09-3064-cv(L)

Caceres v. The Port Authority of New York & Jersey 1 UNI TEDSTATE S COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 FOR THE S ECOND CIRCUI T 4 5 Aug ustTe rm, 20 09 6 7 (Ar gue d: Apr il 15, 20 10 D eci ded : J anu ary31 , 2 011 ) 8 9 Doc ketNo s. 09- 306 4-c v(L ), 09- 321 7-c v(XAP) 10 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 13 14 JOS EPHCACERES, 15 16 Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t-C ros s-Appe lle e, 17 18 - v .- 19 20 THE PO RT AUT HOR ITYOFNE W Y ORKAN D N EW JER SEY , P OLI CE 21 OFF ICE R M ICHAELBARRY , ( SHI ELDNO . 1 810 ), SERGEANT K. 22 COT REL L, (SH IEL D N O. 304 ), POL ICE OF FIC ER M. LYD ON, (S HIE LD 23 NO. 15 85) , P OLI CE OFF ICE R J . MALI CE, (S HIE LD NO. 24 42) , 24 POL ICE OF FIC ER A. PIN IEL LO, (S HIE LD NO. 18 56) , P OLI CE 25 LIE UTE NAN T ROEN ZO SAN GIO RGI , ( SHI ELDNO . 1 66) , P OLI CE 26 OFF ICE R T RUG LIO , ( SHI ELDNO . 2 105 ), ind ivi dua llyan d i n 27 the ir off ici al cap aci tie s, 28 29 Def end ant s-Appe lle es- Cro ss- App ell ant s, 30 31 JOHN D OE, 1- 10 ind ivi dua llyan d i n t hei r o ffi cia l c apa cit y, 32 the name Joh n D oe bei ng fic tit iou s, as the tr ue names are 33 pre sen tlyun kno wn, JANE DOE , 1 -10 in div idu all y a nd in the ir 34 off ici al cap aci ty, th e n ame Ja ne Doe be ingfi cti tio us, as 35 the tr ue names are pr ese ntl y u nkn own , 36 37 Def end ant s. 38 39 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 40 Bef ore : JAC OBS , C hie f Judg e, McLAUG HLI N a nd SAC K, 41 42 Cir cui t Judg es.2 1 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey detained 2 Plaintiff Caceres for two days on a warrant erroneously 3 attributed to him. A jury assessed false-arrest damages at 4 $10,000, joint and several, against the Port Authority and 5 one of its officers. The United States District Court for 6 the Southern District of New York (Koeltl, J.) entered a 7 judgment, against the Port Authority in the amount of the 8 verdict, and in favor of the officer as a matter of law on 9 the ground of qualified immunity. Caceres appeals the 10 qualified immunity ruling; the Port Authority cross-appeals 11 on the ground that absent liability of any of its officers, 1 2 vicarious liability does not lie. We af firm t he jud gme nt in 13 fav or of the of fic er; we va cat e t he jud gme nt aga ins t t he 14 Por t Auth ori ty andre man d t o d ism iss th at cla im forla ck of 15 jur isd ict ion . 16 BRE TT HARRIS KL EIN , L eve nth al & 17 Kle in, LL P, Bro okl yn, NY , f or 18 Pla int iff -Ap pel lan t-C ros s19 App ell ee. 20 21 SCO TT CHARLE S O CCH IOG ROS SO, Po rt 22 Aut hor ityofNe w Y orkan d N ew 23 Jer sey , N ew Yor k, NY, fo r 24 Def end ant s-Appe lle es- Cro ssApp ell ant s. 25 26 27 28 293 1 DENNIS JACOB S, Chi ef Jud ge: 2 3 Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Joseph Caceres was a 4 painter on the George Washington Bridge, which is maintained 5 and operated by the Port Authority of New York and New 6 Jersey (“Port Authority”). After he parked near his work 7 site without the requisite permit, his car was impounded at 8 the Port Authority police station in New Jersey. When he 9 went to pick up his car, a routine computer search of his 10 name and date of birth showed that Caceres had a New York 11 State Identification (“NYSID”) number, which is a 12 (supposedly) unique designation assigned to each arrestee by 13 the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. 14 The search also linked Caceres to a “John Doe” bench 15 warrant. Caceres was detained for two days, until the Port 16 Authority supervisor, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant 17 Roenzo Sangiorgi, determined the warrant was for another 18 person who was erroneously issued the same NYSID number as 19 Caceres. 20 Caceres sued Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant Port 21 Authority and numerous Port Authority officers for, inter 22 alia, false arrest under state law and for violation of his 23 federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A4 1 jury assessed false-arrest damages at $10,000, joint and 2 several, against the Port Authority and Sangiorgi. The 3 United States District Court for the Southern District of 4 New York (Koeltl, J.) entered a judgment, against the Port 5 Authority in the amount of the verdict, and in favor of 6 Sangiorgi as a matter of law on the ground of qualified 7 immunity. For some reason, Caceres (not content with a 8 damages award that was fully recoverable from the Port 9 Authority) appealed the qualified immunity ruling; the Port 10 Authority, which had been content to pay the judgment, then 11 cross-appealed on the ground that absent liability of any of 1 2 its officers, vicarious liability does not lie. We af firm 13 the ju dgmentinfa vorofth e o ffi cer , a nd vac ate th e 14 jud gme nt aga ins t t he Por t Auth ori ty andre man d t o d ism iss 15 tha t c lai m f or lac k o f j uri sdi cti on. 16 17 I 18 Cac ere s c hal len ges th e qual ifi ed immuni ty rul ingun der 19 bot h f ede ral an d s tat e l aw. W e r evi ew a d ist ric t c our t’s 20 gra nt of jud gme nt as a m att er of lawde no vo, ap ply ingth e 21 same s tan dar ds as the di str ictco urt . Bla ck v. Fin ant ra 22 Cap ita l, Inc ., 418 F. 3d 203 , 2 08 (2dCi r. 200 5). Judgmen t5 1 as a m att er of lawis ap pro pri ate wh en “a par ty has be en 2 ful ly hea rd on an iss ue” an d “ a r eas ona ble ju ry wou ld not 3 hav e ale gal ly suf fic ien t e vid ent iar y b asi s t o f indfo r t he 4 par ty on tha t i ssu e.” F ed. R. Ci v. P. 50( a)( 1). I n o ur 5 rev iew , w e “ con sid er the ev ide nce inth e l igh t m ost 6 fav ora ble toth e p art y a gai nstwh om the mo tio n w as mad e” and 7 “gi ve tha t p art y t he ben efi t o f a ll rea son abl e i nfe ren ces 8 tha t t he jur y m igh t h ave dr awninhi s f avo r f romth e 9 evi den ce. ” Tol ber t v . Q uee ns Col l., 24 2 F .3d58 , 7 0 ( 2d 10 Cir . 2 001 ) ( quo tin g S mit h v . L igh tni ng Bol t P rod s., In c., 11 861 F. 2d 363 , 3 67 (2dCi r. 198 8)) . Fed era l a nd sta te law 12 ent itl eme nts ar e c ons ide redse par ate ly. 13 14 A 15 On the federal false arrest claim, Sangiorgi enjoys 16 qualified immunity if “it was objectively reasonable for the 17 officer to believe that probable cause existed” or if 18 “officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether 19 the probable cause test was met.” Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 20 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987). 21 At the threshold, Caceres argues that the warrant 22 itself is facially invalid because it does not conform toCa cer es’ s h airco lorma tch ed the de scr ipt iononth e 1 war ran t; his da rk eye co lorwa s ane ar mat ch (bl ack , compar ed wit h b row n o n t he war ran t). T he hei ghtdi scr epa ncy was tw o i nch es, th e w eig ht was wi thi n t wen ty pou nds , a nd the age di scr epa ncywa s a bou t f ive ye ars . The ag e d iff ere nce wou ld notne ces sar ilybe ap par enttoth e e ye, bu t a n o ffi cer mig ht (ormi ghtno t) hav e n oti cedth at the bi rthda te in the war ran t d id notma tchth e b irt h d ate th at Cac ere s g ave , o r hadonhi s l ice nse . 6 1 the New York Criminal Procedure Law. However, Sangiorgi was 2 an officer in a different jurisdiction, out of the thousands 3 of jurisdictions in the United States, all of which may 4 issue bench warrants with various characteristics and 5 requirements. Similarly, Caceres argues that Sangiorgi 6 failed in other respects to follow proper police procedures. 7 Assuming that Sangiorgi erred, error is what is indulged by 8 qualified immunity. 9 More particularly, Caceres emphasizes the several 10 physical differences between himself and the descriptive 11 particulars in the warrant. Height, weight and age were not 12 grossly disparate, and some other features matched. But 1 13 Caceres is a light-skinned Hispanic, whereas the warrant 14 specified a black man of dark complexion. 15 A reasonable officer could have concluded nevertheless 16 that the warrant was for Caceres. Complexion varies within 17 a given race classification, and the descriptive terms inUn con tro ver tedte sti mon y b y S ang ior gi est abl ish ed 2 tha t t he rac e a nd ski n c olo r i nfo rma tio n w as bas ed on obs erv ati ons byth e a rre sti ng off ice r. Tr ial Tr . a t 6 60- 61. 7 1 the warrant reflected one person’s subjective classification 2 at one point in time. A Port Authority officer might 2 3 reasonably assume that the skin color and race information 4 were entered incorrectly--particularly since height, weight, 5 age, hair color and eye color were either accurate or within 6 bounds. 7 Far more implausible was the actual explanation for the 8 confusion: that two individuals were erroneously associated 9 with the same NYSID number. That is so rare (if not unique) 10 that it was unheard-of by the testifying officers. A 11 reasonable officer could therefore have concluded that the 12 “warrant hit” conferred probable cause notwithstanding an 13 incompatible physical description, reasoning that a false 14 hit from the historically reliable recordkeeping system-- 15 organized by NYSID number--is at least as rare as error in 16 the physical description fields. Cf. United States v. 17 Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 27 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that 18 arresting officers’ reliance on historically reliable 19 warrant recording system was objectively reasonable). Three 20 officers of the New York City Police Department came to the8 1 same conclusion: Caceres had been detained three times 2 before on the basis of the same bench warrant. See Caceres 3 v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 646 F. Supp. 2d 412, 418 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Caceres further argues that he professed 5 innocence and explained to the Port Authority officers that 6 the warrant was a mistake; but police are not bound to 7 credit such protestations. 8 Accordingly, Sangiorgi is entitled to qualified 9 immunity on the federal false arrest claim. 10 11 B 12 On the state law false arrest claim, Sangiorgi’s 13 liability is governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act 14 (“NJTCA”). See N.J.S.A. § 59:3-1(a). Although the NJTCA 15 provides a statutory “good faith” exception--a variant of a 16 qualified immunity defense--the exception is unavailable in 17 claims for false arrest or false imprisonment. See § 59:3- 18 3. However, common law defenses that existed when the NJTCA 19 was enacted were not preempted. See Fielder v. Stonack, 141 20 N.J. 101, 117 (1995) (“When liability is established under 21 the [NJTCA], it is still subject to immunity specified in 22 the Act as well as any common-law immunity which predatedTh ere is a sli ghtdi sag ree men t a bou t t he sco pe of the 3 pur por tedDe laC ruz st and ard . The pa rti es agr ee tha t i t i s an obj ect ive re aso nab len ess st and ard ; Cac ere s s ugg est s i t i s par all el to the fe der al ver sio n, butth e P ortAu tho rit y arg ues itis on ly an obj ect ive re aso nab len ess st and ard , a nd notth e d isj unc tiv e t wo par t t estfo r t he fed era l d efe nse . The di sag ree men t i s i rre lev ant . Bec aus e i t w as obj ect ive ly rea son abl e f or San gio rgi tobe lie ve tha t p rob abl e c aus e exi ste d, he is ent itl ed to qua lif iedimmun ityun derei the r par ty’ s i nte rpr eta tio n o f t he sta nda rd. 9 1 the Act .” (emphasis added)). 2 In deciding qualified immunity, the district court 3 assumed that the New Jersey common law standard is 4 coextensive with federal law, citing DelaCruz v. Borough of 5 Hillsdale, 183 N.J. 149 (2005). See Caceres, 646 F. Supp. 6 2d at 426; Joint Appendix at 489, 496. DelaCruz is 7 ambiguous as to the availability of qualified immunity under 8 New Jersey common law; but the court relied on the parties’ 9 own readings of the case, which (though divergent) were 10 consistent in material respects. Under these 3 11 circumstances, we accept the parties’ consensus. Cf. Walter 12 E. Heller & Co. v. Video Innovations, Inc., 730 F.2d 50, 53 13 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The parties by their acquiescence . . . may 14 induce the . . . court to assume that foreign law is similar 15 to that of the forum.”). We therefore need not decide whatCo mpa re, e. g., N.J.S.A. § 59:3-3 (excluding false 4 arrest claims from good faith defense for public employees) , wit h V isi dorCo rp. v. Cl iff sid e P ark , 4 8 N .J. 21 4, 221 (19 66) (“ [T] he non lia bil ityofin div idu al pub licof fic ial s fordamag es ens uin g u ponth eirgo od fai th exe rci se of jud gme nt anddi scr eti on in the pe rfo rma nce ofth eirdu tie s, has lo ng bee n r eco gni zedinou r S tat e.” ). Se e g ene ral ly Tic e v . C ramer, 13 3 N .J. 34 7, 355 -56 (1 993 ) ( “Li abi lit y o f the pu bli c e mpl oye e . . . i s s ubj ecttoth e i mmu nit ies of the [N JTCA] andth e c omm on law .”) .

Even if qualified immunity for the state law claim 5 were unavailable, Caceres’s damages would be severely limited at best: The NJTCA prohibits damages for pain and suffering in the absence of substantial bodily harm, reflecting the policy choice that “in view of the economic burdens presently facing public entities a claimant should not be reimbursed for non-objective types of damages . . . except in aggravated circumstances.” N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(d) & cmt.; see also DelaCruz, 183 N.J. at 164. Caceres makes no claim of substantial bodily harm. Ca cer es argues that the Port Authority forfeited this 6 argument by not raising it in its Rule 50 motions before the 10 1 New Jersey law would be if it were clear, which it is not. 4 2 Sangiorgi is entitled to qualified immunity on the 3 state law false arrest claim for the same reasons he enjoys 4 qualified immunity on the federal claim. (And the state law 5 claim would be insubstantial in any event. ) 5 6 7 II 8 The Port Authority argues that it cannot be held 9 vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee (such as 10 Sangiorgi) who has successfully established immunity. As a 6district court. See Pro vos t v . C ityofNe wbu rgh , 2 62 F.3 d

146 , 1 61 (2dCi r. 200 1). B eca use ofth e j uri sdi cti ona l iss ue dis cus sedin fra , t he for fei tur e i ssu e i s i rre lev ant . 11 1 preliminary matter, we have an independent obligation to 2 consider our subject matter jurisdiction to hear this claim 3 even in the absence of a challenge from any party. See Dean 4 v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2009). 5 The Port Authority, a bi-state agency created by a 6 compact between New York and New Jersey, enjoyed sovereign 7 immunity until 1951, when New York and New Jersey consented 8 to suits against it in limited circumstances. See Bunk v. 9 Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 144 N.J. 176, 183 (1996). The 10 Port Authority’s statutory immunity was waived by identical 11 New York and New Jersey statutes that required a sixty-day 12 notice of claim and commencement of suit within one year from 13 the date of the accrual of the cause of action. See N.J.S.A. 14 § 32:1-163; N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 7107. These requirements 15 are jurisdictional. See Matthews v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 163 16 N.J. Super. 83, 85 (Law Div. 1978), aff’d, 171 N.J. Super. 38 17 (App. Div. 1979); Pinckney v. Jersey City, 140 N.J. Super. 18 96, 100-03 (Law Div. 1976) (“It is a firmly established rule 19 in American jurisprudence that . . . provisions which are 20 conditions which the sovereign attaches to the waiver ofInHe ss, th e S upr eme Co urttr eat ed the su bsi dia ry, 7 PATH (Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation), as equ iva len t t o t he Por t Auth ori ty forpu rpo ses ofso ver eig n immuni ty bec aus e i t i s whol ly own ed. 5 13 U.S . a t 3 3-3 5. 12 1 immunity are jurisdictional.”). The failure to satisfy these 2 conditions “will result in withdrawal of defendant’s consent 3 to suit and compels the dismissal of the action for lack of 4 subject matter jurisdiction.” Lyons v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & 5 N.J., 643 N.Y.S.2d 571, 571-72 (1st Dep’t 1996). 6 This analysis is consistent with Hess v. Port Auth. 7 Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994), in which plaintiffs 8 sought damages from a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port 9 Authority under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 7 10 (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. The claim was brought 11 within the three-year time limit set by FELA but beyond the 12 one-year limit specified by the New York and New Jersey 13 consent-to-suit statutes. Relying mainly on the attenuation 14 between the Port Authority’s finances and the fiscs of New 15 York and New Jersey, the Court held that the Port Authority 16 lackedEleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from federal 17 statutory claims. Hess, 513 U.S. at 49-52. But this holding 18 does not bear upon the validity of conditions for waiving 19 sovereign immunity over claims arising under state law. See13 1 Mullen v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 2 n.4 (D.N.J. 1999) (“Hess did not reach the question of 3 whether state law claims could be barred for failure to 4 comply with the commencement of suit and notice 5 requirements.”); Recreation World, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 6 & N.J., No. 96 Civ. 5549, 1998 WL 107362, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 7 Mar. 9, 1998). 8 The vicarious liability in this case, if any, must arise 9 from state law because the jury found that the Port Authority 10 was not liable under § 1983 for failure to train, the only 11 basis on which Caceres sought to hold the Port Authority 12 liable under federal law. See Caceres, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 13 424 n.10; see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 14 658, 691 (1978) (holding municipalities cannot be liable 15 under § 1983 on vicarious liability theory); Raysor v. Port 16 Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1985) 17 (applying Monell rule to Port Authority). Hess therefore has 18 no impact on whether the jurisdictional requisites have been 19 satisfied for Caceres’s state law claim. 20 Caceres’s claim accrued when he was released from 21 custody around midnight on August 5-6, 2004. He filed his 22 complaint on February 27, 2006, more than one year afterward.14 1 The district court therefore lacked subject matter 2 jurisdiction to consider the claim. Although this 3 jurisdictional issue was not raised by either party or the 4 district court, it cannot be waived and dismissal is 5 mandatory. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 6 919 v. CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 7 301 (2d Cir. 1994). 8 9 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in favor of 10 Sangiorgi based on qualified immunity is affirmed, the 11 judgment against the Port Authority is vacated, and the case 12 is remanded to the district court with instructions to 13 dismiss the claim against the Port Authority for lack of 14 jurisdiction.