725

Additional Views

Senator Mark Dayton 

I voted not to approve the draft Report in Committee, because it is seriously incomplete 

without the information, documents, and testimony denied by the White House. According 

to the Ranking Member’s “Additional Views,” on March 15, 2006, he asked the Chairman 

to subpoena the withheld documents and witnesses. She declined.

Earlier this year, on January 12, 2006, the Chairman and Ranking Member wrote thenWhite House Chief of Staff , Mr. Andrew Card, regarding the information they had previously requested. Th eir letter stated, in part, “Th is practice (of withholding information) 

must cease.” 

It continued, “We are willing to discuss claims of executive privilege asserted by the White 

House, either directly or through a federal agency. But we will not stand for blanket instructions to refuse answering any questions concerning any communications with the EOP 

[Executive Offi ce of the President].” 

Th eir insistence that either Administration offi cials comply with this oversight committee’s 

rightful demands, or the President invoke his Executive Privilege not to do so, was entirely 

appropriate. Unfortunately, when Mr. Card and his subordinates still refused to comply, 

the Chairman denied the Ranking Member’s request to issue subpoenas. Regrettably, other 

Committee Members (at least, this Member) were not informed of their previous attempts 

to obtain information, or of the decision to give in to the Administration’s recalcitrance. 

Unfortunately, at its mark-up of the draft report, the Committee failed to support my motion to subpoena those documents and witnesses, which were being withheld by the White 

House without claim to Executive Privilege, and which were being wrongfully denied by 

executive agencies.

Th e Administration’s refusal to comply and cooperate with this investigation is deplorable, 

as is the Committee’s failure to back the Chairman’s and Ranking Member’s proper insistence that the White House do so. Th is Committee is charged by the full Senate with the 

responsibility to oversee the agencies, programs, and activities that are related to homeland 

security. Th e Committee was expressly directed by the Senate Majority Leader to examine 

the Bush Administration’s failure to respond quickly or eff ectively to the disasters caused 

by Hurricane Katrina. Th is investigation is not complete without all of the information 

requested from the Administration by the Chairman, the Ranking Member, or their staff s. 

Furthermore, its fi ndings and conclusions can hardly be considered reliable, if the White 

House has decided what information to provide, and what information to withhold, from 

the Committee.

Th is unfortunate acquiescence confi rms the judgment of the Senate Democratic Leader that 

an independent, bi-partisan Commission was necessary to ensure a complete and unbiased 

investigation into the federal, state, and local responses to Hurricane Katrina. His request 

has been repeatedly denied by the Majority, with the assurance that this Committee would 

fulfi ll its responsibilities. Tragically and reprehensibly, it has failed to do so. Th us, the Committee failed the Senate’s Constitutional obligations to be an independent, co-equal branch 

of government from the Executive. It also failed the long-suff ering victims of Hurricane 

Katrina, who deserve to know why their governments failed them, and all the American 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
726

people, who depend upon their elected representatives to protect their lives and their interests, without regard to partisan political considerations. Th at partisanship includes unjustifi ed protection of an administration of the same political party, as much as undue criticism 

of one from another party.

Given the information provided to the Committee, the Chairman, the Ranking Member, 

and the Committee staff deserve commendation for their dedication to this undertaking. 

Th ey held 22 hearings, and they arranged for Committee members to tour affl icted sites 

in Mississippi and Louisiana. Th e hearings established an extensive public record, which 

informed Committee members and provided the solid foundation of this Report.

Our January 17, 2006, trip to Gulfport, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Louisiana, allowed us 

to visually inspect areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina and to meet with state and local 

offi cials. Almost fi ve months aft er the hurricane, the observed and reported lack of progress 

in clean-up, repair, and reconstruction, provided further evidence of the federal government’s continuing failure to respond effi ciently or eff ectively. Th ere is no time in which the 

helping hand of government is more urgently needed and more surely deserved than during 

and aft er a disaster. Victims are damaged or devastated – physically, emotional, and fi nancially. Local offi cials and their public services are overwhelmed, if not destroyed. Th ey need 

a federal emergency-response organization composed of experienced, dedicated professionals, who have the resources necessary to alleviate short-term suff ering and commence longterm recovery, and also the authority to expeditiously commit those resources. 

What the failed federal response to Hurricane Katrina showed is the utter ineptitude of the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Even worse, FEMA’s indiff erence and incompetence in the aft ermath of Hurricane Katrina was not an isolated instance. In the direct 

experience of this Senator with FEMA’s disaster-relief responses in Minnesota, the agency is 

too oft en a major obstruction to recovery projects, rather than a principal ally. 

I agree with this Report’s “Core Recommendation #1 – Create a New, Comprehensive 

Emergency Management Organization ... to Prepare for and Respond to all Disasters 

and Catastrophes.” I remain open-minded whether this new entity should remain within 

the DHS, as this Recommendation intends, or be established as a separate federal agency. 

Th e challenge for the Committee, for all of Congress, and for the Administration will be 

to actually “re-create” an existing federal agency that has become dysfunctional and nonfunctional. Merely “reforming” FEMA by rearranging some boxes and lines on its organizational chart, revising it, and giving its head a new title, will be usefully inadequate. Th e 

new organization must be more streamlined, centralized, and compact than its predecessor. 

It must be less bureaucratic, less consumed with regulatory minutiae, and less resistant to 

local recovery initiatives. It must spend less time creating complex plans and cumbersome 

procedures, and more time in training and perfecting action responses to emergency 

situations.

Th is new organization cannot be eff ective, however, without a clear defi nition of its role in 

national disasters. Inter-governmental, and even inter-agency, coordination is an oxymoron 

in an emergency. Someone must be in charge. And that “someone” must be clearly understood by everyone in advance of the crisis. It is no coincidence that the most eff ective “First 

Responders” immediately aft er Hurricane Katrina were military organizations: the U.S. 

Coast Guard and the National Guard. Th ey are trained to act in crisis situations. Th ey have 

clear, pre-established chains of command. Th ey act.

Th at is why I am concerned about “Core Recommendation #5,” which states, “Although the 

federal government should play a more proactive role in responding to catastrophic events, 

Additional Views
727

when state and local offi cials may be overwhelmed, states and localities will continue to provide the backbone of response – the fi rst response – for all disasters, catastrophic or not.”

While that approval may be appropriate for “typical disasters” (itself an oxymoron!), 

Hurricane Katrina exposed its fatal fl aws in an extreme or widespread disaster. Lines of 

communication are disrupted, if not temporarily destroyed, in such a catastrophe, which 

makes inter-governmental “coordination” extremely diffi cult, ineffi cient, and delayed. If the 

situation deteriorates in the disaster’s aft ermath, as has occurred in New Orleans, attempts 

to avoid responsibilities and to blame others for failed responses, override eff orts of coordination and cooperation. 

A large-scale catastrophe requires a federally led response. Invoking what is presently 

termed the “Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Plan” should place 

this new organization’s head as the “Situation Commander,” operating directly under, and 

reporting directly to, the President of the United States. All of the other federal, state, local, 

and private emergency-response operations should then become subordinate to, and under 

the direction of, the “Situation Commander,” for as long as the President deems necessary. 

History shows that “If the student does not learn the lesson, the teacher reappears.” Th is 

Report describes some of the most important lessons from the failed response to Hurricane 

Katrina. Th is Committee’s and the Congress’s subsequent actions to correct those serious 

defi ciencies before the next catastrophe will indicate whether those lessons will be learned. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared