U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Report of Investigation Concerning 

Alleged Mismanagement and 

Misconduct by Carl J. Truscott, Former 

Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

Office of the Inspector General 

Oversight and Review Division 

October 2006 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... i

TABLE OF APPENDICES................................................................................. v

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND..................................................................... 3

I. Truscott’s Professional Background ....................................................... 3

II. Background on ATF............................................................................... 3

CHAPTER THREE: ALLEGATIONS, EVIDENCE, AND FINDINGS..................... 5

I. Truscott’s Hiring Policies and Their Budget Impact ................................ 5

A. Budget and Hiring Situation Before Truscott’s Arrival................... 5

B. Truscott’s Hiring Policies .............................................................. 6

C. Concerns Expressed to Truscott about FY 2006 Hiring ................. 7

1. Concerns expressed by Headquarters officials ..................... 8

2. Concerns expressed by field managers .............................. 13

D. Impact of Hiring on Operational Budget...................................... 14

1. Ballistic vests.................................................................... 15

2. Vehicles ............................................................................ 17

3. Contractor services, security, travel, and training.............. 17

4. Office space ...................................................................... 18

E. Findings..................................................................................... 19

II. Design Changes to ATF’s New Headquarters Building .......................... 20

A. Allegation................................................................................... 20

B. Evidence .................................................................................... 21

1. History and cost overview of the New Headquarters building 

project .............................................................................. 21

2. Truscott’s involvement in the new Headquarters project.... 24

3. Changes and upgrades to the new Headquarters design.... 25

4. Rescinding the modifications............................................. 36

C. Findings..................................................................................... 39

III. Other Construction and Renovation Projects........................................ 42

A. Renovations to Current Headquarters Gym ................................ 42

1. Allegation.......................................................................... 42

2. Evidence ........................................................................... 42

3. Findings ........................................................................... 44

B. Renovations to Field Division Space............................................ 44

1. Allegation.......................................................................... 44

2. Evidence ........................................................................... 44

3. Findings ........................................................................... 48

C. Construction of NRT Truck Garage ............................................. 49

1. Allegation.......................................................................... 49

2. Evidence ........................................................................... 49

3. Findings ........................................................................... 52

i 
D. Expansion of Scope of Federal Firearms Licensing Center 

Feasibility Study ........................................................................ 53

1. Allegation.......................................................................... 53

2. Evidence ........................................................................... 53

3. Findings ........................................................................... 55

IV. Assistance in Nephew’s High School Project......................................... 55

A. Allegation................................................................................... 55

B. Evidence .................................................................................... 55

C. Assistance Provided.................................................................... 56

1. Information requests......................................................... 56

2. Visit to Philadelphia Field Division .................................... 58

3. Visit to ATF Headquarters ................................................. 59

4. Completion of the video project ......................................... 60

5. Post-completion requests and follow-up ............................ 61

D. Truscott’s Explanation of ATF’s Involvement............................... 62

E. Findings..................................................................................... 63

V. Use of Executive Protection Branch...................................................... 66

A. Allegation................................................................................... 66

B. Evidence .................................................................................... 66

1. Creation of the EPB .......................................................... 67

2. Current staffing and equipment ........................................ 70

3. Protection in and around Washington, D.C. ...................... 72

4. Protection while traveling outside of the Washington, D.C. 

area .................................................................................. 75

5. Examples of questionable use of protective detail .............. 82

6. Travel procedures of previous ATF Directors...................... 84

7. Senior managers’ observations on Truscott’s travel 

requirements .................................................................... 85

8. Responsibility for EPB procedures..................................... 86

C. Findings..................................................................................... 88

VI. Travel .................................................................................................. 91

A. September 2005 Trip to London, England................................... 91

1. Allegation.......................................................................... 91

2. Evidence ........................................................................... 91

3. Findings ......................................................................... 100

B. October 2005 Trip to New York City.......................................... 102

1. Allegation........................................................................ 102

2. Evidence ......................................................................... 102

3. Findings ......................................................................... 106

C. January 2005 Trips to Boston, Massachusetts, and Ottawa, 

Canada .................................................................................... 107

1. Allegations ...................................................................... 107

2. Evidence ......................................................................... 107

3. Findings ......................................................................... 111

ii
VII. ATF Reception at International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference

......................................................................................................... 112

A. Allegation................................................................................. 112

B. Evidence .................................................................................. 113

1. Chronology of the ATF reception ..................................... 113

2. Security at the ATF reception.......................................... 117

3. Developments after the ATF reception ............................. 118

C. Anti-Deficiency Act Issues ........................................................ 120

D. Findings................................................................................... 121

VIII. Use of Representation Fund............................................................... 122

A. Allegation................................................................................. 122

B. Evidence .................................................................................. 122

C. Findings................................................................................... 126

IX. Creation of a Hostile Work Environment ............................................ 126

A. Allegation................................................................................. 126

B. Evidence .................................................................................. 126

C. Findings................................................................................... 129

X. Personnel Practices............................................................................ 130

A. Allegation................................................................................. 130

B. Evidence .................................................................................. 130

1. Truscott’s relationship/association with the former Secret 

Service official................................................................. 130

2. Hiring the former Secret Service official........................... 131

3. The former Secret Service official’s performance evaluation

....................................................................................... 134

C. Findings................................................................................... 135

XI. Use of Visual Information Branch Resources...................................... 137

A. Allegation................................................................................. 137

B. Evidence .................................................................................. 137

1. Use of VIB photographers ............................................... 138

2. ATF publication and video............................................... 141

C. Findings................................................................................... 142

CHAPTER FOUR: OIG CONCLUSIONS ....................................................... 143

I. Construction Projects ........................................................................ 144

II. Assistance in Nephew’s High School Project....................................... 145

III. Security for Truscott.......................................................................... 146

IV. Travel ................................................................................................ 147

V. ATF Reception at IACP Convention..................................................... 147

VI. Use of the Representation Fund......................................................... 148

VII. Creation of a Hostile Work Environment ............................................ 148

VIII. Personnel Practices............................................................................ 148

IX. Use of Visual Information Branch Resources...................................... 149

X. Recommendations ............................................................................. 149

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iv
TABLE OF APPENDICES 

Appendix A Truscott Letter 

Appendix B Suite 500 – Requests/preferences/requirements of Director 

Truscott 

Appendix C ATF Documentary Outline 

v 
[BLANK PAGE] 

vi 
CHAPTER ONE: 

INTRODUCTION 

This report describes the investigation by the Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG), Oversight and Review Division, into allegations that Carl J. 

Truscott, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF), mismanaged government funds, committed travel abuse, engaged in 

improper hiring practices, and created a hostile work environment. The source 

of the allegations was an anonymous letter dated January 20, 2006, addressed 

to Inspector General Glenn A. Fine and United States Special Counsel Scott J. 

Bloch. 

 The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott had engaged in 

“egregious acts of gross mismanagement of public funds and failures of 

leadership.” Specifically, the complaint alleged that Truscott had mismanaged 

appropriated funds by excessive use of his Executive Protection Branch 

security detail; by incurring cost overruns in connection with an ATF reception 

at a law enforcement conference; and by making unnecessary design changes 

to ATF’s new Headquarters building project. The complaint also alleged several 

other inappropriate or wasteful expenditures, including improperly using the 

ATF representation fund to pay for the meals of individuals having no 

connection to ATF’s mission, dedicating funds to furnish and equip field 

division training rooms and gyms after unnecessary expansions, and ordering 

the unnecessary construction of a garage to house a National Response Team 

truck. 

 In addition, the complaint alleged that Truscott committed travel abuse 

in connection with trips to London, New York City, Boston, and Ottawa. The 

complaint also alleged that he improperly hired an unqualified former U.S. 

Secret Service colleague whom he subsequently awarded with a bonus and pay 

raise. Finally, the complaint alleged that Truscott created a hostile work 

environment for two Administrative Assistants by causing them to prepare for 

and serve lunches to him and his guests. 

 During our investigation, two additional issues surfaced which we also 

reviewed – that Truscott exercised poor judgment in pursuing an aggressive 

hiring policy against the advice of senior ATF management officials, and that 

Truscott committed misconduct by directing ATF staff to assist his nephew in 

producing a video about ATF for a high school project. In addition to the 

specific allegations described above, the investigation also considered the more 

general concerns expressed to the OIG by witnesses regarding Truscott’s 

approach to management and leadership. 

1 
 The OIG initiated its investigation on February 1, 2006. As part of our 

inquiry, we interviewed Director Truscott, ATF Deputy Director Edgar 

Domenech, the ATF Assistant Directors,1 senior budget and management 

officials, the New Building Project Manager, several Special Agents in Charge 

(SAC), an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), Special Agents, various 

Branch Chiefs, and other ATF employees with knowledge concerning the 

allegations. We also reviewed numerous documents and other materials, 

including budget proposals and projections, impact statements, hiring data, 

travel vouchers, new Headquarters design plans, e-mails, correspondence, 

presentation materials, photographs, and a video. 

 Truscott reviewed a draft of this report and responded in writing by a 

letter dated September 25, 2006. The letter, without attachments, is included 

in the report as Appendix A (the Truscott Letter). In addition, the OIG met with 

Truscott and his counsel on September 26, 2006 (the OIG/Truscott meeting). 

We refer to both the Truscott Letter and the OIG/Truscott meeting, where 

appropriate, throughout this report. We also made minor modifications in the 

report, where appropriate, based upon some of his comments. However, the 

OIG found no basis to change any of its findings as a result of Truscott’s 

comments.2

This report summarizes the results of our investigation. Chapter Two 

provides brief background information about Truscott and ATF. Chapter Three 

sets forth the evidence we discovered relevant to each allegation and issue, our 

analysis, and our findings. Chapter Four contains our conclusions. 

 Before addressing each of the allegations, we provide a brief description 

of Truscott’s background and the mission of the ATF. 

 1 We interviewed all but one Assistant Director holding office during the relevant time 

period. We did not interview the Assistant Director for the Office of Management because she 

retired from the ATF prior to the start of the investigation. However, we did interview other 

senior officials in that directorate, including the ATF’s Budget Officer. 

2 While we do not separately respond in this report to each of Truscott’s comments, we 

believe it is important to note that the Truscott Letter incorrectly states that the OIG found no 

“administrative misconduct” during the investigation. As discussed in Chapter Three, Section 

IV of this report (Assistance in Nephew’s High School Project), the OIG found that Truscott 

violated several ethics regulations, violations we clearly would define as misconduct. 

2 
CHAPTER TWO: 

BACKGROUND 

I. Truscott’s Professional Background 

Truscott received a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice from 

the University of Delaware in 1979. He began his law enforcement career in 

1980 as an investigator for the New Jersey Department of Law and Public 

Safety, Division of Gaming Enforcement. In 1981, Truscott joined the United 

States Secret Service as a Special Agent in the New York Field Office. 

 Truscott served in a variety of senior management capacities in U.S. 

Secret Service Headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Los Angeles Field Office, 

and then back in Washington, D.C. While in the Los Angeles Field Office, 

Truscott was asked to be the security coordinator of the 1996 Republican 

National Convention. Beginning in 1997, Truscott worked for two years as a 

detailee to the United States Senate as a staff member on the Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Justice, Commerce, Science, and Related Agencies. After 

serving as Special Agent in Charge of the Presidential Protective Detail, 

Truscott was appointed as Assistant Director of the Secret Service Office of 

Protective Research in January 2003, where he was responsible for “overseeing 

the agency’s protective and investigative intelligence, threat assessments, 

technical security, information technology, emergency preparedness and 

operational security.” U.S. Secret Service Press Release, April 1, 2004. 

 Attorney General John Ashcroft appointed Truscott to be the sixth 

Director of ATF in April 2004. Truscott assumed his duties as ATF Director on 

April 19, 2004, and was formally sworn in as Director on May 17, 2004. He 

resigned as ATF Director on August 4, 2006, effective August 8, 2006. 

II. Background on ATF 

The ATF’s mission is “to conduct criminal investigations, regulate the 

firearms and explosives industries, and assist other law enforcement agencies” 

as part of the U.S. government’s effort to counter terrorism, reduce violent 

crime, and protect the public. ATF Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009. 

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, codified at 6 U.S.C. 

§ 101, et seq., ATF moved from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to 

the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ). 6 U.S.C. § 531(a). Certain of 

ATF’s administrative and revenue collection functions remained with Treasury 

with the establishment of the Tax and Trade Bureau. 6 U.S.C. § 531 (d)(1). 

The transfer of ATF and its remaining law enforcement and regulatory 

3 
responsibilities to the DOJ as a separate component became effective on 

January 24, 2003. 

To support its mission, ATF employs approximately 4,950 Special Agents, 

Industry Operations Investigators (IOIs or investigators), and other staff, most 

of whom are assigned to one of ATF’s eight directorates.3 The Office of Field 

Operations is the largest directorate, accounting for approximately 80 percent 

of the agency’s employees, and has primary responsibility for administering 

ATF’s 23 Field Divisions. ATF’s Senior Leadership Team includes the Director, 

the Assistant Directors of the eight directorates, the Deputy Director, the Chief 

of Staff, and the Chief Counsel. 

 3 The eight ATF directorates are the Offices of Field Operations, Management, Public 

and Governmental Affairs, Enforcement Programs and Services, Science and Technology, 

Strategic Intelligence and Information, Training and Professional Development, and 

Professional Responsibility and Security Operations. 

4 
CHAPTER THREE: 

ALLEGATIONS, EVIDENCE, AND FINDINGS 

I. Truscott’s Hiring Policies and Their Budget Impact 

 During the course of our investigation, numerous witnesses told us that 

Truscott’s hiring policy led to excessive hiring, which in turn had a serious 

negative impact on ATF’s operating budget. This issue was not among the 

original allegations raised in the anonymous complaint. However, the OIG 

decided to examine the issue because the anonymous complaint alleged that 

many of Truscott’s spending decisions were inappropriate given ATF’s fiscal 

constraints. Thus, before discussing allegations of mismanagement of public 

funds, such as those related to the new Headquarters building and other space 

management issues, we describe in this section the extent to which Truscott’s 

hiring decisions affected ATF’s overall financial circumstances, particularly 

with respect to support of operations. This discussion is not intended to be an 

exhaustive analysis of ATF budget and personnel practices, but is meant to 

provide context for other allegations addressed in this report. 

A. Budget and Hiring Situation Before Truscott’s Arrival 

According to several witnesses, ATF has been facing critical budget 

problems during the past few years that can, in part, be traced back to the 

agency’s transition from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) in 2003. A senior financial management official told us that 

when ATF was split between the Treasury Department and the DOJ, the budget 

for the portion of ATF that transferred to the DOJ was reduced by $80 million 

in order to fund the former ATF operations that remained at the Treasury 

Department. The official stated that the actual cost of the former ATF 

operations that stayed at Treasury was about $50 million. The official said 

that the transfer to DOJ resulted in overstaffing and a strain on ATF’s budget 

when it moved to DOJ. 

A senior official who worked in ATF’s Budget Office since before the 

transition told us that former Director Buckles instituted a hiring freeze after 

the transition. This senior budget official said Buckles’ decision reflected an 

acknowledgement at that time that ATF could not hire new personnel and still 

have the money it needed in the operating budget to carry out its day-to-day 

missions. 

5 
B. Truscott’s Hiring Policies 

 When Truscott became ATF Director on April 19, 2004, ATF had 

approximately 4,659 employees, including 2,313 special agents.4 

Truscott told us that shortly after joining ATF, he visited each of the 

ATF’s 23 Field Divisions. He stated that the most consistent thing he heard 

from both field and Headquarters personnel was that ATF could not perform its 

job because it did not have an adequate number of staff. Truscott said he 

accordingly made hiring a priority during his tenure. He told us that the entire 

Strategic Leadership Team endorsed his hiring program. 

 As a result of this decision, in the fourth quarter of FY 2004 ATF hired 

approximately 178 new employees, more than had been hired in the preceding 

three quarters. During all of FY 2004, ATF hired a total of 324 new employees 

while losing 313, resulting in a net gain of 11 employees for the year. 

 Hiring activity increased significantly in FY 2005.5 Truscott told us that 

ATF hired approximately 550 people in FY 2005.6 By the end of FY 2005, ATF 

had 4,921 employees on board, a net increase of 161 employees over the year 

before. 

 Truscott continued his hiring initiative into FY 2006. ATF hired 

approximately 214 new employees through the first three quarters of FY 2006, 

while approximately 157 employees left ATF during that period, for a net gain 

of approximately 57 employees. Most of the new agents and investigators were 

brought on in the first quarter of FY 2006. According to the senior budget 

official, ATF had 4,951 employees as of May 1, 2006. 

As discussed in greater detail below, Truscott planned to hire several 

hundred more agents and investigators in FY 2006. However, many of these 

prospective hires were not brought on due to government-wide and DOJspecific rescissions to the ATF’s FY 2006 budget in December 2005 and to a 

decision by the ATF Deputy Director to cancel several new recruit training 

classes after Truscott had relinquished budget decision making authority to 

 4 The number of authorized Full Time Equivalent (FTE) positions for Fiscal Year (FY) 

2004 was 4,790, and the number of FTEs used that year was 4,625. (Table of ATF External 

Hires FY 2004-2006, prepared by ATF at the OIG’s request.) 

5 The ATF’s authorized FTEs for FY 2005 rose to 4,940, and the number of FTEs used 

was 4,752. Id. 

6 The Table of ATF External Hires FY 2004-2006 indicated that 139 special agents, 142 

investigators, 127 other, and 90 students were hired in FY 2005, for a total of 498. 

6 
him in February 2006, after Truscott was informed of the allegations against 

him.7

 A senior management official told us that Truscott’s “vision” was to hire 

to the maximum FTE level authorized by the agency’s annual budget. This 

official said that Truscott believed that a budget request to fund a given 

number of people, once endorsed by the President and approved by Congress, 

represented a Presidential and Congressional mandate to hire that number of 

people. The official said, however, that it is widely recognized that a lot of 

agencies have “hollow” FTEs, meaning FTEs that an agency does not have 

sufficient funds to support. One SAC we interviewed stated that Truscott’s 

priority was to hire up to the FTE ceiling, but that in his nearly 20 years with 

ATF, no Director had ever hired to the FTE ceiling because ATF never had 

sufficient operational funds to support the positions. 

C. Concerns Expressed to Truscott about FY 2006 Hiring 

 ATF budget documents and witnesses’ statements reflect that while 

Truscott was directing an aggressive effort to hire new employees in late 

FY 2004 and throughout FY 2005, ATF’s ability to support its expanding staff 

with training, equipment, and space was decreasing. Although appropriated 

funding (excluding emergency supplemental funding) for ATF had steadily 

increased during that period, the ATF’s allocation for its operational budget 

had steadily decreased. Senior ATF managers told us that as it became 

apparent to them that this trend was likely to continue in FY 2006, they began 

to voice their concerns to Truscott about his hiring policy. 

 In FY 2004, ATF’s appropriated funding was $827 million. Funding 

increased to $878 million in FY 2005, and to $911 million in FY 2006.8 In 

contrast, ATF’s operational budget in 2004 was $176 million, or approximately 

21.3 percent of appropriated funds. In FY 2005, the operational budget was 

approximately $155 million, or 17.7 percent of appropriated funds. ATF’s 

Office of Management estimates that in FY 2006, the operational budget will 

remain at $155 million, or 17 percent of appropriated funds.9 As described 

above, the number of employees supported by the operational budget has 

increased by nearly 300 over this 3-year period. 

 7 In the Truscott Letter, Truscott stated that he relinquished budget authority to 

Deputy Director Domenech in February 2006 only with respect to future decisions concerning 

the Director’s office in the new Headquarters building. See Truscott Letter at p. 2, n. 4. 

8 The final FY 2006 appropriation figure reflects a December 2005 rescission of 

approximately $13 million. 

9 The estimate for the FY 2006 operational budget assumes that ATF will receive 

approximately $1.4 million from DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund toward the 

purchase of investigative equipment. 

7 
 Domenech and other witnesses cited three primary reasons for the 

decrease in operational funds during this period. First, the growth in ATF 

personnel resulted in greater spending on salaries. Second, a clerical error in 

the calculation of FICA benefit contributions resulted in an $11 million 

underestimation of projected payroll costs. Finally, as described in Section II of 

this chapter, ATF had to take several million dollars out of its operational 

budget in FY 2005 to cover its share of expenditures for the new Headquarters 

building. According to these witnesses, ATF anticipated having to move money 

from its operational budget into the Headquarters project again in FY 2006.10

Truscott told the OIG that no one in ATF’s leadership ranks objected to 

his hiring initiative. He made a similar statement during his testimony on 

April 26, 2006, before the House Science, State, Justice and Commerce and 

Related Agencies Subcommittee on FY 2007 appropriations for ATF. In 

response to questions regarding whether hiring was impacting operational 

funds, Truscott defended his hiring policy in part by stating, “it was the 

consensus and has been the consensus that it was important” to hire new 

personnel so that ATF could carry out its mission. (Emphasis added.) 

 However, many senior managers told us that although they supported 

Truscott’s decision to hire new agents, investigators, and other employees 

throughout FY 2005, they told Truscott they were opposed to his decision to 

continue the hiring policy into FY 2006 because of the strain it would place on 

the operating budget. We also were told by several witnesses that field division 

managers expressed concern to Truscott at a November 2005 SAC conference 

that any continued hiring should be balanced against ATF’s ability to support 

the new hires. We discuss below the concerns expressed to Truscott about his 

hiring initiative by senior managers at Headquarters and in the field. 

1. Concerns expressed by Headquarters officials 

 Deputy Director Domenech told us that he agreed it was necessary to 

hire new employees in FY 2005. However, he said that he had told Truscott 

repeatedly that the rate of hiring could not be continued in FY 2006. 

Domenech noted that while the hiring decisions for FY 2006 were being made, 

ATF was also facing an approximately $7.9 million shortfall in funding its share 

of the new Headquarters building (discussed in Section II of this chapter, 

below). Domenech said he told Truscott at the time that they would have to 

take the money to pay for the Headquarters building out of the operational 

fund, and that any money they took from operations would affect all ATF 

 10 A July 10, 2005, e-mail from a senior budget official to a branch chief in the Public 

and Governmental Affairs directorate states: “Taking $33M ‘out of hide’ [for the new 

Headquarters building] in FY05 and FY06 is contributing to a major budget shortfall in those 

two FYs[.]” 

8 
directorates. He said he also explained to Truscott that the operational fund 

was smaller than it had been the year before, but that ATF was bigger and was 

being asked to do more, and that the amount of fixed account spending had 

increased. In sum, he said he told Truscott “[w]e have less money with more 

people. It’s going to impact the agency’s ability to function. That is why, 

Director, do not hire anymore and increase [salary expenses].” 

 Domenech said Truscott reacted by telling him that the new 

Headquarters building and hiring were “critical” for ATF, so they would 

continue to hire agents and investigators. He also said that Truscott accused 

him of “trying to derail [Truscott’s] vision.” 

 

 Two senior ATF Office of Management officials told us that they and 

Domenech had numerous meetings with Truscott as early as June 2005 to 

present him with various hiring scenarios and to explain to him how the 

number of projected hires in FY 2006 would affect funds remaining for 

operational expenses. These briefings culminated in a formal presentation to 

Truscott on October 7, 2005, in which the senior Office of Management officials 

sought to convince him that ATF could not sustain the same level of hiring in 

FY 2006 that it had in the prior fiscal year. Materials from the October 

presentation show that if ATF were to hire up to the projected authorized FTE 

limit of 5,128 in FY 2006, the agency would have to spend $603 million on 

salaries, leaving $118 million for operational expenses. However, if ATF were to 

hire up to the authorized FTE limit in effect for the prior fiscal year (4,940), it 

would spend $583 million on salaries, leaving $137 million available for 

operational expenses.11 

 One of the senior officials at the October meeting stated that she advised 

Truscott to hire fewer new people and to stagger their entry-on-duty dates to 

conserve funds. She said that she also would have liked to hire more 

personnel, but the realities of the budget did not permit it. She said that 

Truscott told her, “You keep raining on my parade.” She said that part of the 

problem was that Truscott did not appreciate “how bad things were in the 

operational accounts.” This official also stated that Truscott had an unrealistic 

assessment of how operational funds could be replenished by reprogramming 

expired accounts that had been used in the past to support specific programs, 

but which would no longer be available in FY 2006.12 She stated that Truscott 

never explained to her where new funds could be found, and she believed 

 11 Both scenarios assumed $119 million in fixed expenses. 

12 As an example, the senior management official stated that ATF was able to apply 

prior year balances from its Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program toward 

operational support of the Office of Field Operations’ Violent Crime Impact Teams in FY 2005; 

however, because the GREAT program had since moved from ATF to the Office of Justice 

Programs, additional funding from that source would not be available in FY 2006. 

9 
Truscott discounted her advice because he thought she was being 

“pessimistic.”

 The two senior Office of Management officials’ account of these meetings 

and the October 7, 2005, presentation is supported by a senior member of 

Truscott’s staff who also attended them. This witness stated, “I’m not sure that 

the Director ever fully grasped the whole issue of FTE” and the continuing cost 

of hiring people. The witness said Truscott was focused instead on how many 

people were on the payroll at the time. The witness said that the budget 

officials emphasized to Truscott that continuing the current pace of hiring 

would leave “so little in the operating funds.” The witness said that Truscott 

was determined to continue to hire and that he wanted his “legacy” to be the 

creation of a new work force. 

Truscott’s Chief of Staff also attended the October 7, 2005, budget 

presentation. The Chief of Staff was hired in June 2005, and thus had little 

direct knowledge about the expanded hirings in FY 2005. He confirmed that a 

senior management official advised Truscott to defer any FY 2006 hiring until 

the end of the fiscal year, but that Truscott brought on the new hires despite 

this advice. However, the Chief of Staff said that at the time Truscott had been 

asking his Assistant Directors to “scrub” their accounts and they were coming 

up with additional money to fund hiring. He said that as a result, Truscott was 

not confident that he was being presented with a “true picture” of ATF’s budget 

situation. The Chief of Staff said Truscott was optimistic that other sources of 

funding, such as reprogramming requests, would come through.13 The Chief of 

Staff also said that Truscott did not want to see the hiring gains made in 

FY 2005 lost in FY 2006. 

 Domenech confirmed that during the period surrounding the October 7 

briefing, the various directorates were “scrubbing their accounts” to find money 

that was to be used for future purchases of equipment and services but which 

had not yet been obligated. Domenech said that Truscott referred to these 

funds as “found money.” Domenech stated, however, that for each dollar 

“found,” there was a commensurate loss in funding for ATF operations going 

forward. A senior budget official we interviewed also supported Domenech’s 

description that the directorates were finding additional funds by cutting future 

spending on such items as telecommunications equipment. 

 Regarding new FY 2006 hires, Domenech stated that he and the two 

senior Office of Management officials advised Truscott to defer any new 

FY 2006 hiring until the end of the fiscal year, by which time a continuing 

 13 The presentation materials from the October 7, 2005, briefing contained an 

assumption that $9.4 million in an ATF reprogramming request would be approved. That 

reprogramming request has never been submitted to Congress. 

10
resolution would have been lifted and the impact from any rescissions to that 

fiscal year’s budget would be known. Domenech said Truscott disregarded 

their advice and instead insisted on scheduling three new classes of agents and 

investigators during the first half of FY 2006.14 

 Domenech and one of the senior management officials told us about how 

the timing of new agent and investigator training classes also impacted the ATF 

budget. Domenech and the senior management official told us that in 

December 2005, after being notified of a government-wide rescission, Truscott 

was persuaded to cancel one of the three training classes for new agents 

scheduled for the first half of FY 2006.15 Domenech and the senior 

management official stated that they had recommended to Truscott that if he 

were unwilling to cancel FLETC classes, he should at a minimum schedule 

them for later in the fiscal year as a way of saving money.16 Domenech told us 

that Truscott, however, could not be persuaded to defer two other basic agent 

and investigator training classes until the latter half of FY 2006. Domenech 

stated that Truscott’s decision to go forward with these classes so early in 

FY 2006 cost ATF several million dollars more in salaries and expenses than it 

would have cost had the classes been deferred or cancelled entirely. In 

February 2006, after the OIG investigation began and Truscott turned over 

agency budget authority to Domenech, Domenech told us he cancelled at least 

four more basic agent and investigator classes.17 

 Other senior managers also told us that Truscott dismissed their 

concerns that ATF lacked sufficient funds to support continued hiring. The 

Assistant Director for the Office of Training and Professional Development 

 14 The three classes were comprised of 72 recruits hired at the end of FY 2005 and 72 

hired very early in FY 2006. According to a proposed FLETC schedule provided to us by ATF, 

one group of 24 recruits within the 48-member special agent basic training class actually 

began training on September 15, 2005, two weeks before the start of the 2006 fiscal year, and 

merged with the other 24 members of the class later in FY 2006. 

15 The December 2005 rescission resulted in a reduction of $13 million from ATF’s 

FY 2006 appropriations. 

16 Domenech referred us to the FLETC scheduling document, which shows that the 

48-member agent class slated to begin in November 2005 would consume 42 FTEs, or 

$3.4 million in salaries and expenses. However, a class of equal size scheduled to begin much 

later in FY 2006, such as in March, would have cost 27 FTEs, or $2.2 million in salaries and 

expenses. Based on the scheduling document, the principle of conserving FTEs by deferring 

the start date of classes would hold true for the investigator training as well. 

17 As is discussed in Section II of this chapter and referenced throughout this report, 

Domenech told us that Truscott turned over budget decision authority to him a few days after 

Truscott met with the Associate Deputy Attorney General on January 30, 2006, and was shown 

a copy of the anonymous complaint letter. Truscott stated in his letter to the OIG that he 

turned over budget authority to Domenech only with respect to future decisions concerning the 

Director’s office in the new Headquarters building. See Truscott Letter at p. 2, n. 4. 

11
(TPD) told us that he and the Assistant Director for the Office of Professional 

Responsibility and Security Operations (OPRSO) talked to Truscott and the 

Chief of Staff about Truscott’s plan to continue hiring in FY 2006. The TPD 

Assistant Director said that he told Truscott that ATF did not have sufficient 

funds to train the proposed number of new hires. He said that Truscott 

responded that they would find the money. 

 The OPRSO Assistant Director told us that he expressed concerns to 

Truscott about the costs related to conducting background investigations on 

new hires, but that Truscott was dismissive of these concerns. This Assistant 

Director told us that Truscott was intent on adding at least four basic training 

classes at the beginning of FY 2006, despite contrary advice “from the majority 

of the Senior Leadership Team.”18 He said that even after Truscott agreed to 

cancel one class scheduled for February 2006, Truscott still urged him to go 

forward with background checks and to keep the recruits “on the shelf” in case 

the agency’s financial situation improved. He said Truscott did not understand 

that there is a cost associated with conducting background checks. He told us 

that the total cost of the investigations performed on recruits who were 

scheduled to attend the FLETC classes that have since been cancelled was 

$280,000 for 112 special agents and $149,500 for 65 investigators.19 

 Domenech and the Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations 

also told us that early in FY 2006 staff in the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General expressed concern over ATF’s aggressive hiring. Domenech said that 

in either October or November of 2005, he and the Assistant Director met with 

an Associate Deputy Attorney General to discuss the hiring issue.20 According 

to this Assistant Director, the DOJ official asked why ATF was hiring so many 

people and stated that this was “gross mismanagement on the part of ATF.” 

The Assistant Director and Domenech said that the DOJ official asked how ATF 

could be hiring all these new employees when the agency was “broke.” The 

Assistant Director and Domenech said that they told the DOJ official that 

Truscott was making these decisions, that they and others had advised against 

 18 The OPRSO Assistant Director was unable to recall any members of the Senior 

Leadership Team expressing support for Truscott’s hiring plan. 

19 According to this Assistant Director, the cost of performing a preliminary 

background investigation for a special agent recruit is $2,500; for an investigator recruit, the 

cost is $2,300. The Assistant Director stated that preliminary investigations remain valid for 

90 days, and thereafter must be updated. Both Domenech and the Assistant Director stated 

that some of these recruits may yet be hired if ATF’s financial circumstances improve, in which 

case only an update on their background check will have to be performed. However, both 

stated that recruits who have been put “on the shelf” tend to find employment elsewhere 

eventually. 

20 The official has since left the DOJ to join the Department of Homeland Security. 

12
it, and that they had informed Truscott of the repercussions.21 Domenech said 

that he later told Truscott of the Associate Deputy Attorney General’s concerns, 

and that Truscott responded, in essence, that he would rather cut spending 

than curtail hiring. 

2. Concerns expressed by field managers 

 We asked Truscott whether anyone from Field Operations had ever 

expressed any concern that they did not have sufficient resources to support 

new employees. Truscott responded that no one had expressed such concerns 

to him. He said that concerns from the field would generally first be raised to 

the Deputy Assistant Directors for Field Operations, then to the Assistant 

Director, then to the Deputy Director, and then to him. 

 However, we received information from numerous witnesses that 

such concerns were expressed to Truscott. A senior official in the Office 

of Field Operations told us that she attended the SAC conference in 

St. Simons Island, Georgia, in early November 2005. She said that the 

field managers made Truscott aware at the conference that they had 

problems supporting personnel in terms of adequate space, training, and 

equipment and did not need to hire any more people at that time. 

 

 At the November 2005 SAC conference, the Assistant Director for the 

Office of Field Operations gave a PowerPoint presentation to Truscott to explain 

the current and projected status of field divisions, primarily in terms of 

available office space for personnel. The Assistant Director told us that the 

presentation emphasized the need to keep an appropriate balance between 

hiring new people and maintaining sufficient operational funds to support 

existing personnel. According to a memorandum prepared by the Assistant 

Director summarizing the information conveyed to Truscott at the conference, 

the SACs “stressed the importance of maintaining sufficient funds to equip and 

house our people, support current employees and . . . maintain [existing] 

equipment.” He said they also told Truscott that many ATF employees did not 

have ATF office space, and that many projects to obtain space were not funded. 

 We reviewed the materials that the Assistant Director and others told us 

were presented to Truscott at the November 2005 conference. The materials 

show that at that time, a total of 84 space projects were unfunded, 105 special 

agents were working in non-ATF space, and 140 ATF employees did not have 

 21 Several Assistant Directors told us that they were never involved in meetings 

regarding hiring decisions. Domenech stated that meetings at which hiring decisions were 

made generally included Truscott, Domenech, the Chief of Staff, another senior member of 

Truscott’s staff, and three senior officials from the Office of Management, including the 

Assistant Director. 

13
workstations “as the result of hiring emphasis and lack of funding space 

expansion projects.” The materials also stated that agents and investigators 

were sitting in conference rooms, foyers, common spaces, and file rooms, and 

listed “space and work stations for all ATF employees” as SAC priorities. Also 

listed as priorities for the field divisions were vehicles and equipment, task 

force support, training, and strategic placement of employees. 

 One SAC who attended the conference told us that on the first two days 

of the conference just the SACs, the Assistant Director for Field Operations, 

and possibly Deputy Director Domenech were present. He said that there was 

a general sense among the SACs that they had insufficient operational funds, 

and that they decided to put forth a unified message to Truscott that there 

should be a balance between the number of agents ATF hired and ATF’s ability 

to adequately support those employees. He said that the SACs’ comments were 

in response to the large scale hiring that had occurred in FY 2005 and the “big 

hit” in resources such as vehicles and travel funds that the field offices took 

that year. He said that Truscott appeared to be taken aback by the 

presentation. 

 Moreover, although Truscott told us that he had widespread support for 

continuing to aggressively hire new personnel going into FY 2006, an 

overwhelming majority of senior executives at Headquarters told us that they 

opposed the policy. Several of these senior executives, including budget 

officials from the Office of Management, stated that they had conveyed their 

recommendation to Truscott that he either not continue to hire so extensively, 

or at a minimum defer basic training classes and start dates until the end of 

the fiscal year. As noted above, in spite of recommendations to the contrary, 

Truscott scheduled several basic training classes in early FY 2006 before 

agreeing to cancel one of the classes after learning of a budgetary rescission in 

December 2005. After Truscott recused himself from decisions affecting ATF’s 

budget shortfall in early February 2006, the Deputy Director cancelled all 

remaining FY 2006 basic training classes. 

D. Impact of Hiring on Operational Budget 

 Domenech told us that it became apparent to him in late 2005 that ATF 

would be facing continued severe shortfalls in operational funds in FY 2006. 

Accordingly, in December 2005 Domenech instructed the Assistant Directors 

for each directorate to prepare an “Impact Statement” discussing how a 

20 percent reduction in resources would affect operations during FY 2006. 

Domenech stated that the 20 percent figure was a reasonable “worst case 

scenario” estimate. 

 The ATF’s Office of Management subsequently summarized the most 

critical points raised in each of the directorates’ statements. The January 2006 

Summary, entitled “FY 2006 Allocation Levels – High Level Impacts” (Summary) 

14
stated that “ATF has had a significant base shortfall since FY 2003 and has 

had to make many difficult decisions to operate within resource levels.” The 

Summary then addressed key impacts of FY 2006 allocation levels, stressing a 

lack of sufficient funds for investigative equipment, vehicles, purchase of 

information and evidence, contractor support, training, and travel. 

 Domenech told us that he personally gave a copy of the Impact 

Statements to Truscott on January 19, 2006, and reviewed the document with 

Truscott on January 23. Domenech said that Truscott reacted to the 

anticipated cutbacks by blaming the Assistant Directors for not properly 

managing their directorate budgets and stating that the Assistant Directors 

were “crying wolf” over the lack of adequate funding. 

 

 According to the Summary, FY 2006 allocations for investigative 

equipment were “almost zero” and “[t]he lack of investigative equipment is 

becoming an agent safety issue.” The Summary stated that as a point of 

comparison, ATF spent $9 million on investigative equipment in FY 2002.22 

According to the Summary, investigative equipment includes firearms, body 

armor, ballistic vests, electronic surveillance equipment, ballistic helmets, 

auxiliary weapons, and respiratory equipment, among other items. 

1. Ballistic vests 

 The Summary stated that ATF has “more than 1,000 vests that have 

either expired or will expire this fiscal year.”23 The Office of Field Operations 

Impact Statement indicated that the purchase of ballistic vests and other 

investigative equipment “will be substantially reduced or eliminated” due to the 

lack of funding. 

 One SAC told us that the use of expired ballistic vests was a “significant 

issue.” He said he was not sure how many such vests were in his division, but 

said that he can guarantee that “quite a few” are. Another SAC stated that as 

of March 2006 some of his agents were using expired vests. A third SAC told 

 22 According to a senior Office of Management official, FY 2002 is often used as a point 

of comparison for budget issues because it was the last full fiscal year before ATF transitioned 

from Treasury to DOJ and also represents a year in which ATF had a good balance between 

fixed costs, salaries and expenses, and operational funds. 

23 Based on ATF documents we reviewed, “expired vests” refers to vests that have been 

used beyond the manufacturer’s recommended period of 5 years. The ATF documents indicate 

that the National Institute of Justice deems the vests “good” for 7 years. However, ATF has not 

conducted any tests on vests older than 5 years and ATF’s Technical Operations Branch 

decided to apply the more conservative 5-year criterion to determine the useable lifespan of 

ATF’s vests. The use of the term “expired” in this report refers only to ATF witnesses’ 

characterization of certain ballistic vests. 

15
us that he did not believe any of his agents had expired vests, but said there 

was a problem in the field securing funding for respirators for his investigators. 

 An e-mail exchange on February 1 and 2, 2006, between officials within 

ATF’s Office of Management and the Technical Operations Branch indicated 

that at that time ATF agents were wearing expired vests, and more vests were 

about to expire. According to a Technical Operations Branch official, “The 404 

vests sent out in 2000 have already expired and the 648 vests sent out in 2001 

will expire this year.” 

 Truscott told us that he felt very strongly about the issue of ballistic 

vests, stating that “the idea of buying anything at ATF instead of ballistic vests 

for our agents simply turns my stomach.” However, he also gave us somewhat 

inconsistent accounts of whether he was aware of any problems with ballistic 

vests. He first stated that “never since the day I got there has anybody ever 

indicated to me that ballistic vests were an issue of any sort.” He later 

conceded that in January 2006 he became aware that some of ATF’s ballistic 

vests “might expire at some point in the not too distant future.” 

 Both the Summary and the Office of Field Operations Impact Statement, 

which were presented to Truscott in January 2006, stated that ATF had 

requested funds from DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Super Surplus Fund to purchase 

vests.24 An ATF senior budget official told us that the Administration 

authorized ATF to seek $4 million from the Super Surplus Fund for 

investigative equipment and “intelligence research tools”; however, documents 

indicate that the Attorney General approved recommending $2.5 million for 

ATF. Ultimately, ATF only received $1,367,000. The budget official told us 

that the money has been used to purchase critically needed investigative 

equipment.25 The budget official told us that enough vests have now been 

purchased to assure that ATF agents will have current vests through 

FY 2007.26 

 24 ATF competes with other components and agencies for these funds, and thus cannot 

rely on funds from this source as part of its annual operating budget.

25 Specifically, $752,000 has been used to support ATF’s respirator program (including 

equipment and training); $365,000 has been used to purchase ballistic helmets; and $250,000 

has been used to purchase vests. 

26 The Assistant Director for Field Operations told us that additional funds for the vests 

were freed up by converting a previous contract for other less critical equipment into one for 

vests. The Assistant Director confirmed that a total of 1068 vests were ordered and that by 

July 2006 approximately 680 vests had been delivered and shipped out to the field divisions. 

16
2. Vehicles 

 The Summary stated that no funds were allocated for vehicle purchases 

in FY 2006. It also stated that over 36 percent of the vehicles in ATF’s fleet had 

accumulated over 100,000 miles, which significantly increased the cost of 

vehicle maintenance. We learned from the Office of Management that ATF 

bought 297 vehicles in FY 2003, 319 in FY 2004, and 366 vehicles in FY 2005. 

ATF’s Budget Officer also confirmed to the OIG that, with the exception of eight 

vehicles bought to support the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center 

(TEDAC), a moratorium was in effect as of June 2006 on the purchase of new 

vehicles in FY 2006. Domenech told us in July 2006 that ATF almost certainly 

will not be able to purchase new vehicles through the remainder of FY 2006. 

 We asked Truscott whether ATF has an adequate fleet of vehicles, and he 

responded that he had been told by his staff that “our fleet is not inconsistent 

with other DOJ components.” He said that purchases of vehicles are generally 

made at the end of the fiscal year, as had been done in FY 2005, and that it 

was too early to tell whether ATF would be able to purchase vehicles at the end 

of the current fiscal year. When asked specifically whether, given the current 

constraints on the budget, he believed funds would become available at the end 

of the current fiscal year for the purchase of vehicles, he replied, “I don’t have 

any idea.” 

3. Contractor services, security, travel, and training 

 According to the Impact Statements, almost all the ATF directorates 

expected to encounter problems in funding contractor services, training, and 

travel. For example, the Office of Enforcement Programs and Services (EPS), 

which relies extensively on contractors to staff the National Tracing Center 

(NTC) and National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN), 

anticipated that cuts to its operating budget would “seriously reduce support to 

State and local law enforcement in pursuit of criminal investigations and 

jeopardize public safety.” The Assistant Director for EPS told us that, in fact, 

many of the problems forecast in the Impact Statement for his directorate are 

occurring. He told us, for example, that the NTC is not fully funded, and as a 

result it is taking longer to complete firearms tracing requests. 

 The Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations 

(OPRSO) projected that its Inspections Division, which investigates allegations 

of misconduct within ATF, would be severely compromised in its mission 

because travel funds would be exhausted by March 2006. The Statement 

noted that 90 percent of its investigations require travel. Domenech told us 

that OPRSO is now deferring programmatic reviews and is sending fewer 

investigators out in the field to respond to misconduct allegations. The OPRSO 

Assistant Director told us that he reprioritized OPRSO’s budget to ensure that 

some funds would be available for limited travel. He also stated that $910,000 

17
worth of security-related projects, such as installation of cameras, access 

control systems, and alarm systems in new field facilities have been deferred 

indefinitely. He stated that approximately $100,000 worth of security upgrades 

at existing facilities have also been indefinitely put on hold. 

 The Office of Training and Professional Development (TPD), which 

supports mandatory and other training of all ATF employees, wrote in its 

Impact Statement that its proposed FY 2006 budget of $13.9 million was a 

reduction of almost 30 percent from its FY 2002 budget, yet there had been no 

corresponding decrease in hiring, mandatory training, and other mission 

requirements that drive training costs. The Assistant Director for TPD told us 

that to be able to fund the training for the new hires and the mandatory 

training for existing employees, he had to cut back on leadership training, 

certified fire investigators recertification, accelerant detection K-9 

recertification, investigator training, and travel. He said that he also made 

tremendous cuts in mandatory training to state and local law enforcement 

personnel. In addition, a SAC told us that due to budget constraints, there has 

been no “out-bureau” training for the past couple of years. 

 Finally, Domenech told us that ATF usually funds approximately 180 

permanent changes of station (PCS) each year. However, he said that because 

of the decrease in available funds, he can only authorize approximately 90 for 

FY 2006. 

4. Office space 

Although the issue of office space was not addressed in the Impact 

Statements, it was raised to Truscott during the November 2005 SAC 

conference described above. We interviewed several SACs about the current 

status of office space for their field divisions. Each told us that finding 

sufficient space for ATF field personnel was still a problem. They stated that 

some personnel were stationed in U.S. Attorney’s Offices and local sheriff’s 

offices, although they also pointed out that stationing ATF agents in non-ATF 

space was sometimes necessitated by ATF’s participation in Project Safe 

Neighborhoods (PSN).27

 Truscott told us he was aware that some field divisions did not have 

sufficient space for their personnel. He said that hiring of personnel and 

expansion of space does not happen simultaneously. He added, “So in some 

cases, you may need to have people double up . . . and, you know, make the 

 27 PSN is a nationwide program designed to reduce gun crime by supporting local antigun crime initiatives. The program relies on United States Attorneys to lead cooperative efforts 

among federal, state and local agencies in the 94 federal judicial districts. Truscott said PSN 

covers approximately 120 cities around the country. 

18
best of things until you can expand a little bit.” Truscott also stated that many 

ATF agents were located in non-ATF space, such as U.S. Attorney’s Offices and 

local police departments, because of ATF’s commitment to PSN. Truscott said 

that this arrangement may actually benefit ATF because ATF can use other 

agencies’ space “albeit not quite as nice space as we would like to have.” 

E. Findings 

 Truscott implemented a very aggressive hiring policy during his tenure, 

and in particular during FY 2005. The ATF hired approximately 950 new 

agents, investigators, and other personnel between the third quarter of FY 

2004 and the end of the second quarter of FY 2006. During that same period, 

ATF separations totaled approximately 630, resulting in a net gain of 

approximately 320 employees between April 2004 and March 2006. 

 During this same time period, ATF’s operating budget decreased by 

approximately $21 million. Truscott’s hiring policy was one of several factors 

that contributed to the decrease in the operating budget. Other factors 

included funding for ATF’s share of new Headquarters building construction 

costs (see Section II of this chapter) and an apparent error in the calculation of 

employee benefits for FY 2006. 

 Truscott told us that his decision to aggressively hire during FY 2005 

was supported by most senior managers, both at Headquarters and in the field. 

Senior managers said they supported this action initially, because ATF had not 

hired many employees in the preceding two years and needed more agents and 

investigators to fulfill its mission. 

 However, we found that contrary to Truscott’s statements to the OIG, he 

did not have senior management support to continue the pace of FY 2005 

hiring into FY 2006. Specifically, we found that Truscott was told repeatedly 

by senior budget and management officials that ATF could not continue 

aggressively hiring new agents and investigators without serious negative 

consequences to the operating budget. These officials presented the facts 

supporting this assessment to Truscott throughout the end of FY 2005, and 

most compellingly in a meeting on October 7, 2005. In addition, the Deputy 

Director of ATF warned Truscott against bringing in new classes of agents and 

investigators early in the 2006 fiscal year because doing so would 

unnecessarily consume salary and expense funds, thereby compounding the 

drain on operational funds. Moreover, during a November 2005 conference, 

the SACs told Truscott that the FY 2005 hiring was contributing to a shortage 

of adequate work space for field personnel and that Truscott needed to be 

mindful of finding a balance between additional hiring and making adequate 

resources available to support the new employees. 

19
 Truscott rejected the recommendations of the Deputy Director, senior 

budget and management officials, and SACs that he not continue the robust 

pace of hiring during FY 2006. We found that Truscott was not responsive to 

the concerns and was at times dismissive of them. 

 

 We concluded that Truscott’s hiring policies affected ATF’s ability to carry 

out its missions. For example, ATF’s capacity to purchase new investigative 

equipment, including ballistic vests, was constrained by diminished resources. 

 In addition, we found that vital contractor services, particularly with 

respect to support of criminal investigations involving the tracing of firearms, 

have been reduced. We further found that many of ATF’s internal security 

upgrades and investigations programs have been deferred indefinitely, in part 

due to reduced travel funds. We also found that ATF has cut back on 

important training and recertification programs for its employees. 

 In sum, Truscott’s decision to increase the size of ATF through aggressive 

hiring contributed to a decrease in funds available to support ATF operations. 

These reductions in funds for ATF operations were occurring at the same time 

that costs were escalating on the construction of the ATF’s new Headquarters 

building, in part because of decisions by Truscott. The next section of this 

report examines that issue. 

II. Design Changes to ATF’s New Headquarters Building 

A. Allegation 

 The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott was responsible for 

unnecessary design changes to ATF’s new Headquarters building, particularly 

in the areas of the Director’s Suite, the Joint Support Operations Center, and 

the gym. According to the complaint, these design changes have significantly 

driven up ATF’s share of the construction costs for the project. The complaint 

letter also alleged that Truscott prioritized the unnecessary design changes 

ahead of the purchase of vehicles and other critical law enforcement 

equipment. Finally, the complaint letter alleged that Truscott spent an 

excessive amount of his time and that of senior managers on the Headquarters 

project. 

 This section provides a brief overview of the new Headquarters building 

project, including a discussion of ATF’s share of expenses to fund the project. 

It then examines Truscott’s involvement in the project generally, and his 

specific involvement in design changes to the Director’s Suite, the Joint 

Support Operation Center (JSOC), and the gym. Lastly, we discuss the events 

of January and February 2006, when ATF was advised to scale back the 

20
project, and the actions that were taken to mitigate the cost implications of 

Truscott’s design changes. 

B. Evidence 

1. History and cost overview of the New Headquarters 

building project 

In the wake of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 

Oklahoma City in April 1995, and under authority of the Anti-Terrorism 

Emergency Supplemental Act of 1995 and Executive Order 12977, ATF and the 

General Services Administration (GSA) jointly undertook a study of options for 

the relocation of ATF from its current headquarters at 650 Massachusetts 

Avenue in downtown Washington, D.C., to a more secure facility.28 GSA and 

ATF jointly conducted financial and security evaluations for over 80 occupancy 

options for ATF between 1997 and 1999. The agencies concluded that the 

option that would produce the best return on investment for the federal 

government would be to construct new headquarters rather than to lease and 

upgrade existing facilities. 

In 2000, Congress appropriated $83 million to GSA for construction of 

the new Headquarters, and ATF was given $15 million in funds from the 

Department of the Treasury’s Asset Forfeiture Fund for site acquisition. The 

site for the new Headquarters building was acquired from the District of 

Columbia government for $15 million in 2001, and the new building design 

contract was awarded to Moshe Safdie and Associates, a Boston architectural 

firm, in that same year. A groundbreaking ceremony at the site of the new 

Headquarters building was held on April 10, 2002.29 The design for the 

building and detailed plans for ATF’s use of the space were nearly complete by 

the end of 2002. Actual construction of the new building began in the summer 

of 2004. 

In early 2004, GSA sought to reprogram an additional $47 million to 

meet what had grown to be $130 million in anticipated total GSA construction 

costs. Congress approved the reprogramming request in early 2005. The Chief 

of ATF’s Space Management Branch told us that ATF was responsible for 

 28 Executive Order 12977 (effective date October 19, 1995), established an Interagency 

Security Committee (ISC) consisting of the Administrator of General Services and 

representatives from 17 major federal departments and agencies. The purpose of the ISC was 

to evaluate security standards for federal facilities and to develop “long-term construction 

standards for those locations with threat levels or missions that require blast resistant 

structures or other specialized security requirements[.]” Id., Sec. 5. 

29 The new Headquarters building will be located at 99 New York Avenue, N.E., in 

Washington, D.C. 

21
paying the costs of the new building design and layout requirements, and for 

the costs of any specific features ATF needed for programmatic reasons that 

were in excess of what GSA identified as necessary for “initial tenant buildout.” The Space Management Branch Chief said that the formula for GSA’s 

funding of the new Headquarters called for GSA to pay $33.00 per square foot 

of space and for ATF to pay anything above that amount. According to a senior 

ATF budget official, ATF’s share of the project covering design changes, security 

features, furnishings, equipment, and relocation expenses, will have cost 

approximately $90 million by the end of the project. This official told us that of 

this amount, $60 million has been funded through Congressional 

appropriations, leaving ATF to find at least $30 million in additional funds. 

The additional $30 million in costs was driven in part by construction 

design changes made after the plans for the new Headquarters had been drawn 

up.30 The New Building Project Office (NBPO) attributed some of the design 

changes to ATF’s internal reorganization after moving from Treasury to the 

DOJ. According to the New Building Project Manager, ATF’s move resulted in 

the loss of the alcohol and tobacco tax and trade regulation offices. This, 

coupled with the formation of the Office of Strategic Information and 

Intelligence directorate (OSII), resulted in significant changes to the layout of 

the new Headquarters. The project manager told us that the changes to the 

layout consisted mainly of reconfiguring walls, entranceways, and other 

features related to office space. One of the more significant modifications 

involved the JSOC, which is operated by the OSII directorate. However, as 

discussed later in this section, witnesses disputed the need for the changes to 

the JSOC even with the creation of the new directorate. 

Other design changes to the new Headquarters building, such as a 

redesign of the blast curtain in front of the structure, resulted from errors and 

omissions in the original design, or from unforeseen conditions at the site of 

the new Headquarters. Finally, some of the design changes, such as changes 

to the Director’s Suite, were alleged to be unnecessary or frivolous changes and 

were proposed or authorized by Truscott. We focus on those changes in 

subsection 3, below. 

ATF officials recognized that ATF would have to pay for any increased 

costs associated with deviations from and corrections to the original new 

Headquarters building plans. The Project Manager told us that Truscott was 

 30 According to an April 2005 “Order of Magnitude Program Estimate” by GSA’s 

construction manager, the total projected cost of all post-plan revisions, including mark-ups 

and design contingencies, was $4.3 million. The general contractor’s estimate for the same 

work was $17 million. According to the Project Manager, the New Building Project Office 

(NBPO) was able to negotiate this figure down to approximately $9.5 million. These costs do 

not include relocation and other non-construction expenses that must be borne by ATF. 

22
made aware within the first three to six months of his tenure that ATF would 

need to “take money out of hide” – meaning out of ATF’s budget – in order to 

pay for the design changes to the new Headquarters. Internal e-mails from 

ATF’s Office of Management in May 2005 reflect that Truscott was frustrated by 

ATF’s inability to get a reprogramming request for additional funding approved 

by DOJ in 2004, especially in light of GSA’s ability to gain approval for a 

$47 million reprogramming of its funds.31 The Project Manager told us that 

the Assistant Director for the Office of Management (who has since retired from 

the ATF) and Deputy Director Domenech had to explain to Truscott that ATF 

was “new to the Department [of Justice]” and that ATF would not be getting 

everything it asked for in terms of financial support for its new Headquarters. 

On June 16, 2005, ATF’s Office of Management submitted another 

request to DOJ to reprogram $13.5 million in funds from expired ATF accounts 

for use in funding the new Headquarters. The request was approved by the 

DOJ and subsequently by Congress in September 2005. A senior budget 

official explained that even after this reprogramming, ATF had to use money 

from its operational funds to cover outstanding construction and other costs 

remaining from the initial $30 million shortfall. This official told us that since 

September 2005 ATF had been seeking DOJ approval to reprogram another 

$8.3 million to replenish the operational funds that were being applied toward 

construction of the new Headquarters. In June 2006, officials in the Office of 

Management told us that it appeared unlikely the request would be granted.32 

According to Domenech, Truscott had “set aside” $7.9 million from ATF’s 

FY 2006 budget to apply to this shortfall. The budget official told us that, in 

fact, Truscott had approved setting aside $21.4 million in FY 2005, but that 

with the $13.5 million in reprogrammed funds approved by Congress to be 

used toward the new Headquarters, only $7.9 million in additional funds was 

needed to cover the remaining shortfall.33 Domenech told us that he made 

clear to Truscott that the $7.9 million being set aside was coming from FY 2006 

operational expenses. Domenech stated that Truscott responded by telling him 

 31 ATF’s reprogramming requests involve asking DOJ to transfer funds from expired 

ATF accounts from prior fiscal years into the Department’s working capital funds from which 

ATF can then draw money to cover current expenses. 

32 On June 6, 2006, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration 

confirmed to us that ATF had sought the reprogramming, but that DOJ has put the request on 

hold. A FY 2006 Balance Sheet indicates that $8,230,000 from ATF funds in FY 2005 was 

spent on the Headquarters. The senior ATF budget official told us that unless ATF could 

obtain approval to cover those funds through further reprogramming, those funds will have 

come out of ATF’s operating funds. 

33 This $21.4 million line item appears in a FY 2006 Balance Sheet under “Bureau 

Priorities.” The senior ATF budget official told us that Truscott actively reviewed this and other 

budget documents with her until about February 2006, when after the allegations against him 

were made, he delegated budget making authority to Domenech. 

23
that the new Headquarters project, along with more hiring, was “critical” for 

ATF. 

2. Truscott’s involvement in the new Headquarters project 

 Many witnesses we interviewed expressed concern and frustration over 

the extent to which Truscott became involved in the new Headquarters building 

project. 

 When Truscott arrived at ATF in April 2004, the design for the new 

Headquarters was complete and construction had begun. The Project Manager 

told us that Truscott met weekly with the New Building Project Office staff 

about the project, and that Truscott’s Executive Assistant, Chief of Staff, and 

often the Deputy Director would attend these meetings as well. Several 

Assistant Directors told us that they were not included in the weekly meetings 

until about January 2006, when it became necessary to find ways to cut costs 

(as discussed in subsection 4, below); however, they were often required to visit 

the new Headquarters site with Truscott, and the project was discussed 

occasionally at Senior Leadership Team meetings. 

 Several senior managers and other officials were critical of what they 

described as Truscott’s excessive involvement in the project. The Project 

Manager, who has had extensive experience with other major federal 

government construction and relocation projects and who worked most closely 

with Truscott on this project, told us that Truscott’s involvement with the new 

Headquarters was more extensive than necessary. She stated when Truscott 

first arrived at ATF, he sought to familiarize himself with “core” aspects of the 

new building, such as gathering points, traffic flow within the building, use of 

space, and the adequacy of the restrooms in terms of size. She stated that 

some of his ideas on these areas were quite helpful, and that she was “thrilled 

at first” that he was taking such an interest in the project. She stated that her 

enthusiasm dissipated over time as she found herself having to spend a lot of 

time preparing to brief him on many details of the project. She said he was 

“inordinately involved and preoccupied” with the project and tried to “put his 

fingerprint” on every aspect of the building. She said that the areas of the 

project in which Truscott had the most input were the Director’s Suite, the 

JSOC, and the gym. 

Domenech said that Truscott was “obsessed” with the project and 

seemed to view the building as his “legacy.” Many other witnesses described 

the Director’s involvement in similar terms. One Assistant Director told us that 

Truscott was exceptionally “in the weeds” on the project. Another Assistant 

Director stated that Truscott was a “little too far down in the weeds” regarding 

the project and that there were other matters the executive staff would have 

liked to see him engaged in instead. A third Assistant Director stated, “[Y]ou 

almost got the impression he was building this for himself.” Several witnesses 

24
commented on the excessive amount of time they believed Truscott devoted to 

the project and, in particular, to his office suite. 

Of the numerous ATF officials we interviewed on this matter, only one 

witness, a senior official in ATF’s Office of Management, stated that he thought 

Truscott’s level of involvement with the project was appropriate. This official 

also said he would have questioned a Director who was not involved in the 

project. However, this official had not attended the meetings regarding the new 

Headquarters, and he did not have first-hand knowledge of Truscott’s degree of 

attention to the project. Another official who had attended several meetings 

concerning the project told us that although Truscott was “intimately” involved 

in the project, he saw the project as former Director Magaw’s legacy because it 

had been started under Magaw’s tenure. This official said that regarding the 

executive suite, Truscott would say that “this is for the Director of ATF, not Carl 

Truscott.” 

3. Changes and upgrades to the new Headquarters design 

 Several witnesses told us that Truscott was involved to some degree in 

virtually every aspect of the new Headquarters project. However, our review of 

Truscott’s actions focused on the three areas of the project identified by 

knowledgeable witnesses as being of the highest priority to Truscott: the 

Director’s Suite, the JSOC, and the gym. 

a. Director’s Suite 

 The Director’s Suite – Suite 500 – will be located on the fifth floor of the 

new Headquarters, and will encompass space for the ATF Director, the 

Director’s Executive Assistant and Chief of Staff, the Deputy Director, two 

administrative assistants, and two Executive Protection Branch (EPB) 

personnel. 

According to the Project Manager, the design for the Director’s Suite has 

undergone significant revisions since Truscott’s arrival in April 2004. Major 

structural revisions to the suite included the removal of an internal spiral 

staircase, which had been included in the original plan for security reasons 

and removed at Truscott’s request. The overall size of the suite was also 

enlarged to accommodate an increase in the staff to be located within Suite 

500.34 The Project Manager, as well as another senior official in the Office of 

 34 When Truscott first came to ATF, the Office of the Director consisted of the Director, 

the Deputy Director, an Executive Assistant, and two staff assistants. Under Truscott, a Chief 

of Staff position was added, and space was created for two Executive Protection Branch 

personnel. 

25
the Director, told us that these structural revisions were largely functional, not 

aesthetic, and were designed to facilitate “flow” within the suite. 

The Project Manager told us that even before Truscott joined ATF, a 

senior official in the Office of the Director who had been hired shortly before 

Truscott arrived told the New Building Project Office staff that the suite was 

“inadequate for an executive suite.” The Project Manager stated that when 

Truscott arrived, he also felt that the suite as originally designed was 

“inappropriate for an executive,” and that it needed to have wood finishes and 

other upgrades. The Project Manager said Truscott asked her many times, “So, 

before I came on board, the original design didn’t have any wood trimming, and 

the doors weren’t wood; there wasn’t anything in there at all?” 

In July 2004, Truscott began meeting regularly with the New Building 

Project Office staff, which included the Project Manager and other ATF 

employees, interior design contractors, and others involved with the building. 

Representatives from Moshe Safdie and Associates sometimes attended the 

meetings. One issue discussed at the meetings was where to locate an internal 

conference room within the suite, whether it should be located in the Director’s 

office, and whether to make it a secure compartmented facility. According to 

the Project Manager, there were “too many meetings to count” on this one 

matter. It was decided that a conference room within the Director’s Suite but 

outside of the Director’s office would be sufficient. 

 In contrast, Truscott told us that the Project Manager repeatedly 

requested to meet with him about the Director’s Suite, stating that at one point 

they met “briefly.” Truscott said he recalled one meeting in particular in which 

he was asked several questions about his new suite. He said the meeting 

involved architect Moshe Safdie, the Project Manager, Truscott’s Executive 

Assistant, “probably” his Chief of Staff, and Domenech.35 Truscott 

characterized many of the decisions regarding the furnishing of his suite as 

originating with others, and he described his own role in selecting the 

furnishings as passive. For example, he said the conversation about bookcases 

and other items for his suite went as follows: 

[H]ere we are sitting in the director’s office and I have a wall right 

now of bookcases and, director, would you like bookcases? Yeah, I 

would. Do you want doors? Yes, I would. You have a refrigerator 

over there, would you like a refrigerator in your office? Yes, I 

would. 

 35 This meeting appears to be one of only two meetings Truscott had with Safdie. The 

other meeting took place in the Boston area on January 5, 2005. Typically, Truscott’s ideas 

and requests were communicated to the architect through the New Building Project Office staff. 

26
However, other witnesses said Truscott actively participated in detailed 

discussions about the interior furnishings and that he identified special 

features he wanted for the suite. For example, a regular participant in these 

meetings stated that Truscott and the group spent “hours and hours” going 

over the layout, the millwork, the built-ins, and some of the finishings in the 

Director’s Suite. This witness said that Truscott constantly suggested changes 

to the type of wood walls he thought were needed to display photographs. The 

witness said that Truscott specified that in his office he wanted a shelf for 

14-inch books, a shelf for 12-inch books, and a shelf for displaying small 

items. The witness said Truscott also spent several hours discussing the 

pantry area adjacent to his office with the group, including what should be 

inside the cupboards and the built-in closets, where to store linens and 

silverware, how many drawers would be needed, and where to put the sink and 

refrigerator. 

Similarly, the Project Manager told us that the group “spent a lot of time 

[on] what’s wood, what’s carpet, what treatment is made for each of these 

areas.” She said that Truscott insisted on having “executive” style wood doors 

leading to his office, and asked that they be able to open and close by a remote 

control device. She said that executive doors are larger and more imposing 

than standard doors, and cost more than the standard doors in the original 

plans. The Project Manager also told us that Truscott wanted wood floors in 

his office. She said the specific style he preferred had been selected by the 

architect, and was modeled on the parquet wood floors in the ceremonial vice 

presidential office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. 

Domenech also told us that Truscott made known his desire for built-in 

bookcases, the wood doors, and wood floors. He also said Truscott re-designed 

the Executive Assistant’s desk so it would match the wood finish of the walls, 

and wanted the pantry room designed in a certain manner. 

In contrast, Truscott said that he did not specifically request built-in 

bookcases, but that “it was understood that they would be built in” based on 

what others suggested to him. Truscott told us that he did ask for wood floors, 

but said he told the others that he was not looking to spend a lot of money on 

it. He said that the Project Manager told him she would look at the prices and 

would let him know if they were reasonable. The Project Manager said the cost 

estimate for the wood flooring was $62,564. 

Truscott also denied requesting “executive” style wood doors leading into 

his suite. He stated that “there was discussion” about it, and that he merely 

agreed with the idea. Truscott acknowledged that it was his idea to install 

remote controlled doors in his suite, and that he suggested it after seeing a 

similar device in the office of the Commissioner for the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police. 

 

27
After reviewing independent government estimate and contractor 

estimate documents, the Project Manager told us that the millwork alone for 

Suite 500 cost $243,000.36 The millwork would have included five executive 

wood doors, matching chair rails, wood wall facing, and a wood table with 

leather inlay. 

Truscott’s requests and suggestions for upgrades to his office and the 

surrounding suite are discussed in numerous e-mails and other documents we 

reviewed. In August 2005, an interior design contractor with the New Building 

Project Office prepared a 5-page document entitled “Suite 500 – 

Requests/preferences/requirements of Director Truscott.” (See Appendix B) 

The Project Manager stated that the document was the result of a “brain dump” 

from a big meeting the New Building Project Office had with Truscott, and that 

it listed everything requested or approved by Truscott that they were “supposed 

to design to in the Director’s office.” She said the list, which was intended to 

be shared with the architect and was not shown to Truscott, is an indication of 

how detailed Truscott’s requests were. The list includes 15 pieces of furniture 

for Truscott’s office, plus a detailed description of a wall unit and closet, 

window treatments, “formal entry vestibule,” a credenza with trash storage 

baskets mounted on retractable arms, and a “[f]lat panel TV monitor, approx. 

42” diagonal – hidden when not in use.” 

In addition to the furniture, wood flooring, special doors and other 

accents in the Director’s office, the list included Truscott’s requests for other 

areas of the suite. For instance, the list includes several items Truscott 

requested for the Director’s bathroom, including “[t]elephone, TV flat panel and 

radio speakers to listen/view news,” quartzite tile floor to match the floor in the 

building atrium, a bench with a water resistant wood seat, tile wall “in 

horizontal straight stacked layout vs brick,” and sconces. Other than for the 

millwork and the conference table, no cost estimates were provided for 

Truscott’s list of requests and preferences for his suite. 

Truscott acknowledged to us that he did request a television for his new 

bathroom. With regard to the television for his office, he said the idea for 

installing a television in his new office was raised by others.37 Truscott said 

 36 Millwork, as the term was used by the witnesses, refers to woodwork, such as 

trimming, chair railings, and other custom features. Both Truscott and Domench told us the 

cost of the millwork was $283,000. The discrepancy likely is attributable to approximately 

$42,000 in wood paneling that, according to Domenech, had already been purchased before 

the order was cancelled in early 2006. 

37 An undated internal e-mail from a Visual Information Branch employee indicates 

that Truscott requested for his office in the current ATF headquarters “a TV, either CRT or 

plasma-screen, with the capability of dividing the picture into quadrants that display each of 

the four major news programs.” The e-mail indicates that Truscott already had a 20-inch cable 

television in his office. 

28
that “[s]omebody came up with a screen that somehow dropped away. . . . 

I wasn’t involved in those discussions.” The Project Manager told us that 

Truscott was the one who requested a television in his new office and that he 

wanted to be able to stow it out of sight when not in use.38 She said the 

architect interpreted Truscott’s request for a concealable television in his office 

by designing a hydraulic lift for the television, a feature which Truscott never 

specifically requested. The Project Manager also told us that the architect, not 

Truscott, selected a $65,000 conference table for the suite. Domenech told us 

that he and the Project Manager scaled down the cost of the conference table to 

one that cost $28,000. 

The list of Truscott’s requests and preferences also addresses furnishings 

in other offices within the Director’s suite. For instance, the list specified that 

the offices of the Chief of Staff and Executive Assistant were to have “Furniture 

style to match Director’s.”39 However, Truscott said that “others” decided that 

other offices within the suite would have built-in desks. He said there was 

“lots of discussion about the design” but that he did not make the decision. 

Truscott also stated that it was his understanding that all new furniture in 

Suite 500 was to be paid for out of approximately $675,000 that had been “set 

aside” from the 2001 budget for executive staff furniture.40

The Project Manager and other witnesses also told us that the cost of 

revising the design of Truscott’s suite was driven up by delays resulting from 

his excessive involvement. The Project Manager expressed frustration over the 

numerous lengthy and often “indecisive” meetings held with Truscott on the 

project. She said she believed the cost of the project was affected because of 

“the time that it took to make decisions and the level of detail that he wanted to 

get into.” She said that the New Building Project Office had a March 2005 

“drop dead date” to submit all changes to GSA’s contractor, but that as of July 

2005 “we were still talking about the Director’s suite.” She said that Truscott 

was warned in March 2005 that further delays would result in additional costs 

to the project and that he needed to finalize his decisions. She stated that 

Truscott did not listen when told about the need to make decisions and the 

cost implications of delay, and that he “never really responded” to those 

concerns. 

 

 38 The Project Manager’s statement is supported by the list of Truscott’s requests and 

preferences for how he wanted the new Director’s Suite to be furnished. (See Appendix B) 

39 The document also states that the Deputy Director’s bathroom was to have a 

telephone and a flat panel monitor, among other items. Domenech told us he never made any 

requests for these items, had no input into the list of Truscott’s requests and preferences, and 

had never seen the list. 

40 Domenech told us that money had been set aside for new furniture for the executive 

staff, but that the funds would not have covered millwork such as built-in furniture. 

29
 Domenech also expressed frustration about the meetings. He described 

one meeting in particular in which Truscott met for hours with the architect 

staff and the interior designers discussing fabric swatches, marble finishes for 

a conference table, wood finishes, and which type of leather would match the 

walls. 

 

b. Joint Support Operation Center 

 ATF has a Joint Support Operation Center (JSOC) in its current 

Headquarters.41 The JSOC is run by the Office of Strategic Intelligence and 

Information (OSII), a directorate that was created in 2003.42

 

According to a former senior official in the OSII directorate, the JSOC 

initially was “literally an answering service.” One Assistant Director of a 

directorate that routinely interacts with OSII also described the JSOC generally 

as a “call-in center” for law enforcement officers to call in requests to trace 

weapons or to reach the ATF “duty agent” for other information. 

The former senior OSII official said that Truscott took an interest in the 

JSOC after he arrived, and upgraded its mission to require staff to notify field 

offices of any critical incidents throughout the country. This official said that 

the JSOC staff now monitor several news channels, answer phones, and take 

reports of stolen explosives and firearms, among other tasks. The OSII 

Assistant Director told us that the JSOC is now designed to provide ATF and 

its federal, state, local, and international constituents with around-the-clock 

“situational awareness.” 

The former OSII official said that Truscott directed the OSII Assistant 

Director to upgrade the physical facility of the JSOC shortly after he was hired 

as Assistant Director for OSII in December 2004. The former OSII official 

described the facility prior to the Assistant Director’s changes as a conference 

room containing chairs pushed up against the wall and two televisions but no 

flat screen models. She said the Assistant Director’s changes consisted of 

taking down one or two walls, moving chairs around, putting up some flat 

screen televisions, and making it “much more operationally efficient looking.” 

An agency-wide e-mail announced that an “opening ceremony” would be held 

for the “newly redesigned” facility on June 1, 2005. 

 41 The JSOC had been called the National Enforcement Operations Center (NEOC) until 

approximately 2004. 

42 According to the Assistant Director for Field Operations, ATF received DOJ approval 

to form the OSII directorate in December 2003 and formal Congressional approval in early 

2004. The Assistant Director stated that the OSII directorate initially was staffed by Office of 

Field Operations personnel. 

30
The former OSII official said that after one meeting Truscott asked her 

opinion about the plan for the JSOC in the new Headquarters. The official told 

us that the design for the new JSOC looked very much like the JSOC in the 

current Headquarters prior to the renovations. She said it was designed to be 

outfitted with cubicles and that the space was “disconnected.” She said she 

told Truscott that if she could propose changes, she would start by removing 

some walls. 

The former OSII official said Truscott told her that he wanted her to look 

at other agencies’ operations centers and make recommendations to him about 

what the new ATF JSOC should look like. She stated that Truscott specifically 

asked her to visit the operations center at the U.S. Secret Service. She told us 

that she had already been to operations centers at the National Security 

Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, 

and the FBI as a result of her position in OSII. 

The former OSII official told us that her discussions with Truscott about 

the JSOC in the new Headquarters centered on Truscott’s “vision” for how the 

facility should look. She said that she and Truscott had “a lengthy 

conversation” about making the new JSOC look “like the 21st Century.” She 

stated that one of Truscott’s objectives was to make the JSOC a place that 

could be shown to people. Domenech told us that Truscott felt that the original 

design for the new JSOC was “not elaborate enough” and that Truscott had 

said he wanted “a star wars type of center.” The Project Manager also told us 

that the JSOC was described to her as the “nerve center of ATF,” and that 

when people come to visit ATF, “they should be able to see our nerve center.” 

The former OSII official said that after she had seen several operations 

centers as instructed by Truscott, she met with the Project Manager and the 

architect. She said that the Project Manager and the architect told her that 

they had spoken with Truscott and understood that there would be some 

design changes to the JSOC. She said the Project Manager and the architect 

“weren’t happy” because everyone had already approved the design and new 

changes would cost additional money. 

The official said she told them that her only major proposal was to 

remove the walls. She said that the Project Manager and the architect came 

back to her with a proposal to move the entire JSOC to a different area on the 

same floor, thereby avoiding the need to remove walls. She stated that the 

decision to relocate the JSOC entailed relocating some OSII offices, but said 

she was not aware of the need to make changes to space in other directorates. 

The Assistant Director for Field Operations, however, told us that the revisions 

to the JSOC resulted in a net loss of space for his directorate. 

The Project Manager told us that other design changes related to seating 

configurations and audio-visual and other technical upgrades all came from 

31
the OSII directorate, and possibly from the OSII Assistant Director. The OSII 

Assistant Director also told us that when he first joined ATF in December 2004, 

Truscott told him to look at the plans for the JSOC “from a technical 

standpoint” to ensure that nothing had been overlooked. The Assistant 

Director told us that at that time, the plans for the new Headquarters were 

“98 percent complete.” He stated that he met with the Project Manager and the 

architect regarding the incorporation of secure communications capabilities in 

the JSOC. 

The JSOC will be located on the seventh floor of the new Headquarters 

building. From descriptions provided to us by both the OSII Assistant Director 

and the former OSII official, the JSOC, as revised and upgraded from the 

original design, was to have theater-style seating, with the supervisor or shift 

leader seated at the top. A video wall would have had 17 monitors to display 

various news broadcasts and closed circuit television channels simultaneously. 

The JSOC’s 15 workstations were each to have adjustable pneumatic desks, 

which, the OSII Assistant Director told us, was the architect’s idea. He said 

that typically staffing on each shift ranges from 3 to 6-7 people, and that the 

reason for having 15 workstations was to accommodate additional staff in the 

event of an incident. Millwork was also added to the JSOC reception area. 

 

The OSII Assistant Director also said that the JSOC will have a glass 

area through which people can view operations. He said he recalled something 

similar in the Secret Service Operations Center where “VIPs” could walk by and 

see how the “nerve center” is operating. He said it is an opportunity to 

showcase ATF. 

The senior ATF officials we interviewed provided a range of views as to 

why the JSOC design was revamped. The Project Manager said she was told 

that the JSOC had to be larger than originally designed in order to 

accommodate more people due to the upgraded mission of the facility. The 

Project Manager said she was also told that the JSOC “had to incorporate more 

of a theater style.” The Project Manager agreed with the characterization that 

the JSOC was primarily “for show,” and stated that “[a] lot of [the changes to 

the JSOC] were aesthetic, and I think that there’s some controversy as to what 

was necessary or not in terms of the size of it and the number of people.” 

Some witnesses questioned the need for the redesign to begin with. 

Domenech said that the original design for the JSOC “wasn’t going to look like 

star wars,” but was “functional.” Domenech stressed that ATF is “not an intel 

agency.” One Assistant Director described the JSOC as a very simple facility 

needing good telephones and access to databases. This witness said that “[t]he 

most important thing about a JSOC is having a trained staff that can run the 

damned thing. That’s where I think we’ve fallen down.” Another Assistant 

Director told us that the essential function of the JSOC as a point-of-contact 

32
for other law enforcement agencies had not changed and thus the redesign was 

unnecessary. 

 Truscott told us that he did not “have anything to do with” the proposed 

redesign of the JSOC, including the increase in its size, the theater-style 

layout, and the electronic upgrades. He stated that the OSII Assistant Director 

worked out the design changes with the New Building Project Office. Truscott 

stated that his involvement with the redesign was limited to being briefed “after 

the fact” about the new JSOC. 

 In contrast, the former OSII official stated that her task was to facilitate 

Truscott’s “visions” and “expectations” for the new JSOC. The official said that 

although she did not recall Truscott making specific suggestions, she discussed 

with him what the finished facility would look like in terms of having monitors, 

screens, chairs, and other features “in general.” The OSII Assistant Director 

said that other than Truscott’s request that he make technical 

recommendations, Truscott had no direct involvement in the revisions to the 

plans for the JSOC. However, he stated to us that after the former OSII official 

had visited other operations centers and had discussed the proposed revisions 

with Truscott, he heard that Truscott had told her, “Now you’ve got it.” 

 

Both the former OSII official and the Project Manager told us that 

Truscott was also involved in approving the design changes. The former OSII 

official said that after she reviewed and concurred with the architect’s 

proposals, the revisions were forwarded to the Office of the Director for 

approval. The official stated that this approval process occurred a few times. 

The Project Manager told us that the New Building Project Office worked 

with the OSII directorate, primarily the former OSII official, on the design 

changes to the JSOC. The Project Manager stated that she briefed Truscott on 

the design changes and discussed the cost of the changes with him. She told 

us that “he was concerned that it would cost something,” and that his attitude 

was one of “hoping it would all be paid for.”43 

The former OSII official said that Truscott never spoke to her about 

limitations on the cost of her proposed changes to the JSOC. She said she was 

unaware of any budget constraints for the revisions or the cost of the proposed 

 43 The Project Manager stated that Truscott at one point suggested approaching GSA 

with a proposal that would help ATF pay for its share of the new Headquarters project. 

According to the Program Manager, Truscott suggested asking GSA for a “rent credit” by which 

GSA would agree to make an early lump sum payment to ATF in lieu of giving ATF a discount 

on its rent over a 5-year period as consideration for ATF’s contribution toward the new 

Headquarters project. She stated that she drafted “talking points” for Truscott to use when he 

contacted GSA, but said that he never followed through on the idea. 

33
changes. She said that other than the Project Manager’s initial resistance to 

the changes due to the fact that the JSOC design had already been finalized 

and that changes would cost money, she had never been made aware of any 

budget concerns throughout the rest of her involvement in the revisions. 

Domenech estimated that the redesign of the JSOC, along with the 

associated changes to the seventh floor of the new Headquarters, cost 

approximately $1.5 million. The OIG was unable to confirm this figure, but it 

is consistent with GSA’s estimate.44 

c. Gym 

The gym in the new Headquarters will be located on the first 

floor. According to the Project Manager, Truscott was very involved with 

redesigning the gym and in selecting equipment for the gym. The Project 

Manager stated that Truscott is an “exercise fanatic” and that Truscott wanted 

to ensure there would be “adequate workout facilities” at ATF. Truscott 

emphasized to us that one of his priorities is to encourage ATF employees to 

maintain physical fitness.45 

 The Project Manager said that Truscott proposed minor structural 

changes for the layout of the gym. She said the proposals entailed moving a 

wall to expand the workout area and to reduce the size of the aerobics area. 

She stated that these modifications did not necessitate any additional changes 

to the overall design of the gym in terms of the heating and ventilation, 

electrical, or mechanical systems.46 Domenech also told us that Truscott “just 

didn’t like the layout” of the gym as it was initially designed and so he 

redesigned it. 

 Witnesses we interviewed gave varying accounts of what Truscott 

directed regarding equipment for the new gym. The Project Manager and 

another senior staff member in the Office of the Director both stated that 

Truscott had insisted that all the equipment in the gym be new. The senior 

staffer told us that Truscott was “adamant” about having the new equipment. 

The Project Manager told us that Truscott thought the new Headquarters 

 44 According to the April 2005 “Order of Magnitude Program Estimate” by Gilbane, 

GSA’s construction manager, the proposed redesign for the seventh floor was projected to cost 

$1,088,824. Over 90 percent of these costs are attributed to “Area A” of the 7th floor, which we 

believe, based on documents provided to the OIG, includes the JSOC. As noted, however, 

according to the Project Manager the general contractor’s estimate for the work was far higher. 

45 Many witnesses we interviewed also stated that Truscott exercised frequently at 

ATF’s gym. 

46 The OIG was unable to obtain a cost estimate for these design changes. 

34
should have all new gym equipment, and that he intended to give the existing 

ATF gym equipment to the field divisions. 

 Truscott said that when he had first been briefed about the gym, he was 

told that $100,000 had been “set aside already” for new gym equipment. 

Truscott said that he believed the $100,000 was still available, but that the 

amount would not be sufficient to buy all new equipment.47 He said that the 

plan for the new gym calls for using most of the existing equipment rather than 

buying all new equipment. Similarly, the Chief of Staff said that Truscott had 

determined that it would be too expensive to buy all new equipment; however, 

it is not clear whether the Chief of Staff was referring to a conclusion that 

Truscott reached only after ATF was forced to make cutbacks on the cost of the 

new Headquarters. 

Truscott acknowledged to us that he had asked the Chief of the 

Executive Protection Branch (EPB) and an ATF fitness center staffer to come up 

with a “comprehensive plan” for outfitting the new Headquarters gym. Several 

other witnesses confirmed that two ATF employees – an EPB official and a 

member of the fitness center staff – were responsible for compiling information 

on gym equipment and furnishings, and on options for the layout of the new 

gym. 

 The EPB Chief responsible for compiling information on gym equipment 

and facilities told us that Truscott had not requested all new gym equipment. 

He stated that Truscott made suggestions for the new gym based on features 

he had seen in other gyms. The EPB Chief said he prepared a “cost benefit 

analysis” to evaluate whether the existing equipment would be adequate for the 

new Headquarters gym or whether new equipment would be needed. The 

analysis, attached to an October 14, 2005, e-mail from the Chief to the Project 

Manager and others, showed that buying all new equipment would cost 

$136,879, and buying only necessary replacement items would cost $79,683. 

The e-mail indicated that the analysis was prepared in contemplation of a 

meeting with Truscott. 

 

 Domenech told us that a briefing and discussion on the new fitness 

center was held on December 12, 2005, that it lasted approximately one hour, 

and that between seven and nine people, including Truscott, attended. This 

meeting appears to be the meeting for which the EPB Chief had prepared the 

cost analysis. The agenda for the meeting reflects that subjects for discussion 

were the purchase of new equipment and the disposition of the existing 

equipment. Truscott told us that a “working group” decided to use most of the 

 47 Truscott said his assumption was that the existing gym equipment would be used at 

other ATF facilities. 

35
existing gym equipment in the new Headquarters, but he was imprecise as to 

when that decision was made. 

An interior design contractor with the New Building Project Office 

summarized in an e-mail to the Project Office staff the issues discussed at the 

December 12 meeting. According to the list, Truscott requested very detailed 

but relatively minor design changes to the gym. Certain items were listed as 

being at the “Director’s request,” including adding padding to the wall under 

the pull-up bars to protect the wall from scuffing; adding more mirrors to the 

weight room; adding telephones to several areas of the facility; adding a 

magazine rack to the wall outside the fitness center office; adding “framed 

inspirational photos of ATF athletic endeavors”; and “[c]onfirm soap dish or 

dispensers in showers.” Truscott’s Chief of Staff, who had attended the 

meeting, told us he recalled wondering why Truscott was involved in these 

discussions. 

According to Domenech, Truscott had also wanted “executive 

showers” in the gym because the Secret Service had them, but 

Domenech said he had told Truscott “no” to the idea. A senior staff 

member in the Office of the Director also recalled that Truscott had 

asked for executive showers. 

4. Rescinding the modifications 

Domenech told us that in December 2005, ATF was in jeopardy of 

obligating funds it did not have toward construction of the new Headquarters 

building. Accordingly, he ordered the New Building Project Office to issue a 

“Do Not Proceed” directive to GSA with respect to certain non-critical design 

change orders. According to Domenech, the directive placed on hold ATF’s 

authorization to GSA to go forward with the change orders, which included the 

millwork in Truscott’s suite and in other locations, as well as certain 

modifications to the JSOC. 

On January 18, 2006, a staff member from the Senate Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Science, Justice, and Related Agencies told 

Domenech and other ATF officials that he had been receiving complaints that 

ATF was spending money on the new Headquarters building instead of on ATF 

operations. The Senate staffer then told Domenech and the others that ATF 

would not be permitted to use any FY 2006 appropriated funds to cover 

expenditures on the new Headquarters project. 

Domenech told us that after the January 18 meeting, he met with the 

members of the Senior Leadership Team, including Truscott, to brief them on 

his meeting with the appropriations staff member. Domenech said that the 

Project Manager was also at the meeting, and that he instructed her at that 

time to find and eliminate unnecessary changes that had been requested to the 

36
plan for the new Headquarters. Several Assistant Directors told us that they 

only became aware of upgrades to the Director’s Suite, the JSOC, and the gym 

during this and subsequent meetings. One Assistant Director stated that he 

was “outraged” to learn of the upgrades that had been requested for the new 

Headquarters and told Truscott at the January 18 meeting that the Assistant 

Directors were being “asked to bless decisions that had already been made.” 

By all accounts, Truscott’s involvement in the project changed in 

January 2006, after ATF was told not to spend FY 2006 funds on the new 

Headquarters. As one Assistant Director stated, “By the time we started 

discussing [rescinding the change orders], there seemed to have been sort 

of . . . a change in the air. . . . [Y]ou could sense he was disassociating himself 

with . . . the building project because he had previously been ultra engaged in 

it.” 

On January 30, 2006, an official in the Office of the Deputy Attorney 

General showed Truscott a copy of the anonymous complaint letter that had 

been sent to the OIG.48 Domenech told us that within a few days of Truscott’s 

January 30 meeting, Truscott told Domenech that he was “recusing” himself 

from making further budget decisions, including those affecting the new 

Headquarters, and that he verbally delegated that authority to Domenech. 

When we asked Truscott whether he had ever expressly delegated budget 

authority to Domenech, he stated, “I think if Edgar cut something, I wouldn’t 

question it. I mean if I . . . heard about it and thought it was important, I 

might say something to him, but I don’t remember.”49 

On February 14, 2006, ATF’s Senior Leadership Team met to view a 

presentation by the New Building Project Office on issues concerning funding of 

the new Headquarters and then to make a final determination of which items 

to cut from the project. According to the Project Manager, Truscott attended 

the meeting through the presentation, but left before the cost-cutting decisions 

were made by the group. One of the Assistant Directors at the meeting also 

told us that Truscott and his Chief of Staff left before the meeting concluded. 

After that meeting, a formal notification was sent to GSA to cancel the items 

decided on by the group. 

 48 Truscott wrote to the OIG that his involvement in the effort to rescind upgrades to 

the Director’s Suite preceded his awareness of the existence of the anonymous complaint. 

Truscott Letter at p. 2. While there is some disagreement in the evidence regarding the extent 

of Truscott’s participation in this cost-cutting effort, the OIG found no evidence contradicting 

Truscott’s statement as to the timing of his participation. 

49 As noted previously, Truscott subsequently told the OIG in the Truscott Letter and at 

the OIG/Truscott meeting that he relinquished budget authority to Domenech at that time only 

as to future decisions concerning the Director’s office in the new Headquarters building. 

37
According to a March 2006 tally of “Do Not Proceed” items compiled by 

the New Building Project Office, a total of $1,375,186 was saved as a result of 

this effort.50 Items cut at that meeting included several displays in the 

building atrium and “entry promenade,” and a library. From the Director’s 

Suite, it was agreed to cut the millwork, the parquet wood flooring in Truscott’s 

office, televisions in Truscott’s and Domenech’s restrooms, the remote 

controlled door mechanism, and other upgrades. As described earlier, the 

millwork was estimated to cost $243,000 and the wood flooring $62,564. 

Truscott told us that he was never “made aware” that changes to the 

Director’s Suite “actually hadn’t been budgeted for yet.” He said that when he 

learned that the millwork cost “$283,000” he was “surprised, to put it 

mildly.”51 He stated that he was the one who pointed out the cost of the 

millwork to the executive staff and said that they did not need to spend that 

amount. Truscott said he made these statements at a meeting in January 

2006. However, Truscott added that the Senior Leadership Team eliminated 

several other items after the millwork had been cut.52 Truscott also stated that 

he never went through an itemized list of the millwork. 

The Project Manager told us she was uncertain whether Truscott first 

was told the cost of the millwork in December 2005, when the first “Do Not 

Proceed” directive was sent to GSA, or in late January 2006, when the Senior 

Leadership Team began meeting to cut items from the project. However, the 

Project Manager, Domenech, and others told the OIG that Domenech, not 

Truscott, initiated the effort to cut items, including the millwork, from the 

Director’s Suite. The Project Manager also told us that even after the executive 

staff began to rescind the upgrades to Truscott’s suite, Truscott on two 

occasions asked her to try to keep the wood floors in his office.53

 50 The Project Manager stated that this figure did not represent a precise final tally 

because other items may have been cut that were not included and certain items may have 

been purchased to replace cancelled items. However, she stated that she thought that the 

figure was generally correct. 

51 As noted above, we believe the discrepancy between Truscott’s understanding of the 

value of the millwork and the estimate provided to us by the New Building Project Office is 

attributed to $42,000 worth of wood paneling which Domenech told us had already been 

purchased before the other millwork orders were cancelled. 

52 Specifically, Truscott wrote to the OIG that “a process was initiated subsequent to 

my discussion with the executive staff, guided by the Deputy Director, to consider and execute 

other cost-saving measures.” Truscott Letter at p. 2. (The Truscott Letter is attached to this 

report as Appendix A.) 

53 Truscott wrote in his letter to the OIG that he “did not ask on two occasions that 

wood floors remain in the Director’s office after they had been eliminated.” Truscott Letter at p. 

2. 

38
The executive staff also cut items from the JSOC. According to a 

March 14, 2006, memorandum from the New Building Project Office to the 

Assistant Director for OSII, “Do Not Proceed” orders were issued for eight flat 

panel televisions and support stanchions, other audio-visual equipment, desks, 

and millwork for the JSOC reception area. The total cost of these items was 

approximately $145,000. Domenech told us that the structural changes to the 

JSOC were not rescinded because it would have been more expensive to undo 

them at that point. 

Domenech told us that $100,000 worth of new gym equipment was also 

cancelled. However, according to a summary of costs saved as a result of the 

February 14 meeting, the New Building Project Office estimated that $75,000 

would be saved by not purchasing new gym equipment. Domenech stated that 

in addition to canceling unnecessary change orders, the Senior Leadership 

Team also agreed to reuse their furniture rather than draw upon funds that 

had been set aside in earlier budgets for the purchase of new furniture.54 

Domenech told us that approximately $3 or $4 million ultimately was 

saved as a result of all of these cost-cutting measures. He said that the 

executive staff was able to find additional money to cover the remaining project 

costs of approximately $4 million from “no year” accounts.55 An ATF budget 

official confirmed that ATF had met its obligation to fund the remaining 

shortfall through “no year” accounts, but noted that these funds would have 

been used for operational expenses if they were not applied to the new 

Headquarters. 

C. Findings 

 ATF was responsible for funding approximately $30 million in costs 

associated with its new Headquarters building. This sum included 

approximately $9.5 million for construction and the remainder for security, 

telecommunications and relocation expenses. In order to meet its costs on the 

project, ATF sought to raise money by securing approval to reprogram expired 

funds, internally reallocating operational funds, and ultimately by canceling 

approximately $1.3 million in proposed design modifications and upgrades, 

among other measures. 

 54 Domenech stated that each Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director was 

given a preset number of items that could be purchased, and that, in contemplation of the 

purchases at the time of the move, a “moratorium” was established in 2003 barring the 

purchase of any new furniture until the move. He stated that the funds reserved for new 

furniture covered only such stand-alone items as chairs, desks, and credenzas, and did not 

cover construction-related furnishings such as millwork or built-in bookcases. 

55 “No year” accounts are appropriated funds that do not expire at the end of a fiscal 

year. 

39
 We determined that the extra construction costs borne by ATF were 

attributable to several factors, including errors and omissions in the original 

design, changes to the layout resulting from ATF’s reorganization after moving 

to the DOJ from the Treasury Department, the creation of a new intelligence 

directorate, but also from optional upgrades. We concluded that the errors and 

omissions in the original design and the ATF reorganization were factors that 

largely predated Truscott’s arrival at ATF. 

However, some of the extra costs resulted from Truscott’s direct 

involvement in or influence over design changes and enhancements, including 

$245,000 in proposed upgrades to the Director’s Suite, $145,000 in upgrades 

to the JSOC, and approximately $75,000 in new gym equipment.56 We found 

that Truscott requested or approved these modifications after being fully and 

repeatedly advised that any modification or upgrade to the new Headquarters 

building would have to be paid from ATF operating expenses. 

 With regard to the Director’s Suite, the evidence shows that Truscott 

invested considerable time in and attention to nearly every facet of its redesign, 

from fundamental structural issues to relatively minute aesthetic details. We 

concluded that Truscott had substantial and direct input into the selection of 

furnishings, millwork, bathroom tiling, fixtures, and other largely aesthetic 

features, particularly within his office. We based this finding on a 

comprehensive list of upgrades compiled by the New Building Project Office 

staff which purported to reflect Truscott’s stated requests and preferences for 

the suite, as well as on numerous accounts provided by witnesses who had 

attended meetings at which Truscott discussed his preference for the items on 

the list. Specifically, Truscott requested a more expensive style of wood doors 

for his suite and wood flooring for his office than contemplated in the original 

design, as well as matching woodwork throughout the suite, and certain other 

amenities such as a flat panel television for his bathroom and a flat panel 

television and remote controlled doors for his office.57 

 

We found that Truscott did not select a $65,000 conference table for the 

Director’s Suite. We also concluded that although Truscott requested that the 

television in his office be concealed when not in use, he was not responsible for 

the elaborate hydraulic mechanism devised by the architect for this purpose, 

an upgrade that subsequently was cancelled. Truscott’s requested or approved 

design changes and upgrades to the Director’s Suite would have added at least 

 56 As noted previously, this analysis focused only on the Director’s Suite, the JSOC, 

and the gym, which were identified to us as areas of the new Headquarters project in which 

Truscott had the most input. 

57 During the OIG/Truscott meeting, Truscott told us that the features he selected for 

the Director’s office were not chosen for him personally, but rather for whoever served as 

Director of the ATF. 

40
several hundred thousand dollars to the cost of the new Headquarters building 

had some of his requests not been cancelled. The evidence was inconclusive 

concerning when Truscott first became aware of the precise cost of these 

requested upgrades. 

Truscott also appears to have spent an inordinate amount of time on 

redesigning his suite, including his weekly meetings with the New Building 

Project Office staff. We believe the time and attention he devoted to the 

aesthetic details of this project exceeded the investment of time to be expected 

of a director a major federal law enforcement agency. 

 

 With regard to the JSOC, we found that Truscott had indirect 

involvement in but ultimate responsibility for the changes made to its design. 

We based our finding largely on the testimony of a former senior OSII official 

and to a lesser extent the Assistant Director of OSII, whose statements to us 

were supported in key respects by the Project Manager and others who were 

knowledgeable about the new Headquarters project. 

 We determined that Truscott’s assertion that he “had nothing to do with” 

the redesign of the JSOC was inaccurate. While Truscott delegated much of 

the detailed decision-making for the redesign to a former OSII official, we found 

that he guided her in this process by conveying to her his vision and 

expectations for the final design. Truscott emphasized to that official and 

others that he wanted the JSOC to look high-tech and to be a showcase for 

visitors. He instructed the official and others to inspect other agencies’ 

operations centers, particularly the U.S. Secret Service facility. In addition, 

Truscott subsequently reviewed and approved the changes proposed by the 

former OSII official and the New Building Project Office. 

 We cannot make a definitive conclusion regarding whether the changes 

to the JSOC were necessary to its functionality. We found a divergence of 

opinions by the witnesses regarding the role of the JSOC in ATF’s mission. 

Some told us that the JSOC was merely a communications center used to 

collect and relay information, and that it was adequate for this purpose as 

originally designed. In contrast, others said that Truscott wanted the JSOC to 

have an enhanced role in ATF operations, to include monitoring news 

broadcasts and providing “real time” information to relevant field personnel. 

However, we believe that Truscott’s interest in the redesign was focused more 

on the JSOC’s appearance than its function. 

 With regard to the gym, Truscott asked the Chief of EPB and a fitness 

center staff member to investigate the cost of purchasing new equipment for 

the facility. We were unable to reconcile the witnesses’ conflicting accounts 

regarding the degree to which Truscott insisted on replacing existing gym 

equipment with new equipment, although witnesses’ statements indicate that 

Truscott, at a minimum, expressed an interest in purchasing new equipment. 

41
Truscott did ask for a wall to be moved to facilitate expansion of the workout 

area, although the cost of doing so was negligible. However, we found that, as 

with the Director’s Suite, Truscott was involved in relatively minor details 

concerning the gym, although it did not appear that he spent an inordinate 

amount of time doing so. 

Finally, we determined that Truscott was aware that the upgrades he 

requested and approved would have to be paid from ATF’s operational funds. 

As discussed above, he repeatedly was told that the upgrades he requested for 

Suite 500 and the redesign he authorized for the JSOC would have to be paid 

for out of operational funds. The Project Manager told us that she had advised 

Truscott as early as 2004 that changes to the existing design of his suite would 

result in additional costs, and based on what others said they told Truscott he 

knew those extra costs would have to be borne by ATF. The Project Manager 

also told us that she had warned Truscott in 2005 that his lengthy 

deliberations over the details of his office upgrades would further drive up 

costs. 

Similarly, Domenech stated that he had emphasized to Truscott that 

revisions to the design of the new Headquarters building would have to be 

funded out of operational expenses. Moreover, as evidenced by an internal 

e-mail exchange between Office of Management and New Building Project Office 

staff in May 2005, Truscott appeared to be frustrated by the fact that ATF had 

to pay a portion of the project costs “out of our own hide,” indicating his 

awareness at that time that there were unfunded expenses associated with the 

building. 

III. Other Construction and Renovation Projects 

A. Renovations to Current Headquarters Gym 

1. Allegation 

 The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott ordered a major 

expansion and renovation of the gym at ATF’s current Headquarters, 

necessitating the relocation of several employees. He allegedly ordered the 

renovations in June 2004, just over two years before ATF was scheduled to 

move into its new Headquarters, despite being advised that the benefit of the 

build-out was extremely limited in light of the timing of the forthcoming move. 

2. Evidence 

 The gym in ATF’s current Headquarters building was renovated in 

November 2004, two years in advance of the anticipated move to the new 

Headquarters. The gym was expanded by annexing adjoining office space. As 

42
a result of the renovation, four ATF contractors in the annexed office space 

were relocated to offices elsewhere in the building that were reconfigured to 

accommodate the move. Documents reflect that the cost of the demolition, 

minor construction, electrical, and painting work in the gym totaled $13,288; 

and the cost of reconfiguring and painting the new office space for the 

contractors totaled $2,261. The documents also reflect that in or about 

February 2005, a portion of a ceiling was raised in the gym to make more room 

to use a chin-up bar. 

 The Chief of the Space Management Branch, the office responsible for 

projects such as the gym renovation, told us that Truscott made the decision to 

expand and renovate the gym and that Truscott “had a lot of input” into the 

project. He also said that the decision to proceed with the gym project was not 

reviewed or approved by other senior managers, as would be the case for more 

expensive projects.58

 Truscott told us that he requested the changes to the current gym. He 

said that when he made this decision, the move to the new Headquarters was 

two years away. In addition, he said the contractors who were relocated as a 

result of the renovation did not really belong in that space “because they were 

kind of in the middle of the gym and there was vacant space that was bigger 

and nicer and had windows.” We asked whether anyone had expressed 

reluctance to undertake the renovations given that ATF would be moving in two 

years. Truscott replied, “No, I talked to the deputy director about it and I can’t 

tell you how thrilled the people have been.”59 Truscott stated that he typically 

uses the gym every morning. 

 Domenech told us that when he spoke to Truscott about whether to go 

forward with the renovation of the gym, he stressed that it should be a 

“business decision” in which the cost of the work should be weighed against 

the benefit of the improvement given the limited time ATF was to remain in the 

building. Domenech said he never advised Truscott not to go forward, but 

made clear to Truscott that it was his decision. Domenech also told us that as 

a result of the expansion, several new treadmills and stationary bicycles were 

purchased at an estimated cost of $10,000. However, he said he believed the 

new equipment will be used in the new Headquarters. 

 58 The Space Management Branch Chief said that, as a general rule, projects costing 

more than $25,000 are reviewed by the Space Resources Board. That Board, which is 

discussed more fully in Section III B of this chapter, below, is composed of Deputy Assistant 

Directors and managers of similar rank from all of ATF’s directorates. It meets at least twice a 

year to allocate funds to space projects. 

59 During the OIG/Truscott meeting, Truscott stated that the genesis for his decision to 

make the changes to the gym was that gym equipment was blocking an emergency stairway 

exit in the gym. 

43
Two Assistant Directors we spoke with stated that the gym in the current 

Headquarters was adequate before the renovation and expansion project. 

However, Domenech stated that prior to the expansion, the gym tended to get 

crowded. None of the witnesses we interviewed about Truscott’s decision to 

expand the gym told us that they advised Truscott against doing so. 

3. Findings 

 We concluded that it was within Truscott’s discretion to determine that 

the expenditure of $16,449 was warranted for expansion and renovation of the 

gym at the current Headquarters building. 

B. Renovations to Field Division Space 

1. Allegation 

 According to the anonymous complaint, Truscott instructed the Budget 

Office to set aside at least $700,000 in appropriated funds for the design and 

building of gymnasiums and conference rooms at facilities into which ATF field 

divisions are relocating. ATF has subsidized gym membership for its 

employees in the past, which, according to the complaint, is more cost effective 

than constructing new gyms. According to the allegation, numerous ATF 

employees across the country either lack adequate workspace or are stationed 

in non-ATF space, and a more appropriate use of the funds would be to provide 

adequate workspace for these employees. 

2. Evidence 

a. Decision regarding field division build-outs 

ATF formed a Space Resources Board (Space Committee) in 2000 to 

examine the agency’s space needs.60 The Space Committee is comprised of 

Deputy Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director-level representatives 

from each directorate, and includes a SAC subcommittee. It meets twice a year 

to allocate funds for space projects. 

The Chief of ATF’s Space Management Branch told us that he, in 

consultation with the Space Committee, drafted an ATF Order establishing 

procedures and standards for the administration of ATF’s space management 

program. He stated that a SAC subcommittee made specific recommendations 

that the Order provide for building conference rooms and gyms for field division 

offices. According to the Chief, a draft of the Order was circulated to each 

 60 The Space Resources Board was referred to by witnesses as the “Space Committee” 

or the “space focus group.” For consistency, this report will use the term Space Committee. 

44
Assistant Director and the Deputy Director for comment. The final Order 

became effective on December 21, 2004, after approval by the Senior 

Leadership Team.61

The Order provides that each ATF field division may have a training room 

of 3,500 square feet and large enough to accommodate 80 percent of total field 

division personnel. The Order states that field offices with more than 30 

employees may have a 4,200 square foot physical fitness facility (defined to 

include a gym, showers, and lockers).62 

The Branch Chief told us that Truscott was not involved in any of the 

meetings discussing the contents of the Order, and that he never briefed 

Truscott on the drafting of the Order. The Chief stated that neither Domenech 

nor Truscott was present when the Senior Leadership Team voted to approve 

the Order, although he added that “every major office within ATF” had signed 

off on it. Domenech also told us that each directorate had participated in 

developing the Order. 

Truscott told us that the Space Committee was already in existence when 

he joined ATF. Truscott said he “encouraged the dialogue” among the 

committee members to consider including training rooms and gyms in the 

Order, but that he did not participate in the decision-making process.63 He 

told us he supported the idea of adding training rooms to field division space as 

offices relocated because he found that the field divisions he had visited had 

inadequate space to hold meetings. He also said that the SACs supported 

adding training rooms and small gyms to the field divisions. 

The Branch Chief told us that the SAC subcommittee wanted more and 

larger conference rooms, and wanted the rooms to be multipurpose so that 

they could accommodate a Critical Incident Management Support Team 

(CIMST), if necessary. The Chief stated that the chair of the SAC subcommittee 

in particular was a strong proponent of the larger conference rooms. 

One SAC told us that his field division was preparing to move into new 

space when Truscott visited as part of his introductory tour in August 2004. 

He said Truscott viewed the new space while it was still under construction 

and that Truscott was concerned that there would be no space to hold a “town 

 61 The Order, known as ATF Order 1830.1C, covers an array of space management 

issues, from acquisition of parking spaces to restrictions on who is authorized to have official 

contact with GSA. 

62 The Order also provides that agents and inspectors should have 80 square feet of 

workspace, and other employees should have 72 square feet of workspace. 

63 Witnesses we interviewed used the terms training room and conference room 

interchangeably. 

45
hall” type of meeting. As a result, construction was halted and the facility was 

redesigned to include a training room. The SAC said that the room added to 

the cost of renting the new facility, but that he is “tickled to death” to have it. 

No gym was added. This SAC told us he currently has major space problems in 

his field and satellite offices, and that his employees are sitting in hallways and 

are using U.S. Attorney’s Office and local sheriff’s office space. 

 The chair of the SAC subcommittee told us that he proposed the idea of 

requiring build-outs for gyms in field division offices. He said that collectively 

the Space Committee agreed with him, but that only about half of the SACs 

agreed. He said that some SACs were opposed to building gyms because it 

would drain money from a limited pot of operational funds. The SAC 

subcommittee chair said that he was very outspoken on the committee 

regarding the need to build gyms and that he was unaware of Truscott’s 

position on the issue. The chair stated that the requirement for expanding 

training or conference rooms was less contentious because SACs considered 

these to be part of operations. 

The Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations told us that he 

believed the plan to incorporate gyms for field divisions as they relocated was 

not a prudent use of resources. He said that field division personnel can be 

given a subsidy of approximately $150 per year for gym membership fees. He 

said this practice was more cost effective than building gyms. Another 

Assistant Director told us that Truscott was told that it was more cost effective 

for the field to contract out for gym services, but that Truscott ignored this 

advice.

The Space Management Branch Chief stated that some SACs are 

“extraordinarily supportive” of having gyms and others are “less supportive.” 

He said that if money were not an issue, he believed all SACs would rather 

have a gym than have a gym membership subsidy. The Chief said that the 

$150 subsidy was a “false number” because actual membership was usually 

more expensive, thereby forcing special agents to subsidize their own fitness 

plans. The Chief also said that Truscott told him he was a strong proponent of 

having gyms in field divisions. 

b. The $750,000 set aside 

An amount of $750,000 was set aside in ATF’s FY 2006 budget to 

support the establishment of gyms and conference rooms in field office 

relocations. ATF’s Fiscal Year 2006 Balance Sheet (dated November 17, 2005) 

shows a line item of $750,000 for “Space Directive” listed under “Bureau 

Priorities.” 

Witnesses disagreed regarding who ordered the $750,000 to be set aside. 

The Space Management Branch Chief told us that Domenech was responsible 

46
for partitioning off the $750,000, although he said he did not know whether 

Domenech acted on his own or at Truscott’s behest. A senior budget official 

stated that she understood that Truscott ordered the set-aside and that he did 

so based on a comparison of ATF field division space to FBI, U.S. Secret 

Service, and other agency field space and his feeling that ATF lacked adequate 

training room, conference room, and gym space. 

Truscott told us that he never gave an order to set aside $750,000 to 

support gyms and conference rooms in the field. He said he did not “know 

anything about that dollar figure.” Truscott told us that the SACs were happy 

with the upgrades they would receive under the Order, but that “obviously, it 

was all based on whether or not there’s adequate funding” for it. 

Domenech told us that Truscott directed that $750,000 be set aside to 

purchase equipment for future gym and conference room build-outs in the field 

divisions. He stated that at that time the Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New 

Orleans, and St. Paul Field Divisions were scheduled to be relocated. He told 

us that the money was specifically to be used for those projects, but that the 

New Orleans project is now “on a separate track” due to Hurricane Katrina. 

Domenech told us that building out the new field division space to the 

specifications in the Order would cost approximately $4 million.64 He stated 

that as ATF’s financial situation became difficult, one of the recommendations 

made to Truscott was that ATF curtail the build-out projects that had not 

already been initiated. Domenech said that Truscott rejected this 

recommendation because he felt that it was “inappropriate” and “would send a 

wrong message.” Domenech stated that during one briefing with Truscott in 

December 2005, a senior official in the Office of Management suggested that 

ATF apply the $750,000 to other needs, but Truscott strongly opposed the idea. 

The senior Office of Management official said that in January 2006 she 

suggested to Truscott that the space directive be revisited. She said that 

Truscott was visibly unhappy with that recommendation, and that he cited the 

need for “professionalism” in the field. This official stated to us that the Secret 

Service and the FBI have gyms in their field divisions, but noted that they do 

not have agents sitting in hallways as ATF does. 

 64 Domenech told us that based on figures obtained from the Space Management 

Branch, the actual construction costs of the build-out in the new Philadelphia Field Division 

space was $315,000 for the training room and $290,000 for the gym. The build-out in the new 

St. Paul Field Division space was $285,000 for the training room and $275,000 for the gym. 

He told us that the Washington, D.C., project and relocation was completed in the summer of 

2005. No gym was constructed for the new Washington Field Division because a commercial 

gym willing to offer favorable membership rates already existed in that space; however, the 

conference room was expanded. 

47
Domenech said that because Truscott rejected the recommendation to 

cancel the build-outs according to the specifications in the Order, the 

construction and relocations for the Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia; and 

St. Paul projects have gone forward, and it is now necessary to purchase the 

equipment to furnish the new space. Domenech added that after Truscott gave 

him budget authority in February 2006, Domenech decided that $485,000 of 

the $750,000 will be used for conference rooms at those field divisions, but not 

for the gyms. He said the balance of the money will “go back to operational 

accounts to help us with our shortfalls.” 

3. Findings 

 The Space Committee was primarily responsible for authorizing field 

divisions relocating to new space to add or expand training rooms and gyms. 

The Space Committee was created years before Truscott’s arrival and was 

comprised of ATF representatives from all directorates and field divisions. The 

evidence reflects that Truscott supported the committee’s decision, but did not 

direct the decision-making process. We found that Truscott intervened in one 

field division relocation project in August 2004 by urging that a training room 

be built during construction of that field division’s new space; however, 

Truscott’s involvement was consistent with the what the Space Committee 

independently agreed to in the final December 2004 Order. 

 As the Director of ATF, Truscott was responsible for the $750,000 set 

aside in the FY 2006 budget to equip and furnish gyms and training rooms in 

recently relocated field divisions. Our determination in part is based upon the 

statements of a senior budget official who told us that Truscott actively 

reviewed the details of ATF’s budgets until approximately February 2006 and 

was aware of each line item. 

 Although the decision to authorize the gym and training room build-outs 

was collectively, if not unanimously, made by senior ATF managers both at 

Headquarters and in the field, we were troubled that Truscott did not revisit 

this decision when ATF’s budget situation worsened, as advised by Domenech 

and a senior Office of Management official. As Director, Truscott was 

responsible for prioritizing how available space should be used and how scarce 

resources should be deployed. We concluded that, in particular, allowing gyms 

to be built in new field division space while field personnel had inadequate 

workspace in other field divisions reflected poor fiscal management on 

Truscott’s part. Given the limitations on ATF’s budget for funding space 

projects, we questioned why Truscott would allow new gyms to be built. 

48
C. Construction of NRT Truck Garage 

1. Allegation 

 The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott ordered that a garage be 

built to house a National Response Team vehicle at ATF’s explosives training 

facility at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. According to the allegation, the vehicle was 

used solely for training purposes, and the cost of building the garage was an 

unnecessary expense at a time of extreme budget constraints. 

2. Evidence 

 ATF’s National Center for Explosives Training and Research (Training 

Center) is located at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. In December 2004 or January 

2005, the Senior Leadership Team held an “off-site” meeting at the Training 

Center to discuss potential capital improvements at the site. Truscott, 

Domenech, all the Assistant Directors, and Training Center staff attended the 

meeting. Truscott toured the facility, which at that time consisted of two 

doublewide trailers, a garage for storing equipment, an explosives range, and 

downrange from the trailers and the garage, a picnic area with an overhang 

used to provide shelter for participants in training exercises during inclement 

weather. Among the proposed capital improvements under discussion at the 

meeting was the construction of permanent classrooms to replace the trailers. 

 According to several witnesses who were at the meeting and took part in 

the tour of the site, Truscott noticed a National Response Team (NRT) truck 

parked in the open. National Response Team trucks are large vehicles used to 

support investigations and gather evidence at critical incident scenes. Several 

witnesses told us the trucks cost between $200,000 and $500,000, depending 

on the equipment with which they are outfitted. The NRT truck at the Fort A.P. 

Hill facility had been “contaminated” in New York City during the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001. Witnesses told us that because of its 

condition, the truck could not be used for evidence collection and other 

response activities; however, it was operable and was used for training at the 

Fort A.P. Hill site. The witnesses said that Truscott told the Assistant Director 

for Training and Professional Development (TPD) that the truck should not be 

outside.65 

Truscott told us that he asked about the truck and was told that it was 

kept outdoors. He said he was concerned about leaving it outdoors because 

NRT trucks cost about $200,000 each and he felt it should be protected from 

the elements. 

 65 The Training and Professional Development directorate is responsible for operating 

the Training Center. 

49
 Witnesses largely agreed that Truscott told the TPD Assistant Director to 

build some kind of housing for the truck, but their accounts varied about what 

kind of structure Truscott told the Assistant Director to build. Truscott told us 

that he asked that an “enclosure” be built for the truck. Domenech said that 

Truscott instructed the TPD Assistant Director to build a garage for the vehicle. 

The Assistant Director for the Office of Public and Governmental Affairs (PGA) 

said he thought Truscott mentioned that he wanted a structure built for the 

truck similar to an equipment storage garage at the site. The TPD Assistant 

Director said that Truscott directed him to build a “structure” to house it so it 

would not be exposed to the elements. This Assistant Director also stated to us 

that although it would have been possible to move the truck into the 

equipment storage garage, Truscott wanted a separate dedicated building for 

the truck. 

ATF documents reflect that a garage was constructed for the truck at a 

cost of approximately $156,000, including $40,000 to run electricity to the 

building. However, Truscott told us that he did not intend that such an 

“elaborate” structure be built. He said when he suggested the enclosure for the 

truck, he was thinking only about “something that would at least keep the 

weather off” it. He said he had seen “enclosures” on the “side of the road” that 

sell for $895 and so he expected the structure he envisioned for the truck to 

cost $1,000. When asked whether he had conveyed this price to the group, 

Truscott stated, “Apparently, maybe not forceful enough . . . . I never had any 

intentions other than, you know, [building] something over the top of [the 

truck]. I learned about it after the fact.” 

We also asked Truscott whether he tracked the expense of building 

the garage. He responded “no” and again stated: “I learned about it after 

the fact that they had decided to build a more elaborate garage. . . .” 

Truscott also stated that he did not know how the garage was funded. 

He said the funding was arranged “in coordination with the deputy and 

the ADs . . . that’s something that Edgar Domenech handled.” 

Ultimately, Truscott told us that he would accept “responsibility” 

for deciding to build a garage, “but not to build a $100,000 garage.” 

However, he said that he was not suggesting that the decision to build 

the garage was a bad one. He said it was something the Training Center 

personnel wanted and needed. 

In contrast to Truscott’s statements that he did not track the progress or 

cost of the garage construction, the TPD Assistant Director stated that Truscott 

told him that he wanted the structure constructed “right away” and that it was 

a “number one priority.” He said that Truscott also asked him to provide a cost 

and time estimate for completion of the project. 

50
The TPD Assistant Director said that at a second Assistant Director 

off-site meeting on January 24, 2005, he presented the plan for the garage to 

Truscott. The Assistant Director said that he told Truscott that it would cost 

$118,000 to construct the garage with an additional $40,000 needed to provide 

electricity to the structure. He said that when Truscott was told the cost, he 

responded, “We’ll find the money.” The Assistant Director said he did not recall 

Truscott ever telling him that the project was too expensive. 

The TPD Assistant Director provided us with the materials he said had 

been presented to Truscott during the second “off-site” at Fort A.P. Hill. The 

materials include a PowerPoint display showing an estimate for “Construction 

of NRT truck storage building” at a cost of $158,000 (including electricity).66 

Another Assistant Director who was at the second meeting confirmed that 

Truscott was at this meeting and that the cost estimates for the garage were 

included in the presentation. 

The TPD Assistant Director told us that initially he had to figure out 

where to find the funds within his directorate’s budget. He said that 

subsequently the Office of Management came up with the funding. Domenech 

also told us that he had to work with this Assistant Director to find the money 

for construction of the garage. 

The TPD Assistant Director also stated that sometime in late summer 

2005, as the garage construction was progressing, Truscott asked him for 

updates on the project and photographs of the structure. The Assistant 

Director said that he had to keep Truscott apprised of the progress because 

“that’s the way [Truscott] is.” He said that Truscott would look at the 

photographs and then hand them back to him. He said that Truscott also 

asked for photographs when the garage was completed. The Assistant Director 

also said that Truscott stopped at Fort A.P. Hill on his way back from 

Charlottesville to Washington, D.C., one evening in December 2005 to see the 

completed garage.67

 

The TPD Assistant Director stated that at the time Truscott ordered the 

garage to be built, the Assistant Director did not think the project was a good 

use of money and that he believed the funds could have been better used for 

other priorities. However, he also said the garage was a good idea because the 

 66 According to ATF documents provided to the OIG, the actual total cost of the garage 

was $116,055, which did not include the estimated $40,000 needed to connect the structure to 

electrical power. 

67 An undated letter from the Chief of the Explosives Training Branch to the Chief of 

the Simplified Acquisitions Branch states that “the project must be completed in its entirety by 

May 15, 2005, per request of the Director of ATF.” The TPD Assistant Director told us that the 

garage in fact was completed in either August or September of 2005.

51
explosives training personnel now have a structure at the range which they can 

also use for other purposes. As an example, he told us that when the weather 

is bad, they can pull the NRT truck out of the garage and hold classes in the 

new structure. 

The dual use of the garage is supported by a February 3, 2005, e-mail 

from the Chief of the Explosives Training Branch to the TPD Assistant Director, 

which states: “The building will act as a range classroom during adverse 

weather conditions . . . .” Truscott also seemed to acknowledge that the 

structure was used as a classroom “when it gets cold and everything else,” as 

well as to store equipment. Truscott also stated that after the garage was built, 

the Training Center staff indicated that they had “always wanted to put a 

garage over at the range area.” 

3. Findings 

We concluded that Truscott ordered the construction of the garage and, 

contrary to his assertions, he was informed about and approved of its cost. 

While it was within his discretion to do so, we agree with the TPD Assistant 

Director’s opinion that the construction could have been deferred to a later 

time because of other higher priorities, such as training and equipment. In 

addition, we were told that the structure, which by most accounts was 

constructed to shield the NRT truck from the elements, is used as a classroom 

during inclement weather. We therefore questioned whether the structure was 

the result of a well thought out capital improvement strategy for the Fort A.P. 

Hill site. 

 The OIG was most troubled by Truscott’s account of his role in the 

construction of the garage. Several Assistant Directors and the Deputy 

Director told us that Truscott ordered a structure to be built to house the NRT 

truck, and that based on their recollection of the event, Truscott’s stated 

purpose for the request was to protect the truck from the weather. Truscott 

himself told us that he “asked them to look at some sort of enclosure” for the 

truck. However, he stated that he did not decide to build the “more elaborate” 

garage ultimately constructed. Moreover, Truscott sought to distance himself 

from the resulting expenditure of $156,000 by claiming that he had only 

contemplated spending $1,000. 

When asked whether he “tracked the expense” of the garage, Truscott 

twice stated he had only learned about it “after the fact.” However, the TPD 

Assistant Director told us that Truscott requested a cost estimate of the project 

in advance of the construction. He and another Assistant Director told us that 

materials containing the cost estimate of the garage were presented to Truscott 

during an “off-site” meeting at Fort A.P. Hill in late January 2005, several 

months before the purchase order for the garage had been executed. According 

to the TPD Assistant Director, Truscott stated “We’ll find the money” when told 

52
how much construction of the garage would cost, indicating that he knew the 

cost of the project. Further, the TPD Assistant Director told us that Truscott 

had asked for photographs of the garage to monitor the progress of the 

construction. The evidence shows that Truscott not only was aware of the 

projected cost of the garage, but was interested enough in the construction to 

have requested updates from the TPD Assistant Director on its progress. 

D. Expansion of Scope of Federal Firearms Licensing Center 

Feasibility Study 

1. Allegation 

The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott expanded the scope of a 

feasibility study of the relocation of ATF’s Federal Firearms Licensing Center 

(FFLC) beyond that required by Congress by ordering that the feasibility study 

also include adding a gym, increasing the size of the Joint Support Operations 

Center and Continuity of Operations Center, and building a Secure 

Compartmentalized Information Facility. According to the allegation, the 

feasibility study cost $250,000, portions of which were unnecessary. 

2. Evidence 

As part of ATF’s general appropriations in FY 2005, Congress included 

an earmark of $5.6 million for “the construction and establishment of the 

Federal Firearms Licensing Center at the [ATF] National Tracing Center . . . .” 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, H.R. 4818. The legislation required 

that ATF’s Federal Firearms Licensing Center (FFLC), currently in Atlanta, 

Georgia, be relocated to ATF’s National Tracing Center (NTC) in Martinsburg, 

West Virginia.68 The GSA conducted a study to determine the feasibility of the 

relocation of the FFLC and the expansion of ATF’s National Tracing Center in 

West Virginia. A GSA contractor was awarded the contract to perform the 

feasibility study in June 2005 and the study was completed in September 

2005. 

 

According to the “Summary of Project Objectives” in the feasibility study, 

ATF asked the study team to include within the scope of the study possible 

expansion at the site of other critical functions, including the Continuity of 

Operations Plan (COOP) Center, the JSOC, and the Secure Compartmentalized 

Information facility (SCIF). The feasibility study produced four alternative 

expansion scenarios, ranging in cost from $5.37 million to $22.4 million. The 

more expensive alternatives included expansion of the COOP and JSOC and 

included construction of a SCIF. The feasibility study did not include a gym. 

 68 The Federal Firearms Licensing Center is responsible for issuing firearms licenses 

and tracking investigations relating to firearms dealers, importers and manufacturers. 

53
The Space Management Branch is actively involved in the relocation 

project. The Branch Chief told us that Truscott never spoke with him directly 

about expanding the feasibility study to include the COOP, JSOC, and SCIF 

enhancements.69 The Branch Chief said that the requests for these features 

came from Deputy Assistant Director-level managers within directorates that 

had an interest in the Martinsburg facility. He told us that the Office of 

Professional Responsibility and Security Operations staff requested that the 

COOP facility be enlarged and include an office for the Director, and that a 

SCIF and a JSOC be added. He added that the SCIF operation was also 

requested by the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information. The Branch 

Chief said his own office initiated discussions of whether to build in a 

20 percent expansion for personnel, and whether to consider adding a gym. He 

stated that the gym would have been added pursuant to the ATF Order 

1830.1C (discussed in Section III B of this chapter, above) because the facility 

would house more than 30 people. 

 The Space Management Branch Chief said he was not sure whether 

senior management even knew that some of these extra items were being 

requested for inclusion in the study. We interviewed the Assistant Director for 

the Office of Enforcement Programs and Services, which was the directorate 

responsible for operating the FFLC. The Assistant Director told us that he did 

not know that the feasibility study included an analysis of the COOP, JSOC, 

and SCIF enhancements until a meeting was held with the GSA contractor and 

ATF representatives on August 30, 2005.70 The purpose of the meeting was to 

present the contractor’s preliminary findings in the feasibility study, which at 

that time was 70 percent complete. 

 

 The Space Management Branch Chief said that Truscott was not at the 

contractor presentation. The Chief stated that after that meeting, he gave a 

presentation to Truscott and that Truscott told him “in no uncertain terms that 

we are to go back and we are to do what the legislation told us to do: to move 

the [FFLC] from Atlanta to Martinsburg, that’s it.” The Chief said that on 

another occasion, during a walk-through of the site in Martinsburg in late 

2005, Truscott was “extremely clear” that he wanted the project limited to the 

relocation only. 

 69 Domenech told us that Truscott did meet with the Space Management Branch Chief 

to request that the feasibility study also include a COOP, a JSOC and a gym. It is not clear 

from Domenech’s statement what the basis of his assertion was, and we did not discuss this 

issue with Truscott. 

70 This Assistant Director said he asked how the COOP, JSOC, and SCIF 

enhancements came to be included in the feasibility study and was told by the then Assistant 

Director for the Office of Management that “the director had wanted to determine whether we 

could, as we were building this licensing center, put these other add-on functions into the 

Martinsburg facility.” The Assistant Director for the Office of Management in office at that time 

retired from ATF prior to the initiation of this investigation and was not interviewed. 

54
 The Space Management Branch Chief stated that the $5.6 million 

earmark included the cost of performing the feasibility study. We asked the 

Branch Chief how much of the cost of the feasibility study was attributable to 

considering the proposed changes for the COOP, JSOC, and SCIF. He said that 

since the purpose of the feasibility study was to determine whether the 

Martinsburg site could support an expansion to include the FFLC workspace 

and staff, the study also considered water capacity and other utilities, sewer 

connections, traffic flow patterns, and parking issues in addition to the 

physical layout options. He said he did not know what percentage of the cost 

of the feasibility study was attributable to studying the additional issues, but 

suggested that it was negligible in comparison to the cost of studying the 

proposed relocation. 

 We also asked a senior Office of Management official with direct 

supervisory authority over the Space Management Branch about the feasibility 

study. This official told us she was familiar with the FFLC relocation project 

and the feasibility study. The official said that the cost of the feasibility study 

would not have been appreciably less had it only analyzed the relocation of the 

FFLC. 

3. Findings 

 The allegation that Truscott improperly expanded the scope of the FFLC 

relocation feasibility study beyond Congress’s directive was not substantiated. 

The directives to GSA’s contractor to consider the COOP, JSOC, and SCIF 

options in the study likely came from mid-level managers within the interested 

directorates, not from Truscott. The Chief of the Space Management Branch 

was directly involved in the project and told us that Truscott’s only involvement 

was to emphasize that the scope of the project should be limited to what the 

funds were earmarked to cover. 

IV. Assistance in Nephew’s High School Project 

A. Allegation 

Several witnesses alleged that Truscott inappropriately used ATF 

personnel and equipment to assist his nephew in producing a video 

documentary on ATF activities for a high school project. This was not among 

the allegations in the anonymous complaint, but was brought to our attention 

during the course of our investigation. 

B. Evidence 

 Truscott told us that in the fall of 2004, his nephew approached him to 

ask if he could do a video on ATF for his high school class assignment, for 

55
which he would receive a grade. Truscott said that his nephew wanted to “tape 

some things and interview me.” Truscott said he asked the Office of Public 

Affairs (OPA) Chief whether it would be possible for his nephew to interview 

Truscott and “talk to a couple of the other folks at ATF.” Truscott told us that 

the OPA Chief said that this would not be a problem. 

 The OPA Chief stated that either Truscott or Domenech asked her to 

assist Truscott’s nephew in the project. She said that at the start of the 

project, Domenech advised her to treat Truscott’s nephew as if he were any 

other member of the public and to provide him only with publicly available 

information. Both the OPA Chief and Domenech told us that they explained 

these limitations to Truscott. 

Domenech also told us that he specifically cautioned Truscott against 

using Visual Information Branch (VIB) resources for the project. Domenech 

said he explained to Truscott that even the public media does not use VIB 

technical resources, such as camera equipment, lights, and teleprompters, 

when it interviews ATF personnel. Domenech said that Truscott was not 

receptive to his concerns. The OPA Chief said that subsequently Domenech 

removed himself from involvement with the project and told her that Truscott 

wanted ATF to assist his nephew on the project and that she should deal with 

Truscott directly. 

 In the section below, we describe the ATF’s assistance to Truscott’s 

nephew in his high school video project, which included responding to 

information requests, arranging visits to three ATF sites, preparing for 

numerous interviews of ATF employees, providing technical assistance, and 

other activities in support of the project. We then discuss Truscott’s 

explanation of ATF’s involvement in the project. 

 

C. Assistance Provided 

1. Information requests 

 Truscott’s nephew made several requests to ATF for information and 

materials during his project. According to OPA staff and documents, Truscott’s 

nephew initially sent his information requests to Truscott, who passed them on 

to the OPA Chief. For example, on October 31, 2004, Truscott’s nephew sent 

an e-mail to Truscott asking questions about the organization of ATF. Truscott 

replied to his nephew by e-mail, with a copy to the OPA Chief, stating that 

Truscott would ask the OPA Chief to send the nephew a copy of a new ATF 

brochure and ATF’s published Strategic Plan. Truscott also responded that 

ATF was publishing a “Director’s vision statement” and would send that as 

well. 

56
 OPA witnesses stated that from October 2004 through December 2004, 

they received numerous telephone calls and e-mails directly from Truscott’s 

nephew requesting additional background information on ATF. One OPA 

employee told us that the requests were sporadic but that sometimes she 

would receive three e-mails a day. She also said that if she did not respond 

quickly enough to a request, Truscott’s nephew would contact one of the other 

OPA employees. During this period, OPA sent four packages of materials to 

Truscott’s nephew in response to his requests, including background materials 

on ATF programs, copies of ATF regulations, and copies of newspaper and 

magazine articles. The OPA Chief told us that she kept Truscott informed of 

his nephew’s requests. 

Truscott told us that ATF only provided his nephew with publicly 

available ATF documents. An OPA witness also told us that much of the 

background information Truscott’s nephew requested was readily available on 

ATF’s website or elsewhere on the Internet. However, she said that OPA 

employees had to “spoon feed” him by explaining where the information could 

be found. She said that typically OPA refers requesters to the appropriate 

website. In this case, however, OPA staff researched the information requests, 

printed the requested information from the Internet, and mailed the documents 

to the nephew. 

 

 In addition to requesting background materials, Truscott’s nephew made 

at least three requests during this period for stock film footage on topics such 

as explosives, ATF’s fire research laboratory, and Truscott’s speeches.71 ATF 

employees provided the requested footage. 

 According to a VIB witness, providing stock footage is a time consuming 

process. A VIB employee must perform a key word search of a database to 

identify relevant videotapes in the VIB library on a requested topic. The 

employee then must retrieve and review the videotapes identified by the search 

and highlight relevant areas within them. The analog videotapes are digitalized 

by transferring the audio and visual portions of the images from the videotapes 

to a computer hard drive. The digitalized files are combined end-to-end to 

create a single file. The resulting file is then copied on a videotape which is 

labeled and mailed. 

Truscott told us that he was aware that VIB was providing his nephew 

with stock film footage. However, he told us that it seemed to him that it was 

the “sort of stuff” that would be provided if “ABC News” requested it. According 

to an OPA witness, stock film footage is routinely provided to the media; 

 71 Stock footage is pre-existing film or video footage that is accessible from a video 

library or archives. 

57
however, the only items OPA has previously provided to students have been 

fact sheets, brochures, and “giveaways” such as ATF caps and pins. 

Truscott told us that he never inquired about how much effort providing 

stock film footage to his nephew would take. He told us that he believed that it 

took “little or no expense and little or no time” and consisted of merely pulling 

a tape out of a drawer and putting it in the mail. 

However, Truscott was copied on an e-mail sent on November 9, 2004, 

from an OPA employee to Truscott’s nephew that indicated it was not merely a 

matter of sending something that already existed. In response to the nephew’s 

inquiry about when he should expect to receive footage he had requested the 

week before, the OPA employee wrote that she “had to have it made into VHS” 

and would send it out that day or the next. 

 

2. Visit to Philadelphia Field Division 

 In addition to requesting stock film footage and background information, 

Truscott’s nephew visited ATF sites during the course of his project, and 

several ATF employees assisted in coordinating these visits. 

 Truscott was aware of these visits. On December 17, 2004, Truscott’s 

nephew visited ATF’s Philadelphia Field Division for his project. Truscott told 

us that he thought the OPA Chief suggested that his nephew visit the field 

division. However, the evidence shows that Truscott received his nephew’s 

request to visit the field division and passed the request to the OPA Chief. In 

an e-mail dated November 2, 2004, Truscott’s nephew told Truscott that he 

was interested in interviewing a Philadelphia Field Division canine handler and 

filming her dog in action. Truscott forwarded this e-mail to the OPA Chief and 

asked her to call his nephew.72 The OPA Chief then communicated with 

Truscott’s nephew about the visit. 

The Philadelphia Field Division’s Public Information Officer (PIO) was 

assigned to facilitate the visit. The PIO scheduled two interviews Truscott’s 

nephew had requested with the canine handler and the office’s Special Agent in 

Charge (SAC). The PIO also contacted the nephew before the visit to identify 

the topics that he wanted the interviewees to discuss. She said that when the 

nephew arrived, she escorted him and his father to the SAC’s office and 

observed his interview of the SAC. The SAC told us that the PIO spent a total 

of about five to six hours working on the nephew’s visit. 

 72 In addition, the nephew’s father, who knew the canine handler, sent an e-mail to the 

canine handler on November 5, 2004. The e-mail stated that the nephew was “producing a 

documentary on the ATF under the guidance of his uncle (ATF Director Carl Truscott)” and 

asked for permission for the interview. 

58
 Truscott’s nephew interviewed the SAC and the canine handler on 

camera. He also filmed a demonstration presented by the canine handler with 

her explosives detection dog. In addition, he filmed a special agent 

demonstrating the Division’s National Response Team truck. The SAC told us 

that he, the canine handler, and the special agent spent about an hour each 

with the nephew. According to the PIO, the nephew used his own camera and 

tripod for the filming. 

 

3. Visit to ATF Headquarters 

 

On January 14, 2005, Truscott’s nephew visited ATF Headquarters. In 

advance of this visit, Truscott’s nephew provided a detailed outline to both 

Truscott and the OPA Chief of the topics he wanted to cover. The outline also 

listed the types of ATF employees he wanted to interview, including a fire/arson 

agent, a ballistics agent, and an alcohol/tobacco agent. In a note 

accompanying the outline, the nephew referred to the ATF employees that he 

wanted to interview and added the qualification, “However, since you are the 

Director of the ATF, it’s up to you who I can interview and place on camera.” 

(See Appendix C.) 

The nephew also sent several e-mails to the OPA Chief and Truscott 

describing the interviews he would be conducting during his visit and 

requesting or referring to the use of ATF’s teleprompter for some of the 

interviews, including Truscott’s. Truscott’s nephew provided “scripts” for the 

interviewees to use, but asked that the interviewees make any necessary edits 

or additions to the scripts. 

 At least three OPA employees participated in facilitating Truscott’s 

nephew’s visit to ATF Headquarters. These employees scheduled interviews 

and arranged for the VIB studio and equipment to be available for the 

interviews. In addition, the OPA Chief or another OPA employee escorted 

Truscott’s nephew throughout the day. An OPA employee also took him on 

tours of the Visual Information Branch, the National Enforcement Operations 

Center (now known as the Joint Support Operations Center, or JSOC), and the 

ATF weapons vault. 

 Truscott’s nephew filmed all of the interviews at ATF Headquarters using 

his own camera. While at the weapons vault, he filmed an agent talking about 

the weapons. He also filmed an interview of Truscott in Truscott’s office. In 

addition, he interviewed the SAC of the Critical Incident Management Branch 

in the SAC’s office. 

 Truscott’s nephew also filmed two interviews in the Visual Information 

Branch studio using ATF equipment, including lights, a teleprompter, and a 

background set. These two interviews were a second interview of Truscott and 

an interview of the Chief of the Alcohol and Tobacco Enforcement Branch. 

59
 The Visual Information Branch Chief and four technical specialists 

participated in setting up and managing these two interviews. The technical 

specialists transferred the nephew’s scripts to a teleprompter and set up the 

lights and the background for the interviews. According to VIB records, these 

tasks took a total of 10.7 hours. In addition, a VIB photographer told us that 

he was asked to take photographs of Truscott’s nephew filming his video (he 

could not recall who made this request). The photographer also spent two 

hours processing and printing the photographs so that they could be presented 

to the nephew as a gift before he left for the day. The photographer told us that 

such quick turnarounds are rarely required. 

 

 Also on January 14, 2005, the New Headquarters Building Project 

Manager briefed Truscott’s nephew on the status of the construction of the new 

building. Truscott’s nephew traveled by Metro to visit the site of the new 

building, accompanied by Truscott, Truscott’s Assistant, and the OPA Chief. 

Truscott’s nephew filmed a third interview of Truscott from the Metro platform 

overlooking the site. 

 

Truscott told us that his nephew’s visit to ATF Headquarters “wasn’t too 

time consuming and . . . for the most part from what I saw, it didn’t seem to 

interfere too much with what the people were doing.” He said that the 

interview in his office only took 15 minutes and the interview in the VIB studio 

took 10 minutes. He said he did not recall anyone preparing talking points for 

him. According to witness reports and documentation, however, each of these 

interviews actually took about 45 minutes. In addition, Truscott’s speechwriter 

wrote talking points for Truscott to use in his interviews. 

4. Completion of the video project 

 After his visit to ATF Headquarters, Truscott’s nephew continued to make 

requests to ATF employees regarding the video project. On January 31, 2006, 

he sent an e-mail to the OPA Chief requesting additional stock film footage on 

three topics. The OPA Chief forwarded the request to an OPA employee, who in 

turn forwarded it to a VIB employee. According to VIB documents and 

witnesses, a VIB employee spent 4.5 hours on February 4, 2006, assembling 

the additional requested video footage. The employee told us that he 

considered this task to be a priority because it was a request from the Office of 

the Director. He said that because of the time he spent meeting this request he 

was unable to complete an urgent ATF-related task. He told us that he had to 

come in on a Saturday to complete his ATF project and that he received 

compensatory time for doing so. 

 

According to OPA witnesses, Truscott’s nephew submitted his film 

project to his teacher in April 2005 and received a grade of “A” on it. We 

reviewed a copy of the final DVD and observed that the credits included the 

statement, “Thank you for giving me this amazing opportunity Uncle Carl.” 

60
Truscott told us that his nephew sent him a DVD of his completed 

project and that he viewed it. He described it as being “too long.” He 

told us that he had only viewed it once and that he could not recall what 

exactly was included in the DVD. 

 

5. Post-completion requests and follow-up 

 In April 2005, Truscott’s nephew solicited suggestions from OPA 

employees on how to improve his completed film. According to an e-mail from 

the nephew to OPA, even though he had already received a grade, he was 

continuing to work on his film for personal reasons. The OPA Chief assigned 

an OPA employee to respond to this request. 

 The OPA employee said that the OPA Chief told her this was an 

important job. She said she spent two to three hours going frame-by-frame 

through the 90-minute video to identify inaccuracies, omissions, and outdated 

film footage. She said she prepared a 2-page list of recommended changes, 

which she provided to the OPA Chief. Truscott’s nephew stated in an e-mail 

that he used the recommendations to improve his film. 

 Requests from Truscott’s nephew for additional stock film footage and 

still photographs, and responses from ATF employees, continued until August 

2005. The OPA employee who reviewed the final video and responded to all of 

these additional requests estimated that she spent a total of three to four work 

days on the nephew’s project from December 2004 through August 2005. 

 The OPA Chief said that in August 2005 she received an e-mail from the 

nephew asking if he could distribute the video to the public school system.73 

The OPA Chief said that she told him he could not and that she made Truscott 

aware of the nephew’s request either verbally or by e-mail. Another OPA 

witness said the OPA Chief told her about this request at the time. This 

witness stated that OPA did not want the nephew to air the video publicly 

because they did not feel it was sufficiently professional in quality and they 

were concerned about security issues. 

 On January 19, 2006, the Philadelphia Field Division SAC sent a letter to 

Truscott’s nephew thanking him for sending a copy of the final product to the 

SAC. The SAC wrote that the film was “one of the best documentaries of ATF’s 

mission” that he had seen. He also stated that it appeared that with his 

“talents and enthusiasm” the nephew would be successful in his future 

 73 The OPA Chief did not specify to us to which school system the nephew wanted to 

distribute his film. We heard a conflicting account from another OPA witness who thought that 

the OPA Chief told her that the nephew wanted to show his film on a community access 

television station. 

61
endeavors, and wished him luck with his college choice. The SAC told us he 

did not recall if he sent this letter on ATF letterhead, but said he assumes he 

did. 

 Truscott’s Assistant said he recalled having a telephone conversation 

with the SAC in which the idea of writing a thank-you note came up. He said 

he also had a discussion with Truscott about the SAC writing such a letter. He 

said Truscott mentioned that his nephew was applying to colleges and asked 

whether the SAC could include “something spirited” in the letter that his 

nephew could use in his college applications relating to his extracurricular 

activities. Truscott’s Assistant said he could not recall which conversation 

came first.74 The SAC told us that he wrote the letter of his own volition, that 

no one at Headquarters suggested he do so, and that he does not know what 

Truscott’s nephew did with the letter. 

D. Truscott’s Explanation of ATF’s Involvement

Truscott told us that he has given talks at many schools and that when 

he received his nephew’s request, “doing something for a student, albeit a 

nephew of the Director, didn’t seem all that out of the ordinary.” However, 

according to all of the witnesses that we interviewed, Truscott’s nephew was 

provided unique access to ATF personnel and resources to conduct his project. 

Domenech told us that he advised Truscott that it would not be appropriate for 

him to use ATF resources for Truscott’s nephew’s school project. The OPA 

Chief told us that although students “are always requesting” to tour ATF and 

meet the Director, ATF traditionally does not honor these requests. She also 

said that Truscott has never met one-on-one with a student other than his 

nephew. 

Similarly, other witnesses that we interviewed from OPA, VIB, and the 

Director’s Office all said they could not recall any other student being given 

this level of access to ATF personnel and resources. Moreover, the Assistant 

Director for the Office of Public and Governmental Affairs told us that he is 

unaware of Truscott providing an interview in his office to anyone despite 

numerous requests for interviews. Several witnesses also observed that 

Truscott routinely refused to give media interviews that would benefit ATF, yet 

readily agreed to be interviewed three times on camera by his nephew for this 

school project. Truscott himself acknowledged that he has never provided 

similar access to anyone else. 

Truscott also suggested that ATF’s involvement in this project was 

akin to community outreach. He told us that he saw assisting his 

 74 We interviewed Truscott before we were told about this letter and therefore did not 

ask him about it. 

62
nephew as a way of “encouraging young people to get involved in good 

careers and stay away from drugs.” He said that he assumed his 

nephew’s class saw the video and “it might actually touch the rest of his 

class.” However, when asked whether he would have provided the same 

access to someone who was not his nephew, he responded, “[I]f it was 

somebody I didn’t know, obviously, I don’t know whether I’d be doing it 

or not.” 

When asked whether there was a point at which using ATF 

resources for his nephew’s project might seem inappropriate, Truscott 

responded “absolutely.” He then stated that ATF employees might have 

spent more time on his nephew’s project than he initially envisioned, but 

said that this was not by his or his nephew’s design. He stated that if 

the time spent on the project was excessive, it was “probably by the 

design of people that thought they were trying to help out the Director.” 

However, Truscott said he would “accept full responsibility for the fact 

that my nephew was in the [ATF Headquarters’] building.” He said “If I had to 

make the decision again considering the totality of circumstances, I would not 

do it and I accept that responsibility.” 

 

Truscott told us that he did not specifically recall discussing his 

nephew’s project with the ATF’s Chief Counsel, but said “I’ve done little or 

nothing in that organization without gaining Counsel’s advice, so it wouldn’t 

surprise me if I did.” ATF’s Chief Counsel told us that he was unaware of the 

nephew’s project until we asked him about it. He told us that had Truscott 

consulted him, he would have raised appearance concerns regarding ATF 

providing assistance to Truscott’s relative. He told us that he would have been 

reluctant to conclude that the use of ATF resources for the project was 

“reasonably necessary” for ATF to do its job. 

E. Findings 

We found that significant ATF resources were used to assist Truscott’s 

nephew on a high school project. The project involved at least 20 ATF 

employees engaged in technical, time-consuming work over an approximately 

10-month period. Although we were unable to quantify the total time spent by 

the employees, we determined that VIB employees spent 10.7 hours setting up 

and managing the VIB studio interviews, a VIB employee spent 4.5 hours on 

one occasion pulling stock film footage and as a consequence received 

compensatory time for spending weekend hours on an ATF project, an OPA 

employee spent an estimated 24 to 32 hours responding to the nephew’s 

inquiries and facilitating his visit to Headquarters, an ATF field division PIO 

spent 5 to 6 hours facilitating the nephew’s visit to that field division, and 3 

ATF employees who were filmed by the nephew spent at least an hour each 

being interviewed. 

63
Besides the extensive use of employee time, we found that the assistance 

provided on the nephew’s project included the use of ATF space and several 

pieces of equipment, including computers, lights, mailing materials, film, and a 

teleprompter. 

We also found that Truscott was aware of a significant portion of the ATF 

assistance provided to his nephew. The nephew initially e-mailed Truscott 

directly with his requests for information for his project. In November 2004, 

the nephew provided Truscott with a detailed outline of his project, which 

included a list of the topics that he wanted to cover in his film and the number 

and types of ATF employees that he wanted to interview on camera.75 In a 

subsequent e-mail to Truscott, the nephew requested that ATF provide him 

with a teleprompter to use for Truscott’s interview in the VIB studio. Moreover, 

although the nephew subsequently began making his requests directly to the 

OPA Chief, the OPA Chief told us that she continued to keep Truscott aware of 

his nephew’s requests. 

In addition to the e-mail requests, Truscott witnessed the ATF personnel 

that were present and the ATF equipment that was used when his nephew 

visited ATF Headquarters in January 2005. During this visit, his nephew 

interviewed Truscott three times – in his office, in the VIB studio, and near the 

site of the new ATF Headquarters. When he was interviewed in the VIB studio, 

Truscott would have been aware that VIB employees were providing technical 

assistance and that VIB equipment, such as lights and a teleprompter, were 

being used. For the interview conducted near the site of the new ATF 

Headquarters building, Truscott and his nephew were accompanied to the 

filming location by Truscott’s Assistant and the OPA Chief. 

Although Truscott was not present when his nephew interviewed other 

Headquarters officials, Truscott told us that he viewed the 90-minute DVD of 

the nephew’s project and therefore he was aware of the extent of ATF personnel 

and resources that were used. In fact, during our interview of Truscott, he 

pointed out to us that he could tell by watching the film that at least one of the 

interviewees was using a teleprompter during the interview. 

While Truscott may have lacked knowledge of every detail of ATF’s 

involvement, he was made aware of the significant extent to which ATF 

resources were used for his nephew’s project. Moreover, by forwarding the 

nephew’s requests to the OPA Chief and instructing her to contact his nephew, 

Truscott failed to establish and communicate any limits to his subordinates as 

to what level of assistance he expected them to provide to his nephew. The 

outline for the project that the nephew sent Truscott was sufficiently detailed to 

 75 Regarding the outline, Truscott acknowledged that he “spent little time reviewing it 

as I should have.” Truscott Letter at p. 2, n. 6. (See Appendix A) 

64
put Truscott on notice that, absent limitations or guidelines, the project was 

bound to consume excessive ATF resources. Moreover, the OPA Chief told us 

she kept Truscott informed of the nephew’s requests for information. 

Finally, we were again troubled that Truscott failed to fully accept 

responsibility for the project by minimizing the extent of ATF resources that 

were committed to it and by seeking to justify ATF’s assistance to the nephew 

as a form of community outreach, while at the same time acknowledging that 

he might not give similar assistance to others. This was especially troubling 

given that Domenech advised Truscott at the outset of the project that he 

should not give his nephew special treatment. Moreover, Truscott did not seek 

the advice of the Chief Counsel’s Office before allowing ATF resources to be 

used for the video project, an action that might have alerted him to the specific 

regulations governing the use of government property and employee time. 

By directing and authorizing the use of ATF resources in his nephew’s 

high school class project, we believe that Truscott violated several ethical 

regulations. First, 5 CFR § 2635.702 (Use of public office for private gain) 

states, in relevant part: “An employee shall not use his public office for . . . the 

private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is 

affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity . . ..” Id. While the “private gain” to 

Truscott’s relative may appear minimal (receiving assistance on a high school 

project and specialized coaching in a field of personal interest), the regulation 

makes clear that the amount or nature of the gain is irrelevant.76 All the 

witnesses, including Truscott, told us that the nephew would not have received 

such assistance had he not been related to Truscott. 

We believe that Truscott’s conduct also violated 5 CFR § 2635.101(b)(9) 

(basic obligation of public service pertaining to Federal property), and more 

specifically, 5 CFR § 2635.704. Subsection (a) of the latter provision states: 

“An employee has a duty to protect and conserve Government property and 

shall not use such property, or allow its use, for other than authorized 

purposes.” Subsection (b) defines government property to include “office 

supplies, telephone and other telecommunications equipment and services, the 

Government mails, automated data processing capabilities, printing and 

reproduction facilities, Government records, and Government vehicles.” We 

found that Truscott allowed the extensive use of government property to assist 

his nephew with the video project. 

Moreover, in directing and authorizing ATF employees to assist his 

nephew with the video project, we believe that Truscott also violated 5 CFR 

 76 One example provided to illustrate a violation of 5 CFR § 2635.702 involves an 

employee of the Securities and Exchange Commission using that official position to assist a 

relative with a consumer complaint over a household appliance. 

65
§ 2635.705(b), which states: “An employee shall not encourage, direct, coerce 

or request a subordinate to use official time to perform activities other than 

those required in the performance of official duties or authorized in accordance 

with law or regulation.” 

Truscott’s violations of these provisions were not of a “de minimis” 

nature.77 To the contrary, we concluded that the use of government property 

and personnel described above in connection with the video project was 

extensive. 

V. Use of Executive Protection Branch 

A. Allegation 

The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott created the Executive 

Protection Branch (EPB) to meet his personal security needs and that EPB 

staffing greatly exceeded the protection level provided for previous ATF 

Directors. The complaint stated that when outside of Washington, D.C., 

Truscott traveled with an excessive number of staff and required that ATF field 

offices provide four additional special agents and two Chevrolet Suburbans to 

facilitate his visits; that the model of the vehicle Truscott used exceeded the 

level of protection provided to other government component heads, despite 

Truscott’s low overall threat assessment; and that Truscott had home-to-work 

transportation authorization, unlike previous ATF Directors. 

B. Evidence 

This section first provides a brief description of the history of the EPB 

and its organizational structure. It describes EPB’s procedures for providing 

protection to Truscott, both locally and when Truscott traveled outside of the 

Washington, D.C. area. The section also includes a description of the travel 

procedures of the prior two ATF Directors and the views of senior ATF 

managers on Truscott’s travel requirements. 

 77 See, e.g., O’Neill v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, 220 F.3d 1354, 1364 

(C.A. Fed. 2000) (noting that, although there is not express “de minimis” exception to 5 CFR 

§ 2635.704, the argument for such an exception “has some force.”) In fact, the DOJ analog to 

5 CFR § 2635.704 on use of government property, codified at 28 CFR § 45.4, does allow for 

very limited personal use of government property, such as making telephone calls “to locations 

within the office’s commuting area.” We concluded that the use of government property 

sanctioned by Truscott in connection with his nephew’s video project far exceeded the personal 

use exceptions contemplated in the DOJ regulation. 

66
1. Creation of the EPB 

DOJ Order 2630.5, dated June 26, 1979, provides authority for the 

DOJ’s offices, boards, divisions, and bureaus to establish protective details for 

agency officials. The Order states that “[w]here there is legitimate concern for 

the safety of an agency official, and where the agency’s functioning may be 

impaired by the danger to that official, the agency has implied power to use its 

personnel and funds to protect him.” The Order further states: “The 

protection provided . . . DOJ executives should be adequate, but not obtrusive. 

Protective devices and procedures should shield the DOJ executives from 

danger, but . . . should not be so cumbersome that they inhibit public access 

to the executive.” 

According to the current EPB Chief, the idea of establishing a protective 

security detail for the Director of ATF pursuant to the DOJ Order was first 

given serious consideration in 2003. At the time, Bradley Buckles was the ATF 

Director and the current EPB Chief was a program manager in the Special 

Operations Division. 

The EPB Chief told us that in March 2003 he was assigned by his 

Branch Chief to conduct a security review to determine whether a protective 

detail should be established for the ATF Director. He said that he reviewed the 

DOJ Order and recommendations from previous ATF security reviews, and 

conducted research regarding other agencies’ protective details. Based on this 

work, he concluded that there was a need to establish a protective detail for the 

ATF Director. 

The EPB Chief said that his Assistant Director presented the idea for a 

protective detail to Buckles, but Buckles rejected the idea because he had no 

interest in augmenting his security. He told us that at that time Buckles’s 

security consisted solely of an Executive Assistant, who primarily provided 

administrative assistance. 

 

Domenech told us that in December 2003, shortly before Buckles’s 

retirement, he and the Assistant Director for the Office of Professional 

Responsibility and Security Operations (OPRSO) reintroduced the idea of 

establishing a protective detail.78 The OPRSO Assistant Director told us that 

both he and Domenech felt that the next Director would have a “higher profile” 

because he was to be appointed by the Attorney General and therefore ATF 

needed to have a formal executive protection process. 

 78 Domenech became the Acting ATF Director upon Buckles’s retirement on January 3, 

2004. 

67
Domenech asked a special agent who was then in the Office of 

Inspections to establish a working group to evaluate the threat assessment 

level and nature of executive protection needed for the Director’s position. The 

Inspections official said that he was told that a protective detail was needed 

because the next Director would be a “political appointee” and thus have a 

higher profile, would be operating in a law enforcement environment due to the 

transfer of ATF to DOJ, and would have more interaction with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI). The EFB Chief was asked to give his prior research to the working group 

and assist the Inspections official in developing the Executive Protection 

Branch. 

 On February 6, 2004, the Inspections official asked the Operations 

Security Branch Chief to conduct a threat assessment review for the position of 

the Director.79 The assessment was completed on March 4, 2004. It 

recommended that increased executive protection be established because of 

ATF’s transfer to DOJ, but concluded that the current threat level for the 

position of the Director was low. The assessment stated that with the 

exception of threats made toward former ATF Director Stephen Higgins (1983-

1993), no direct or specific threats towards any ATF Director had ever been 

received. 

On March 25, 2004, the Inspections official presented a proposal for the 

creation of the EPB to Domenech.80 Domenech requested several adjustments 

to the plan. One adjustment reduced the number of special agents assigned to 

EPB from five to three, resulting in a total staff of five: a Branch Chief, three 

special agents, and an intelligence analyst. Domenech also wanted to add only 

one vehicle rather than two to the two vehicles then in use for transporting the 

Director. Domenech told us that his intent was that the EPB initially would be 

staffed with three special agents, but would evolve based on the comfort level 

and expectations of whoever was appointed as Director. 

On April 1, 2004, the Inspections official submitted a revised plan to 

Domenech that included a total of five staff. In addition, it included 

requirements for EPB to conduct advance site visits and security surveys for all 

locations visited by the Director, and to provide protection to the Director 

during business hours and at business functions with assistance from local 

ATF field divisions. The plan specified that EPB would provide transportation 

to the Director “portal to portal, business hours/functions only.” The proposal 

 79 According to the Office of Operations Security memorandum, the threat assessment 

process consisted of “identifying and listing potential threats, and any known or potential 

adversaries that could put critical assets at risk.” 

80 A copy of the original EPB proposal was not available. The earliest version we were 

given is the version that was presented to the ATF senior executive staff. 

68
also recommended adding “run flat” tires to the vehicles used to transport the 

Director.81 The Inspections official told us that he and the EFB Chief 

considered the plan to be flexible and subject to revision by the new Director. 

 On April 13, 2004, the Inspections official and the Operations Security 

Branch Chief briefed the senior executive staff of ATF about the EPB proposal, 

and the senior staff concurred with the plan. EPB was officially established on 

April 18, 2004, the day before Truscott reported for duty. The Inspections 

official was named the Branch Chief. EPB initially was staffed by a Branch 

Chief and two special agents detailed from other components of the ATF. A 

third special agent was detailed to EPB on May 16, 2004. 

After Truscott was named Director, Domenech met with Truscott and 

provided him with information and briefing materials about the EPB.82 

Truscott said that Domenech told him that both the ATF senior executive staff 

and DOJ had approved the plan. Truscott also told us that Domenech had 

informed him of the low threat assessment.

At some point, ATF’s executive protection plan was provided to DOJ for 

review. According to the Director and Deputy Director of DOJ’s Security and 

Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS), DOJ components are required to submit 

their executive protection plans to DOJ, but DOJ is not responsible for 

authorizing or approving the initial plans.83 Domenech told us that shortly 

after Truscott began work at ATF, DOJ informed him that Truscott was not 

legally entitled to portal-to-portal transportation and therefore ordered that 

ATF cease this practice. He also told us that because the threat level related to 

the Director’s position was low, round-the-clock protection could not be 

justified. After this DOJ order, Truscott began driving himself to and from 

work. 

Domenech told us that ATF subsequently revised and resubmitted its 

request for portal-to-portal transportation to DOJ. The OPRSO Assistant 

Director told us that a few weeks later DOJ authorized the portal-to-portal 

service on a 90-day provisional basis. ATF subsequently sought and in 

 81 A “run flat” tire is designed to resist the effects of deflation and thus to enable the 

vehicle to be driven after the tire is punctured. 

82 The Attorney General announced Truscott’s appointment as ATF Director on April 1, 

2004. Truscott’s first day on duty as the Director was April 19, 2004. 

83 DOJ Order 2630.5, dated June 26, 1979, states, “Each Bureau Security Programs 

Manager is responsible for developing, implementing, and managing his own executive 

protection program.” The order further states that the Department Security Officer “will 

periodically review executive protection plans and evaluate protection procedures to ensure 

that they comply with the policies of this order.” The order does not require the executive 

protection plans to be submitted for review prior to implementation. 

69
December 2004 obtained an amendment of 31 U.S.C. § 1344 (b)(6) to authorize 

portal-to-portal transportation specifically for the ATF Director.84 

In February 2006, after the initiation of the OIG investigation, the ATF 

Office of Operations Security conducted a revised threat assessment review for 

the Director. The assessment, completed on March 2, 2006, stated that “[a]s of 

this date, there has been no specific threat identified toward the Director of 

ATF.” However, the threat assessment raised the threat level from low to 

medium based on several factors, including the inclusion of preventing 

terrorism in ATF’s mission statement, an anticipated increase in Truscott’s 

international travel, an elevation of the threat from street gangs, workplace 

violence, and Truscott’s proximity to high risk targets.85 

2. Current staffing and equipment 

 EPB’s permanent staff positions increased to its current level of five 

positions (a Branch Chief and four special agents) in October 2004. Both the 

Assistant to the Director (Assistant) and the current EPB Chief told us that the 

staff increase was needed because of Truscott’s heavy travel schedule and his 

protective needs.86 The EPB Chief told us that he would like to add one more 

agent to EPB. He said that when Truscott had back-to-back trips, it was 

difficult to staff the protective detail and meet the EPB employees’ training and 

leave needs. 

EPB currently has three vehicles in its fleet, two Chevrolet Suburbans 

and one Ford Crown Victoria sedan. One of the Suburbans was purchased in 

 84 31 U.S.C. § 1344 (b) specifies those exceptions in which a U.S. passenger carrier can 

be used to transport officers and employees of federal agencies between their residence and 

place of employment. The exceptions specified in § 1344 (b)(6), to which the position of the ATF 

Director was added in December 2004, were the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

Director of the FBI, the Administrator of the DEA, and the Administrator of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration. The inclusion of the ATF Director in 31 U.S.C. 

§ 1344(b) was made retroactive to January 1, 2004. Pub. L 108-447, Div. B, Title I, § 117, 

December 8, 2004. 

85 According to the OPRSO Assistant Director, the revised threat assessment was 

conducted in order to meet an annual review requirement by SEPS. According to an 

October 12, 2005, e-mail from the EPB Chief to the Chief of the ATF Security and Emergency 

Programs Division, the DOJ Assistant Director of Physical Security told the EPB Chief that 

components should submit threat assessments and security plans annually to SEPS. In the 

e-mail, the EPB Chief stated that the ATF’s submission date would be March 2006, the 

anniversary date of the prior submission. 

86 On February 20, 2005, the Inspections official, who had been named as the original 

EPB Chief, became the Assistant to the Director and one of the EPB agents was promoted to 

Branch Chief. The Assistant told us that even after he left EPB, he continued to be involved 

with the protective function. The current EPB Chief also told us that after he became the EPB 

Branch Chief, Truscott continued to deal directly with his Assistant on security matters. 

70
February 2004 at a cost of $34,461 and the other was purchased in October 

2004 at a cost of $47,016. The Crown Victoria was purchased in November 

2004 at a cost of $26,631. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us that initially EPB had only one sedan and 

one Suburban and would transport Truscott in either vehicle. However, he 

said that Truscott told him on several occasions that he preferred to ride in a 

Suburban or SUV because of the additional leg room and maneuverability and 

because it was what he was used to. The Assistant said that EPB purchased 

the second Suburban as a back-up vehicle because Truscott said he preferred 

to ride in a Suburban. 

Domenech also told us that previous ATF Directors were transported in a 

sedan, but that Truscott told him that he became accustomed to using 

Suburbans when he worked with White House security and that he preferred 

that vehicle. Domenech also said that Truscott had instructed the Assistant to 

review the equipment used by the U.S. Secret Service and told him “we need to 

be similar in nature.” 

The Assistant told us that for protective details in Washington, D.C., an 

EPB advance agent drove the sedan and Truscott rode in one of the 

Suburbans. He said that the second Suburban was used as a replacement 

vehicle on those occasions when the other Suburban had mechanical 

problems. He told us that both Suburbans are equipped with “run flat” tires. 

He said he and the current EPB Chief decided to acquire the run flat tires and 

did not discuss that decision with Truscott.87

The Assistant also told us that in either late spring or early summer 

2004 Truscott complained that the leg room in the Suburban was limited and 

mentioned that he had heard that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s vehicle 

had been reconfigured so as to provide her with more leg room. The Assistant 

told us that based on Truscott’s comments, he had a row of seats in one of the 

Suburbans removed. He said that afterwards Truscott told him that although 

he appreciated the extra leg room, he felt that the removal of the seats caused 

the vehicle to sway. The Assistant said that he then had the Suburban 

returned to its original configuration. He said that in total this removal and 

replacement of the seats cost about $500 to $600. 

ATF documents reflect that EPB expenditures for its six months of 

operation in FY 2004 totaled $476,916 (including $315,048 in salary expenses) 

and for FY 2005 totaled $821,232 (including $683,088 in salary expenses). 

The projected FY 2006 expenditures for EPB are $937,514 (including $713,526 

 87 The Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations complained to us that 

$6,000 was taken out of his budget to pay for the “run flat” tires. 

71
in salary expenses). Domenech told us that the documents reflect only EPB 

expenses. No estimates of costs expended in support of Truscott’s security, 

such as those borne by the Office of Field Operations, were provided. 

3. Protection in and around Washington, D.C. 

While in the Washington, D.C. area, Truscott was provided with 

executive protection during the work day only. According to Truscott’s 

Assistant and the EPB Chief, an EPB agent drove Truscott from his home to 

the office and back each work day. The Assistant said that when Truscott 

came into the office on a weekend, he drove himself in his personal vehicle and 

was not escorted by the Assistant or an EPB agent. 

a. Local travel 

According to Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief, when Truscott 

traveled locally during work hours, typically an EPB advance agent traveled 

ahead to the venue. Both witnesses said the purpose of the advance visit was 

not just for security reasons, but also to address Truscott’s administrative 

needs. For example, the Assistant said that when Truscott spoke at an event, 

the advance agent had to ensure that there was a podium, microphone, and 

water and had to find out such information as who would be in the audience, 

what dignitaries would be attending, where Truscott would be sitting, and who 

would be introducing him.88 

ATF provided the OIG with a document dated September 1, 2005, that 

describes the specific security and administrative activities that the advance 

agent is required to perform for these types of events. Security activities 

include being familiar with the floor plans of the site and identifying threats 

specific to the site. Administrative activities include determining “how many 

[guests] are expected, what is their affiliation with the event, are there any 

other VIPs” and knowing where the rest rooms are. 

According to the Assistant, Truscott was normally transported to the 

venue in a Suburban driven by an EPB agent with the Assistant accompanying 

him. The advance agent would already be at the venue to greet them and to 

escort Truscott to the event. 

Truscott similarly described the advance agent’s function to us. He 

stated that if he were giving a speech at the Marriott Hotel, for example, an 

advance agent would go to the hotel the day before the speech to meet the 

people coordinating the event and to obtain details about the movements of 

 88 Although witnesses said Truscott rarely ate lunch at restaurants, an advance agent 

was also used when Truscott traveled to a local restaurant for lunch. 

72
participants in the event. Truscott also said that he would travel to the event 

with a driver and a security escort and that the advance person would greet 

them at the event. 

The Assistant stated that when Truscott became Director, his sole focus 

was to get Truscott to the site and ensure that he was safe. He said that 

initially he was not focused on Truscott’s administrative needs. However, the 

Assistant stated that Truscott subsequently counseled him whenever Truscott’s 

administrative needs were not met. For example, Truscott would say, “I didn’t 

know ‘X’ was going to be there, you should have told me.” The Assistant said 

that part of his and the EPB’s job was to protect Truscott from embarrassment. 

b. Exceptions for the Department and Capitol Hill 

 Several witnesses familiar with EPB operations told us that Truscott 

requested that his level of protection be scaled back when he traveled to the 

Department or Capitol Hill. According to one witness, Truscott specifically 

directed that an advance agent should not be used when Truscott traveled to 

the Department. In addition, the EPB driver waited with the vehicle at the 

Department rather than accompanying Truscott and Truscott’s Assistant into 

the building. Only the Assistant escorted Truscott inside the building. 

 Similarly, another witness told us that EPB’s presence was minimized on 

visits to Capitol Hill. The witness said that an advance agent was usually used 

for visits to Capitol Hill to help get Truscott through security and to find the 

meeting location. However, once inside the building, Truscott was escorted 

only by the EPB advance agent rather than both the EPB advance agent and 

Truscott’s Assistant. In addition, as with visits to the Department, the EPB 

driver waited with the vehicle while Truscott was escorted into the building. 

 One witness said he believes that Truscott did not want to give DOJ 

officials the perception that he had a big security detail; however, Truscott 

never told this witness specifically that this was the reason for scaling back on 

the detail. This witness said that his belief was based on an incident when 

Truscott encountered senior DOJ officials while he was accompanied by his 

protective detail and afterward made comments to the witness to the effect that 

he was uncomfortable with the situation. The witness added that on another 

occasion when he accompanied Truscott to a meeting at the Department, he 

waited for Truscott down the hall rather than directly outside the meeting 

room. He said that afterwards Truscott thanked him for his discretion. 

Other witnesses also told us that Truscott appeared to be sensitive to 

DOJ officials’ perception of the size of his protective detail. One senior 

executive told us that Truscott made it very clear that the number of people 

accompanying him should be reduced when he visited the Department or 

Capitol Hill. This official said that Truscott was particularly sensitive to the 

73
perceptions of the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General 

for Administration. Another senior executive stated that Truscott appeared to 

be aware that his level of protection was excessive because when he visited the 

Department, he allowed only one security person to accompany him. 

Truscott acknowledged to us that his protective detail was reduced for 

trips to the Department. However, he said the reason for reducing security was 

that Main Justice is a “secure” building. He also told us that in the first couple 

of days of his tenure, there was a “collective conversation” and his Assistant 

and Domenech agreed that an advance agent was not needed for trips to the 

Department. 

Although Truscott initially acknowledged to us that he requested that 

EPB reduce his security profile for trips both to the Department and to Capitol 

Hill, he later stated that an advance agent was sent to Capitol Hill “probably 

every time” to coordinate the logistics because it is a “more complex site” than 

Main Justice. He also said that he would be driven to Capitol Hill in one 

vehicle by an EPB agent and would be accompanied by a second EPB agent. 

c. Protection within ATF Headquarters Building 

Witnesses told us that Truscott nearly always was accompanied by his 

Assistant or an EPB agent even within the ATF Headquarters building.89 For 

example, Domenech said that Truscott would not leave his suite without 

security. Domenech said that when he asked Truscott why this was necessary, 

Truscott responded that the building was not secure because it contained two 

floors of commercial space. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us that Truscott’s Administrative Assistant 

routinely alerted him when Truscott prepared to leave the suite and that he 

then met Truscott at the door of the suite. However, Truscott’s Assistant 

attributed Truscott’s need for an escort to both administrative and security 

concerns. He said that he took notes on conversations Truscott had with ATF 

employees at Headquarters. Similarly, one senior executive attributed 

Truscott’s need for an escort to his unfamiliarity with ATF staff and his desire 

to have someone cue him on their names. 

 

Truscott denied to us having any security concerns about the ATF 

building and insisted that he felt comfortable walking on his own through the 

building. He stated that it was not uncommon for his Assistant to accompany 

him in the building. However, Truscott said the Assistant did so of his own 

 89 Truscott’s Assistant is a Special Agent who served Truscott in both a protective and 

an administrative capacity. 

74
volition because for security reasons he needed to know where Truscott was at 

all times. 

Witnesses also told us that Truscott regularly used the ATF 

Headquarters gym in the morning and that early in his tenure an agent 

regularly escorted him to the gym and waited there while he exercised. 

Witnesses said this changed when Truscott realized that two EPB agents 

exercised at the same time he did. From then on, the agent escorting Truscott 

to the gym waited only until Truscott entered the gym. After Truscott finished 

his workout, one of the EPB agents who exercised at the same time would 

escort Truscott back to his suite. 

Truscott told us that initially someone suggested that he take two agents 

with him to the gym. He said he could not “get to [his Assistant] fast enough” 

to tell him that because ATF is a secure building and the agents have other 

responsibilities, he did not see a need for an agent to stay with him at the gym. 

He told us that his Assistant asked him whether, as an alternative, he would 

allow an EPB agent to escort him to the gym so EPB would know where he was. 

Truscott said that he agreed to this. 

Truscott’s Assistant said he did not recall suggesting that Truscott take 

two agents with him to the gym. He said that typically Truscott would go to the 

gym immediately after arriving at work in the morning and that at first an EPB 

agent would accompany him to the gym and wait. He said that this was 

because EPB did not know what Truscott’s expectations were. He said that 

after the first couple of weeks, Truscott told him that he did not need any 

agents escorting him to the gym or waiting for him. He said that he 

accordingly directed the EPB agents not to do this. He said that he might have 

made the suggestion to Truscott that an agent escort him and then leave. He 

said that to his recollection this was done only on one occasion. 

4. Protection while traveling outside of the Washington, 

D.C. area 

Truscott’s Assistant and the current EPB Chief told us that a few months 

after Truscott became the Director, they prepared a document entitled 

“Planning for a Director’s Visit” (Protocol Document) in order to educate the 

field divisions about Truscott’s expectations. The Protocol Document 

established standard protocols for Truscott’s visits to field divisions outside the 

Washington, D.C. area. 

Truscott’s Assistant and the current EPB Chief told us that they based 

the requirements in the Protocol Document on their experience with Truscott 

and knowledge of his expectations, in addition to information regarding other 

agencies’ protective details. The document was finalized on June 18, 2004, 

and provided to the Office of Field Operations for distribution to its field 

75
division Special Agents in Charge (SAC). The witnesses said they did not recall 

ever showing this document to Truscott, and Truscott told us that he had never 

seen the document. 

a. Advance agent 

According to Truscott’s Assistant, the EPB Chief, and the September 

2005 advance agent protocols document provided to us, each time Truscott 

traveled outside the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, an EPB agent 

prepared an advance report and traveled to the location a day or two ahead of 

him. The advance report included departure and arrival information, contact 

names and telephone numbers, names of nearby hospitals, and a detailed 

itinerary. While at the location, the advance agent’s activities included making 

practice runs of the routes that Truscott would travel, arranging for a staging 

area at the airport for Truscott’s motorcade, pre-checking Truscott and the EPB 

detail into the hotel, meeting with hotel staff to discuss security issues, and 

confirming the details of Truscott’s visit with the field division staff.

 

b. Airport procedures 

The advance reports reflect (and Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief 

confirmed) that when Truscott traveled by air, an EPB agent would drive him to 

the airport. A second EPB agent was responsible for obtaining Truscott’s 

boarding pass and coordinating with Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) personnel to allow Truscott to bypass security as a “VIP.” The second 

EPB agent and an airport police officer would meet Truscott curbside at the 

airport. The EPB agent and police officer, sometimes accompanied by an 

airport official, would escort Truscott to the gate or to a holding area if one was 

available. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us that Truscott did not like to wait. He said 

that many of the airport arrangements, such as allowing Truscott to bypass the 

security line and wait in a holding area, were more for his convenience than to 

provide protection. He said that such arrangements did have protective 

elements, however. For example, he said that these procedures allowed the 

protective detail to remain low-key and helped them to maintain control over 

Truscott. He also said that part of the reason for bypassing security was so 

that he and the EPB agents did not have to make it known that they were 

armed. He also said that by keeping Truscott in an enclosed space, the EPB 

agents could prevent someone from harassing or attacking Truscott or 

bothering him by “asking him for a dollar.” 

One senior executive also commented on Truscott’s dislike of waiting and 

told us that Truscott made it clear that he was not going to wait at a ticket 

counter or on a security line, that he wanted to wait in a holding area, and that 

he wanted a car waiting for him on the other end of the flight. 

76
According to Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief, upon the flight’s 

arrival various local ATF and other officials would meet Truscott at the arrival 

gate. The Assistant told us that sometimes the greeting party at the arrival 

airport would total five to seven people. He said the group varied and might 

include a uniformed police officer, a TSA officer, an airport official, the local 

ATF SAC, a local field division special agent functioning as the point of contact, 

and the EPB advance agent. The greeting group often would escort Truscott to 

a secure holding area at the airport while staff retrieved his luggage. Truscott 

would then be escorted to the curb where field division vehicles awaited him 

and his party. 

The Assistant told us that the procedures for escorting Truscott through 

the airport were developed to meet Truscott’s expectations. He said that 

Truscott always wanted to know ahead of time who was going to greet him at 

the airport. 

An Assistant Director who frequently traveled with Truscott told us that 

there often were so many people accompanying Truscott through the airport 

that it drew attention to him. This official compared walking through the 

airport with Truscott to “the parting of the seas” and said that on occasion 

people stopped him in the airport to ask who Truscott was. 

In contrast, Truscott told us that he liked to maintain a low profile at the 

airport. He said that he has told his Assistant more than once that he did not 

like to draw attention to himself and his party. He also said he did not think it 

is appropriate to have several people at the airport to greet him. 

However, Truscott also told us that having people meet and walk with 

him through the airport is consistent with maintaining a “low profile.” He said 

his group was “a couple of people walking through the airport just like a couple 

of businessmen.” Truscott added that sometimes a uniformed officer escorted 

his group beyond the security checkpoint but this was because some of the 

ATF staff members were armed. Truscott said he always tried to keep some 

distance from the officer in order to maintain a low profile. 

Truscott’s Assistant said that around the spring of 2005, Truscott told 

him that it was not necessary to have “all those people” greeting him at the 

gate. He said that Truscott told him that he only needed one field division 

agent and the EPB advance agent to greet him. He also said that Truscott 

reminded him that he had never asked for the SAC or the ASAC to greet him 

and that he did not want to take them away from their busy schedules. The 

Assistant told us that from his perspective, the numbers and types of persons 

who had been greeting Truscott were what Truscott expected. The Assistant 

said that while Truscott never specified who should be at the gate to greet him, 

he also never raised any objections during the first year of his tenure to the 

number and types of people greeting him at the gate and therefore this became 

77
the standard protocol. The Assistant added that he did not know why Truscott 

changed his expectations about being met at airports, and speculated that 

Truscott might have received some negative feedback from either the field 

division agents or from the Assistant Directors. He said that he did as 

instructed and reduced the number of people greeting Truscott. 

The Assistant added that after the OIG investigation began, Truscott 

scaled back even more. He said that in March 2006, the last time that he 

traveled with Truscott, Truscott told him that he did not want anyone greeting 

him. The Assistant said that he and Truscott traveled alone and that they were 

met by a single field division agent driver and transported in a single vehicle. 

The EPB Chief also said that at some point Truscott said that he did not 

want a large group of people greeting him at the gate. However, he said that 

Truscott did not suggest reducing the number of people greeting him at the 

airport. Instead, Truscott suggested that the greeting party meet him at the 

side of the gate or in some other location so that they did not look like an 

entourage waiting for him. 

 

c. Number and type of field division vehicles required 

According to Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief, ATF field divisions 

provided support for Truscott’s trips within their regions whether or not 

Truscott visited the field office while in the region. The Assistant said that the 

field divisions were generally asked to provide three vehicles for Truscott’s 

visits: a “lead” vehicle for the EPB advance agent, a “limo” for Truscott and the 

Assistant, and a “follow” vehicle.90 The divisions were also expected to supply 

three special agent drivers, including a special agent who was qualified as a 

medic. 

The Assistant said that the lead vehicle generally traveled ahead of the 

other two vehicles to make any necessary arrangements, such as checking 

Truscott into the hotel. The other two vehicles traveled together. He said that 

the purpose of the follow vehicle was primarily to provide transportation in case 

the limo broke down, rather than to provide security. 

The EPB Chief said he recalled at least one occasion in which four field 

division vehicles were used to transport Truscott. He said that on that 

occasion, the field division felt that because of heavy traffic it would be easier 

to secure lanes with a three-vehicle motorcade. 

 

 90 The terms “lead,” “limo,” and “follow” vehicles were terms used in the advance 

reports. 

78
 Truscott told us that he was aware of the vehicle arrangements for his 

visits, but said that he was not involved in developing these procedures. He 

told us that if he ever saw too many resources being used, he would tell his 

Assistant that in his opinion they were overdoing the security. He said he did 

not think that ATF should “be drawing on more resources than [it] actually 

needs.” 

 Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief told us that good security 

requires maintaining a low profile. When asked how a motorcade achieved 

that, the EPB Chief told us that the motorcade was not obvious because the 

follow car did not block or shield the limo. He said that EPB advised the field 

divisions that the follow car should stay behind the limo and try not to allow 

any vehicles in between, but should not take any aggressive maneuvers to 

prevent intervening vehicles. In addition, the motorcade did not use lights or 

sirens. 

The EPB Chief said that EPB typically requested the field division to 

provide a Suburban or a large SUV to be used as the limo. Truscott’s Assistant 

said that EPB made that request because of Truscott’s expressed preference for 

riding in a Suburban. 

The Assistant said that most of the field divisions had a Suburban or 

SUV available. He also said if one was not available for Truscott’s visit, he 

alerted Truscott ahead of time. He said that in these cases Truscott “wouldn’t 

throw a tantrum,” but would make a comment such as “I can’t believe that out 

of a field division, they don’t have one Suburban.” 

Truscott told us that he preferred Suburbans because they “blend in 

better” and because they are roomier. He stated that his Assistant was aware 

of his preference, but denied telling the Assistant or any SAC that he required a 

Suburban. He told us: “I’ve gotten to cities and there’s a sedan sitting there 

and I get in and I don’t say a word to anybody.” Truscott, however, was unable 

to recall any specific cities where this had occurred. 

Truscott also told us that using a Suburban made him less conspicuous 

because there are more SUVs on the road than sedans. Truscott’s Assistant 

told us that he has heard Truscott’s rationale, but that it does not make sense 

to him because he believes SUVs stand out more on the road. The EPB Chief 

also said that using a Suburban did not lower the security profile. He said EPB 

used Suburbans because that was Truscott’s preference. 

Witnesses told us that not all of ATF’s field divisions own Suburbans and 

that in order to accommodate Truscott’s preferences some divisions had rented 

Suburbans or had borrowed them from another federal agency when Truscott 

traveled to their area. The EPB Chief told us that EPB never asked the field 

divisions to do this and in fact told the divisions that if they did not have a 

79
Suburban or SUV they should instead provide a large sedan. However, 

Truscott’s Assistant acknowledged that since EPB told the field divisions that 

Truscott preferred a Suburban, it was reasonable to expect that the field 

divisions would try to provide that type of vehicle. 

 We were told about two examples where vehicles were rented to 

accommodate Truscott’s visits. One SAC told us he rented seven vehicles for 

an April 2005 visit that Truscott made to three field offices within his division. 

Rental receipts reflect that the total cost of the rentals was approximately 

$1,200. The SAC told us that it was widely known that Truscott preferred 

riding in an SUV. He said that the few SUVs in his field division were utility 

vehicles that had no room for luggage. In addition, he said that the field 

division had no decent vehicles that he could afford to take off the streets for a 

week and that he believed renting was the best alternative. He added that he 

did not tell either Truscott or EPB that he rented the vehicles. 

Another SAC told us that he rented a Suburban for a June 2005 trip that 

Truscott made to multiple field offices within his division. He said that he was 

aware of Truscott’s preference to ride in a Suburban or SUV. He told us he 

rented the vehicle because, although his division owned two Suburbans, each 

had only two rows of seats and therefore was not large enough to accommodate 

all the people traveling with Truscott. Rental receipts show that the total cost 

of renting the Suburban for three days was $505. The SAC said he did not 

recall telling Truscott or any EPB agents that the vehicle was rented. 

Truscott told us that he never directed anyone to rent or borrow a 

vehicle. However, he said that if field offices were borrowing or renting 

Suburbans for his visits, that was because of “what people think the 

expectations are.” He told us that he hoped the field divisions would not have 

to rent Suburbans but said that it was the SAC’s prerogative to do so. He also 

said that he would rather ride in a 15-year old ATF sedan than in a rented 

vehicle. 

Truscott acknowledged that on one or two occasions he was aware that 

the Suburban he was riding in had been rented for his visit. He said that on 

those occasions, he learned the vehicle was rented because he asked the SAC 

about the car. He said that “presumably” it was the SAC’s decision to rent the 

vehicle. He said he did not comment on the decision to the SAC because he 

tried not to second-guess the SAC’s decisions. 

Truscott’s Assistant also told us that on one occasion Truscott 

commented on “how nice” the vehicle transporting him was and the SAC told 

him that it was rented. The Assistant said that despite knowing that field 

divisions sometimes rented Suburbans for his use, Truscott never directed him 

to instruct the field divisions not to do it. According to the Assistant, 

80
Domenech put a halt to this practice sometime during 2005 after hearing 

about it from the Assistant Director for the Office of Field Operations. 

Truscott’s Assistant also told us that on one occasion the field division 

borrowed an SUV from the U.S. Secret Service. Truscott told us that he 

became aware that he was riding in a Secret Service vehicle when he noticed 

that it was much more elaborate than the typical ATF Suburban. Truscott said 

he had misgivings about this practice, but did not mention it to the SAC. The 

Assistant said that afterwards Truscott commented to him that he was not 

comfortable with ATF borrowing another agency’s equipment. The Assistant 

said that based on Truscott’s comments, he immediately put the word out to 

the field divisions that they should not borrow vehicles from other agencies. 

d. Medic requirement 

 According to Truscott’s Assistant, an EPB official, and the EPB Protocol 

Document, field divisions were also asked to provide a medic for Truscott’s 

visits. The EPB official told us that the medic was necessary in case of 

accident or injury to Truscott. He said that the field divisions were told that it 

was acceptable to have the medic function as one of the drivers. The Assistant 

said EPB told the field divisions that if no medic was available, division 

personnel should be aware of the location of the nearest hospital. 

We found that at least one field division made an extra effort to provide a 

medic because the EPB Protocol Document listed it as a requirement. In this 

instance, the SAC told us that because he did not have a medic assigned to his 

field division, he brought in a medic from a field office located 90 minutes away 

for one of Truscott’s visits. 

The medic requirement was not included in the April 1, 2004, proposal 

regarding the establishment of the EPB. That proposal stated that field 

divisions should identify the nearest medical facilities and level of care 

available. The EPB Chief told us that the medic requirement was not part of 

the original plan because the majority of the other protective details he 

researched did not have such a requirement. He said that only the “high-level” 

security details such as the U.S. Secret Service had such a requirement. 

Truscott told us that he was not aware that EPB protocols included the 

medic requirement and he did not know that medics accompanied him during 

his visits. He attributed the requirement to EPB and told us that he did not 

think it was necessary because many ATF special agents have had medical 

training. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us that having a medic present was his and the 

EPB Chief’s idea. However, he said that he believes Truscott was aware that 

medics were included in the EPB requirements. The EPB Chief said he could 

81
not recall if Truscott suggested the medic requirement or whether he and 

Truscott’s Assistant proposed the idea. 

e. Other equipment 

Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief also told us that during the first 

year of Truscott’s tenure the Assistant carried a suitcase containing emergency 

equipment when traveling with Truscott. The suitcase contained a first aid kit, 

satellite telephone, two biohazard suits, two gas masks, a defibrillator, and a 

pocket mask for use in CPR. Both witnesses told us that they proposed the 

idea of carrying the medical items. The Assistant also said that when he began 

assembling the bag, Truscott asked him what it contained and suggested 

adding a biohazard suit. The Assistant said that Truscott provided the 

biohazard suit he owned from his tenure with the Secret Service. The Assistant 

told us that he stopped carrying the emergency suitcase after about a year.

 Truscott told us that he had a discussion with his Assistant regarding 

carrying gas masks and biohazard suits. He said he knew that the Assistant 

assembled a bag that “more than likely” contained biohazard suits. He said he 

thought this was appropriate because he knew they would have to be selfsufficient in an emergency. He told us that he did not know what else was in 

the bag. 

5. Examples of questionable use of protective detail 

 

Several witnesses told us that EPB and field division special agents were 

sometimes required to accompany Truscott on personal business or were used 

unnecessarily. We describe several of those incidents in this section. 

In June 2005, Truscott traveled to the region of the Boston Field Division 

to visit various ATF field offices and U.S. Attorney’s Offices. Truscott’s Chief of 

Staff, Truscott’s Assistant, and an EPB advance agent traveled with Truscott 

from Washington, D.C. Several agents from the Boston Field Division also 

accompanied Truscott while he was in the region. These agents included the 

SAC; an ASAC; and three special agent drivers, one of whom who was a medic. 

The group traveled in two sedans and one rented Suburban. 

 Witnesses told us that the group checked into their hotel in Portland, 

Maine, at around 6:00 p.m. The group dispersed at the hotel because Truscott 

declined to go out to dinner. Although witness accounts varied on the timing, 

all agreed that at some point after the group had dispersed, Truscott decided 

that he wanted to go out for cheesecake.91 

 91 Truscott’s Assistant told us that he was the one who raised the suggestion to 

Truscott of going out for dessert and that Truscott agreed. 

82
 The SAC told us that he and the ASAC were sitting in the hotel lobby 

discussing business when Truscott’s Assistant approached approximately 

30 minutes later and told them that Truscott wanted to go out for cheesecake. 

The SAC said he asked either the Assistant or the EPB advance agent why 

everyone had to go and was told that everyone was needed. The SAC told us 

that he had to reassemble all of the agents, some of whom had already left the 

premises to work out or go for a run. He said he also had to find a local 

restaurant that served cheesecake. 

 The SAC said he and the ASAC contacted all of the local special agents, 

who returned to the hotel and changed back into business attire. Once he 

identified a restaurant, the advance team called the restaurant to see if it could 

accommodate the group and then drove to the restaurant ahead of the group. 

The SAC told us that he considered this to be a little “over the top.” He said 

that if it were up to him, he would have just taken Truscott to the restaurant 

himself in one vehicle. 

Truscott’s Assistant said he recalled telling the SAC to reassemble the 

agents. He said he did not recall being told that the agents had dispersed. He 

said that only 10 to 15 minutes had passed and that if the agents had 

dispersed, they could not have gone very far. He said that Truscott was not 

aware that the agents had dispersed and that they were getting back into 

business attire and that Truscott “probably didn’t give it any thought.” The 

Assistant said that he did not tell the SAC that the agents had to be dressed in 

business attire. He said that Truscott would not have objected to the agents 

remaining in their casual clothes and that outside of normal business hours, 

the agents accompanying Truscott often dressed casually. 

Two other instances were noted to us, both of which occurred during 

Truscott’s attendance at the November 2004 International Chiefs of Police 

(IACP) Conference in Los Angeles. Truscott told us that while there he attended 

an official meeting on Saturday morning and met with a friend that afternoon 

at a pier near Santa Monica. He told us that the only way he could get to the 

pier was to travel with the EPB and field division agents who were 

accompanying him. He said that there was no discussion about this, but he 

knew that traveling with the protective detail would be EPB’s recommendation. 

In contrast, Truscott’s Assistant told us that if Truscott had said that he 

wanted to travel on his own, EPB would have allowed him to do so. The 

Assistant said that he normally assumed that Truscott wanted EPB to 

accompany him unless he was told differently. 

Witnesses told us that Truscott was escorted to the pier by his Assistant, 

the EPB advance agent, and two field division special agent drivers in two field 

division vehicles. According to the witnesses, the Assistant and the three other 

83
agents stood on the pier 40 to 50 feet away while Truscott visited with his 

friend on the pier for 45 minutes. 

 During another afternoon on the same trip, Truscott visited a former 

neighbor at his home in Los Angeles. One witness told us that Truscott and 

the protective detail stopped at the former neighbor’s home on the way to an 

ATF office. Truscott acknowledged that he was accompanied by his protective 

detail for this visit. 

 Witness accounts varied as to the number of cars in the motorcade and 

the number of field division special agents present during the trip to the former 

neighbor’s house. One witness said there were three special agents in two 

vehicles; another witness said there were six special agents in three vehicles. 

According to the witnesses, Truscott and his Assistant visited with the 

former neighbor for 45 minutes to an hour while an ATF photographer and the 

field division special agents waited outside in the vehicles. 

On another occasion while in San Francisco on official business, 

Truscott had dinner with a friend and the friend’s spouse. According to 

Truscott’s Assistant, he, an EPB agent, and a field division special agent 

accompanied Truscott to the restaurant and sat at a table nearby. We asked 

the Assistant why it was necessary for the field division agent to be present. 

He told us that the field agent had to drive because the EPB agents did not 

know their way around San Francisco.

One witness told us that he felt this arrangement did not serve any true 

security purpose since it drew attention to Truscott. This witness said he 

believed the detail was used “for show” to impress Truscott’s friend. 

6. Travel procedures of previous ATF Directors 

Most of the witnesses we interviewed had also worked under two 

previous ATF Directors, John Magaw and Bradley Buckles, and therefore were 

able to compare the procedures for the prior Directors’ travels outside the 

Washington, D.C. area with the EPB procedures that were established under 

Truscott’s tenure.92 

According to witnesses, a Special Assistant position was established 

under Magaw’s tenure for the primary purpose of managing his travel logistics. 

We interviewed the special agent who had served in that position and he told 

us that when Magaw traveled to a field division, he left it up to the field division 

 92 John Magaw, a former U.S. Secret Service Director, was the ATF Director from 1994 

until 1999. Bradley Buckles, who came up through the ATF ranks, was the ATF Director from 

1999 until 2004. 

84
to determine the best way to handle the visit. He said that no advance teams 

were used, nor was a medic required to be present during the visit. He said 

that generally he would travel with the Director and they would be met by the 

SAC of the field division and a special agent driver. Several other witnesses 

who had either traveled with Magaw or who had been SACs at field divisions 

that Magaw visited gave similar descriptions of Magaw’s travel. 

 

According to all witness accounts, Buckles was very informal, traveled 

infrequently, and preferred to travel alone. Buckles also had an assistant but 

used him more for logistics than security. One former SAC told us that he 

would meet Buckles at the airport, but that Buckles did not require much else. 

He said that Buckles had been in ATF so long, he knew the people and the 

culture and therefore was comfortable with keeping things low key. 

7. Senior managers’ observations on Truscott’s travel 

requirements 

 During our review, most of the eight Assistant Directors we interviewed 

criticized the amount of resources used to facilitate Truscott’s travel and 

questioned the need for the level of protection provided to Truscott considering 

the low threat level.93 

 

Five of the Assistant Directors said they considered the level of protection 

provided to Truscott to be excessive. For example, one referred to the level of 

protection provided on Truscott’s trips as “mini-Presidential executive 

protection details.” Another said that Truscott traveled in a way that seemed 

designed to draw attention to himself. A third commented that Truscott’s 

protective detail gave the impression of lavish spending at a time when 

everyone else in ATF was suffering financially. 

Three of the Assistant Directors also described complaints they had 

received from the SACs about the protective detail. One told us that Truscott’s 

visits were a huge drain on the field divisions’ resources. Another stated that 

the field divisions complained that they often had to set up “mini-command 

centers” to support Truscott’s visits. This official told us that his impression 

 93 We did not interview the current Assistant Director for the Office of Management 

because she assumed that position after Truscott learned of the allegations against him. 

Instead, we interviewed the person who served as Acting Assistant Director from September 

2005 until January 2006 (the previous Assistant Director no longer is employed by ATF). Of 

the eight Assistant Directors we interviewed, two had never traveled with Truscott and 

therefore were unaware of his travel arrangements. Accordingly, they told us that they had no 

basis for having an opinion. We did not ask one of the Assistant Directors we interviewed 

about Truscott’s travel arrangements. The remaining five had extensive knowledge of 

Truscott’s travel arrangements through both their personal travels with Truscott and their 

routine contacts with field division employees. 

85
from conversations with the SACs is that they had never before seen anything 

like the amount of support, logistics, and personnel required to transport 

Truscott and entertain his needs day and night. A third Assistant Director told 

us that he heard from several field division personnel that they considered 

EPB’s protocols for the visits to be “overkill.” 

 We interviewed four SACs about Truscott’s security requirements.94 One 

SAC told us that the security requirements struck him as relating more to 

Truscott’s preferences than to security needs and said he thought that Truscott 

was trying to present himself as equal in stature to the FBI Director. This SAC 

also commented that the “choreographed” nature of Truscott’s travel, with all of 

Truscott’s movements timed to the minute, was similar to a U.S. Secret Service 

protective detail. 

 Another SAC told us that field office resources were used more for 

coordination than security purposes during Truscott’s visits, but said that he 

thought providing the resources was appropriate. The third SAC said that 

while he thought that the arrangements reflected EPB’s attempts to present a 

professional image, he would not necessarily do things the same way if he were 

the Director. The fourth SAC commented that although he believed Truscott 

was entitled to some level of security, his understanding was that the threat 

level relating to Truscott was not very high. 

Three of the Office of the Director employees we interviewed also 

commented on Truscott’s security requirements when traveling. One who had 

traveled with Truscott told us that he had no frame of reference to comment on 

the level of protection, except that Truscott’s detail was not on the scale of the 

Attorney General’s detail. Another stated that Truscott viewed himself as 

needing a protective detail equivalent to the President’s and said it was due to 

“absolute arrogance” on Truscott’s part that procedures had to be developed to 

address his dislike of waiting. The third employee, who had also traveled with 

Truscott, characterized the amount of resources used to facilitate Truscott’s 

travel as “excessive” and remarked that the level of engagement and planning 

reflected Truscott’s background with the U.S. Secret Service. 

8. Responsibility for EPB procedures 

When we asked Truscott about his protective requirements, he attempted 

to minimize the amount of input he had into EPB procedures. He told us that 

he generally allowed his Assistant and the EPB Chief to run the protective 

 94 The four SACs we interviewed were witnesses to specific events cited in the 

complaint letter. While interviewing them regarding these events, we also questioned them on 

aspects of other allegations that we believed they might have familiarity with, including 

Truscott’s security requirements during visits to their field divisions. 

86
detail as they wished, and that he tried to be “deferential” and not interfere 

with their arrangements. He said that he tried to show the same respect for his 

Assistant that the President and others whom Truscott once protected showed 

him. However, he acknowledged that because he has a lot of experience in this 

area, he privately gave his Assistant “all sorts of professional guidance” and 

suggestions, which the Assistant generally accepted. 

Both Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief told us that before creating 

the EPB, they had no experience in protection matters. They both said 

Truscott has extremely high expectations and they learned a lot about 

protection from him. The Assistant stated that although Truscott generally did 

not give direct orders, he offered suggestions, exhibited negative body language, 

and berated the Assistant for unsatisfactory arrangements. The Assistant said 

he accordingly learned to identify and meet Truscott’s needs. He remarked 

that he “didn’t have a problem figuring out [Truscott’s] expectations when [he] 

was getting called on the carpet and [Truscott] was getting on [his] case 

because maybe a visit didn’t go the way he wanted it to go.” The Assistant said 

that he and the EPB Chief tailored the EPB requirements to meet Truscott’s 

expectations and constantly fine tuned them as additional expectations became 

known. 

Other senior level officials confirmed Truscott’s Assistant’s and the EPB 

Chief’s account of Truscott’s influence on the EPB procedures. One witness 

told us that when Truscott first arrived at ATF, because of EPB’s inexperience 

he did not receive the level of protection that he expected and wanted. This 

official said that Truscott worked with EPB to improve its level of support until 

he was satisfied. The witness also said that Truscott told the executive staff 

that every minute of his time must be accounted for by the protective detail. 

The witness said this expectation resulted in EPB having an advance team 

arrange every detail of each trip. Two other senior level officials told us that 

given Truscott’s personality and his prior protective experience, they believe it 

unlikely that he would defer to his Assistant regarding any security decisions. 

 Truscott, his Assistant, and the EPB Chief all told us that they believed 

that the level of protection provided to Truscott was appropriate and considered 

it to be a “measured” approach. Truscott described his level of protection as 

slightly more than the U.S. Marshal and much less than the FBI Director and 

the DEA Administrator. Regarding whether the level of protection provided was 

appropriate considering the lack of threats against him, Truscott responded 

that in his experience, “those that don’t threaten are often the ones that 

attack.” When asked why he would need to have protection during the work 

day but not after work hours, he said that people knew ahead of time that the 

Director of ATF was going to give a speech at a certain place and that his hope 

was that they did not know where he lived or what he was doing on the 

weekend. 

87
C. Findings 

Before Truscott became Director of ATF, the executive staff approved the 

creation of EPB despite the assessed low threat level for the position of Director 

of ATF. The threat level was low during the first two years of Truscott’s tenure, 

although it was raised to medium in early 2006. 

ATF was authorized to form the EPB pursuant to DOJ Order 2630.5. 

Consistent with that Order, ATF officials determined prior to Truscott’s arrival 

that the new director should receive more protection than had been provided to 

prior directors, in part due to the fact that Truscott was to be the first director 

appointed by the Attorney General and the first director to serve at ATF since it 

had become a component of the DOJ. Truscott was given authorization for 

portal-to-portal use of a government vehicle pursuant to a December 2004 

amendment to 31 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(6), an amendment made retroactive to 

January 1, 2004. Thus, contrary to the anonymous complaint, we found that 

Truscott did not “create” the EPB. Rather, we determined that the EPB was 

formed by ATF in contemplation of Truscott’s arrival. 

Under Truscott’s tenure and with Truscott’s approval, the EPB grew from 

a staff of three special agents and a branch chief to four special agents and a 

branch chief. We found that the number of vehicles assigned to the EPB grew 

from one sedan and one Suburban to one sedan and two Suburbans during 

Truscott’s tenure. 

We found that in and around Washington, D.C., EPB’s responsibilities 

generally included driving Truscott from his home to the office and back each 

work day, escorting Truscott both within ATF Headquarters and to external 

meetings and events, and traveling in advance to external venues to ensure 

that Truscott’s security and administrative needs were met. To perform these 

functions, EPB used a driver and an advance agent. In addition, Truscott’s 

Assistant generally accompanied Truscott in both a protective and 

administrative capacity. 

When Truscott traveled outside the Washington, D.C., area EPB’s 

responsibilities included coordinating with the field divisions to ensure that the 

EPB protocols were followed, traveling to the location in advance to make the 

arrangements for the trip, and facilitating Truscott’s movements through both 

the departure and arrival airports. In addition, field divisions in areas to which 

Truscott was traveling were expected to support EPB’s mission by providing 

special agents and vehicles. Specifically, field divisions were requested at a 

minimum to provide three vehicles, including a Suburban or SUV; three special 

agent drivers, including a special agent qualified as a medic; and a special 

agent designated as the point of contact to coordinate the visit with the EPB 

advance agent. We found that the field divisions generally provided the 

88
requested personnel and vehicles, and on at least two occasions rented SUVs 

based on Truscott’s stated preference for them.

We found that Truscott was aware and approved of the security and 

logistical measures taken on his behalf both by the EPB and by field division 

staff. We further found that Truscott actively participated in shaping EPB 

protocols by conveying his expectations to his Assistant through suggestions 

and expressions of disapproval when his expectations were not met. During 

his interview, Truscott demonstrated a high degree of familiarity with many of 

the details of his security procedures, and acknowledged that he had some 

influence on EPB’s procedures. 

It was reasonable for Truscott to have an interest and involvement in the 

EPB based on his years of experience with the U.S. Secret Service. However, 

for these very reasons, we rejected Truscott’s efforts to attribute to others many 

of the EPB actions we questioned. For instance, we declined to accept 

Truscott’s deflection of responsibility for the field divisions’ rental of SUVs for 

his field visits, which Truscott dismissed as resulting from “what people think 

the expectations are.” 

We questioned whether Truscott allowed or encouraged his security 

arrangements to draw upon more ATF resources than were necessary to meet 

the security objectives authorized under DOJ Order 2630.5.95 As described 

throughout this report, Truscott was repeatedly made aware of ATF’s worsening 

fiscal condition. Under the circumstances, we concluded that at a minimum 

Truscott should have looked for ways to limit his use of the EPB and field 

personnel resources to necessary security, as contemplated by DOJ Order 

2630.5. 

We were especially concerned by witness statements questioning the 

extent of ATF field division personnel and other resources used to facilitate 

Truscott’s travel. We heard repeated complaints from ATF personnel related to 

the amount of effort and resources that the field divisions were expected to 

provide when Truscott visited their jurisdictions. Several witnesses described 

these measures as excessive and only marginally related to security. We 

credited in particular the frustration expressed by numerous witnesses about 

field divisions being required to divert four or more agents and three vehicles 

 95 We reviewed budget documents provided to us by ATF and determined that it cost 

$476,915 to fund the EPB for the last six months of FY 2004; $821,231 to fund it in FY 2005; 

and an estimated $937,513 to fund it in FY 2006. We were unable to determine what 

additional costs were expended by the Office of Field Operations and other directorates in 

support of EPB’s mission to provide security for Truscott. However, as described above, we 

found that substantial resources in the field were used to assist the EPB with security and 

other functions for Truscott when he traveled. 

89
from their normal operations to facilitate Truscott’s visits or having to rent 

Suburbans to accommodate Truscott’s personal preferences. 

We were also troubled by Truscott’s use of the EPB and special agents in 

the field to escort him during non-official diversions, such as to visit an old 

neighbor and to meet a friend for dinner while on travel in California. Truscott 

contended that although he did not discuss with EPB whether the detail 

should accompany him on a side visit to a friend, he believed EPB would 

recommend traveling with him. However, Truscott’s Assistant told us that EPB 

would have permitted Truscott to scale down the protective detail had he 

requested that. We also noted that Truscott had asked for his detail to be 

reduced, and EPB had complied, for trips to the ATF gym. 

Moreover, we found that Truscott consciously scaled back his security 

detail at times. Witnesses told us that the use of advance agents and the 

number of agents escorting Truscott generally were minimized at Truscott’s 

direction when he visited either the DOJ or Capitol Hill. Several witnesses told 

us that they believe Truscott was sensitive to DOJ officials’ perception of the 

size of his security detail. Truscott’s explanation that he scaled down his 

security detail because Main Justice is a “secure facility” is undermined by the 

fact that he also scaled down his security detail when he visited Capitol Hill. 

Moreover, Truscott began to reduce his security detail at all locations after he 

became aware of the allegations raised in the anonymous complaint. 

According to one witness, what had typically been a 3-vehicle motorcade with 

as many as four special agents was reduced to a single vehicle and one special 

agent driver by March 2006, even after Truscott’s threat assessment had been 

raised from low to medium. We concluded that Truscott’s selective ratcheting 

up and down of his security detail was driven more by considerations of 

appearance than security needs. 

As noted throughout this report, we found especially troubling Truscott’s 

propensity for assigning responsibility to his Assistant and others, including 

field personnel, when we questioned various aspects of his protective detail. 

We determined that the expansion of Truscott’s security profile over the course 

of his tenure, including the amount of resources expended and the detailed 

procedures to be followed, resulted primarily from Truscott’s input, rather than 

from his deferral to the judgment of others. The many witnesses we 

interviewed were remarkably consistent in their characterization of Truscott’s 

readiness to make known his preferences and expectations for his security, 

either through suggestions or expressions of disapproval. We also noted, for 

example, when he disapproved of certain arrangements, such as borrowing 

Secret Service vehicles, he expressed that disapproval clearly and the practice 

stopped. We found that the EPB and field division special agents who handled 

Truscott’s security and logistical needs reasonably sought to meet Truscott’s 

expectations and deferred to his guidance, particularly given his extensive 

experience with the U.S. Secret Service. We thus rejected Truscott’s attempts 

90
to shift the blame to his subordinates for judgments for which he clearly was 

responsible. 

VI. Travel 

 This section analyzes allegations in the anonymous complaint that 

Truscott misused public funds in connection with three trips – one to London 

in September 2005; one to New York City in October 2005; and another trip to 

Boston and Ottawa in January 2005. 

A. September 2005 Trip to London, England 

1. Allegation 

The anonymous complaint alleged that a trip made by Truscott in 

September 2005 to London was a waste of taxpayer dollars. The complaint 

alleged that seven ATF people accompanied Truscott to attend four and a half 

hours of meetings over the course of three days. 

2. Evidence 

 According to travel documents and witness accounts, Truscott traveled to 

London on Monday, September 12, 2005, and returned on Thursday, 

September 15, 2005. He was accompanied by his Assistant, his Chief of Staff, 

the Assistant Director for the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information 

(OSII), and the Chief of the Executive Protection Branch (EPB). 

Four other ATF employees traveled to London on Wednesday, 

September 7, 2005, five days in advance of Truscott. These four employees 

were the Deputy Director of the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center 

(TEDAC), the Chief of OSII’s Violent Crimes Intelligence Division (VCID), and 

two EPB special agents.96 The two EPB special agents returned with the rest of 

the group on the morning of Thursday, September 15. The TEDAC Deputy 

Director and OSII VCID Chief returned a day later on Friday, September 16. 

The total cost of the trip for the nine travelers was $37,065. 

 96 TEDAC is an FBI-led initiative that is comprised of personnel from multiple agencies. 

Although the TEDAC Director is an FBI agent, an ATF agent serves as the TEDAC Deputy 

Director. The TEDAC Deputy Director reports to the OSII Assistant Director. 

91
a. Genesis of the trip 

Truscott and other witnesses told us that the purpose of the trip was to 

meet with the U.S. Ambassador and with officials from the London 

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in order to discuss a proposal to detail an 

ATF Certified Explosives Specialist (CES) to the MPS’s Anti-Terrorist Branch. 

The OSII Assistant Director said the U.S. Ambassador was involved because 

the proposed position could not be established without the approval of the U.S. 

State Department. 

The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that he had made a proposal for 

such a detail in 2000, but that ATF management at that time was not 

responsive.97 He said that he reintroduced the proposal within ATF in March 

2005 after receiving a favorable reaction to the idea from the Chief of the 

United Kingdom’s (U.K.) Police National Bomb Data Centre. 

On May 23, 2005, the TEDAC Deputy Director wrote a memorandum to 

the OSII Assistant Director proposing the detail. The OSII Assistant Director 

approved the proposal. The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that he had a 

subsequent discussion about the proposal with the MPS Anti-Terrorist Branch 

Detective Chief Superintendent. According to the TEDAC Deputy Director, the 

MPS official suggested that Truscott and the MPS Commissioner meet to 

discuss the proposal. The TEDAC Deputy Director said that he recommended 

the meeting to the OSII Assistant Director, and the OSII Assistant Director 

agreed. 

 By letter dated June 14, 2005, the MPS Anti-Terrorist Branch 

Commander invited Truscott to meet with the MPS Commissioner on 

September 14, 2005. The letter proposed that the meeting participants discuss 

issues concerning terrorism and issues of mutual interest to both countries. 

The letter described four areas of mutual interest, including establishing a 

partnership between the MPS and TEDAC and an exchange program “where 

staff can learn skills in a safe working environment (training).” Although the 

letter did not specifically mention establishing a CES position within the MPS, 

the OSII Assistant Director told us that he considered it to be an offer to do so. 

b. Reasons for individual travel 

We asked several witnesses why eight ATF employees traveled to London 

with or in advance of Truscott for this meeting. 

 97 In 2000, the TEDAC Deputy Director was serving as the Chief of the National Arson 

Explosives Repository Branch, which is now called the United States Bomb Data Center. 

92
The OSII Assistant Director and others told us that he went on this trip 

because he was the “point person” for the proposal to detail the CES to MPS’s 

Anti-Terrorist Branch. 

Truscott’s Chief of Staff told us that Truscott allowed him to decide 

which of Truscott’s trips to attend. He said that at the time of this trip he had 

only been Chief of Staff for three months and felt he needed to travel with 

Truscott to further develop their relationship. He also said that his role on the 

trip was to assist Truscott. Truscott confirmed that he allowed his Chief of 

Staff to decide whether to accompany him on the trip. 

According to the EPB witnesses, the EPB Chief, Truscott’s Assistant, and 

the two EPB agents provided security for Truscott on the trip. The two EPB 

agents traveled five days in advance of Truscott to make security arrangements 

for the trip; they also served in a protective capacity once Truscott arrived and 

for the duration of the trip. The EPB Chief told us that his role was to 

“augment” security. Truscott’s Assistant told us that he accompanied Truscott 

everywhere and usually served the dual role of providing protection and 

administrative support to Truscott. Both witnesses also told us that they 

traveled with Truscott because they preferred to have two people accompany 

Truscott on international flights for security purposes. 

We asked why a 4-person protective detail was necessary for this trip. 

The EPB Chief said more liaison is needed in a foreign country and there are 

more potential security pitfalls in a location such as London where there have 

been terrorist attacks. He also said a 4-person detail was warranted because 

none of the EPB agents were armed and therefore the detail lacked the 

“ultimate line of defense.” According to the EPB advance report for the trip, the 

MPS had denied EPB’s requests for Truscott to have armed protection due to 

the low threat level for the Director. The MPS and U.S. Embassy security 

arrangements were limited to providing drivers and vehicles to transport 

Truscott and his party during their visit. 

In addition, Truscott’s Assistant and the EPB Chief said they believed it 

was prudent to have two EPB advance agents rather than one because the 

logistics for foreign travel are more complicated than for domestic travel. They 

said that one of the agents had not traveled overseas before and this trip served 

as on-the-job training for him. They also said it was reasonable for the two 

agents to travel to London five days in advance of Truscott. They said that two 

of those days were weekend days and the advance team therefore only had 

three working days in which to make the security arrangements; conduct 

liaison with British law enforcement, State Department, and U.S. Embassy 

officials; arrange for rental cars and drivers; and make advance visits to the 

locations on Truscott’s itinerary. 

93
Truscott told us that he was not involved in the security arrangements 

for the London trip. He said those decisions would have been made by his 

Assistant or Domenech. He told us that he tried not to “second guess” his 

Assistant and the others about security. Truscott also told us that if he had 

designed the trip, he would have tried to reduce the number of vehicles. He 

said he believed the number of cars was excessive but the use of four cars was 

not at his request. He also said that sometimes the local authorities decide 

how security is to be handled. 

The TEDAC Deputy Director and the OSII VCID Chief also traveled to 

London with the two EPB agents five days before Truscott and his party 

arrived. We received inconsistent explanations about why they traveled to 

London five days before the others. 

Truscott told us that the TEDAC Deputy Director’s and the OSII VCID 

Chief’s trip to London had nothing to do with the advance preparations for his 

visit. He said the two men were in London on other business and just 

happened to be there at the same time he was. He acknowledged, however, 

that they were “in and around” events involving Truscott’s group. 

In contrast, the TEDAC Deputy Director told us that he and the OSII 

VCID Chief traveled to London on September 7 in order to help the two EPB 

agents facilitate the security arrangements and logistics for Truscott.98 He said 

that the OSII Assistant Director wanted him to be “on the ground” to help 

maneuver through London because he did not want anything to go wrong with 

Truscott’s trip. The TEDAC Deputy Director said that he had a working 

relationship with the MPS and that during the days prior to Truscott’s arrival, 

he and the OSII VCID Chief accompanied the EPB agents to New Scotland Yard 

where the MPS is based. The TEDAC Deputy Director said he introduced the 

EPB agents to the appropriate people, helped them procure radios and cell 

phones, and helped them map out the locations where Truscott would be 

traveling. 

The TEDAC Deputy Director also said he, the OSII VCID Chief, and the 

two EPB agents spent Monday, September 12, making the transportation 

arrangements for Truscott’s visit. The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that 

four vehicles, including an MPS police vehicle, were used to transport Truscott 

and his group throughout their stay in London. The EPB advance report for 

this trip also reflects the planned use of four vehicles. 

However, Truscott’s Assistant said that the TEDAC Deputy Director and 

the OSII VCID Chief were not in London at EPB’s request. He said that the 

 98 We did not interview the OSII VCID Chief or the two EPB special agents who traveled 

to London on September 7. We interviewed all the other travelers. 

94
TEDAC Deputy Director was not there for security purposes, but was there at 

the OSII Assistant Director’s behest to “grease the skids” for the meetings that 

Truscott and the OSII Assistant Director were attending. He said that while 

there, the TEDAC Deputy Director may have assisted the EPB advance agents 

with the security arrangements by introducing them to his contacts, but that 

this was not something that EPB requested him to do. The Assistant said that 

he did not know what the OSII VCID Chief’s contribution to the trip was. The 

EPB Chief told us that he “assumed” that the TEDAC Deputy Director and the 

OSII VCID Chief were in London on OSII business. 

The OSII Assistant Director told us that the TEDAC Deputy Director and 

the OSII VCID Chief were in London for several reasons: to assist the EPB 

advance team by “opening doors” for them with the MPS; to “handle” some 

business related to the U.S. Bomb Data Center and the TEDAC; to obtain 

details on the type of bomb used in the July 7 and July 21, 2005, London train 

and bus bombings; and to conduct business meetings with their UK 

colleagues.99 

 

 The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that he and the OSII VCID Chief also 

spent some time on Thursday and Friday, September 8 and 9, at the U.K. 

Police National Bomb Data Centre. He stated that the OSII VCID Chief had 

responsibility for the U.S. Bomb Data Center. According to the TEDAC Deputy 

Director, the OSII Assistant Director asked him to introduce the OSII VCID 

Chief to his U.K. counterparts so that he could develop working relationships 

with them, which he did. 

c. Lodging arrangements 

According to ATF travel records, all nine travelers stayed at the London 

Marriott Hotel County Hall, a luxury hotel on the Thames River.100 Each 

traveler was reimbursed from $415 to $435 per night for the hotel costs at this 

hotel.101 That amount significantly exceeded the maximum applicable U.S. 

government hotel reimbursement rate of $263 a night for London. The total 

excess charge to the government for the group’s lodging expenses was $7,974. 

 99 An OSII Deputy Assistant Director told us that she believed that the OSII Assistant 

Director was unaware that the TEDAC Deputy Director and the OSII VCID Chief had spent a 

total of nine days in London until he saw their travel vouchers. She said that the OSII 

Assistant Director mentioned to her that he “was not happy that they traveled early and 

perhaps returned late.” The OSII Assistant Director did not indicate to us that he had any 

concerns regarding the TEDAC Deputy Director’s and the OSII VCID Chief’s travel schedule. 

100 The OSII VCID Chief stayed in a different hotel on his last night in London. 

101 The rates claimed by the travelers differed because of the slight variations in 

exchange rates used by the travelers to calculate their costs. 

95
The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that he was responsible for making 

the hotel arrangements.102 He said that he had previously used the hotel 

because it was an American-owned hotel that accepted the U.S. government 

rate. He said that he selected the hotel for security reasons and for its 

convenient location. He also stated that he did not contact any other hotels 

nor did he inquire at the U.S. Embassy regarding local hotels that offered the 

U.S. government rate. 

The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that when he first made the 

arrangements, the hotel quoted him the U.S. government rate, but the hotel 

subsequently charged a higher rate. He speculated that this might have 

occurred because there was a convention in town and the hotel only had a 

limited number of rooms available at the U.S. government rate, but said he 

could not recall if this was the case. He told us that he did not recall when he 

found out that a different rate was being charged. He said that he did not 

dispute the charges with the hotel and was not aware of any of the other 

travelers disputing the charges. 

 

 

The TEDAC Deputy Director also told us that although he reserved a 

block of rooms, it was up to the individual travelers to make their own 

reservations with the hotel. However, we were unable to confirm who made 

these reservations. None of the other travelers expressed any concerns to us 

regarding the high costs of the hotel. With the exception of the TEDAC Deputy 

Director, all of the travelers, including Truscott, told us that they were not 

familiar with the hotel before the trip and were not involved in making the hotel 

arrangements. 

Truscott’s travel authorization, which was approved by the Office of the 

Deputy Attorney General on September 7, 2005, estimated lodging costs based 

on the U.S. government rate of $263 per night. Travel vouchers and revised 

travel authorizations for the other travelers were prepared after the trip and 

approved by the travelers’ immediate supervisors.103 The travel authorizations 

and vouchers requested reimbursement of actual subsistence costs.104 

(continued) 

102 The TEDAC Deputy Director also told us that his wife and daughter accompanied 

him on the trip. 

103 Domenech approved the Chief of Staff’s and the OSII Assistant Director’s travel 

documents. The OSII Assistant Director approved the TEDAC Deputy Director’s and the OSII 

VCID Chief’s travel documents. The Chief of the Security and Emergency Programs Division 

approved the EPB Chief’s and Truscott’s Assistant’s travel documents, and the EPB Chief 

approved the two EPB agents’ travel documents. 

104 In accordance with § 301-11 of the FTR, federal employees in official travel status 

are reimbursed for their lodging costs up to a specified maximum daily rate. Under certain 

circumstances, as specified in § 301-11.300 of the FTR, travelers are allowed to claim 

reimbursement of actual costs for lodging above the maximum daily rate. These circumstances 

include when lodging is procured at a place where a meeting, conference, or training session is 

96
According to the EPB Chief and as required by ATF Temporary Duty 

Travel Policy (ATF Order 1540.1), prior to a trip travelers electronically submit 

estimates of the travel costs to their supervisors. The EPB Chief provided us 

with a copy of his electronic submission, which was prepared on September 7, 

2005, and which estimated the lodging rate at $263 per night. He also told us 

that because the hotel rate was in excess of the U.S. government lodging rate, 

each traveler was required to submit an amended authorization after returning 

from the trip. 

Truscott’s Administrative Assistant told us that when Truscott returned 

from the London trip she prepared a revised travel authorization based on his 

actual lodging costs and submitted it and his travel voucher to the Office of the 

Deputy Attorney General. She said that to the best of her recollection no one 

in that office raised concerns regarding the hotel costs. We observed that the 

travel authorizations and vouchers for Truscott and the other travelers did not 

explain why it was necessary to incur the hotel costs substantially above the 

government rate. 

When asked about the cost of the trip, Truscott responded that it was a 

“good idea” for him to go on the trip and “unfortunately it cost money to do 

things and, you know, I don’t want to spend a penny if we don’t have to.” He 

said that he “would accept responsibility” if the trip was too expensive and a 

hotel was selected “beyond what should have been selected.” However, he said 

that the choice of hotel was not his decision and that he left such decisions to 

others. 

d. Itinerary 

Truscott, his Assistant, the OSII Assistant Director, and the EPB Chief 

arrived in London the evening of Monday, September 12. They were met at the 

airport by the TEDAC Deputy Director, the OSII VCID Chief, the two EPB 

advance agents, MPS police officers, and a Foreign Service National 

employee.105 They were transported to their hotel in four vehicles, one driven 

by an MPS police officer and the other three driven by U.S. State Department 

contract drivers. 

According to the witnesses, over the two full work days in London 

(Tuesday and Wednesday), Truscott had meetings at the U.S. Embassy, with 

 

to be held; when costs have escalated because of special events; when lodging within the 

prescribed allowances cannot be obtained nearby and the cost to commute exceeds the 

prescribed allowance amount; reasons related to mission requirements; or other reasons 

approved by the agency. 

105 A Foreign Service National employee is a non-U.S. citizen employed by the U.S. 

Embassy. 

97
the U.K. Security Service, and with the MPS. However, only a few of the other 

ATF employees joined him at these meetings. 

Most of the witnesses told us that on both days Truscott, his Assistant, 

his Chief of Staff, and the OSII Assistant Director met in the hotel at around 

8:45 a.m. to go over the day’s activities. On one of these days they were joined 

by the TEDAC Deputy Director and the OSII VCID Chief.106 

On Tuesday, September 13, all nine travelers went to the U.S. Embassy 

and spent about 1.5 to 2.5 hours there.107 Truscott, his Chief of Staff, his 

Assistant, and the OSII Assistant Director met with the U.S. Ambassador and 

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). They also met with the Regional Security 

Officer (RSO), who gave them a tour of the embassy and introduced them to 

other law enforcement personnel. During these meetings, the TEDAC Deputy 

Director, the OSII VCID Chief, the EPB Chief, and the two EPB agents waited 

either in the lobby or elsewhere in the building. 

On that day or the next, British officials took Truscott and the OSII 

Assistant Director on a 30- to 40-minute tour of Buckingham Palace.108 

During the tour, the TEDAC Deputy Director, the OSII VCID Chief, Truscott’s 

Chief of Staff, Truscott’s Assistant, the EPB Chief, and the two EPB agents 

waited outside the palace gates. 

On Wednesday, September 14, the group visited the U.K. Security 

Service, MI5, for an hour or less. While there, only Truscott and the OSII 

Assistant Director met with the MI5 Deputy Director. The TEDAC Deputy 

Director, the OSII VCID Chief, Truscott’s Chief of Staff, Truscott’s Assistant, 

the EPB Chief, and the two EPB agents waited outside. 

 106 The OSII Assistant Director’s description of the trip activities often varied from the 

other witnesses’ recollections, including Truscott’s, which were generally consistent with each 

other. For example, the OSII Assistant Director said he did not recall any morning meetings at 

the hotel, although every other witness described such meetings. Also, the OSII Assistant 

Director told us that the group left the hotel each day at 8:00 a.m. or earlier and did not return 

until around 7:00 p.m. All the other witnesses stated that the group generally left the hotel at 

mid-morning and departed to return to the hotel around 4:30 p.m. 

107 While the witnesses we interviewed agreed that the specific activities described in 

this report took place, they disagreed on the days and times that these events occurred. In this 

report, we use the dates included in the EPB’s advance report, unless otherwise specified. 

108 The Buckingham Palace tour was not included in the EPB advance report. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us that this might have been an impromptu activity that was 

scheduled after Truscott and the others arrived. 

98
The group also traveled that day to a storage facility outside of 

London.109 At the facility, Truscott, his Chief of Staff, the OSII Assistant 

Director, the TEDAC Deputy Director, and the OSII VCID Chief viewed the rail 

cars and buses that had been damaged in the July 2005 London bombings and 

were briefed on the MPS’s response to the bombings. Truscott’s Assistant, the 

EPB Chief, and the two EPB agents waited outside the facility. 

Also on September 14, the group visited the MPS at New Scotland Yard, 

where the entire group had lunch in the dining room of one of the MPS 

officials. Truscott, his Chief of Staff, and the OSII Assistant Director met for 

approximately an hour with the MPS Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, 

and Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations. They also received a 

tour of the U.K. Bomb Data Centre and were briefed on the July 2005 London 

bombings. 

The OSII Assistant Director told us that at the meeting with the MPS 

officials, they discussed the CES position and mutual training opportunities. 

Both the OSII Assistant Director and Truscott’s Chief of Staff told us that the 

MPS Commissioner was receptive to the idea of establishing the CES position, 

but he told them at the meeting that he first wanted to vet ATF’s proposal 

through his colleagues on the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).110 

The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that during the meeting and tour he 

visited with his British counterparts in the U.K. Bomb Data Centre. The EPB 

Chief and the two EPB agents did not attend the meeting or the tour. 

Truscott and all of the other ATF staff except the TEDAC Deputy Director 

and the OSII VCID Chief returned to Washington, D.C., on Thursday, 

September 15. The TEDAC Deputy Director and the OSII VCID Chief returned 

the next day. The TEDAC Deputy Director told us that they stayed the extra 

day to meet with their counterparts to find out the results of Truscott’s 

meetings with the MPS Commissioner. He said that an MPS official, who did 

not attend the meeting, told him that he thought the meeting went well, but 

that he did not get any specific information from his MPS superiors. He said 

that the official also suggested to him that Truscott follow up with the 

Commissioner. 

 109 This activity was not included in the advance report. Truscott’s Assistant told us 

that this was an impromptu visit. Most of the witnesses we spoke to believed that this took 

place on Wednesday. 

110 PERF, established in 1977, is a U.S.-based organization of police executives. 

According to its website, the organization is “dedicated to improving policing and advancing 

professionalism through research and involvement in public policy debate.” 

99
3. Findings 

Truscott traveled to London in September 2005 to conduct official 

business and thus the trip was authorized under ATF’s Temporary Duty Travel 

Policy. (ATF Order 1541.1, Chapter B.) The witnesses we interviewed 

confirmed that Truscott met with embassy officials and his U.K. law 

enforcement counterparts in London to discuss a possible ATF detail position 

with the MPS’s Anti-Terrorism Branch, among other official activities. 

However, we concluded that this trip raised concerns as to the number of 

travelers, the procedures by which the travel arrangements were made, and the 

overall cost. 

We had concerns regarding the number of ATF employees who 

accompanied Truscott on this trip. The FTR § 301-70.1 states that travel 

expenses should be limited to that which is “necessary to accomplish the 

mission in the most economical and effective manner.”111 Truscott was 

accompanied on this trip by his Chief of Staff, the OSII Assistant Director, two 

OSII employees, and four agents on protective duty, at a total cost of $37,065. 

As noted, the purpose of Truscott’s trip was to meet with the U.S. Ambassador 

and with MPS officials to discuss a proposal to detail an ATF Certified 

Explosives Specialist to the MPS’s Anti-Terrorist Branch. We found that each 

of these meetings was attended by Truscott and two or three ATF employees 

while the others waited outside. We question why, under circumstances calling 

for fiscal restraint, Truscott failed to exercise more control over the number of 

ATF personnel accompanying him on an expensive overseas trip. 

We also question whether the TEDAC Deputy Director’s and the OSII 

VCID Chief’s arrival in London five days prior to Truscott and the others was 

consistent with accomplishing the mission “in the most economical and 

effective manner,” as required by the FTR and ATF policy. Two advance agents 

already were in London well before Truscott’s arrival to ensure that the trip 

went smoothly. We heard conflicting statements as to the need for the TEDAC 

Deputy Director and the OSII VCID Chief to be on this trip in the first instance, 

and based on these statements it appeared that their presence in London 

during the first five days was in part redundant of the advance agents’ 

function. We further found that the reason given for the TEDAC Deputy 

Director and the OSII VCID Chief to remain in London an extra day – to follow 

 111 ATF Order 1540.1, Chapter B, § 11 similarly states: “It is the policy of ATF to 

authorize, approve or grant permission to its employees for travel that is necessary to 

effectively and economically accomplish the purposes of the Government.” 

100
up on what had transpired during the previous days’ meetings – was a 

questionable justification at best, given the added expense.112 

 We also question the need for Truscott to be accompanied by four EPB 

agents during the trip, although we did not determine that Truscott personally 

requested a security contingent of this size. While in London, Truscott traveled 

only to highly secure locations for meetings, such as the U.S. Embassy, MI5, 

and New Scotland Yard. Because of Truscott’s assessed low threat level, 

British authorities denied EPB’s request to carry firearms or have Truscott 

provided with armed protection during the trip. Throughout the visit, 

Truscott’s group was transported around London in vehicles driven by U.S. 

Embassy contract drivers and escorted by a MPS vehicle driven by an MPS 

police officer. These arrangements were made before any of the nine travelers 

left Washington, D.C. Yet despite these security arrangements, Truscott’s 

Assistant, the EPB Chief, and two other agents accompanied Truscott on the 

trip to provide protection. The four agents accompanying Truscott rode in the 

vehicles and waited outside while Truscott was in meetings. We believe this 

level of protection was excessive. 

 We also found that Truscott and the eight ATF employees on the trip 

stayed at accommodations costing significantly above the maximum U.S. 

government lodging rate, resulting in total excess charges of $7,974. The 

TEDAC Deputy Director, who was responsible for selecting the hotel, told us 

that at some point he learned that the hotel rate was in excess of the maximum 

U.S. government lodging rate, but that he made no effort to find alternative 

accommodations. 

However, we did not find that Truscott was aware of the specific travel 

arrangements, nor did we find that he was aware of the hotel rate charged until 

after his return from the trip. 

We were unable to find any witness willing or able to identify who 

specifically made the hotel room reservations, but there is no evidence that 

Truscott was involved in this aspect of the trip. We found the TEDAC Deputy 

Director’s account of his role in selecting the hotel problematic, and were 

particularly troubled by his professed lack of knowledge as to how the hotel 

rate escalated far beyond the government rate he claimed he was quoted. 

Subsequent to the trip, all of the travelers, including Truscott, submitted 

travel vouchers requesting reimbursement for the actual hotel costs, along with 

revised travel authorizations. While FTR § 301-11.302 states that requests for 

 112 The TEDAC Deputy Director brought his wife and daughter along to London, and we 

could not ascertain whether their inclusion in the trip had any bearing on the length of his 

stay. 

101
authorization for reimbursement under actual expense should be made in 

advance of travel, it allows agencies to grant after-the-fact approvals when 

supported by an explanation acceptable to the agency. ATF Order 1540.1, 

Chapter B, § 13d states that employees should include a cover memorandum 

with their travel requests “explaining in detail the specific reasons why a 

request for the actual subsistence is being submitted.” Further, ATF 

Order 1540.1, Chapter I requires the traveler to include on the travel voucher a 

statement with “information as to the nature of the assignment, or other 

unusual circumstances that require use of actual expense basis.” None of the 

subsequent authorizations or the travel vouchers for any of the travelers 

included an explanation of why it was necessary to incur the excess costs. We 

recommend that ATF employees be reminded of their need to comply with ATF 

and other applicable travel policies. 

B. October 2005 Trip to New York City 

1. Allegation 

 The complaint letter alleged that in October 2005 Truscott and two 

members of his protective detail incurred excessive airfare when they traveled 

to New York City for the day. The complaint letter further alleged that although 

DOJ officials were aware of and questioned Truscott’s travel costs, they were 

not aware that Truscott took two agents with him, which would “triple” the 

costs of which the Department had concern. The complaint letter also alleged 

that a GS-14 supervisor and a GS-13 special agent were instructed to 

accompany Truscott while he dined with others on this New York City trip. 

2. Evidence 

On October 31, 2005, Truscott flew to New York City to attend the 

Marine Corps - Law Enforcement Foundation dinner.113 He was accompanied 

on the trip by the EPB Chief. 

Truscott and the EPB Chief were met at JFK International Airport by an 

EPB advance agent, who had flown to New York City the day before, and by a 

New York Field Division ASAC. The dinner took place from 5:00 p.m. to 

9:00 p.m. at a New York restaurant located approximately four miles from the 

airport. 

 113 The Marine Corps - Law Enforcement Foundation, established in 1995, is a 

charitable organization that provides scholarship and other financial assistance to the children 

of military and federal law enforcement personnel killed in the line of duty. The Foundation 

puts on numerous fundraising events, including an annual dinner that is attended by military 

and law enforcement officials. 

102
According to the EPB Chief, the ASAC, and the EPB advance report, 

when Truscott arrived three field division vehicles with three special agent 

drivers and a medic were waiting curbside at the airport. The EPB advance 

agent rode ahead to the function in the first vehicle, a sedan; Truscott, the 

ASAC, and the EPB Chief rode in the second vehicle, an SUV; and the medic 

rode in the third vehicle, an SUV. 

Only Truscott attended the dinner. The ASAC went home after dropping 

Truscott off at the restaurant. The other four field division agents waited 

outside the restaurant until the event ended and then transported Truscott 

back to the airport. The EPB Chief told us that he and the EPB advance agent 

did not attend the dinner, but went into the restaurant periodically to check on 

Truscott. 

The ASAC told us that about a week before the event, the New York Field 

Division SAC directed him to meet Truscott at the airport and transport him to 

the function. He said that it is standard protocol in the field division for the 

SAC to greet the Director, but that the SAC was going to be out of town at the 

time of Truscott’s visit. The ASAC stated that in his opinion this was an 

appropriate level of resources to use for both logistical and security reasons. 

He said that his presence was not needed, but that it was probably appropriate 

for him to be there. He said that he discussed operational issues with Truscott 

on the way to the dinner. He also stated that he did not see a problem with 

having five agents accompanying Truscott, because Truscott is the Director of 

one of the major federal law enforcement agencies within DOJ. He said that 

the medic was present at the request of EPB. 

The EPB Chief also told us that he thought that this was a reasonable 

level of resources for security purposes. He said that other security details also 

were present at the function and that some of them were much more highprofile and much larger than Truscott’s. He said that the New York Police 

Department Commissioner arrived with only an advance agent and a single 

vehicle, but that there were military officials accompanied by more extensive 

security details. 

When questioned about the amount of field division resources used for 

the event, Truscott responded that these were EPB’s standard procedures and 

that these procedures reflected a “measured” level of security. 

Truscott and the EPB Chief arrived at JFK International Airport at 

4:00 p.m. They returned to Washington, D.C., along with the EPB advance 

agent, that same evening at 10:40 p.m. The total cost of the trip for Truscott 

103
and the two EPB agents was $2,497.114 Truscott and the EPB Chief’s airfare 

was $819; the EPB advance agent’s was $384. 

The difference in airfare costs resulted from Truscott’s and the EPB 

Chief’s failure to use a contract carrier.115 The EPB advance agent flew to JFK 

International Airport from Dulles International Airport on a contract carrier. 

Truscott and the EPB Chief flew to JFK International from Reagan National 

Airport, a routing for which there are no contract carriers. According to a 

memorandum from the Justice Management Division (JMD), at the time of 

Truscott’s trip the round-trip contract fares between various Washington, D.C., 

area airports and New York City area airports ranged from $167 to $517. 

The EPB Chief told us that he prepared the itinerary for his and 

Truscott’s trip and researched the flights. He said that when making the 

arrangements, he selected the flights that fit that schedule. He told us that he 

knew the flight he selected was a non-contract flight, but he did not pay 

attention to the cost. He told us that if he had noticed how much the cost was, 

he would have brought it to Truscott’s attention and would have suggested that 

alternate arrangements be made. The EPB Chief said that he took full 

responsibility for selecting the non-contract carriers. 

Truscott’s Administrative Assistant told us that she made the flight 

reservations with Omega Travel on behalf of both Truscott and the EPB Chief. 

According to ATF travel records, she did this on Friday, October 28. Contrary 

to the EPB Chief’s assertion that he did not notice the cost of the airfare, the 

Administrative Assistant told us that she brought the cost to the EPB Chief’s 

attention and asked him whether they could schedule those flights. She said 

that the EPB Chief’s response was, “Well, he’s the Director.” The 

Administrative Assistant said she did not recall discussing cheaper alternative 

airfares with the EPB Chief. She also said that she did not bring the cost of the 

tickets to Truscott’s attention. 

 114 This sum includes the EPB Chief’s airport parking fees and the advance agent’s 

POV mileage and hotel costs, among other minor expenses. Truscott claimed only airfare. 

115 The FTR § 300-3.1 defines contract carriers as “U.S. certified air carriers which are 

under contract with the government to furnish Federal employees and other persons 

authorized to travel at Government expense with passenger transportation service.” The FTR 

§ 301-10.107 requires federal employees to use contract carriers except under certain 

conditions, such as when “space or a scheduled contract flight is not available in time to 

accomplish the purpose of [the employee’s] travel, or use of contract service would require [the 

employee] to incur unnecessary overnight lodging costs which would increase the total cost of 

the trip.” ATF travel policy (ATF Order 1540.1, Chapter C) requires ATF employees to use 

government contract airline services unless their travel meets one of the exceptions cited in 

FTR § 301-10.107. 

104
On Monday, October 31, the Administrative Assistant prepared 

Truscott’s travel authorization form and faxed it to the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General (ODAG) at 4:24 p.m., after Truscott had arrived in New York 

City. The Administrative Assistant told us that the delay in preparing and 

faxing the travel authorization was an oversight on her part. The travel 

authorization, which included the airfare amount of $843, was approved on 

that same day by the ODAG. 

After the trip, on November 1, 2005, the Administrative Assistant 

prepared Truscott’s travel voucher and submitted it to the ODAG. The 

Administrative Assistant told us, and e-mails reflect, that the ODAG inquired 

why it was necessary for Truscott to travel to JFK International Airport at a 

higher airfare, instead of to LaGuardia Airport at a lower, contract fare. 

The Administrative Assistant responded by e-mail to the ODAG that 

Truscott could not depart Washington, D.C., any earlier on October 31 because 

of his heavy meeting schedule that day. She also stated that because of his 

meeting schedule and his arrival in New York during rush hour, he had to fly 

into the airport closest to the dinner, which was JFK International Airport. 

The Administrative Assistant told us that she notified the EPB Chief that 

the Office of the Deputy Attorney General was questioning the airfare costs, but 

said she did not bring the matter to Truscott’s attention. 

On November 15, 2005, a JMD official sent a memorandum to ATF’s 

Office of Management requesting, on behalf of the ODAG that a revised travel 

authorization be submitted for Truscott’s travel, including a written 

justification for the higher-cost, non-contract airfare. The Administrative 

Assistant and EPB Chief prepared the revised authorization and sent it to the 

ODAG. The revised authorization stated “a non-contract fare @ a higher cost 

was being requested in order to meet the timing of the official event.” It was 

faxed to the ODAG on November 23, 2006, and approved by that office on 

November 25, 2006. 

The EPB Chief provided us with a copy of the electronic submissions 

prepared by him and the EPB advance agent containing estimates of their 

travel costs. Each estimate was submitted on October 28, 2005. The EPB 

Chief said that he submitted his estimate to his supervisor, the Chief of the 

Security and Emergency Programs Division, for approval. The EPB Chief was 

responsible for approving the advance agent’s travel authorization. 

Truscott said that all he could recall about the arrangements was that he 

told his Assistant, his Administrative Assistant, or the EPB Chief the 

approximate times he wanted to travel. He said that no one brought the airfare 

cost to his attention. In addition, he said that he was not aware of the airfare 

costs until after he had returned from the trip and saw the travel voucher that 

105
his Administrative Assistant had prepared for him. He said that he was 

“outraged” by the high cost and brought it to the attention of his Assistant and 

Domenech. He said that he was unaware that the ODAG had questioned the 

cost. 

His Assistant told us that a couple of days after the trip, when Truscott 

saw the travel voucher that the Administrative Assistant prepared for him, he 

questioned the Assistant about the excessive airfare cost. The Assistant said 

that Truscott directed him to pay more attention to travel costs in the future 

and to consider cheaper transportation options whenever possible. The 

Assistant told us that he was perplexed by Truscott’s sudden concerns about 

cost because in the past Truscott’s primary concern had been getting in and 

out of travel sites as quickly as possible. He added that Truscott’s “marching 

orders” had been that he did not want to spend the night anywhere unless he 

had no other choice. 

Domenech also told us that Truscott spoke to him about the excessive 

travel costs associated with the New York City trip. Domenech said that when 

Truscott brought the matter to his attention, Truscott already was aware of the 

excess costs because of the ODAG’s queries. He said that Truscott told him 

that he would not have approved the cost if he had known how much it was. 

Domenech said that he later spoke to Truscott’s Assistant and Truscott’s 

Administrative Assistant who told him that Truscott “wouldn’t and didn’t want” 

to stay overnight and therefore they had to select a late night return flight, 

which happened to have a non-contract fare. Domenech added that Truscott 

did not have any pressing business the day after the event and that Domenech 

thought it would have been cheaper for him to stay overnight in New York and 

either fly or take the train back the next day. Domenech told us that he told 

the Assistant and the Administrative Assistant to advise Truscott of any noncontract fares in the future. 

3. Findings 

We found that an excessive amount of ATF resources was used in 

connection with Truscott’s attendance at the Marine Corps – Law Enforcement 

Foundation dinner held in New York City in October 2005. Truscott was met 

at the airport and transported to the dinner by an ATF advance agent and five 

ATF New York Field Division employees. The caravan was composed of three 

ATF field division vehicles. Four field division agents and the EPB employees 

waited outside the restaurant for four hours while Truscott attended the dinner 

and then drove Truscott back to the airport. We questioned the propriety of 

committing five special agents from the New York Field Division to transporting 

Truscott four miles to a restaurant to attend a charity function. 

106
We were troubled by Truscott’s indifference to the amount of ATF 

resources that were used to transport him to this event and by his 

characterization that having seven ATF employees, including a medic, 

accompany him to the function reflected a “measured” level of security. For the 

reasons discussed in Section V of this chapter, above, we were also troubled by 

Truscott’s failure to take responsibility for the amount of resources used and 

his deferral of responsibility for this to EPB. 

We also found that during this trip Truscott and one member of his 

protective detail incurred airfare costs that were substantially higher than the 

government contract flight fares. However, the evidence showed that Truscott 

was not made aware of the cost of the flights prior to the trip. 

C. January 2005 Trips to Boston, Massachusetts, and Ottawa, 

Canada 

1. Allegations 

 The complaint letter alleged that in January 2005, Truscott, 

accompanied by his protective detail and ATF’s New Headquarters Building 

Project Manager, traveled unnecessarily to Boston, Massachusetts, to visit the 

architect of the new ATF Headquarters building. The letter alleged that this 

trip was unnecessary because the building plans had already been drafted and 

finalized and ATF staff and contract employees were subject matter experts 

qualified to deal with any building-related issues. 

The complaint letter also alleged that after visiting Boston, Truscott went 

to Ottawa, Canada, accompanied by ATF’s New Headquarters Building Project 

Manager and an Assistant Director. The letter alleged that although Truscott 

traveled to Canada to meet with ATF personnel and the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police (RCMP), he spent much of the trip visiting buildings designed 

by the architect of the new ATF Headquarters. In sum, the letter alleged that 

this series of visits to examine examples of architectural design resulted in an 

expenditure of funds for which there was no apparent benefit to the 

government. 

2. Evidence 

 On January 5, 2005, Truscott traveled to Ottawa, Canada. On the way 

to Ottawa, Truscott stopped off in Boston, Massachusetts for a total of 4.5 

hours before continuing to Ottawa. We discuss the Boston and Ottawa legs of 

the trip in turn below. 

107
a. Boston 

In Boston, Truscott visited the office of Moshe Safdie, the architect of 

ATF’s new Headquarters building. He also traveled to Salem, Massachusetts, 

to tour the Peabody Essex Museum, a building Safdie had designed. Truscott 

was accompanied on the trip by his Assistant, his Executive Assistant, the 

Assistant Director for the Office of Management (OM), and the New 

Headquarters Building Project Manager. 

The idea for the trip appears to have originated with the Project Manager. 

The Project Manager told us that during this period of time she had been 

traveling to Boston at least monthly to meet with Safdie. She said that Safdie 

told her that he would like to meet Truscott the next time Truscott was in 

Boston. Safdie suggested that he give Truscott a computerized “virtual tour” of 

the new ATF Headquarters building and show him the Peabody Essex Museum 

auditorium, which was similar in design to the new ATF Headquarters 

auditorium. 

The Project Manager said that she learned that Truscott was planning to 

travel to Boston to visit the company that manufactures ATF’s badges. She 

said she and Truscott’s staff decided that “it would make good economic sense” 

for Truscott to meet with Safdie at the same time. However, after the trip was 

scheduled, Truscott cancelled his visit to the badge manufacturer when he 

learned that he would not have sufficient time to visit both the company and 

Safdie and still make an early afternoon flight to Ottawa. 

Truscott told us that on the Project Manager’s recommendation, he 

stopped in Boston on the way to Ottawa to “get a sense of [Safdie’s] vision for 

the building.” Truscott told us that this was the first time he had met Safdie. 

He said Safdie subsequently visited Washington, D.C. and Truscott also met 

with him there. 

Truscott told us that the OM Assistant Director went on the trip because 

she expressed an interest in going and because she was the Project Manager’s 

supervisor. Domenech stated that Safdie had extravagant tastes and that the 

Project Manager had been screening Safdie’s suggestions before presenting 

them to Truscott. He told us that before Truscott’s trip to Boston, the OM 

Assistant Director and the Project Manager expressed concerns to him that 

Safdie might propose expensive design changes directly to Truscott that he 

might accept. He said that the OM Assistant Director decided to go on the trip 

so that she could try to prevent this from happening.116 

 116 We did not interview the OM Assistant Director because she is no longer employed 

by ATF. 

108
Truscott told us that he asked his Executive Assistant to go on the trip 

because she was involved in decisions relating to the new Headquarters 

building and was interested in learning more about the building. The 

Executive Assistant told us that Truscott requested that she accompany him 

but did not tell her why. She said that at the time Truscott was trying to 

include her in a variety of different things. She told us that she did not feel 

that there was a good reason for her to be on the trip and believes that it was 

an inappropriate use of resources for her to go.117 She added that she believes 

Truscott sometimes traveled with too many personnel. 

When Truscott and the others landed in Boston, they were met by an 

EPB advance agent who had traveled to Boston from Washington, D.C., the day 

before. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of ATF’s Boston Field Division and 

another field division Special Agent also met them at the airport gate. Waiting 

curbside at the airport were three Special Agent drivers, including a medic 

assigned to the Springfield Field Office (about an hour and 15 minutes away) in 

three ATF field division vehicles. 

The SAC and the four field division agents drove Truscott and his group 

in the three vehicles first to Safdie’s office and then to the Peabody Essex 

Museum. Truscott, his Assistant, his Executive Assistant, the Assistant 

Director, the Project Manager, and the SAC met with Safdie and visited the 

Peabody Essex Museum. The four field division agents waited either in their 

vehicles or in the lobbies of Safdie’s office and the museum. After the museum 

tour, the field division agents drove Truscott’s group back to the airport, where 

the Executive Assistant and the Assistant Director caught a return flight to 

Washington, D.C. Truscott, his Assistant, and the Project Manager continued 

to Ottawa. 

We asked Truscott whether he thought the number of field division 

resources used for the Boston leg of this trip was appropriate, especially 

considering that he did not visit the field division. Truscott responded, 

“Anything . . . where the Director is in the district is a direct relation to the field 

division . . . .” He also stated that the EPB guidelines were “codified” by the 

Assistant Director for the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security 

Operations and by Domenech and not by him. Finally, he said that “when the 

Director and the executive staff, meaning the Deputy Director and the Chief 

Counsel, had decided that it’s important enough for the Director to go to 

Boston, then if it takes some resources for a short period of time to facilitate 

that, I absolutely think it’s appropriate.” 

 117 During the OIG/Truscott meeting, Truscott stated that his Executive Assistant 

wanted to go on the Boston trip. 

109
b. Ottawa 

Truscott traveled to Ottawa to meet with various U.S. Embassy, ATF, and 

RCMP officials. He also visited two Safdie-designed buildings while there. 

 Truscott, his Assistant, and the Project Manager arrived in Ottawa at 

approximately 5:00 p.m. on January 5. They were met at the airport by the 

Assistant Director of ATF’s Office of Enforcement Programs and Services (EPS), 

who had traveled separately from Washington, D.C. The EPS Assistant 

Director’s responsibilities include oversight of ATF’s office in Ottawa. The EPB 

Chief served as the advance agent and traveled to Ottawa on January 4. The 

entire group returned to Washington, D.C. on the afternoon of January 7. 

During Truscott’s stay in Ottawa, the RCMP provided two vehicles for 

transportation and armed security for the group.118 The U.S. Embassy 

provided an additional vehicle which the EPB Chief used as the advance 

vehicle. 

 According to the EPB advance report, on the first full business day, 

January 6, Truscott and his party first traveled to the U.S. Embassy. Truscott, 

his Assistant, the EPS Assistant Director, and the ATF Attaché met for 

approximately 30 to 45 minutes with various embassy officials, including the 

Ambassador.119 The EPS Assistant Director told us that the group discussed 

substantive issues at the meeting with the Ambassador. He said that the 

meetings with the other embassy officials, including the Assistant Regional 

Security Officer, the Secret Service Attaché, and the CIA Station Chief, were 

brief courtesy visits. 

 After that meeting, Truscott, the EPS Assistant Director, and the ATF 

Attaché met with the RCMP Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner for 

about 30 minutes. The EPS Assistant Director told us that this was a 

substantive meeting concerning ATF mission-related topics. The EPB Chief 

and the Project Manager waited outside during this meeting and the embassy 

meetings. 

Truscott and the rest of his party went to the Canadian Police College 

after the meeting with the RCMP Commissioner. The ATF Attaché 

accompanied them. At the college they were given an RCMP precision riding 

demonstration, a tour of the stables, and a briefing on the horse program and 

the history of the RCMP. Afterwards, Truscott and most of his party attended a 

2-hour working lunch with RCMP officials. The EPB Chief said that he and the 

 118 Due to Canadian law, the EPB agents were not permitted to carry their weapons. 

119 ATF maintains an office at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa. 

110
Project Manager did not attend the working lunch but instead had lunch on 

their own. 

 At approximately 2:30 p.m. that day, the group traveled to the National 

Gallery of Canada. According to one witness, they took a “very long” tour of the 

museum with a Safdie associate. The group then traveled to the Ottawa City 

Hall for an additional tour with the Safdie associate. At about 5 p.m., the 

group returned to the hotel. 

On January 7, Truscott and his group went to the U.S. Embassy. There 

Truscott met with the ATF Attaché, the Assistant Attaché, and the Chief of 

Station from approximately 9:30 to 10:30 a.m. Afterwards, the group went to 

the RCMP National Operations Center, where they were given a 45-minute 

tour. Truscott, his Assistant, the EPS Assistant Director, the EPB Chief, and 

the Project Manager then went to a restaurant for lunch and afterwards were 

taken to the airport for their return flights. 

Truscott said that he visited the two Safdie-designed buildings in Ottawa 

because Safdie and the Project Manager wanted him to see them since they 

were similar in some ways to the new ATF Headquarters building. He 

emphasized that seeing these buildings was not the main purpose of the trip. 

He said that the Project Manager came along on the trip because she was 

familiar with the two buildings and knew the individuals who took them on the 

building tours. Domenech also said the Project Manager was the only person 

who could clearly articulate the design of the museum as it related to the 

design of the new Headquarters building. 

The Project Manager said she was on the trip solely to accompany 

Truscott to the Safdie buildings. She said she did not attend the embassy or 

RCMP meetings, and that she “tagged along” with Truscott to the RCMP riding 

demonstration and the National Operations Center. 

3. Findings 

 

We found that it was not improper for Truscott, as Director of ATF, to 

meet with the architect for the new Headquarters building and to view 

buildings that the architect had designed. Although it is reasonable to 

question why a component head would choose to spend his time and agency 

resources on such a trip, it was within Truscott’s discretion to determine that a 

meeting with the architect and tours of buildings the architect had designed 

could help inform his decisions on the project. 

However, we question Truscott’s judgment in involving so many 

Headquarters and Field Division resources on the meeting with Safdie and tour 

of the museum in Boston. Truscott was accompanied in Boston by five ATF 

Headquarters employees. Of those five employees, only the Project Manager 

111
was extensively involved in the new building project. Moreover, Truscott’s 

Executive Assistant told us that she did not know why Truscott wanted her on 

the trip and felt that it was inappropriate for her to be there.120 The Executive 

Assistant, the OM Assistant Director, and the EPB advance agent returned to 

Washington, D.C. after the Boston visit. The travel costs for the Executive 

Assistant and the OM Assistant Director for their brief visit totaled 

approximately $849. 

In addition, five Boston Field Division agents – the SAC and four field 

division agents – joined the EPB advance agent in escorting Truscott and his 

group from the airport to Safdie’s office and then to the museum. Three ATF 

vehicles were used to transport the group. The SAC joined Truscott and others 

with the architect and at the museum while the four field division agents and 

the EPB advance agent waited in the cars or lobbies of the buildings. 

For the reasons stated in Section V of this chapter, above, we found the 

extensive use of field division resources on the Boston leg of the trip to be 

troubling. Moreover, Truscott’s justification that the use of these agents was 

“in direct relation to the field division” simply because he was in the district 

indicated to us a disturbing indifference to the need to use agency resources 

efficiently. Further, because of our knowledge of Truscott’s involvement in 

shaping EPB procedures, we were troubled by his tendency to place 

responsibility for EPB’s actions on others, in this case the Assistant Director 

for the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Programs and 

Domenech, whenever EPB’s procedures came under scrutiny during the 

investigation. 

We did not find Truscott’s tours of Safdie-designed buildings while in 

Ottawa to be improper. It is undisputed that Truscott’s trip to Ottawa had a 

legitimate agency purpose and that a substantial amount of time during the 

trip was spent in official meetings with U.S. Embassy, ATF, and RCMP officials. 

We concluded that it was within Truscott’s discretion to tour the two buildings 

and therefore his actions were not improper. 

VII. ATF Reception at International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Conference 

A. Allegation 

 ATF hosted a reception aboard a yacht during a September 2005 

International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Miami Beach, 

 120 As noted, during the OIG/Truscott meeting Truscott stated that the Executive 

Assistant wanted to participate in the Boston trip. 

112
Florida. According to the anonymous complaint, ATF had contracted for 200 

guests to attend the event; however, at least 600 people attended, resulting in a 

charge to ATF of $46,354. Appropriated representation funds available for that 

fiscal year were only $25,000, resulting in a potential Anti-Deficiency Act 

violation. The anonymous complaint alleged that the cost of the event and 

related security services was excessive and illustrated a “gross mismanagement 

of public funds” by Truscott.121 

B. Evidence 

1. Chronology of the ATF reception 

 The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) holds an annual 

conference for members of the law enforcement community.122 The 2005 IACP 

Conference was held in Miami Beach, Florida, from September 24 through 28. 

On September 25, 2005, ATF hosted a dockside reception aboard a 120-foot 

yacht at the Conference. 

 ATF’s Office of Public and Governmental Affairs (PGA), Liaison Division, 

had primary responsibility for planning the reception. According to the Senior 

Program Analyst (Program Analyst) assigned to organize the reception, 

planning began in February or March 2005 with a tour of available hotels and 

venues in Miami Beach. The Program Analyst said that her office narrowed the 

selection down to three possible venues, including a 120-foot, four-level yacht 

owned by a charter boat company. The company had been identified during 

the tour and recommended by an employee in ATF’s Miami Field Division who 

used to be in the hotel business. 

The Program Analyst said that in late July or early August 2005, she and 

the Chief of the Liaison Division went to Miami Beach to explore the three 

options. She said that by the time of this trip, she had been told by Domenech 

that the ATF reception was likely going to be sponsored by three organizations 

– a company and two foundations – contributing a total of $20,000, and that 

she and the Chief of the Liaison Division thus knew they had to keep the cost 

 121 The cost overrun portion of this allegation is the subject of at least one 

Congressional inquiry from Senator Bill Nelson of Florida. The ATF Chief Counsel told us that 

ATF has received two Congressional inquiries into this matter, but was unable to recall who 

made the other inquiry. 

122 According to an IACP website, “The International Association of Chiefs of Police is 

the world's oldest and largest nonprofit membership organization of police executives, with over 

19,000 members in over 100 different countries. The IACP Conference is a closed show which 

is open only to IACP members and their guests.” 

113
of the event under that amount.123 Domenech told us that sponsors have been 

paying for these events on ATF’s behalf for the past five or so years. 

 The Program Analyst stated that she and the Chief of the Liaison Division 

met with the charter boat company to discuss the reception. She said that she 

and the Chief told the company that ATF had sponsors for the event who would 

pay directly to the company. She said that the company asked for an estimate 

of how many people would attend the reception and that she and the Chief told 

the company that historically about 200 people had attended. She said the 

company assured them that it could handle at least that number of guests. 

 

 The Program Analyst stated that a few days after she and the Chief of the 

Liaison Division returned from Miami, she presented the three proposed 

venues to the ATF’s Executive Staff.124 She said she, the Chief, Truscott, 

Domenech, Truscott’s Chief of Staff, Truscott’s Assistant, Truscott’s Executive 

Assistant, and the PGA Assistant Director were at the meeting. The Program 

Analyst said her office passed out a briefing booklet that described each of the 

venues and that each venue’s proposal was based on 200 attendees. 

 According to the Program Analyst, Truscott asked a lot of specific 

questions at the meeting about all the venues. She said that initially Truscott 

was not keen on the charter idea until it was explained to him that the boat 

could be docked so that people would be free to come and go. Truscott’s 

Assistant said Truscott asked if anyone would be monitoring to ensure that 

only invited guests were let in and that he asked what would happen if a police 

official showed up without an invitation. The Assistant said the answer was 

that they would “check out” the person. He said that Truscott responded, 

“Well, you’re not going to turn them away, are you?” He said that Truscott did 

not want anyone to be embarrassed. The Assistant also stated that the overall 

$20,000 cost of the reception was discussed at this meeting, but not the basis 

on which the cost had been calculated. 

 According to the Program Analyst, the PGA Assistant Director told her 

that a few days after the meeting Truscott and Domenech selected the yacht 

charter as the reception site. The Assistant Director, however, told us that the 

 123 The event was sponsored by Sony BMG Music Entertainment ($10,000); the Federal 

Drug Agents Foundation ($5,000); and the Federal Enforcement Homeland Security 

Foundation ($5,000). Because the event was held at the end of the fiscal year, ATF would not 

have had sufficient funds remaining in its $25,000 representation fund to cover the full cost of 

the event. On September 19, 2005, in anticipation of the reception, ATF purchased 

commemorative lapel pins at a cost of $2,320. Based on a review of the representation fund 

logbook for FY 2005, the representation fund had an available balance of $4,387 after the lapel 

pin purchase.

124 The three venues were the yacht, the ballroom of the hotel where ATF was staying, 

and a theme park. 

114
Executive Staff decided on the venue as a group. Truscott told us that the 

decision to hold the reception on the yacht was the result of a 

“recommendation,” and that because of a “unanimous decision of my staff, I 

went along with that.” Truscott stated that he polled his staff on the decision 

because he was “concerned about the perception of having a reception on a 

boat.” The Chief of Staff also told us that the PGA staff recommended holding 

the event aboard the yacht and that both he and Truscott were concerned 

about perception but went along with the idea. 

 The Program Analyst said that once the venue was selected, her office 

contacted all the Assistant Directors for their final invitation lists. She said she 

believed that her office forwarded the compiled list to Truscott to ensure that 

no one had been overlooked. She said that because they wanted to keep the 

attendee numbers down, ATF requested that the IACP indicate in its booklet of 

events that the ATF reception was by invitation only. The OIG reviewed an 

IACP Conference Tentative Reception Schedule (dated September 6, 2005), 

which stated that the ATF reception was to be by “Invitation Only.” 

 Truscott told us that he was unaware of whether the reception was to be 

by invitation only, adding, “I’m sure [invitations] were handed out, but the idea 

is if I handed one to you and you brought two people from your organization, 

obviously, they would be welcome.” 

 The Program Analyst said that ATF sent out a total of 500 invitations in 

anticipation that only half of the invitees would attend. Domenech told us that 

in addition to the list of invitees approved by Truscott, which based on the list 

reviewed by the OIG numbered approximately 80, ATF also gave each of its 23 

field divisions five to ten invitations that they could provide to local law 

enforcement officials. Some invitations were also given to the Assistant 

Directors to distribute. 

On August 24, 2005, the charter boat company faxed to the Program 

Analyst an event contract, a menu selection, and an invoice for the event. Both 

the event contract and the invoice indicated that the event would cost a total of 

$19,251, including a charter fee and a $1,000 refundable security deposit.125 

The contract and invoice also showed that the overall cost was determined by 

multiplying the “unit price” for food and bar service by the “quantity” of 200. 

The contract provided to the OIG by ATF is unsigned. The Program Analyst 

told us that to her knowledge the contract was never signed by ATF, and that 

this was probably because the sponsors, not ATF, would be making direct 

payments to the charter boat company for the event. 

 125 According to the Program Analyst, ATF decided to apply the $1,000 security deposit 

toward the purchase of an ice sculpture of the ATF seal to be displayed aboard the yacht 

during the reception rather than return it to the three sponsors. 

115
 The ATF employees we spoke with generally understood ATF’s 

arrangement with the charter boat company to be based on a 200-guest limit. 

The Program Analyst told us that she interpreted the terms of the contract to 

mean that ATF was only authorizing the charter boat company to provide 

enough food and beverages for 200 people and that when the food and 

beverages ran out, no more would be provided. She said that in the past, once 

ATF and the vendor signed a contract for a specific amount of food and 

beverages, no additional food and beverages were provided. She also stated 

that in the past ATF had signed contracts with the vendors because only half of 

the cost was paid by the sponsors with the balance coming out of the ATF 

representation fund. 

Similarly, the PGA Assistant Director stated that he was told that the 

cost for the event was based on a flat rate and that this rate was negotiated 

based on the number of anticipated attendees. Domenech told us his 

understanding was that the cost was based on a combination of number of 

hours for the event and the “projected headcount for the food.” Truscott said 

that he was not aware of the terms of the contract prior to and at the time of 

the event and that based on his experience with a previous ATF reception at an 

IACP conference, it would have been a “bad business practice” to agree to a per 

person arrangement. 

ATF’s Chief Counsel told us that he had not been made aware of the 

terms of the contract or the basis for the invoice until after the event, when a 

dispute arose regarding a second invoice from the charter boat company. The 

Chief Counsel said he was not certain whether anyone in his office had been 

asked to review the terms of the contract or the invoice prior to the event. 

 The ATF reception was held from 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. on September 25, 

2005. According to several witnesses, many more people than expected came 

to the reception, and the yacht became extremely crowded with guests. The 

Program Analyst told us that after the first hour the food was gone, the bar was 

going dry, and people were complaining. She also told us that three of the four 

levels of the yacht were being used and that at one point, a decision was made 

to open up a fourth level to accommodate the extra people.126 

 126 The PGA Assistant Director and Domenech told us that the captain agreed to open 

up a fourth level for an extra fee. Domenech told us that he gave the Assistant Director verbal 

authorization to do this. The Program Analyst told us the level was opened for about 20 

minutes but was then closed because no one was using the space. Domenech told us that ATF 

may have been charged between $1,500 and $2,500 for this extra space. A log of expenditures 

from the representation fund lists an entry dated September 29, 2005, showing that $2,500 

was spent on the ATF reception for “catering services.” This charge is not separately itemized 

on either of the invoices sent to ATF by the charter boat company, and it is not clear if the 

payment actually was made or otherwise reimbursed by a sponsor. A January 31, 2006, 

e-mail from the Program Analyst to Truscott’s Executive Assistant and others states that no 

FY 2005 representation funds were used for the reception. 

116
Several witnesses also told us that the captain of the vessel sat by the 

entrance and held a clicker, which the witnesses generally assumed was for the 

purpose of counting the number of people boarding the yacht. The Program 

Analyst stated that several people came aboard the yacht but then turned 

around and left upon seeing how crowded it was. She said that the captain 

clicked them in anyway. Domenech told us that so many people arrived that 

they had to “stagger” their entrance onto the yacht. A photographer from ATF’s 

Visual Information Branch (VIB) told us that he recalled that the yacht became 

so crowded that ATF employees were asked to disembark, leaving only the 

guests and dignitaries on board. 

 Several witnesses stated that Truscott mainly stayed aboard the yacht by 

its entrance during the event. Truscott’s Assistant said that he was with 

Truscott on the “receiving line” as Truscott greeted arriving guests. The VIB 

photographer also said Truscott greeted guests at the entrance. The Program 

Analyst told us that Truscott was on the receiving line from about 6:00 to 

7:00 p.m. or 7:30 p.m. and that he then went upstairs on the yacht. 

Truscott told us that he did not see anyone showing invitations as he 

greeted them when they arrived. The Program Analyst stated that attendees 

were not required to show their invitations to enter the venue, just their 

conference identification (ID). She said that the Executive Protection Branch 

security agents checked conference IDs at the entryway. Domenech told us 

that he was on the “receiving line” with Truscott and that invitations of arriving 

guests were checked, but only for the first half-hour of the reception. 

2. Security at the ATF reception 

 Domenech told us that when he arrived at the reception, he observed 

that approximately 15 to 20 ATF special agents from the Miami Field Division 

were providing security for the event. He stated that a patrol boat manned 

with local police and an ATF special agent also had been provided by a local 

municipality to make sure no one came close to the yacht. Domenech said he 

found this security arrangement to be “excessive . . . overkill.” The Assistant 

Director for the Office of Field Operations told us that the ATF Miami Field 

Division office “virtually shut down” during the reception to provide security. 

Domenech stated that he ordered the number of special agents providing 

security for the event reduced to approximately three or four. Domenech told 

the OIG that he believed Truscott would have approved the original security 

arrangements involving the larger group of agents because in his experience 

Truscott always wanted to know every detail of the security arrangements. 

Domenech also stated that Truscott would have been briefed by Truscott’s 

Assistant about security prior to the reception. 

117
 Truscott’s Assistant told us that Truscott had suggested to him having a 

security patrol near the yacht in case someone fell into the water. The 

Assistant said that this was Truscott’s way of “educating” him on proper 

procedures. The Assistant said that he contacted the Miami Field Division 

about this and that the field division made arrangements for the Miami Beach 

police to run a patrol boat around the yacht. According to the Assistant, the 

Miami Beach police agreed to patrol near the yacht as part of its routine water 

patrol, although he personally did not see the patrol boat during the reception. 

The Chief of the Executive Protection Branch also told us that the patrol boat 

was coordinated through the Miami Field Division and that the Executive 

Protection Branch’s only responsibility was the protection of Truscott and the 

executive staff. 

 Truscott’s Assistant also told us that he recalled seeing between six and 

eight special agents from the Miami Field Division providing security at the 

reception.127 He stated that Truscott never requested any particular number of 

agents to provide security, although the Assistant said he would have told 

Truscott about the security arrangements as a matter of course. He stated that 

Truscott may have asked him how many agents would be used and where they 

would be posted, but that would have been the extent of Truscott’s 

involvement. 

 Truscott told us that he spoke with his Assistant about the idea of 

having a patrol boat near the yacht because “you’re going to have the heads of 

many law enforcement agencies there. . . . I did think it was appropriate to 

make sure that we did something so we had some idea what was taking place 

on the water so we didn’t have some sort of waterborne attack.” When we 

asked Truscott whether he knew the extent of the resources drawn from the 

Miami Field Division in connection with the event, he responded, “I don’t have 

any idea.” 

3. Developments after the ATF reception 

 On September 26, 2005, the day after the reception, the charter boat 

company faxed another invoice to ATF in the amount of $46,354. The invoice 

included a service fee, crew gratuities, and the same “unit price” for food and 

bar service as the August 24, 2005, invoice but this time multiplied by a 

“quantity” of 600. The e-mail from the charter company transmitting the 

invoice to the Program Analyst stated, in relevant part: 

 127 The Assistant said it was possible that 15 to 20 special agents were involved in 

providing security if they were working in shifts, which he did not know to be the case. As 

noted, the event was scheduled to last two hours. 

118
I hope all went well last night. Your event must definitely be the 

talk of the convention! Attached, please find the invoice reflecting 

the balance for the overage of 600 passengers. Please note that 

only the food, bar service fee and gratuities are being charged. 

 The Program Analyst said that when the charter boat company 

representative who had sent the e-mail to her did not hear back from her that 

day, the representative called the Chief of the Liaison Division. According to 

the Program Analyst, that was when her Division Chief first learned that the 

charter boat company was taking the position that the cost of the event was 

based on the number of attendees. The Program Analyst stated that ATF’s 

position was that it only ordered the quantities listed on the contract and did 

not authorize any additional quantities. The Program Analyst also said that 

the Chief told the representative that the food had run out about an hour into 

the event. 

 

 The Program Analyst stated that the captain of the yacht claimed he 

provided extra food that had been ordered for the next day’s charter on the 

same vessel. She said that ATF asked the company to prove this by showing 

them the contract for the other charter. The Program Analyst said that the 

company never provided this documentation. She told us that she was in 

Miami for three or four days after the reception and noticed that the yacht was 

docked and closed during that entire time. She therefore questioned the 

captain’s assertion about a charter the next day. 

 The Program Analyst stated that shortly after she returned from Miami, 

the Liaison Division Chief advised her that he had turned the matter over to 

ATF counsel and that counsel had advised him to refer all calls and e-mails to 

the Chief Counsel’s Office.

 ATF’s Chief Counsel stated that his office has asked the charter boat 

company for an itemization of costs incurred “above what was agreed upon,” 

and had not received a response as of July 27, 2006. The Chief Counsel said 

he was aware of two Congressional inquiries into the alleged cost overrun 

matter and stated that his office has requested more information from the 

charter company. He said that ATF has not yet made any determination as to 

whether it is legally obligated to pay the overage to the charter company. The 

Chief Counsel also said that he had not discussed the matter with Truscott. 

ATF’s Office of Public and Governmental Affairs Liaison Division prepared 

an IACP Conference “After-Action Report” (November 29, 2005) to “determine 

which areas were successful and which areas can be fine-tuned in the future to 

promote outreach and education.” The report noted that the reception “drew 

the largest attendance in ATF’s reception history (reportedly over 600 guests).” 

Under a section entitled “Suggestions for 2006,” the report stated that larger 

reception sites should be selected in the future, and that ATF should 

119
“specifically negotiate (and put in contract) clear guidelines on the point in 

which the caterer is to cut-off food service and/or entry so we are charged for 

the amount of food/beverage consumed and not the number of attendees.” 

(Emphasis in original). The report also suggested printing more invitations for 

next year to hand-deliver at the conference. The Program Analyst told us that 

she does not think ATF is planning a reception for the 2006 IACP conference. 

 Truscott told us that he first learned about the cost dispute concerning 

the reception a “couple of weeks” before his March 9, 2006 interview with the 

OIG. In a January 31, 2006, e-mail to the Associate Deputy Attorney General, 

he stated: 

I was just handed a congressional inquiry from Senator Bill Nelson 

(Florida) on behalf of his constituent (the reception venue) with a 

discrepancy of $46,354.44 versus ATF’s acknowledged discrepancy 

of $2,500.00 which I mentioned earlier today. An enormous 

discrepancy and we are still sorting through it. 

I am not asking for any action on your part. I just wanted to 

clarify what I told you earlier today which was the most up-to-date 

information I had at the time of our discussion.128

C. Anti-Deficiency Act Issues 

 Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration Lee Lofthus told us 

that, according to the Justice Management Division’s Office of General 

Counsel, ATF was limited to the $25,000 that had been appropriated for its 

representation fund in FY 2005 and would be in violation of the Anti-Deficiency 

Act if it exceeded this amount to pay for the reception. Lofthus stated that so 

long as no valid claims have been filed against ATF for additional payments, 

there would be no deficiency issues. 

 Lofthus also stated that pursuant to DOJ Order 2030.4E, entitled 

“Control of Funds Under Apportionment” (May 6, 1993), ATF would have 

committed a reporting violation in connection with the reception had it in fact 

violated the Anti-Deficiency Act. Specifically, under Paragraph 16 a. of the 

DOJ Order, “The head of an [office, board, division] or a bureau must report to 

the Assistant Attorney General for Administration through the Controller any 

violations of Sections 1341(a), 1342 and 1517(a) [of the Anti-Deficiency Act].129 

Lofthus told us that the duty of the head of a bureau – in this instance 

 128 The OIG believes that the $2,500 “discrepancy” is an apparent reference to the cost 

of opening up a fourth level of the yacht. 

129 See also 31 U.S.C. § 1351 (requiring officer or employee in violation of section 

1341(a) to report such violation to the President and Congress). 

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Truscott – to report the violation is “non-delegable.” Lofthus added that DOJ 

Order 2030.4E has now been superseded by 2030.4F, which states, in relevant 

part: “Any individual who knows of any possible Anti-Deficiency Act violation 

must report it.” (Emphasis added.) That order took effect on February 14, 

2006, and thus would not apply to the ATF reception. 

D. Findings 

 We concluded that the ATF reception was poorly planned and executed 

by the agency, but that Truscott was not responsible for the resulting 

problems. 

We found that ATF did not pay for the reception out of its FY 2005 

representation fund appropriation as implied in the anonymous complaint. 

The testimony and documents considered by the OIG established that three 

sponsors paid for the undisputed portion of the bill for the event. 

A review of ATF’s representation fund logbook showed that the only 

expenditures ATF paid in connection with the event were $2,320 for 

commemorative lapel pins and $2,500, presumably to open a fourth level on 

the yacht. While it is not yet clear whether ATF will have legal liability for any 

portion of the $46,354 in extra costs claimed by the charter boat company, we 

concluded that Truscott was not responsible for planning the ATF reception 

and was not aware of the terms of ATF’s arrangement with the charter boat 

company.130 Truscott relied instead on those who had experience planning 

similar events in the past. 

We believe the ATF should have exercised more diligence in the planning 

of the event. The initial contract and invoice sent to ATF on August 24, 2006, 

reflected that the cost of the reception was to be based on a per-person 

formula. This is evident from the columns designated “unit price” and 

“quantity” on both documents. While the terms of the agreement were not 

otherwise explicitly delineated, the documents as written should have caused 

ATF’s event planners to consider the possible implications if more than 200 

guests were to attend. At a minimum, staff in the Public and Governmental 

Affairs directorate who reviewed the contract and the invoice should have 

sought the advice of the Chief Counsel’s Office on this matter. 

 Based on the materials provided to the OIG, we saw no evidence that ATF 

entered into a written contract with the charter boat company. The absence of 

 130 It was not clear from the wording of the invoices and other relevant documents 

whether the charter boat company intended the second invoice for $46,354 to be an update of 

the first invoice for $19,251 or to be a charge in addition to the amount of the first invoice. 

121
a firm agreement with the company was bound to invite the kind of dispute in 

which ATF finds itself embroiled. 

Truscott said he did not become aware of the second invoice for $46,354 

until on or about January 31, 2006, when ATF received an inquiry from 

Senator Nelson about the outstanding bill. The DOJ Order in effect at the time 

of the event only required notification if an anti-deficiency violation had 

occurred. We found that there was no deficiency at that time and Truscott was 

under no duty to provide notice of a potential deficiency based upon the 

charter boat company’s claim for additional payment. 

Several witnesses we interviewed questioned the need for such extensive 

security at the event, including a patrol boat in the harbor suggested by 

Truscott. While we agree that some level of security was appropriate for this 

event, we question the amount of ATF resources used for security and the need 

for a patrol boat. However, the security arrangements did not cost the ATF 

additional money. While we question the need for such a level of security, we 

cannot conclude that it was improper for the ATF to arrange for this security at 

this event. 

VIII. Use of Representation Fund 

A. Allegation 

The anonymous complaint alleged that on numerous occasions Truscott 

invited individuals with no apparent connection to ATF activities to have lunch 

at U.S. government expense in his office or at nearby restaurants. The 

complaint alleged that this was a misuse of Congressional earmarked 

representation funds and therefore a violation of appropriations law. 

B. Evidence 

 

 ATF’s annual appropriations specially designate the amount to be used 

for official reception and “representation” expenses. The amount designated for 

this purpose was $18,000 for FY 2004, $25,000 for FY 2005, and $40,000 for 

FY 2006. 

 DOJ Executive Order 2110.31B, dated March 22, 2002, authorizes the 

representation funds of DOJ components to be used to: (1) extend courtesies 

to representatives of foreign countries, (2) fund official activities that further 

the interests of DOJ, or (3) host events and provide mementos to State and 

local officials and community leaders, in furtherance of the interests of DOJ. 

 ATF Order 1100.163A, dated August 10, 2004, prescribes procedures 

applicable to ATF’s representation fund. The Order states that the purpose of 

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the representation fund is “to pay for official, exceptional expenses in support 

of furthering an official mission of the Bureau that cannot be paid for from 

general appropriations.” The directive allows the representation fund to be 

used for “[e]ntertainment . . . to promote personal relationships necessary to 

enhance the performance of [ATF],” but not for “[s]trictly personal relationships 

serving merely the individual and not the Bureau as a whole.” 

 We reviewed ATF documents concerning representation fund 

expenditures for the period April 19, 2004 (Truscott’s arrival date), through 

February 21, 2006. We found 17 instances during this period in which the 

representation fund was used to pay for lunches that took place either in 

Truscott’s office or at a nearby restaurant. Participants in these lunches 

included representatives of nonprofit organizations such as the Boys & Girls 

Clubs of America and HEROES, Inc.; foreign dignitaries; former ATF 

management officials; U.S. Senate staffers; and employees of other federal 

agencies.131 These 17 expenditures totaled $392.66.132 

We found that three of these lunches were questionable uses of the 

representation fund, although they involved very small amounts of money. We 

discuss each of these lunches below. 

 On December 21, 2005, Truscott, his Chief of Staff, and two ATF 

Assistant Directors had lunch in Truscott’s office with a former DEA employee 

who was involved in a DEA museum.133 A National Football League (NFL) 

referee who was a friend of the former DEA employee also attended the lunch. 

Truscott used the representation fund to pay for both of the guests’ lunches. 

One of the Assistant Directors who was present told us that his directorate was 

responsible for developing ATF exhibits for the new Headquarters building and 

that at the lunch the former DEA employee provided information on how DEA’s 

museum operated. However, this Assistant Director, Truscott, and Truscott’s 

Chief of Staff told us that the NFL referee had no connection with ATF business 

and was basically just tagging along with the former DEA employee. We 

 131 HEROES (Honor Every Responsible Officer’s Eternal Sacrifice), Inc. is a nonprofit 

organization dedicated to aiding families of law enforcement officers and firefighters who have 

died in the line of duty in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 

132 Truscott stated during the OIG/Truscott meeting that no representation fund 

money was used to pay for any ATF employee’s lunch. 

133 None of the witnesses had a clear recollection of the nature of the former DEA 

employee’s involvement with the DEA museum. Truscott told us that this individual used to 

work for the DEA and was “instrumental still in the museum that DEA has.” Truscott’s Chief 

of Staff said that the individual was “associated” with the DEA museum and gift shop. One of 

the Assistant Directors said that this individual “headed up” DEA’s memorial foundation and 

was working on creating a traveling exhibit. The other Assistant Director said that this 

individual was “involved” with a DEA memorial project. 

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therefore question the use of the representation fund for the NFL referee’s 

lunch. The cost of the NFL referee’s lunch was $20.43. 

 In addition, Truscott had lunch in his office on June 20, 2005, with a 

Lockheed Martin employee. This individual’s lunch was paid for from the 

representation fund. Truscott told us that at the time of the lunch ATF had no 

current or pending business with Lockheed Martin. He said that he has known 

this individual for years from meeting her at various U.S. Secret Service events 

and that they met for lunch at her suggestion.134 He said that the reason they 

had lunch in his office was that he wanted to avoid having her pay for his 

lunch out of Lockheed Martin funds. He also told us that he spent most of the 

time at the lunch telling her about the great things going on at ATF. We were 

unable to discern why this lunch was “necessary to enhance the performance” 

of ATF. Moreover, according to Lee Lofthus, the DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney 

General for Administration, this lunch was problematic because it could give 

the appearance of ATF giving preferential treatment to a potential contractor. 

The cost of the Lockheed Martin employee’s lunch was $10.60. 

 On February 25, 2005, Truscott, Domenech, and a senior official in the 

Office of the Director had lunch in Truscott’s office with the former Director 

and former Deputy Director of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). Lofthus told 

us that DOJ does not use representation funds for intra-DOJ meetings or for 

intra-DOJ component head meetings. He said that the rationale behind this 

practice is that the purpose of the representation funds is to promote 

“relationships of value” with outsiders and that the Department has a preexisting “relationship of value” with its components. Lofthus also said that this 

was an unwritten policy, but was based on DOJ’s interpretation and 

application of the DOJ Order. Accordingly, we questioned this use of the 

representation fund. The total cost of the USMS officials’ lunches was $19.00. 

When we asked Truscott about his use of the representation fund for 

lunches, he told us that “scheduling requests” are sent to the Chief Counsel’s 

Office for review and approval for all of Truscott’s meetings, including 

lunches.135 Truscott also told us that the responsibility for ensuring that 

 134 Truscott stated that the Lockheed Martin employee “has an affiliation with law 

enforcement” and speculated that she “likes to maintain professional relationships with people 

in the law enforcement community.” Truscott did not elaborate on the employee’s affiliation 

with law enforcement. 

135 Truscott reiterated this point during the OIG/Truscott meeting, and stated that any 

lapse in this process was due to the Chief Counsel’s failure to review the scheduling request or 

his Administrative Assistant’s failure to make note of the scheduling request, although Truscott 

said he takes ultimate responsibility for any lapse. 

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representation funds are properly used belongs to the fund custodian and with 

Domenech, who is the approving official for the expenditures. 

However, Truscott’s Executive Assistant told us that Truscott did not 

specify that he wanted scheduling requests approved by the Chief Counsel’s 

Office for lunches until the end of January 2006. In addition, we observed that 

the representation fund file contained documentation of only one instance 

where the Chief Counsel’s Office provided a legal opinion on the propriety of a 

lunch. Moreover, ATF’s Chief Counsel told us that he had no specific 

recollection of discussing the propriety of any representation lunch 

expenditures with Truscott. In addition, an e-mail from an attorney in the 

Chief Counsel’s Office to Domenech dated March 21, 2006, stated “We do not 

normally see [representation] fund charges before they occur.”136

Domenech told us that because he is the approving official for the 

representation fund, he tried to ensure that Truscott was aware of the proper 

use of the fund. He said that he told Truscott on at least half a dozen 

occasions that there had to be an official reason for the government to pay for a 

lunch and that the reason had to be more than Truscott’s desire to have a 

lunch. Domenech told us that typically Truscott would invite him to the 

lunches and ask him for input regarding the guests, and, if he did not attend, 

brief him afterwards on the results of the lunch. He said that typically Truscott 

would also ask one of the Assistant Directors to put together a briefing paper 

regarding the organization whose representative was coming to lunch. 

Domenech said that in December 2005 Truscott stopped inviting him to or 

informing him of the results of the lunches and stopped requesting briefing 

papers to prepare him for the lunches. Accordingly, Truscott did not provide 

Domenech with details about every lunch.137 

According to the Deputy Assistant Director for the ATF’s Office of 

Management, she and Domenech are responsible for certifying that the 

representation funds are used correctly. She told us that when certifying a 

particular expenditure, she reviews the overall appropriateness of the 

expenditure. Specifically, she determines whether the expenditure falls within 

the guidelines for allowable expenditures and is not something specifically 

 136 The e-mail also stated that the ATF’s Financial Management Division was in the 

process of rewriting its representation fund order and that it had agreed with Counsel’s request 

that Counsel be consulted before a representation fund charge is processed. The e-mail also 

indicated that Counsel was planning to provide training to ATF’s senior executive staff on the 

use of the representation fund. 

137 As noted earlier, Domenech was present at the lunch that we questioned involving 

USMS officials. He was not present at the lunch with the Lockheed Martin employee. He told 

us that he was not present at and had not been briefed on the lunch involving the former DEA 

employee and the NFL referee. We did not ask Domenech whether he was aware of, or had 

been briefed on the lunch involving the Lockheed Martin employee. 

125
prohibited under ATF policy. She said that it was not possible for either her or 

Domenech to know whether all of Truscott’s lunch meetings were related to 

ATF business. Therefore, they had to rely on Truscott to make that judgment. 

C. Findings 

 Our review identified three instances where Truscott hosted lunches in 

his office that did not appear to “promote personal relationships necessary to 

enhance the performance of [ATF]” as required under ATF Order 1100.163A. 

The total cost of the questionable expenditures was $50.03. According to Lee 

Lofthus, the DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration, there is 

no “de minimis” exception to improper usage of the representation fund based 

on the amount of money involved. 

Once again, we were troubled by Truscott’s attempts to shift 

responsibility for the propriety of the expenditures to the Chief Counsel’s Office 

and Domenech. As the Director of ATF, Truscott was responsible for ensuring 

that his use of appropriated representation funds was in accordance with DOJ 

and ATF regulations. We found that despite his assertions to the contrary, 

Truscott rarely sought Counsel’s opinions on the appropriateness of his lunch 

meetings. 

IX. Creation of a Hostile Work Environment 

A. Allegation 

The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott required two female 

administrative staff members, a GS-12 and GS-13, to arrange for and serve 

lunch to him and his guests in the Director’s office. The two staff members 

were instructed to announce that “Lunch is served,” causing them humiliation 

and forcing them to engage in a work activity that was outside the scope of 

their duties. 

B. Evidence 

 As discussed in the previous section of this report, Truscott frequently 

invited guests to his office for lunch. According to several witnesses, initially 

the lunches were modest, consisting of cold cut sandwiches and chips on 

Styrofoam plates. In approximately December 2005, after Truscott told his 

executive staff at a meeting that he wanted to “kick it up a notch,” the lunches 

escalated into more elaborate events consisting of hot meals on china. 

One of the Administrative Assistants who served the lunches was 

Truscott’s Administrative Assistant and the other was Domenech’s 

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Administrative Assistant.138 Both women confirmed that they prepared for, 

served, and cleaned up after the lunches.139 

Truscott’s Administrative Assistant told us she typically prepared for the 

lunches by laying out a linen tablecloth and then setting up china, glassware, 

and silverware. She said she did not recall Truscott directly asking her to do 

this. She told us that her predecessor had handled the lunches for Truscott 

and had given her instructions on how to prepare the table settings, and so she 

believed she was expected to do so as well. She said she also was responsible 

for retrieving ice from the basement of the ATF building for beverages. 

Truscott’s Administrative Assistant told us that as the lunches grew 

more elaborate, her duties increased. She stated that Truscott’s additional 

instructions, which were relayed to her through Truscott’s Assistant, included 

laying out the condiments, sauces, salads, and desserts before the guests 

arrived, and then waiting a specified amount of time before serving the main 

dish. After the meals, she and the other Administrative Assistant served coffee 

to Truscott and his guests, and then the two cleaned up. She stated that 

Truscott usually offered to help clean up, but that she and the other 

Administrative Assistant would tell Truscott that they could handle it. 

Truscott’s Administrative Assistant told us that at one point Truscott’s 

Assistant told her that Truscott would like her to say, “Lunch is served, sir.” 

She said she recalled making this announcement at only one lunch. She said 

she found this request “a little bold” and “somewhat demeaning.” She also 

stated that “he’s the Director, he’s my boss, so I do what I’m asked to do.” 

Truscott’s Assistant confirmed the Administrative Assistant’s account of 

the lunches. Specifically, he told us that Truscott gave him instructions to 

pass along to the Administrative Assistant as to how to set the table and how 

long to wait before serving the food to Truscott and his guests. He further told 

us that Truscott had asked him to instruct the Administrative Assistant to 

announce “Lunch is served, Director,” on at least one occasion.140 Truscott’s 

 

(continued) 

138 Truscott’s Administrative Assistant began working for him in January 2005. 

Domenech’s Administrative Assistant began work in March 2005. 

139 Our review of the representation fund log and supporting documents indicates that 

three hot lunches were served in Truscott’s office between November 29, 2005, and 

January 19, 2006. The lunches consisted of salad, bread, baked lasagna and ziti, and 

cheesecake. The food had been brought in from a nearby restaurant. 

140 During the OIG/Truscott meeting, Truscott disputed that he had instructed his 

Assistant to tell the Administrative Assistant to announce that “Lunch is served.” Truscott 

stated that his Assistant had asked if it would be permissible to interrupt Truscott’s meetings 

in his office with the lunch guests because the Assistant needed to know when to break into 

the meeting when lunch was ready. According to Truscott, he agreed that staff could interrupt 

127
Assistant also told us that Truscott told him to instruct the Administrative 

Assistants to be sure that the food was warm when it was served. 

Domenech’s Administrative Assistant said she was responsible for the 

same general responsibilities described by Truscott’s Administrative Assistant. 

She also said that she and Truscott’s Administrative Assistant took turns 

taking the linen tablecloth home to have it dry cleaned. She said that she put 

the cost of the dry cleaning on her government credit card. 

 Truscott’s Executive Assistant stated that both staffers had come to 

speak to her regarding the lunches. The Executive Assistant said it was her 

impression that they did not like serving the lunches, but felt it would have 

been inappropriate to raise any objections. She told us one of the 

Administrative Assistants was upset because Truscott had once complained 

that the food was not hot enough. The Executive Assistant also told us that 

both staffers participated in picking up and plating the lunches even before 

Truscott elevated the meals to hot food.141 

 Truscott told us that it was not his idea to have staffers in his office 

present the lunches. He said that initially the predecessor to his current 

Administrative Assistant had offered to pick up and set out his lunches for 

him, and that her successor – one of the two current Administrative Assistants 

– continued the practice without objection and “seemed to be amenable to it.” 

Truscott said he often helped clean up and that “more often than not, they 

stopped me from doing that, so . . . it was that sort of behavior on their part 

that made me think that they were okay with it.” 

Truscott said that he never gave the two Administrative Assistants any 

direction or made any suggestions regarding the preparation of the lunches in 

terms of plating the food, heating it, or announcing in any particular fashion 

that the food was being served. He stated that he was unaware that the 

Administrative Assistants were heating up the food and that he did not think 

that they spent a lot of time working on the lunches. However, Truscott’s 

Assistant also told us that Truscott told him to instruct the Administrative 

Assistants to be sure that the food was warm when it was served. 

We asked Truscott whether he viewed serving lunches as a part of his 

Administrative Assistant’s duties. He responded that “you probably wouldn’t 

find it on her position description,” but he believed she was “fine with it.” He 

added that if the lunches took time out of the Administrative Assistant’s 

 

the meeting when the food was ready, but that any directive to require the Administrative 

Assistants to announce that “lunch is served” came from the Assistant, not Truscott. 

141 One witness told us that sometimes Executive Protection Branch special agents 

were sent to pick up the food orders from the restaurant. 

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schedule, he thought that was “in the best interests of ATF.” Truscott 

reiterated that he often helped to clean up the dishes and stated that some 

might ask whether that was a good use of his time as the Director. 

We asked Truscott whether it was reasonable to assume that a GS-13 

Administrative Assistant would voice discomfort to the Director of ATF with 

respect to her lunch responsibilities. Truscott responded that if she were 

uncomfortable, she would have told either his Executive Assistant or 

Domenech and it would “make its way” back to him. Truscott told us that after 

he met with the Associate Deputy Attorney General on January 30, 2006, and 

learned of the anonymous complaint, he apologized to both Administrative 

Assistants and ceased the practice. He added that “I still believe in my heart 

that the lunches I had and the work that [the Administrative Assistant] did was 

in the best interest of ATF.” 

One of the Administrative Assistants told us that preparing for and 

cleaning up after the lunches was very time consuming and that she had to 

stay late to complete other work as a result. The other Administrative 

Assistant told us the lunch responsibilities did not interfere with her ability to 

complete her other tasks. She stated that she has worked for two political 

appointees before and had never had to serve lunches. She stated that she 

was not told that serving lunch was to be a part of her duties with ATF, and 

she found it a little unusual. 

C. Findings 

We concluded that Truscott encouraged or allowed the Administrative 

Assistants in his office to pick up meals, arrange the table settings, heat the 

meals, serve the meals, and clean up afterward. In addition, Truscott conveyed 

to his Assistant his wishes as to how the Administrative Assistants should 

present the meals. 

We believe that serving lunches was not among the duties reasonably to 

be expected of Administrative Assistants in the Office of the Director. In 

addition, we found that it was not reasonable for Truscott to assume from the 

Administrative Assistants’ acquiescence in performing these tasks and rejection 

of his attempts to help clean up that they were comfortable with these 

responsibilities. We believe Truscott failed to grasp how the supervisorsubordinate relationship might inhibit his subordinates’ willingness to express 

their discomfort with his expectations regarding the lunches. 

We believe that Truscott exercised poor judgment by placing his 

subordinates in the demeaning position of serving lunch to him and his guests. 

We concluded that Truscott’s expectations for the role of his Administrative 

Assistants in this regard were inappropriate. 

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Finally, we were troubled by Truscott’s statement to us that he never 

gave the two Administrative Assistants any direction or made any suggestions 

regarding the preparation of the lunches in terms of plating the food, heating it, 

or announcing in any particular fashion that the food was being served. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us that Truscott instructed him to tell the 

Administrative Assistants to set the table, make sure the food was hot, and 

even to announce that “lunch is served.” The Administrative Assistants also 

told us that Truscott conveyed his instructions to them through the Assistant. 

X. Personnel Practices 

A. Allegation 

 The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott selected a longtime 

personal friend and former colleague at the Secret Service for an Assistant 

Director position at ATF. According to the complaint, Truscott personally 

suggested to the former Secret Service official that he apply for the position and 

selected him for it even though he was not among the candidates recommended 

by ATF’s Executive Resources Board. In addition, the complaint alleged that 

Truscott gave the former Secret Service official an “Outstanding” job 

performance rating and a significant monetary award after nine months of 

employment, despite a low performance assessment of the former Secret 

Service official’s directorate in an independent management study. The 

complaint alleged that these practices were violations of the federal civil service 

laws. 

B. Evidence 

1. Truscott’s relationship/association with the former 

Secret Service official 

Truscott told us that he has known the former Secret Service official 

(who we sometimes refer to in this report as “former official”) since 

approximately 1980, when the two worked together as investigators with the 

New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety. Truscott stated that he 

joined the Secret Service in 1981, and the former Secret Service official joined 

the Secret Service about a year or two later. Truscott stated that he did not 

have much interaction with the former official at the Secret Service because 

they were usually posted in different cities. 

The former Secret Service official told us that he worked for Truscott at 

the Secret Service when Truscott was an Assistant Director and the former 

official was the SAC of one of Truscott’s divisions. The former official told us he 

had regular contact with Truscott during this period and that Truscott was 

familiar with his work. 

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Both Truscott and the former Secret Service official told us they had little 

contact beyond work and events such as retirement dinners. Truscott stated 

that they do not “get together socially.” 

2. Hiring the former Secret Service official 

In July 2004, a few months after Truscott was sworn in as ATF Director, 

the former Secret Service official applied to ATF for the position of Assistant 

Director/Certified Information Officer (CIO) for the Office of Science and 

Technology (OST). The former Secret Service official stated that he is a certified 

CIO and was the Deputy CIO at the Secret Service at the time he applied for 

the ATF position. The former official stated that Truscott called him to tell him 

about the opening, although the former official said he also may have seen the 

position advertised on the USAJobs website.142 Truscott also told us that he 

contacted the former official about the opening. 

The former Secret Service official was interviewed by a 3-person ATF 

panel for the position.143 The panel was drawn from the members of ATF’s 

Executive Resources Board (ERB), which is comprised of the Senior Leadership 

Team, and also included a DOJ senior manager.144 The ERB panel interviewed 

a total of ten applicants, one of whom was recommended for the position. The 

selectee was hired and entered on duty on October 17, 2004. 

Truscott stated that he did not hire the former Secret Service official 

because “he was not the best person for that position.” The former official said 

that Truscott told him to keep an eye on the USAJobs website because 

additional positions might be coming available. 

In September 2004, the former Secret Service official applied for the 

position of Assistant Director for the recently created Office of Strategic 

Intelligence and Information (OSII). Truscott told us he had suggested that the 

former official apply for that position as well. The former official stated to us 

that he applied upon seeing the job announcement online and only heard from 

Truscott about the position after he already had submitted his paperwork to 

ATF. The former official told us that while his application with ATF was 

 142 A USAJobs vacancy announcement for the position stated that the job was open to 

all federal civilian employees or candidates having Senior Executive Service (SES) 

reinstatement eligibility. The former Secret Service official received his SES certificate on 

April 22, 2004. 

143 The panel was composed of two Assistant Directors, including one Assistant 

Director who is no longer with ATF, and DOJ’s Chief Information Officer. 

144 According to Domenech, the Executive Resources Board is convened to review 

applicants for SES-level vacancies. As Deputy Director, Domenech is the chair of the ERB and 

selects the interview panels. 

131
pending, he retired from the Secret Service in October 2004 and took a job as a 

GS-15 Supervisory Special Agent with the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA) Criminal Investigative Division. The former official stated that he decided 

to accept the EPA position instead of waiting for a decision on his ATF 

application because the EPA provided him a bona fide offer. 

The former Secret Service official was interviewed for the OSII Assistant 

Director position on October 14, 2004, by an ERB panel composed of two 

current and one former Assistant Director. The panel interviewed six 

candidates for the position, including four applicants from within ATF (the 

internal ATF candidates). According to Truscott, all applicants selected to be 

interviewed by the panel had already been screened by a subgroup of the ERB 

to ensure they were technically qualified for the job. 

One of the Assistant Directors on the interview panel, who had also 

served on the interview panel for the OST vacancy, stated that when the panel 

asked the former Secret Service official why he was interested in the OSII 

position, he stated that Truscott had called him and asked him to apply and 

acknowledged that he did not have much experience in the intelligence arena. 

This Assistant Director told us that he did not think the panel made a formal 

ranking of the applicants, but that he would have ranked the former Secret 

Service official no higher than fourth. He said he considered the former official 

a “non-selection” due to his lack of intelligence experience. 

Another Assistant Director, who served as the chair of the panel, also 

told us that he would have ranked the former Secret Service official fourth out 

of the six applicants. This Assistant Director also said that the former official 

told the panel that he had applied at Truscott’s suggestion. The Assistant 

Director said the former official’s responses to the panel’s questions were not 

good and that the Assistant Director did not think that the former official really 

wanted the position. Both Assistant Directors told us that they liked the 

former official personally and had a lot of respect for his “professionalism.”145 

The panel ultimately recommended one of the internal ATF candidates 

for the position. According to one of the Assistant Directors on the interview 

panel, there was a lot of internal disagreement over this decision regarding 

whether the internal ATF candidate had the right management qualifications 

for the position.

 The Assistant Director chairing the panel said that as the chair of the 

panel it was his responsibility to provide Truscott and Domenech with the 

panel’s recommendations. The Assistant Director said that he told Truscott 

 145 We did not interview the third Assistant Director on the interview panel because she 

had left ATF prior to the OIG’s initiation of the investigation. 

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and Domenech that the panel’s first choice was one of the internal ATF 

candidates. He said that Domenech did not agree with this selection because 

of “personality” reasons. 

 The Assistant Director stated that Truscott then called him in to his 

office and asked who else the panel had picked. He said that he told Truscott 

and Domenech that the number two candidate was someone from the 

Congressional Research Service whom he said had a good intelligence 

background with the Department of Defense, the FBI, and on Capitol Hill, but 

who lacked law enforcement experience.146 He said that Truscott then asked, 

“Who else?” He said that he gave the name of the third candidate, another of 

the internal ATF candidates. He said that Truscott then asked him how the 

former Secret Service official ranked. He said that he told Truscott that the 

former official did not do well and that he had admitted to the panel that he 

had no intelligence experience, but that he could learn. According to the 

Assistant Director, Truscott said that he knew the former official and was 

familiar with his work on intelligence matters. The Assistant Director told us 

that Truscott then said that he was selecting the former official for the position. 

 Domenech confirmed that he had “concerns” about the selection of the 

internal ATF candidate who had been ranked first for the position. He said 

that because of some personnel issues involving the individual, he could not 

concur with the panel’s recommendation. Domenech said that Truscott asked 

him whether he was bound by the recommendation to select the internal ATF 

candidate and Domenech answered that he was free to select anyone he 

deemed appropriate. 

 Domenech said that Truscott told him he had based his decision to hire 

the former Secret Service official on his knowledge of the former official’s skills. 

Domenech said that it was an “open secret” during the interview process that 

the former official and Truscott knew each other, but added that he did not 

become aware that they had known each other since 1980 until after the 

former official had been selected. Domenech told us that at that time he would 

have either asked Truscott to withdraw himself from the selection process or 

seek the advice of ATF counsel as to whether his participation in the selection 

process was appropriate had Domenech known the length of Truscott’s 

association with the former official. 

 

 The Assistant Director who served on the interview panels for both the 

OST and the OSII vacancies also told us that he did not become aware of the 

length of Truscott’s association with the former Secret Service official until after 

 146 The selection of one of the internal ATF candidates as the number one candidate 

and the Congressional Research Service candidate as number two is memorialized in an 

October 15, 2004, document summarizing the panel’s recommendations. 

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the former official had been hired. This Assistant Director stated that he 

believed Truscott should have recused himself from all personnel decisions 

concerning the former official. He also stated that his low ranking of the 

former official was based solely on the former official’s qualifications, and 

would not have been affected had he known of the former official’s long 

association with Truscott. 

The former Secret Service official told us that in late November 2004 he 

got a call from Truscott telling him that the ERB had recommended him, that 

the Deputy Director concurred, and that he had accepted their 

recommendation and selected him for the position. The former Secret Service 

official assumed his duties as Assistant Director for OSII on December 27, 

2004. 

One of the Assistant Directors on the interview panel told us that this 

was the first time in his experience in which the ERB’s recommendation was 

ignored. Another Assistant Director on the panel told us that Truscott 

“usually” followed the recommendation of the interview panel. 

Truscott told us that he hired the former Secret Service official because 

“he is a leader, first and foremost.” Truscott stated that a major component of 

the OSII directorate is information technology and that “[t]here are few people, 

if any, in the organization that have the wherewithal and the experience that 

[the former official] has” in that regard. He stated that “[the former official] is 

one of the finest assistant directors at ATF today and it was a great decision 

that I made to hire him.” Truscott stated that he had reviewed the other 

applicants’ qualifications before selecting the former official. Truscott said he 

thought the former official had not been selected by the interview panel 

because he was “an outsider, he doesn’t have the ATF background.” 

Truscott also stated that if he had wanted to bring the former Secret 

Service official into ATF, he could have done so when the AD position for the 

OST directorate was open. He stated that he did not know at that time that an 

SES position for the new OSII directorate would be approved by the Justice 

Department. We reviewed documents which indicated that the vacancy 

announcement for the OSII position was dated September 8, 2004, 

approximately two months after the former official applied for the OST position 

and two weeks after his August 25, 2004, interview for that position. 

3. The former Secret Service official’s performance 

evaluation 

Domenech told us that he is responsible for reviewing the performance 

evaluations of all SES employees, but that Truscott must approve them. He 

stated that at the end of FY 2005, he gave the former Secret Service official a 

rating of “Fully Successful.” He stated that Truscott elevated the rating to 

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“Outstanding.” Domenech said that he could never give an “Outstanding” 

rating to anyone who had been on a job for less than a year because “there’s 

just not enough to base that on.”147 

Domenech said that the former Secret Service official received a bonus 

and a salary adjustment as a result of Truscott’s action. A Standard Form 

50-B (Notice of Personnel Action) shows that in December 2005 the former 

official received an SES performance award of $11,648. Another document 

indicated that the former official was recommended for a pay adjustment of 

$5,197. The former official told us that he received a pay increase of 

approximately $6,500. Truscott confirmed that Domenech had recommended 

a “Fully Successful” for the former official but that because Truscott believed 

the former official “was functioning at a higher level than that,” he boosted his 

rating to “Outstanding.” Truscott stated that he raised the ratings of at least 

two other managers. 

In 2005, a non-profit government consulting firm was retained by ATF to 

perform an organizational assessment.148 Among other conclusions, the 

assessment found that only 17 percent of ATF’s field division SACs found the 

work of OSII’s Intelligence Research Specialists to be timely and of quality. The 

assessment noted that there was no “clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, 

products” between the intelligence support provided by Field Operations and by 

OSII. 

The results of the assessment were presented to the Senior Leadership 

Team, including Truscott, in August 2005, before Truscott raised the former 

Secret Service official’s performance rating. One Assistant Director cited this 

finding in the assessment to us as evidence that the former official did not 

deserve a performance award. The former Secret Service official stated that the 

results of the assessment reflected the frustrations of the SACs based on what 

they believed ATF’s intelligence capability was versus what they thought it 

should be. The former official also questioned the accuracy of the SAC survey, 

adding that the satisfaction rate would be 80 percent if the survey were taken 

again more currently. 

C. Findings 

We concluded that Truscott acted within his authority in hiring the 

former Secret Service official and in elevating his performance rating. Based on 

Domenech’s statement to us in his capacity as the chair of the Executive 

 147 Domenech stated that he gave 7 “Outstanding” performance ratings out of the 

approximately 28 SES employees he evaluated at the end of FY 2005. 

148 The assessment considered whether ATF was operationally efficient with respect to 

its mission, legislative mandates, and administrative priorities. 

135
Resources Board, Truscott was not bound by the interview panel’s 

recommendation and was free to select from the full pool of applicants. 

Domenech himself rejected the panel’s first choice for the position based on his 

prior experience with that applicant. 

We also noted that Truscott did not hire the former Secret Service official 

for the Assistant Director position in the OST directorate. The former official 

had applied for that position, at least in part at Truscott’s suggestion, 

approximately two months before the OSII vacancy was advertised. Truscott 

selected another applicant for the OST vacancy, undercutting the allegation 

that Truscott’s actions amounted to preferential treatment for a friend. 

We considered this allegation in the context of the merit system 

principles applicable to executive agencies, as set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b), 

and concluded that the process which led to the hiring of the former Secret 

Service official was the result of “fair and open competition,” and that Truscott 

made his selection on the basis of his assessment of the “relative ability, 

knowledge, and skills” of the applicant.149 That Truscott was familiar with the 

former official’s qualifications as a result of his longstanding professional 

relationship with him did not disqualify the former official from consideration 

or selection. As stated in Merit Systems Protection Board v. Nichols, 36 

M.S.P.R. 445 (1988), “a manager is as free to hire a fully qualified friend as she 

is an unknown.” Id. at 465. 

We also considered whether Truscott and the former Secret Service 

official had a “covered relationship” under 5 CFR § 2635.502 (Personal and 

business relationships), which would have required Truscott not to participate 

in personnel decisions concerning the former official. The provision describes 

several categories of familial and business affiliations, but did not include a 

description of former colleagues. See 5 CFR § 2635.502(b)(1)(i)-(v) and 

examples cited therein. As a result, Truscott was not foreclosed from 

participating in personnel decisions involving the former official. 

Regarding Truscott’s decision to elevate the former Secret Service 

official’s rating to “Outstanding,” we noted that roughly a quarter of the SES 

managers received an “Outstanding” rating for the FY 2005 rating period. 

According to Truscott, he elevated the ratings of at least two other managers in 

addition to the former official, although it is not clear he did so during the 

 149 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(1) states: 

(1) Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate 

sources in an endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of 

society, and selection and advancement should be determined solely on 

the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills, after fair and open 

competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity. 

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same FY 2005 rating period. While Domenech told us that it was his opinion 

that such a rating should not be given to employees with less than one year on 

the job, it would be unreasonable to hold Truscott to Domenech’s management 

philosophy. 

In sum, we concluded that Truscott did not act improperly either by 

hiring the former Secret Service official or by awarding him a higher job 

performance evaluation than had initially been given. 

XI. Use of Visual Information Branch Resources 

A. Allegation 

The anonymous complaint alleged that Truscott used ATF’s Visual 

Information Branch (VIB) resources, particularly its photographers, for self 

promotion without regard for the appropriate use of VIB staff time and 

resources. The complaint stated that Truscott routinely was accompanied by 

one and often two photographers who were expected to be with him at all 

times. The complaint cited the September 2005 IACP Conference as an 

instance in which two photographers were assigned to cover Truscott. The 

anonymous letter also alleged that Truscott’s excessive use of VIB 

photographers impacted the VIB’s ability to perform legitimate mission critical 

tasks, and the drain on the VIB’s resources became so excessive that other 

directorates using its services had to pay for the VIB’s travel expenses. 

The complaint further alleged that Truscott directed ATF to produce a 

glossy 35-page publication about ATF at a cost of over $60,000 when the same 

material more cost-effectively could have been posted on ATF’s intraweb. 

Lastly, the complaint alleged that Truscott decided to have a video produced 

about ATF at a cost of $80,000. The complaint alleged that funding for the 

video has been at the expense of funding for core mission functions. 

B. Evidence 

ATF’s Visual Information Branch (VIB) is in the Office of Science and 

Technology (OST) directorate.150 At the time of the complaint, the VIB had a 

staff of 12, including a Branch Chief, audio visual production and graphics 

specialists, and two photographers.151 The VIB mission is to produce, or 

coordinate production of, graphics, audio visual, and photographic products for 

 150 The VIB recently was renamed Visual Information Services, but is referred to as the 

“VIB” in this report for consistency purposes. 

151 Based on our review of employee rosters, a third photographer, a contractor, is no 

longer with the VIB. 

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use by ATF in training, public relations, congressional hearings, and in support 

of litigation. 

The VIB Chief told us that he has noticed a “tightening of the belt” in the 

VIB since he became branch chief in December 2003. He stated that the VIB’s 

FY 2006 total budget is only 75 percent of its actual FY 2005 expenditures. We 

also interviewed two other VIB employees, one a photographer and another a 

visual information specialist. The photographer told us that the VIB has found 

it increasingly difficult to hire new personnel. The visual information specialist 

told us he did not notice any change in the VIB’s operations since Truscott’s 

arrival. 

The FY 2006 Impact Statement for OST indicated that the VIB will 

continue to support ATF’s needs “within available resources.”152 The Impact 

Statement further indicated that “additional services above and beyond 

available funds shall be paid by customers,” and that the VIB’s services will be 

reduced where travel is required. The Assistant Director for OST told us that 

this statement was based on a “worst-case scenario” and was the result of both 

a projected agency-wide increase in demand for the VIB’s services coupled with 

a reduction in the VIB’s budget. The OST Assistant Director stated that the 

VIB has not had to “charge” any other directorates for its services through at 

least the first three quarters of FY 2006. 

The VIB Chief told us that requests on behalf of Truscott for VIB’s 

services sometimes came from staff within Truscott’s office, but more often 

come from the Office of Public and Governmental Affairs (PGA).153 The VIB 

Chief stated that the VIB is “overloaded” with work and that Truscott and his 

intermediaries have contributed to this. He stated that the situation is 

exacerbated by the tendency of the Director’s Office to not understand the time 

it takes his staff to turn around an assignment. The OST Assistant Director 

also told us that the Office of the Director gives the VIB very short deadlines for 

its requests. 

1. Use of VIB photographers 

Domenech told us that Truscott required two photographers from the 

VIB to “mirror his every movement” at both the 2005 IACP Conference and at 

 152 The OST Impact Statement was prepared in December 2005 as part of an exercise 

by all ATF directorates to project how cuts to FY 2006 operational funds could affect ATF 

operations. The Impact Statements are discussed in more detail in Section I of this chapter. 

153 A review of requests for VIB services between June 2005 and February 2006 

indicates that, of 1,462 requests, 102 were from the Office of the Director and 385 were from 

PGA. The other requests were from other ATF offices and directorates. According to the VIB 

Chief, the VIB services approximately 2,200 project requests per year. 

138
the prior year’s IACP event in Los Angeles. Domenech stated that Truscott 

thought it was very important for ATF employees to see him on the ATF website 

and in newsletters “so the employees would feel connected to the activities of 

the Director.” 

 Truscott told us that he did not know whether he had requested any 

photographers for the IACP Conference, although he stated there probably was 

a photographer at both the 2004 and 2005 events. Truscott stated that he 

travels frequently and that “rarely, if ever have I asked a photographer to come 

on the trip.” However, Truscott also stated that “there may have been 

conversations” about having a photographer at an IACP event, adding, 

“Sometimes you’ll find when a Director says, is there going to be a 

photographer, everybody runs out and gets a photographer. So to the extent I 

may have said ‘Is there going to be a photographer there,’ to take that to mean 

that I asked for a photographer, it is possible that that happened.” Truscott 

said it was in the best interests of ATF and of the government to have a 

photographer present at the IACP Conference. 

Regarding the 2005 IACP Conference, the VIB Chief told us that he had 

dispatched two photographers to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina to 

document the work of ATF, but was then told by the OST Assistant Director to 

bring the photographers to Miami Beach to (as the Chief stated) photograph 

Truscott “schmoozing at the IACP Conference.” The OST Assistant Director 

told us that the order to take the photographers out of New Orleans came from 

Domenech, who did not want ATF to appear to be “grandstanding.” Domenech 

confirmed that he had ordered the photographers out of New Orleans because 

he did not want ATF to be seen as exploiting a tragedy in that manner. The 

OST Assistant Director said he did not think Truscott was involved in the 

decision to withdraw the photographers from New Orleans. 

Ultimately, only one photographer went to Miami Beach from New 

Orleans. That photographer told us he was the only ATF photographer at the 

ATF reception on the yacht discussed previously in Section VII of this chapter. 

He said that the other photographer took annual leave and remained in New 

Orleans. The photographer also stated that he was planning to go to Miami 

Beach from New Orleans even before being ordered to leave New Orleans. 

Truscott’s Assistant told us he also recalled only one photographer at the 

event. 

 The photographer told us that just before the 2004 IACP Conference, he 

had been asked by Truscott’s Assistant to be Truscott’s photographer.154 The 

photographer stated that Truscott’s Assistant told him Truscott had specifically 

 154 The photographer told us that he was hired by ATF in 1997 as ATF’s first “official” 

photographer. 

139
requested him over another VIB photographer. The Assistant told us he had 

frequent contact with the photographer in connection with requests from the 

Office of the Director, but that he did not recall Truscott ever specifically 

requesting this photographer. 

Truscott said that he was aware of the allegation that he takes two 

photographers with him when he travels, and stated that “that simply is not 

the case.” He stated that no photographer from ATF has gone along with him 

when he travels. He also said that his Assistant had a camera that he used 

while traveling with Truscott. Truscott said that “as you might imagine, when 

you go around and visit, people like to have a picture with the Director.” 

In contrast with Truscott’s statement that no photographer accompanies 

him when he traveled, the VIB photographer stated that he has been requested 

to travel to cover Truscott’s events, although he has never flown with Truscott. 

In addition to the two IACP Conferences, the photographer also traveled to 

Phoenix in April 2005 to cover Truscott’s speech at a U.S. Attorney’s 

Conference. 

The photographer stated that in late 2005 he was told to get a 

passport.155 The photographer said that the OST Assistant Director told the 

VIB Chief that Truscott really liked having him covering his events. According 

to the photographer, the OST Assistant Director told him that he envisioned 

having the photographer spending 80 to 90 percent of his time covering 

Truscott. The photographer told us that he suggested hiring a GS-7 or GS-9 to 

handle this responsibility. He stated that he saw his job as servicing the field 

divisions and that he refused to spend 90 percent of his time traveling with 

Truscott. 

The photographer stated that Truscott is never accompanied by more 

than one photographer when he travels. Truscott’s Assistant also told us that 

only one photographer has ever been assigned to cover Truscott. The 

photographer said that on two occasions the VIB has been asked to have two 

photographers follow the executive staff touring the new Headquarters building 

site.156 The OST Assistant Director told us that he has seen two VIB 

 155 Truscott’s Assistant told us that he was the one who told the photographer to get a 

passport. The Assistant stated that this was his idea, based on his assumption that the 

photographer would be asked to cover assignments overseas. 

156 The VIB photographer also stated that there are photo boards on each floor of ATF 

Headquarters that are constantly rotated and that someone from PGA is always asking the VIB 

whether they have shot anything new. An Assistant Director told us that there were pictures of 

Truscott on every floor of the ATF Headquarters building and in the elevator banks, but that 

the pictures were taken down and replaced with pictures of ATF employees shortly after these 

allegations surfaced. 

140
photographers at some ATF events, including holiday receptions. The 

Assistant told us that there may have been more than one photographer at the 

2004 IACP Conference. 

 The VIB Chief stated that the VIB does a fair amount of “grin and grip” 

photography, which consists of taking pictures of various officials shaking 

hands with Truscott at events. Truscott said it was “normal” to have a 

photographer document certain events in Washington, D.C., such as awards 

ceremonies, although he had not issued such a request. 

The VIB photographer stated that he was told to be unobtrusive at 

events. He said that Truscott’s Assistant has told him to take as many pictures 

as he can, but not to look like he is following Truscott.157 He said that his level 

of involvement also depends on who else is present at the event. He said that if 

there are higher ranked individuals at the party, such as the FBI Director, the 

DEA Administrator, or the Attorney General, Truscott does not want to “show 

them up” by having him take photographs. He said that if, however, Truscott 

feels like he is the “big dog” in the room, he will want photographs taken. 

2. ATF publication and video 

 In November 2004, ATF published a 36-page booklet entitled “ATF our 

future your role.” The booklet contains an introductory statement by Truscott, 

followed by a summary of ATF’s missions, a description of basic ATF 

operations, charts showing employee and budget statistics, and plans for 

“strategic growth.” The narratives are interspersed with photographs and 

graphs. 

The Chief of the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) told us she was actively 

involved in the booklet project. She stated that the publication was only 

distributed internally and that the idea for it came out of discussions between 

herself, Truscott, Domenech, and maybe Truscott’s Executive Assistant. She 

said the purpose of the publication was to inform ATF employees about 

Truscott’s “vision” for ATF and on their role as ATF employees. According to 

the OPA Chief, the text, script, photographs, and the coordination for the 

booklet were done by the VIB, and the overall design was contracted out. 

Contractor documents, which refer to the project as “The Director’s Vision 

Book,” indicate that the cost of producing the booklet was $24,018. 

The OPA Chief told us she attended several meetings on the project. She 

said that she gave Truscott a number of proposals and options on how to 

disseminate the information, including the printed booklet, a PDF file on the 

 157 The Chief of the VIB also told us that Truscott’s Assistant worked closely with the 

VIB in setting up photo shoots for Truscott’s appearances. 

141
ATF intraweb, or a DVD that could be distributed. She said that Truscott was 

aware there would be a cost savings if they posted the information online, but 

that he thought it was important for employees to have something physical to 

read, to keep on their desks, and to be able to reference. 

The OPA Chief also told us that ATF retained a contractor to produce a 

video entitled “This is ATF.” The video is scheduled to be shot in August 2006 

at a cost of $70,251.158 Domenech confirmed the project and that the plan had 

been for Truscott to narrate a portion of the video. The OPA Chief said that the 

video is being produced to update a video that was made several years ago, and 

that it will be used for “community outreach.” The OPA Chief stated that when 

she was a field office PIO, she used her video all the time in making 

presentations to community groups, schools, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and the 

Lions and Kiwanis Clubs. She stated that the videos are an important tool to 

educate the public about ATF. 

C. Findings 

 We concluded that the allegations regarding Truscott’s use of the VIB 

photographers were not fully accurate. Truscott did have a role in having at 

least one photographer assigned to accompany him while traveling to ATF and 

other law enforcement events. Truscott himself acknowledged as much by 

explaining how he was aware that his asking whether a photographer would be 

at the IACP Conference was interpreted to be a request that a photographer be 

present. Further, while two photographers were assigned to cover one or 

perhaps two events at which Truscott was participating, we found no basis to 

conclude that these assignments were at Truscott’s direction or that Truscott 

was to be the focus of the coverage. 

 We found, based on a review of contractor documents, that the cost of 

publishing the ATF booklet was $24,018, exclusive of the cost of VIB staff time. 

We did not find Truscott’s decision to issue a written statement of his vision for 

ATF to be unreasonable, nor did we conclude that his preference for a booklet 

over an electronic version of the message amounted to a waste of ATF 

resources. 

 Lastly, we found that ATF has contracted for production of a promotional 

video that will cost between $70,000 and $78,000. The video will update an 

outdated version. Based on the statements of ATF’s OPA Chief about the need 

for the video, we cannot say such an expenditure was improper. 

 158 A purchase order indicates that the video will be approximately 10 minutes long 

and will cost $70,251 to produce. A second purchase order indicates a separate charge of 

$8,000 to “research and write a video script to update the existing ATF video . . . .” 

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CHAPTER FOUR: 

OIG CONCLUSIONS 

 As we described throughout this report, our investigation substantiated 

various allegations raised in the anonymous complaint against Truscott. 

Beyond those allegations, we also found that Truscott exercised poor fiscal 

judgment in many instances. While we did not find that these financial 

decisions constituted misconduct, we questioned his aggressive hiring policy 

and numerous specific expenditures related to design changes to the new 

Headquarters building and other construction projects, particularly given the 

state of ATF’s budget.159 Many of Truscott’s decisions relating to hiring ATF 

personnel and to various construction projects would have had a more adverse 

impact on ATF operations had they not been reversed by others. We were also 

troubled by the drain on ATF resources that resulted from Truscott’s excessive 

use of personnel and vehicles in connection with his security, particularly 

when he traveled. 

 We found that Truscott acted improperly by directing or authorizing ATF 

employees to assist his nephew in making a video for a high school project. We 

concluded that Truscott improperly allowed government property and official 

time of ATF personnel to be used in connection with the project. 

 Over the course of the investigation, we also identified several 

overarching concerns with respect to Truscott’s leadership and management of 

ATF. First, as noted throughout the report, we were troubled by Truscott’s lack 

of acceptance of responsibility for many of the decisions on these matters. 

From relatively minor issues, such as decisions on how to furnish the 

Director’s Suite in the new Headquarters building, to major policy directives, 

such as how many new employees to hire, Truscott attempted to deflect 

responsibility to his subordinates, misrepresented the amount of involvement 

he had in the actions, or otherwise sought to distance himself from his own 

decisions. We found several instances where Truscott’s statements to us about 

his conduct were contradicted by numerous other witnesses, and in some 

instances, by documents as well. 

We were also troubled by Truscott’s failure to seek or accept the counsel 

of experienced ATF managers on a range of important issues. For example, 

Truscott dismissed advice from senior managers that ATF could not sustain the 

level of hiring he had proposed for FY 2006 without depleting resources 

necessary for agency operations. Truscott also was warned by several senior 

 159 A discussion of Truscott’s hiring policy and its impact on the ATF budget is 

discussed in Chapter Three, Section I, above. 

143
officials of the repercussions his revisions to the design of the new 

Headquarters would have on the cost of the project and on ATF’s operating 

budget, but he disregarded those warnings as well. Truscott also ignored or 

failed to seek counsel on various issues such as allowing ATF resources to be 

used for his nephew’s video project and on the use of the representation fund 

to pay for lunch for him and his guests. 

Our specific findings regarding Truscott’s conduct are set out below. 

I. Construction Projects 

We found that Truscott was responsible for ordering several hundred 

thousand dollars worth of upgrades to the Director’s Suite in the new 

Headquarters building, including expensive millwork and unnecessary 

amenities. We also found that Truscott had indirect but overall responsibility 

for expensive design changes to the JSOC, although we did not conclude that 

these changes were unrelated to ATF’s mission. However, we determined that 

the JSOC design changes that Truscott encouraged and approved related more 

to the appearance of the JSOC than to its functionality. We further found that 

Truscott proposed several structural changes to the gym and suggested 

purchasing approximately $100,000 in new equipment. We concluded that 

Truscott was advised by senior budget and management officials that his 

proposed modifications to the new Headquarters building would have to be 

paid for out of operational expenses, and that Truscott was therefore aware of 

the cost implications. 

When Truscott arrived at ATF, the design for the new Headquarters 

building was complete and construction had begun. Truscott became deeply 

involved in the details of the project, and in particular in the design of the 

Director’s Suite, the JSOC, and the gym. Truscott either proposed or 

authorized numerous design changes and upgrades to these areas of the new 

Headquarters building. We also found that Truscott devoted an excessive 

amount of time to the redesign and upgrading of his suite and the gym, 

immersing himself in details at a level that we would not expect of the Director 

of a major law enforcement agency. 

After ATF was told by a congressional staff member not to spend any 

FY 2006 appropriated funds on the new Headquarters, senior managers took 

the lead in scaling back the project and cancelled many upgrades requested or 

authorized by Truscott. Without those modifications Truscott’s design changes 

would have had a substantially more severe impact on ATF’s operational 

budget. 

144
We also found that Truscott authorized an expansion and renovation of 

the gym in ATF’s current headquarters, at a total cost of $16,449, but we 

concluded that it was within Truscott’s discretion to approve this expenditure. 

With respect to ATF field facilities slated for relocation, we found that an 

ATF committee, comprised of mid-level managers from all ATF directorates, 

authorized expanding or constructing space for gyms and training rooms, and 

did so independently of Truscott’s involvement. However, we found that 

Truscott was responsible for setting aside $750,000 in the FY 2006 budget to 

purchase equipment and furnishings for the expanded facilities, a finding that 

is in contrast with Truscott’s recollection of the matter. We also questioned 

why Truscott did not re-examine the committee’s authorization to build or 

expand gyms and training rooms at a time when SACs were bringing to 

Truscott’s attention the lack of adequate work space for personnel. 

In addition, we found that Truscott ordered a garage to be built to house 

an NRT truck at a field training facility at a cost of approximately $156,000. 

Contrary to Truscott’s statements to us, he tracked the progress of the project 

and was briefed on its cost prior to construction. Although we concluded that 

it was within Truscott’s discretion to approve the construction of the garage, we 

had concerns about Truscott’s forthrightness with the OIG on this matter. 

On a related matter, we found insufficient evidence to support the 

allegation that Truscott improperly expanded the scope of a Federal Firearms 

Licensing Center feasibility study beyond Congress’s directive. 

II. Assistance in Nephew’s High School Project 

We found that Truscott improperly authorized his subordinates to assist 

his nephew in producing a video about ATF for a high school project. Truscott 

and approximately 20 ATF employees extensively assisted the nephew with his 

project in a variety of ways, including providing background information, 

writing scripts, providing stock footage, conducting on-camera demonstrations 

and tours, and being interviewed. Substantial employee time and ATF 

resources were used over an approximately 10-month period to complete and 

critique the video. 

We also found that Truscott had sufficient knowledge of the extent of 

resources being used on the project to know that it was inappropriate. 

Truscott’s nephew provided him with a detailed outline of what he wanted the 

video to include and a list of many interviewees. An official in the Office of 

Public Affairs stated that she also kept Truscott informed of his nephew’s 

requests regarding the project. Moreover, Deputy Director Domenech advised 

Truscott that he should not use ATF resources to assist with his nephew’s 

school project. Notwithstanding this advice, Truscott allowed ATF’s 

145
participation in the project and never placed limits on the ATF resources that 

could be used in support of the project. 

By authorizing the use of ATF resources for his nephew’s project, we 

believe Truscott violated various ethics regulations, including 5 CFR 

§ 2635.702 (use of public office for private gain); 5 CFR §§ 2635.101(b)(9) and 

2635.704 (relating to unauthorized use of government property); and 5 CFR 

§ 2635.705(b) (use of subordinate’s official time).160 

III. Security for Truscott 

ATF security for Truscott was extensive and involved a significant drain 

on ATF resources, both in the Executive Protection Branch (EPB) and when 

Truscott traveled to the field. This extensive use of resources for Truscott’s 

security occurred with Truscott’s knowledge and approval. Given ATF’s fiscal 

circumstances and considering Truscott’s low threat assessment, we 

questioned whether Truscott permitted more resources to be committed to his 

security than were necessary. 

The EPB was created under authority of DOJ Order 2630.5 prior to and 

in anticipation of Truscott’s arrival as Director of ATF. However, under 

Truscott’s tenure, the EPB grew in number of personnel, vehicles, and overall 

use of resources. Many of the resources used to provide security for Truscott 

came from field divisions, which we found were expected to provide numerous 

special agents, vehicles, and even a medic when Truscott traveled to the field. 

Many witnesses we interviewed expressed frustration at being required to divert 

these resources from conventional field division functions. We also questioned 

Truscott’s occasional use of EPB and field division personnel and vehicles in 

connection with non-official excursions, such as to accompany him while 

meeting a friend on a Saturday during a trip to California. 

We further concluded that, on various occasions, Truscott used EPB and 

field divisions selectively and based more on considerations of appearance than 

on fluctuations in security needs. This selective use was evidenced by, among 

other practices, Truscott’s scaling down his protective detail when he visited 

the Main Justice Department building, which witnesses told us was driven by 

Truscott’s concern over how a larger detail might be perceived by DOJ officials. 

Truscott claimed that his security arrangements were the result of his 

subordinates’ decisions and judgments and were not his responsibility. We 

 160 Contrary to the statement in Truscott’s letter to the OIG, which asserted that our 

report did not find any administrative misconduct by Truscott, these violations do constitute 

misconduct. 

146
determined that Truscott had significant input into both EPB and field division 

procedures regarding his security arrangements. He made his preferences 

known, and he also expressed displeasure when he believed the security 

arrangements were inadequate. Truscott’s assertions that he was merely 

deferring to the recommendations of the EPB special agents were contrary to 

the evidence we found. 

IV. Travel 

We also questioned the arrangements for several of Truscott’s trips, 

including the number of other ATF employees who accompanied him. Truscott 

and eight other ATF employees traveled to London, England, in September 

2005 to meet with U.K. officials to discuss a possible ATF detail position with 

the London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), among other issues. We had 

concerns about the number of travelers who accompanied Truscott on the trip, 

and in particular the need for four ATF security personnel, especially given the 

protection provided by the MPS that had been arranged in advance and the 

secure facilities at which Truscott was scheduled to meet the U.K. officials. We 

also questioned why two ATF employees, whose overall purpose for 

participating in the trip was not clear, traveled to London five days in advance 

of Truscott’s arrival and left one day after Truscott’s departure. The total cost 

of the trip for the nine ATF employees was over $37,000. 

On another trip in October 2005, Truscott traveled to New York City to 

attend a charity dinner for law enforcement agents killed in the line of duty. 

We found that excessive ATF resources were used to escort Truscott to and 

from the function, including two EPB agents, five field division agents, and 

three vehicles. 

In January 2005, Truscott traveled to Boston, Massachusetts, to meet 

with the new Headquarters architect and to tour one of the architect’s 

buildings, and then traveled to Ottawa, Canada, for official meetings with U.S. 

Embassy officials, Canadian officials, and ATF employees, and to visit buildings 

that had been designed by the architect. We found that Truscott was 

accompanied by five ATF Headquarters employees in Boston. An additional five 

field division employees, including the SAC, were involved on the Boston leg of 

the trip. Again, we questioned Truscott’s judgment in allowing such an 

extensive use of resources for that portion of the trip. We also were troubled by 

Truscott’s denial of responsibility for the use of these resources. 

V. ATF Reception at IACP Convention 

We found that ATF’s reception aboard a yacht at the September 2005 

IACP Convention in Miami Beach, Florida, was poorly planned and resulted in 

147
a potential claim by a charter boat company against the agency for additional 

costs based on the alleged attendance of several hundred more guests than 

originally planned for. The potential claim, if meritorious, could cause ATF to 

incur expenses beyond those authorized to be expended from the FY 2005 

representational fund. However, we did not find that Truscott was responsible 

for the planning of the event. 

VI. Use of the Representation Fund 

Truscott often used ATF funds for lunches in his office with guests. We 

identified three questionable instances in which Truscott hosted lunches in his 

office that did not appear to “promote personal relationships necessary to 

enhance the performance of [ATF],” the applicable standard for appropriate use 

of the representation fund under ATF Order 1100.163A. The amount of the 

funds used for these lunches was small. However, we were troubled by 

Truscott’s shifting of responsibility for his use of the representation fund onto 

others. We also had concerns that Truscott did not seek sufficient guidance 

from the Chief Counsel’s Office on the proper use of the fund, notwithstanding 

his assertions that he had done so. 

VII. Creation of a Hostile Work Environment 

We found that Truscott directed two female administrative staffers to 

assist in preparing for and serving lunches to him and his guests. We 

determined that, contrary to Truscott’s statements to us, he conveyed his 

instructions to the Administrative Assistants, through another employee, 

regarding how he wanted the meals prepared and served. That employee 

confirmed, for example, that on at least one occasion, Truscott directed that 

one of the Administrative Assistants announce, “Lunch is served.” Although 

we did not find that Truscott violated any regulations or agency policies 

through these actions, we concluded that he exercised poor judgment by 

requesting his subordinates to perform such functions which were not part of 

their job duties. 

VIII. Personnel Practices 

We found that Truscott acted within his discretion by hiring a longtime 

acquaintance and former Secret Service colleague for an ATF Assistant Director 

position, even though a panel that reviewed the applicants ranked others as 

better suited for the position. We also found that Truscott acted within his 

discretion in elevating the performance rating of this individual above the 

rating he had initially been given after nine months on the job, notwithstanding 

that the upgrade in the rating entailed a monetary benefit. 

148
IX. Use of Visual Information Branch Resources 

We found that Truscott did not make improper use of VIB resources, and 

in particular of ATF photographers. We concluded that the allegation that 

Truscott often required two photographers to accompany him at events was not 

substantiated. We also concluded that Truscott did not use excessive ATF 

resources in directing that a booklet for ATF employees be published, and he 

acted within his discretion in authorizing an update of a video about the ATF. 

X. Recommendations 

Because Truscott resigned as the ATF Director on August 4, 2006, we 

make no recommendations regarding his actions. 

In the course of our investigation, however, we learned of two additional 

areas of ATF’s procedures that we recommend the ATF address. 

First, as noted in Chapter Three, Section VI, above, we found that ATF 

employees failed to comply with FTR and ATF travel procedures by failing to 

document the reasons for incurring costs beyond the government rates for 

hotel accommodations. We recommend that ATF employees be reminded of the 

need to comply with all ATF and Department travel procedures. 

Second, as discussed in Chapter Three, Section VII, above, concerning 

the September 2005 ATF Reception at the IACP Convention in Miami Beach, 

ATF failed to enter into a clear agreement with the charter boat company 

servicing the event. The absence of a written contract led to a 

misunderstanding between ATF and the company regarding the amount to be 

charged for extra food and services alleged to have been provided. 

We recommend that in the future ATF, through its Chief Counsel’s Office, 

review contracts with vendors who will be providing ATF services for events. If 

the event is to be paid for by sponsors, as was the case here, we recommend 

that ATF create an accounts receivable for the sponsors’ donations so that ATF 

can pay for its events pursuant to binding agreements. 

149
APPENDICIES
A
September 25, 2006

Mr. Glenn A. Fine

Inspector General

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Dear Mr l Fine:

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to respond to your Draft Report

concerning anonymous allegations made during my tenure as the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). In the Draft Report, you found no basis for

substantiating a single allegation relating to administrative misconduct. In spite of this, you have

chosen to bury these conclusions in a Draft Report that: 1) is negative in tone; 2) impugns my

character and integrity without basis; and 3) second-guesses my professional judgment,

discretionary decisions, and management style based upon criticisms from unidentified sources.

The unidentified sources were likely persons within ATF who were resistant to my status as an

outsider from another rival federal law enforcement agency and my efforts at necessary change.

Your Draft Report also fails to put the allegations made in context, to make mention of the

significant progress ATF made during my stewardship and under difficult circumstances, or balance

the allegations made against my unblemished professional career. As Attorney General Alberto R.

Gonzales noted in his August 2006 public statement, I have been a leader in law enforcement and

have had "a long and distinguished career in government service including the personal protection

of four presidents while at the Secret Service before [taking] the helm of the ATF in 2004. ''1 I

consistently received favorable views from other Department of'Justice leadership, and from

officials who have senwed in leadership posts throughout my ctureer, including during my time at

ATF. Many of those leaders are prepared to step forward and vouch for me, my integrity and my

professional judgment. One of those officials, the NIT Chief of Staff, strongly condemned the

allegations made against me in the attached declaration to the executive staff.2 If your Report were

made public inits current form, none of this would be recognized. On this basis alone, the Draft

Report should not be released until appropriate revisions are made.

I believe strongly in the inspector general concept, but inspectors general, given their

awesome powers, have an obligation to be impartial and fair, to,make judgments based upon legal

norms and a careful review of the facts, and to operate within their statutory mandates. Nothing in

the Inspector General Act gives you the license to second-guess professional discretionary

judgments. You have, in my view, not been guided by these principles in this Draft Report. I

respectfully request, therefore, that the Report be revised in substance and tone to reflect in

unequivocal terms that there were no findings of administrative misconduct; and that decisions

made with respect to all of the other allegations, with the single exception of my nephew' s high

school project, were within my discretion to make. More specific responses to these allegations and

recommendations on modifying the Draft Report are set forth below.

Statementof AttorneyGeneral.AlbertoR. GonzalesontheResignationof ATF]DirectorCarlJ. Truscott,(Department

ofJusticePressRelease),datedAugust4, 2006.

2Statementof ATFChiefof StaffGregHarristo theATFexecutivestaffshortly;_llerthe existenceofthe anonymous

letterwasmadepublic.PermissiongrantedtelephonicallybyGregHarrison September24,2006to includehisfull

statementinmyresponse.
2

Construction Projects 3

I believed ATF' s move into its first permanent headqum_ers" building would be an

organizational and institutional transformation and have a long-lasting and professional influence on

the bureaul My detail-oriented experience coupled with sentiments such as those expressed below

by building architect Moshe Safdie, motivated me to be attentive to the new ATF headquarters'

building in general. Specifically, I believed that the Director's office area should not be built and

designed in accordance with my personal preferences, but for any Director and staff who occupy

them and in the best interests of the American taxpayer. 4 ATF's plan was consistent with similar

space which I had seen first-hand at the offices of other Departmental component heads and the

General Services Adrainistration has stated that ATF acted within established guidelines.

The first time it was brought to my attention that certain items for the Director's office and

contiguous areas had not been previously budgeted for, I - not the Deputy Director, notified the

executive staff and I told them that given the current budget environment the items should be

eliminated - and they were. These discussions occurred before I was made aware of the existence

of the anonymous letter. Additionally, a process was initiated subsequent to my discussion with the

executive staff, guided by the Deputy Director, to consider and execute other cost-saving measures.

Mso, I did not ask on two occasions that wood floors remain in the ]Director's office after they had

been eliminated.

Additionally, in unsolicited correspondence I received fi-omMoshe Safdie, he wrote in part:

"In reading the commentary of your "over-involvement" in the design of the ATF headquarters, I could not

help but reflect how misinformed and misunderstood the subject of archi.tecture and the environment are in the

public eye. Atterall, the working environment of the ATF is of far-_reacl_ingimpact on the effectiveness on the

working commmfity for generations to come. It is not only worthy of the Director's attention, but

absolutely demands it. How many public buildings have we seen conceived and constructed only to take their

toll on the efficiency and effectiveness of the working community within them'?' '5 (Emphasis added)

Assistance on Nephew's High School Proiect

My nephew is a young man who is passionate about everythJing he does- particularly as it

relates to his personal interests of videography and his career aspirations of following in my

footsteps as a career public servant in the field of law enforcement. ]Hewanted to produce a video

and I facilitated his request, assuming that the bureau's participation would be minimal while

advancing a good story about ATF. 6 I was not contemporaneously aware of the role of every ATF

employee as you suggest, but I should have been aware of the anticipated extent of ATF

involvement and I should have placed appropriate limits on the resources that could be used in

support of the project. I only wish I had received the advice and counsel as described by the witness.

3 Those issues from your review which are not addressed in my response are not _mplicit acceptance of those issues.

Rather, I am intentionally silent on those issues based on other statements I have made throughout this response. 4

I never relinquished the overall ATF budget authority to the D_uty Director. I did ask him to oversee furore decisions

regarding the Director's office after I was made aware that an anonymous letter had been written.

Letter from Mr. Moshe Safdie, Moshe Safdie and Associates Inc. to Carl J. Truscott, dated August 116,2006.

Permission granted telephonicaUy by Moshe Safdie on September 19, 2006 to include the passage in my response.

6 Appendix B (Documentary Outline) provides a detailed summz_, however I SlX;ntlittle time reviewing it as I should

have.
3

Securi_

As you substantiated, the security for the ATF' Director was established and approved by

ATF senior leadership prior to my arrival as Director; it was reviewed by and comported with the

Department of Justice Executive Protection ProgramT; and it was codified in Title 31, Section 1344,

Passenger Carder UseS. Additionally, I believe the overall security arrangements were a measured

approach for a bureau head with direct responsibility for firearms and explosives crimes and

contributing to the Department's highest priority of preventing terrorism: I never requested

additional personnel, vehicles or other resources above what had been established by the ATF

senior leadership.

As an example of a weakness in your Draft Report and notwithstanding your lengthy

discussion regarding Suburbans, several weeks prior to my arrival at ATF the Deputy Director was

driven to Secret Servi:ce headquarters to meet with me to discuss my pending arrival at ATF. He

was driven in a Suburban by the same special agent who ultimately headed the Executive Protection

Branch when I arrived at ATF. The suggestion that Suburbans were utilized after my arrival and

based solely on my personal preference is undeniably wrong.

Travel

My travel to Boston, Massachusetts and Ottawa, Canada; London, England; and New York,

New York, was undertaken to "effectively and economically accomplish the purposes of the

Government ''9 and to build necessary relationships to advance ATF. If the purposes of the trip had

not met those thresholds, tlheATF personnel would not have traveled. With respect to my travel,

my expenses would not have been reimbursed without the approval of the office of the Deputy

Attorney General - and they were.

I concur with your recommendations regarding two additional areas of procedures that ATF

should address. First, you found that ATF employees failed to comply with FTR and ATF travel

procedures by failing to document the reasons for incurring costs beyond the government rates for

hotel accommodations. ATF employees, particularly the executive staff, should be reminded of the

need to comply with all ATF and Departmental travel procedures. Second, concerning the

September 2005 ATF reception at the IACP Convention in Miami Beach, ATF failed to enter into a

clear agreement with the charter boat company servicing the event. The structure which I

incorporated at ATF requiring Chief Counsel review of every activity relating to the Director's

office should have included reviewing contracts with vendors who would be providing ATF

services and I should have ensured they had done so.

7DepartmenOrder t 2630.5,datedJune26, 1979.

8Aprovisionfora passengercarderto be usedtotransporttheATFDirectorbetweenresidenceandplaceof

employment.

9"Itisthepolicyof ATFto authorizeapprov , eorgrantpermissiontoits employeesfortravelthatis neces_-yto

effectivelyandeconomicallyaoc_mplishthe purposesoftheGovermnent(ATF ." Order1540.1,ChapterB, Section11).
4

Requested Modifications and Summary

1. Your Draft Re:portfound no basis for substantiating a single allegation relating to

administrative misconduct. Hence, the Report should unequivocally state that you found no

evidence to substantiate a single allegation relating to administrative misconduct. As such,

there is no justification for the public dissemination of this unbalanced Draft Report as it is

presently written. Additionally, your anticipated public disc]iosureof ATF component head

security matters is irresponsible despite the fact that I have resigned. The "Security" section

of your Draft Report (including Appendices C, D, and E were written and approved by

others within ATF and unseen by me until after the anonymous letter had been written) does

not contain classified information, but most-assuredly contains operational security

information which is of value to an adversary ,ofcurrent and future ATF Directors. You

should also re-evaluate your public disclosure regarding the security posture for the Director

of the U.S. Marshalr s Service and redact appropriately.

2. I will accept responsibility for everything that actually occurred at ATF during my tenure.

That point is unmistakable, as I alone am answering to you and ultimately to the Attorney

General for the allegations which have been made. Your Report should not indicate that I

was reluctant llodo so.

3.• The tone of your Report should be modified so that it is not unjustifiably negative and does

not make insirmations based on contradictory 'witnessstatements that are not based on

contravention of statute, regulation, or policy.

4. The title of your Draft Report includes the words "mismanagement" and "misconduct." The

Draft Report did not substantiate misconduct; and mismanagement is a subjective editorial

observation and has no place on a title page. The title page should be edited accordingly.

5. I request that my response be included as an appendix in your final Report and please mail

me a printed copy of the final Report.

6. Please provide me with a copy of the anonymous letter, dateclJanuary20, 2006.

Under the leadership of President George W. Bush, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales

and former Attorney General John Ashcrofl, my contributions and leadership at ATF have been

noteworthy and I will forever be proud of them. I departed public service earlier this year grateful

for the honor and privilege of serving with the trust and confidence of the American people.

Please respond to my requested modifications in writing:prior to the finalization of your

Report.

_spectfully,

Attachment

cc: Attorney General Alberto R. Genzales
B
Page 1 of 1

• I j

! E

From:; _lgUl

Sent: . Friday,August26, 2005 1:31PM;

To,: _miJ_ll___

Subject: List/Noteson Direcxtor'sSuite to prepare Moshe

Attachments: Suite500Prog'g-Furn.xls

1.. Hopethishelps

2/14/2006 .. _-_,-.: ' _t?._.-",:;c:_
Programming. 2/14/2006

Suite 500- Requests/preference/requirements of Director Truscott

Corridor outside of Suite.

Entry1Presenctow e ardSuitefromelevators- very iimportant

FormerDirector'sportraitswall- Directorisstillnotcomfortablewiththisarea

Newrequestedglasswall/doorto definearea leadingto suite5.00

Reception

Semi-formal seating for 5-6

Sofa 3 Occasional tables 2 Loungechairs;

Receptionistsdesk - iiscurrently very uncomfortabk,withthis areaas redesigned

At wood wall:- flanking flags and ATF sealfor formal photo-taking

Flags

First impression of the Director's suite, office, position

Semi-formaland comfortable ....

Receptionist to screenvisitors

Duress button

Special lighting

Artwork - being developedvia exhibits -undecided

Plants

Interior Reception out side Director's ofc. I Director's Staff•Assistants

Transitionalarea be_reen Receptionand Director'sOffice

Desk per designintent- see elevations and transaction height - very fond of this

Staffassistants1!obe seated12feetapart ormore

Staffassistantsto havea separationelement- see DI

Staffassistantsto haveseparatefile storage,visitorseating

3 2-drawerlateralfiles,ea.: total6

1 guestchair,ea;total2

Lightingintothisroomimportant

Wood accentwall

Formaldoubledoorentranceto Director'sOffice,withremotecontrolfromAsst'sdesk

Duress button '_

Flat panel monitor, 21" per assistant - must be placedas notedon Drs

Art - TBD

Plants

Director's Office

Viewto deskfrom entrancedoor

Formalentryvestibule

WoodfloorstartingfromWooddoubledoors

Formaldoubledoorentranceto Director'sOffice,remotecontrblfrom Director'sdesk

Will probablyonlyuse oneopening

Formalfurniture1:oinvokeFederalDC look- butcomfortable

Seatingfor 8-10 including:

2 sofas

4 occasionaltables

2 loungechairs

2 guestchairsat desk

Librarytable

Credenza ;"

Executivetask chair

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Programming 2/14/2006

Desk

Coffeetable

Accentcarpet- inseatinggrouparea,

Lighting

Wall storageunit(items perDirector'srequest)

Historicdetailingto invokefederal DC look

Matching,woodanddetailing

•FlatpanelTV monitor,approx.42" diagonal- hiddenwhennotinuse

Undercounterrefrigerator

BasecabinetstoragewithIockable areas _.

Open bookcase shelving:

Some Iockablestorage.

Two display units with glass doors

CD/DVD/radiocontrol (stereo inside base cabinet)

Closet with custom storage interior

Shorthanging .

Tall hanging

Drawers

Shelves ..

Shoe/bootstorage

Tall storage

FlagsandSeal - per currentdisplayinDirector'soffice • _ .

•..- - • Special lighting ....

Duress button

•Soft window treatments

Director's Bathroom (Per Director's request)

Lavatory

Closedstorageunderneathfor suppliesandsandals

Drawerstorage

Granitecounterto matchbuildingstandardrestroomlavatories

Counter-to-ceilingmirror

Specialliglhting

Toilet

Glasswallshowerenclosure

Executivelook/matchingaccessories:brushednickeldiscussed

Sconces

Fixtures '_

Towel bars

Toilet paper holder

Several hooks

Tile walls

Buildingstandard men's room accent tile: khaki

Tile in hori?ontalstraight stacked layout vs brick

Quartzitetile floor to match Atrium flooring

Open shelf wall rnountedstorage: chrome/brushed nickel hotelltowel shelf abovetoilet

Bench _

Open storage underneathfor supplies and sandals

To fit in alc,0vebetween doorand shower

Water resistant wood seat

Telephone, TVflat panaland radiospeakers to listen/viewnews (he isan avid exerciser) "

Private Conference Room

Seatingfor8

%...

•2 of 5 C:_DocumandeSnts etingsg_Local Settings_TemporaryInternetFiles_OLK36_,Suite500Prog'g-Fum.xls 9:56 AM
'1

Programming _ 2/14/2006

Conferencetableto reconfigurefordifferentfunctions(likes small breakfast mtgs)

Connectivity:telephone,largefiatpanelmonitor,stereospeaker

Credenza,, "

Smallhidingbarsink

Undercounterefrigerator

Trashstorage:retractablearm withbaskets

Storageforservingitems

•Closeto Office Door

so t,hat visitors don_have to go through Director's office for meetings

AN closet

Deputy Director's Office

Formalfurniture,butcomfortable•

Conferencetableto accommodate6

Sixconferencechairs

Two lounge,chairs

Occastionaltable

Credenza

Executivetask chair

Desk

Bookcase :'

Lighting

Largefiatpanelinwa_l

Flags

Softwindowtreatments

Speciallighting.

Duressbutton

Closeproximityto Director'sofficeandto the StaffAssistants'office

Deputy Director'sBathroom ,..

Lavatory

Openstorageunderneathfor suppliesandsandals

Drawerstorage

Granitecounterto matchbuildingstandardrestroomlavatories

Counter-to-ceilingmirror

Speciallighting

Toilet

Showerenclosure

ExecutiveIook/rnatchingaccessories:

Sconces "

Fixtures

Towelbars

Toiletpaperholder

Several hooks

Tile walls

Buildingstandardmen'sroomaccenttile:khaki

Tilein hoizontalstraightstackedlayout

Quartzitetile floorto match Atrium flooring ,_

Open shelf wall mounted storage: chrome hotel towel shelfabove toilet '

Connect'ivity telephone, small flat panel monitor, stereo speaker

3 of 5 C:_Documentsand.Settings_.ocal Settings_TemporaryIntemetFiles_OLK36%Suite500Prog'g-Fum.xls 9:56AM

,_:25:7_:5_.__#......
_D

Programming ; 2/1412006

#

Copy Corridor

Copier

Shredder

Wood.wallcabinetryto matchlargeconferenceroom,

Woodbase cabinetryto matchlargeconferencerQom.

-Black Zodiaq countertops

No backsplashes

Undercabinet task lighting

Closet for Reception,Areastorage

A_

Pantry-

.Woodwallcabinetryto matchlargeconferenceroom

Woodbasecabinetryto match largeconference room

Black Zodiaq countertops

No backsplashes

Undercabinettask Ughting

. Full-sizerefrigerator

Two freezerdrawers

Custom door,•panelto match cabinetry

Two-drawer dishwasher with custom door panel to match cabiinetry

Rangelovenloverhead microwave-vent

Largesinglebowl stainlesssteel sink " .... :_

BrushedchromeADA compliant faucet

Brushed chrome ADA compliant spray handle

1/2 horse power garbage disposal

Undercounter ice maker.

Largecoffee urn,

Undercabinet coffee maker '

Resilient floor (Director does not like the standard pantry' tile)

Recyclingbins " "

Stoolsat counter :

Water cooler

Art

Conference Room "

Largeformalelipticalconferencetableto accornmodate14

14(only)formalconferencechairs,fourwoodlegs,Upholsteredhiglhbacksandarms

Nocasterson chairs

No seat atHEAD,and FOOT of table- not a "working" conference room

Formal side seating to accommodate 8

3 settees

4 occasionaltables

2 formal conference chairs to match those at table

Special lighting

Flags and wall displays

Credenza with historic detailing to invoke federal DC look

Base cabinet storage with Iockable areas

Flat panel monitor,42" diagonalor larger ._..

Retractable Projector screen

Wood to match detailing•onceiling and opposite accent wall

Projector shelf

4 of 5 C:_Do_ments and Settings_l_Local Settings_.TemP0rary Internet Files_OLK36\Suite500Prog'g-Furn.xls 9:56 AM
. Programming_ 2/14/2006

1)

Softwindowtreatments. _

Non clutteredwalls- few art or historicalcertificatesonly- notlikepresent

Plants(?)

Conference room PantryWoodwallcabinetryto matchlargeconferenceroom

Wood basecabinetryto matchlargeconferenceroom

Black.Zodiaqcountertops

No backsplashes

Smallbarsink:black

Blac,k ADA compliantfaucet "

Black ADA compliant .sprayhandle

1/2 horsepower garbage disposal

Undercabinettask.lighting,

Undercounter refrigerator.

.Trashstorage: retractablearm with baskets

Storage for serving items

Directaccess from Reception Area

Secondaryaccessto main Pantry :_

AN closet

Resource Closet

Fourmetalstoragecabinets:36" widex 18" deepx 72" high

•Two Iockablemetalstoragecabinets:36" wide.x 18"deep x 7.2"high .......... _

Smallworktable:48" longx 24"deep

Executive Assistant

, . Buildingstandard Type E office: 200 squarefeet

Furniturestyleto match Director's

Chief of Staff

Buildingstandard Type E office: 200 square feet.

Furniturestyle to match Director's

Physical Security Detail

Two buildingstandard.Type Boffices: 100 square feet

. No guestchairs

Plus weapons/storage cabinets

5 of 5 ' C:_ocur,,and ,otSettings s Oocal Settings_TemporaryInternetFiles_OLK36_SuiteS00Prog'g-Furn.xls 9:56AM
C
DIRECTOR: CARl_ TRUSCOTT

ATF DOCUMENTARY OUTLINE ]

KEY: First Box In Row Relates With First Box in [

Row Located Under The Sub Topics. !

..........

FIREARMS ALCOHOL & TOBACCO EXPLOSIVES & ARSON

, ,, ,, , ,, ,, ,,

• National Integrated Balligic , Gang Resistance Education and • National Response Team (NT,T)

T Information Network Training (GREAT) -ATF Response Truck

O (NIBIN)/Gun Forensics

........ • Tobacco Analysis ¢" Explosives Detection Canines

• Project Safe Neighborhoods

(PSN) ® Alcohol Analysis • Fire Research Lab (FRL)

............

SUB TOPICS ]

......

FIREARA_ .................ALCOHOL & TOBACCO EXPLOSIVES & ARSON

Mission _ Mission _" Mission

_, Purpose > Purpose _' Purpose

Goals >, Goals P Goals

_, Technology _. Cities Involved _" Equipment on Truck

Violations _, Technology

_, Investigations (Undercover _, Mission _' Past Locations (Ex. 9/11)

Work?) _ Purpose > Accomplishments

_' Goals _, People Involved

_> Mission _' Technology

Purpose _ How it's analyzed ,/ Mission

_' Goals .... ¢" Purpose

_' Technology Y," Mission ¢" Goals

Purpose ¢' Accomplishments

Goals ,/ Relationship with K-9's.

-- > Technology ¢" Training

I'd like to interview you _ How it's analyzed

i about the broad and general ._ Their communication with _' Mission

description of the ATF. industries _, -Puri_e

(Ex. History, Mission, _ Goals .....

Accomplbhments, Purpose, i _ Technology

Goals [Future], Stats, ere) _ Equipment

\ ), The Lab Itself

t INTERVIEWEES > How it's used

,,., ,.., , . . , ,., ....

a.. Ballistic Agem [to talk about 4. G_ILE.A.T. Leader/Director [to ¢" K-9 Trainer Agem [I can

NIBIN and the technology used briefly talk about the program] handle this one.]

to link incidents and the culprit.]

4. Alcohol/Tobacco Agent [to briefly .1. Explosives Agent [to briefly

Simply stated, by briefly talk about the technology and their talk about the NRT truck.]

"Interviewing" the agents/personneL lab workings

the viewers can gain knowledge on ............. -:. Fire/Arson Agent [to briefly

the topic. "Interviewing" can be done by s_tting down in a talk about the lab and

chair with proper lighting, etc [[which is what I'd like to do :reconstructing the fires.]

when I interview you, re simply getting a few sentences from

an agent standing outside in the hallway.

.........
November 17, 2004

Uncle Carl,

After studying the information over the last couple weeks, I'm proud to have produced

a very clear and organized Outline for you.

You may think this looks complicated, however, it is not...

• The top half of the paper has a box which includes the Major Topics I thought necessary to

cover in the ATF.

• The bottom half over the paper has an even bigger box with sub-topics for each Major Topic.

[These are in relation with the Major Topics.]

• The very bottom of the page includes a boxwith possible interviewees for those Major topics.

[These aren't in order with them.] I just suggested those ]positionsto be interviewed.

F.Y.I. •The kinds of "interviews" I will be conducting won't JLncludeme, the "host" or the

"Interviewer." In fact, I wiillnever be on camera. I simply just want the interviewee, or the ATF

Agent in this case, to be talking about the topic inf:rontof the camera.

However, since you are the Director of the ATF, it's up to you who I can interview and place

on camera.

In conclusion, once you have reviewed this Outline and made any Changes you deem necessary, then

we can discuss possible interviewees for the near future.

Thank you very much!