a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2006 BISCUIT FIRE 

RECOVERY PROJECT

Analysis of Project 

Development, Salvage 

Sales, and Other 

Activities

GAO-06-967
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

BISCUIT FIRE RECOVERY PROJECT

Analysis of Project Development, Salvage 

Highlights of GAO-06-967, a report to Sales, and Other Activities 

congressional requesters 

In 2002, the Biscuit Fire burned

almost 500,000 acres of the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest in 

southwestern Oregon. In its wake, 

the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

(Project) is one of the largest, most

complex postfire recovery projects

undertaken by the Forest Service.

Considerable controversy exists 

over the Project and its salvage

sales to harvest dead trees. 

GAO was asked to determine (1) 

how the Project compares with the 

Forest Service’s general approach 

to postfire recovery, (2) the status 

of the Project’s salvage sales and 

how the reported financial and

economic results of the sales 

compare with initial estimates, (3) 

the status of other Project 

activities, and (4) the extent of

reported improper logging and the

agency’s response. To answer these 

objectives, GAO reviewed Project

environmental analysis documents,

plans, and activity reports and 

interviewed agency officials. 

What GAO Recommends

Given the size and unique nature of

this fire and continuing public 

interest, GAO recommends that the 

Chief of the Forest Service direct 

the Pacific Northwest Regional

Forester and the Rogue RiverSiskiyou Forest Supervisor to

report annually on the Project’s 

status until substantially complete. 

In comments, the Forest Service 

agreed with the report findings but 

asked for a time limit for the 

recommended annual report. GAO 

modified its recommendation. 

The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the Forest Service’s 

general approach to postfire recovery in developing the Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project, but several unique circumstances affected the time taken 

and the alternatives it included. For example, the size of the burned area—

and, subsequently, the size of the Project—complicated the environmental 

analysis and increased the time needed to complete and review it. Also, the 

regulations and guidance governing timber harvest and road building in the 

forest’s inventoried roadless areas changed several times, in part due to 

litigation, affecting the amount of timber available for harvest. 

As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales;

however, incomplete sales and a lack of comparable economic data, among 

other things, make comparing the financial and economic results with the 

agency’s initial estimates difficult. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the 

Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales and 

related activities. In the next several years, the Forest Service also plans to 

spend an additional $5.7 million to remove brush and reforest the sale areas. 

In return, the agency collected about $8.8 million from the sales. While the 

agency estimated that the salvage sales would generate about $19.6 million 

for restoration, 6,900 local jobs, and $240 million in regional economic 

activity, it is premature to compare these estimates with the results because 

the sales are not complete. The Forest Service will generate additional 

expenditures, revenues, and economic activity from two sales sold in the 

summer of 2006. Even when complete sales’ results are available, however, a 

comparison will be complicated by a lack of comparable financial and 

economic data. 

Through December 2005, the forest staff began work on most of the other 

activities identified in the Project but completing them depends on the 

amount of salvage harvest, funding sources, and work schedules. For 

example, the amount of brush disposal work—estimated at 18,939 acres—

will be reduced because the acres of salvage harvest have been reduced. 

Other activities, such as establishing fuel management zones to help fight 

future fires, depend on the Forest Service funding and scheduling the work 

over many years. In addition, a large-scale study and monitoring activities

are still being planned and yet unfunded. Although the forest staff identified 

the importance of making Project results available to the public, they do not 

separately report on Project activities and results from other programs. 

During salvage harvest operations in 2004 and 2005, the Forest Service 

reported three incidents of improper logging and took action to prevent such

occurrences in the future. Two of the incidents were caused by Forest 

Service errors in marking its boundaries. Forest staff have since developed 

procedures to better mark boundaries of sale areas. A third incident was 

caused by an error on the part of the company that purchased the sale; the 

company was fined $24,000, and the trees were left on the ground. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-967.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robin M. 

Nazzaro at (202) 512-3184 or 

nazzaror@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6

Background 9

Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest Staff Followed the Forest 

Service’s Postfire Recovery Approach, but Unique Circumstances 

Affected the Time Taken and Alternatives Considered for the 

Biscuit Fire Recovery Project 15

Salvage Sales Are Nearly Complete, but a Full Comparison of 

Financial and Economic Results with Initial Estimates Is

Difficult 30

Other Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Activities Are Under Way, but 

Depend on Harvest Activity, Schedules, Sale Revenues, and Other 

Funding 43

Forest Made Operational Changes and Assessed Fines to Address 

Improper Logging That Occurred in Three Locations 53

Conclusions 57

Recommendation for Executive Action 58

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 58

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 61

Appendix II: Comments from the Forest Service 66

GAO Comments 68

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 69

Tables Table 1: Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Salvage Sale Locations and 

Volumes through December 2005 34

Table 2: Biscuit Fire Hazard and Deck Tree Salvage Sales and 

Volumes through December 2005 35

Table 3: Estimated Expenditures on Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales, 

Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005 39

Table 4: Revenues Collected from Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales 

through December 2005 40

Table 5: Work Planned and Completed through December 2005 44

Figures Figure 1: Biscuit Fire Map, Vegetation Change 10
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Figure 2: Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Time Line Compared with 

the Forest Service’s General Approach to Postfire 

Recovery 16

Figure 3: Unique Circumstances Affecting the Time Taken and 

Alternatives Considered for the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project 22

Figure 4: Map of Burned Area with Inventoried Roadless Areas 27

Figure 5: Map of Salvage Sales Sold in the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project 32

Figure 6: Map of Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Fuel Management 

Zones 48

Abbreviations

EIS environmental impact statement

K-V Knutson-Vandenberg 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NOI Notice of Intent

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Page 1 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 18, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

United States Senate

The Honorable Ron Wyden

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

United States Senate

The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project (Project), a large-scale project to recover 

areas of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest burned by the Biscuit 

Fire, is one of the largest and most complex postfire recovery projects the 

Forest Service has ever undertaken. The Biscuit Fire burned almost 500,000 

acres of federal land in Oregon and California in 2002, making it the largest 

fire in the nation outside of Alaska since 1997. 1 In the last decade, the 

nation has experienced many large fires that have burned increasing 

numbers of acres. The 2002 fire season, one of the nation’s worst fire 

seasons in the last 50 years, burned 6.9 million acres of public and private 

forests and rangelands in the United States—more than any other year 

except 2000 and 2005. 

After large fires on federal lands, federal land managers identify activities 

and projects that they believe will help recover forest resources such as 

trees and vegetation, roads, recreation facilities, wildlife habitat, and 

streams and rivers. Specifically, the Forest Service within the Department 

of Agriculture—and other federal land management agencies—have 

defined recovery activities to include emergency stabilization, 

rehabilitation, and restoration. Emergency stabilization is conducted 

within 1 year of a fire through the Burned Area Emergency Response 

program to address threats to life, property, or resources; it includes work

1

GAO reported on the federal government’s efforts to suppress the Biscuit Fire in GAO, 

Biscuit Fire: Analysis of Fire Response, Resource Availability, and Personnel 

Certification Standards, GAO-04-426 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2004). 
Page 2 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

such as seeding and mulching to reduce soil erosion and runoff.2

Rehabilitation is conducted within 3 years of a fire and includes such work 

as repairing roads or trails, reforesting or planting trees, and restoring 

wildlife habitat. Restoration continues such rehabilitation activities as 

reforesting beyond the first 3 years after a fire. The Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project focuses on the long-term rehabilitation and restoration of the fire 

area, not emergency stabilization or Burned Area Emergency Response 

activities. 

During the postfire process, the Forest Service may also consider whether 

to leave burned trees and allow the burned area to recover naturally or to 

harvest some of the dead and dying trees—called salvage harvesting—with 

the intention of generating jobs and economic development, and generating 

funds to help pay for the recovery of natural resources or Forest Service 

infrastructure, such as roads and trails. According to the Forest Service, 

salvage harvesting should be done relatively quickly after a fire, before the 

trees begin to decay, which makes the wood less usable and valuable. 

Generally, smaller trees lose their commercial value after about 2 years, 

and larger trees lose most of their commercial value after 3 or 4 years. 

However, considerable scientific controversy exists about whether and 

how quickly harvested areas recover compared with unharvested areas, 

and experts disagree about whether salvage harvesting the burned timber 

provides economic development and generates funding for recovery in 

addition to that needed to pay for planning, preparing, and administering 

sales. For this reason, we recently recommended that the Forest Service 

pursue additional research on the effects of salvage harvesting.3

While the Forest Service does not have a discrete program or agencywide 

guidance for managing postfire rehabilitation and restoration activities, its 

general approach begins with an evaluation of the condition of forest 

resources. For large fires, Forest Service staff can use photographs and 

images taken from airplanes or satellites—collectively called remote 

sensing data—to identify burned and unburned areas. Then, staff identify 

activities that they believe will help rehabilitate and restore damaged 

2

GAO reported on this program in GAO, Wildland Fires: Better Information Needed on 

Effectiveness of Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments, GAO-03-430

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2003).

3

GAO, Wildland Fire Rehabilitation and Restoration: Forest Service and BLM Could 

Benefit from Improved Information on Status of Needed Work, GAO-06-670 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 30, 2006).
Page 3 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

resources, as well as opportunities for salvage harvest. Depending on how 

severely or intensely an area is burned, the effects to trees, water, wildlife, 

and other resources can vary. According to agency officials, they may 

determine that no rehabilitation or restoration work is needed because 

natural recovery may be sufficient or the fire may have benefited some 

resources that are adapted to wildland fire. Further, some areas that have 

burned, such as wilderness areas, may limit management activities. 

However, when the staff identify activities they want to undertake and 

determine that the activities will significantly impact the environment, they 

develop an environmental impact statement (EIS), as required by the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The EIS identifies the 

significant environmental effects of the proposed action and a range of 

reasonable alternative actions. If the proposed action includes salvage 

sales, the staff conduct a financial and economic analyses of the sales for 

each alternative in the EIS; the financial analysis estimates the agency’s 

expenditures and revenues, and the economic analysis estimates the jobs 

and economic income generated. They then issue a record of decision 

stating the agency’s decision and identifying the alternatives considered 

and begin to implement and monitor the selected alternative. Project 

activities are typically implemented by the appropriate forest program, 

such as Forest Products, Engineering, or Fish and Wildlife, as part of each 

program’s annual workload. 

The Biscuit Fire burned nearly half of the Siskiyou National Forest, which 

was administratively joined with the Rogue River National Forest in 2004, 

and almost all of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, which lies within the Siskiyou 

forest.4

 The area lies within the Klamath-Siskiyou ecoregion, an area 

renowned for its abundant ecological diversity and rugged geological 

features, as well as being one of the largest areas without roads in the 

Pacific Northwest. These areas are managed under the Siskiyou National 

Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (forest plan), as amended by 

the Northwest Forest Plan—a plan designed to protect species that rely on 

old-growth forests, while also producing a sustainable level of timber from 

the national forests of the Pacific Northwest.5

 The Northwest Forest Plan 

designates land allocations, or areas that must be managed for designated 

purposes in accordance with specified standards and guidelines. These 

4

There are 155 nationally proclaimed forests, some of which have been joined 

administratively to enable better management, resulting in 123 administrative units.

5

The Siskiyou National Forest and the Rogue River National Forest have separate forest 

plans that were approved in 1989 and 1990, respectively. 
Page 4 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

allocations include late-successional reserves—areas designed to serve as 

habitat for species, such as the Northern spotted owl, that depend on 

late-successional and old-growth trees—as well as areas called “matrix” 

lands in which most commercial timber harvest is to take place. The 

Siskiyou forest plan designates some of these lands as inventoried roadless 

areas—areas without roads that were identified by the Forest Service in 

wilderness planning efforts. They are managed according to underlying 

land allocations, some of which restrict road construction and timber 

harvesting.

After the Biscuit Fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff 

developed the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project and an accompanying EIS. In 

July 2004, the Forest Supervisor signed three records of decision for the 

Project, one covering activities within inventoried roadless areas, one 

covering activities in late-successional reserves outside roadless areas, and 

one covering activities in matrix lands outside inventoried roadless areas. 

In accordance with the Forest Service’s decentralized management 

structure—which includes 155 national forests, nine regions, and a 

Washington Office—the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest Supervisor 

decided which of the alternative actions to implement. The activities in the 

records of decision included almost 20,000 acres of salvage logging with 

367 million board feet of timber;6

 almost 20,000 acres of brush 

disposal—removal of branches and other postharvest debris in the sale 

areas; 285 miles of fuel management zones—areas in which trees and brush 

have been removed to reduce “fuel” that might burn in future fires; almost 

30,000 acres of reforestation, including harvested acres; and about 7,500 

acres of wildlife habitat rehabilitation. The records of decision also called 

for the Forest Service to monitor certain resource conditions, such as 

water quality, and conduct a large-scale study of the effects of fire on 

late-successional reserve habitat and the effect of various management 

actions on postfire recovery. 

The Forest Service’s decision to include salvage harvest in the recovery 

project, particularly in late-successional reserves and inventoried roadless 

areas, was controversial. Experts disagreed on the amount of timber to 

harvest, with some asserting that there were large amounts of timber 

available to harvest in the fire area, and others asserting that any salvage 

harvest would damage the forest. Numerous lawsuits challenged different 

aspects of the NEPA analysis, including the adequacy of the Forest 

6

A board foot is the volume of a piece of wood 1-foot square and 1-inch thick. 
Page 5 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Service’s economic analysis of the sales; these suits are still pending. 

Meanwhile, a timber industry group was concerned about the time taken to 

conduct the EIS and salvage harvest, while environmental groups said any 

delay was attributable to the time taken to analyze additional salvage 

harvest. In addition, the Forest Service’s implementation of the Project’s 

salvage sales is controversial. As of the end of 2005, the Forest Service had 

sold burnt timber in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas, as well 

as roadside trees that were considered hazardous because they could fall. 

Although the forest staff identified the sale boundaries and visited the sale 

sites during harvest operations, instances of improper salvage harvest 

occurred. In particular, environmental groups reported that salvage harvest 

occurred in a botanical area adjacent to one of the salvage sale areas and 

stated that this indicated poor management of the sales by the forest staff. 

These groups also dispute the Forest Service’s financial and economic 

estimates for the salvage sales.

In this context, you asked us to determine (1) how the development of the 

Biscuit Fire Recovery Project compared with the Forest Service’s general 

approach to postfire recovery, (2) the status of the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results 

of the sales compared with the Forest Service’s initial estimates, (3) the 

status of other activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, and 

(4) the extent and cause of improper logging within the Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project, as reported by the Forest Service, and changes the 

agency made to prevent such occurrences in the future.

In conducting our work, we reviewed minutes, briefings, and other forest 

documents from the administrative file for the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project and developed a time line of the decisions made by the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest staff. We discussed the time line with 

officials and decision makers at the Forest Service’s Rogue River-Siskiyou 

National Forest, Pacific Northwest Region, and Washington Office and the 

Department of Agriculture to further elaborate on events that affected the 

time frames and alternatives considered for the Project. To determine the 

status of the Project’s activities, we reviewed contracts for work that had 

been accomplished, reviewed plans for work not yet accomplished, and 

discussed both the contracts and the plans with the forest staff to reconcile 

any differences. We reviewed financial and economic analyses of the 

salvage sales in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project EIS and discussed them 

with the Forest Service’s Regional Economist. However, because of 

ongoing litigation, we did not evaluate the adequacy of the economic 

analysis. We obtained and analyzed Forest Service expenditures and 
Page 6 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

receipts from the Biscuit Fire salvage sales, as well as expenditure data 

from the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture’s Office of 

General Counsel, which provided legal services related to the salvage sales. 

We obtained expenditure data for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 and 

receipts through December 2005, the last year for which complete data 

were available. Finally, we examined internal and investigative reports on 

improper logging and interviewed responsible officials about their 

responses. As appropriate, we assessed the reliability of the data and 

determined that it was sufficient for this report. We performed our work 

between November 2005 and July 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more 

detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Results in Brief The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the Forest 

Service’s general approach to postfire recovery in developing the Biscuit 

Fire Recovery Project; however, several unique circumstances affected the 

time taken to develop the Project and the alternatives it included. First, the 

size of the burned area—and, subsequently, the size of the 

Project—complicated the environmental analysis and increased the time 

needed to complete and review it. For example, to assess resource 

conditions, such as identifying the extent of dead trees, the forest staff had 

to rely on remote sensing data that were difficult to interpret and 

time-consuming to verify. Second, before, during, and after the 

development of the Project and EIS, the regulations and guidance 

governing permissible timber harvest and road building in inventoried 

roadless areas changed several times, in part due to litigation. According to 

agency officials, these changes affected the amount of timber available for 

harvest in the inventoried roadless areas and, therefore, directly affected 

the range of alternatives considered in the EIS and the time needed to 

develop them. Finally, during development of the EIS, the forest staff 

reorganized and downsized, although the effect on the EIS is difficult to 

quantify. According to the staff, the changes increased their workload and 

limited the amount of time they could devote to developing and 

implementing the Project. However, according to the Forest Supervisor and 

other managers, the forest had enough staff to develop and implement the 

various alternatives identified in the EIS. 

As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales 

in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas; however, incomplete 

sales information and a lack of comparable economic data make a 

comparison of the financial and economic results of the sales with the 
Page 7 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

agency’s initial estimates difficult. For the sales conducted through 2005, 

purchasers harvested almost 60 million board feet, which is much less than 

the 367 million board feet proposed for sale in the EIS. Forest staff 

overestimated the timber available for harvest and, in addition, some 

timber decayed during the preparation of the EIS and sales, further 

reducing the volume of available timber. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005, 

the Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales 

and related activities such as law enforcement. In the next several years, 

the Forest Service plans to spend an additional $5.7 million to remove 

brush, reforest, and conduct other work in the sale areas. In return, the 

agency collected about $8.8 million from the sales. In the EIS, the sale 

expenditures and receipts were estimated to be about $24 million and $19.6 

million, respectively, and the salvage harvest was expected to generate 

about 6,900 local jobs and $240 million in regional economic activity. 

However, it is premature to compare the results through 2005 with the 

estimates because the Forest Service will generate additional expenditures, 

revenues, and potential economic activity from two sales in June and 

August 2006. Even if complete sale results were available, methodological 

differences and lack of comparable economic data complicate the 

comparison of the salvage sale results and EIS estimates. For example, the 

financial comparison is complicated by the fact that the reported 

expenditures through fiscal year 2005 include different activities, such as 

the environmental analysis, than the EIS estimates. Similarly, the economic 

comparison is complicated by the fact that the Forest Service does not 

report the jobs or economic activity resulting from sales. According to 

Forest Service officials, the agency does not conduct the type of analysis 

needed to report the results because the primary reason for preparing EIS 

estimates is to compare the relative economic effects of salvage 

alternatives and not to provide a precise prediction of the outcomes of the 

sales. However, all else being equal, given that the volume of timber sold 

through 2005 is substantially less than the volume of sales assumed in the 

EIS for the selected alternative, we would expect the actual economic 

results to be less than the EIS estimate. 

Through December 2005, the forest staff have begun work on most of the 

other activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project but 

completing them depends on the amount of salvage harvest, funding 

sources, and schedules. Three such activities, reforestation, brush disposal, 

and road maintenance, are under way and have funding and time frames 

associated with them, but the needed work will change with the amount of 

salvage harvest. For example, the amount of brush disposal 

work—estimated at 18,939 acres in the records of decision—will be 
Page 8 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

reduced because the number of acres where salvage harvest occurred has 

been reduced. Other activities, such as establishing fuel management zones 

and rehabilitating wildlife habitat—both in and outside salvage sale 

areas—depend on the Forest Service funding and scheduling the work over 

many years. In addition, a large-scale adaptive management study and 

monitoring activities are still being planned and not yet funded. As of June 

2006, work contemplated in the study—such as mapping monitoring 

plots—had not been started, and the forest staff had not determined how 

the study would be funded. According to the Forest Service, these activities 

can be funded and implemented many years into the future. 

During salvage harvest operations in 2004 and 2005, the Forest Service 

reported three incidents of improper logging and took action to prevent 

such occurrences in the future. Two of the incidents were caused by Forest 

Service errors, and a third was an error on the part of the harvest company 

that purchased the sale units. One of the Forest Service errors was 

identified by a local environmental group, and the second was caught by an 

independent researcher; the purchaser error was reported to the Forest 

Service by the purchaser. Both of the Forest Service errors resulted from 

mismarked boundaries, one at the boundary of a botanical area and the 

other at the boundary of the wilderness area. The forest staff have since 

developed procedures to better mark boundaries of sale areas, and the 

regional staff have emphasized the need to properly measure boundaries as 

well. In the case of the purchaser’s error, existing sale administration 

processes addressed the mistake. Specifically, in accordance with the sale 

contract provisions, the purchaser was fined $24,000, or $200 for each tree 

cut, and the trees were left on the site. In addition to these errors, the forest 

staff worked with local groups that monitored the sale areas before and 

after harvest and followed up on numerous other claims of improper 

logging, but determined that the logging was properly conducted. 

Given the size, unique nature, and public interest and controversy 

surrounding the fire and the Project, the potential for significant research 

results on the effects of postfire management activities, and potential 

future changes to Project activities, it is important that the Forest Service 

be able to specifically track and provide information on the Project’s status 

and results. However, because the activities are being implemented 

through the agency’s regular programs, the forest staff do not track or 

report the status of Project activities separately from other program 

accomplishments. As a result, although the forest staff indicated in the 

Project records of decision that monitoring results would be made 

available to the public, they cannot readily report on the status of Project 
Page 9 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

activities—in particular the activities that will be implemented over the 

long term. To help keep the Congress and the public informed on the 

Project’s status and results—particularly the research study component of 

the Project—we are recommending that the Chief of the Forest Service 

direct the Pacific Northwest Regional Forester and the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest Supervisor to publish an annual status 

report on the Project through its completion. In commenting on a draft of 

this report, the Forest Service generally agreed with our findings and the 

recommendation but stated that the time period for providing the report 

should be limited to the next 3-to-5 year period. Because of the long-term 

nature of some of the activities in the Project, we believe the reports should 

be provided until the Project is substantially complete. We revised the 

recommendation accordingly. 

Background The Biscuit Fire began in July 2002 as 5 separate fires in southwest Oregon 

in the Siskiyou National Forest, which was administratively joined with the 

Rogue River National Forest in 2004. The fire was one of 12 or 13 large fires 

that burned throughout the Pacific Northwest Region in 2002 due to severe 

drought conditions; in addition to the Biscuit Fire, fires burned in the 

Deschutes, Umpqua, Malheur, and other forests in the region. In Oregon, 

the Biscuit Fire burned mostly within the Siskiyou Forest, which 

encompasses more than 1 million acres of diverse, steep, and rugged 

landscape made up of the Klamath Mountains, the Coast Ranges, the 

180,000-acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness, and many roadless areas.7

 By 

September 2002, the fire was being controlled, and Forest Service staff 

were conducting Burned Area Emergency Response program projects to 

stabilize the most severely burned areas. By November 2002, the fire was 

declared controlled, and the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff 

were beginning their postfire recovery efforts.

In evaluating conditions after the fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National 

Forest staff determined that some areas were not so severely burned as to 

warrant management action. However, in some instances, the forest staff 

identified areas that were severely burned and resources that would not 

recover as quickly as desired without forest intervention. The fire burned in 

a mosaic pattern, with about 30 percent of the area burned lightly, with 

little vegetation killed, and about 44 percent burned intensely, with more 

7

The fire also burned a small portion of the Six Rivers National Forest in California and the 

Medford District of the Bureau of Land Management.
Page 10 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

than 75 percent of vegetation killed; the remaining acreage burned with 

mixed intensity and mixed results (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Biscuit Fire Map, Vegetation Change 

Pacific

 Ocean OREGON

CALIFORNIA

S. Bank Rd.

FLAT

TOP

OAK

FLAT

GAME

LAKE

VALEN

LAKE

HAYES

HILL

VULCAN

LAKE

BRANDY

PEAK

CHETCO

PEAK

BISCUIT

HILL

ELK

MTN.

EMILY

MOUNT

BOSLEY BUTTE

BIG

CRAGGIES

LAWSON

BUTTE

BUCKSKIN

PEAK

BABYFOOT

LAKE

PEARSOLL

PEAK

BALD

MOUNTAIN

SQUAW

MOUNTAIN

FISH HOOK

PEAK

ONION

MOUNTAIN

OREGON

MTN.

QUOSATANA

BUTTE

FIDDLER

MTN.

TENNESSEE

MTN.

SNOW

CAMP

MTN.

EIGHT

DOLLAR

MTN.

QUAIL

PRAIRIE

MOUNTAIN

"

"

"

"

"

")

"

"

1107

3

"

")

3

Rogue River

Chetco River

Illinois River

E. Fork Illinois River

N. Fk. Smith R.

S. Fk. Chetco R.

£

£199

W. Fork 

Illinois River

Rogue River

Selma

Agness

Galice

TAKILMA

O'BRIEN

Brookings

CAVE

JUNCTION

1:330,000

Siskiyou National Forest

Biscuit Fire boundary

Bureau of Land Management lands

Other ownership in Siskiyou National Forest

0 5 2.5 Miles

Vegetation change

Dead trees without needles

Dead trees with needles

Live and dead mixed

Little or no change

Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data.

N
Page 11 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

In evaluating postfire recovery projects and activities, the following laws 

and regulations affect the approach that the Forest Service generally takes: 

• The National Forest Management Act of 1976 requires the Forest 

Service to, among other things, (1) develop a plan to manage the lands 

and resources of each national forest in coordination with the land 

management planning process of other federal agencies, states, and 

localities and (2) revise each plan at least every 15 years. Each forest 

plan—called a Land and Resource Management Plan—establishes how 

land areas within a forest may be used and governs individual projects 

or activities that occur within the forest. Individual projects or activities, 

such as building a road or harvesting timber, may take place only if they 

are consistent with the plan and after site-specific environmental 

review, which often includes public notice, comment, and 

administrative appeal. 

• Under NEPA, agencies such as the Forest Service generally evaluate the 

likely effects of projects they propose using a relatively brief 

environmental assessment to determine if an EIS is needed. If the action 

would be likely to significantly affect the environment, a more detailed 

EIS is required. An agency may exclude categories of actions having no 

significant environmental impact—called categorical exclusions—from 

the requirement to prepare an EIS.8

 One purpose of the EIS is to ensure 

that agencies have detailed information available to inform their 

decision making. Agencies such as the Forest Service give the public an 

opportunity to comment on draft environmental assessments and 

impact statements. In addition, the Forest Service has established 

procedures for administrative appeal of its decisions concerning 

projects and activities on National Forest System lands.9 As a general 

8

Some Forest Service activities that are subject to a categorical exclusion include actions to 

(1) repair and maintain roads and trails, (2) regenerate an area to native tree species, 

including site preparation, and (3) maintain and repair recreation sites and facilities.

9

Under these regulations, an appeal must be filed within 45 days of the public notice of 

decision and the appeal must be decided within 45 days after the appeal period closes. The 

project may be implemented on or after15 days following the appeal decision. The regional 

forester decides appeals of project decisions by forest supervisors within the region. 

Regardless of appeals, that portion of a project determined to be an emergency situation 

may proceed immediately. Emergency situations include those where immediate 

implementation of a decision is necessary to provide relief from hazards threatening human 

health and safety or natural resources, or situations that would result in substantial loss of 

economic value to the federal government if delays occurred. 
Page 12 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

rule, once the administrative appeals process is complete, the public can 

litigate in a federal court a decision about a particular project.

• In 2001, the Forest Service issued a rule for managing its inventoried 

roadless areas, which generally include areas without roads that are 

5,000 acres or larger, or smaller areas contiguous to designated 

wilderness areas.10 This rule, which was intended to provide lasting 

protection for inventoried roadless areas within the National Forest 

System, generally prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, 

and timber harvesting. However, U.S. District Court for the District of 

Wyoming found the rule unlawful and struck it down in 2003.11 The 

government did not appeal this decision and issued a new rule related to 

the roadless areas in 2005, also now in litigation. The new rule allows 

states to petition the Forest Service to issue regulations establishing 

management requirements for inventoried roadless areas within their 

states. The opportunity for submitting state petitions is available until 

November 13, 2006.12

• Projects involving salvage harvests are governed by the Forest Service’s 

timber sales regulations and procedures. To sell timber, the forest staff 

identify the areas that they want to harvest—called sale units—identify 

the unit boundaries, and develop a timber sale contract that contains 

many standard provisions, such as limits on which trees can be 

harvested and requirements to prevent and control erosion. Sale units 

can be located along roads to allow access by logging trucks and 

equipment; logs are cut and hauled from the slopes by tractors or pulled 

by cables suspended above the ground. Sale units that are located 

farther away from roads—such as roadless areas—can be logged using 

10Under the Wilderness Act of 1964, the Forest Service undertook a planning effort to 

identify roadless areas to be added to the wilderness system and those to be opened to 

development, called the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation. It undertook a second 

evaluation, called the Roadless Area Review and Evaluation II beginning in 1977 and 

completed it in 1979.

11Wyoming v. USDA, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated as moot 414 F. 3d 1207 

(10th Cir. 2005).

12As of July 2006, the Department of Agriculture had agreed to work with three 

states—Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina—to make state-specific rules 

governing inventoried roadless areas. Three states—California, New Mexico, and 

Oregon—have filed a lawsuit challenging the repeal of the 2001 rules, and Oregon and 

Washington filed petitions with the Department of Agriculture asking that states be allowed 

to follow the 2001 rules.
Page 13 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

helicopters. In such cases, loggers cut the trees and the logs are then 

flown out by helicopter. Timber sales are laid out by timber planners and 

the sales are monitored by a timber sale administrator that visits the site 

to review contract provisions and harvest operations.

A large fire such as the Biscuit Fire can cause major changes to a forest’s 

resources and planned program of work such as the amount of timber to be 

sold and harvested, campgrounds and trails to be maintained, and areas of 

vegetation to be removed or reduced to help avoid future fires. The 

Siskiyou forest plan establishes goals and objectives for the desired future 

conditions of the forest that describe management of forest resources and 

activities such as timber, grazing, recreation, wilderness, and others. As 

with all land management activities, postfire recovery projects must be 

consistent with the forest plan. In the case of the Biscuit Fire, postfire 

recovery projects need to comply with the Siskiyou forest plan, which was 

approved in 1989. The projects also need to comply with the Northwest 

Forest Plan, a comprehensive document amending several forest plans 

adopted in 1994 for the management of federal forest land in Washington, 

Oregon, and northern California. Old-growth forests are valued as habitat 

that includes large standing, dead, and down—fallen—trees in various 

stages of decay. The plan includes a combination of land allocations 

managed to protect and enhance habitat for late-successional and 

old-growth related species, while providing a sustainable level of timber 

sales, as well as standards and guidelines for the management of these land 

allocations. These standards and guidelines include requirements for 

retaining dead and decaying trees on the ground, as well as standing dead 

trees, called snags, that are essential habitat for many wildlife species. The 

standards and guidelines also impose restrictions on timber harvesting and 

road building in riparian areas—areas along streams, ponds, reservoirs, 

and wetlands—to limit the amount of sediment running into them. 

Postfire recovery projects are funded by various sources, principally 

appropriations and trust funds. The Forest Service conducts its 

rehabilitation and restoration activities through existing programs, 

including its forest management, watershed, recreation, wilderness, and 

construction programs, among others. To fund such activities, the agency 

uses appropriations from sources that include its National Forest System, 

capital improvement and maintenance, and wildland fire management
Page 14 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

accounts.13 In addition, the Forest Service uses the Knutson-Vandenberg 

(K-V) trust fund that collects receipts generated from timber sales to pay 

for reforestation and timber stand improvement in areas harvested for 

timber, as well as wildlife habitat and other improvements in sale areas.14 It 

also uses the Salvage Sale Fund, which collects receipts generated from 

salvage sales, to pay for future salvage sales. Other sources of funds, such 

as gifts, bequests, and partnerships, also fund postfire recovery projects.15

13We are exploring with the Department of Agriculture the availability of these 

appropriations for the purpose of funding rehabilitation and restoration projects.

14The Knutson-Vandenberg (K-V) Act of 1930 (16 U.S.C. 576-576b) established a trust fund to 

collect a portion of timber sale receipts to pay for reforesting areas from which timber is 

cut. The reforestation projects eligible for such funding include growing trees for planting, 

planting trees, sowing seeds, removing weeds and other competing vegetation, and 

preventing animals from damaging new trees. The act was amended in 1976 to allow the 

Forest Service to use these funds for other activities, such as creating wildlife habitat. It was 

amended again in 2005 to authorize expenditures within the entire Forest Service region in 

which the timber sale occurred.

15The most significant partnership is the one established by the Secure Rural Schools and 

Community Self-Determination Act of 2000. Under this act, the agency can use resource 

advisory committee funds, which are provided to forests for local stewardship projects 

chosen by resource advisory committees. Under the act, counties may receive certain 

annual payments in lieu of those that the county would have received for timber harvests 

occurring on national forests within the county. The county may reserve a portion of these 

funds for special projects that benefit federal lands. These projects are to be proposed by 

local resource advisory committees and must be approved by the Forest Service, which can 

then carry out approved projects using the reserved funds.
Page 15 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Rogue River-Siskiyou 

National Forest Staff 

Followed the Forest 

Service’s Postfire 

Recovery Approach, 

but Unique 

Circumstances 

Affected the Time 

Taken and Alternatives 

Considered for the 

Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project

In developing the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, the Rogue River-Siskiyou 

National Forest staff followed the Forest Service’s general approach for 

postfire recovery efforts, but several unique circumstances, combined, 

affected the time taken to develop the Project and the alternatives included 

in it. First, the size of the burned area—and subsequently the 

Project—complicated the environmental analysis and the time needed to 

complete and review it. For example, to assess resource conditions, such 

as identifying the extent of dead trees, the forest staff had to rely on remote 

sensing data that were difficult to interpret and time-consuming to verify. 

Changes in the remote sensing data throughout the development of the 

Project caused the salvage sale volumes in the different EIS alternatives to 

change. Second, before, during, and after the development of the Project 

and the EIS, the regulations and guidance governing activities that could 

occur in the inventoried roadless areas changed several times, in part due 

to litigation. Changes that allowed salvage harvest in the inventoried 

roadless areas directly affected the alternatives considered in the EIS and 

the time needed to develop them. Third, during development of the EIS, the 

forest staff were reorganized and downsized, although the effect on the EIS 

is difficult to quantify. According to the forest staff, the changes increased 

their workload and limited the amount of time they could devote to 

developing and implementing the Project. However, according to the 

Forest Supervisor and other managers, the forest had enough staff to 

develop and implement the various alternatives identified in the EIS. 

Rogue River-Siskiyou 

National Forest Staff 

Followed the Forest 

Service’s General Approach 

for Planning the Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project

In the wake of the Biscuit Fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest 

staff followed the Forest Service’s general approach to postfire recovery 

planning for large fires. The Forest Service does not have a national 

program directing postfire recovery efforts or nationwide guidance on the 

development of recovery projects after a fire. However, according to Forest 

Service officials, regions and forests that had experienced past large fires 

with severe damage to their resources followed a general approach of 

assessing the conditions of forest resources after the fire, identifying 

projects needed to rehabilitate and restore damaged resources and 

opportunities for salvage harvest, and following the steps documented in 

the Forest Service’s NEPA manual, which include implementing and 

monitoring the chosen project. Figure 2 shows the time line of events in the 

development of the Project compared with the Forest Service’s general 

approach. 
Page 16 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Figure 2: Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Time Line Compared with the Forest Service’s General Approach to Postfire Recovery

2002 2003

Biscuit Fire recovery

pocess

General approach

July 2002:

Biscuit Fire starts.

November 2002:

Fire out.

Postfire assessment 

begins.

Department of Agriculture 

Undersecretary visits

forest.

January 2003:

Postfire assessment 

complete.

Interdisciplinary team 

formed.

March 2003:

Notice of Intent 

(NOI) for EIS.

Interdiscplinary 

team starts

developing EIS

alternatives.

Pre-NEPA NEPA

Fire Assess conditions Develop proposed action NOI Develop and assess alternatives
Page 17 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

2004 July 2003:

Washington, D.C. 

briefings. 

Interdisciplinary 

team starts

developing two 

new alternatives

for EIS. 

November 2003:

Draft EIS

released; public 

comment period 

begins. 

January 2004:

Public comment 

period ends.

June 2004:

Final EIS

issued. 

Emergency 

situation 

determination 

approved. 

August 2004:

Court order grants

preliminary injunction 

concerning certain 

salvage sales. 

September 2004:

Court order grants stay 

of certain salvage sales

pending resolution of 

appeal.

First salvage harvesting 

starts. 

July 2004:

Three records of 

decision signed.

First salvage sale 

awarded.

First lawsuit filed.

Implementation

Draft EIS Public comments Final EIS/Record of Decision Liti Appeals gation

Source: GAO.

2004
Page 18 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Generally, to determine management actions to recover a burned area, 

forest staff assess the postfire conditions and evaluate various actions that 

could help to achieve their forest plan’s desired conditions. For large fires 

and recovery projects specifically, as shown in figure 2, forest staff (1) 

assess the resources in the burned areas; (2) develop a proposed action to 

recover resources, which can include multiple activities; (3) issue a Notice 

of Intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS; (4) develop and analyze alternatives to 

the proposed action; (5) issue a draft EIS and solicit public comments on 

the draft; and (6) issue a final EIS and record of decision to make a formal 

decision about the project.16 At this point, the forest staff implement and 

monitor the project, although it may be appealed or subject to litigation. 

Some projects can be finished within a few years after the fire; others may 

be implemented years after the fire. 

In the case of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, the forest staff wrote a 

formal postfire assessment, published in January 2003, 3 months after the 

fire was declared controlled. The Biscuit postfire assessment was 

conducted by a team of forest resource specialists, with expertise in 

forestry, recreation, engineering, hydrology, soil science, and fish and 

wildlife. The team visited key areas burned by the fire to view and measure 

the effects of the fire and to determine how severe the effects were on 

different resources. They then identified potential work to repair damaged 

resources. During this assessment, the team also held multiple meetings to 

gather the public’s input on what to do to repair the damage caused by the 

fire. 

In January 2003, after the Biscuit postfire assessment was completed, 

forest officials began the NEPA process by identifying members of an 

interdisciplinary team made up of about 30 resource specialists from the 

Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest and other units of the Forest Service. 

Over the next few months, the team developed the purpose and need for 

the recovery work and then developed a proposed action, or a set of 

activities to be conducted in the area. In March 2003, the forest staff 

published an NOI in the Federal Register announcing that it would prepare 

an EIS for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project. In it, the forest staff identified 

the purpose and need for action in the Biscuit Fire area: recovery of 

potential economic value through salvage harvest; restoration of vegetation 

16The agency may or may not follow similar steps for smaller fires or fires with less 

controversial activities. In such cases, Forest Service officials may plan smaller projects or 

they may not plan any activities if they do not expect to receive funding.
Page 19 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

altered by the fire—in particular, reforestation; protection of late 

successional habitat from future fire and insect damage; protection from 

future fire through hazardous fuel reduction; and learning about postfire 

management activities. The Project originally proposed in the NOI included 

salvage harvest on about 7,000 acres of matrix lands, totaling 90 million 

board feet; fuel reduction on 16,000 acres including late-successional 

reserve lands; meadow habitat treatments; road closures and repair; and 

reforestation on about 30,000 acres.

As shown in figure 2, from March through October 2003, the 

interdisciplinary team developed alternatives for the proposed action and 

analyzed their effects on the environment. According to forest and regional 

officials, the team sought to develop a range of alternatives that were 

reasonable, including a range of salvage options, fuel reduction 

alternatives, and other activities. According to the Department of 

Agriculture’s Office of General Counsel, the agency is given discretion in 

developing a reasonable range of alternatives but typically develops two or 

more alternative ways of meeting the purpose and need of the proposal—in 

addition to an alternative that considers no action. During the process of 

developing alternatives, the team also identified projects in the Biscuit Fire 

area that could be conducted under categorical exclusion, including 

repairing recreational trails and sites; road maintenance such as replacing 

culverts; reforestation of burned areas identified as plantations—areas 

managed for harvest; and salvage harvesting trees that posed a hazard 

along roads. The team and the forest staff documented these categorically 

excluded projects separately and conducted them in 2003 and 2004 as the 

EIS for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project was being developed. In addition, 

the forest staff held “deck” sales in which they sold trees that had been cut 

by firefighters during suppression activities and piled up or “decked.” 

According to Forest Service officials, because the environmental effects of 

cutting the trees occurred during the firefighting, an emergency activity, 

and the hauling would have limited environmental effects, the deck sales 

were not subject to a NEPA analysis.

The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff issued its draft EIS for the 

Biscuit Fire Recovery Project in November 2003, a year after the fire was 

controlled, and allowed public comment through January 2004, as shown in 

figure 2. Approximately 23,000 public comments were received, 

summarized, and incorporated into the final EIS, which was issued in June 

2004. A month later, in July 2004, the forest staff issued three records of 

decision—one each for the inventoried roadless areas, the matrix areas 

outside inventoried roadless areas, and late-successional reserves outside 
Page 20 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

inventoried roadless areas. According to Forest Service officials, the 

decision to issue three records of decision was made to separate the more 

controversial projects—specifically the salvage sales in the inventoried 

roadless areas—from the less controversial projects to allow the latter to 

move forward without appeal and litigation. With the issuance of the final 

EIS and records of decision, an emergency situation determination 

approved by the Pacific Northwest Regional Forester in June 2004 became 

effective for the salvage sales in the matrix and late-successional reserve 

areas. The determination stated that the government would lose 

approximately $3.3 million if the sales were delayed for the full 105-day 

appeal period. The decision did not apply to the inventoried roadless area 

sales because, according to agency officials, the forest staff were not ready 

to conduct these sales at the time of the decision. Although the region was 

the first in the country to define an emergency under the economic criteria 

in the Forest Service regulations, the Biscuit Fire was not the first recovery 

project to which the region applied this argument.17

Overall, the general approach to postfire recovery efforts does not have 

specific time frames associated with it. According to Pacific Northwest 

Region officials, the NEPA analyses conducted in the region can take from 

1 to 3 years to complete. Figure 2 shows that the development of the 

Biscuit Fire Recovery Project took about 1 3⁄4 years, after the fire was 

controlled, to complete, from November 2002 through July 2004. The 

records of decision were issued in July 2004, and the forest staff awarded 

the first of several salvage sales the same month. The emergency situation 

determination allowed the forest staff to begin implementing the Project 

immediately, without waiting up to 105 days for the appeal process to 

conclude. However, according to Forest Service officials, because the 

harvest season in this region typically ends in September, the purchasers 

did not have time to schedule the Biscuit Fire harvest into their workloads, 

and most of the salvage sale harvest occurred in 2005—3 years after the 

fire. This delay in the salvage harvest concerned all parties involved 

because of the additional loss of the commercial value of the trees. One of 

the key lessons identified in a regional evaluation after the 2002 fire season 

17The use of an economic rationale to support an emergency situation determination was 

upheld in November 2004 in League of Wilderness Defenders v. U.S. Forest Service, Civ. No. 

04-488-HA (D. Or. 2004). The use of an economic rationale was deemed “not an 

impermissible reading” of the Appeals Reform Act, Earth Island Institute v. Pengilly, 376 F. 

Supp. 2d 994, 1008-1009 (E.D. Cal. 2005). The Pengilly decision struck down the regulation 

authorizing regional foresters to make emergency situation determinations. Id. at 1009. The 

Chief of the Forest Service is now the only official authorized to make such determinations.
Page 21 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

was that the identification of potential salvage sales should begin 

immediately after a fire. At the national level, in December 2004, an 

interregional committee published a strategy for postfire recovery, which 

identified challenges for managing postfire environments and proposed 

potential actions to improve the identification of salvage sales after large 

fires. According to Forest Service Washington Office officials, these actions 

have not yet been implemented because the agency has instead been 

focused on formulating broader restoration policy that encompasses 

postfire recovery actions.

Unique Circumstances 

Affected the Time Taken 

and Alternatives Considered 

for the Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project

While the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff followed the general 

approach for postfire recovery on Forest Service lands, three unique 

circumstances affected the time taken to develop the Project EIS and the 

alternatives that were included in it. First, the size of the fire and proposed 

recovery activities increased the complexity of the analysis and review of 

the overall Project. Second, changes in the regulations and guidance for 

inventoried roadless areas that occurred during development of the Project 

caused alternatives to be added to the analysis and increased the time 

taken for the analysis. Third, the forest staff planned and implemented a 

major reorganization and downsizing during the development of the 

Project. Combined, these unique circumstances affected the time taken to 

develop the Project EIS, although it is difficult to distinguish the individual 

effect of each circumstance. In addition, the size of the fire and the changes 

to the management activities allowed in the inventoried roadless rules 

caused changes in the amount of timber considered for salvage sale in the 

Project alternatives and added two alternatives to the EIS. Figure 3 shows 

the events surrounding each unique circumstance compared with the 

events in the development of the Project. 
Page 22 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Figure 3: Unique Circumstances Affecting the Time Taken and Alternatives Considered for the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

2002 2003

Biscuit Fire

recovery

process

Circumstances

• Inventoried

roadless

areas

• Reorganization

December 2002:

9th Circuit 

reverses decision 

enjoining the 2001 

roadless rule.

August 2002:

35 employees are 

placed on the 

Workforce Reduction 

and Placement 

System list.

January 2003:

Forest reorganization 

effort started.

April 2003:

Seven 

alternatives

developed, one 

including 

inventoried 

roadless areas.

May 2003:

Five alternatives

developed, none 

with harvest in 

inventoried 

roadless areas.

June 2003:

Forest Service 

Interim Directive on 

inventoried roadless

areas expires.

Briefing for 

Department of 

Agriculture Deputy 

Undersecretary.

• Size of burned

area September 2002:

Burned Area

Emergency 

Response satellite 

imagery taken.

October 2002:

Aerial photographs

of burned area

taken.

February 2003:

Briefing for 

Regional 

Forester.

March-April 2003:

Briefings for Oregon 

and tribal 

representatives.

May 2003:

Briefing for 

Department of 

Agriculture 

Undersecretary. 

June 2003:

Interdisciplinary 

team decides to 

use satellite data

instead of aerial 

data.

July 2002:

Biscuit Fire starts.

November 2002:

Fire out.

Postfire assessment 

begins.

Department of 

Agriculture 

Undersecretary 

visits forest.

January 2003:

Postfire 

assessment 

complete.

Interdisciplinary 

team formed.

March 2003:

NOI for EIS.

Interdiscplinary 

team starts

developing EIS

alternatives.
Page 23 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Size of Burned Area and Project 

Increased Complexity of 

Analysis and Attention to and 

Review of Project

The first circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected development 

of the Project was the size of the area burned by the fire and, subsequently, 

the size of the area included in the Project. The size increased the 

complexity and amount of work needed to analyze and review resource 

conditions, Project alternatives, and potential impacts. While the fire 

burned almost 500,000 acres, the forest staff excluded the Kalmiopsis 

Wilderness in the postfire recovery work, leaving about 320,000 acres of 

nonwilderness area for evaluation. Normally, to assess the conditions of 

2004

November 2003:

Strategic business

plan issued.

June 2004:

1 forest 

position 

abolished.

October 2004:

47 forest 

positions

abolished.

July 2003:

Oregon State 

University report 

issued estimating 2 

billion board feet of 

timber available.

10th Circuit enjoins

2001 roadless rule. 

July 2004:

Forest Service 

Interim Directive on 

inventoried roadless

areas issued.

December 2003:

Timber volumes

changed to reflect 

satellite data and 

additional field 

work.

February 2004:

First 

Environmental 

Review 

Committee 

review.

April 2004:

Second 

Environmental 

Review Committee 

review.

May 2004:

Pacific Northwest 

Research Station 

issues report, 

Forest Service 

uses it to estimate 

1 billion board feet 

of timber available.

July 2003:

Washington, 

D.C. briefings. 

Interdisciplinary 

team starts

developing two 

new alternatives

for EIS. 

November 2003:

Draft EIS

released; public 

comment period 

begins. 

January 2004:

Public comment 

period ends.

June 2004:

Final EIS

issued. 

Emergency 

situation 

determination 

approved. 

August 2004:

Court order grants

preliminary 

injunction 

concerning 

certain salvage 

sales. 

September 2004:

Court order grants stay 

of certain salvage 

sales pending 

resolution of appeal.

First salvage 

harvesting starts. 

July 2004:

Three records

of decision 

signed.

First salvage 

sale awarded.

First lawsuit 

filed.

Source: GAO.
Page 24 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

resources burned in a fire, forest staff conduct site visits, take 

measurements and samples of different resources and conditions, and 

identify potential rehabilitation and restoration activities. For large fires, 

they can use aerial photographs and satellite images. However, the Biscuit 

Fire was much larger than other fires that were considered large, causing 

the forest staff to conduct the postfire assessment and to use different 

sources of remote sensing data to assess the condition of forest resources. 

The size of the fire and Project also increased the attention and amount of 

review the Project received.

The forest staff decided to conduct a postfire assessment of the Biscuit Fire 

because of the large area that had been burned and needed to be assessed 

to determine what recovery actions were needed. However, according to 

forest and regional officials, while the data gathered and analyzed during 

the assessment were useful in moving forward with recovery, writing the 

formal report added time to the process. Forest officials involved in the 

Biscuit postfire assessment stated that because the fire was so large, and 

access was limited due to the lack of roads and steep terrain, they could 

only conduct limited site visits to gather information on the condition of 

forest resources that had been burned and those that remained unburned. 

The assessment, according to the officials, was useful for the purposes of 

getting a head start on gathering data on these resource conditions, which 

were ultimately useful in the NEPA analysis. At the same time, forest and 

regional officials acknowledged that the assessment did not help them 

narrow the range of projects to be conducted and was time-consuming and 

expensive, causing several weeks of delay in the NEPA analysis. According 

to these officials, the postfire assessment—while useful in soliciting public 

comments about what should be done to recover the burned 

area—contained a wish list of projects that could be done regardless of 

funding sources and schedules. As such, the assessment may have set 

expectations too high about what could be practically accomplished, given 

funding and time. According to the Forest Supervisor, the postfire 

assessment should have focused on time-sensitive projects to facilitate the 

NEPA process. In response to the lessons learned from the 2002 fire 

season, the region will conduct postfire assessments separately from the 

assessment of salvage opportunities and will deploy a rapid assessment 

team to quickly identify salvage opportunities after a fire to prevent delay 

and decay of trees that can be harvested. 

The size of the burned area and the increased complexity of the assessment 

was also reflected in the need to use remote sensing data to adequately 

assess the resources in such a large area. Changes to the sources of data 
Page 25 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

added time to the EIS development and affected the salvage harvest 

volumes being considered in different alternatives. Given the size of the 

burned area and Project area, the forest staff used aerial and remote 

sensing data, in addition to site visits to verify the data, to assist in the 

analysis of vegetation conditions, burned timber available for salvage, and 

wildlife habitat conditions. Overall, the data helped the staff in covering a 

large area but also required additional analysis work that added to the time 

needed to develop the EIS. The interdisciplinary team started using aerial 

photographs taken at the end of the fire, as shown in figure 3, to identify 

potential areas for salvage harvest. The team used these photographs to 

identify patches of dead trees that were a certain size and density; however, 

because the locations seen in the photographs were inaccurately identified 

and details were insufficient at times, the forest crews did not always find 

enough dead trees when they visited the sites. By June 2003, the wildlife 

staff on the team determined that satellite images taken of the burned area 

more clearly showed areas of dead timber than the aerial photographs. 

Because the team did not want to use two sets of data—the aerial 

photographs and the satellite images—the team selected the satellite 

images as the data set for the EIS analysis. This added time to change the 

underlying maps in its Geographic Information System, which the forest 

staff used to prepare maps for the EIS analysis. In addition to adding time 

for analysis, the data changes had an effect on the EIS alternatives being 

considered by the team. For example, the maximum amount of timber 

estimated as available for salvage harvest decreased from about 1 billion 

board feet in the draft EIS issued in November 2003 to about 600 million 

board feet in the final EIS issued in June 2004, due to the use of more 

accurate satellite data, more field verification of data, and application of 

strict salvage guidelines for the late-successional reserves. 

Finally, the size of both the fire area and the Project resulted in additional 

review by Forest Service regional officials and Department of Agriculture 

officials, as well as increased attention by state officials. The additional 

review included two evaluations by the region’s Environmental Review 

Committee—a group responsible for examining more complicated EIS 

documents in the region for substantive concerns and to ensure 

compliance with Forest Service regulations. The Environmental Review 

Committee reviewed the EIS in February 2004 and again in April 2004 

before its issuance. According to regional staff, the evaluations identified 

the need to revise the document, and these revisions required a few 

additional weeks to complete. In addition, the review included visits and 

several briefings for the Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretary of 

Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment and key state and 
Page 26 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

tribal officials to apprise them of the status of the EIS (see fig. 3). 

According to the Undersecretary, large, controversial fires and recovery 

projects such as the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project elicit additional 

attention from department officials because of increased congressional 

interest. These briefings took some time, but according to the Forest 

Supervisor, did not affect the time needed to produce the EIS. 

Authorized Management 

Activities in Inventoried 

Roadless Areas Changed over 

the Course of Planning for the 

Project

The second circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected the 

development of the Project was the uncertainty of the regulations and 

guidance governing road building and salvage harvest activities in 

inventoried roadless areas, which affected the alternatives in the Project 

EIS and the time needed to analyze them. Figure 4 shows the inventoried 

roadless areas in the fire area. 
Page 27 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Figure 4: Map of Burned Area with Inventoried Roadless Areas

Pacific

 Ocean OREGON

CALIFORNIA

S. Bank Rd.

FLAT

TOP

OAK

FLAT

GAME

LAKE

VALEN

LAKE

HAYES

HILL

BRANDY

PEAK

CHETCO

PEAK

BISCUIT

HILL

ELK

MTN.

EMILY

MOUNT

BOSLEY

BUTTE

BIG

CRAGGIES

LAWSON

BUTTE

BUCKSKIN

PEAK

BABYFOOT

LAKE

PEARSOLL

PEAK

BALD

MOUNTAIN

SQUAW

MOUNTAIN

FISH HOOK

PEAK

ONION

MOUNTAIN

OREGON

MTN.

QUOSATANA

BUTTE

FIDDLER

MTN.

TENNESSEE

MTN.

SNOW

CAMP

MTN.

EIGHT

DOLLAR

MTN.

QUAIL

PRAIRIE

MOUNTAIN

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

1107

3

"

3

Rogue River

Chetco River

Illinois River

E. Fork Illinois River

N. Fk. Smith R.

S. Fk. Chetco R.

199

W. Fork Illinois River

Rogue River

Selma

Agness

Galice

Takilma

O'Brien

Brookings

CAVE

JUNCTION

South Kalmiopsis IRA

North Kalmiopsis IRA

Shasta Costa IRA

North Kalmiopsis IRA

Briggs IRA

South Kalmiopsis IRA

Mt. Emily IRA

North Kalmiopsis IRA

South Kalmiopsis IRA

North Kalmiopsis IRA

Squaw Mountain IRA

South Kalmiopsis IRA

Packsaddle IRA

Windy Valley IRA

Quosatana IRA

Windy Valley IRA

Potato Mountain IRA

Siskiyou

Kalmiopsis Addition IRA

North Kalmiopsis IRA

Rogue IRA

North Kalmiopsis IRA

Siskiyou

VULCAN

LAKE

Siskiyou National Forest

Kalmiopsis Wilderness

Biscuit Fire boundary

Bureau of Land Management lands

Other ownership in Siskiyou

National Forest

N

1:330,000

Inventoried roadless areas

Sources: GAO analysis of Forest Service data.
Page 28 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

As can be seen from figure 3, the regulations and guidance governing 

activities in inventoried roadless areas changed several times. The first 

change occurred in December 2002. Regulations promulgated in 2001 

would have limited road building and timber harvest in inventoried 

roadless areas; however, in May 2001, the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Idaho prohibited the Forest Service from implementing the regulations. 

Subsequently that year, to help provide guidance for addressing road and 

timber management activities until land and resource management plans 

are amended or revised, the Forest Service issued an interim directive that 

allowed some road building and timber harvest activities in the areas with 

the approval of the Chief of the Forest Service or a Regional Forester. In 

December 2002, immediately after the fire was controlled and as the forest 

staff developed the postfire assessment, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit reversed the Idaho district court’s decision, effectively 

reinstating the 2001 regulations. The plaintiffs petitioned the appellate 

court to rehear the case, which the court denied in April 2003. During this 

time, the interdisciplinary team was developing its proposed action and 

began developing its EIS alternatives. In April 2003, the team had identified 

seven alternatives, the largest of which included 386 million board feet of 

salvage harvest from matrix, late-successional reserve, and inventoried 

roadless areas. However, by May 2003, after the appellate court declined to 

rehear the plaintiff’s case, the team narrowed the alternatives to five, the 

largest of which included 104 million board feet from matrix lands and fuel 

reduction work and did not include salvage harvest in the inventoried 

roadless areas. 

In July 2003, a convergence of events led the forest staff to develop two 

new alternatives with larger salvage harvest amounts, including amounts in 

the inventoried roadless areas. That month, the 2001 regulations were again 

enjoined, this time by the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming.18

Second, the Forest Service’s interim directive on inventoried roadless areas 

expired and was not reinstated until July 2004. During this time, forest 

supervisors were authorized to make road and timber management 

decisions within inventoried roadless areas consistent with the applicable 

land management plan. And third, an Oregon State University report 

identified 2 billion board feet as available for salvage harvest in the Biscuit 

18In May 2005, the Department of Agriculture repealed the 2001 roadless rule, issuing a new 

one in its place. In July 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated the 

district court decision, holding that the dispute giving rise to the original opinion had 

become moot with the repeal of the 2001 rule.
Page 29 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Fire area, many times greater than the largest draft EIS estimate. According 

to Forest Service officials, the amounts differed because the purpose of the 

Oregon State University report was to identify all timber available for 

salvage regardless of legal or other restrictions on harvest. The district 

court’s decision came a week after the Oregon State University report and 

during the same week that the Forest Supervisor and Project leader visited 

Washington to brief Forest Service Washington Office staff, Oregon 

congressional delegation members, and Department of Agriculture officials 

on the five alternatives in its EIS—none of which included salvage harvest 

in the inventoried roadless areas. The forest officials providing the briefing 

received several comments about the need for more logging that would 

include harvest in the inventoried roadless areas. According to forest and 

regional officials, the failure to consider at least one alternative proposing 

salvage harvest within inventoried roadless areas might have made the EIS 

vulnerable to legal challenges based on the idea that the alternatives the 

Forest Service considered did not include a reasonable range of 

alternatives. Despite concerns about completing the EIS quickly to allow 

any salvage harvest to occur as quickly as possible, forest and regional 

officials determined that an estimated 8-week delay to conduct the analysis 

of new alternatives would be acceptable. Between the end of July and 

October 2003, the interdisciplinary team developed two additional 

alternatives that included about 1 billion board feet and about 500 million 

board feet of salvage harvest respectively for the draft EIS. 

Forest Reorganization and 

Downsizing Began during 

Planning for the Project

The third circumstance unique to the Biscuit Fire that affected the 

development of the Project was a reorganization and downsizing of the 

Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff. Since the 1990s—before and 

after the two forests were administratively combined—the Siskiyou and 

Rogue River National Forest workforce declined as timber harvest 

amounts declined. Their annual operating budget dropped from $33.6 

million in fiscal year 2001 to $25.1 million in fiscal year 2006. The number of 

staff also dropped, falling from 619 at the beginning of fiscal year 2002 to 

400 at the start of fiscal year 2005.19

Beginning in January 2003, just as the forest staff issued its postfire 

assessment, the staff reorganized to address decreasing budgets and staff 

numbers. As shown in figure 3, the forest staff issued a strategic business 

plan in November 2003, just as the draft EIS was released and the two 

19The figures for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 combine the budget and staffing for the two 

forests.
Page 30 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

forests joined as one administrative unit. More than 150 positions were 

identified that could be officially abolished to achieve the reorganization 

option the Forest Supervisor selected. The forest staff began identifying 

positions to be abolished in August 2002, identifying 35 positions to be 

placed on the Forest Service’s Workforce Reduction and Placement System 

list, which allows the employees to receive priority in moving to vacant 

positions elsewhere in the Forest Service. After its strategic business plan 

was issued, the forest staff began officially abolishing positions in June 

2004. From that month through October 2004, 48 positions were abolished. 

The effect of this downsizing and reorganization on the development of the 

EIS is difficult to quantify. According to forest staff involved with the 

interdisciplinary team that developed the EIS, they worked on both the EIS 

and Project in addition to their ongoing daily responsibilities. They 

contrasted this experience with a previous large fire on the forest’s 

lands—the Silver Fire in 1987—for which there was dedicated staff for the 

EIS and recovery project. However, according to the Forest Supervisor and 

other managers, the forest had enough staff to develop and implement the 

various alternatives identified in the EIS. The Forest Supervisor stated that 

he directed staff to place priority on the Project and, according to the 

Regional Forester, additional staff were available to help the team, if 

needed. 

Salvage Sales Are 

Nearly Complete, but a 

Full Comparison of 

Financial and 

Economic Results with 

Initial Estimates Is 

Difficult 

As of December 2005, the forest staff had nearly completed 12 salvage sales 

in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas; however, incomplete 

sales information and a lack of comparable economic data make a 

comparison of the financial and economic results of the sales with the 

agency’s initial estimates difficult. For the sales conducted through 2005, 

purchasers harvested almost 60 million board feet, which is much less than 

the 367 million board feet proposed for sale in the EIS. Forest staff 

overestimated the timber available for harvest and, in addition, some 

timber decayed during the preparation of the EIS and salvage sales, further 

reducing the volume of available timber. For fiscal years 2003 through 2005, 

the Forest Service and other agencies spent about $5 million on the sales 

and related activities such as law enforcement. In return, the agency 

collected about $8.8 million from the sales. From these receipts, the Forest 

Service plans to spend an additional $5.7 million in the next several years to 

remove brush, reforest, and conduct other work in sale areas. In the EIS, 

the sale expenditures and receipts were estimated to be about $24 million 

and $19.6 million, respectively, and the salvage harvest was expected to 

generate about 6,900 local jobs and $240 million in regional economic 
Page 31 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

activity. However, it is premature to compare the results through 2005 with 

the estimates because the Forest Service will generate additional 

expenditures, revenues, and potential economic activity from two sales in 

June and August 2006. Even if complete sale results were available, 

methodological differences and a lack of comparable economic data 

complicate the comparison of the salvage sale results and EIS estimates. 

For example, the financial comparison is complicated by the fact that the 

EIS expenditure estimates are based on different activities than the 

reported expenditures through fiscal year 2005; adjustments can be made 

to allow a comparison, but they are complicated. Similarly, the economic 

comparison is complicated by the fact that the Forest Service does not 

report the economic results of sales. The analysis needed to report such 

data can be done, but according to Forest Service officials, the agency does 

not conduct this type of analysis because the primary reason for preparing 

EIS estimates is to compare the relative economic effects of salvage 

alternatives and not to provide a precise prediction of the outcomes of the 

sales. 

Forest Service Has Nearly 

Completed 12 Salvage Sales, 

but the Volume Harvested 

through 2005 Was 

Substantially Less Than 

Estimated 

As of December 2005, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff 

completed 12 salvage sales identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project 

EIS and records of decision. After the EIS and records of decision were 

released in July 2004, the forest staff finished preparing and completed 12 

sales totaling about 67 million board feet of timber on almost 3,700 acres of 

land in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas, as shown in figure 5. 
Page 32 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Figure 5: Map of Salvage Sales Sold in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Siskiyou National Forest

Matrix

Late-successional reserves

Inventoried roadless areas

Biscuit Fire boundary

Kalmiopsis Wilderness

Chetco

Chetco

Horse

Steed

Steed

Wafer

Wafer

Fiddler

Mike’s Gulch

McGuire

McGuire

Briggs Cedar

Flat Top

Lazy

Hobson

Berry

Blackberry

Indi

Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data. 
Page 33 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

One sale occurred in 2004; the others occurred in 2005. Although several 

lawsuits were filed against the sales, they generally did not delay the 

implementation of the salvage sales in the matrix areas. A timber industry 

trade association and timber companies filed the first case against the 

Project alleging, among other things, that the Project violated the National 

Forest Management Act by failing to implement required reforestation 

activities. Environmental groups also filed lawsuits against the Project 

alleging, among other things, that the Forest Service: (1) allowed 

unauthorized personnel to mark trees for harvest, (2) performed an 

inadequate NEPA analysis, and (3) lacked authority to issue the emergency 

situation determination.20 Two court orders stemming from this collection 

of cases affected the timing of Project activities. First, the U.S. District 

Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary injunction on August 

3, 2004, prohibiting certain salvage activities from proceeding because the 

sales contracts failed to require Forest Service personnel—rather than 

purchasers—to identify standing dead trees within the sale area that were 

not to be harvested for environmental reasons. The court lifted this 

injunction on August 20, 2004, after the agency amended the contracts. 

Second, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an 

emergency stay prohibiting the late-successional reserve sales from 

proceeding pending resolution of an environmental group’s appeal of a 

district court ruling in favor of the Forest Service. The emergency order 

was in effect from September 7, 2004, through March 7, 2005. This period 

included the winter months during which sales activity can be impossible 

because of weather conditions and, when possible, may be restricted to 

limit the risk of spreading a particular fungus along wet roads. The forest 

staff provided a waiver to begin harvesting in March 2005 rather than June, 

the usual end of the restrictions on salvage harvest activities. 

Table 1 shows the volume of timber sold and harvested on the 12 sales as of 

December 2005. According to Forest Service staff, the majority of the 

timber volume harvested occurred in 2005. In general, the volume 

harvested was less than the volume sold because the sales were “scaled” 

sales that allowed the purchasers—with the concurrence of the timber sale 

administrator—to leave trees that did not have good timber and pay only 

for the timber removed from the sale units. In the case of the Horse sale, 

20The industry association case was mostly dismissed, while certain parts were voluntarily 

withdrawn. Most of the environmental claims were rejected by the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Oregon. The environmental groups’ appeals are pending in the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as of September 2006.
Page 34 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

the harvested volume was greater than the sale volume because additional 

trees died after the sale contract was awarded but before the harvest was 

complete. According to a forest official, these trees posed a hazard to the 

loggers in the sale unit, so the timber sale administrator added them to the 

sale contract. 

Table 1: Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Salvage Sale Locations and Volumes through 

December 2005

Source: Forest Service Automated Timber Sale Accounting System.

Through 2005, the agency had sold nothing in the inventoried roadless 

areas but decided in spring 2006 that it would offer two sales—Mike’s 

Gulch and Blackberry—in these areas. In the records of decision, the forest 

staff had identified salvage harvest units in the inventoried roadless areas 

of the forest with a total of 194 million board feet available. In laying out 

salvage sales, the forest staff planned to offer about 38.1 million board feet 

in the two sales and determined that the remaining harvest units did not 

have enough merchantable timber left for sale. The forest staff selected the 

sale areas that had the better timber volume and would have the least effect 

on roadless and potential future wilderness values. Mike’s Gulch was 

advertised and sold in June 2006; the forest staff sold 261 acres with about 

Volume (in thousand board feet)

Sale name Date sold Sold Removed Remaining

Matrix lands

Briggs Cedar December 2004 2,341 1,823 0

Chetco August 2004 289 217 0

Flat Top November 2004 6,622 3,537 0

Horse July 2004 2,415 2,800 0

Indi July 2004 6,305 4,244 300

Late-successional reserves

Berry July 2004 12,834 9,923 0

Fiddler July 2004 14,482 10,613 0

Hobson July 2004 7,319 3,810 0

Lazy August 2004 5,581 875 4,706

McGuire June 2005 2,104 866 0

Steed August 2004 6,074 4,572 0

Wafer August 2004 688 436 0

Total 67,054 43,716 5,006
Page 35 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

9.3 million board feet for about $300,000. In August 2006, the forest staff 

sold almost 7.9 million board feet on 274 acres in the Blackberry sale for 

almost $1.7 million. 

In addition to the salvage sales that resulted from the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project EIS and records of decision, the forest staff completed eight 

salvage sales of timber using a categorical exclusion that did not require 

the preparation of an EIS. These sales involved trees that the forest staff 

identified as hazardous because they could fall on roads. In addition, the 

forest conducted six deck tree sales. The hazard and deck tree sales were 

sold in 2003, while the development of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project 

was ongoing. The deck sales were completed in 2003, while the hazardous 

trees were harvested primarily in 2004. Table 2 shows the individual sales 

and timber volumes harvested.

Table 2: Biscuit Fire Hazard and Deck Tree Salvage Sales and Volumes through 

December 2005 

Source: Forest Service Automated Timber Sale Accounting System.

Sale name Volume removed (in thousand board feet)

Hazard sales

Raspberry 2,565

Indigo 1,798

Qcamp 11

River Six 1,851

Baby Onion 1,517

Bald Bear 3,251

Game Horse 3,105

Chetco 594

Deck sales

North 339

South 198

Chetco 32

North End II 138

Buckskin II 45

Dasher II 46

Total 15,489
Page 36 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Although all salvage sales planned in the EIS and records of decision are 

not complete, the acres and amount of timber salvaged in the matrix and 

late-successional reserve areas were much less than anticipated by the 

forest staff in the EIS. In the records of decision, the forest staff estimated 

that it would sell about 367 million board feet of salvage timber, which 

would be removed from 18,939 acres. Through December 2005, 44 million 

board feet have been removed from 3,700 acres, and an additional 15 

million board feet have been removed from the hazard and deck tree sales. 

In a March 2006 report,21 the forest staff identified the following two 

reasons that the amount sold is much less than they had estimated: 

• Overestimation: The original amount of timber available for harvest 

was overestimated for three reasons. First, the forest staff had difficulty 

applying the legal requirements in the Northwest Forest Plan to protect 

late-successional reserve habitat and riparian corridors. The staff had 

adjusted the timber volume estimates in the EIS to remove 

late-successional reserve habitat and riparian reserves. After the 

issuance of the EIS and records of decision, when the staff planned the 

sales, they discovered more riparian areas that needed protection and 

identified more trees that they needed to leave to meet habitat 

requirements. Second, the forest staff discovered that the hazard 

salvage sale volumes had not been removed from the EIS volumes. 

Third, the volume estimates based on remote sensing data were 

inaccurate—when the forest staff visited the sale sites and viewed the 

actual trees rather than photos or images, the trees were either alive or 

not large enough for sale.

• Decay: The amount of timber that would be lost to decay was 

underestimated. Although the forest staff estimated decay rates 

accurately, the EIS estimate was based on one-third of the timber 

harvest occurring in 2004 rather than 2005, when most of the salvage 

harvesting actually occurred. In planning the sales, the forest staff 

determined that more trees had decayed than they had estimated in the 

EIS. As such, they removed some sale units and acres because the trees 

no longer had commercial value or there were too few trees with 

remaining value to make the sale unit economical to harvest. 

21Forest Service, Response to Appropriations Committees’ Questions (Washington, D.C.: 

March 2006).
Page 37 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

In addition, the March 2006 report identified 8,174 acres from inventoried 

roadless areas that had not been harvested due to ongoing litigation. In 

April 2005, the Forest Service agreed with plaintiffs in one of the cases 

pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon not to 

harvest in the inventoried roadless areas until a new roadless rule had been 

finalized.22 The rule was finalized in May 2005. In August 2005, the state of 

Oregon and two other states—California and New Mexico—filed a lawsuit 

asserting that the Forest Service rescinded the 2001 roadless rule without 

carrying out the environmental analysis NEPA requires.23 Throughout 2005, 

the Forest Service held ongoing discussions with the Governor of Oregon 

to delay action on inventoried roadless area sales to await a decision on 

one of several lawsuits before the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Oregon challenging the adequacy of the EIS for the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project. According to Forest Service officials, they were trying to avoid 

further litigation concerning the roadless area sales. In February 2006, the 

district court rejected the challenge. In June 2006, after the forest staff 

auctioned the first inventoried roadless area sale—Mike’s Gulch—an 

environmental group challenged this sale in district court, alleging that the 

Forest Service violated NEPA by not preparing a supplemental EIS to 

review significant new information concerning adverse environmental 

effects of salvage logging within inventoried roadless areas. The court 

refused to issue a preliminary injunction against the sale, holding that the 

environmental group was unlikely to prevail. In July 2006, the plaintiffs in 

the states’ roadless rule case moved for a temporary restraining order 

against the sale. After the Mike’s Gulch purchaser agreed not to start 

operations until August 4, 2006, the plaintiffs withdrew the motion. The 

purchaser began harvesting on August 7, 2006. The purchaser of the 

Blackberry sale began harvest on August 28, 2006. 

22The plaintiffs in turn agreed to a stay of the court’s consideration of claims that the Biscuit 

Fire Recovery Project inventoried roadless area record of decision violated the 2001 rule.

23Washington and Wyoming joined the lawsuit later.
Page 38 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Forest Service and Other 

Agencies Spent an 

Estimated $5 Million for the 

Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales 

from Fiscal Years 2003 

through 2005, and Forest 

Service Plans to Spend $5.7 

Million of the $8.8 Million in 

Receipts from Sales

From fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the Forest Service reported that it 

spent an estimated $4.6 million to plan, prepare, and administer the salvage 

sales in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project, while other agencies spent an 

estimated $350,000. Forest Service expenditures include NEPA planning, 

salvage sale preparation, and administration for fiscal years 2003 through 

2005, and indirect activities that support the Forest Products 

program—such as information technology, budget, financial, and public 

affairs activities.24 Other agencies’ expenditures were for activities related 

to Biscuit Fire salvage sales, including Department of Agriculture and 

Department of Justice attorneys’ legal services in litigation over the salvage 

sales through 2005.25 Table 3 shows the Forest Service’s and other agencies’ 

estimated expenditures on the Project salvage sales by fiscal year. 

Appendix I discusses the methodology used to estimate Forest Service 

expenditures.

24Because the Forest Service does not account for expenditures on a sale-by-sale basis, the 

forest staff identified expenditures based on their knowledge of the work conducted during 

fiscal years 2003 through 2005 and estimated regional and Washington Office expenditures 

based on the percentage charged for regional and Washington Office costs against the 

forest’s salvage sale plans. Under Forest Service direction, forests collect an assessment for 

regional and Washington Office activities for the Salvage Sale Fund. Each forest calculates 

its own assessment rate. In fiscal years 2001 through 2005, the rate for the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest was 5.2 percent.

25Within the Department of Justice, the Environment and Natural Resources Division 

defends Executive Branch agencies in environmental challenges to government programs 

and represents the United States in matters concerning the stewardship of the nation’s 

natural resources and public lands. The division paid attorney salaries and travel expenses 

to defend challenges to the Project from existing resources.
Page 39 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Table 3: Estimated Expenditures on Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales, Fiscal Years 2003

through 2005

Sources: Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Justice.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

a

Includes law enforcement overtime and travel, but not regular law enforcement salaries because 

these are not tracked by sale. According to Forest Service officials, the funds were not new funds but 

were taken from existing budgets.

b

Includes Office of General Counsel salaries, including 32.85 percent for benefits. According to 

General Counsel officials, the funds were not new funds but were taken from existing budgets.

c

Includes attorney salaries, including 29.54 percent for benefits and travel. According to department 

officials, the funds were taken from existing budgets. 

As the Project’s salvage sales are not complete and work will continue 

through at least fiscal year 2006, additional expenditures for the salvage 

sales can be expected. Also, the forest staff plans to spend $5.7 million in 

the next several years to remove brush, reforest the sale areas, and repair 

and maintain roads. This figure is based on collections of salvage sale 

receipts collected and deposited into the K-V Fund, Brush Disposal Fund, 

road maintenance account, and other accounts to pay for work in the 

Biscuit Fire salvage sale areas. The Brush Disposal Fund is a permanent 

fund created to allow the deposit of funds to pay for certain brush disposal 

work on all timber sales, including salvage sales. Forest Service staff 

complete brush disposal work using funds collected as an additional 

charge to the purchaser based on the amounts paid for the trees harvested. 

The funds are deposited in the Brush Disposal Fund, and the agency 

generally seeks to spend them within 3 years of the completion of the sale. 

The road maintenance account is a trust fund created with purchasers’ 

deposits for roadwork that is then conducted by the Forest Service. 

In total, for the 12 salvage sales and 14 hazard and deck sales completed 

through 2005, the forest staff collected more than $8.8 million. Of this 

amount, about $3.7 million was collected from the Project’s salvage sales, 

while more than $5.1 million was collected from the sale of hazard and 

deck trees. Table 4 shows the revenues generated for the Project’s sales, as 

well as the hazard and deck tree sales.

Agency 2003 2004 2005 Total

Forest Servicea $1,250,000 $2,489,000 $906,000 $4,646,000

Agricultureb 12,000 13,000 9,000 34,000

Justicec 0 87,000 226,000 313,000

Total $1,262,000 $2,600,000 $1,100,000 $4,993,000
Page 40 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Table 4: Revenues Collected from Biscuit Fire Salvage Sales through December 2005

Source: Forest Service Automated Timber Sale Accounting System.

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Of the total receipts collected, about $6.8 million was collected as revenue 

for the sales, and about $2.1 million was collected as deposits for brush 

disposal, road maintenance, and other work. From the $6.8 million, the 

forest staff deposited $3.7 million into the K-V Fund for reforestation and 

other rehabilitation work associated with the sale and the fire; most of the 

remaining funds were deposited into the Salvage Sale Fund to support 

future salvage sales in the region. Of the $2.1 million in deposits, about $1.2 

million was deposited into the Brush Disposal Fund, $538,000 was 

deposited for road maintenance, and about $290,000 was deposited for 

other purposes that include contracts for companies that weigh and 

measure the harvested trees—called scaling contracts. 

A Comparison of the 

Financial and Economic 

Results with EIS Estimates 

Is Difficult

While the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project contains estimates of the financial 

and economic results of the salvage sales for each proposed alternative, a 

comparison of the estimates with the results is difficult. First, the 

incomplete sales mean that financial and economic data for the salvage 

sales are also incomplete, which makes a comparison of the sales’ financial 

and economic results with the EIS results premature. Furthermore, even 

with complete sales data, the comparison of the estimates with final sales’ 

results is complicated by methodological differences related to the way the 

expenditure estimates and results are calculated and a lack of comparable 

economic data. 

The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project EIS estimated that the salvage sales 

planned under the alternative selected by the Forest Supervisor would cost 

about $24 million to prepare, administer, and reforest and would generate 

about $19.6 million in revenues for the government—about $13 million 

from sales receipts and $6.6 million for brush disposal deposits. These 

Deposits

Sale type Sale receipts Brush disposal

Road 

maintenance Other Total

Hazard and deck sales $4,528,933 $411,371 $175,074 $33,285 $5,148,664

Matrix and late-successional 

reserve sales $2,245,145 $826,424 $362,507 $256,068 $3,690,145

Total $6,774,078 $1,237,795 $537,582 $289,353 $8,838,809
Page 41 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

funds, according to the Project EIS, would be available to help pay for 

postfire recovery activities. In addition to financial revenues for the federal 

government, the EIS estimated the economic effects of the salvage sales for 

each alternative. The Project EIS estimated the direct and indirect 

economic effects of the sales in each alternative for five counties in 

southwest Oregon—Coos, Curry, Douglas, Jackson, and Josephine—and 

examined the economic sectors affected by the salvage sales, such as wood 

manufacturing, construction, and retail trade. The EIS estimated that the 

salvage logging in the selected alternative of the EIS would generate about 

6,900 local jobs and $240 million to the regional economy related to the 

harvesting and processing of the timber.26

Because the Forest Service held two additional salvage sales for the Project 

in 2006, it is premature to compare the forest’s financial and economic 

results with the estimates in the EIS. With additional sales, the Forest 

Service will have additional, unknown expenditures and revenues, making 

the total results on all sales unknown and incomparable with the estimated 

results. A comparison of the results through 2005 with the EIS estimates 

could be made if the estimates were available on a sale-by-sale basis; 

however, according to a Forest Service official, the EIS estimates are 

averaged across the sales and are reported as a total only, not separately 

for each sale. Unlike typical timber sales that have well-defined units and 

volumes, the EIS estimates were necessarily formulated using several 

broad assumptions about the salvage sale units and the timber volume 

available in them, as well as harvesting methods and average purchaser 

costs. Because the forest staff ultimately ended up changing sale units and 

recombining units in different sales, the units in the EIS estimate differ 

from those ultimately sold. According to a Forest Service official, these 

assumptions and average prices would cause the estimate to be less 

precise, but they had to be made because the size of the fire and the 

number of sales prevented the forest staff from making more precise 

estimates. Similarly, the economic estimates cannot be compared with the 

sale results because the appropriate regional data, such as jobs created by 

salvage sales, cannot be calculated until the sales are complete. 

26To generate these estimates, the Forest Service assumed that all salvage-related activities 

would be located in the area, and the local job market and wood-processing sector could 

respond to this new demand. To the extent that the salvage-related activities displace other 

regional work, these estimates would be reduced. 
Page 42 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Although a comparison of the financial results of the Project’s salvage sales 

is premature because the sale results are incomplete, an examination of the 

volume and prices paid—both components of revenue—indicates that the 

EIS overestimated volume and underestimated prices received for 

potential sales. The amount of timber volume sold and removed from the 

12 salvage sales was much less than the EIS estimated was available. The 

EIS estimated that 173 million board feet out of the total 367 million board 

feet, or 47 percent of the total timber volume estimated for sale, would be 

available in the matrix and late-successional reserve areas, while the 

remaining 194 million board feet would be available in the inventoried 

roadless areas. By the end of 2005, the forest staff had sold 67 million board 

feet from the matrix and late-successional reserves. With regard to price, 

the EIS estimated that the timber sales would generate receipts of $37 per 

thousand board feet. The actual price received for the 12 salvage sales 

averaged $47 per thousand board feet, while the actual price received for 

the hazard sales averaged $293 per thousand board feet and for the deck 

sales averaged $397 per thousand board feet. The difference in prices 

received reflects some difference in quality due to the fact that the hazard 

and deck trees were removed a year or so earlier. It also reflects the fact 

that the hazard sales are near a road and deck sales are already logged, 

which would mean a purchaser would have minimal or no logging costs. 

Even when the salvage sales are complete and final data are available on 

sale expenditures, revenues, and economic results, certain methodological 

factors complicate the comparison of the sale results with the EIS 

estimates. Specifically, the Forest Service’s estimated expenditures and 

those estimated in the EIS were calculated for different purposes and, 

therefore, do not contain the same items. For example, the EIS estimates 

do not include expenditures on NEPA, indirect costs, or law enforcement 

and litigation, while the forest’s estimated expenditures for fiscal years 

2003 through 2005 do include these expenditures. According to a Forest 

Service official, the purpose of the EIS is to compare alternatives and 

assess the differences among alternatives, therefore certain costs that are 

the same for each alternative, such as NEPA and indirect costs, are not 

included. On the other hand, the expenditures reported by the forest staff 

for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 include those expenditures that can be 

allotted to salvage sales—such as NEPA expenditures—for the purpose of 

showing full expenditures related to the Biscuit Fire salvage sales. A 

comparison of these amounts would be complicated by adjustments and 

assumptions that would need to be made to facilitate the comparison.
Page 43 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

With regard to the economic analysis, even at the completion of the sales, 

the Forest Service does not conduct the type of analysis needed to report 

the actual economic results of the sales, which would allow a comparison 

with the estimates. The needed analysis would require the collection of 

appropriate economic data, as well as formulation of appropriate economic 

models to clearly separate the effects of salvage sales on jobs and on the 

economy of the region from effects of other concurrent regional and 

national factors. This retrospective analysis is difficult but could be done; 

however, according to a Forest Service official, the agency does not 

typically conduct the analysis needed to report these results because the 

primary reason for preparing EIS estimates is to compare the relative 

economic effects of salvage alternatives and not to provide a precise 

prediction of the results of the sales. However, given that the volume of 

timber sold through December 2005 is substantially less than the volume of 

sales assumed in the EIS for the selected alternative, we would expect the 

actual economic results of the sales to be less than the EIS estimate, all else 

being equal.

Other Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project 

Activities Are Under 

Way, but Depend on 

Harvest Activity, 

Schedules, Sale 

Revenues, and Other 

Funding

The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff have begun implementing 

other activities in the Project’s records of decision but completing these 

activities depends on the extent of salvage sales, workload schedules, 

salvage sale revenues, and other funding. In the Project’s records of 

decision, the forest staff included numerous activities to help burned areas 

recover, including postsale activities such as reforestation that would be 

conducted in salvage sale areas. Table 5 shows the key activities included 

in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project records of decision and the amount of 

work planned and completed for each through December 2005. The forest 

staff have begun work on reforestation, brush disposal, and road 

maintenance but the extent of this work depends, in large part, on the 

amount of salvage harvest activity that occurs. The forest staff have also 

begun work on fuel management zones and wildlife habitat 

activities—which are planned for both within and outside the salvage sale 

areas—but completing this work depends on uncertain schedules and 

funding sources. In addition to the activities in table 5, the records of 

decision for the Project proposed a large-scale study of postfire 

management activities such as salvage harvest and fuel management zones, 

and monitoring of the Project’s activities. The forest staff are still planning 

these activities, which are not yet funded.
Page 44 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Table 5: Work Planned and Completed through December 2005

Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service documents.

Work Under Way on Brush 

Disposal, Reforestation, and 

Road Maintenance 

Activities, but Extent of 

Work Needed Depends on 

Levels of Harvest 

Through December 2005, forest staff had begun work on brush disposal, 

reforestation, and road maintenance activities. These activities have 

funding sources because the Forest Service collects and deposits sale 

revenues for brush disposal and reforestation activities and because much 

of the road maintenance work is conducted by the sale purchaser. 

However, the amount of work that the forest planned to accomplish for 

each of these activities has changed as a result of the amount of timber sold 

and harvested in the Biscuit Fire salvage sales. For example, the amount of 

brush disposal work—an estimated 18,939 acres in the records of 

decision—will be reduced because the acres where salvage harvest will be 

done have been reduced. 

Brush Disposal As shown in table 5, the forest staff have accomplished 554 acres of brush 

disposal, also referred to as slash disposal or activity fuel treatment. After a 

salvage sale, forest staff are responsible for brush disposal, which usually 

entails burning piles or areas that are covered with vegetative debris from 

the sale such as stumps, chunks of wood, broken tree tops, tree limbs and 

branches, rotten wood, or damaged brush resulting from salvage logging 

operations. In general, under the Biscuit Fire salvage sale contracts, the 

purchasers were required to create piles of such debris on the acres logged 

before the forest staff conducted their brush disposal work. 

While the forest staff had planned to accomplish almost 18,939 acres of 

brush disposal, they have revised the total amount needed to about 3,000 

acres because the acres sold for salvage harvest were much less than 

anticipated—about 3,700 acres through December 2005. The forest staff do 

Project activity Work planned 

Work completed 

through 

December 2005

Brush disposal—activity fuel treatment (acres) 18,939 554

Reforestation (acres) 30,278 706

Road maintenance (miles) 559 307

Fuel management zone creation (miles) 285 15

Wildlife habitat restoration—seeding (acres) 6,800 715

Wildlife habitat restoration—meadow 

encroachment reduction (acres) 700 0
Page 45 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

not need to conduct brush disposal if the anticipated salvage sales do not 

occur. In addition, the forest staff said that they will not conduct work on 

every single acre of a salvage sale unit because, in some cases, the 

treatment is not needed. As of the end of December 2005, the forest staff 

have collected $826,000 in the Brush Disposal Fund for the Biscuit Fire 

salvage sales. 

Reforestation As of December 2005, the forest staff had planted 706 acres of trees. The 

Forest Service plants trees to help reforest areas where trees have been 

removed by natural events such as wildland fire, or by timber harvest, that 

might not recover naturally. In the Project records of decision, the forest 

staff estimated that they would plant trees on about 30,000 acres, including 

18,939 acres in the areas that would be salvage harvested, and about 11,000 

acres that had been burned but not harvested. On the harvested acres, the 

forest staff plan to conduct reforestation work after the salvage sales are 

closed and brush disposal is completed. The estimated 30,000 acres of 

planting will be reduced because the forest staff will not need to plant acres 

that were planned for salvage but will not be harvested. In addition to the 

reforestation activity identified in the Project records of decision, the 

forest staff replanted 8,935 acres through 2005 under a categorical 

exclusion to restore plantations—areas to be managed for future timber 

harvest—destroyed by the Biscuit Fire. This work was funded from 

appropriated funds and reforestation trust funds. 

In general, planting work that occurs in salvage sale areas is funded from 

sale revenues collected and deposited into the K-V Fund, while planting 

outside of sale areas is funded through the forest’s appropriated funds for 

vegetation management. For sale area reforestation, the K-V plans 

identified about $4.6 million worth of work to plant the harvested areas. 

About $2.7 million was deposited into the K-V Fund for planting activities, 

although the plans are not yet final and, according to forest staff, funds can 

be shifted to projects needing them until the plans are final. The Forest 

Service retains these funds for use in the salvage sale area and generally 

uses them within 5 years after the sale is closed to complete reforestation. 

During the 5 years after a sale is completed, forest staff inspect the areas to 

determine the extent of growth of planted seedlings and naturally grown 

seedlings. In some cases, the Forest Service determines that sufficient 

numbers of trees have grown in the area naturally, and the planned 

reforestation work will not be needed. According to agency guidance, if 

this occurs before the sale is administratively closed, the K-V funds can be
Page 46 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

used to fund other activities planned for the sale area, such as wildlife 

habitat restoration.27

Road Maintenance As of December 2005, 307 miles of the 559 miles of road maintenance had 

been completed. Road maintenance activities, which include blading, 

grading, and gravel replacement on Forest Service roads, were conducted 

by the purchasers as part of the salvage sale contracts. The 559 miles 

identified in the records of decision include all the roads in the forest’s road 

system; however, according to forest engineers, not all roads will receive 

treatment because only the roads used by purchasers while they are 

harvesting the Biscuit Fire salvage sales are maintained under contract. 

Furthermore, some roads may receive two or more treatments because 

roads that are used for two or more sales are maintained under each 

contract. In addition to the road maintenance planned for the Project, 176 

miles of roads were maintained by the purchasers during and after the 

hazard and deck sales—some of them the same roads that were treated 

under the Project sales. 

In addition to the maintenance performed by the purchaser, the purchasers 

made deposits into a road maintenance account. The forest staff will use 

these deposits to pay for work, such as asphalt resurfacing, on roads used 

by multiple purchasers. The deposits were collected in addition to the price 

paid for the salvage sale and were based, in part, on the volume of timber 

harvested from each sale. As of December 2005, more than $360,000 had 

been deposited in the road maintenance account to be used to maintain 

roads in the future. 

Work Is Under Way on Fuel 

Management Zones and 

Wildlife Rehabilitation, but 

Funding and Schedules Are 

Uncertain 

As of the end of 2005, the forest staff had also begun fuel management and 

wildlife rehabilitation activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project records of decision, but completing these activities will depend on 

the Forest Service funding and scheduling the work over many years (see 

table 5). As of June 2006, the forest staff have not specified funding sources 

or work schedules for completing these activities. 

27In 2005, the Congress amended the K-V act to specifically authorize the expenditure of 

funds for watershed restoration; wildlife habitat improvement; control of insects, disease, 

and noxious weeds; community protection activities; and the maintenance of forest roads 

within the Forest Service region in which the timber sale occurred.
Page 47 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Fuel Management Zones As shown in table 5, by the end of 2005, the forest staff had completed 

almost 15 miles of fuel management zones.28 These fuel management zones 

are concentrated along roads and ridges, as well as the perimeter of the 

Biscuit Fire. They are areas where vegetation or fuels—trees and brush 

that act as fuel for wildland fires—have been reduced to help create a 

space where firefighters can be more successful suppressing future fires. 

Maintaining them requires periodic efforts to burn or cut down brush and 

trees that grow in the areas. The Project’s records of decision show that the 

forest staff plan to maintain about 285 miles of these fuel reduction zones 

in the matrix, late-successional reserves, and inventoried roadless areas, as 

shown in figure 6. 

28These figures do not include work conducted for the hazard sales.
Page 48 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Figure 6: Map of Biscuit Fire Recovery Project Fuel Management Zones

N

Pacific

 Ocean OREGON

CALIFORNIA

S. Bank Rd.

FLAT

TOP

OAK

FLAT

GAME

LAKE

VALEN

LAKE

HAYES HILL

VULCAN

LAKE

BRANDY

PEAK

CHETCO

PEAK

BISCUIT

HILL

ELK

MTN.

EMILY

MOUNT

BOSLEY

BUTTE

BIG

CRAGGIES

LAWSON

BUTTE

BUCKSKIN

PEAK

BABYFOOT

LAKE

PEARSOLL

PEAK

BALD

MOUNTAIN

SQUAW

MOUNTAIN

FISH HOOK

PEAK

ONION

MOUNTAIN

OREGON

MTN.

QUOSATANA

BUTTE

FIDDLER

MTN.

TENNESSEE

MTN.

SNOW

CAMP

MTN.

EIGHT

DOLLAR

MTN.

QUAIL

PRAIRIE

MOUNTAIN

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

"

3

3

Rogue River

Chetco River

Illinois River

E. Fork Illinois River

N. Fk. Smith R.

S. Fk. Chetco R.

£

199

W. Fork Illinois River

Rogue River

TAKILMA

O'BRIEN

CAVE

JUNCTION

Selma

Agness Galice

Brookings

Illinois Valley

1:330,000

Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service data.

Bureau of Land Management lands

Other ownership in Siskiyou

National Forest

Communities at risk

Wildland-urban interface

Fuel management zones

Priorities 1, 2, 3, and 4

Siskiyou National Forest

Kalmiopsis Wilderness

Biscuit Fire boundary
Page 49 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

The forest staff do not have a schedule for developing fuel management 

zones and have not requested additional funds for the work. According to a 

forest official, most of the work to date has been incidental to salvage sale 

work in areas where salvage sales touched on identified fuel management 

zone areas. The official explained that creating and maintaining fuel 

management zones identified in the records of decision must be done in 

addition to fuel reduction work needed in areas adjoining developed or 

urban areas, called the wildland-urban interface. The official stated that 

funding priorities for fuel reduction work are concentrated in the 

wildland-urban interface because this is where human life and high value 

property are most at risk. The forest staff has identified numerous projects 

in this area that need to be completed, and the fuel management zone work 

would not have as high a priority for funding. 

Wildlife Habitat Rehabilitation By the end of 2005, the forest staff had accomplished 715 acres of 

seeding—scattering grass seeds in meadows to increase the amount of 

vegetation and enhance native grasses—to improve wildlife habitat. In 

addition to seeding, wildlife restoration work can involve removing trees 

and shrubs to reduce their encroachment into grasslands and meadows. 

Such work provides forage for grazing wildlife, including deer and elk, and 

provides habitat for birds such as the purple martin. 

In the Project records of decision, the forest wildlife staff planned to 

accomplish 6,800 acres of seeding and 700 acres of meadow encroachment 

work. As with fuel management zones, the forest staff have not scheduled 

or requested additional appropriated funds to accomplish the work. While 

the staff included about $1.3 million of projects in K-V plans for the Biscuit 

Fire salvage sales, salvage sale revenues were sufficient to fund about 

one-third of the planned work. Forest staff stated that it is still possible for 

K-V funds to become available to fund wildlife projects if the funds are not 

used for reforestation or planting work; however, if K-V funds are not 

available, the wildlife projects planned for the Biscuit Fire area will 

compete for funding with other wildlife projects outside the fire area. 

Research and Monitoring 

Are Being Planned, but 

Funding and Schedules Are 

Uncertain 

The Project records of decision include a large-scale adaptive management 

study of postfire activities, such as salvage harvest and prescribed burns, 

and monitoring of the progress and results of the Project. These activities 

will be implemented over many years and depend on other activities to be 

accomplished. The forest staff are still planning these activities and 

completing them depends on schedules and funding sources. Although the 

staff have developed a tentative schedule for the monitoring program, they 
Page 50 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

have not developed a schedule for the adaptive management study. The 

study includes some activities that are part of the forest’s regular work but 

also includes work that would be desirable if funding can be identified. 

Similarly, while some monitoring work was intended to be conducted as 

part of the forest’s regular program work, several of the monitoring items 

have been designated as desirable depending on funding sources. 

Adaptive Management Study At the time of our review, the forest staff had just begun planning for the 

large-scale adaptive management study included in the Project. The study 

includes a management experiment to learn about and adapt different 

management actions in postfire vegetation across a broad landscape. The 

objectives of the study are to compare the results of different postfire 

management strategies designed to restore and protect habitat for 

late-successional reserves and old-growth related species. With the help of 

Forest Service researchers, a study plan was written to design the study, 

identify comparable areas of the forest in which to conduct different 

treatments, design the vegetation treatments, and identify monitoring 

needed for the projects. The treatments include salvage and replanting, 

natural recovery, and prescribed burns, which will set the areas on 

different pathways for recovery that will be monitored for significant 

differences. 

Completion of the study depends on the completion of other Project 

activities. The treatments cannot be completed unless other 

activities—namely the salvage sales and fuel management zones—are 

completed. In addition, one of the treatments included in the study involves 

prescribed burning, but the forest staff have not yet issued a record of 

decision for prescribed burning activities that it studied in the EIS. 

Completion also depends on activities being conducted in the areas chosen 

for the study. The EIS identified 12 areas of about 3,000 acres each as 

locations for the study. At the time of our review, because the acres of 

salvage sale had been reduced, about half of the study areas were available. 

According to the researchers who designed the work, the study is still 

viable, despite the reduction in areas subject to different treatments. 

Implementing the study depends on the forest staff scheduling the 

activities identified as needed and determining which forest program will 

conduct and fund the work. The Project EIS outlined the study’s activities 

and identified those that the forest staff could undertake in their normal 

workload and additional activities that should be accomplished but were 

not funded. The Pacific Northwest Research Station paid for and 

conducted initial work in the area by gathering remote sensing data of the 
Page 51 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

burned area to establish a baseline for future assessments of vegetation 

conditions and how the three different treatments may affect the 

vegetation differently. While there is still time to set up the study, the 

Pacific Northwest Research Station recommended that a committee or 

board be established to ensure that the needed activities are conducted. 

The forest officials had not taken action on this recommendation at the 

time of our review.

Monitoring The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project records of decision identify a number of 

monitoring activities, with three purposes: (1) to assure that all aspects of 

the Project are implemented as intended, (2) to determine that certain 

critical activities have the desired effect, and (3) to allow changes to occur 

if activities are found to have been implemented incorrectly or have 

undesired effects. The records of decision and the final EIS identify some 

of the monitoring activities, as required to meet policy or standards, while 

the final EIS identifies other monitoring activities as desired, which refers 

to monitoring that would provide important information for future projects 

and administrative studies. 

At the time of our review, the forest staff reported that they had conducted 

some of the monitoring associated with salvage sales from the records of 

decision, which included monitoring

• planting sites and site preparation,

• the number of snags and down trees retained on salvage sale sites,

• activities to mitigate the effect of noxious weeds,

• marking used during salvage sales to ensure compliance with harvest 

requirements and marking guides,

• activities to mitigate threats to threatened and endangered species, and

• specific aspects of activities identified for protecting threatened and 

endangered species.

According to forest staff, this monitoring is carried out by timber sale 

administrators as they visit and inspect sale sites. Their findings are 

included in inspection reports that are part of the timber sale contract files. 

The administrators can also determine whether best management practices 

have been followed for the timber sales, which include actions to reduce 
Page 52 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

soil erosion and runoff from sale areas. According to forest staff, these 

practices can be separate activities or they can be part of the design of the 

timber sale. For example, a best management practice can include 

designing a timber sale to use cable or helicopter logging rather than 

tractor logging to reduce soil disturbance and erosion. 

For the other monitoring identified in the records of decision, the forest 

staff have drafted a plan that states whether each activity is required to 

meet policy or standards, suggests the frequency with which monitoring 

should take place, and outlines monitoring parameters and techniques. For 

example, the plan identifies the need to monitor noxious weed treatments 

after 1 to 5 years and after 5 to 10 years by using field visits to examine 

treated sites to determine whether treatments have removed populations of 

weeds. The plan does not, however, identify which forest staff will conduct 

the monitoring or which forest funds will be used to accomplish the work. 

The Project records of decision stated that monitoring results would be 

made available to the public. The unique nature of the Biscuit Fire and the 

significance of the Project activities underscore the importance of this 

information for showing the Congress and the public the extent of recovery 

work accomplished and remaining to be done. However, monitoring the 

status of the Project’s activities is not included in the monitoring plan. 

Further, the forest staff do not report annual accomplishments for the 

Biscuit Fire separately from their other program accomplishments. The 

activities in the Project are being implemented by the forest’s regular 

programs, including Forest Products, Natural Resources, and others. 

Although a forest monitoring report for 2004 includes activities conducted 

in the Biscuit Fire, forest staff did not comprehensively report on the status 

of activities in the Project such as salvage sales, reforestation, road 

maintenance, wildlife habitat rehabilitation, fuel management zones, and 

others. Without such information, the forest staff cannot report on the 

status and results of the Project, as described in the records of decision. 
Page 53 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Forest Made 

Operational Changes 

and Assessed Fines to 

Address Improper 

Logging That Occurred 

in Three Locations 

During the hazard and salvage sales conducted in areas burned by the 

Biscuit Fire, the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest staff received and 

investigated numerous complaints of logging in areas where it should not 

have occurred. The forest staff confirmed three instances of improper 

logging and determined that two were the result of errors on the part of the 

forest staff, and one was an error by the timber purchaser. The forest staff 

attributed most of the other alleged cases of improper logging to 

disagreements over the definition of a riparian area and, after further 

review, dismissed them. Forest Service officials admit that the confirmed 

cases of improper logging were serious errors and have taken steps to 

prevent such occurrences on future salvage sales. 

Forest Staff Made Mistakes 

Leading to Two Incidents of 

Improper Logging but Plan 

to Better Mark Boundaries 

The forest staff acknowledge that mistakes resulted in improper logging in 

two cases, one that occurred in the Babyfoot Lake Botanical Area adjacent 

to the Fiddler salvage sale—one of the 12 salvage sales in the Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project—and another in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area adjacent 

to the Bald Bear hazard sale. In both cases, forest officials identified 

actions to improve the marking of boundaries for timber and salvage sales. 

Babyfoot Lake Botanical 

Area—Fiddler Salvage Sale 

Babyfoot Lake is a 350-acre area within the Siskiyou National Forest 

designated as a botanical area because it contains several rare species such 

as Brewer’s spruce, a spruce that grows in southwest Oregon and northern 

California. Botanical areas are specific management areas designated in 

forest plans that require natural management and allow researchers to 

study plants in their natural state. As such, timber harvest should not occur 

in the area. However, during the Fiddler salvage sale, about 16 acres of the 

botanical area adjacent to the sale were harvested. This incursion was 

discovered by members of a local environmental group in August 2005. A 

total of 292 tree stumps were counted within the area. 

According to the District Ranger in whose area the incident occurred and 

who investigated the incident, a series of occurrences led to the improper 

logging:

• During the fall of 2003 and spring of 2004, the Fiddler sale was being 

planned on maps and on the ground. In December 2003, the timber 

officer responsible for the Fiddler sale left the forest staff and from that 

time through January 2005, the position was filled by two detailees from 

different ranger districts and by the District Ranger. 
Page 54 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

• In the fall of 2003, the Forest Service staff used maps and a global 

positioning system to paint and flag the boundary of the Fiddler sale 

units, including a unit near Babyfoot Lake. During the winter, the timber 

staff discovered that the botanical area was included in the sale unit on 

the map. The boundary that should have followed a ridge top next to a 

road was instead drawn farther down the hill in the botanical area. The 

map was corrected, and the timber staff determined that they would 

need to repaint and remove flags from the unit boundaries in the spring 

when the weather improved and they could visit the site. 

• In the spring of 2004, the correct boundary of the Fiddler sale units was 

painted by helicopter—a new technique that was being tested on the 

Biscuit Fire areas—following the correct boundary from the map. 

However, no one removed the flags and paint from the incorrect 

boundary, resulting in two boundaries marked on the sale unit. The 

timber sale administrator—the staff person responsible for monitoring 

the sale units during the salvage operations—did not notice this 

discrepancy while reviewing the sale units just before the sale. 

• During harvest operations in 2004, the timber sale administrator and the 

purchaser followed the flags and painted trees, not the 

helicopter-painted boundary, which was the correct one. 

The District Ranger determined that this was a mistake on the part of the 

timber staff and that the amount of communication among the timber staff 

and oversight over the salvage sales were insufficient. She stated that the 

staff were working quickly to plan sales and to prepare for sales as soon as 

the records of decision with an emergency situation determination were 

signed. The sales were sold 2 weeks after the records of decision were 

signed. 

The District Ranger stated that several simple actions were needed to avoid 

similar problems in the future. In a report to the Forest Supervisor, she 

stated that future sales should ensure that botanical areas are marked on 

the sale map and flagged to distinguish them from the sale boundaries. It 

was further suggested that timber sale procedures include a checklist of 

items—such as botanical areas—for timber sale administrators’ reviews. In 

November 2005, the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector 

General confirmed the error on the part of the forest staff and stated that 

the proposed solutions sounded reasonable. According to forest timber 

staff, the staff used an updated checklist to review the layout of the Mike’s 
Page 55 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Gulch sale held in June 2006. The sale units did not contain a botanical area 

but bordered a research natural area that is to be marked.

The District Ranger also asked for an assessment of actions that could be 

taken to mitigate the damage that occurred from the salvage cutting and 

has implemented some actions already. For example, the Forest Service did 

not burn the slash in the area, as it normally would after a salvage harvest, 

leaving the trees to decay naturally. As of June 2006, the assessment and 

several actions had been recommended. For example, one of the 

recommendations is to expand the boundaries of the botanical area to 

include several areas of live Brewer’s spruce outside the current boundary; 

agency officials say this action would require the preparation of an 

environmental analysis or EIS and perhaps an amendment to the Siskiyou 

forest plan. 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness 

Area—Bald Bear Hazard Sale

In 2003, the Forest Service sold hazardous trees along roads in the Biscuit 

Fire area. One of the sales—the Bald Bear sale—occurred along a road on 

the boundary of the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area. Although timber harvest 

and mechanized activities such as the use of chain saws are not allowed in 

wilderness areas, about 16 trees within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area 

were cut during the hazard sale. The District Ranger who investigated this 

incident found the following:

• The road in the Bald Bear sale runs along the boundary of the 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area; the boundary follows a ridgeline but where 

the terrain flattens, the boundary is along the road. The boundary signs 

were burned and difficult to see. 

• The timber staff that marked the boundary for the sale called the forest 

staff to verify the boundary and were told it was on the ridge. The timber 

staff followed a line through the flat area, rather than the road, and 

included a portion of wilderness in the sale area. 

• The timber officer did not confirm at the site that the boundary was 

accurate, which was important given its close proximity to the 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area.

• An outside researcher informed forest staff about the boundary error. 

The timber sale administrator directed the purchaser not to cut the area 

until the boundary could be checked; however, when the administrator 

arrived at the site, the trees had already been cut.
Page 56 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

The District Ranger stated that the logging was a result of mistakes on the 

part of the forest staff and the purchaser. Specifically, she noted that 

checking the boundary was the timber officer’s responsibility and 

acknowledged that the timber staff did not discuss the proximity of the 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area with the purchaser. Either of these activities 

might have identified the mismarked boundary. In addition, she said the 

purchaser failed to control its workforce after receiving notification of the 

mistake. 

The District Ranger asked the timber staff to identify actions to prevent this 

problem in the future. She noted that the regional staff issued a letter in 

2004, prior to the incident, emphasizing the need to better identify forest 

boundaries. According to forest timber staff, in marking the Mike’s Gulch 

sale in June 2006, the forest staff used surveyors to identify the forest’s 

boundaries with private lands, and planned to have the surveyor mark the 

boundaries of the research natural area. The District Ranger stated that she 

had her staff prepare a range of options to mitigate the damage caused by 

the improper logging and, as of June 2006, had decided to leave the trees 

and stumps untouched since they are near the road and not part of the 

pristine environment. 

Timber Purchaser 

Improperly Cut Trees That 

Were Not Burned, and 

Forest Staff Followed 

Contract Procedures in 

Fining Company

During the Wafer sale—another of the 12 salvage sales from the Project 

records of decision—the purchaser cut 120 live, or “green,” trees in error. 

The purchaser caught the mistake and brought it to the attention of the 

Forest Service timber sale administrator. The timber sale administrator 

halted the sale and put the purchaser in breach of contract. The purchaser 

stated that the cutting crew was inexperienced and, therefore, made the 

mistake. The forest’s contracting office required the purchaser to pay $200 

per tree, or $24,000, in penalties, and the green trees were left in the forest. 

This incident of improper logging was investigated by a Forest Service law 

enforcement officer. According to the law enforcement official, because 

the purchaser reported the improper logging, it is not likely that the 

purchaser was attempting to steal the green trees. In addition, the forest 

staff took action in response to the improper logging by putting the 

purchaser in breach of contract. The sale contract clearly stated that all 

green trees were to be protected. However, according to Forest Service 

officials, accidental harvest of green trees can sometimes occur in large 

salvage sale operations. While timber sale administrators inspect sales 

periodically, they neither inspect the cutting operations on a day-to-day 

basis nor control the purchaser’s operations. 
Page 57 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Forest Service Pursued 

Other Claims of Improper 

Logging

In addition to these three incidents, Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest 

officials received numerous reports of improper logging from local 

environmental groups who monitored the salvage sale operations. 

According to a forest official, timber sale administrators and other forest 

staff investigated these claims. The majority of these claims involved 

logging in riparian reserves, which are 174-foot buffers on each side of a 

stream or waterway that protect riparian habitat and water quality. Forest 

officials stated that the agency’s definition of a riparian area differs from 

the definition used by the environmental groups. The Forest Service 

defines a riparian area to be a channel with some evidence of sediment 

having been moved, while the environmental groups identify a riparian area 

as a depression in which water may flow. In reviewing these areas, forest 

staff said they identified one riparian area that had been salvage harvested 

and should not have been. However, it is difficult to know when the stream 

appeared because according to forest staff, after logging, the runoff from 

rain and precipitation is much higher and new “streams” are created. Also, 

during wet years, more streams are created from the increased runoff. 

Another claim of improper logging had to do with salvage harvesting in a 

botanical area. The same environmental group that discovered the 

Babyfoot Lake harvest reported to the Forest Service that logging from the 

Steed sale overlapped into the Sourgame Botanical Area. The forest staff 

investigated this incident and determined that the environmental group had 

used the larger of two boundaries, identified as alternatives, in the EIS for 

the Siskiyou forest plan. The record of decision for the plan chose the 

smaller area as the botanical area. 

Conclusions The Biscuit Fire Recovery Project generated considerable public interest 

and controversy, particularly over treatment of the postfire landscape. With 

the near completion of the Project’s salvage sales, it is apparent that much 

less was sold and removed through the salvage sales, changing the need for 

such projects as brush disposal and reforestation. It remains to be seen 

how much of the other recovery work—wildlife habitat rehabilitation, fuel 

management zones, monitoring, and the adaptive management study—will 

be accomplished given the lack of specific funding and schedules. As the 

Project’s activities are implemented over the next several years, 

accountability for their accomplishment rests with the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest staff. One of the Project activities with 

potentially significant results is the proposed large-scale adaptive 

management study, which offers an opportunity to gather scientific 
Page 58 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

information with broad implications for recovery actions and postfire 

salvage harvest elsewhere on Forest Service lands. Successful 

implementation of the study and other Project activities will take 

commitment on the part of the forest staff to coordinate the work over 

several years. In light of the size and unique nature of the Biscuit Fire, and 

continuing public interest in the recovery of the area, it is important that 

the forest staff communicate the results of the Project to the Congress and 

the public. The forest staff—and the Forest Service—recognize the 

importance of providing information on the Project’s status and results to 

the public but do not report results in such a way that makes the 

information readily available. Regular tracking and reporting of the status 

of the Project’s activities and results are needed. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To help keep the Congress and the public informed on the status of the 

Biscuit Fire Recovery Project and the significant research work on the 

postfire effects of salvage and nonsalvage management actions, we 

recommend that the Chief of the Forest Service direct the Rogue 

River-Siskiyou National Forest Supervisor and the Pacific Northwest 

Regional Forester to provide an annual public report on the status of the 

activities included in the Project. The report should provide an update on 

the status of work accomplished and still planned for each of the activities 

in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project EIS and records of decision: fuel 

treatments, prescribed burning, salvage harvest, vegetation and wildlife 

restoration, roads and water quality, and the large-scale study. The agency 

should produce such reports until the Project is substantially complete. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided the Departments of Agriculture and Justice with a draft of this 

report for review and comment. The Forest Service provided written 

comments on behalf of the Department of Agriculture (see app. II). The 

Department of Justice had no comments on the draft report. In its 

comments, the Forest Service said that the report provided a good view of 

the process, events, and Project through December 2005. The agency 

generally agreed with our recommendation for the issuance of an annual 

update on the status of Biscuit Fire recovery activities but suggested that 

the time period for producing the report be limited to the next 3- to 5-year 

period. We stated in the recommendation that the reports should be 

produced annually until the Project is complete and that may be 5 years or 

longer given the nature of some of the recovery activities. For this reason, 

we hesitate to provide a specific time limit but believe there is value to 
Page 59 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

providing the agency with some discretion about when they discontinue 

the report. Therefore, we revised the recommendation to state that the 

reports should be provided until the Project’s activities are substantially 

complete. 

The Forest Service also stated that an explanation of the litigation, 

controversies, and protests that occurred since December 2005 would 

provide the readers an understanding of the complexities of trying to 

manage fire projects. The report describes the status of sales through 2006, 

the emergency situation determination used to expedite the sales, the 

effects of litigation on the sales, and delays in the inventoried roadless area 

sales. We believe this discussion is sufficiently descriptive of these events 

and, therefore, did not make any changes to the report in response to this 

comment. The Forest Service also said that the report does not make it 

clear that the planning processes and appeals do greatly reduce the final 

timber harvest volumes. While the planning process was a factor in the 

time taken to develop the EIS, we did not evaluate the effects of the 

process on timber volumes because it was not one of the objectives of this 

report. Also, the report does not discuss the appeals process because the 

Forest Service used an emergency situation determination, which 

eliminated the appeals process for 11 salvage sales. Finally, the Forest 

Service also provided several clarifications of technical information that 

we incorporated in the report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 18 

days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the 

Attorney General of the United States, the Chief of the Forest Service, and 

other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 60 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 

or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Public Affairs and 

Congressional Relations may be found on the last page of this report. GAO 

staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Robin M. Nazzaro

Director, Natural Resources

 and Environment 
Page 61 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

Our objectives were to determine (1) how the development of the Biscuit 

Fire Recovery Project compared with the Forest Service’s general 

approach to postfire recovery; (2) the status of the Biscuit Fire Recovery 

Project salvage sales and how the reported financial and economic results 

of the sales compared with the Forest Service’s initial estimates; (3) the 

status of other activities identified in the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project; and 

(4) the extent and cause of improper logging within the Biscuit Fire 

Recovery Project, as reported by the Forest Service, and changes the 

agency made to prevent such occurrences in the future.

To determine how the development of the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project 

compared with the Forest Service’s approach to postfire recovery efforts, 

we developed information on the (1) general approach used by the Forest 

Service to assess postfire conditions and identify rehabilitation and 

restoration projects and (2) detailed process used by the Rogue RiverSiskiyou National Forest to develop the Biscuit Fire Recovery Project. To 

develop information on the general approach, we first reviewed available 

Forest Service guidance and directives on postfire management and 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). There is no final guidance on 

postfire rehabilitation and restoration activities and, therefore, we 

reviewed guidance for the Pacific Northwest Region and a draft national 

strategy developed by the Interregional Ecosystem Management 

Coordination Group to describe the general postfire recovery process. We 

also interviewed Forest Service officials at headquarters, the Pacific 

Northwest Region, and the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest about the 

general approach. To develop the details of Project development, we 

reviewed meeting minutes of the Project’s interdisciplinary team and a 

forest advisory group during the development of the Project and its 

environmental impact statement (EIS) in 2003 and 2004. We also 

interviewed forest and regional staff involved in the development and 

review of the Project and EIS. To facilitate the interviews, we developed a 

time line of key events, which we provided to officials before the 

interviews. We also interviewed the key decision makers in the process—

the Forest Supervisor, Regional Forester, Deputy Chief for the National 

Forest System, and Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretary of 

Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment to determine their 

roles in the process and in the final records of decision for the Project. 

To determine the status of the Project’s salvage sales, we obtained and 

analyzed information on the sales proposed in the Project’s records of 

decision. We gathered sale data from the Forest Service’s Automated 

Timber Sale Accounting System including sale name, acres sold, volume 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 62 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

harvested, receipts, and receipts disposition. We also gathered this 

information for sales held prior to the issuance of the Project EIS—sales of 

hazard trees and trees cut from fire lines during the active fighting of the 

Biscuit Fire. We gathered this information as of December 2005 to ensure 

that we captured volume harvested and receipts paid for timber harvested 

in the fall of 2005 but for which the financial data were captured a month or 

two later. To determine whether the timber receipts data were reliable for 

our purposes, we interviewed Forest Service financial officials about the 

Timber Sale Accounting System and operations and controls over data and 

data reliability, as well as reviewing the system documentation. Through 

this process, we determined that the data are reliable for reporting the 

status of the Biscuit Fire salvage sales and receipts.

To gather information on the Forest Service’s expenditures on the Project’s 

salvage sales, we had to identify what activities and budget line items are 

related to salvage sales because the Forest Service does not report 

financial data on a sale-by-sale basis. We gathered information for fiscal 

years 2003 through 2005 because this was the period during which the 

Forest Service conducted work to plan and implement the Project and its 

salvage sales and because 2005 is the last fiscal year for which complete 

financial data are available. To identify what activities are associated with 

salvage sales, we reviewed the Forest Service timber sale preparation 

handbook that describes what activities to include in the financial analysis 

of a timber sale. We also interviewed Forest Service personnel about what 

activities and expenditures should be included in a full accounting for a 

timber sale, including a salvage harvest sale. Finally, we obtained and 

reviewed previous Forest Service reports that referred to the total cost of 

its timber sale program and reviewed the activities and expenditures 

included in those estimates.1

 We then worked with the financial staff of the 

Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest to identify the expenditures for a 

range of activities included in these reports: NEPA planning, timber sale 

preparation, timber sale administration, reforestation activities, timber

1

The Forest Service used to report on the full costs of the timber program using the Timber 

Sale Program Information Reporting System. Changes to the agency’s accounting system 

and lack of interest caused the agency to stop producing the reports.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 63 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

stand improvement activities, and forest indirect expenditures.2 Most of 

these expenditures occurred from two budget line items—one for 

appropriated timber funds and one for the Salvage Sale Fund. We also 

included an estimate of regional and Washington Office expenditures. 

Because the Forest Service does not account for the costs of timber sales, 

we had no basis to allocate regional and Washington expenditures and as a 

result, used the forest’s assessment rate for regional and Washington Office 

costs for the Salvage Sale Fund. The rate, 5.2 percent, was charged to all 

Salvage Sale Fund plans by the forest staff in fiscal years 2001 through 2005 

to collect funding to pay for regional and Washington Office activities. 

Finally, because law enforcement and litigation are activities directly 

related to salvage sales, we obtained expenditures from the Forest 

Service’s law enforcement regional office located in Portland, Oregon, and 

from the Department of Agriculture’s Office of General Counsel and the 

Department of Justice’s Environment and Natural Resources Division for 

their work related to litigation and other legal services for the salvage sales. 

The law enforcement expenditures represent overtime and travel 

expenditures for officers who worked on the Biscuit Fire salvage sales; the 

expenditures for the Departments of Agriculture and Justice represent 

salaries for the attorneys involved in litigation and other legal services. To 

determine the reliability of the Forest Service data, we interviewed Forest 

Service financial officials responsible for the Foundation Financial 

Information System and the auditors responsible for reviewing the Forest 

Service’s annual financial statements to determine if there were any 

material weaknesses relevant to the data. We determined that there were 

none and that the data are reliable for our purpose of reporting Biscuit Fire 

salvage sale expenditures. We are relying on the reported expenditures of 

the Departments of Agriculture and Justice.

We reviewed the Forest Service’s estimated financial and economic results 

for the proposed salvage sales in the Project EIS and discussed specific 

aspects of the estimates with the Forest Service’s Regional Economist, the 

primary official responsible for these analyses. We attempted to compare 

the financial results of the actual salvage sales with the Forest Service’s 

estimated financial results. However, because during the course of our 

2

We did not include the annual payment made to local governments under the Secure Rural 

Schools and Community Security Act of 2000. The act established an alternative payment 

for counties that share federal timber receipts. For fiscal years 2000 through 2006, the 

counties could choose to receive payment based on the 25 percent amount established 

under the act of May 23, 1908 or an average of the three highest 25 percent payments made 

during 1986 through 1999. 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 64 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

analysis the Forest Service held two more salvage sales in the summer of 

2006, the financial results—expenditures and receipts—of the sales 

available to date were incomplete. We also determined that there are 

methodological differences in the calculation of expenditures. We 

determined that the Forest Service does not report economic results, and 

we could not make the comparison of economic results and estimates, 

although such a comparison could be made if the appropriate analysis were 

conducted. We attempted to adjust the EIS estimates to make a comparison 

based only on the sales conducted through 2005 by disaggregating the EIS 

estimates by sale. The disaggregated results would have enabled us to use 

only the results of comparable EIS sales as the basis of comparison with 

the results of sales actually sold though 2005; however, we determined that 

the EIS estimates, which were based on broad averages across the land 

types, could not be disaggregated and attributed to individual sales. 

To determine the status of other recovery project activities, we interviewed 

forest staff responsible for the activities included in the records of decision 

and identified the sources of information available to document the status. 

Different program staff are responsible for conducting the activities in the 

Project, which include planting, seeding, road maintenance, fuel 

management zones, research, and monitoring activities. For activities other 

than research and monitoring, we compiled and summarized the work 

conducted through December 2005, reviewing contracts for planting work, 

accomplishment reports for brush disposal work and wildlife rehabilitation 

activities, and maps for fuel management zones. Where they were available, 

we reviewed plans for work to be accomplished in the future. We presented 

this information to the appropriate forest staff and confirmed the data with 

them. To determine the status of the landscape-scale research study, we 

interviewed the forest and Pacific Northwest Research Station officials 

who developed the research proposal in the EIS. The officials provided an 

update of the status, which we then confirmed with forest officials. Finally, 

we obtained a copy of the most recent monitoring schedule and discussed 

the monitoring program with the forest’s timber manager. 

To determine the extent and cause of reported improper logging, we 

obtained and reviewed Forest Service reports on the three incidents in the 

Babyfoot Lake Botanical Area, Kalmiopsis Wilderness, and Wafer sale to 

determine the facts of the incidents. We then reviewed an Office of 

Inspector General report on the Babyfoot Lake incident and two law 

enforcement reports on the wilderness and Wafer sale incidents to 

determine other views of the incidents. We visited the Babyfoot Lake site to 

view the correct boundary and the improperly harvested area. We 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 65 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

interviewed Forest Service officials responsible for the day-to-day 

oversight and operations of timber sales, representatives of a local 

environmental group monitoring the salvage sales and responsible for 

discovering the Babyfoot Lake incident, and law enforcement and Office of 

Inspector General officials who reviewed the cases to determine the Forest 

Service’s response to the incidents. To determine the Forest Service’s 

response to other claims of improper harvest, we reviewed a file of letters 

and agency responses. We also reviewed reports from a third-party monitor 

who visited sale sites that had been harvested and viewed the results of 

operations. 

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards from November 2005 through July 2006. 
Page 66 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Appendix II

Comments from the Forest Service ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 12.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 11.
Appendix II

Comments from the Forest Service

Page 67 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

Now on p. 18.
Appendix II

Comments from the Forest Service

Page 68 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

The following are GAO’s comments on the Forest Service’s letter, dated 

September 7, 2006.

GAO Comments 1. We revised the report accordingly. We stated that the EIS is required 

rather than needed.

2. We revised the report accordingly.

3. We revised the report accordingly.

4. We revised the report accordingly.

5. We revised the report accordingly.

6. We revised the report accordingly.

7. The report describes the status of sales through 2006, the emergency 

situation determination used to expedite the sales, the effects of 

litigation on the sales, and delays in the inventoried roadless area sales. 

We believe this discussion is sufficiently descriptive of these events 

and, therefore, did not make any changes to the report in response to 

this comment. While the planning process was a factor in the time 

taken to develop the EIS, we did not evaluate the effects of the process 

on timber volumes because it was not one of the objectives of this 

report. Also, the report does not discuss the appeals process because 

the Forest Service used an emergency situation determination, which 

eliminated the appeals process for 11 salvage sales. 

8. We disagree that the report should be limited to the next 3 to 5 years 

because some of the activities in the Project are likely to extend beyond 

that period of time. For this reason, we continue to believe that such a 

time limit should be based on the Project’s completion. We do believe 

there is value to providing the agency with some discretion about when 

they discontinue the report. Therefore, we revised the recommendation 

to state that the reports should be provided until the Project’s activities 

are substantially complete. 
Page 69 GAO-06-967 Biscuit Fire Recovery Project

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Robin M. Nazzaro (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, David P. Bixler, Assistant 

Director; Susan Iott; Rich Johnson; Mehrzad Nadji; and Dawn Shorey made 

key contributions to this report. Joyce Evans, Lisa Knight, John Mingus, 

Cynthia Norris, Alison O’Neill, Kim Raheb, Jena Sinkfield, Jay Smale, and 

Gail Traynham also made important contributions to this report.

(360651)
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