 1998 Hurricane Georges – 406,441; and 1992 Hurricane 

Andrew – 151,134. 

Registrations Six Weeks After Declaration 

2004 Hurricanes Declaration Registrations Total Registrations88

Charley 08/13/04 222,949 273,033 

Frances 09/04/04 396,174 459,420 

Ivan 09/16/04 131,783 151,387 

Jeanne 09/26/04 301,378 363,979 

Total 1,052,284 1,247,819 

2005 Hurricanes Declaration Registrations Total Registrations89

Katrina 09/29/05 1,621,266 1,692,024 

Rita 09/29/05 818,082 836,563 

Total 2,439,348 2,528,587 

FEMA Referrals to Other Assistance Providers

In addition to registration intake for its individual assistance programs, FEMA 

makes referrals to other governmental and nongovernmental departments, 

agencies, and organizations to assist applicants in addressing needs. As of 

 

85 On September 28, 2004, FEMA established a record of 44,800 registrations taken over a 24-hour period. Audit of 

FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program in Miami-Dade County, Florida, for Hurricane Frances, DHS OIG-05-

20, May 2005, page 45. 

86 FEMA Recovery Division, data as of September 16, 2005. 

87 Ibid. 

88 FEMA NPSC, data as of December 13, 2005. 

89 Ibid. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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November 16, 2005, FEMA had made over four million referrals to other 

assistance providers.90 

Housing Area Command Concept 

The introduction of a contractor, and lessons learned from the 2004 hurricane 

season, led to a concept of operations to more effectively coordinate and 

manage housing operations. A Housing Area Command concept was 

established in 2005 to respond to large-scale disasters where housing needs 

were significant and spread over multiple states. The Housing Area 

Command would coordinate and oversee housing solutions throughout the 

affected area where several JFOs had been established. However, the 

Housing Area Command would not be an operational element as the housing 

operation functions remain within the JFO.91 The Technical Assistance 

Contractor would be involved in staffing housing operations and 

implementing housing solutions such as emergency group shelters, 

manufactured housing, travel trailers, and modular construction. 

In response to the Hurricane Dennis disasters declared on July 10, 2005, 

FEMA used a Technical Assistance Contractor to implement its direct housing 

assistance mission for the first time. The contractor would be responsible for 

mobile home and travel trailer site assessment, transportation, installation, and 

group site coordination. However, Hurricane Dennis’ predicted devastation 

was not realized and the contractor did not become fully operational. 

On August 22, 2005, a disaster was declared in Wyoming as a result of 

damages sustained from a tornado. This event provided FEMA with an 

opportunity to implement contractor support in a controlled disaster 

environment, as the needs and damage were specific and defined within a 

determined geographic area. For example, 278 individuals had applied for 

disaster assistance, approximately $413,689 in assistance was approved, and 

52 families were housed in mobile homes as of October 17, 2005. 

One week after the Wyoming declaration, Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 

Because a contractor was already engaged, FEMA was able to mobilize it and 

make preparations for direct housing needs in the Gulf Coast region. Prior to 

Hurricane Katrina, however, FEMA had only used a Technical Assistance 

 

90 See Appendix O for FEMA’s referrals to other assistance providers. 

91 Housing Area Command, draft Concept of Operations Plan, July 29, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Contractor once, and its tasking for the provision of direct housing assistance 

was minimal. 

Initial Implementation Lacked Coordination with Oversight and 

Operational Elements

Prior to landfall, FEMA’s Housing Area Command was activated and began 

planning contingencies for potential shortfalls in sheltering and housing. 

FEMA activated four technical assistance contactors to support its temporary 

housing mission, procured 20,000 manufactured housing units, and planned to 

purchase over 100,000 units. All contractors reported directly to the Housing 

Area Command. Eighteen days after landfall, only 910 units were occupied 

by disaster victims, 1,306 additional units were ready for occupancy, and 

4,798 additional units were positioned in various staging areas. As of 

October 1, 2005, 4,128 units were occupied: 667 in Louisiana, 2,929 in 

Mississippi, and 532 in Alabama. 

FEMA field and headquarters staff told us the use of the Technical Assistance 

Contractors provides FEMA with new resources to enhance its housing 

mission and the use of contractors should continue in response to future 

disasters. FEMA staff also told us they experienced great difficulty in 

obtaining information on the contractors’ progress to establish direct housing 

resources. Significant communication impediments resulted from having all 

technical assistance contactors report only to and obtain tasking only from the 

Housing Area Command, without appropriate coordination and input from 

field operational elements, such as the JFOs. 

A week before landfall, FEMA was in the process of conducting briefings and 

soliciting proposals from contractors to perform its direct housing mission. 

However, FEMA had not adequately defined the roles, responsibilities, 

expectation for deliverables, or performance measures for contractors. In 

response to Hurricane Katrina, the Housing Area Command awarded several 

contracts; however the terms, conditions, and deliverables of the contracts 

were unknown and not appropriately coordinated with FEMA personnel 

responsible for contract oversight. For example, FEMA officials said the 

Housing Area Command tasked the Technical Assistance Contractors without 

the knowledge of the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative or the 

JFO, creating a tasking for work without proper documentation. 

A lack of coordination and communication also existed between the Housing 

Area Command and operational elements in all affected areas. Some FEMA 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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officials viewed the Housing Area Command as becoming an operational 

element working parallel to JFO operations, while others viewed it as working 

in disregard of housing resource needs and identified requirements set or 

requested by other FEMA components. 

For example, the Housing Area Command identified the need for a 1,400 

housing unit site in Alabama; however, the FCO and JFO housing operations 

element had not identified or requested such a group site. Instead, the FCO 

had asked for and received permission from FEMA headquarters to use the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Planning Response Team for the placement of 

travel trailers on private sites and the development and placement of one 

smaller group site. FEMA field officials told us that they were instructed by 

FEMA headquarters to only use the Housing Area Command and its tasked 

Technical Assistance Contractors to establish housing resources. 

Further, FEMA has specific requirements for determining whether a travel 

trailer or mobile home is “ready for occupancy.” One essential requirement is 

that the unit has a reliable source of power. When FEMA conducted quality 

assurance checks on a select number of trailers in Louisiana, which the 

contractors had certified as units ready for occupancy, a reliable source of 

power had not been established and FEMA was not able to approve the units 

for occupancy. In addition, no mobile homes may be placed in a Special 

Flood Hazard Area; only travel trailers are allowable in these areas and only 

on a very limited basis when establishing emergency sites. In these cases, the 

Housing Area Command, and its use of Technical Assistance Contractors, had 

allowed the potential establishment of housing resources under conditions 

contrary to FEMA standards. Collectively, these examples demonstrate a lack 

of coordination within FEMA to effectively implement its direct housing 

mission and a basic lack of understanding for the regulations that govern the 

placement and functional requirements for direct housing resources. 

Recommendation #23: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a contract mechanism for its direct 

federal resources that clearly defines the expected roles, responsibilities, 

deliverables, and performance measures for contractors implementing 

FEMA’s direct housing operations mission. 

Recommendation #24: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency discontinue the practice of tasking any 

contractor without the appropriate coordination and approval of the 

Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Recommendation #25: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish clear roles and responsibilities for 

the Housing Area Command and define its reporting requirements and chain 

of command relationship with the FEMA headquarters, Joint Field Offices, 

and Technical Assistance Contractors. 

Delivery of FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program 

FEMA realized that implementing the IHP in its traditional manner was 

unrealistic given the widespread relocation of many disaster victims 

throughout the United States, the total destruction of significant numbers of 

homes, and inaccessibility issues in performing home inspections to determine 

damage and verify need. Many disaster victims would be unable to return to 

their homes for an extended period of time. In an effort to assist those 

victims, FEMA attempted to devise new methods to expedite financial 

assistance and technology to verify need. However, it was difficult for FEMA 

to maintain internal controls as modifications were made to eligibility criteria 

and the use of technology to verify damage, occupancy, and ownership were 

less reliable than initially anticipated. 

For example, FEMA realized that a large number of registrations for IHP 

assistance were potentially duplicate applications. As of October 18, 2005, 

there were 1,645,784 total registrations made. Of those, 120,489 (7 percent) 

were cancelled by FEMA as exact duplicate registrations, and another 189,437 

(12 percent) were flagged as potential exact duplicates.92 Because other 

federal agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, the Internal 

Revenue Service, and the SBA, maintain basic identification information on 

individuals, information sharing agreements between FEMA and other federal 

agencies could provide FEMA with more accurate means to verify applicant 

identity and eligibility for assistance. 

Expedited Assistance

On September 6, 2005, FEMA authorized the use of expedited assistance 

within the housing assistance component of the IHP. Expedited assistance is 

initiated rarely and used only during extraordinary disaster events. FEMA 

made the determination to award this form of assistance based upon the 

 

92 FEMA NPSC, data as of October 18, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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severity of damage and nationwide relocation of disaster victims. Unlike 

other forms of FEMA housing assistance, on-site inspections to verify 

damages are not performed as expedited assistance allows for a pre-inspection 

disbursement of funds based on specific criteria. 

FEMA provided an equal amount of assistance, $2,000, to all eligible 

households that met the following criteria: (1) the registration must be for the 

primary residence only; (2) the registrant must be displaced due to the 

disaster; and, (3) the registrant is in need of shelter. These eligibility 

questions were not directly asked of the applicant during the registration 

intake process, but questions included within the registration script were used 

to meet the criteria. If the criteria were met, assistance was provided without 

any other verification. Funds could be used for any needs an applicant may 

have had, such as food, shelter, clothing, and personal necessities. There was 

also no requirement of applicants to account for how funding was spent, in 

consideration for additional FEMA IHP assistance.93 

Debit Cards Used as Delivery Mechanism

By September 7, 2005, FEMA had developed an additional mechanism for 

providing expedited assistance to applicants who did not have electronic 

access to an existing bank account, did not have an existing bank account, or 

who did not have access to a mailing address. In these instances, FEMA’s 

pilot program would provide a debit card once the registration process was 

completed and eligibility criteria for expedited assistance were met. 

Individuals without electronic funds transfer would receive a card with a 

personal identification number and the assistance would be loaded onto it after 

one business day. The debit card’s associated banking information (routing 

and account number) would be used by FEMA to electronically deposit the 

disaster assistance. This would allow for verification that the applicant’s 

name and social security number matched before funds would be released. 

Accounts would then be established, where electronic funds could be 

transferred, for those applicants who did not have bank accounts. 

On September 8, 2005, FEMA’s Director authorized the distribution of debit 

cards which began the following morning at three shelters in Texas: Reliant 

Arena (Astrodome) in Houston, Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, and 

Reunion Arena in Dallas. However, FEMA’s Director made the decision to 

 

93 In instances where an applicant was provided expedited assistance in error, the applicant was required to demonstrate 

the exhaustion of funds before a recertification of additional IHP assistance was made. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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issue the cards as active with the $2,000 and with a personal identification 

number. Basically, this meant FEMA was providing funds without any 

assurance of need and with no way to verify that people who received the 

cards were actually eligible for the assistance. Cards were distributed for two 

days before this delivery mechanism for expedited assistance was abruptly 

discontinued. 

Total Debit Card Distribution 

Location Cards Issued Total Card Value 

Houston 6,701 $ 13,402,000 

Dallas 2,479 $ 4,958,000 

San Antonio 2,194 $ 4,388,000 

Total 11, 374 $ 22,748,000

Without the internal controls established by FEMA’s program officials, the 

pilot program as implemented, greatly increased the potential for 

mismanagement and the likelihood of fraud and abuse. Greater attention must 

be made by FEMA in establishing and maintaining eligibility criteria for the 

distribution of any federal funds, especially for a pilot-program that was never 

before tested. In two days, over $22 million was provided to persons who 

may, or may not, have been eligible for assistance. 

Eligibility Modifications

One condition that must have been met to qualify for assistance was that the 

primary residence sustained damage. However, some people had evacuated 

their homes not knowing whether damages were sustained. When applicants 

registered for assistance and answered “no” or “did not know” to that 

particular question, they were determined ineligible. FEMA made a decision 

to change the processing script and allowed those applicants to be eligible. 

FEMA also determined the fixed amount of $2,000 in expedited assistance 

would not be considered a duplication of benefits with its housing assistance 

program and therefore was not subject to recoupment. In addition, expedited 

assistance was provided to applicants with insurance, with the understanding 

it was to be treated as an advance on the applicant’s insurance settlement. 

This decision would be retroactive on applicants who were previously denied. 

Federal regulation, however, prohibits FEMA from funding applicants who 

are able to meet their needs through other means and prohibits duplication of 

benefits.94 For those applicants with insurance coverage, temporary housing 

 

94 44 CFR §206.110(a) and (h) 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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assistance shall be provided only when payment of insurance benefits have 

been significantly delayed, benefits are not sufficient to cover housing needs, 

or when housing is not available in the private market.95 

FEMA began fielding reports that members of a number of households had 

been separated during the evacuation process and were residing in different 

geographic locations. Initially, FEMA determined that only one expedited 

assistance award would be provided per household, pursuant to federal 

regulation, but it has the authority to provide assistance to more than one 

residence and, eventually it did so, making expedited assistance available to 

separated household members, including minor children housed with extended 

family or guardians.96 

FEMA awarded over $1.6 billion to 803,088 applicants in the three affected 

states. The Hurricane Katrina authorization for expedited assistance was 

discontinued on September 26, 2005. In comparison, FEMA provided 

approximately $51 million to 94,993 applicants during the four hurricanes that 

affected Florida in 2004.97 

Total Expedited Assistance 30 Days After Declaration 

for Hurricane Katrina98

State EA Applications EA Eligible EA Approved 

Louisiana 618,692 618,692 $1,249,112,299 

Mississippi 161,540 161,540 $323,148,354 

Alabama 22,856 22,856 $45,707,416 

Total 803,088 803,088 $1,617,968,069 

Great liberty, within its limited authority, was taken by FEMA to modify the 

delivery of expedited assistance to afford assistance to as many applicants as 

possible. However, any semblance of internal control that initially existed to 

ensure basic eligibility criteria were met was significantly diminished, if not 

entirely removed. Program controls should not be removed in response to 

catastrophic events. Modifications, while maintaining internal control, should 

be anticipated and planned for by FEMA. 

Recommendation #26: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish eligibility criteria, internal 

 

95 44 CFR §206.101(d) 

96 44 CFR §206.117(b) (A) 

97 FEMA NPSC, provided December 19, 2005, from data complied as of six weeks after the declaration of each disaster. 

98 FEMA NPSC, data as of September 30, 2005. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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program controls, and a basis for testing a program before implementation to 

ensure the program meets disaster assistance provisions of the Stafford Act. 

Implementation of the IHP Housing Assistance Component

In less affected areas, FEMA implemented its traditional housing assistance 

and other needs assistance components of the IHP and performed home 

inspections to verify damage and assess need. A home inspection is generally 

required as a condition of eligibility for IHP assistance. Once inspections 

were completed, FEMA determined eligibility for both components. 

Under the housing assistance component, if needs could not be addressed 

through insurance or loans from the SBA, depending on the degree of damage, 

FEMA provided renters and homeowners temporary housing in the form of 

rental assistance or provided housing units (such as travel trailers or mobile 

homes) when rental resources were not available within the affected area. It 

also provided homeowners with funds for home repair when a damaged home 

could be made safe, sanitary, and functional, or funds for replacement when 

homes were destroyed. 

Total Registrations for FEMA’s IHP and Housing Assistance Awards 

08/28/05 to 09/30/05 

State Registrations HA Referrals Average Grant99 Total Grants 

Louisiana 990,917 897,280 $1,699 $1,947,569,186 

Mississippi 464,462 395,939 $2,330 $390,682,308 

Alabama 102,558 87,345 $1,825 $63,483,992 

Total 1,557,937 1,380,564 $1,951 $2,401,735,486 

Other Needs Assistance

Under the other needs assistance component, if needs could not be addressed 

through insurance or loans from the SBA, depending on the degree of damage, 

grants were provided to repair damaged personal property or to pay for 

disaster-related necessary expenses and serious needs, which were limited to 

items or services that help prevent or overcome a disaster-related hardship, 

injury, or adverse condition. Such items included: reimbursement for 

medical and dental costs; funeral and burial costs; clothing; household items 

(room furnishings, appliances); tools required for employment (specialized or 

protective clothing and equipment); necessary educational materials (school 

 

99 The average grant reflects the average award amount per registration. A single registration may receive multiple 

categories of housing assistance. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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books, computers, supplies); generators; cleaning items (wet/dry vacuum, air 

purifier, dehumidifier); and damages to vehicles. The majority of other needs 

assistance provided was for items listed in the other category, such as 

generators and cleaning equipment, personal property, and transportation 

needs. 

Total Registrations for FEMA’s IHP and Other Needs Assistance Awards 

08/28/05 to 09/30/05 

State Registrations ONA Referrals Average 

Grant100

Total Grants 

Louisiana 990,917 469,608 $1,114 $18,043,483 

Mississippi 464,462 251,477 $2,433 $30,005,548 

Alabama 102,558 63,802 $1,110 $20,744,939 

Total 1,557,937 784,887 $1,552 $68,793,970 

The maximum amount of assistance for both components combined, however, 

could not exceed the IHP cap of $26,200. In all affected states, as of 

September 30, 2005, over $2.4 billion in housing assistance was awarded, and 

over $68 million for other needs assistance. The majority of applicants 

determined ineligible for housing assistance and other needs assistance were 

due to duplicate applications, insufficient damage, and insurance. 

Efforts to Determine Eligibility Without Inspection

In the most affected areas, however, FEMA determined the conduct of 

inspections within a reasonable and responsive timeframe was not feasible and 

attempted to verify damage using new methods and technology. Homes with 

major damage or completely destroyed homes were identified through rapid 

assessment, the use of satellite imagery, and geospatial maps to indicate water 

levels of one foot or higher. Residents in those dwellings would have their 

pre-disaster occupancy and ownership verified through external databases, so 

that a physical inspection was not necessary to provide more expedient 

assistance for real and personal property. 

Transitional Housing Assistance

FEMA awarded transitional housing assistance to eligible homeowners and 

renters by providing an initial payment of $2,358 to cover three months 

rent.101 An equal amount of transitional housing assistance was awarded only 

 

100The average grant reflects the average award amount per registration. A single registration may receive multiple 

categories of other needs assistance. 

101 FEMA determined the amount by using a national average of fair market rent for a two-bedroom unit. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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to eligible households in the most affected counties and parishes of 

Mississippi and Louisiana. It was provided without inspection to applicants in 

Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, St. Tammany, and Plaquemines parishes in 

Louisiana; and Jackson, Harrison, and Hancock counties in Mississippi. 

Applicants in all other counties and parishes in the affected states would 

receive rental assistance and other forms of IHP assistance if found eligible 

after inspections were conducted. As of October 2, 2005, 332,992 applicants 

were approved for transitional housing assistance totaling over $788 

million.102 

With satellite imagery and geospatial maps, in combination with information 

supplied by a FEMA contractor on consumer information to verify occupancy, 

FEMA thought it would be able to “auto-determine” assistance for the 

majority of applicants that resided within these areas. The contractor used tax 

records, census data, public utilities, and other public records to verify the 

occupants of individual homes and their residency status as an owner or 

renter. However, the contractor was not able to provide FEMA with 

verification data as early as anticipated. Also, FEMA had not explored or 

developed contingencies should the information be untimely or incomplete. 

For applicants with occupancy that could not be verified by the contractor or 

through documents submitted by the applicant, FEMA attempted to verify 

occupancy by using the internet to match the phone number, name, and 

address with additional sources of information. When verification could not 

be established using these methods, applicants would be referred to HUD for 

assistance under the Hurricane Katrina Housing Assistance Program. 

To avoid possible duplication of assistance, FEMA continued its policy of 

providing housing assistance to only one member of a household, and 

attempted to determine the primary lease or mortgage holder as “head of 

household,” and provided transitional housing assistance only to that 

individual. Other household members were determined ineligible for 

transitional housing assistance, but could qualify for other needs assistance, 

for personal property, transportation, or medical, dental, and funeral expenses, 

when the need for such assistance was verified. 

Delay in Providing Additional Housing Assistance to Most Affected Areas

The initial method FEMA developed to provide expedited transitional housing 

assistance was thought to be an unreliable method for use in awarding 

 

102 DHS Situation Report Number 73, October 2, 2005. 
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additional IHP housing assistance. Concerns were raised within FEMA and 

elsewhere in DHS that additional analysis and data would be required to 

validate the method before additional housing assistance could be provided. 

The implication of this decision was that eligible applicants in the most 

affected areas were only provided expedited assistance ($2,000) and 

transitional housing assistance ($2,358) to address their housing needs, while 

applicants in other areas where inspections were conducted were potentially 

eligible for up to $26,200 in IHP assistance. Applicants who resided outside 

of the most affected areas were not eligible for transitional housing assistance. 

By October 28, 2005, FEMA program officials had completed additional 

analysis and provided data to support the extent of damage caused by different 

water levels (four to six feet) in a variety of homes that ranged in size, style, 

and foundation type. It believed this data demonstrated that any home with 

two feet or more of water in it for a week or longer had sustained damages 

beyond the housing assistance maximum replacement award amount of 

$10,500, and that water levels two feet or below would often result in damage 

that could be repaired to a habitable condition within the replacement award. 

Further, maps it had used on water depth in particular areas, could be 

enhanced with zip code overlays to the extent where individual homes were 

visible to view the physical condition of the home. It had also conducted onsite visual inspections in more than 200 locations within the defined areas of 

the maps and the physical inspection results supported the reported water 

levels. 

FEMA proposed that homes that had two feet or more of standing water be 

deemed destroyed, and uninsured homeowners be eligible for the maximum 

real property replacement grant of $10,500. Homes with standing water levels 

between one and two feet were deemed as having major damage, and 

uninsured homeowners were eligible for the maximum real property repair 

grant of $5,200. Homes with one foot or less would be deemed as having 

sustained moderate damage, and uninsured homeowners were eligible for a 

real property repair grant of $2,600. 

In addition, both renters and homeowners in these designated areas were 

eligible for personal property other needs assistance awards if the following 

criteria were met: (1) an applicant was uninsured; (2) failed the SBA income 

test and had been denied a loan; and (3) had damage levels of two feet or more 

for 100 percent replacement award, damage level one to two feet for 50 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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percent replacement award, and damage of one foot or less for 25 percent 

replacement award.103 

Finally, FEMA placed additional requirements on the provision of IHP 

assistance. All homes with less than six inches of water would be inspected 

and IHP assistance provided through traditional means. Applicants with flood 

insurance would not be eligible for IHP real or personal property grants, 

unless the applicant was able to demonstrate that insurance was insufficient to 

address need. For any personal property awards made to applicants residing 

in a Special Flood Hazard Area-Zone A, FEMA would initiate a Group Flood 

Insurance Purchase Requirement ($600), which would be calculated towards 

the maximum IHP awards. 

Given the degree of damage, inaccessibility issues for conducting traditional 

inspections, and the widespread relocation of the majority of residents within 

these areas, FEMA’s initial efforts to verify damages and determine 

occupancy through alternative means were creative and demonstrated an 

effort to provide assistance as expeditiously as possible. However, initial 

assumptions FEMA made on the data’s accuracy, reliability, and timeliness 

were not realized, which cast doubt upon its effectiveness for use as a basis 

for awarding additional assistance. FEMA should place priority on its efforts 

to use new methods and technology to verify damage, occupancy, and 

ownership, when traditional methods of inspection are not responsive in the 

timely provision of assistance. FEMA must ensure the method used has been 

tested, is based on supportable data, and provides the highest assurance that 

assistance is provided only to applicants meeting established program 

eligibility criteria. 

Recommendation #27: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency place priority on analysis of new methods 

and technology to verify damage, occupancy, and ownership, when traditional 

methods of inspection are not responsive in the timely provision of assistance. 

Methods and applicable technology must be tested, based on supportable data, 

and provide the highest assurance of meeting program eligibility 

requirements. 

In general, we determined the authorities of the Stafford Act are adequate to 

deliver the necessary assistance required in response to a catastrophic event. 

 

103 The other needs assistance personal property replacement awards were based on a two-bedroom home with complete 

furnishings. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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However, Individual Assistance programs are cumbersome, not easily 

administered, confusing to applicants, subject to funding caps, cost share 

requirements, and time limitations. FEMA should consider revising its 

program delivery process to more efficiently and effectively address the needs 

of victims. 

Delivery of FEMA’s Public Assistance Program 

The Public Assistance program was an integral part of FEMA’s ability to 

assist states with funding to shelter evacuees throughout the United States. 

Program modifications were made to expedite the processing of project 

worksheets, removing debris from private property, and funding 100 percent 

of eligible costs for emergency protective measures and debris removal for 60 

days.104 Some practices demonstrated a unique interpretation of statutory 

authority, while others provided an unprecedented level of federal assistance. 

Request for Federal Assistance

Given the amount of debris and immediate threats to life and health, the 

decision to reimburse 100 percent of eligible costs for emergency protective 

measures and debris removal for an initial 60-day period, seemed prudent yet, 

with the exception of the World Trade Center recovery after 

September 11, 2001, was unprecedented. Historically, these costs are shared 

between the federal government, the state, and the applicant, and the time 

period allowed for reimbursement of emergency activities is more closely 

aligned with the initial response period of a disaster, for activities within a 

72-hour period. 

Emergency protective measures and debris removal accounted for the vast 

majority of work requested under the Public Assistance program by the 

affected states as of October 1, 2005.105 In addition, Mississippi submitted 

one project under the buildings and equipment category. Alabama submitted 

nine projects for buildings and equipment, six for utilities, and five for parks, 

recreational facilities, and other items. As of October 1, 2005, FEMA had 

 

104 A project worksheet initiates the process for receipt of federal funds under the Public Assistance program, and 

includes information on the project’s location, damage description and dimensions, scope of work, and an estimate or 

actual costs of the project depending on its size. 

105 See Appendix C for a detailed list of eligible work categories under FEMA’s Public Assistance program. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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received a total of 430 project worksheets requesting Public Assistance 

program funds and obligated more than $962 million. 

Public Assistance Projects Obligated as of October 1, 2005 

Category Louisiana Mississippi Alabama Total 

A – Debris Removal $1,425,334 $128,567,943 $5,286,941 $135,280,218 

B – Emergency Protective Measures $777,861,116 $43,847,142 $4,623,733 $826,331,991 

C – Roads and Bridges 0 0 $914 $914 

E – Buildings and Equipment 0 $330,572 $21,622 $352,194 

F – Utilities 0 0 $29,930 $29,930 

G – Parks, Recreational Facilities, 

and Other Items 

0 0 $14,221 $14,221 

Total $779,286,450 $172,745,657 $9,977,361 $962,009,468 

Program Implementation

FEMA must notify Congress of any project estimated at $1 million or more 

before funds may be obligated. Of the 430 projects, 48 were over $1 million. 

FEMA made conscious decisions to expedite its processing of these projects 

so funds could be available to support applicant needs. Once a project 

worksheet was entered into FEMA’s National Emergency Management 

Information System, a fact sheet and press release were prepared and 

distribution coordinated for official notification. FEMA processed project 

worksheets for the debris removal and emergency protective measures 

categories within one day, and for all other categories within three days. 

In addition to debris on public property caused by Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 

determined that debris on private property also created a threat to life, public 

health, and the safety of the general public.106 FEMA identified eight parishes 

in Louisiana, six counties in Mississippi, and two counties in Alabama where 

FEMA would reimburse eligible costs for removing debris from private 

property. As a standard practice, debris located on private property is not 

reimbursed under the Public Assistance program. 

Use of Stafford Act Section 403

Prior to and soon after landfall evacuees began arriving in states through 

coordinated and uncoordinated means. With the potential of thousands of 

evacuees arriving with and without notice, the efforts of the Red Cross, 

VOADs, states, and other organizations to shelter evacuees would likely 

 

106 FEMA based its determination on the declaration of a Public Health Emergency in Alabama, Mississippi, and 

Louisiana by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services on August 31, 2005. 
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become overwhelmed, requiring state and local governments to provide both 

short and long term sheltering needs beyond existing capabilities. In an effort 

to assist state and local governments to supplement their efforts to shelter and 

care for Hurricane Katrina evacuees, FEMA used Section 403, Essential 

Assistance, of the Stafford Act.107 On September 2, 2005, the President began 

issuing emergency declarations authorizing reimbursement of 100 percent of 

eligible costs incurred by states providing shelter and care to evacuees. Prior 

to Hurricane Katrina, such authority had not been used to reimburse states for 

the costs associated with sheltering disaster victims from other states. By 

September 30, 2005, 45 emergency declarations had been made and over $72 

million obligated to five states. 

FEMA planned to use Section 403 funding until it could develop a longerterm strategy for implementing its Individual Assistance programs, which 

have statutory assistance limitations of 18 months and a maximum of $26,200. 

On September 9, 2005, FEMA provided guidance on eligible costs for 

emergency sheltering and determined states could be reimbursed for such 

costs under Section 403 for up to 12 months. In response to the guidance, 

several states engaged in contracts to support their short-term and interim 

sheltering operations. Further, the subsequent announcement to move all 

evacuees out of shelters and into longer term housing by October 1, 2005, left 

states uncertain as to what costs FEMA would reimburse, and for how long. 

The use of authorities under Section 403 of the Stafford Act should be viewed 

as resourceful and innovative given the unprecedented evacuation of 

thousands of people to locations throughout the United States as well as the 

loss of significant housing resources within the affected areas. However, 

FEMA should evaluate the policy implications of its continued use as a means 

to provide emergency shelter when the assistance provided is not closely 

aligned with the initial response period of a disaster. 

As a condition of reimbursement to states, FEMA did not require evacuees to 

have registered with FEMA, which is not a requirement for the provision of 

assistance under Section 403 of the Stafford Act. This decreased FEMA’s 

ability to know whether people were actually eligible for assistance as a direct 

result of the disaster. Also, FEMA increased the potential for duplication with 

its other assistance programs, as there was no internal mechanism to check 

whether an evacuee had received assistance from the IHP and when interim 

housing may have been provided. Only when FEMA was able to identify that 

 

107Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended, Section 403, 42 U.S.C. §5170b 
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an evacuee had received IHP funds was the interim housing assistance funded 

under Section 403 phased out. 

We believe the decision to use Section 403 to address longer-term housing 

needs of disaster victims demonstrates a fundamental lack of planning by 

FEMA and other federal and nongovernmental partners to address 

contingencies for the loss of housing resources presented by catastrophic 

disasters. 

FEMA should also reevaluate using emergency declarations as a delivery 

mechanism for Section 403 assistance, as each declaration required staff 

intensive resources to process and administer this assistance by individual 

state. Centralizing the administration and funding of this assistance under the 

major declarations for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama could have served 

the same purpose, without having placed additional demands on limited 

resources and could have enhanced the communication and consistency by 

which this assistance was provided. However, FEMA officials believed that 

the decision was prudent as its regional offices continue to maintain 

responsibility for states within their jurisdiction, as would be the case in any 

emergency or major disaster declaration. 

Recommendation #28: We recommend the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with federal, state, and 

nongovernmental partners, develop more effective and efficient plans for the 

delivery of assistance to address long-term housing issues, and test these plans 

in a simulated environment before application in actual disasters. 

FEMA Needs to Improve Readiness 

The response to Hurricane Katrina showed that FEMA was not adequately 

prepared for a catastrophic event in terms of staffing, training, planning, 

exercises, and the remediation of “lessons learned” during previous events. 

We surveyed FEMA’s efforts in these areas from 1995-2005, including grants 

to improve state readiness, in order to evaluate FEMA’s overall posture for 

catastrophic events. FEMA’s poor workforce management and frequent 

reorganizations have not provided sufficient trained staff for catastrophic 

surges or day-to-day operations. FEMA’s involvement in state efforts through 

federal emergency management grants has diminished significantly, reducing 

opportunities to build relationships between federal and state responders. 
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Finally, FEMA needs a stronger mechanism for redressing issues identified in 

previous disasters and exercises. 

FEMA’s Organization and Capacity to Respond to Disasters 

Including its alignment within DHS, FEMA has undergone more than five 

reorganizations in the past decade.108 At the onset of Hurricane Katrina, these 

were the operational divisions at FEMA headquarters: 

• Response Division: The Response Division includes 2 emergency 

operations centers; 8 logistics centers that stock initial response 

resources and accountable property including meals, generators, and 

computers; 5 MERS detachments to provide communications and life 

support for emergency responders; 28 US&R teams in 19 states; and 

the NDMS teams that staff hospitals, veterinary clinics, and morgues. 

Response Division staff participate in catastrophic planning and 

exercises and coordinate ESF-5 and ESF-9. 

• Recovery Division: The Recovery Division administers Individual 

and Public Assistance programs, processes all gubernatorial requests 

for major disasters and emergencies, supplies the cadre of FCOs, 

administers the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, and coordinates 

ESF-6. Its resources include four NPSCs that manage telephone 

registration and process disaster victim applications for assistance. 

• Mitigation Division: The Mitigation Division manages programs 

intended to lessen the risk and effect of disasters, including the 

National Flood Insurance Program and pre-disaster mitigation grants. 

• Preparedness Division: The Preparedness Division conducts 

capability assessments, resolves remediation issues, and participates in 

some state-run exercises. In previous years, this division had 

additional responsibilities in conducting exercises, administering 

grants, and preparing for chemical and radiological incidents. 

 

108 Appendix P contains two DHS organizational charts highlighting DHS components with a role in the phases of 

emergency management. The August 2005 chart represents DHS’ organization when Hurricane Katrina occurred; the 

October 2005 chart represents organizational changes following the DHS Secretary’s Second Stage Review. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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FEMA also houses the U.S. Fire Administration and training centers such as 

the Emergency Management Institute. Further, FEMA has ten regional 

offices across the country to assist states in disaster management. The 

regional offices staff the RRCCs and JFOs. 

FEMA Regional Office Structure

In FY 2005, FEMA was authorized 4,905 employees divided between 

permanent full-time and temporary staff. In addition, FEMA maintains a 

roster of several thousand DAEs trained for different cadres such as disaster 

logistics, individual assistance, or public affairs. When response and recovery 

demands increase, FEMA obtains surge staffing for particular disasters by 

activating DAEs and by shifting some permanent employees to disasterspecific positions. 

FEMA expenditures in a given year are funded through annual appropriations, 

previous appropriations authorizing funds to be spent over multiple years, and 

no-year funds, such as the Disaster Relief Fund. Most of FEMA’s salaries 

and expenses and some programs are funded through the annual 

appropriation. FEMA assistance for specific disasters, such as individual 

assistance payments or preparations in the days immediately before a disaster, 

is paid for with the Disaster Relief Fund. FEMA’s enacted FY 2005 budget, 

excluding supplemental appropriations, was $3.1 billion. FEMA’s nonDisaster Relief Fund appropriations have consistently decreased since 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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FY 2002, but Disaster Relief Fund appropriations increased. 

FEMA Enacted Budget Appropriations, FY 1995 – FY 2005

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Fiscal Year

Dollars (in millions)

Disaster Relief Fund (not including supplemental appropriations)

Other budgeted funds (such as most salaries and expenses)

While FEMA receives an appropriation each year for the Disaster Relief 

Fund, in eight of the past ten fiscal years Congress passed supplemental 

appropriations bills to augment the fund. After Hurricane Katrina, Congress 

passed two emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $62.3 billion for 

relief and recovery, $60 billion of which went to FEMA to administer. As of 

November 30, 2005, FEMA had obligated or expended funds worth $19 

billion in response to Hurricane Katrina. During December 2005, Congress 

passed a hurricane relief bill that redirected $29 billion from the first 

appropriations to economic development, federal facility restoration, and 

efforts to strengthen the New Orleans levee system. 

Grant Program Changes Contributed to Weakened Relationship with 

States 

Over the past ten years, a number of changes to the administration of grants 

for natural hazards preparedness diminished FEMA’s involvement in how 

states conduct emergency training, planning, exercises, and other functions. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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In 1995, FEMA had strict oversight of how states and territories spent 

emergency management grants, which provided FEMA with a degree of 

influence over state emergency preparedness. Several program changes 

increased state discretion for how grants could be spent and decreased FEMA 

direction and involvement. Changes in recent years have also diverted 

attention from natural hazards preparedness to terrorism preparedness. In 

2005, FEMA no longer administered natural hazards preparedness grants,109

as this program was transferred to DHS’ Office of Domestic Preparedness 

(ODP), now part of the new Preparedness Directorate.110 

Over the last decade, FEMA used three different mechanisms for providing 

funds and technical assistance to state and local governments to enhance allhazards preparedness: 

• 1983-1995 – Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement: The 

Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement combined the requirements 

from many preparedness programs into a single document for each 

state, enabling FEMA to consolidate the administration and funding of 

its grant programs. The Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement 

involved between 9 and 27 programs that prescribed very specific uses 

for funds. In 1995, these programs included state and local assistance; 

training; hurricane preparedness; earthquake preparedness; the 

Community Assistance Program; the Disaster Preparedness 

Improvement Grant, a counter-terrorism program; hazardous 

materials; Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act Title III; 

and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. Under 

the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement, states submitted quarterly 

reports to FEMA on the use of program funds. 

 

109 In addition to the natural hazards preparedness grant programs discussed in this section, FEMA continues to 

administer grants for the National Flood Insurance Program, the Map Modernization Management Support and 

Cooperating Technical Partners programs (mitigation), Flood Mitigation Assistance, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation 

program, Hazardous Materials Assistance, Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act Title III, the Chemical 

Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, the National Dam 

Safety program, US&R, and a few smaller miscellaneous grants such as research consortiums. Although the 

responsibility for the Assistance to Firefighters Grants program shifted to ODP in 2004, FEMA still administers these 

programs and is reimbursed by ODP. 

110 On July 13, 2005, DHS’ Secretary reorganized the department. The Office of Domestic Preparedness was realigned 

under the Assistant Secretary for Grants and Training, reporting to the Under Secretary for Preparedness. ODP’s parent 

office, State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, was realigned under the Assistant Secretary for 

Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs. 
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• 1996-1999 – Cooperative Agreement Under the Performance 

Partnership Agreement: In 1996, FEMA began using Performance 

Partnership Agreements for emergency preparedness grants to states. 

These agreements consolidated the previous, specific grant programs 

to give states more flexibility in allocating preparedness grant funding 

and to reduce FEMA’s administrative management burden. In return, 

states were to develop the new, strategic agreements with FEMA and 

achieve measurable results each year. The Cooperative Agreement 

under the Performance Partnership Agreement shifted FEMA’s focus 

from grant oversight to technical assistance; removed “one size fits 

all” grant prescriptions; deregulated the Civil Preparedness Guide; and 

reduced state reporting to a semi-annual basis. This agreement 

contained most of the same programs as the Comprehensive 

Cooperative Agreement, such as state and local assistance, but it added 

a 50 percent state matching requirement for some programs.111 The 

Performance Partnership Agreement five-year plans were never fully 

implemented because the program was replaced after four years. 

• 2000-2004 – Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPGs): 

In 2000, EMPGs replaced the Cooperative Agreements and combined 

separate funding streams to states into a single grant.112 The EMPG 

was less prescriptive than its predecessor. FEMA required states to 

develop a tailored preparedness baseline that matched the Capability 

Assessment for Readiness, and to resume quarterly financial reporting. 

As long as expenditures addressed state needs identified in the 

assessment and supported FEMA’s strategic plan and annual goals and 

objectives, states had the authority to use funding, as they considered 

appropriate. The amount of EMPG funds allocated to the states was 

based on a share of all program funds that were included in the grants, 

a population factor, and the gradual incorporation of a 50 percent 

federal-state match requirement. Administration of this grant 

transferred to ODP in FY 2005. 

 

111 Other programs consolidated under these agreements included the Mitigation Assistance Program, Hurricane 

Program, and State Hazard Mitigation Program in 1997; Earthquake Program, Pre-Disaster Mitigation, and Flood 

Mitigation Assistance in 1998; and the National Dam Safety Program in 1999. 

112 The programs consolidated into the EMPG were State and Local Assistance, Superfund Amendment and 

Reauthorization Act Title III, Mitigation Assistance Program (which included the Earthquake and Hurricane 

Preparedness programs), Anti-Terrorism Training, Disaster Preparedness Improvement Grant, and the state 

administration portion of Project Impact. Programs that were funded under separate authorities were left out of the 

EMPG and became separate Cooperative Agreements, i.e., Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, 

Community Assistance Program – State Support Services Element, and Flood Mitigation Assistance. 
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Overall, federal funding for all-hazards preparedness grants has decreased. 

Between FY 2000 and FY 2005, EMPG funds increased noticeably, with a 

slight decrease in FY 2002, a marked jump in FY 2003, and a plateau in FY 

2005. The following chart demonstrates the increase in EMPG funding for 

the three states affected by Hurricane Katrina. Some states were challenged to 

obtain EMPG funds under the 50 percent match requirement, considering that 

some programs included in the EMPG had been previously provided at 100 

percent federal funding. 

FEMA and State Combined Non-Terrorism EMPG Funding Totals*

$0

$1,000,000

$2,000,000

$3,000,000

$4,000,000

$5,000,000

$6,000,000

$7,000,000

Alabama $4,007,558 $4,090,324 $4,063,018 $5,505,728 $5,784,616 $5,793,236 

Louisiana $4,006,278 $4,073,125 $4,045,525 $5,502,520 $5,781,854 $5,790,470 

Mississippi $3,106,095 $3,164,341 $3,121,300 $4,411,320 $4,637,632 $4,644,542 

FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

* For FY 2000 through FY 2002, Non-Terrorism and Terrorism EMPG funds were allocated 

separately due to separate funding authorizations. 

Even though there were reporting requirements and accountability 

mechanisms for EMPGs, FEMA was limited in its ability to prioritize or 

direct state activities. In practice, EMPGs required states to report to FEMA 

regions on their annual plans and performance objectives, but EMPG 

authorization language did not enable FEMA regions to influence changes to 

the plans or use of funds. Additionally, according to FEMA headquarters and 

regional officials, EMPG reporting mechanisms were inconsistent and lacked 

quantitative performance measures. 
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FEMA Region IV and VI and ODP officials assert that EMPGs provide 

limited assistance and fund only basic operational costs such as salaries and 

overhead, both at the state and local levels. State emergency management 

agencies in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana reported distributing a 

significant portion of their EMPG funds to local emergency managers for 

county and parish preparedness activities, with the remainder used for state 

salaries and overhead. States use little EMPG funding to undertake specific 

natural hazards preparedness activities such as catastrophic planning. 

According to state officials, EMPG does not provide enough funds to conduct 

as many activities – exercises, conferences, training sessions, and other events 

– as states would need to be sufficiently prepared for disasters. In fact, 

officials from the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness said that EMPG funds are closer to half of what is required. The 

remaining amount is either provided by the state, or unfunded. 

When the EMPG program transferred to ODP, FEMA ceased providing 

financial assistance to states for natural hazards preparedness activities. The 

program and its predecessors had been the exclusive mechanism for FEMA to 

provide such assistance. FEMA was no longer able to influence state 

activities tied to the grant funding, including state training, planning, and 

exercises. FEMA lost its direct preparedness relationship with the state 

emergency management agencies. By the time FEMA begins joint operations 

with the state under a federally declared disaster, preparedness activities will 

have given way to immediate response and recovery needs. FEMA’s 

relationship with state agencies for natural hazards preparedness is no longer 

structural but ad hoc. 

FEMA has limited visibility and no required evaluation of the states’ overall 

preparedness goals or their day-to-day activities. There is no formal 

mechanism for FEMA regional personnel to provide feedback on both the 

development of EMPG guidance and the use of EMPG funds, which distances 

FEMA from state activities. At the federal headquarters level, ODP writes 

EMPG annual guidance without the input of FEMA employees experienced in 

natural hazards preparedness. 

Nevertheless, ODP and states have invited FEMA to continue its involvement 

in some informal ways. At the regional level, ODP established a system of 

preparedness officers that roughly parallels FEMA’s regional structure. ODP 

regional staff make efforts to include FEMA in state EMPG evaluation and 

reporting systems. In addition, state officials at the Alabama, Mississippi, and 

Louisiana emergency management agencies have worked to maintain a 
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relationship with FEMA by including it in their activities. For example, 

natural hazards program managers at the state level invite FEMA regional 

personnel to conferences and state and local exercises. However, because 

FEMA is no longer funded to oversee grant-related activities, staff in both 

Regions IV and VI said they depended on diverting travel funds to participate, 

which were not readily available. 

Even though federal funding for all-hazards preparedness has not decreased, 

there is a perception among states that DHS favors terrorism preparedness 

because of the less prescriptive grant mechanism, FEMA’s discontinued 

administration of these grants, and the expansion of terrorism preparedness 

grants. While ODP officials state that they have adopted a multi-hazard or 

capabilities-based approach to domestic preparedness, the majority of 

preparedness grants are reserved for terrorism-related activities. In addition to 

EMPG, ODP distributes funds through the State Homeland Security Program, 

the Urban Area Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement Terrorism 

Prevention Program, which focus on improving state and local terrorism 

preparedness. 

Recent analysis from the Government Accountability Office demonstrates that 

legislative language directed ODP to emphasize funding for terrorism 

programs, potentially at the expense of funding for natural hazards 

preparedness, or even all-hazards. In FY 2005, almost three out of every four 

grant dollars provided to state and local governments were for three primary 

programs with an explicit focus on terrorism. 
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Emergency 

Management 

Performance Grant

5%

Urban Area Security 

Initiative

26%

Other Grants

2%

Assistance to 

Firefighters Grant

21%

State Homeland 

Security Grant 

Program

34%

Law Enforcement 

Terrorism 

Prevention Program

12%

Terrorism

Most FY 2005 DHS Grant Funding for First Responders Focuses on Terrorism

Source: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazard Capabilities Continue to 

Evolve, GAO-05-652, July 2005. 

Moreover, unlike the very flexible EMPG block grants, ODP’s terrorismoriented programs contain stringent requirements for how funds can be spent. 

As a result of state efforts to comply with such requirements in order to 

receive funding, state officials experienced ODP’s “multi-hazard approach” as 

a shift towards terrorism preparedness, at the expense of natural hazards. 

Organizational Staffing Requires Better Management 

While Hurricane Katrina highlighted weaknesses in FEMA’s ability to staff 

catastrophic events, FEMA confronts staffing challenges on a day-to-day 

basis. Frequent reorganizations, chronic vacancies, the use of temporary staff 

in permanent positions, and fragmented human resources management limit 

FEMA’s ability to hire and retain sufficient staff. 

FEMA has reorganized its divisions and offices more than five times since 

1995.113 Though some divisions within FEMA have created organizational 

charts, FEMA has not created a chart for its current organization. FEMA’s 

 

113 See Appendix Q for an overview of FEMA’s reorganizations over the past ten years. 
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transient structure disrupts working relationships as staff counterparts alter 

roles. It also creates the opportunity for increased turnover as staff adjusts to 

changing duties and accountability structures. In addition, the reorganizations 

caused FEMA offices to delay hiring while position needs were determined. 

While interviews suggest that low staffing levels might be a chronic and 

worsening condition, we could not ascertain the extent of changes in vacant 

positions, because staffing baselines have only been recorded since 

January 2005. The lack of organizational charts and workforce plans 

compounded the issue. According to FEMA, approximately 20 percent of 

FEMA positions are not filled with permanent full-time staff. A July 2004 

report from the Office of Personnel Management determined that FEMA 

Disaster Temporary Employees, COREs, and DAEs are at times unavailable 

to provide surge capacity during a disaster response because they are being 

used in permanent roles. 

Vacancies existed for many years but have increased since FEMA’s 

incorporation into DHS. For example, FEMA’s Response Division had over 

100 vacancies as of June 2005. In contrast, based on budgeted staffing levels, 

FEMA’s staffing levels have remained relatively constant. However, these 

numbers are misleading because they do not reflect funds set aside to support 

DHS programs (3 percent of FEMA’s budget) or the number of positions 

Human Resources deliberately leaves unfilled because of budget constraints 

(15 percent of FEMA positions). 

Negative effects from FEMA’s understaffing include decreased morale and 

inadequate succession planning. The remaining FEMA staff is overworked, 

often performing multiple duties and working with few days off during 

disaster responses. The annual Office of Personnel Management reports on 

morale indicate that FEMA has one of the lowest levels in the federal 

government.114 Also, because hiring is restricted, FEMA staff said they rely 

on retirements and departures to open up positions for new hiring. But 

waiting for such vacancies to occur does not allow FEMA to prioritize hiring 

positions based on need. In addition, many FEMA headquarters and FEMA 

field personnel told us that they will not continue to work for the agency or 

 

114 In 2003, FEMA was ranked the worst place to work in Federal government by its own employees in the Office of 

Personnel Management surveys analyzed by the Partnership for Public Service. In 2005, FEMA was ranked at this level, 

as it was no longer a cabinet-level agency, but remained tied for last place among many others. See Best Places to Work, 

2005. Partnership for Public Service, viewed at http://www.ourpublicservice.org/usr_doc/Subcomponent_Rankings.pdf

Compare with Best Places to Work, 2003. Partnership for Public Service, viewed at 

http://www.ourpublicservice.org/usr_doc/2003-Rankings.pdf 
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will retire as soon as they are eligible. The negative media portrayals of 

FEMA’s efforts in response to Hurricane Katrina and the staff’s perceived 

lack of confidence by DHS’ Secretary have also contributed to low morale. 

FEMA does have significant vacancies in higher-level positions. For 

example, within the Preparedness Division, half of the Senior Executive 

Service and GS-15 positions were vacant during our review. Vacancies at 

higher levels not only decrease institutional knowledge, but also disrupt 

divisions as acting managers often perform two jobs, and postpone less 

immediate concerns such as planning and training. 

Despite Expanded Training Delivery, Some FEMA Training Needs Are 

Unmet 

FEMA provides regular training for emergency responders at the federal, 

state, and local levels, manages the training and development of FEMA 

employees internally, and provides disaster-specific training through the 

Disaster Field Training Operations cadre. FEMA’s Training Division 

increased the size and number of classes it delivered, even as budgets 

decreased. Courses provided by the Emergency Management Institute are one 

of FEMA’s primary interactions with state and local emergency managers and 

responders. However, employee development lacks the resources and 

organizational alignment to improve performance. 

FEMA Training for Emergency Responders Has Increased

FEMA’s Training Division provides instruction through four venues: the 

Emergency Management Institute, part of the National Emergency Training 

Center located in Emmitsburg, Maryland; the Noble Training Center for 

public health in Anniston, Alabama; at field locations and conferences; and 

distance learning via independent study courses. The number of Emergency 

Management Institute enrollees has increased significantly over the past ten 

years, even as institute staff decreased. Since 1995, resident enrollments 

tripled and use of FEMA’s independent study courses increased 30 times over, 

largely due to internet enrollments. Students complete over 1 million courses 

each year. 

While the vast majority of those are NIMS and ICS courses, the use of 

hurricane-specific and general emergency management courses has increased 
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as well. FEMA’s Training Division conducts industry-standard evaluations of 

these courses and can demonstrate student learning in Emergency 

Management Institute classes. However, the ability of the classes to improve 

emergency management during a hurricane is not quantifiable with current 

measurements. Additionally, some older courses, including Community 

Hurricane Preparedness, need to be updated to incorporate evaluations of 

student learning and course effectiveness. 

The Emergency Management Institute conducts an Integrated Emergency 

Management Course that provides small-scale exercises for managers and 

elected officials to learn and rehearse disaster response plans and decisionmaking skills. The Integrated Emergency Management Course can be tailored 

for specific communities. It was provided to New Orleans officials in 2001. 

While the Emergency Management Institute selects applications based on risk, 

prioritization depends on communities and individuals that apply for the 

training. 

Under current authorities and grant program requirements, FEMA does not 

have the ability to impose training requirements on states. When FEMA 

replaced its prescriptive grant programs with EMPG block grants in 2000, 

FEMA decreased its oversight of state training budgets and training 

requirements. The NIMS Integration Center has begun to reestablish 

requirements from FEMA, prescribing NIMS and NRP basic training courses 

for state and local emergency managers and responders. 

FEMA also retains influence over state and local training by supporting 

emergency management certifications, through its own programs and through 

partnerships. It supports the International Association of Emergency 

Managers’ Certified Emergency Manager certification and the Association for 

State Floodplain Managers’ Certified Floodplain Manager program. FEMA’s 

Emergency Management Higher Education Project supported the rapid growth 

of college programs in emergency management from 4 in 1994 to 123 in 

2005. 

FEMA Lacks an Organized System for Employee Development

Several FEMA staff told us that insufficient employee development led to a 

shortage of qualified staff for key positions responding to Hurricane Katrina. 

For example, the NRCC was unable to obtain trained managers and section 

chiefs to man additional shifts, which caused some FEMA employees to work 

long shifts every day without relief. Staff also said that FEMA does not have 
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enough trained and experienced personnel for day-to-day positions supporting 

emergency preparedness and response. 

Under the Chief Human Capital Officers Act, the Office of Personnel 

Management established standards in the human capital assessment and 

accountability framework to ensure that agencies close skill gaps in missioncritical occupations and maintain continuity of effective leadership.115 

According to the standards, FEMA should create individual development 

plans (or a similar process) and maintain accurate information on training 

planned and completed. 

FEMA does not have individual development plans, despite attempts to 

institute such plans in the past. With the exception of training requirements 

for cadres such as the FCOs, FEMA does not have standard requirements for 

pursuing credentials, additional qualifications, or recommended training. 

FEMA’s Employee Development Branch, which provides general 

professional development, does not have authority to set training 

requirements. Overall, FEMA enrollments in professional development 

courses, which include leadership and managerial training, decreased 

significantly in the past ten years. For example, in 2005 only 25 percent of its 

employees were enrolled in such programs when compared to 1995 levels. 

Furthermore, FEMA has no centralized and comprehensive information on 

employee training. FEMA uses several incompatible systems, including 

databases operated by the Employee Development branch, Emergency 

Management Institute, Disaster Field Training Operations cadre, and 

information technology security. Additional classes, including classes 

provided at conferences, classes provided by the state or locals, and leadership 

training courses, are not consistently tracked. FEMA regional training 

managers also maintain records on their own, drawing from each of these 

systems. Not only is this process inefficient and susceptible to error, it 

complicates efforts to monitor employee development of mission-critical 

skills and competencies. 

Recommendation #29: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency create individual development plans (or a 

similar process) and implement a consolidated records system to maintain 

accurate information on training completed. 

 

115 5 U.S.C. §1003(c). 
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FEMA Planning Efforts Were Incomplete and Insufficient 

Other than evacuation plans created under the National Hurricane Program, 

our review demonstrated no FEMA efforts to conduct planning specifically 

for catastrophic natural disasters, and little awareness of the need for 

preparing for them, prior to 2001. Individual officials within FEMA 

promoted catastrophic planning for New Orleans that culminated in the 

Hurricane Pam planning scenario in 2004. Though the Hurricane Pam efforts 

were only partially complete when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, they 

resulted in the draft Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan. FEMA 

is pursuing additional initiatives to increase its catastrophic planning. 

The National Hurricane Program: An Effective Tool

The National Hurricane Program, which has several components, is FEMA’s 

most comprehensive hurricane preparedness tool. The current National 

Hurricane Program budget is $2.9 million, with $1.8 million used for the 

Hurricane Evacuation Study Program.116 The purpose of the Hurricane 

Evacuation Study is to inform emergency managers about factors affecting 

hurricane evacuation planning and decision-making, and to provide skills and 

training aids for public education. FEMA, along with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 

developed the Hurricane Evacuation Study, which includes analyses of 

hazards, vulnerability, behavior, shelter, and transportation for a given state. 

The Hurricane Evacuation Study also involves an effort to coordinate 

evacuations between states, resolving issues such as exit routes that cross over 

state borders and sheltering in another state. After a hurricane, the Hurricane 

Evacuation Study develops a post-storm assessment, which it uses to guide 

future program goals and initiatives. These assessments contain 

recommendations for program improvement and identify areas to focus 

preparedness and response efforts. 

Although the National Hurricane Program has had a steady budget for the 

Hurricane Evacuation Study, because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 

budget for this program is decreasing, the program is required to do more with 

the funding FEMA provides. National Hurricane Program personnel told us 

that updating states’ studies are difficult because the budget is limited and 

conducting the studies requires an extensive amount of time. The Hurricane 

 

116The remaining $1.1 million is used for other mitigation activities, such as developing building codes for coastal 

construction. 
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Evacuation Study must be updated as populations shift and geographical 

changes alter the supporting assessments and analyses. Therefore, the 22 

states and island territories covered under the Hurricane Evacuation Study 

take turns having their studies conducted. 

Over the past ten years, the National Hurricane Program has conducted 

several studies in the Gulf Coast region. Alabama had its Hurricane 

Evacuation Study completed in 2001, Mississippi’s was completed in 2002, 

and Louisiana’s study was in progress during the 2005 hurricane season. 

Louisiana and Mississippi had a joint Hurricane Evacuation Study done in 

order to model traffic congestion, shelter demand, and to review existing 

traffic plans for major evacuation routes between the two states. 

In addition to the Hurricane Evacuation Study, the National Hurricane 

Program maintains a number of decision assistance tools including software 

packages to assist state and local officials in hurricane prone regions decide 

when to evacuate. The software is used in conjunction with the Hurricane 

Evacuation Study, which provides evacuation timetables to assist states with 

estimating how long an evacuation might take. 

FEMA’s Catastrophic Planning Efforts Were Incomplete

There were no FEMA efforts to conduct planning specifically for catastrophic 

incidents, and little awareness of the need for preparing for them prior to 

2001. In 2001, FEMA categorized a major hurricane striking New Orleans as 

among the three most likely catastrophic disaster events to occur within the 

United States. After 2001, FEMA staff attempted catastrophic planning but 

staff comments and supporting documents point to inadequate funds to 

complete such plans. Beyond the overarching strategy compiled in the 

Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP, FEMA has not developed final, 

incident-specific catastrophic plans for functional responses to disasters. 

New Orleans Planning Project

In 2001, FEMA’s Director requested that its Region VI and Louisiana develop 

a proposal for a hurricane-planning project. Louisiana’s Office of Emergency 

Preparedness, FEMA, and representatives from the New Orleans district of the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jointly developed a proposal and scope of 

work. FEMA awarded a contract for $99,000 to URS Corporation to conduct 

information collection on the development of a Southeastern Louisiana 

Catastrophic Disaster Plan. URS Corporation was to collect all existing plans, 
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maps, infrastructure information, meteorological information, and other 

preliminary information regarding New Orleans’ hurricane threat. URS 

Corporation produced a report on decision-making and sheltering, which 

FEMA later provided to IEM, Inc. for use in developing the 2004–2005 

Hurricane Pam catastrophic planning session. 

New Orleans Among Overall Catastrophic Planning Efforts

In 2003, several catastrophic planning projects within FEMA as well as 

among coordinating agencies were either underway or had been proposed. A 

draft November 2003 FEMA document lists 22 such projects, 7 of which were 

catastrophic hurricane projects involving New Orleans. FEMA had either 

lead or joint responsibility for 17 projects.117 Several documents from these 

projects were in draft form at the time Hurricane Katrina struck. 

Also in FY 2003, FEMA’s Response Division developed a five-year strategy 

for catastrophic planning in the highest risk communities across the country. 

The strategy called for FEMA to engage in state, local, and regional-based 

planning initiatives involving multiple agencies at all levels of government. 

The strategy was submitted in the FY 2005 budget request from FEMA to 

DHS for a funding increase of $4.5 million to develop catastrophic disaster 

response plans at the federal level, in partnership with state and local 

governments, for five of the nation’s highest-risk communities, and to 

establish catastrophic planning templates adaptable to other U.S. 

communities.118 However, the additional funding was not approved. 

In 2004, Louisiana’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness briefed a senior administration official on catastrophic planning. 

This official insisted that the State of Louisiana work with FEMA to develop a 

catastrophic plan for New Orleans. However, as FEMA had not received 

additional funding for the project, it secured funds by making cuts to other 

programs. 

Design and planning for the Louisiana catastrophic hurricane-planning event 

began in March 2004. The project was based on a scenario that assisted 

Louisiana and its 13 southernmost parishes to develop a response and 

 

117The other projects included four national catastrophic planning projects; three catastrophic housing activities; three 

Texas hurricane projects; one catastrophic New Madrid fault earthquake project; one catastrophic Miami hurricane; and 

more peripheral but related activities. 

118 DHS EP&R, “Justification of FY 2005 Over Target Requests,” July 25, 2003. 
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recovery plan for a major hurricane that floods New Orleans and the 

surrounding parishes, and to identify any issues that could not be resolved 

based on current capabilities. It was the only ongoing catastrophic planning 

effort for the region when Hurricane Katrina occurred; however, the plan 

resulting from this scenario was in draft form at that time. 

Planning sessions were built upon an initial scenario named “Hurricane Pam” 

that was conducted from July 16 – 23, 2004. It involved over 350 participants 

from more than 15 federal agencies, 30 Louisiana state agencies and 13 

parishes, FEMA headquarters, FEMA Regions I, II, IV, and VI, the Louisiana 

Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the State of 

Mississippi, the State of Arkansas, and numerous voluntary agencies. The 

weather scenario, designed by the National Weather Service, involved a slow 

moving Category 3 hurricane, sustaining 120 mph winds at landfall in 

Louisiana. IEM, Inc., a contractor hired in May 2004, provided planning 

session support. The first two days of the exercise were devoted to prelandfall planning and achieved the following objectives: 

• Validation of existing local, state, regional, and headquarters plans, 

recommendation of changes needed, and consolidation into a single 

joint master plan; 

• Identification of potentially available existing teams and resources and 

where, when, and how they will be alerted, activated, and deployed; 

• Identification of new plans, checklists, and decision and action points 

that need to be developed and documented; 

• Identification of any inconsistencies or conflicts between state, 

regional, and national plans and recommendations of changes to 

resolve discrepancies; 

• Objectives with specific emphasis on search and rescue, temporary 

medical care, sheltering, temporary housing, schools, and debris; and, 

• Objectives with specific emphasis on other action topics selected 

during the exercise, including hazardous materials; dewatering of 

levee-enclosed areas; billeting of federal response personnel; 

donations management and volunteer resources; distribution of ice, 

water, and power; public information; transition from rescue to 

temporary housing; and reentry and access control. 

The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, which included 15 

specific areas of focus, was a major output of these planning sessions. 

Beyond the four Hurricane Pam sessions, however, no catastrophic planning 
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events reached fruition. According to FEMA officials, the major challenge in 

conducting catastrophic planning was a lack of funding. There were three 

follow-up planning sessions after the initial event, which focused on 

sheltering, temporary housing, and temporary medical issues with the last one 

held in August 2005. The follow up sessions were significantly delayed after 

the initial Pam exercise due to difficulties in obtaining funding. 

The original proposals for the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Plan included 

a second series of planning sessions, Pam II, which was originally scheduled 

for April 2005. Pam II was intended to cover additional subject areas, 

including transportation, communications, feeding, security, external affairs 

and public relations, financial, personal records, and missing persons/family 

reunification. The areas of focus proposed for Pam II were not only essential 

issues, as demonstrated by problems that emerged after Hurricane Katrina, but 

they were problems for which little to no planning had been conducted. 

FEMA leadership never approved funding for Pam II. In total, FEMA spent 

$1.5 million on the Hurricane Pam planning scenario and all additional 

sessions. 

In addition to Hurricane Pam, there have been at least a few initiatives to 

conduct additional catastrophic planning. During the 2004 hurricane season, 

FEMA requested funding from the disaster supplemental funds for several 

initiatives. FEMA’s Response Division initially requested $20 million from 

these funds to create ten catastrophic plans, including completion of the New 

Orleans plan. The funding was intended primarily for contract support of 

state and local efforts, as well as to fund federal, state, and local travel. 

FEMA issued a draft “Strategy for Catastrophic Incident Planning” for FY 

2005 – FY 2009 in early 2005, which is designed to establish “a 

comprehensive and aggressive set of unified goals and objectives” and to 

provide “a baseline against which to identify, validate, align, and prioritize 

necessary capability-building initiatives” to meet the challenges posed by an 

incident of catastrophic magnitude.119 However, this document has not been 

finalized or distributed, and thus does not provide much-needed guidance on 

the conduct and purpose of catastrophic planning initiatives. 

Also in 2005, FEMA introduced seven Disaster Support Initiatives, one of 

which focuses on catastrophic planning and exercises. The catastrophic 

planning initiative proposes 16 projects to be implemented in FY 2005 and 

 

119 DRAFT Strategy for Catastrophic Incident Planning, FY 2005–FY 2009 (DHS-FEMA-0079-0000403–0000417). 
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FY 2006. According to the project’s abstract, the catastrophic planning 

initiatives address five concerns: (1) improving local response and recovery 

planning in high-risk localities; (2) improving mass care capabilities; (3) 

improving catastrophic temporary housing capabilities, (4) improving 

decontamination capabilities; and (5) expanding logistical support capabilities. 

FEMA resubmitted the catastrophic planning initiative to the Office of 

Management and Budget for approval in October 2005. Also in 2005, the 

Response Division received supplemental funding which provided $160,000 

to complete the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Planning Project Initiative, 

plus $60,000 for federal and state travel to two Louisiana workshops. 

Recommendation #30: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency finalize and distribute the Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, using the lessons learned during 

Hurricane Katrina to improve the plan. 

Recommendation #31: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency request appropriation or provide other 

funding, resources, and institutional support to agency components and to 

state and local partners to complete draft or proposed catastrophic planning 

initiatives for natural disasters. 

Long-term Deterioration in FEMA’s Exercise Program 

Emergency management exercises are developed to test and validate existing 

programs, policies, plans, and procedures to address a wide range of disasters 

to which FEMA must respond. There are numerous types of exercises, 

ranging from tabletop exercises where participants discuss actions and 

responses; to command post exercises, where specific aspects of a situation 

are exercised; to large-scale exercises, which involve multiple entities and a 

significant planned event with activation of personnel and resources. In 1998, 

FEMA ceased conducting large-scale exercises, and its exercise program has 

gradually deteriorated in authority, staff, and budgetary resources. Further, 

FEMA no longer has a significant role in the development, scope, and conduct 

of state exercises, though FEMA personnel maintain a presence at state 

events. FEMA participates in exercises administered by other agencies, 

including DHS’ ODP and the Department of Defense, but these exercises limit 

FEMA’s ability to choose which plans, objectives, and relationships to test. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Until 1993, FEMA had one branch dedicated to planning, preparing, and 

directing exercises. After Hurricane Andrew, a reorganization dispersed 

exercise personnel throughout FEMA; and following additional 

reorganizations, only one section retained a focus on exercises. Currently, the 

All Hazards Exercise Section in FEMA’s Preparedness Division120 has one 

staff member working on exercise planning and development. Compounding 

the decline in staff, over the past ten years, FEMA’s exercises budget 

decreased by more than 90 percent to less than $200,000. This funding leaves 

FEMA unable to conduct a large-scale catastrophic event exercise, which 

costs between $500,000 and $1 million. The decline in budget highlights the 

diminished focus on exercises in particular and natural hazards preparedness 

in general.121 

FEMA Preparedness Division Exercises Budget Request

$287

$196

$687

$241

$466

$836

$707.50

$2,000

$1,598

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Dollars in thousands

Further, there is now no clear “owner” within FEMA with the authority to 

plan and implement exercises and induce the participation of the other FEMA 

 

120 FEMA’s Preparedness Division remained intact at the time of Hurricane Katrina, and is therefore referred to as such 

in this report. The Division has begun the Second Stage Review transformation into the Preparedness Directorate 

directly under the Secretary of Homeland Security, outside of FEMA. 

121 Each of FEMA’s programs, such as the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program and the Chemical Stockpile 

Emergency Preparedness Program, has its own required exercises run by program personnel. There are no required 

natural disaster exercises. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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divisions. While an interoffice memorandum designates the Preparedness 

Division’s All Hazards Exercise Section as the “executive agent within FEMA 

for all exercise matters,” there does not appear to be any coordination between 

divisions for exercises, giving the designation little real effect.122 For 

example, staff said that the Response Division did not inform the All Hazards 

Exercise Section of the Hurricane Pam planning exercise until the planning 

scenario was already taking place. While the Hurricane Pam planning 

scenario is not a typical test and validation exercise, it is significant that 

FEMA Response Division staff did not tap Preparedness Division experience 

in developing the scenario. Similarly, exercise staff have developed scenarios 

but been unable to solicit participation from the Response and Recovery 

Divisions. Now, with the Second Stage Review reorganization of DHS, 

FEMA’s exercise staff may move to the new Preparedness Directorate, 

leaving FEMA’s role undefined. 

FEMA No Longer Conducts Catastrophic Natural Disaster Exercises on 

a National Level

Between 1995 and 1998, FEMA conducted several large-scale natural event 

exercises, targeting different areas threatened by natural disasters such as 

hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods. In 1998, FEMA leadership determined 

that FEMA exercises would focus on tabletop rather than full-scale exercises. 

Staff in the Response Division questioned the need for expensive full-scale 

exercises, and instead believed small-scale exercises with fewer participants 

and objectives would be more useful. 

Now that FEMA does not conduct its own catastrophic natural disaster 

exercises, it partners with exercise conductors. For example, FEMA 

participates in exercises run by the Department of Defense, jointly developing 

scenarios in order to test Defense and FEMA objectives. When FEMA 

collaborates with the Department of Defense, there is usually at least one 

terrorist or weapon of mass destruction event occurring at the same time as a 

hurricane or other natural disaster event.123 FEMA is on a two-year staggered 

cycle of exercise planning and conduct, meaning that the agency plans one 

exercise while another is in more advanced stages, and continues in this way. 

 

122 There is currently a draft exercise policy, but it has been on hold through the 2005 hurricane season as FEMA 

personnel have been responding to events, such as Katrina. Compounding this have been personnel changes within 

FEMA’s Preparedness Division (it has been without a Director for one year), and the shift to the Second Stage Review 

reorganization. 

123 The scenario for Unified Defense ’04 was the release of a dirty bomb at the same time that a hurricane strikes the 

south coast of Texas. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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The difficulty with FEMA’s “piggybacking” exercise strategy is that FEMA 

must wrap its objectives around an exercise that it is able to participate in, as 

opposed to creating an exercise around the objectives it seeks to test. A set of 

general objectives has been developed by the All Hazards Exercise Section as 

a foundation for FEMA participation in national-level exercises. We note 

very little specificity regarding the plans, procedures, and scenarios FEMA 

seeks to test. 

Diminished FEMA Role in State Exercises

FEMA regional officials built relationships with state and local officials 

through exercises, grants for exercises, and other preparedness efforts. With 

changes in grant management including its transfer to ODP, FEMA no longer 

has a significant role in the development, scope, and conduct of state 

exercises, though FEMA personnel maintain a presence at state events. 

Without this mechanism, FEMA regional personnel said they are struggling to 

maintain relationships with the states to support future responses. 

Under its system of grant management in the late 1990s, FEMA required 

states to participate in a four-year exercise cycle. During the first three years, 

states tested their response to a natural disaster, a technological disaster, and a 

national security event. States chose their own scenarios in the fourth year 

according to risks faced. However, FEMA’s consolidation of EMPG in 2000 

eliminated the state exercise cycle requirement. In spring 2004, ODP 

assumed FEMA’s former responsibility for the development and distribution 

of the all hazards exercise schedule, a monthly, yearly, and tri-yearly schedule 

of all planned exercises in the country. This reduced FEMA’s association 

with another aspect of state exercises. Finally, with the transfer of 

preparedness grants to ODP in FY 2005, responsibility and authority for the 

funding and oversight of exercise requirements moved as well, and FEMA 

could no longer require states to conduct exercises it deemed necessary or 

appropriate for preparedness. Because ODP provides grant funding, states 

seek ODP guidance on exercise requirements, where they once turned to 

FEMA. Nearly all DHS first responder grants provide funds for states to 

conduct exercises for terrorist and weapons of mass destruction scenarios. 

While FEMA does not have control or influence over state exercises, FEMA 

regional personnel participate in the state exercises in a variety of roles. In 

Regions IV and VI, a FEMA regional representative is present at most major 

state exercises as a participant, evaluator, or observer. Regional personnel 

told us relationships are developed through participation and coordination, 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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which are invaluable during actual responses. FEMA personnel in both 

Region IV and VI said that a lack of travel funds, however, has prevented 

them from participating in state-run exercises sufficient to sustain the 

relationships they believe are vital to the conduct of emergency management 

and response. What travel funds they do have are earmarked for specific 

programs, such as the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program. 

Exercise is one component of preparedness that has been allowed to atrophy 

over the past decade. While augmenting FEMA’s exercise capabilities will 

not immediately enhance its ability to respond and prepare for natural 

disasters, it is one of the best ways to determine the appropriateness of 

policies, plans, and procedures, and alert FEMA to the circumstances and 

situations for which it is not prepared. 

Recommendation #32: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency and Under Secretary for Preparedness 

jointly develop a formal mechanism to ensure continuity between 

preparedness, response, and recovery by including FEMA regional staff in the 

Preparedness Directorate’s relationships with state emergency management 

agencies for grants, exercises, planning, technical assistance, and training. 

FEMA Should Strengthen Remediation Measures for Lessons Learned 

Some of FEMA’s difficulties during the response to Hurricane Katrina were 

first observed during previous disasters and exercises. After Action Reports, 

facilitator-led discussions (hotwashes), and third party reviews resulted in 

recommendations and “lessons learned.” However, changes for corrective 

action were not tracked or implemented to prevent problems and issues from 

recurring. After several unsuccessful attempts at tracking lessons learned, 

FEMA began using RAMP in 2003 to consolidate, assign, track, and monitor 

the remediation of issues and the distribution of lessons learned.124 FEMA 

should strengthen RAMP by providing greater management support and by 

requiring interim remediation measures. 

 

124 Another repository of lessons learned is ODP’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing website, which consolidates 

lessons learned in a single site accessible to emergency response providers and homeland security officials throughout 

the country. Unlike FEMA’s RAMP, the Lessons Learned Information Sharing website does not include mechanisms 

for pushing new lessons to designated staff or for monitoring the implementation of recommendations. It serves as an 

“information clearinghouse” rather than a remediation tool. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Following are some examples of issues FEMA still needs to remediate: 

• In 2003, Hurricane Isabel demonstrated that FEMA needed a better 

understanding of state capability to respond to a disaster. FEMA 

expected the states affected by Hurricane Isabel to support themselves 

with basic provisions for the first 72 hours, but states required federal 

assistance sooner. In 2003, it was recommended that FEMA 

communicate closely with the states regarding their mutual 

expectations.125 However, in 2005, FEMA remained unable to 

determine the point at which states will become overwhelmed and 

require federal assistance. FEMA’s awareness of state capabilities, 

now based on state self-assessments and a third-party review 

conducted and compiled by a nongovernmental organization, does not 

include 21 states and territories and has no requirement that state 

assessments be kept current. 

• During the Top Officials 2 exercise in 2003, states affected by a 

simulated biological attack requested major disaster declarations under 

the Stafford Act, but FEMA interpreted the biological attack not to be 

within the scope of the Act and ineligible for assistance. During the 

exercise, the Department of Health and Human Services provided 

assistance under its authority, which is less comprehensive than the 

assistance available under the Stafford Act. FEMA did not alter its 

interpretation or seek amendment to the Stafford Act by the time of 

Top Officials 3, in April 2005.126 

• The 2004 hurricanes highlighted that FEMA had insufficient methods 

to track logistics assets. In December 2004, FEMA added improving 

asset visibility as a remedial action in RAMP.127 While FEMA began 

implementing a total asset visibility program in the summer of 2005, 

during Hurricane Katrina FEMA remained unable to track most state 

requests through to order fulfillment. Staff compiled reports manually 

with paper tracking forms and ad hoc spreadsheets. 

FEMA’s RAMP program provides a tool to address these issues. It combines 

the essential components of a lessons learned system to: collect issues from 

hotwashes around the country, consolidate issues into a single report, assign 

responsibility for fixing problems, and monitor the progress of those solutions. 

However, the program does not have consistent high-level oversight or 

 

125 DHS 2003 Performance and Accountability Report, February 13, 2004, p. 170. 126 A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise, Report Number OIG-06-07, November 2005. 127 Special RAMP report from the 2004 hurricane season dated November 29, 2004, issue LG-2 and LG-4. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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support, and it does not have strong mechanisms to ensure completion of 

assigned remediation tasks. The RAMP program manager and remedial 

action managers in each FEMA division perform those tasks as collateral 

duties. The FEMA divisions have authority to reject assigned RAMP tasks 

and to set their own completion date for accepted tasks. While this flexibility 

can be helpful – for example, it allows a division to refuse a new task for a 

problem recently addressed – it also leads to delays. In August 2005, there 

were four action plans overdue and five missed remediation completion dates, 

some older than three months. Monthly RAMP reports did not exist for 

September, October, November, and December 2005, because of the 

increased agency demands due to hurricane response activities. FEMA needs 

to emplace stricter oversight of RAMP task completion. 

A second issue with RAMP is the need for interim solutions when remediation 

plans are long-term. As of December 2005, RAMP contained eight 

outstanding remedial action issues that have a remediation completion date 

greater than one year from the time the issue was assigned. For the RAMP 

action to improve logistics asset visibility, staff revised the completion date 

twice, extending it to October 2009. We observed no interim remediation 

measures in RAMP for these long-term solutions. Since the majority of 

disasters to which FEMA responds recur on a yearly cycle, such as hurricanes, 

long completion dates allow the problems and issues to recur. We recognize 

that particular issues may require long-term remediation plans. However, 

FEMA should implement interim solutions to lessen the impact of known 

problems. 

Recommendation #33: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency oversee the Remedial Action Management 

Program to maintain focus and provide support for corrective action. 

Recommendation #34: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency direct its Remedial Action Management 

Program to identify interim remediation plans for issues that have a 

remediation completion date of greater than one year from the date assigned. 

Future Considerations 

The integration of FEMA, natural hazards preparedness, and disaster response 

and recovery into DHS requires additional work and a level of support not 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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currently demonstrated. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 

terrorism prevention and preparedness overshadowed preparedness for natural 

hazards, both in perception and in application. This has occurred even though 

natural disasters are more frequent and cannot be prevented. An all-hazards 

approach can address preparedness needs common to both types of disasters. 

DHS needs to take a greater role in ensuring that all four phases of emergency 

management – preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation – are 

managed throughout the department on an all-hazards basis. DHS’ leadership 

in these areas will assist in unifying the many DHS components with 

emergency management and response roles into a single, integrated culture 

that can enhance and sustain its all hazards capability. 

Working Toward All-Hazards Preparedness 

The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that DHS’ efforts to protect 

and prepare the nation for terrorist events and natural disasters have not yet 

translated into preparedness for all hazards. State emergency management 

staff we interviewed said the majority of DHS preparedness grants are spent 

on terrorism preparedness, which has not afforded sufficient support or 

funding for natural hazards preparedness. However, a July 2005 Government 

Accountability Office report said that while some DHS grants have 

prescriptive requirements focused on terrorism, most of the grant funding is 

applicable to all-hazards preparedness. Many preparedness measures funded 

by DHS first responder grants can serve both means, and federal and state 

emergency managers need to adopt an all-hazards approach. Second, 

emergency managers need to establish a baseline for preparedness at both the 

state and federal level in order to meet increasing standards of preparedness. 

Directing Preparedness Activities Toward All Hazards

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, “Management of Domestic 

Incidents,” calls for a single national incident management system. Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-8, “National Preparedness,” calls for the 

development of a national preparedness goal. Together these directives form 

the backbone of the National Preparedness System, encompassing seven 

component documents: the NRP, the National Preparedness Goal, the 

National Preparedness Guidance, the 15 Homeland Security Planning 

Scenarios, the Universal Task List, the Target Capabilities List, and NIMS.128 

 

128 The National Preparedness Goal is still in draft form. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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There are differences between responses to terrorist incidents and natural 

disasters such as hurricanes. For example, a response to a weapon of mass 

destruction would require expert assessments, protective gear, and law 

enforcement investigation. However, the incident management techniques 

and resources for terrorist events and natural disasters are more similar than 

different: use of the incident command structure, communications and 

information techniques, applying federal assistance under the Stafford Act. 

The greatest delta is perception. Staff in the Hurricane Katrina affected states 

described a heavy emphasis on terrorism funding and expressed bafflement at 

the lack of natural hazards funding. Few perceived grants as “all-hazard.” 

This perception may be fueled by the fact that all DHS preparedness grants 

are now managed by an entity – ODP – whose mandate was originally 

terrorism preparedness. Additionally, only 2 of the 15 National Planning 

Scenarios, a compilation of potential disasters that ODP developed to support 

preparedness, involve natural disasters (a major hurricane and a major 

earthquake). Though the documents in the National Preparedness System 

address all hazards, the prevalence of terrorism-related items in them fosters a 

perception that the preparedness for and response to a terrorist event is 

different from that of a naturally occurring event. 

Further, requirements associated with federal emergency preparedness grants 

to states also support the perception that terrorism preparedness is separate 

from natural disaster preparedness. A majority of grants to states emphasize 

preparedness for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and limit use of 

the grants to terrorism-preparedness measures, such as the purchase of 

specific personal protective equipment. ODP staff said that state grantees are 

failing to take advantage of the grants’ flexibility and use them for all-hazards 

preparedness measures. State emergency managers questioned grant packages 

that required so much spending on potential events involving terrorism and 

weapons of mass destruction, when they received far less funding to prepare 

for natural disasters that are certain to recur. For example, the Gulf Coast 

region experienced 91 major disaster and emergency declarations from 

September 1, 1995, to September 1, 2005, all due to natural hazards such as 

hurricanes and flooding. Yet a significant portion of the federal funding for 

these states is earmarked for terrorism preparedness to the exclusion of natural 

hazards preparedness. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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DHS Grant Funding for 

Terrorism and All Hazards Preparedness

$538

$918 $1,000 $960

$720

$403

$2,500

$2,925

$2,385

$2,640

$103

$130

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

$3,000

$3,500

$4,000

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006

(proposed)

Grant Funding (in millions)

All hazards Terrorism

Total

$233

Total

$941

Total

$3,418

Total

$3,925

Total

$3,345

Total

$3,360

One official involved in the Hurricane Katrina response added that DHS’ 

preparations for natural hazards should be considered in the same context as 

preparations for National Security Special Events, which are high profile, 

large-scale events that present high-probability targets. National Security 

Special Events, though historically less a cause of loss of life and property 

than natural disasters, receive millions of preparedness dollars. For example, 

for the 2005 Super Bowl in Jacksonville, Florida, overtime costs alone, which 

DHS helped fund, topped $1.5 million. Over 50 state, local, and federal 

agencies including the U.S. Secret Service, FEMA, the U.S. Coast Guard, 

Customs and Border Patrol, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had 

worked for over a year to establish security for the 2006 Super Bowl in 

Detroit, Michigan. 

Preparedness Baseline Needed

Although the seven components of DHS’ National Preparedness System 

establish goals and targets for preparedness, they do not assess current state or 

federal capabilities in terms of plans, equipment, staff, training, and resources. 

FEMA does not currently have a system to determine when a disaster is 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

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beyond the capabilities of state and local governments; and systems to assess 

state capabilities remain unable to determine the point at which the state will 

need federal assistance. Currently, there is no baseline of preparedness for 

either the states or the nation, though there have been several attempts to 

develop baselines. Such assessments are needed to plan response efforts and 

to remediate shortfalls. 

Federal awareness of when an individual state will become overwhelmed and 

require federal support enables preparation and is essential to a rapid and 

seamless response. Differences in state and local capabilities translate into 

differences in the federal response. For example, the state of Florida’s 

response to October 2005’s Hurricane Wilma required significantly less 

federal support than September 2003’s Hurricane Isabel response in North 

Carolina, though Hurricane Wilma far surpassed Hurricane Isabel in strength, 

damage, and mortality. North Carolina required federal commodities right 

away, whereas Florida supplied much of its own commodities and logistics 

management throughout its response to the storm. What is catastrophic for 

one state may not be catastrophic for another. Similarly, unpredictable 

disasters may render an otherwise capable state helpless by destroying 

essential infrastructure, including emergency response commodities. 

Therefore, each state and potentially any disaster may have a different trigger 

at which a state becomes overwhelmed. This prevents the federal government 

from establishing a single, national point – such as after the first 72 hours of a 

disaster – at which the federal government prepares to intervene. 

FEMA has never had an effective system for assessing state readiness or 

determining a standard to which a state must be prepared. Beginning in the 

late 1990s, FEMA used the Capabilities Assessment for Readiness to assess 

state capabilities. Designed jointly by FEMA and the National Emergency 

Management Association, Capabilities Assessment for Readiness required 

states to conduct self-assessments. However, the program had flaws, 

including the short time frame allowed to complete assessments, limited 

empirical data about state capability, insufficient confidence in the validity 

and accuracy of the of the self-assessment process, and a lack of information 

from which to determine how large a disaster each state can handle on its 

own.129 

 

129 FEMA Office of Inspector General, Review of FEMA’s Cooperative Agreement Process, Report #I-01-99, March 

1999. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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In 2002, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program replaced the 

Capabilities Assessment for Readiness for state assessments.130 The 

Emergency Management Accreditation Program is a non-governmental 

association that assesses states’ emergency management capabilities. Like the 

Capabilities Assessment for Readiness, the Emergency Management 

Accreditation Program assessments rely on state self-assessments and do not 

calculate the scale of disaster a state can manage without federal assistance. 

However, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program adds on-site, 

peer-evaluations of state assessments to accredit states on a voluntary basis. 

When the management of emergency management grants transferred from 

FEMA to ODP, FEMA lost its authority to require state assessments and 

validation of them under an accreditation program. In 2005, ODP encouraged 

but did not require states to use Emergency Management Accreditation 

Program assessments. For FY 2006, ODP plans to make grant awards 

contingent on states using an assessment like the Emergency Management 

Accreditation Program, but ODP will not require accreditation. 

FEMA remains involved in the state assessment process because FEMA 

contracts out to the Emergency Management Accreditation Program to 

perform the assessments in the National Emergency Management Baseline 

Capabilities Assurance Program (NEMB-CAP). NEMB-CAP is a one-time 

project to combine Emergency Management Accreditation Program state 

assessments into a national preparedness baseline. Begun in 2003, NEMBCAP did not meet its 2005 completion deadline. If the project is completed, 

the baseline will be difficult to use in comparative analysis because early 

assessments may no longer be current or relevant. Of the 56 states and 

territories eligible for assessment, only 35 (62.5 percent) have completed 

assessments since 2003. The NEMB-CAP results to date show insufficient 

state capabilities, and there does not appear to be a system to address the 

shortfalls. In its most recent progress report, the NEMB-CAP has 

demonstrated that only 2 of the 35 assessed states are fully compliant with the 

Emergency Management Accreditation Program standards. FEMA and ODP 

have not yet determined whether states that scored higher should receive 

additional funds because they spent previous grants effectively, or whether 

states that scored lower should receive additional funds because they have 

greater deficiencies. 

An additional weakness is that NEMB-CAP does not include a federal 

assessment component to determine the readiness of FEMA and other federal 

 

130 Separate Capabilities Assessment for Readiness assessments are still in use for local and tribal governments. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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agencies to support states. NEMB-CAP’s premise is that because the state 

response precedes the federal one, an assessment of the readiness of each state 

provides a baseline of the readiness of the nation. However, Hurricane 

Katrina demonstrated that federal readiness could not be taken for granted. A 

two-tiered state and federal assessment would provide a more realistic and 

“big picture” view of national readiness and allow FEMA to determine areas 

of weakness across all levels of government. 

Recommendation #35: We recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security provide states with 

training on the applicability of the National Preparedness System and 

preparedness grants to all hazards, including natural disasters. 

Recommendation #36: We recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security develop a system to 

assess state capability to respond to a disaster, without federal assistance and 

in respect to a minimum level of preparedness based on the Emergency 

Management Accreditation Program standard. 

Recommendation #37: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a method for determining the level 

of readiness of FEMA to respond to a disaster that exceeds a state’s 

capabilities. 

Developing DHS Culture in Carrying Out Emergency Management 

Responsibilities 

Emergency management refers to the comprehensive approach to preparing 

for, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of emergencies 

and disasters. With the creation of DHS, what was traditionally the 

responsibility of one agency has evolved into a department-wide 

responsibility. DHS is positioned to significantly enhance the nation’s 

emergency management capability. It has more internal resources within one 

department than what existed when FEMA was an independent agency. DHS 

is the executive agent of the NRP and the NIMS. Finally, it is the central 

point of oversight to integrate the four phases of emergency management. 

Many DHS components provide support throughout the emergency 

management phases of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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Page 141 

Under the Federal Response Plan, FEMA was the lead for only 2 of 12 ESFs: 

Information and Planning and US&R. Under the NRP, DHS is either the 

coordinator or has lead responsibilities for 8 of the 15 ESFs.131 In addition to 

the ESFs that FEMA leads, DHS furnishes leadership for ESF-15, External 

Affairs, with its Public Affairs staff, and ESF-2, Communications, with 

National Communications System staff. Several DHS components support 

ESF-13, Public Safety and Security, including the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. 

Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border 

Protection, and Transportation Security Administration. Moreover, of the 57 

federal departments, agencies, and other organizations tasked by FEMA 

(mission assigned) to support the federal or state operation for Hurricane 

Katrina during our review period, 14 were DHS components: 

Responding DHS Components 

Border and Transportation Security 

Citizen and Immigration Services 

Coast Guard 

Customs and Border Protection 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

Federal Protective Service 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

National Communications System 

Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 

Office of the Chief Financial Officer 

Science and Technology Directorate 

Secret Service 

Transportation Security Administration 

In addition, DHS is the central element in identifying Incidents of National 

Significance and coordinating activities in support of other federal 

departments and agencies acting under their own authority. DHS is 

responsible for the establishment and operation of critical coordination and 

operation centers, field office facilities and organizational elements, such as 

the IIMG. DHS’ HSOC continually monitors potential disasters and 

emergencies and provides informational and operational support during 

Incidents of National Significance. Also, DHS is responsible for identifying 

personnel to lead, coordinate, and communicate activities in such critical roles 

as the PFO, the FCO, and the IIMG Director. 

DHS’ emergency response role was further illustrated when then Under 

Secretary for EP&R requested, and the Secretary supported, the use of all 

 

131 See page 31 for a list of ESFs for which DHS is either the coordinator or primary agency under the NRP. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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available DHS employees to respond to the needs of the disaster and reinforce 

the department's all-hazards capabilities. During our field interviews one 

FEMA employee suggested that all DHS employees should be assigned to an 

emergency response function and provided with the necessary training to 

perform that function. The employee also felt that a department-wide 

credentialing program could be used to measure proficiency. 

Finally, DHS’ central role in emergency management is reinforced by the 

changes it has made to assign responsibility for the four phases of emergency 

management (preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation) within the 

department. DHS began transferring preparedness grant and exercise 

responsibilities from FEMA to the Office of State and Local Government 

Coordination in 2004. The Secretary’s Second Stage Review reinforced the 

redistribution by creating a Preparedness Directorate in 2005, with FEMA 

retaining responsibility for response, recovery, and mitigation. Ensuring that 

all four phases of emergency management are working harmoniously is the 

responsibility of the DHS Secretary. 

Merging the preparedness activities within one office allows for departmentwide priority setting of funds and resources that are available for grants, 

training, exercises, equipment, personnel, and other preparedness activities. 

With all of its preparedness activities and resources consolidated, DHS is 

better poised to assist state, local, and tribal entities, and embrace the 

capabilities of the private sector in adopting an all-hazards approach to 

national preparedness. Such an approach considers the risks of not only 

natural and accidental disasters, but also events that result from terrorism. 

DHS' implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 through 

its new Preparedness Directorate requires the department to coordinate the 

development of a national all-hazards preparedness goal that would establish 

measurable readiness priorities and targets that balance the potential threat of 

terrorist attacks and large-scale disasters with the resources required to 

prevent, respond to, and recover from them.132 The consolidated or “one-stop 

shop” nature of these activities diminish the possibility of gaps or duplication 

in allocating funds and resources on a risk-oriented basis. Unlike its previous 

designation where distinct agencies within DHS endeavored to separately 

assist state, local, and tribal governments in preparedness functions, the 

Preparedness Directorate is positioned to effectively target DHS’ cumulative 

 

132 DHS’s Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazard Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652, July 2005, 

available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05652.pdf, p. 2 (accessed on January 10, 2006). 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

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resources, such as grants to urban areas for increased security and assistance 

to firefighters, in an integrated and complementary manner. 

It is critical that DHS develop a culture that maximizes the capabilities of its 

components, personnel, and resources; establishes performance expectations; 

and adequately funds department priorities. To this end, DHS needs to revise 

the NRP during its upcoming scheduled review to aggressively address 

deficiencies; streamline, clarify, and enhance processes, protocols, and 

procedures so as not to delay critical decision-making; and incorporate lessons 

learned from Hurricane Katrina. DHS must also provide the necessary 

emergency management leadership to other federal departments, agencies, and 

other organizations when responding to Incidents of National Significance. 

Recommendation #38: We recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with 

the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, ensure all DHS 

employees receive training on DHS responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. 

Stafford Act Authorities are Sufficient, Long-Term Recovery Issues Need 

to be Addressed 

In general, we determined the authorities of the Stafford Act are adequate to 

deliver the necessary supplemental assistance required after such a 

catastrophic event, subject to funding caps, cost shares, and time limitations. 

However, the Stafford Act specifically limits Department of Defense 

assistance to ten days.133 In statute and federal regulation, which implements 

the Stafford Act, we were not able to establish a provision for an extension of 

time for this assistance.134 Other provisions of Stafford Act assistance contain 

provisions for time extensions, waivers of funding caps, and the ability to 

increase the funding cost share of eligible disaster related costs giving the 

President or his designee the flexibility to provide assistance, based on the 

severity and magnitude of the event. For example, the time limit for 

 

133 According to 44 CFR 206.34, the 10-day limit only applies to instances where FEMA’s Associate Director can direct 

the Department of Defense to utilize its personnel and equipment “during the immediate aftermath of an incident which 

may ultimately qualify for a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency, when threats to life and property 

are present which cannot be effectively dealt with by the State or local governments.” 134 42 U.S.C. §5170b, Essential Assistance, Section 403; and 44 CFR Section 206.34, Request for utilization of 

Department of Defense resources. 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 144 

completing a direct federal assistance mission assignment is 60 days after the 

President’s declaration. 

However, based on extenuating circumstances, or unusual project 

requirements, FEMA may extend this time limitation.135 Additionally, the 

President or his designee can approve up to 100 percent funding of direct 

federal assistance for an extended period of time. For example, in Louisiana, 

direct federal assistance mission assignments are eligible for 100 percent 

funding through and including June 30, 2006. In Mississippi, direct federal 

assistance mission assignments were eligible for 100 percent funding through 

and including March 15, 2006. And, in Alabama, direct federal assistance 

mission assignments were eligible for 100 percent funding for 60-days from 

the date of the major disaster declaration which was August 29, 2005. DHS 

may want to consider whether this limitation has an effect on the overall 

federal response to catastrophic events. 

Congress intended the Stafford Act to provide an orderly and continuing 

means of supplemental assistance by the federal government to state and local 

governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and 

damage which result from declared disasters. The authorities, as applied by 

FEMA, have demonstrated to be dynamic and sufficient in addressing the 

needs of individuals, states, and local governments in most emergency and 

major disaster events declared by the President. As the Stafford Act was 

intended to provide supplemental federal disaster relief and emergency 

assistance, we urge that considerable caution be exercised when 

recommending changes to this authority in light of the flexibility that already 

exists. 

However, we note areas where individual needs have been demonstrated and 

authorities are not provided: (1) the ability to address individual physical loss 

from an event that results in widespread physical catastrophic damages; and 

(2) the ability to address individual economic loss from an event that results in 

widespread economic disruption. 

As previously discussed, FEMA’s IHP has a maximum financial cap of 

$26,200. The program’s direct federal assistance provision may not be 

extended past 18-months after the date of a declared major disaster, except 

when the President extends that period due to extraordinary circumstances that 

would be in the public interest. In events where entire communities have been 

 

135 44 CFR 206.208 (d). 
A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 145 

affected and the vast majority of housing stock destroyed, there is no other 

current mechanism, aside from FEMA’s IHP, for the federal government to 

address individual needs for persons without insurance or persons unable to 

obtain a loan. Congressional consideration may be warranted to better 

position the federal government to address widespread physical catastrophic 

damages and economic loss issues of individuals affected by disasters. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Department did not provide its official comments to our report until after 

the report was signed on March 31, 2006. Although we attached management 

comments, which were dated April 4, 2006, we did not perform an in depth 

analysis of them. We requested the Department to advise us, within 90 days, 

of the actions taken or planned to implement each of our recommendations. 

We consider all 38 recommendations to be unresolved and open. 
Appendix A 

Hurricane Katrina Event Timeline 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 146 

Hurricane Katrina – Storm Track, Key Events and Decisions 

August 24 – September 30, 2005 

Wednesday, August 24, 2005 

0500 

hrs136

• Tropical depression 12 – to become Hurricane Katrina – identified about 270 miles 

ESE of Florida. 

0700 hrs • FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team activated. 

• FEMA Region IV RRCC activated at modified level in Thomasville, GA 

Thursday, August 25, 2005 

0500 hrs • Tropical Storm Katrina is located 90 miles east of Fort Lauderdale, FL 

0700 hrs • FEMA NRCC Red Team activated at modified Level 2 

• FEMA NRCC ESFs 1 (with Air Ops Element), 3, 4, 5, 7, 15, and a Military Liaison 

activated 

1200 hrs • FEMA Region IV RRCC transitioned from Thomasville at Level 3 to Atlanta, GA at 

Level 2; ESFs 1, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, and a Military Liaison activated. 

1530 hrs • Tropical Storm Katrina becomes a hurricane, located 25 miles east of Fort Lauderdale, 

FL 

1830 hrs • Hurricane Katrina makes first landfall in Florida as a Category 1 hurricane. 

Friday, August 26, 2005 

0500 hrs • National Hurricane Center predicts second landfall near the Florida panhandle 

Category 1 storm on August 28 or 29, 2005 

1130 hrs • Hurricane Katrina strengthened to a Category 2 storm; National Hurricane Center 

predicts second landfall near the Florida panhandle as Category 3 storm on 

August 29, 2005. 

1700 hrs • National Hurricane Center advises Hurricane Katrina’s track has shifted significantly to 

the west; predicts second landfall near eastern Louisiana and Mississippi coast 

• Governor of Louisiana declares State of Emergency 

• Alabama Emergency Operations Center activated 

Saturday, August 27, 2005 

0700 hrs • FEMA NRCC activated at Level 1 (24-hour operations) 

• FEMA NRCC ESFs 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and EMAC activated 

0830 hrs • Louisiana Emergency Operations Center activated 

• Governor of Mississippi declares State of Emergency 

• Mississippi Emergency Operations Center activated 

1000 hrs • FEMA Emergency Response Team-Advanced activated; pre-staged at FEMA RRCC 

Region IV in Atlanta, GA 

• FEMA Emergency Response Team-Advanced activated and deployed to Alabama 

Emergency Operations Center 

• FEMA Emergency Response Team-Advanced activated and deployed to Mississippi 

Emergency Operations Center 

 

136 All times are eastern daylight time. 
Appendix A 

Hurricane Katrina Event Timeline

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 147 

1200 hrs • FEMA Region IV RRCC activated at Level 1; all ESFs plus a Military Liaison 

activated 

• FEMA Region VI RRCC activated at Level 1; all ESFs plus a Military Liaison and 

U.S. Coast Guard activated 

• FEMA Emergency Response Team-National activated and deployed to Louisiana 

Emergency Operations Center 

1700 hrs • Contra Flow activated on Mississippi and Louisiana interstate highways 

1944 hrs • Emergency Declaration FEMA–3212–EM–LA issued for Louisiana; FCO–William 

Lokey 

Sunday, August 28, 2005 

• Governor of Alabama declares State of Emergency 

1115 hrs • Emergency Declaration FEMA–3213–EM–MS issued for Mississippi; FCO–William 

Carwile 

by 1700 

hrs 

• Contra Flow deactivated on Mississippi and Louisiana interstate highways 

1830 hrs • Emergency Declaration FEMA–3214–EM–AL issued for Alabama; FCO–Ron 

Sherman 

Monday, August 29, 2005 

0710 hrs • Hurricane Katrina makes second landfall over Southeast Louisiana as a Category 4 

storm 

0921 hrs • First report of levee breaches; City of New Orleans begins to flood 

1448 hrs • Major Disaster Declaration FEMA–1603–DR–LA issued for Louisiana; FCO–William 

Lokey 

• Major Disaster Declaration FEMA–1604–DR–MS issued for Mississippi; FCO–

William Carwile 

2051 hrs • Major Disaster Declaration FEMA–1605–DR–AL issued for Alabama; FCO–Ron 

Sherman 

Tuesday, August 30, 2005 

• DHS’ Secretary, Michael Chertoff, declares Hurricane Katrina an Incident of National 

Significance; Under Secretary for EP&R Michael Brown appointed PFO 

Thursday, September 1, 2005 

• Alabama operations transition to Joint Field Office in Montgomery, AL 

Friday, September 2, 2005 

• Emergency declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – Arkansas, 

Texas 

Monday, September 5, 2005 

• Vice Admiral Thad Allen appointed as Deputy PFO for Hurricane Katrina in New 

Orleans 

• Emergency declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees - Tennessee, 

Georgia, Oklahoma, Florida, West Virginia, North Carolina, Utah, and Colorado 

Tuesday, September 6, 2005 

• Expedited Assistance authorized in the amount of $2,000 for eligible applicants under 

the Individuals and Households Program 
Appendix A 

Hurricane Katrina Event Timeline

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 148 

Wednesday, September 7, 2005 

• Emergency declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – Michigan, the 

District of Columbia, Washington, Oregon, New Mexico, and Illinois 

Friday, September 9, 2005 

• Vice Admiral Thad Allen appointed as PFO for Hurricane Katrina 

Saturday, September 10, 2005 

• Emergency declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – Kentucky, 

Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Alabama, Indiana, 

Iowa 

Monday, September 12, 2005 

• Under Secretary Michael Brown resigns as FEMA’s Director 

• Louisiana operations transition to Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge, LA 

• Emergency declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – Virginia and 

Arizona 

Tuesday, September 13, 2005 

• R. David Paulison appointed as Acting Director of FEMA 

• Emergency declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – Minnesota, 

Nevada, Idaho, Nebraska, Connecticut, North Dakota, California, Wisconsin, Ohio, 

Maryland, Massachusetts, and Montana 

Saturday, September 17, 2005 

• Mississippi operations begin transition to Joint Field Office in Jackson, MS 

Sunday, September 18, 2005 

• Mike Bolch appointed as FCO for Alabama 

Monday, September 19, 2005 

• Joint Field Office in Jackson, MS becomes fully operational 

• Emergency Declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – Rhode Island, 

Maine, New Jersey, and New Hampshire 

Wednesday, September 21, 2005 

• Vice Admiral Thad Allen appointed as FCO in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 

Saturday, September 24, 2005 

0330 hrs • Hurricane Rita makes landfall as Category 3 storm in Texas and Louisiana 

Wednesday, September 28, 2005 

• Transitional Housing Assistance authorized for eligible applicants in the most affected 

areas of Louisiana and Mississippi in the amount of $2,358 for rent without home 

inspection under the Individuals and Households Program 

Friday, September 30, 2005 

• Emergency Declarations issued to support Hurricane Katrina evacuees – New York 

and Delaware 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 149 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs 

FEMA may provide financial assistance and, if necessary, direct services to 

eligible individuals and households who, as a direct result of a major disaster, 

have necessary expenses and serious needs and are unable to meet such 

expenses or needs through other means.137 FEMA is authorized to administer 

four distinct Individual Assistance programs in response to disasters declared 

by the President: (1) Individuals and Households; (2) Crisis Counseling; (3) 

Unemployment Assistance; and, (4) Legal Services. 

Individuals and Households Program

The Individuals and Households Program is FEMA’s primary mechanism to 

assist individuals and households recover from damages or losses sustained as 

a direct result of a disaster, when losses are not covered by insurance and 

property has been damaged or destroyed. Applicants must meet specific 

eligibility criteria to qualify for assistance, and the program is designed to 

assist only with critical expenses that cannot be covered by other means, such 

as loans from the SBA. It does not cover all losses from damage to homes, 

personal property, and household items that result from a disaster and is not 

intended to restore damaged property to its condition before a disaster. 

For Hurricane Katrina, an individual or household could receive a maximum 

of $26,200 of IHP assistance, with repair and replacement assistance capped 

at $5,200 and $10,500 respectively.138 Rental assistance was provided to 

renters whose homes were uninhabitable due to the disaster and to 

homeowners until more permanent repairs could be made to their primary 

residence. The combination of all forms of IHP financial assistance cannot 

exceed the maximum grant of $26,200. 

When housing resources are not available within an affected area to 

accommodate the needs of disaster victims, FEMA is authorized to provide 

direct federal assistance, such as mobile homes and travel trailers, for up to 18 

months following a declared major disaster. Using lessons learned from 

previous disasters, FEMA developed a concept of operations and procurement 

strategy in August 2004 to address direct housing needs associated with 

multiple disasters. The strategy would allow FEMA to: (1) establish a 

temporary housing surge capacity of 2,500 units; (2) establish primary 

 

137 42 U.S.C. §5174 and 44 CFR Part 206, Subparts D and F. 138 The maximum grant amount is adjusted annually to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. See 69 FR 61515 

(October 19, 2004). 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 150 

contractors for installation, maintenance, site inspection of units, and 

deactivation; (3) develop uniform procurement specifications for temporary 

housing units; (4) develop a statement of work for refurbishing and deploying 

units in storage; (5) establish staffing requirements to support field and 

storage operations; and, (6) support shelter operations. 

While supporting 2004 disasters, FEMA began to establish additional 

capability and capacity in its housing unit inventory, and formalized the use of 

Technical Assistance Contractors.139 As of May 2005, FEMA’s existing 

housing inventory was approximately 4,832 mobile homes and travel trailer 

units.140 

As of November 16, 2005, FEMA had received 1,680,516 registrations for 

IHP assistance from residents of the three affected states, determined that 

984,432 (or 59 percent) were eligible, and approved approximately $3.5 

billion in assistance.141 IHP has two major components: Housing Assistance 

and Other Needs Assistance. Housing Assistance is 100 percent federally 

funded and administered and provides assistance for temporary rental 

assistance, home repairs, and home replacement. Other Needs Assistance is a 

cost-shared partnership between FEMA and the states.142 As part of this 

partnership, FEMA and the states engage in annual coordination efforts to 

determine how Other Needs Assistance will be administered for the coming 

year. States may choose to administer the component or to have FEMA 

administer it. For Hurricane Katrina, all three states elected to have FEMA 

administer the program; however, each retained influence over the program by 

determining which household items were eligible for reimbursement. 

Contract inspectors, under FEMA’s Inspections Services Branch, verify 

personal and real property losses and damages of individuals and households 

while FEMA personnel verify reported disaster-related deaths as well as 

medical and dental needs for the IHP. Inspectors visit homes of applicants to 

verify disaster-related damages to real and personal property. Findings are 

uploaded into FEMA’s processing system, the National Emergency 

Management Information System, which in most disasters automatically 

determines eligibility in over 90 percent of cases. FEMA caseworkers process 

all cases that cannot be processed automatically to determine eligibility for 

IHP. 

 

139 Approximately 20,000 temporary housing units were assigned to the field to support FEMA’s Disaster Housing 

Operations mission in 2004. 

140 FEMA Direct Housing 2005 Pre-Hurricane Season Briefing, May 26, 2005. 141 FEMA Data Status Report as of November 16, 2005. 142 Under the other needs assistance component of the IHP, a state must provide a 25 percent match. 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 151 

Crisis Counseling

FEMA provides financial assistance for professional counseling services to 

relieve mental health problems caused or aggravated by a disaster or its 

aftermath. Under the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program 

(Crisis Counseling Program), FEMA provides assistance to states through the 

Immediate Services Program and Regular Services Program. The Immediate 

Services Program affords funding for screening or diagnostic techniques that 

can be applied to meet mental health needs immediately following the 

disaster. The duration of the Immediate Services Program is 60 days from the 

declaration date, with a potential extension of 30 days or more. The Regular 

Services Program generally expands upon the existing Immediate Services 

Program to identify and reach impacted populations more effectively. The 

Regular Services Program funds up to nine months of services from the date 

of the award notice, with potential extensions of up to three months, 

contingent upon the ongoing need. For catastrophic disasters, the Regular 

Services Program often is extended beyond three months. 

The Crisis Counseling Program is intended to supplement – not supplant – a 

state’s mental health program. The program is 100 percent FEMA-funded. 

The Center for Mental Health Services under the U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services consults with state officials and helps ensure that 

appropriate services are provided. Historically, only states receiving a disaster 

declaration were eligible to receive funding for the Crisis Counseling 

Program. Recognizing the special needs resulting from Hurricane Katrina and 

the unprecedented relocation of disaster victims, FEMA, in consultation with 

the Center for Mental Health Services, allowed states to apply for funding 

without a disaster declaration; funding was provided through the existing 

declarations. FEMA monitored applicant registrations from all states and 

when a threshold of 150 was exceeded, FEMA coordinated with the Center 

for Mental Health Services and contacted each State Emergency Management 

Agency and State Mental Health Authority to invite applications for the 

Immediate Services Program. As of November 17, 2005, 35 states and the 

District of Columbia had met the threshold. The Immediate Services Program 

was initiated for 33 states and the District of Columbia; FEMA approved 

$24,423,729 to fund the program.143 

 

143 FEMA Recovery Division, November 17, 2005. Two states decided not to initiate the Immediate Services Program 

because needs were met through existing resources. 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 152 

Disaster Unemployment Assistance

The Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to provide assistance to any unemployed 

individual whose employment or self-employment was interrupted as a direct 

result of a declared disaster and who is not eligible for regular state 

Unemployment Insurance or other supplemental income. The Disaster 

Unemployment Assistance program provides financial assistance until 

applicants resume work or their customary employment, traditionally up to 26 

weeks. Disaster Unemployment Assistance was not designed as an income 

replacement program. The amount of assistance is authorized by a state’s 

regular unemployment program. Through a delegation of authority by FEMA, 

the U.S. Department of Labor oversees and coordinates the program. The 

program is 100 percent FEMA-funded and administered by state agencies 

responsible for providing unemployment services and insurance. 

Eligible applicants received at least the minimum benefit rate, estimated at 

$86 per week in Mississippi, $89 per week in Alabama, and $98 per week in 

Louisiana at the time of Hurricane Katrina.144 Applicants qualifying for the 

maximum amount could receive $210, $220, or $258 per week respectively. 

Gaps may exist between an applicant’s day-to-day living expenses and 

Disaster Unemployment Assistance benefit amounts, which could be 

considerably less than the weekly pay of most. As of September 30, 2005, 

approximately 67,769 claims were received in all three affected states and 

66,806 claims (98.6 percent) were approved, totaling $18,982,565.145 

Hurricane Katrina Disaster Unemployment Assistance 

as of 09/30/05 

State DUA 

Claims 

DUA 

Eligible 

First 

Payments

Amount 

Compensated 

Louisiana 55,950 55,950 55,950 $15,121,129 

Mississippi 10,285 10,238 8,409 $3,788,968 

Alabama 1,534 618 333 $72,468 

Total 67,769 66,806 64,692 $18,982,565

After Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne struck Florida during the 

2004 hurricane season, approximately 14,761 claims were received during a 

comparable period and 12,698 claims (86 percent) were approved, totaling 

$2,489,619. 

 

144 The minimum Disaster Unemployment Assistance benefit amount is based on 50 percent of the average weekly 

benefit amount for regular unemployment insurance within a state. For Hurricane Katrina, the initial minimum amount 

was based upon the average of total unemployment benefits from 04/01/04 to 03/31/05 within each state. 

145 U.S. Department of Labor, data as of September 30, 2005. 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 153 

Disaster Unemployment Assistance for 2004 Hurricanes146

Hurricane DUA 

Claims 

DUA 

Eligible 

First 

Payments

Amount 

Compensated 

Charley 3,283 3,244 1,770 $779,529

Frances 6,888 5,984 2,946 $1,197,349

Ivan 2,811 2,654 1,242 $352,292

Jeanne 1,779 816 342 $160,449

Total 14,761 12,698 6,300 $2,489,619

The higher than average approval rate in the Hurricane Katrina affected states 

may have occurred as a result of the Department of Labor’s decision to extend 

the 21-day filing period for applicants to provide supporting documentation to 

90 days. Due to the widespread evacuation and limited access to appropriate 

documentation, many workers would likely be unable to present 

documentation within 21 days. As of November 17, 2005, FEMA had 

obligated the following funds to three affected states for Disaster 

Unemployment Assistance: Louisiana – $94,402,248; Mississippi – 

$28,400,000; and Alabama – $1,150,000. 

Legal Services

FEMA is authorized by the Stafford Act to provide legal services to help lowincome victims with issues such as landlord and tenant relationships, 

employment, immigration, and insurance provisions. Assistance is also 

available to address issues with credit and bankruptcy, will validity, trusts and 

estates, real property, and powers of attorney. The Disaster Legal Services 

program was implemented for Hurricane Katrina with eligibility criteria used 

in previous disasters. Attorneys work pro bono and FEMA reimburses 

eligible administrative costs through the Young Lawyers Division of the 

American Bar Association. FEMA believes the program is cost effective 

because the work is pro bono and many lawyers, firms, and organizations 

donate legal services outside FEMA programs. Within the affected areas, the 

program was implemented as intended. As of November 23, 2005, legal 

services assistance totaled $21,400.147 

Coordination with Voluntary Organizations

FEMA is authorized by the Stafford Act to coordinate the activities of 

voluntary organizations to the extent that they “agree to cooperate under this 

advice or direction.” Under ESF-6, FEMA exercised its lead responsibility in 

 

146 U.S. Department of Labor, Hurricane Charley data as of September 30, 2004; Hurricane Frances data as of October 

31, 2004; Hurricane Ivan data as of October 31, 2004; and, Hurricane Jeanne data as of November 30, 2004. 

147 FEMA Recovery Division, November 23, 2005. 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 154 

an environment of consensus that allowed the Voluntary Organizations Active 

in Disaster to carry out their missions in a coordinated manner. VOADs 

typically provide immediate emergency assistance to victims while FEMA 

addresses shorter and longer-term recovery needs. Near the end of the 

recovery phase, VOADs address victims’ unmet needs. 

FEMA is required by the Stafford Act to ensure that benefits are not 

duplicated among disaster programs, insurance benefits, or any other types of 

disaster assistance. FEMA traditionally has not considered the assistance of 

voluntary organizations to be duplicative of its assistance programs. For 

example, the Red Cross provides food and water to affected communities 

through fixed feeding sites and emergency response vehicles that canvass 

neighborhoods with hot meals, water, and snacks. These programs are 

separate from any assistance provided by FEMA and other government 

agencies. 

Small Business Administration Loans Address More Permanent Needs

While disaster assistance is available through FEMA’s IHP, most federal 

disaster assistance is provided through loans from SBA, which must be repaid. 

IHP applicants may be required to first seek assistance from SBA before being 

considered for certain types of IHP assistance. 

SBA reviews the income-to-debt ratio of those who apply to determine 

whether applicants are eligible for loans. Based on this information, SBA 

determines whether the applicant has the resources to repay the loan. 

Applicants who cannot afford a loan or do not qualify will be referred back to 

FEMA to determine eligibility for IHP grant assistance. 

Under SBA’s Disaster Loan Program, homeowners may apply for real 

property loans of up to $200,000 to repair or restore a primary residence 

damaged in a declared disaster area to its pre-disaster condition, but may not 

use the funds to upgrade homes or make additions. The loan amount depends 

on the cost of repairing or replacing the home, less any insurance settlements 

or grants. Any proceeds from insurance coverage on the property or home 

would be deducted from the total damage to the property to determine the 

eligible loan amount. 

In addition, renters and homeowners may borrow up to $40,000 in personal 

property loans to repair or replace clothing, furniture, cars, or appliances 

damaged or destroyed in the disaster. For applicants unable to obtain credit 

elsewhere the interest rate does not exceed four percent. For those who can 
Appendix B 

FEMA’s Individual Assistance Programs

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 155 

obtain credit elsewhere, the interest rate is no more than eight percent. The 

SBA offers terms of up to 30 years for repayment, which are determined on a 

case-by-case basis. For Hurricane Katrina, SBA provided the following data 

on loan applications for homeowners and renters. 

SBA Disaster Loan Information by State 

through of 09/30/05 

State Cumulative 

FEMA Referrals 

to SBA

Applications 

Received by 

SBA 

Applications 

Approved by 

SBA

Amount 

Approved by 

SBA 

Mississippi 290,286 10,089 95 $7,661,700 

Alabama 57,876 1,791 43 $1,497,100 

Louisiana 636,050 17,195 136 $5,336,100 

By September 30, 2005, SBA had approved 274 applications for $14,494,900 

in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana; and, by November 23, 2005, had 

approved 8,979 applications for $633,146,300 within the affected states. 
Appendix C 

FEMA’s Public Assistance Program and Eligible Work 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 156 

FEMA’s Public Assistance Program 

FEMA’s Public Assistance program provides supplemental federal disaster 

grants for the repair, replacement, reconstruction, or restoration of disasterdamaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations, and for the reimbursement of eligible emergency related 

activities such as debris removal and emergency protective measures.148 The 

federal share of assistance is at least 75 percent of the eligible cost. The state 

determines how the non-federal share (up to 25 percent) is split among 

applicants; eligible applicants are state agencies, local governments, certain 

private non-profit organizations, and federally recognized Indian tribes or 

tribal organizations.149 

To be eligible for assistance, the work must be required as the result of the 

disaster, be located within the designated disaster area, and be the legal 

responsibility of an eligible applicant. Eligible work is categorized as either 

“emergency work” or “permanent work.” Emergency work is defined as work 

that must be done immediately to save lives and protect improved property 

and public health and safety, or to avert or lessen the threat of a major 

disaster.150 

Emergency Work

Category A: Debris Removal

Clearance of trees and woody debris; building wreckage; sand, mud, silt, 

and gravel; vehicles; and other disaster-related material deposited on 

public and, in very limited cases, private property 

Category B: Emergency Protective Measures

Measures taken before, during, and after a disaster to save lives, protect 

public health and safety, and to protect improved public and private 

property 

 

148 Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended, Sections 403, 406, 407, 418, and 419. 

149 Certain eligible private non-profit organization facilities must be open to the public and perform essential services of 

a governmental nature. 

150 44 CFR §206.201(b) 
Appendix C 

FEMA’s Public Assistance Program and Eligible Work

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 157 

Permanent Work

Category C: Roads and Bridges

Repair of roads, bridges, and associated features, such as shoulders, 

ditches, culverts, lighting and signs 

Category D: Water Control Facilities

Repair of irrigation systems, drainage channels, and pumping facilities. 

Repair of levees, dams, and flood control channels fall under Category D, 

but the eligibility of these facilities is restricted (Permanent repair of Flood 

Control Works is the responsibility of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

and the Natural Resources Conservation Service) 

Category E: Buildings and Equipment

Repair or replacement of buildings, including their contents and systems; 

heavy equipment; and vehicles 

Category F: Utilities

Repair of water treatment and delivery systems; power generation 

facilities and distribution lines; and sewage collection and treatment 

facilities 

Category G: Parks, Recreational Facilities, and Other Items

Repair and restoration of parks, playgrounds, pools, cemeteries, and 

beaches. Also, this category is used for any work or facility that cannot be 

characterized adequately by Categories A-F 

The state serves as the grant administrator for all funds provided under the 

program and also is considered the grantee, which then provides funds to 

subgrantees, such as local governments.151 Small projects, estimated to be 

less than $51,000, are funded based on an approved project cost estimate. 

Large projects, estimated to be $51,000 or more, are funded based upon the 

actual cost of the project. The state or grantee may provide advances or 

progress payments to subgrantees on large projects as work is completed. 

The President’s pre-landfall emergency declarations in Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Alabama authorized federal funds under the Public Assistance program 

for debris removal and emergency protective measures (Categories A and B) 

at 75 percent. Major disaster declarations in all three states on 

 

151Federally recognized tribes and tribal organizations may also be their own grantee if approved by FEMA. 
Appendix C 

FEMA’s Public Assistance Program and Eligible Work

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 158 

August 29, 2005, authorized FEMA to provide Public Assistance for debris 

removal and emergency protective measures at 100 percent federal share for a 

period of up to 72 hours. However, the President amended the cost sharing 

arrangements two days later and authorized funding for debris removal and 

emergency protective measures at 100 percent of total eligible costs for a 

60-day period, retroactive to August 29, 2005. The vast majority of work 

requested by the affected states as of October 1, 2005, was for emergency 

protective measures and debris removal. As of October 1, 2005, FEMA had 

received a total of 430 projects and obligated more than $962 million. 
Appendix D 

The National Incident Management System 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 159 

Command and Management Under NIMS 

To the extent possible, disasters are managed locally; most responses do not 

exceed the capabilities of the local government. However, some incidents 

require multiple jurisdictions or levels of government to provide an adequate 

response. In addition, some incidents initially can be handled locally but grow 

in size or complexity and require assistance and support beyond what is 

available at the local level. The NIMS provides an effective and efficient 

coordination system to enable multiple entities at different levels of 

government to conduct incident management activities. 

The NIMS uses two levels of management structures depending on the size, 

nature, and complexity of the incident. First, an ICS is a standard on-scene, 

all-hazard incident management system that allows users to establish an 

integrated organizational structure to respond to single or multiple incidents. 

Second, Multiagency Coordination Systems provide a common framework to 

integrate and support incident management and coordination for incident 

prioritization, critical resource allocation, integration of communication 

systems, and information flow. 

The Incident Command System

The ICS structure is designed to enable effective and efficient domestic 

incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, 

personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common 

organizational structure. The ICS structure is widely applicable to a variety of 

emergencies from small and basic to large and complex, whether natural or 

man-made. It applies across all levels of government, the private sector, and 

nongovernmental organizations, as well as across multiple functional 

disciplines. Several characteristics enable ICS to efficiently and effectively 

manage incidents: 

• Use of common terminology; 

• Scalable, top-down modular system based on the size, complexity, and 

nature of the incident; 

• Incidents managed by objectives established by the incident command; 

• Use of incident action plans to communicate strategic objectives and 

operational and support activities to the incident command 

organization; 

• Span of control ranging from three to seven subordinates; 

• Designation of one supervisor for each individual for the incident; 
Appendix D 

The National Incident Management System

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 160 

• Clear chain of command and authority within the organization; and, 

• Use of communication plans and interoperable communications 

systems. 

ICS Organization

The ICS structure usually includes five major functional areas: command, 

operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. Depending on the 

size and complexity of the incident, additional functional or geographic 

branches or divisions can be included within one or more of the major 

functional areas. FEMA used all five major functional areas in each of the 

affected states. 

• Incident Command: The Incident Commander is responsible for 

overall management of the incident. This can be accomplished 

through a single command or a unified command. Under a single 

command, the Incident Commander develops the strategic incident 

objectives, approves the incident action plan, and approves all requests 

for ordering and releasing incident resources. 

Unified command is used for incidents involving multiple agencies or 

jurisdictions. Under unified command, multiple agencies and 

jurisdictions are able to work together effectively without 
Appendix D 

The National Incident Management System

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 161 

compromising their different legal, geographic, and functional 

authorities and responsibilities. Designated members of each agency 

work together to develop a common set of objectives and strategies for 

the entire incident and jointly plan support activities under a single 

incident action plan. As a result, unified command improves 

information flow, communication, and coordination and reduces 

duplication of efforts. For Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi and 

Alabama established unified commands from the start, while 

Louisiana did not. 

• Operations: The Operations Section is responsible for activities 

dedicated to reducing the immediate hazard, saving and sustaining 

lives and property, establishing situational awareness and control, and 

restoring normal operations. ICS provides flexibility for organizing 

incident operations depending on the nature of the incident, the 

agencies involved, and the strategic objectives set by the incident 

commander. Within the Operations Section, divisions or groups are 

established when resources involved exceed the Operations Section 

Chief’s manageable span of control. Divisions create geographical 

areas of operation. Groups create functional areas of operation. If the 

number of divisions or groups exceeds the manageable span of control 

or the incident involves multiple jurisdictions, branches would be 

established. 

• Planning: The Planning Section gathers, evaluates, and disseminates 

situational information and intelligence critical to the incident; 

prepares situation reports and incident maps; maintains the status of 

incident resources; and develops the incident action plan based on the 

incident commander’s strategic objectives. 

• Logistics: The Logistics Section provides support needs for the 

incident, including ordering resources from off-incident locations if 

not readily available in the incident area. Logistics provides facilities, 

transportation, supplies, equipment maintenance and fuel, food 

services, communications, and medical services for personnel. 

• Finance/Administration: A Finance/Administration Section is 

established if an incident requires significant financial, reimbursement, 

or administrative support services. If established, this section monitors 

multiple sources of funds, tracks and reports funds spent or obligated, 

and reconciles operational records with financial records. 
Appendix D 

The National Incident Management System

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 162 

Multiagency Coordination Systems

Multiagency coordination systems provide the framework to coordinate and 

support incident management policies and priorities, facilitate logistics 

support and resource tracking, make critical resource allocation decisions, 

coordinate incident related information, and coordinate interagency and 

intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, 

and strategies. Facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communications are resources integrated into a multiagency coordination 

system. Operational responsibility for incident management activities 

remains, however, with the on-scene incident commander. 

Both EOCs and multiagency coordination entities could be part of a 

multiagency coordination system. EOCs, usually established at the state or 

local level, are the physical location where core functions of coordination, 

communications, resource dispatch and tracking, and information collection 

are executed. Personnel from multiple jurisdictions or functional disciplines 

may staff EOCs. For Hurricane Katrina, each affected state activated and 

staffed its EOC following basic ICS positions and elements. This facilitated 

coordination between federal and state counterparts, and ultimately, 

integration when the incident command organization was established in each 

state’s JFO. The HSOC was activated and executed the core EOC functions at 

the federal level for Hurricane Katrina. 

Multiagency coordination entities support and facilitate incident management, 

coordinate policy, and provide strategic guidance and direction to support 

incident management activities. These entities usually include representatives 

from agencies or organizations with direct incident management responsibility 

or significant support and resource responsibilities. Several multiagency 

coordination entities were used during the Hurricane Katrina response, 

including the NRCC, RRCCs, and the IIMG. 
Appendix E 

The National Response Plan 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 163 

The National Response Plan 

On April 14, 2005, the NRP superseded the Initial National Response Plan, 

the Federal Response Plan, the Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations 

Plan, and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The NRP 

references 70 statutes, regulations, executive orders, and presidential 

directives that outline the authorities and responsibilities of the signatories for 

domestic incident management. Thirty-two federal departments and service 

agencies agreed to support the NRP: 

National Response Plan Signatories 

Department of Agriculture Environmental Protection Agency 

Department of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Department of Defense Federal Communications Commission 

Department of Education General Services Administration 

Department of Energy 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Department of Health and Human Services National Transportation Safety Board 

Department of Homeland Security Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development Office of Personnel Management 

Department of Interior Small Business Administration 

Department of Justice Social Security Administration 

Department of Labor Tennessee Valley Authority 

Department of State U.S. Agency for International Development 

Department of Transportation U.S. Postal Service 

Department of the Treasury American Red Cross 

Department of Veteran Affairs Corporation of National Community Service 

Central Intelligence Agency 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster 

The NRP consists of a base plan plus 31 annexes: 

• Fifteen ESF annexes: The 15 ESF annexes categorize emergency 

services that are likely to be needed during a domestic incident, such 

as transportation, urban search and rescue, and food. These annexes 

provide for service planning, support, resources, and program 

implementation. 
Appendix E 

The National Response Plan

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 164 

• Nine support annexes: These annexes explain crosscutting processes 

and administrative requirements, such as logistics management and 

public affairs. 

• Seven incident annexes: The incident annexes explain how the NRP 

will be tailored to address particular events including catastrophic, 

terrorism, and biological incidents. 

The NRP designates lead and support agencies for administering each annex. 

A chart of the 15 ESFs and the agencies responsible for their coordination is 

on page 31. 

DHS has primary responsibility for the Catastrophic Incident Annex. The 

DHS Secretary officially activates this annex when needed. According to the 

NRP, a catastrophic event is any incident “that results in extraordinary levels 

of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government 

functions.”152 The Catastrophic Incident Annex applies to any kind of 

incident of this scale, whether caused by a natural hazard or man-made. For 

such incidents, the NRP requires a proactive federal response, including rapid 

deployment of specific teams and resources. The Catastrophic Incident 

Supplement to the annex specifies which teams and resources deploy on a 

phased schedule. This supplement was published in September 2005, and 

therefore was not finalized in advance of Hurricane Katrina. 

 

152 Page 43. 
Appendix F 

Comparison of PFO and FCO Duties 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 165 

Comparison of PFO and FCO Duties Under the National Response Plan 

PFO FCO 

Designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

as necessary, to facilitate federal support to 

established incident command structures and 

coordinate overall federal incident management and 

assistance to officials such as the FCO 

Appointed by the President to coordinate the federal 

response effort for a specified emergency or major 

disaster declaration; manages and coordinates the 

application of programs and funds under the Stafford 

Act, including mission assignments and resource 

allocation 

Provides real-time incident information to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security through the HSOC 

and the IIMG, as required 

When delegated from the DHS/EPR/FEMA Regional 

Director, serves as Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM) 

to administer the financial aspects of assistance 

authorized under the Stafford Act 

Ensures the seamless integration of federal activities 

in support of and in coordination with state, local, 

and tribal requirements 

Taking other such action consistent with the authority 

delegated to him/her as deemed necessary to assist local 

citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining 

assistance to which they are entitled 

Serves as a primary, although not exclusive, point of 

contact for federal interface with state, local, and 

tribal senior elected/appointed officials, the media, 

and the private sector 

Working in partnership with the State Coordinating 

Officer (appointed by the governor to oversee operations 

for the state) and the Governor’s Authorized 

Representative (empowered by the governor to execute 

all necessary documents for federal assistance on behalf 

of the state) 

Ensures that adequate connectivity is maintained 

between the JFO and the HSOC; local, county, 

state, and regional EOCs; nongovernmental EOCs; 

and relevant elements of the private sector 

Conducts an initial appraisal of the types of assistance 

most urgently needed 

Ensures overall coordination of federal domestic 

incident management and resource allocation 

activities 

Coordinates the timely delivery of federal assistance to 

affected state, local, and tribal governments and disaster 

victims 

Coordinates response resource needs between 

multiple incidents as necessary, or as directed by the 

Secretary of Homeland Security 

Coordinates the administration of relief, including 

activities of the state and local governments, and other 

relief or disaster assistance organizations, which agree to 

operate under his/her advice or direction 

Facilitates interagency conflict resolution as 

necessary 

Participates in ongoing steady-state preparedness 

efforts (as appropriate for PFOs designated in a 

“pre-incident” mode, when a threat can be ascribed 

to a particular geographic area) 

Provides strategic guidance to federal entities 

Coordinates the overall federal strategy locally to 

ensure consistency of federal interagency 

communications to the public 

Establishes such field offices as deemed necessary and 

authorized by the President 
Appendix G 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 166 

The following is a list of some of the organizations that contributed to the response, 

relief, and recovery efforts during the hurricanes the affected the Gulf Coast region 

and continue to provide assistance to help families recover. 

Members – National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 

• Adventist Community Services 

• America’s Second Harvest 

• American Baptist Men 

• American Radio Relay League 

• American Red Cross 

• AMURT (Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team) 

• Catholic Charities USA 

• Center for International Disaster Information 

• Christian Disaster Response International 

• Christian Reformed World Relief Committee 

• Church of the Brethren –Emergency Response/Service Ministries 

• Church World Service 

• Convoy of Hope 

• Disaster Psychiatry Outreach 

• Episcopal Relief and Development 

• Friends Disaster Service, Inc. 

• The Humane Society of the United States 

• International Aid 

• International Critical Incident Stress Foundation 

• International Relief Friendship Foundation 

• Lutheran Disaster Response 

• Mennonite Disaster Service 

• Mercy Medical/Angel Flight America 

• National Emergency Response Teams (NERT) 

• National Organization for Victim Assistance 

• Nazarene Disaster Response 

• Northwest Medical Teams International 

• The Points of Light Foundation and Volunteer Center National Network 

• Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 

• REACT International, Inc. 

• The Salvation Army 

• Society of St. Vincent de Paul 

• Southern Baptist Convention – North American Mission Board 

• United Jewish Communities 

• United Church of Christ – Wider Church Ministries 

• United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) 

• United Way of America 

• Volunteers of America 
Appendix G 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 167 

• World Vision 

Members of State, County, City VOADs also Providing Services 

• Christian Appalachian Project 

• Christian Contractors Association (FLVOAD) 

• United Jewish Federation of New York 

Friends of VOAD (These organizations have long standing relationships with 

National VOAD) 

• Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 

• Compassion Alliance 

• Hope Coalition America 

• Samaritan’s Purse International Relief 

• Scientology Disaster Response 

Other Organizations Providing Services and Accepting Donations 

• Alzheimer’s Association 

• AmeriCares 

• American Kennel Club 

• American Veterinary Medical Foundation 

• Blacks in Government 

• NIEHS, Research Triangle Park Chapter 

• Brother’s Brother Foundation 

• Children’s Hunger Fund 

• Christian Children’s Fund 

• Churches of Christ Disaster Relief Effort 

• Green Cross Assistance Program 

• Habitat for Humanity 

• HOPE worldwide 

• His Work In Progress 

• Independent Charities of America (ICA) 

• International Medical Corps 

• International Rescue Committee 

• Islamic Circle of North American Relief (ICNA Relief USA) 

• Islamic Relief USA 

• Mercy Corps 

• National Alliance on Mental Illness 

• Orphans International Worldwide 

• Orthodox Christian Charities 

• Save the Children 

• World Relief
Appendix H 

FEMA Consolidated Shelter Report 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 168 
Appendix H 

FEMA Consolidated Shelter Report

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 169 
Appendix I 

Disaster Recovery Centers: Location Map 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 170 
Appendix J 

Disaster Recovery Centers: Hours of Operation 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 171 

Hurricane Katrina Fixed Disaster Recovery Centers 

Operational Hours 

August 24, 2005, to September 30, 2005

Louisiana 

# Parish City Opening Date Operational 

1 Caddo Shreveport 09/06/2005 9am-7pm 

2 Ouachita Monroe 09/06/2005 9am-7pm 

3 Iberville Plaquemine 09/08/2005 9am-7pm 

4 Lafayette Lafayette 09/09/2005 9am-7pm 

5 Rapides Alexandria 09/10/2005 9am-7pm 

6 Webster Minden 09/14/2005 9am-7pm 

7 Plaquemines Belle Chase 09/14/2005 8am-6pm 

8 E. Baton Rouge Baton Rouge 09/15/2005 9am-7pm 

9 Washington Bogalusa 09/16/2005 9am-7pm 

10 Washington Franklinton 09/16/2005 9am-7pm 

11 Avoyelles Marksville 09/17/2005 9am-7pm 

12 St. Tammany Slidell 09/19/2005 9am-7pm 

13 Orleans Algiers 09/19/2005 9am-7pm 

14 St. James Vacherie 09/20/2005 9am-7pm 

15 LaFourche Thibodeaux 09/20/2005 9am-7pm 

16 St. Charles Boutte 09/20/2005 9am-7pm 

17 St. John the Baptist LaPlace 09/27/2005 9am-7pm 

18 Ascension Gonzales 09/27/2005 9am-7pm 

19 Jefferson Gretna 09/28/2005 9am-7pm 

20 LaFourche Raceland 09/29/2005 9am-7pm 

21 Iberia New Iberia 09/29/2005 9am-7pm 

22 Tangipahoa Amite 09/30/2005 9am-7pm 

23 Livingston Walker/Denham Springs 09/30/2005 9am-7pm 

Alabama 

# City Opening Date Operational 

1 Bayou La Batre 09/02/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

2 Chatom 09/03/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

3 Bay Minette 09/05/2005 7am-7pm 

4 Robertsdale 09/05/2005 7am-7pm 

5 Foley 09/11/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

6 Mobile 09/18/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

7 Montgomery 09/18/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

8 Mobile 09/21/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

9 Birmingham 09/23/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 

10 Livingston 09/30/2005 8am-6pm Closed Sunday 
Appendix J 

Disaster Recovery Centers: Hours of Operation

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 172 

Hurricane Katrina Fixed Disaster Recovery Centers 

Operational Hours 

August 24, 2005, to September 30, 2005

Mississippi

# City Opening Date Operational 

1 Ocean Springs 09/06/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

2 Pascagoula 09/09/2005 8am-6pm 

3 Moss Point 09/09/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

4 Poplarville 09/12/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

5 Waveland 09/08/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

6 Gulfport 09/15/2008 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

7 Biloxi 09/15/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

8 Jackson 09/19/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

9 Purvis 09/19/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

10 Picayune 09/20/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

11 Pass Christian 09/19/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

12 McComb 09/24/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

13 Hattiesburg 09/25/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

14 Laurel 09/25/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

15 Woodville 09/27/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

16 Biloxi 09/29/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 

17 Wiggins 09/30/2005 8am-6pm; Sunday 1pm-6pm 
Appendix K 

Agencies Receiving Mission Assignments 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 173 

Cumulative Listing of Agencies Receiving Mission Assignments for All Three States 

For the Period August 28 - September 30, 2005 

American Red Cross National Communications System (DHS) 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service National Credit Union Administration 

Border and Transportation Security (DHS) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

Center for Disease Control National Labor Relations Board 

Corporation for National and Community Service National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Customs and Border Protection (DHS) National Science Foundation 

Department of Agriculture Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Department of Commerce Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

Department of Defense Office of the Chief Financial Officer (DHS) 

Department of Education Office of Personnel Management 

Department of Energy Office of State and Local Government Coordination 

and Preparedness (DHS) 

Department of Health and Human Services Railroad Retirement Board 

Department of Housing and Urban Development Science and Technology Directorate (DHS) 

Department of Interior Securities and Exchange Commission 

Department of Justice Social Security Administration 

Department of Labor Soil Conservation Service 

Department of Transportation Tennessee Valley Authority 

Department of Treasury Transportation Security Administration (DHS) 

Environmental Protection Agency U.S. Agency for International Development 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (DHS) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Federal Protective Service (DHS) U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (DHS) 

Food and Nutrition Service U.S. Coast Guard (DHS) 

General Services Administration U.S. Forest Service 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS) U.S. Geological Survey 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

(DHS) 

U.S. Postal Service 

Merit Systems Protection Board U.S. Public Health Service 

National Aeronautic and Space Administration U.S. Secret Service (DHS) 

National Archives and Records Administration U.S. Small Business Administration 

 Veterans Administration 
Appendix L 

Mission Assignment Descriptions 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 174 

Louisiana 

State Requests for Specific Types of Assistance from August 29 to September 30, 2005 

# Tasked Agency 

MA 

Type Date Description 

1 Corporation for National 

Community Service 

DFA153 08/31/05 Pharmaceuticals and other necessary medical supplies 

2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/29/05 Procure, transport, and distribute bags of ice 

3 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/29/05 Emergency power generation 

4 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/29/05 Acquire, transport, and distribute bottled/bulk water 

5 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Temporary roofing support, provide temporary roofing, and 

coordinate roofing activities 

6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Housing planning support 

7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Emergency debris clearance, removal, and disposal site 

management 

8 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Complete a series of levee breaches to lower the water to level 

of the surrounding lakes/marshes, then repair the levee 

breaches, and repair and operate pumps to remove the 

remaining water 

9 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/31/05 Housing Planning support 

10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/31/05 Dredging services for specified waterways 

11 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/03/05 Engineering and construction support to DMORTS 

12 Department of Housing and 

Urban Development 

DFA 09/27/05 Transitional housing assistance 

13 Department of Defense DFA 08/31/05 Helicopter support to move 2,500 victims per day 

14 Department of Defense DFA 08/31/05 Support rotary air operations for search and rescue and levee 

reparations 

15 Department of Defense DFA 09/01/05 Airlift support to transport an estimated 10,000 evacuees from 

New Orleans to Houston, Texas, and San Antonio, Texas 

16 Department of Defense DFA 09/02/05 Meals ready-to-eat (MREs) 

17 Department of Defense DFA 09/02/05 High-water vehicles 

18 Department of Defense DFA 09/04/05 Temporary housing support at NAS New Orleans 

19 Department of Defense DFA 09/06/05 Trucks/drivers for supplies and personnel 

20 Department of Defense DFA 09/22/05 Sheltering area for LA NG troops 

21 Department of Education DFA 09/15/05 Personnel to facilitate appropriate communication and 

coordination regarding displaced students that have been 

relocated nationwide 

22 Department of Transportation DFA 09/03/05 Air transportation for evacuation of critical medical patients 

23 Department of Transportation DFA 09/03/05 Transportation assistance 

24 Department of Transportation DFA 09/18/05 Supplemental emergency transportation 

25 Environmental Protection Agency DFA 08/29/05 Activate EPA to support FEMA 

26 Environmental Protection Agency DFA 09/01/05 Removal and disposal of actual and potential oil discharges 

releases of hazardous material, pollutants and contaminants 

27 General Service Administration DFA 09/03/05 Medical service package 

28 Health and Human Services DFA 08/31/05 Medical personnel to support hospital, clinic and medical 

special needs shelters 

 

153 Direct federal assistance consists of goods and services provided directly from the federal government to affected 

state and local jurisdictions when they lack the capability to perform or contract for eligible emergency work (such as 

providing debris removal, potable water, emergency medical services, and urban search and rescue). A Presidential 

emergency or major disaster declaration must be issued before direct federal assistance can be provided. 
Appendix L 

Mission Assignment Descriptions

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 175 

29 Health and Human Services DFA 08/31/05 Technical expertise, to determine requirements, if any, for 

vector control 

30 Health and Human Services DFA 08/31/05 Deliver 500 beds and associated supplies to the Strategic 

National Stockpile vender supply chain 

31 Health and Human Services DFA 09/06/05 Mental health professionals 

32 Health and Human Services DFA 09/07/05 Veterinarians to assist with large and small animal care and 

carcass disposal issues 

33 Health and Human Services DFA 09/08/05 Deliver 1000 beds and associated supplies to the Strategic 

National Stockpile vender supply chain 

34 Health and Human Services DFA 09/09/05 General health and medical assistance 

35 Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

DFA 09/27/05 Law enforcement support 

36 Coast Guard DFA 09/01/05 Air and ground support to perform lifesaving and, search and 

recovery missions 

37 Coast Guard DFA 09/05/05 Security personnel for law enforcement operations 

38 Department of Agriculture DFA 09/16/05 Assistance with the removal and disposal of animal carcasses 

39 Department of Justice DFA 09/02/05 Air transportation 

40 Department of Justice DFA 09/03/05 Protective services 

41 Department of Justice DFA 09/10/05 Beds with staff to maintain custody and control of up to 1000 

inmates 

42 Department of Justice DFA 09/11/05 Transportation of inmates 

43 Department of Justice DFA 09/14/05 Law enforcement support 

1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers TA154 08/30/05 Aid in accomplishing of priority missions 

2 Environmental Protection Agency TA 09/01/05 Assessment of water and wastewater facilities and threats of 

oil, hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants 

3 Health and Human Services TA 09/10/05 Coordination of TB patients, tracking patients, coordinate 

distribution of drugs, and purchasing of supplies 

4 Department of Justice TA 09/22/05 Assist NOPD establish a law enforcement coordinating center 

in New Orleans and to reconstitute the NOPD and its 

supporting 911 system 

Mississippi 

State Requests for Specific Types of Assistance from August 30 to September 30, 2005 

# Tasked Agency 

MA 

Type Date Description 

1 Corporation for National 

Community Service 

DFA 09/03/05 Teams to manage donations of volunteers, goods, and cash. 

Support the Blue Roof Project. Assist special needs clients 

2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Emergency power planning and preparation support 

3 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Emergency debris clearance, removal, and disposal support 

4 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 08/30/05 Temporary roofing support, provide temporary roofing, and 

coordinate roofing activities 

5 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/07/05 Equipment/materials to make temporary repairs to the 

wastewater treatment plants and collection systems 

6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/10/05 Self-help tarps for small areas of roof damage 

7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/10/05 Design, develop, and construct, including installation utilities, 

sites for portable buildings to support public education and 

other public service entities 

 

154 Technical assistance is expertise provided to state and local jurisdictions when they have the resources but lack the 

knowledge and skills needed to perform the required activity (such as hazardous materials assessment). Technical 

assistance may be provided prior to a Presidential emergency or major disaster declaration. 
Appendix L 

Mission Assignment Descriptions

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 176 

8 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/29/05 Provide essential services including debris removal, provision 

of temporary government facilities essential for government 

operation and other measures to protect public health and 

safety 

9 Department of Defense DFA 09/01/05 Purchase of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies that cannot 

be immediately filled by HHS 

10 Department of Defense DFA 09/08/05 Emergency facility repair for displaced citizens, public 

shelters, local infrastructure and utilities 

11 Department of Defense DFA 09/23/05 Provide berthing barges for displaced individuals 

12 Department of Transportation DFA 09/30/05 Emergency public transportation services in support of the Red 

Cross and other essential government services 

13 Department of Transportation DFA 09/30/05 Emergency public transportation services to access essential 

government and life sustaining services 

14 Environmental Protection Agency DFA 08/31/05 Removal and disposal of oil discharges and other hazardous 

material, pollutants and contaminants and implement measures 

to prevent potential releases 

15 Environmental Protection Agency DFA 09/17/05 Burn sites monitors 

16 Environmental Protection Agency DFA 09/19/05 Disposal of rotting, decaying putrescible type matter 

17 Federal Protective Service DFA 09/02/05 Federal Protection Service support 

18 Federal Protective Service DFA 09/15/05 Law enforcement support 

19 Health and Human Services DFA 08/31/05 Environmental health support to include the inspection of food, 

potable water, sanitary waste, and other preventative medicine 

activities 

20 Health and Human Services DFA 08/31/05 Medical staff support to include physicians, nurses, and 

specialty staff 

21 Health and Human Services DFA 08/31/05 Providing staff support to and purchase pharmaceuticals and 

medical supplies for MSDoH 

22 Health and Human Services DFA 09/02/05 One Strategic National Stockpile push package 

23 Health and Human Services DFA 09/02/05 Epidemiology disease surveillance support 

24 Health and Human Services DFA 09/07/05 Personnel and equipment to provide technical assistance/ 

assessment/surveillance activities to reduce vector borne pests 

25 Health and Human Services DFA 09/09/05 Supplement hospital capacity to provide collection point and 

triage for special needs patients 

26 Health and Human Services DFA 09/11/05 Vaccines and ancillary supplies 

27 Health and Human Services DFA 09/16/05 Liaison to coordinate emergency dental services 

28 Health and Human Services DFA 09/20/05 Personnel to support CFHC services 

29 Health and Human Services DFA 09/22/05 Dental staff to operate temporary dental facility 

30 Health and Human Services DFA 09/20/05 Assess patients in mobile medical facilities and shelters for 

replacement in nursing facilities, assisted living facilities and 

personal care homes 

31 Health and Human Services DFA 09/23/05 Medical teams needed to address medical and mental health 

concerns 

32 National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

DFA 08/30/05 Use of NASA facility to house state emergency workers and 

vehicles, or specific services 

33 National Communication System DFA 09/11/05 Telephone service to for shelter information, donation of goods 

and services, and volunteer placement provisions 

34 National Communication System DFA 09/19/05 Telephone service 

35 Department of Agriculture DFA 09/10/05 Resources to assist the state respond to animal and agricultural 

issues 

36 Department of Justice DFA 09/14/05 Law enforcement support 

37 Forest Service DFA 09/23/05 Fire fighting assistance to address fire threat 

1 Environmental Protection Agency TA 08/30/05 Assessment of water and wastewater facilities and threats of 

oil, hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants 
Appendix L 

Mission Assignment Descriptions

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 177 

2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers TA 08/31/05 Aid in accomplishing of priority missions 

3 Health and Human Services TA 09/01/05 Expertise to estimate the amount and duration of federal 

support needed to augment hospital staffing 

4 Health and Human Services TA 09/04/05 Expertise to assess damage to community water supplies 

5 Department of Agriculture TA 09/10/05 Technical assistance 

6 Forest Service TA 09/10/05 FEMA liaison to county emergency manager providing 

guidance and advice on available FEMA recovery and 

response assistance 

7 Health and Human Services TA 09/17/05 Expertise needed to assist utility companies, and to monitor 

and track water and wastewaters systems as they come on line 

Alabama 

State Requests for Specific Types of Assistance from September 1 to September 30, 2005 

# Tasked Agency 

MA 

Type Date Description 

1 Corporation for National 

Community Service 

DFA 09/04/05 Personnel to support call centers, warehouses and distribution 

systems for management of donations and volunteers, and 

other services and facilities 

2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/01/05 Emergency debris clearance, removal, and disposal support 

3 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/05/05 Temporary housing support. Design, site development and 

construction, including installation of utilities at a mobile 

home group site 

4 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers DFA 09/06/05 Temporary housing support to FEMA Housing Area 

Command (HAC) 

5 Environmental Protection Agency DFA 09/02/05 Removal and disposal of oil discharges and other hazardous 

material, pollutants and contaminants and implement measures 

to prevent potential releases 

1 Environmental Protection Agency TA 09/04/05 Assessment of water and wastewater facilities and threats of 

oil, hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants 
Appendix M 

Call Center Staff Compared to Number of Calls 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 178 

Call Center Staff vs. Number of Calls - 08/24/05 to 09/30/05

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

8/24 (4)8/25 (4)8/26 (4)8/27 (0)8/28 (0)8/29 (4)8/30 (4)8/31 (4)

9/1 (9)9/2 (9)

9/3 (11)

9/4 (7)

9/5 (11)9/6 (11)9/7 (11)9/8 (11)9/9 (11)

9/10 (12)9/11 (12)9/12 (12)9/13 (12)9/14 (19)9/15 (19)9/16 (19)9/17 (19)9/18 (19)9/19 (19)9/20 (19)9/21 (19)9/22 (19)9/23 (19)9/24 (19)9/25 (19)9/26 (19)9/27 (19)9/28 (19)9/29 (19)9/30 (19)

Date of Calls (Number of Sites Open)

Call Center Staff

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

Number of Calls

Staffing Total Calls Made Calls Answered
Appendix N 

Average Length of Disaster Victim Calls 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 179 

Average Length of Disaster Victim Call

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

8/248/258/268/278/288/298/308/31

9/19/29/39/49/59/69/79/89/9

9/109/119/129/139/149/159/169/179/189/199/209/219/229/239/249/259/269/279/289/299/30

Date of Calls

Average Length of Calls (in minutes)

Average Minutes Waiting in Queue Average Minutes Speaking with Agent
Appendix O 

FEMA Referrals to Other Assistance Providers 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 180 

FEMA Referrals to Other Assistance Providers as of November 16, 2005 

Total Referrals by State155 Assistance Providers 

Louisiana Mississippi Alabama Total 

Aging Services 4,488 2,632 693 7,813

Agricultural Aid 21,406 25,446 2,695 49,547

Banking Questions 157 272 21 450

Consumer Services 3,038 1,235 60 4,333

Contractors License Board 0 736 194 930

Crisis Counseling 5,143 2,063 525 7,731

Department of Environment 1,661 735 206 2,602

Department of Human Services 0 1,856 507 2,363

Disaster Recovery Center 2,790 1,463 490 4,743

Disaster Unemployment Assistance 625,689 243,176 47,319 916,184

Emergency Assistance (Red Cross) 675,010 249,994 47,638 972,642

Financial Services 0 1,136 0 1,136

Fraud Detection 1,712 663 218 2,593

Health Department 3,844 1,627 441 5,912

Housing and Urban Development 0 591 0 591

Information and Referrals 5,182 2,099 700 7,981

Insurance Information 2,723 1,227 350 4,300

Legal Services 763 889 246 1,898

SBA 1,075 752 355 2,182

SBA Workshop 652,425 299,026 56,752 1,008,203

Social Security 3,359 1,528 407 5,294

Tax Assistance 659,173 304,924 57,793 1,021,890

Veterans Benefits 1,238 713 180 2,131

TOTAL REFERRALS 2,670,876 1,144,783 217,790 4,033,449

 

155 FEMA Recovery Division, November 16, 2005. 
Appendix P 

DHS Organizational Charts 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 181 
Appendix P 

DHS Organizational Charts

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 182 
Appendix Q 

FEMA Ten-Year Overview 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 183 

FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 

Prominent 

Disaster Events*

Oklahoma City 

bombing; 

Hurricane 

Marilyn 

Hurricanes 

Fran, Opal 

Hurricanes 

Bonnie, 

Georges 

Hurricanes Bret, 

Floyd 

Cerro 

Grande fire; 

Hurricanes 

Irene, Lenny 

Total Event 

Designations 35 149 57 148 106 104 

Major Disasters 29 72 49 61 53 41 

Emergencies 2 2 5 3 16 5 

Fire Assistance 4 75 3 54 37 58 

Laws, Plans, 

and Policies 

The Stafford Act 

was most recently 

amended in 1993. 

The FRP was in 

effect since 1992. 

Second version of 

FRP published. 

Disaster 

Mitigation 

Act of 2000

amends 

Stafford Act. 

Leadership President: William Clinton 

FEMA Director: James Lee Witt 

FEMA 

Reorganizations 

Planning 

and 

Operations 

rejoined 

after 1993 

split. 

Three Territorial 

Logistics Centers 

established to stock 

commodities for 

initial response. 

Annual 

Appropriation $847 million $805 million $1,816 million $842 million $1,064 million $873 million 

Supplementary 

Appropriation(s) 

for the Disaster 

Relief Fund $2,273 million 

$3,171 

million $3,300 million 

$1,600 

million $1,806 million 

$2,176 

million 

Authorized 

FTEs 3,864 3,860 4,945 4,625 4,539 4,789 

FEMA 

Programmatic 

Changes 

Discussed In 

This Report 

FEMA conducts 

its first large-scale 

natural event 

exercise 

(Response ’95). 

Hurricane Liaison 

Team created. 

FEMA 

consolidates 

preparedness 

grants and 

links them to 

state 

strategic 

agreements. 

FEMA begins 

voluntary selfassessments of state 

readiness. 

FEMA 

conducts its 

last largescale natural 

event exercise 

(Response 

’98). 

EMPGs 

combine six 

preparedness 

grants. 

*

Includes all Category 3, 4, and 5 hurricanes. 
Appendix Q 

FEMA Ten-Year Overview

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 184 

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 

Prominent 

Disaster Events*

September 11th attacks on 

World Trade Center and 

Pentagon 

Loss of Space Shuttle 

Columbia; Hurricane 

Isabel 

Hurricanes Ivan, 

Charley, Jeanne, 

Frances 

Hurricanes 

Dennis, Katrina, 

Rita 

Total Event 

Designations 104 126 115 129 139 

Major Disasters 50 42 62 65 45 

Emergencies 15 1 19 7 67 

Fire Assistance 39 83 34 57 27 

Laws, Plans, 

and Policies 

The Homeland 

Security Act of 2002

creates DHS. DHS 

publishes the Initial 

NRP; FRP remains in 

effect. President 

Bush releases HSPD5. 

DHS publishes 

NIMS. 

President Bush 

releases HSPD8. 

NRP supersedes 

FRP in April. 

President: George Bush 

DHS Secretary: Thomas Ridge DHS Secretary: 

Michael Chertoff 

Leadership 

FEMA Director: Joseph Allbaugh 

EP&R Under Secretary and FEMA Director: Michael Brown 

FEMA 

Reorganizations 

Preparedness, Training and 

Exercises merges with 

Response & Recovery into 

Readiness, Response, & 

Recovery Directorate. 

FEMA creates External 

Affairs and Administration 

& Resource Planning 

Directorates. 

Readiness, 

Response, & 

Recovery 

Directorate splits 

into National 

Preparedness 

Division and 

Response & 

Recovery 

Division. 

FEMA incorporated 

into DHS’ EP&R 

Directorate. NDMS 

moves from HHS to 

FEMA. 

Some FEMA staff 

moved to DHS 

headquarters. 

DHS Second 

Stage Review 

creates DHS 

Preparedness 

Directorate, 

absorbing some 

FEMA staff. 

EP&R layer to be 

eliminated. 

Annual 

Appropriation $1,221 million $2,610 million $2,465 million $3,256 million $3,089 million 

Supplementary 

Appropriation(s) 

for the Disaster 

Relief Fund $4,383 million $8,008 million $1,925 million $2,245 million $66,385 million 

Authorized 

FTEs 4,859 4,952 4,574 4,859 4,905 

FEMA 

Programmatic 

Changes 

Discussed In 

This Report 

Initial FEMA proposal to 

develop a Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan. 

Evacuation 

Liaison Team 

created. 

NEMB-CAP 

preparedness baseline 

study and RAMP 

begin. Response 

Division develops a 

5-year catastrophic 

planning strategy. 

Four-part 

Hurricane Pam 

planning event 

begins in 

Louisiana. 

Management of 

the EMPG 

transfers to ODP. 

*

Includes all Category 3, 4, and 5 hurricanes. 
Appendix R 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 185 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

The purpose of our review was to assess FEMA’s performance as it conducted 

its disaster management activities in response to Hurricane Katrina. We 

examined whether FEMA's authorities, plans and procedures, organizational 

structure, and resources were adequate and operational. 

The review included three of the four major phases of disaster management: 

preparedness, response, and recovery. We evaluated FEMA’s preparedness 

efforts over the past ten years to determine its organizational capability and 

posture prior to Hurricane Katrina. For the response and recovery, we focused 

on the three states most affected by Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall – 

Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana – and limited the review timeframe to 

August 24, 2005, through September 30, 2005. This period extends from the 

National Hurricane Center’s first notice of the storm to the beginning of 

recovery efforts. We examined FEMA’s role and performance under the 

National Response Plan and National Incident Management System, focusing 

on four ESFs for which FEMA is the coordinator or primary agency: ESF-5, 

Emergency Management; ESF-6, Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services; 

ESF-9, Urban Search and Rescue; and ESF-15, External Affairs. 

We reviewed statutes and regulations related to FEMA and state disaster 

authorities. We examined FEMA documentation that included annual 

performance reports, policy memoranda, directives, standard operating 

procedures and manuals, and internet sites. Also, we reviewed various reports 

on FEMA programs from the Government Accountability Office; the 

Congressional Research Service; FEMA and DHS Office of Inspectors 

General; and, other related reports and news articles. 

We interviewed over 230 people, in person and by teleconference, and 

performed site visits to the Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana JFOs and 

Joint Information Centers, and to FEMA Region IV and VI offices in Georgia 

and Texas. In addition to interviewing FEMA and PFO staff at these sites, we 

interviewed officials from the Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana state 

emergency management agencies. We also conducted interviews with 

officials at DHS and FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC, the Red Cross; 

the National VOAD; the Department of Labor; the SBA, and private sector 

contractors. 

As part of our data analysis, we collected a sample of action request forms 

from all three affected states to determine and trace request fulfillment 

through FEMA field and headquarters offices. We examined work orders 
Appendix R 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 186 

FEMA assigned to other federal agencies in support of the federal response. 

We reviewed situation reports generated by federal and state agencies, 

incident action plans and activity chronologies assembled by the JFOs, and 

data from disaster assistance program offices. We studied FEMA’s 

catastrophic planning materials, budget data, staffing levels, and training and 

exercise records for the past ten years. For the same period, we evaluated 

FEMA’s efforts to work with state governments in preparing for natural 

disasters involving hurricane scenarios, particularly in the Gulf Coast region. 

Fieldwork began at the end of September 2005 and continued through 

December 2005. This review was conducted under the authority of the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality 

Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 
Appendix S 

Recommendations 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 187 

Recommendation #1: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Director of the 

Office of Operations Coordination, clarify the National Response Plan 

guidelines for federal, headquarters-level collection and synthesis of 

situational and operational information, with the intent of eliminating 

duplication of effort between the Interagency Incident Management Group 

and Homeland Security Operations Center. 

Recommendation #2: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, clarify the roles of the Principal Federal Official, the Federal 

Coordinating Officer, the Federal Resource Coordinator, and the Disaster 

Recovery Manager to provide a clear distinction for the types and levels of 

response activities that warrant a combination or modification to those roles; 

develop procedures for the timely activation of each role; and, ensure that 

these officials be provided with the necessary training to complement their 

qualifications for serving in these positions. 

Recommendation #3: We recommend that the Director of the Office of 

Operations Coordination for the Department of Homeland Security, in 

coordination with the Chief Information Officer, design an information 

management system that allows users to track and share information more 

openly and efficiently; and, standardize the format and methodology for 

collecting and reporting information. 

Recommendation #4: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish an ESF-6 working group to define 

the explicit roles and responsibilities for each agency, develop standard 

operating procedures, and implement a concept of operations plan for 

response activities that address all levels of disasters. 

Recommendation #5: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop alternative housing resource plans 

that include a review of all identified resources within an affected area, 

determine whether potential duplication exists, and efficiently deliver services 

that are accommodating to the disaster victim. 

Recommendation #6: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a more comprehensive training 

program to prepare existing and new personnel for Disaster Recovery Center 

assignments. 
Appendix S 

Recommendations

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 188 

Recommendation #7: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a more comprehensive program to 

recruit, train, and retain local hires for use in augmenting FEMA’s Disaster 

Assistance Employees and permanent staff. 

Recommendation #8: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, review ESF-9 Annex capabilities for search and rescue and 

coordination within FEMA and other Department of Homeland Security 

components (such as U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection) 

or with other federal departments and agencies, and either redistribute ESF-9 

responsibilities or develop greater water rescue capabilities within FEMA. 

Recommendation #9: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, develop a surge plan and standard operating procedures for 

augmenting FEMA’s ESF-9 coordination capability during catastrophic 

events with resources such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border 

Protection personnel. 

Recommendation #10: We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for 

Public Affairs, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, develop a definitive ESF-15 organizational chart that is 

scalable to the size of an incident, with a clear hierarchical structure and 

information flow. 

Recommendation #11: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency further develop and fully implement formal 

ESF-15 training, so all full-time employees and Disaster Assistance 

Employees have a comprehensive understanding of how to operate within its 

structure during an incident. 

Recommendation #12: We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Public 

Affairs for the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the 

Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, complete the 

development of and fully implement the DHS Public Affairs state outreach 

program. 

Recommendation #13: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency address levels of coordination and 

expectations with Department of Defense entities under the NRP, including 
Appendix S 

Recommendations

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 189 

Northern Command and the Military Liaison, to facilitate coordination during 

responses to future domestic incidents. 

Recommendation #14: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, establish measurable response expectations and provide the 

necessary financial, technical, and staff support to meet those expectations. 

Recommendation #15: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, develop a means to standardize and streamline the resource 

ordering and tracking process. 

Recommendation #16: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop and implement a resource tracking 

system that is capable of documenting whether resources were delivered and 

the efficiency with which the resource was provided. 

Recommendation #17: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Manager of the 

National Communications System, determine and fill requirements to provide 

emergency responders with communications equipment capable of performing 

in austere conditions. 

Recommendation #18: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency define the Mobile Emergency Response 

Support authorizations for equipment and staffing, including requirements for 

mission support during a catastrophic disaster, and fund and staff the 

detachments to meet requirements. 

Recommendation #19: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a disaster workforce plan that 

accounts for standing capability for permanent, temporary, and reserve staff 

that is responsive to the needs demonstrated in response to previous disasters, 

and also develop a plan that is scalable to other events irrespective of cause, 

size, or complexity. 

Recommendation #20: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop and implement a system that 

automates and tracks the selection, deployment, training, and demobilization 

of responders. 
Appendix S 

Recommendations

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 190 

Recommendation #21: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency provide training to additional National 

Processing Service Center staff and contractors to enhance FEMA’s capability 

to perform applicant assistance and case management activities responsive to 

the needs of applicants. 

Recommendation #22: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish and test the information 

technology infrastructure of the system to ensure support of user demands and 

develop internal controls to decrease the potential for duplicate applications. 

Recommendation #23: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a contract mechanism for its direct 

federal resources that clearly defines the expected roles, responsibilities, 

deliverables, and performance measures for contractors implementing 

FEMA’s direct housing operations mission. 

Recommendation #24: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency discontinue the practice of tasking any 

contractor without the appropriate coordination and approval of the 

Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative. 

Recommendation #25: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish clear roles and responsibilities for 

the Housing Area Command and define its reporting requirements and chain 

of command relationship with the FEMA headquarters, Joint Field Offices, 

and Technical Assistance Contractors. 

Recommendation #26: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency establish eligibility criteria, internal 

program controls, and a basis for testing a program before implementation to 

ensure the program meets disaster assistance provisions of the Stafford Act. 

Recommendation #27: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency place priority on analysis of new methods 

and technology to verify damage, occupancy, and ownership, when traditional 

methods of inspection are not responsive in the timely provision of assistance. 

Methods and applicable technology must be tested, based on supportable data, 

and provide the highest assurance of meeting program eligibility 

requirements. 
Appendix S 

Recommendations

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 191 

Recommendation #28: We recommend the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with federal, state, and 

nongovernmental partners, develop more effective and efficient plans for the 

delivery of assistance to address long-term housing issues, and test these plans 

in a simulated environment before application in actual disasters. 

Recommendation #29: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency create individual development plans (or a 

similar process) and implement a consolidated records system to maintain 

accurate information on training completed. 

Recommendation #30: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency finalize and distribute the Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, using the lessons learned during 

Hurricane Katrina to improve the plan. 

Recommendation #31: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency request appropriation or provide other 

funding, resources, and institutional support to agency components and to 

state and local partners to complete draft or proposed catastrophic planning 

initiatives for natural disasters. 

Recommendation #32: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency and Under Secretary for Preparedness 

jointly develop a formal mechanism to ensure continuity between 

preparedness, response, and recovery by including FEMA regional staff in the 

Preparedness Directorate’s relationships with state emergency management 

agencies for grants, exercises, planning, technical assistance, and training. 

Recommendation #33: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency oversee the Remedial Action Management 

Program to maintain focus and provide support for corrective action. 

Recommendation #34: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency direct its Remedial Action Management 

Program to identify interim remediation plans for issues that have a 

remediation completion date of greater than one year from the date assigned. 

Recommendation #35: We recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security provide states with 

training on the applicability of the National Preparedness System and 

preparedness grants to all hazards, including natural disasters. 
Appendix S 

Recommendations

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 192 

Recommendation #36: We recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security develop a system to 

assess state capability to respond to a disaster, without federal assistance and 

in respect to a minimum level of preparedness based on the Emergency 

Management Accreditation Program standard. 

Recommendation #37: We recommend that the Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency develop a method for determining the level 

of readiness of FEMA to respond to a disaster that exceeds a state’s 

capabilities. 

Recommendation #38: We recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Preparedness for the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with 

the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, ensure all DHS 

employees receive training on DHS responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 193 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 194 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 195 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 196 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 197 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 198 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 199 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 200 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 201 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 202 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 203 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 204 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

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In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 205 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 206 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 207 
Appendix T 

Management Response to Draft Report

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 208 
Appendix U 

Major Contributors to This Report 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 209 

Office of Inspections and Special Reviews

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector 

Moises Dugan, Senior Inspector 

Wynne Krause Kelch, Inspector 

Jennifer A. Lindsey, Inspector 

Sarah Hewitt, Inspector 

Lawrence Anderson, Inspector 

Jessica Barnes, Inspector 

Razili K. Datta, Inspector 

Russell Lundberg, Inspector 

Michelle Streit, Inspector 
Appendix V 

Report Distribution 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities 

In Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Page 210 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Under Secretary for Preparedness 

Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Assistant Secretary, Policy 

Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Director, Office of Operations Coordination 

Executive Director, Office of Grants and Training 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

DHS OIG Liaison 

FEMA Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Appropriations 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Government Reform 

U.S. House of Representatives 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, Attn: Office of Inspector 

General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to protect the 

identity of each writer and caller.