No. 2--02--1408

_________________________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

_________________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,	)	of Du Page County.

	)

	Plaintiff-Appellee,	)

	)

v.	)	No. 98--CF--1856

	)

DAVID TERAN,	)	Honorable

	)	George J. Bakalis,

	Defendant-Appellant.	)	Judge, Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following a jury trial, defendant, David Teran, was convicted of committing the first-degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 1998)) of Roderick Floyd.  In finding defendant guilty of this

offense, the jury rejected defendant's claim that he was insane under section 6--2(a) of the Criminal

Code of 1961 (the Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/6--2(a) (West 1998)).  After denying defendant's

motion for new trial, the trial court sentenced him to 45 years' imprisonment.  Defendant appeals,

contending that section 6--2(a) of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional in that it violates equal

protection, due process, and the proportionate penalties clause of our Illinois Constitution (U.S.

Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§2, 11).  We affirm.

	At trial, the State presented evidence reflecting that on August 28, 1998, the victim was

working for a moving company in Addison.  Terry Frazier testified that on August 28, 1998, he and

Bill Patterson and the victim returned from a job in Grayslake and in Addison at approximately 10 p.m.  The victim paid them, and then Frazier and Patterson left.  Frazier testified that, before he left,

the victim told him that he was going to drive a smaller van home, and the victim checked a load in

that van.

	Przemysklaw Krynski testified that on August 28, 1998, at approximately 11 p.m., he was

driving east on Fay Avenue in Addison, when he observed the victim lying in the street.  Krynski

telephoned 911 and reported this to the operator.  Richard Imbordino, a firefighter, testified that he

arrived at the scene at 11:42 p.m., and the victim had no vital signs.  Imbordino further testified that

the Addison police arrived right after he did.

	Shaku Teas, a forensic pathologist, testified regarding his autopsy on the victim.  Teas

testified that he found six gunshot wounds and that the victim died of multiple gunshot wounds. 

Other witnesses testified regarding their collection of the evidence, including the bullet fragments and

gun shell casings found in and around the victim, and testified that the recovered shell casings were

fired from the same firearm.

	Teresa Burke testified that she was defendant's former spouse.  She testified that she and

defendant married in 1985 and had three children.  She first separated from defendant in 1987 because

of his "temper mostly" and because he was "threatening" toward her.  Burke described an incident

on Father's Day where defendant wanted to get cash from their credit card "so he could buy

marijuana."  At the time, she was seven months pregnant.  Burke thought that defendant was going

to hit her, but he did not.  Burke further testified that, after they reconciled, they would go out

occasionally.  When they went out, Burke was concerned that defendant "might make a scene"

because he was "very impatient" and she feared that he might "start yelling and yelling at people."  Burke and defendant again separated for five months in 1991.  When he returned, he became

employed at Cumbee Freight as an over-the-road truck driver.

	Burke testified that she told defendant in 1997 that she wanted a divorce.  Burke agreed that

there were arguments and incidents of threats and violence, but she had not known defendant to be

delusional or to have hallucinations.  She testified regarding specific incidents where defendant was

verbally and physically threatening toward her and her mother.  According to Burke, defendant

relocated to Florida but returned in June 1997.

	Burke testified that, although defendant resided in Florida, when he was in Illinois he would

occasionally stay in his truck at Louis' Diner in West Chicago.  He would arrange to visit the children. 

Burke and the children visited defendant in Florida in April 1998.  While there, defendant told her that

he had learned that Louis Teran was not really his father.  Burke testified that she believed defendant

was happy about this information because Louis Teran had abused defendant as a child.  Defendant

made attempts to locate his natural father, Richard Klein.

	Burke testified that on the morning of August 29, 1998, she picked up defendant from Louis'

Diner and took him to a bar in West Chicago at 11 a.m.  When she picked up defendant from the bar

approximately three hours later, he was "pretty intoxicated."  While she drove defendant back to his

truck, defendant mentioned that he had been "abducted."  Burke told him to stop talking because the

children were in the car.

	Burke further testified that on September 3, 1998, defendant told her that he needed to take

some time off from work and that he did not believe his employer would allow this.  Defendant

explained that he might quit his job, and he asked Burke to help him clean out his truck.  She agreed

to do so, and then Burke followed defendant to Cumbee Freight in Chicago Ridge to give him a ride after dropping off the truck.  Burke testified that, while they were driving away from Cumbee Freight,

defendant spoke of having "alien enzymes" that he needed to "release."  Defendant informed Burke

that the world was going to end on September 26 with a meteor striking the earth.  Defendant said

that his natural father was the head of the "mob" and that "he was given a choice" to either kill Burke

or kill someone else.  Defendant told Burke that he chose to kill someone else because he did not

want to kill her.

	Burke further testified that, when she asked defendant whom he had killed, defendant replied

that he killed "some Nigger" with his 9-millimeter pistol at an "[i]ndustrial park in Addison." 

Defendant described to Burke that he knocked on the victim's truck, and the victim asked what he

had ever done to him.  Defendant said the victim's wife and child saw him commit the shooting. 

Defendant told Burke that he had a license to kill and that the police could do nothing.

	Burke testified that on September 7, 1998, she reported to the police what defendant had told

her.  Burke testified that, other than the prior conversation, defendant never spoke of being an alien,

having alien DNA, being a hit man, or being an undercover agent.  Other than when defendant used

"hard drugs" as a teenager, Burke did not know defendant to have any hallucinations or delusions. 

On cross-examination, Burke admitted that she "tried to get him committed" before she contacted

the police.

	Michael Simo testified that in September 1998, he was a detective with the Addison police

department and investigating the victim's murder.  On September 8, 1998, he spoke with Burke and

with James Chambers, defendant's stepbrother, regarding defendant's alleged participation in the

shooting.  Simo testified that on September 9 he went with other officers to Aurora to speak with

defendant about the shooting; defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the police station.  Detective Van Stedum was also present during the interview.  Simo read Miranda warnings to defendant, and defendant initialed the form.

	Simo testified that defendant initially denied having any knowledge of the shooting and

claimed that he had sold his 9-millimeter gun in 1997 in Florida.  The officers told defendant that his

brother had told them that defendant had picked up his gun on the night of the shooting and that

someone informed them that he was involved in the shooting.  Defendant then asked the officers

whether they had run his name through their computer, as it would reveal that he was not to be

apprehended if he was wanted for murder.  Defendant claimed that he worked at the Treasury

Department and had special assignments that he could not discuss.  When Van Stedum asked

defendant whether his brother was involved, defendant became angry and said, "I shot the goddamn

coon, no one else was involved, no one else was in the truck with me."  Until this point, the officers

never disclosed to defendant that the victim was black.

	Simo further testified that defendant said that the shooting occurred near VFN Fiberglass,

where his brother worked.  Defendant described a box van in the area, parked on Fay Street. 

Defendant approached the victim and started shooting.  Before the shooting, the victim asked

defendant what he ever did to defendant.  Defendant said that the last shot was to the back of the

victim's head.  After the shooting, defendant went to Louis' Diner.  Simo testified that defendant

assisted him in drawing a depiction of the scene of the shooting.

	Simo testified that defendant stated that he had disposed of the weapon in pieces in various

locations.  Defendant noted that he had thrown the barrel of the gun into the Cal-Sag Canal a few

days after the shooting.  Defendant said he used "regular" 9-millimeter ammunition.  At approximately 10 p.m. on September 9, 1998, the officers transferred defendant from Aurora to the Addison police

station.

	Simo further testified that, at the Addison police department, defendant told the officers that

"he had been given his directions and been told what to do."  When he asked defendant whether he

would put that in writing, defendant appeared to become angry and told him to call the Treasury

Department to verify his version of the events.  Simo and Van Stedum then brought defendant to the

crime scene, and defendant directed them to the area of the shooting.  According to Simo's testimony,

defendant accurately reenacted the shooting but would not allow the officers to photograph him.

	Simo testified that defendant said that he had picked up his gun from his brother's house

before the shooting and he and his brother drank beer and shot pool at a bar.  His brother then drove

him to Louis' Diner.  Defendant went back to Addison, where the shooting occurred.

	On September 10, 1998, Simo and Van Stedum went to the residence of James Chambers. 

Chambers gave them various items, including a 9-millimeter Luger hollow-point cartridge, 24 other

9-millimeter cartridges, a Smith & Wesson manual, and checks and money orders in defendant's

name.

	Simo further testified that on September 10, 1998, defendant wrote a statement in the

presence of Van Stedum.  In the statement, which was presented to the jury, defendant asserted that

he owned the guns and ammunition recovered from Chambers.  Defendant wrote that he went to

Addison, did his "business," and shot at the victim seven or eight times.  The last shot was directed

toward the victim's head.  He also noted that he had disposed of the weapon across the country and

in the Cal-Sag Canal.

	Simo testified that on September 11, 1998, he asked defendant, if the shooting had not been

a government hit and if defendant shot the victim because he was angry, would shooting the man have

been right or wrong; defendant replied in such a case it would be wrong to kill.  Later that day, Simo

told defendant that he did not believe that the shooting was a government hit.  Defendant then asked

Simo whether he believed in Nostradamus and said that by midnight he had to kill a person who was

alone.  If he did so, he would get his family back.  Defendant then said his natural father was the head

of the "Mafia" and had authorized defendant to kill.  Defendant also stated that his mother was

impregnated by an alien and that he had been "hidden in the belly of an English pig."  Simo further

testified that defendant offered to show him on a map where he had thrown the frame for the gun. 

Simo and Van Stedum went to that location on September 25, 1998, and they recovered the gun

frame.  The frame was for a Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter, serial No. TET2847.  Simo testified that,

during all of the time he spoke with defendant, he had no problems communicating with defendant,

and defendant's answers were responsive.

	Raymond Perreault, defendant's former neighbor, identified defendant's firearm as a Smith &

Wesson 9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol, serial number TET2847.  Perreault further testified that

he sold defendant one-half of a box of ammunition, keeping one bullet for his collection.  Perreault

testified that he gave the police a bill of sale and the bullet.

	The State rested, and defendant called Michael Chiappetta, his retained licensed clinical

psychologist, to testify regarding his evaluation of defendant's sanity.  Chiappetta met with defendant

on five occasions between May 2001 and August 2001.  Chiappetta testified that he reviewed various

materials, including police reports, hospital records, and evaluations by Dr. Corcoran, Dr. Kelly, Dr.

Wasyliw, and Dr. Zoot.  He noted that in 1979 defendant was diagnosed as having latent schizophrenia during his hospitalization at River's Edge Hospital, when defendant was approximately

15 years of age.  Chiappetta noted that, although latent schizophrenia was no longer a recognized

diagnosis, it was similar to a diagnosis of indeferentia schizophrenia.

	Chiappetta further testified that in May 2001 he spoke with corrections officers, who told him

that defendant had disorganized behavior and was threatening them and other inmates.  Chiappetta

noted that, when defendant arrived at the jail, he was placed on Haldol, an antipsychotic medication,

Trazodone to help him sleep, and Cogentin to treat the side effects of Haldol.  After Dr. Corcoran,

who had diagnosed defendant with a psychosis, not otherwise specified, changed defendant's

medication to Risperdal, a number of defendant's delusions disappeared.  Defendant stopped taking

the medications in the summer of 2000.

	Chiappetta testified that in June 2001 defendant made "racial epithets" to jail guards, though

"the people he spoke to were not of the same race that he was making epithets about."  Defendant

told Chiappetta that the word "nigger" was not necessarily a racial term but was a demeaning term

he used to refer to anyone he felt was "under him."  Defendant's varied speech volume on that date

indicated a disordered behavior, one of the qualities of schizophrenia and psychosis.

	Chiappetta testified that, at various times, defendant had differing delusional themes about the

shooting, which included the government, mafia, or aliens directing him.  According to Chiappetta,

these delusions were directly related to the shooting, and the shooting was committed "with his

delusional ideations."  Chiappetta added that defendant had no motive to kill the victim or take his

property, and did not make any attempt to conceal the shooting.  Defendant "did what he had to do,

according to the delusional themes and he left."

	Chiappetta testified that defendant told him that he had written "refused" on two copies of

his confession and that, before giving the confession, a gun was held to his head, he was starved, and

he was drugged.  Defendant told him that Alberto Louis Teran held a gun to his head to get him to

confess.  Defendant also said that his birth certificate was a forgery, and he denied that he had ever

served in the Marines.  Chiappetta testified that all of these beliefs were false, and the delusions were

an attempt to distance himself from his delusion about the aliens.

	Chiappetta noted that Drs. Wasyliw, Kelly, and Corcoran all diagnosed defendant as suffering

from psychosis, not otherwise specified.  Chiappetta concluded, though, that on the day of the

shooting, defendant was suffering from a cognitive disorder and had disorganized thinking. 

Chiappetta opined that the combination of the stress of the breakup of his marriage and the search

for his natural father culminated in the development of the delusional ideations.

	Chiappetta concluded "to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty" that defendant was

not sane at the time of the shooting.  Chiappetta testified that defendant was delusional and had

"impaired appreciation of the criminality of his behavior," and this impairment was a result of a mental

disease or defect.  Chiappetta continued that, at the time of the shooting, defendant "lacked a

substantial appreciation of the criminality of his conduct."  Chiappetta testified that defendant's

condition was caused by a combination of a personality disorder, such as antisocial personality

disorder, and a psychosis or apparent schizophrenia.

	Chiappetta acknowledged that antisocial personality disorder alone was not a mental disease

or defect.  Chiappetta agreed that defendant was angry and hostile but did not agree that he

"necessarily has antisocial behaviors."  Chiappetta also agreed that his report indicated that defendant

had antisocial behaviors.

	On rebuttal, the State called Thomas Cumbee, one of defendant's former employers at

Cumbee Freight.  Cumbee testified that defendant did a good job, kept to himself, and did not get into

trouble.  On September 4, 1998, defendant quit his job, purportedly because he was an "agent for the

Treasury" and had been called to duty.  Cumbee testified that, prior to this date, defendant had not

demonstrated any delusional beliefs.  Cumbee believed that defendant knew the difference between

right and wrong in August and September 1998.  John Cumbee, another former employer, testified

that defendant was a good driver and a good worker.  He did not notice defendant exhibit any

delusional beliefs.

	James Chambers testified that defendant had a "pretty normal" temper.  Chambers testified

that in 1998 defendant would occasionally stop by his workplace, which was approximately three

blocks from the scene of the shooting.  Chambers testified that on August 28, 1998, at approximately

3:30 p.m., defendant came by his workplace and asked him for his 9-millimeter firearm, which

Chambers had been holding for defendant.  Defendant said he wanted to take target practice.  Later

that evening, they went to a tavern in Glendale Heights and played pool.

	Chambers further testified that, at the tavern, defendant asked Chambers if he believed in

aliens.  They left the tavern at approximately 10 p.m., and Chambers last saw defendant at

approximately 10:15 p.m.  Chambers never observed defendant having any kind of delusions.

	Chambers testified that he again saw defendant on September 3 or 4, 1998, after defendant

had quit his job.  Defendant told Chambers that he had "activated" genes in his body and was going

to become an alien.  Defendant said nothing to Chambers about shooting the victim.  On cross-

examination, Chambers acknowledged that defendant was hospitalized in 1979 for psychiatric reasons

following an altercation between defendant and his stepfather.

	Lisa Chambers, defendant's stepsister, testified that she saw defendant at her brother James's

apartment on August 28, 1998.  She did not observe defendant being delusional at that time, and he

made no statements about being an alien.  Mary Miller, defendant's stepmother, also testified that she

saw defendant on August 28, 1998, at James's apartment, and he did not appear delusional.  Kathleen

Steder, who had dated defendant from March 1998 to August 1998, testified that she saw defendant

on August 28, 1998, and he did not mention aliens or seem out of touch with reality.

	Jonathan Kelly, a psychiatrist, testified regarding his evaluation of defendant's sanity.  Kelly

met with defendant in 1999 for defendant's fitness evaluation, and in October 2001 and in January

2002 regarding defendant's sanity.  Kelly opined that, although defendant was suffering from a mental

disease or defect on the date of the shooting, defendant had the "substantial capacity to appreciate

the criminality of his conduct" on the date of the shooting.

	Kelly further testified that the reasons he believed that defendant could appreciate the

criminality of his conduct were that defendant sought out someone to shoot, sought an isolated area

in which to approach a victim, waited until dark and no witnesses were present, and approached the

victim while holding the gun behind his back.  Kelly continued that, after the shooting, defendant left

the scene, went back to where his truck was usually parked, had a couple of beers, and then went to

bed.  Kelly also noted that defendant failed to turn himself in or initially admit involvement,

disassembled the weapon, and disposed of the pieces while driving cross-country for his job.  Kelly

opined that defendant's conduct reflected an effort to avoid apprehension, to dispose of evidence

linking him to the crime, and to avoid detection of his criminal behavior.

	Kelly also testified regarding defendant's plan for the shooting.  Kelly discussed defendant's

familiarity with firearms and stated that defendant had gone to his stepbrother's apartment to retrieve a firearm a few hours before the shooting occurred.  Kelly testified that defendant had told him that,

for approximately two weeks prior to the shooting, he had sat in his truck observing people and trying

to decide whom he was going to choose to shoot.  Kelly opined that defendant's conduct reflected

a premeditated plan to commit the crime.

	Kelly further opined that defendant was malingering, reasoning that there was no evidence

of delusions prior to August 28, 1998, and when defendant discussed his delusions, he was

inconsistent in that the nature of the delusions changed from one interview to the next.  Kelly testified

that, based on his review of defendant's records from his 1979 hospitalization, there was evidence that

defendant suffered from a "severe character disorder with antisocial features."  Kelly also noted other

evidence supporting that diagnosis, including that defendant had been involved in "hundreds of fights

during his life," he had "several arrest charges related to battery and criminal damage to property,"

he had on one occasion "threatened to blow the head of his landlady off," and on another occasion

he had thrown his mother-in-law "to the ground and then kicked her and slapped his wife."  Kelly

testified that antisocial personality disorder would not qualify as a mental disease or defect.

	On cross-examination, Kelly acknowledged that, on August 28, 1998, defendant suffered from

a mental illness and a "substantial disorder and thought behavior which impaired his judgment."  He

acknowledged that one of his diagnoses, psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, was also a

diagnosis that Dr. Orest Wasyliw had made of defendant's condition.

	Orest Wasyliw, a clinical psychologist specializing in clinical forensic and neuropsychology,

testified that he interviewed defendant three times in 1999 and twice in October 2001.  Wasyliw also

performed psychological tests on defendant, reviewed defendant's file, and spoke with Kelly,

Detective Simo, and Detective Van Stedum.  Wasyliw concluded that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder his entire adult life.  In discussing defendant's 1979 hospitalization,

Wasyliw testified that what precipitated the hospitalization was defendant "getting into fights and

trouble, including fights with his family and his parents, and using drugs."  Wasyliw diagnosed

defendant as suffering from "psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, with paranoid features."

	Wasyliw opined that on August 28, 1998, defendant appreciated the criminality of killing the

victim.  Wasyliw opined that defendant was sane at the time of the shooting.  On cross-examination,

Wasyliw acknowledged that all of the evaluators agreed that defendant had been experiencing a

psychotic disorder for many years before the shooting.

	At the close of evidence, the parties presented their closing arguments and the trial court

instructed the jury.  The jury received verdict forms by which it could find defendant not guilty; not

guilty by reason of insanity; guilty but mentally ill; or guilty of the offense of first-degree murder. 

Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder.  The trial court

entered judgment on the verdict and ordered a presentence investigation report.  Defendant moved

for a new trial, which, after a hearing, the trial court denied.  The trial court sentenced defendant to

45 years' imprisonment.  Defendant timely appeals following the trial court's denial of defendant's

postsentencing motion.

	Defendant presents the following issue for our review:  whether section 6--2(a) of the

Criminal Code is unconstitutional in that it violates equal protection, due process, and the

proportionate penalties clause of our Illinois Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §1; Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, §§2, 11).

	Before addressing defendant's contention, we will address the historical context under which

it arises.  In Illinois, all defendants are presumed to be sane.  People v. McDonald, 329 Ill. App. 3d 938, 946 (2002), citing People v. Williams, 265 Ill. App. 3d 283, 289 (1994).  However, a defendant may assert the affirmative defense of insanity and, if proved, escape criminal responsibility.  See 720

ILCS 5/6--2 (West 2002).  At least as far back as 1827, our legislature has considered and

reconsidered the extent of a criminal defendant's responsibility as it was affected by a mental disorder. 

See Rev. Stat. 1827, §§5, 6 (section 5 provides that a "lunatic or insane person, without lucid

intervals, shall not be found guilty of any crime *** with which he may be charged").  In its Laws of

1961, the General Assembly revised and enacted the insanity statute, providing in pertinent part:

		"A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as

a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate

the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."  1961

Ill. Laws 1998 (§6--2(a)) (effective January 1, 1962).

	In Public Act 82--553, the legislature amended the statute to add a provision allowing for a

person to be found guilty but mentally ill and a provision defining the phrases "mental illness" and

"mentally ill."  See Pub. Act. 82--553, §1, eff. September 17, 1981.  In Public Act 83--288, the

legislature amended the statute to add a provision describing the burden of proof as to the State and

to the defendant.  See Pub. Act. 83--288, §1, eff. January 1, 1984.  That provision states, in pertinent

part:

		"When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the burden of proof

is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is not

guilty by reason of insanity."  Pub. Act. 83--288, §1, eff. January 1, 1984.

In 1995 the statute was again amended.  See Pub. Act 89--404, §15, eff. August 20, 1995 (codified

at 720 ILCS 5/6--2 (West 1996)).  This amended version of the statute altered the definition of insanity.  Under the amendment, a defendant could no longer raise an insanity defense based on her

or his inability "to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."  The amendment also increased

a defendant's burden of proof for an insanity defense from "a preponderance of the evidence" to "clear

and convincing evidence."  Pub. Act 89--404, §15, eff. August 20, 1995 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/6--

2(a), (e) (West 1996)).

	In 1999 our supreme court declared Public Act 89--404 unconstitutional because it was

enacted in contravention of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution.  See People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1999).  As a result, the law was void ab initio, and section 6--2 of the Criminal Code remained as it was before the adoption of Public Act 89--404's amendments.  However, during the

pendency of the Reedy decision, the General Assembly enacted new legislation containing the same revisions to section 6--2 of the Criminal Code originally included in Public Act 89--404.  See Pub.

Act 90--593, §15, eff. June 19, 1998.  Public Act 90--593 cured the defects of Public Act 89--404

as determined by Reedy and has been held not to violate the single subject clause.  See People v. Terry, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1104, 1110 (2002).

	Therefore, effective June 19, 1998, section 6--2 of the Criminal Code provided in relevant

part:

		"(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct,

as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the

criminality of his conduct.

	* * *

		(e) When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the burden of

proof is on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not

guilty by reason of insanity."  720 ILCS 5/6--2(a), (e) (West 1998).

	In the present case, because the crime was allegedly committed on August 28, 1998, the

insanity defense statute in effect at the time was the amended version which became effective June

19, 1998.  As stated, the version changed the definition of insanity and increased a defendant's burden

of proof.  Defendant on appeal here contends that his equal protection and due process rights were

violated when the jury applied the amended insanity statute to his case.  Defendant argues there was

no rational basis for removing the prong that would have allowed him to argue at trial that he was

unable "to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."  720 ILCS 5/6--2(a) (West 1994).  As

part of his argument, defendant notes that the statute providing for the defense of intoxication has

retained the prong allowing for a defense based on a defendant's inability "to conform his conduct to

the requirements of law."  See 720 ILCS 5/6--3 (West 2002).  Section 6--3 provides in pertinent part:

		"A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged  condition is criminally responsible for

conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial

capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of law."  720 ILCS 5/6--3 (West 2002).

	Defendant argues that, in amending the insanity statute but not the intoxication statute, the

legislature created a situation where a defendant who cannot conform his conduct to the requirements

of law and commits an offense and thereafter seeks an insanity defense to escape criminal

responsibility is treated differently from another defendant who, with the same type of mental

inability, commits an offense and thereafter seeks an intoxication defense to escape criminal responsibility.  Defendant argues that, under the first scenario, the defendant is criminally responsible,

but under the second scenario, the defendant is not criminally responsible.  Defendant concludes that,

because of this disparate treatment, the insanity statute is unconstitutional.

	The constitutionality of a statute is subject to de novo review (People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000)) and may be raised for the first time on appeal (People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 510 (1999)).  Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the challenging party

bears the burden of rebutting that presumption.  People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000). This court has a duty to interpret a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it

can be reasonably done.  People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1998).  Our supreme court has previously held that requiring a defendant to prove insanity does not violate due process.  People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 541-43 (1992).  Therefore, we will focus our analysis as it pertains to defendant's equal protection claim.

	The standards used to determine the constitutionality of a statute under the due process and

equal protection clauses are identical.  People v. Pursley, 341 Ill. App. 3d 230, 236 (2003), citing People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 242 (1994).  The analysis employed to assess equal protection claims is the same under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV,

§1; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, §2).  Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d at 450; People v. Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d 742, 748 (2004).  The guarantee of equal protection of the law requires the government to treat similarly

situated individuals in a similar manner.  Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d at 450; Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 748.  The government may not accord different treatment to individuals who have been placed by statute

into different classes based on criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation.  The government, however, is not forbidden from drawing proper legislative distinctions among different

categories of people.  Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 748-49.

	The level of scrutiny applicable in reviewing legislative classifications depends on the nature

of the classification.  Where the statute creates a "suspect" classification, such as one based on race

or national origin, or impinges on fundamental rights, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny.  Statutes

that do not implicate these concerns are subject to rational basis review.  People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1992); Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 749.  Here, defendant argues that the insanity statute impermissibly denies him an opportunity to escape criminal responsibility based on his inability to

conform his conduct to the requirements of law, while the intoxication statute permits the defense. 

The availability of an affirmative defense is not a suspect classification under the equal protection

clause; therefore, the amendment to the insanity statute needs only to satisfy the rational basis test. 

See Reed, 148 Ill. 2d at 8.

	Under the rational basis test our review is limited and deferential; a statutory classification will

be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.  Pursley, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 236.  If we can reasonably conceive of any set of facts to justify the statutory classification, we will

uphold the statute.  Reed, 148 Ill. 2d at 8.  Thus, we must determine whether a rational basis exists for denying defendants wishing to raise an insanity defense the opportunity to argue that they should

escape criminal liability because they are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of the

law.

	It is well established that the legislature, under its police power, has broad discretion to define

offenses and prescribe penalties and aggravating factors for the offenses.  People v. Torres, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1113 (2002).  Further, the legislature may amend a statute that it has enacted.  See People v. Allen, 153 Ill. 2d 145, 153 (1992).  As stated earlier, the insanity statute has been periodically amended since 1827.  With respect to the change in the definition of insanity and a

defendant's burden of proof, a review of the legislative history reflects that the General Assembly was

concerned that the insanity defense had become too easy to raise and too difficult to disprove.  See People v. Vernon, 276 Ill. App. 3d 386, 390 (1995).  The General Assembly may have also been concerned that those committed to psychiatric care after successfully raising an insanity defense could

be released into society to again commit criminal acts.  Vernon, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 390.  The General Assembly also feared that defendants could fabricate an insanity claim.  Vernon, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 390, quoting 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 21, 1983, at 136 (Comments of

Representative Johnson) (noting that the legislature stated that the changes now at issue were " 'a

modest and reasonable step towards *** putting an out of control defense in some sort of meaningful

control' ").  Based on our review of the statute, its history, its legislative history, and other court

decisions interpreting the statute, we conclude the General Assembly had a rational basis for

amending the definition of insanity.

	With respect to the legislature's decision not to change the definition of the intoxication

statute when it amended the insanity statute, we believe defendant's argument fails here for a number

of reasons.  First, the legislature has no duty to amend its compilation of statutes when it decides to

strike language in one statute simply because the same language is contained in another enactment. 

Second, we believe that the classes of individuals are not similarly situated.  A person seeking a

determination of insanity presents evidence that is primarily subjective (see, e.g., McDonald, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 946), while a person seeking to establish a defense of an intoxicated or drugged condition

may present evidence that includes objective or scientific methods, such as a blood test (see, e.g., People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 36 (1975)).  Finally, we note that Public Act 90--593 did not change the other prong of the definition of insanity, which permits a defendant to argue that he is not

guilty because he "lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct."  720 ILCS

5/6--2(a) (West 1996).  Defendant was still free to argue and be found insane under this prong.

	Although defendant focuses his brief on the legislature's decision to strike the phrase "conform

his conduct to the requirements of law," the legislature's decision to change the burden of proof in

section 6--2(e) and its rationale for so changing it are part and parcel of the amendment.  Given the

legislature's concerns, we believe that the amendment to section 6--2 of the Criminal Code embodies

a rational approach to a perceived problem.  See Vernon, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 390.  Accordingly, we conclude defendant's equal protection and due process rights were not violated.

	We also reject defendant's claim that the insanity statute violates the proportionate penalties

clause, because defendant lacks standing to make such a claim.  Generally, courts will not consider

the validity of a statutory provision unless the person challenging the provision is directly affected by

it or the unconstitutional feature is so pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid.  People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 482 (2003), citing People v. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d 472, 480-81 (1972).  In either case, defendant has standing to bring his constitutional challenge only if he is able to show himself

to be within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality.  See Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d at 482, citing People v. Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1976).

	In the present case, defendant essentially presents a hypothetical situation in which he argues

that he would have faced vastly different penalties had he been able to use as his affirmative defense

the prior version of the insanity statute.  Of course, this situation also implies that a jury would have

found in his favor by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or mental defect and that he lacked the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  In

reality, defendant was charged with committing the offense of first-degree murder, and a jury found

him guilty of committing first-degree murder.  Implicit in the jury's finding of guilt is a refusal to find

that defendant suffered from a "mental disease or mental defect" or that he lacked the "substantial

capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct," or both.  See 720 ILCS 5/6--2(a) (West 1998); People v. Foley, 318 Ill. App. 3d 38, 44 (2000).  A defendant does not ordinarily have standing to challenge a statute as it might have been applied in different circumstances.  See People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 644 (2000).  Because defendant is unable to show that he was actually an aggrieved party

(see Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d at 482), we conclude defendant has no standing to challenge the penalties he could have faced had the legislature not amended the insanity statute, and had the jury found by

a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or mental defect and was

unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

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	Defendant also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. 

Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony regarding bad acts

that defendant allegedly committed, failing to request a limiting instruction, and failing to object

during the State's closing argument.  Defendant asks that we review his contention for plain error. 

Defendant also claims that the cumulative impact of these alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial

and thus warrants reversal.  The State counters that we need not review defense counsel's

performance because defendant cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his

counsel's alleged errors.

	The standard for determining whether defense counsel was ineffective is well established. 

Generally, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's errors.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984) (adopting Strickland).  Decisions such as what matters to object to and when to object are matters of trial strategy.  People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 327 (1997).  A decision that involves a matter of trial strategy will typically not support a claim of

ineffective representation.  People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 305 (1994), citing People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 106 (1989).  Neither mistakes in strategy nor the fact that another attorney with the benefit

of hindsight would have proceeded differently is sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of

counsel.  People v. Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 130, 138 (1995).  Moreover, reviewing courts have repeatedly held that the prosecutor must be given wide latitude in her or his ability to argue before

the jury.  People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993).  Nevertheless, we may resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice renders

irrelevant the issue of counsel's performance.  People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 469 (1996), citing People v. Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 90 (1994).

	In the present case, the record fails to demonstrate that defendant suffered prejudice.  To

show prejudice, a defendant must establish a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.  The evidence clearly established that on August 28, 1998,

defendant approached the victim and shot him numerous times, causing his death.  Defendant told his former wife, Teresa Burke, that he had killed some "some Nigger" with his 9-millimeter firearm

at an industrial park in Addison.  Defendant confessed to the police, described the victim and the

scene of the shooting, accompanied the officers to the scene and reenacted the shooting.  Defendant

told the officers how he disposed of his weapon and further told them where they could find parts of

his weapon.  Defendant also wrote a statement, implicating himself.

	Furthermore, the evidence supported the jury's verdict that defendant was not insane at the

time of the shooting.  The State presented evidence that, before the shooting, defendant sought to

retrieve his gun from his stepbrother, James Chambers.  Chambers testified that he did not notice

defendant having delusions or that defendant could not understand right from wrong.  After the

shooting, defendant disassembled the weapon and disposed of the parts in various places.  When he

was apprehended by the police, defendant denied any knowledge of the shooting and claimed that he

had sold his 9-millimeter gun in 1997.  Detective Simo testified that, after the initial denial, he had

no problems communicating with defendant during any of the interviews, and defendant's answers

were responsive.  As stated earlier, both the State and defendant presented authorities who examined

defendant and his history.  Despite defendant's theories that he had alien DNA, was employed and

authorized by the Treasury Department to kill, and his natural father was the head of the "mafia" and

authorized him to kill, we believe there was overwhelming evidence that defendant knowingly shot

the victim and appreciated the criminality of his act.  All of the State's testimony, including its expert

testimony, supported the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of committing first-degree murder

and its rejection of defendant's affirmative defense that he was insane.

	Given our above determination that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish

defendant's guilt and sanity, defendant cannot establish that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of his trial would have been different had defense counsel interposed objections to the

State's evidence or its closing argument or requested limiting instructions.  Incompetence of counsel

is not established by a failure to object to evidence, even if the evidence is inadmissible.  People v. Walker, 255 Ill. App. 3d 10, 17 (1993).  Furthermore, any failure bring the instructional error to the trial court's attention did not deny defendant a fair trial as no grave or reversible error occurred.  See People v. Perkins, 274 Ill. App. 3d 834 (1995).

	In defendant's brief and at oral argument, defense counsel relied on People v. Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d 631 (1994), in support of the argument that trial counsel was ineffective when he allowed

the State to present excessive and repetitive evidence of prior crimes and bad acts to the jury without

a relevancy objection or a request to trial court to balance the probative value of the evidence against

the prejudicial effect.  In Chambers, the defendant stabbed his girlfriend to death during an argument while they were passengers riding in a car following a night of drinking.  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 631-32.  The defendant presented an insanity defense.  Prior to trial, the trial court barred the

admission of the defendant's previous convictions and ruled the convictions were admissible only for

impeachment purposes.  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 633.  At trial, one of the State's expert witnesses testified in detail about the defendant's criminal history, which included offenses of

aggravated arson, smoking in a community center, traffic tickets, burglary, 33 counts of armed

robbery, attempted murder, residential burglary, and aggravated battery.  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 633.  Defense counsel did not object.  A jury convicted the defendant, and he appealed, contending,

inter alia, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not block the admission of evidence regarding his criminal background.

	On review, this court reversed, noting that the expert witness's testimony put before the jury

"a significant amount of criminal history that would otherwise have been excluded."  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 633.  We stated that the detailed evidence of the defendant's criminal history was "only

marginally relevant" to the dispute at issue, which concerned the defendant's intoxication at the time

of the murder.  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 635.  We also determined that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

it, especially in detailed form.  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 635.  In finding that reversible error occurred, we stated that the evidence pertaining to the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime was

not so overwhelming that no fair-minded jury could have voted for acquittal.  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 636, citing People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 141 (1980).

	In the present case, the disputed issues centered on whether defendant suffered from a mental

disease or mental defect and whether he was so impaired by the delusions regarding aliens, the

Treasury Department, or the mob that he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality

of his conduct.  These issues could not be determined unless the experts reviewed defendant's mental

history, which included the incidents leading up to his 1979 hospitalization.  " 'Almost every aspect

in a defendant's life is relevant when the defense of insanity is raised.' "  Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 634, quoting People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284, 290 (1986).  Unlike in Chambers, the testimony regarding defendant's past conduct was relevant to the issues in dispute and was not so prejudicial

that it outweighed its probative value.  Defendant's past conduct, including the acts of violence, and

his conduct in the months and days before the shooting were relevant and probative in the jury's

determination of whether defendant suffered from a mental illness or mental defect and whether he

lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the shooting.  We also note that none of the evidence regarding defendant's conduct had been the subject of a prior

court ruling barring the State from presenting it.  See Chambers, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 633.  We, therefore, find Chambers distinguishable.

	Because no prejudice resulted, it cannot be said that defense counsel denied defendant the

effective assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, we hold that trial counsel was not ineffective.  Further,

a review of defense counsel's performance does not fall within the parameters of the plain error

doctrine because the evidence is not closely balanced.  See People v. Williams, 265 Ill. App. 3d 283, 288 (1994).

	Based on our review of the record, we determine that defendant failed to establish a

reasonable probability that, but for these alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

outcome of defendant's trial would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.  We therefore reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.  We also reject defendant's argument that the cumulative effect of his counsel's errors denied

him a fair trial.  "[W]here there is no reversible error on any individual issue, these errors cannot

cumulatively warrant a new trial."  People v. Smallwood, 224 Ill. App. 3d 393, 409 (1991).  Because we found no reversible errors committed here, there was no cumulative effect warranting a new trial. 

	[The preceding material is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.]

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

	Affirmed.

	GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.