J-S17017-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

CHARLES M. ADAMS, 

 Appellant No. 809 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order Entered May 11, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000048-1982 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2016 

 Appellant, Charles M. Adams, appeals from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Fayette County denying his motion for post-conviction DNA 

testing filed pursuant to section 9543.1 of the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

 On direct appeal, this Court summarized the underlying facts of the 

case as follows: 

On January 6, 1982, [Appellant] went to a hardware store in 

Hopwood to purchase an O-ring which he needed to fix a leaky 

spigot in his home. He purchased the O-ring, drove home and 

attempted to fix the faucet. When his wife complained that the 

faucet still leaked, [Appellant] removed the spigot and drove 

back to the hardware store. There he proceeded to stab Harry 

Frankhouser 29 times, causing his death. [Appellant] then 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 
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dragged the body of the deceased man to the back room. As he 

returned to the front of the store, Joseph Keffer entered the 

front door. Keffer and [Appellant] remained in the store until 

the police arrived. 

Commonwealth v. Adams, 1632 Pgh 1984, 503 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. filed 

September 13, 1985) (unpublished memorandum at 3). 

 Appellant was charged with criminal homicide and criminal attemptrobbery. On October 19, 1983, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree 

murder and attempted robbery. On November 26, 1984, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to serve a mandatory term of life imprisonment on the 

first-degree murder conviction and a consecutive term of incarceration of 

five to ten years on the attempted-robbery conviction. This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on September 13, 1985, and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of 

appeal on May 4, 1987. Commonwealth v. Adams, 503 A.2d 453 (Pa. 

Super. 1985), appeal denied, 527 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1987). 

 The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as 

follows: 

 [Appellant] filed his first [petition for post-conviction relief] 

on February 21, 1985 which was dismissed [because of] the fact 

it was premature due to his pending appeal. On April 18, 2005, 

[Appellant] filed a pro se Motion for DNA testing under 42 

Pa.C.S.A. [§ 9543.1(a)]. On August 9, 2005 the motion was 

granted. On July 28, 2006, [counsel] was appointed to 

represent [Appellant] in his Petition for DNA testing and all 

subsequent matters stemming from it. On August 3, 2006 this 

[c]ourt ordered the Commonwealth to send all clothing items to 

the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Laboratory for DNA 

evaluation and testing. On January 4, 2007, [Appellant] was 
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required to submit to blood samples and testing for DNA 

analysis. The State Police lab report [received in May of 2007] 

indicated that additional “alleles” not consistent with the DNA 

profiles of [Appellant] or the victim were present on the victim’s 

navy blue sock. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/12/10, at 2. 

 On July 2, 2007, Appellant filed a PCRA petition seeking relief on the 

basis of newly discovered evidence. Subsequently, Appellant filed two 

amended PCRA petitions. After multiple delays, the PCRA court held an 

extensive evidentiary hearing on December 18, 2009, at which both 

Appellant and the Commonwealth presented expert testimony. On April 12, 

2010, the PCRA court entered an order denying relief. 

 Appellant brought an appeal to this Court, which affirmed the decision 

of the PCRA court on December 17, 2010. L.C. v. Adams, 23 A.3d 586 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on May 12, 2011. 

Commonwealth v. Adams, 22 A.3d 1033 (PA. 2011). 

 On March 19, 2015, Appellant filed with the PCRA court the instant 

“motion for post conviction DNA testing.” In an order dated March 30, 2015, 

the PCRA court directed the Commonwealth to file a response to Appellant’s 

motion within thirty days. The Commonwealth failed to file a response as 

directed. Thereafter, on May 11, 2015, the PCRA court entered an order 

denying Appellant’s request for post-conviction DNA testing. This timely 
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appeal followed.1 Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

I. THE PCRA COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ISSUE AN ORDER 

TO HAVE THE VICTIMS BI-FOCALS, A CHROME PIPE, A BLOOD 

STAINED CARDBOARD BOX, A YELLOW 15 QUART DISH PAN, A 

BROWN LEATHER BELT SHEATH THAT WERE SOAKED WITH 

BLOOD, THAT WERE NEVER TESTED FOR DNA, BUT WERE 

____________________________________________ 

1

 An order granting or denying a motion for DNA testing disposes of all 

claims raised by all parties to the litigation and, therefore, is a final order. 

Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 64 A.3d 602, 609 (Pa. 2013). 

2

 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) filing, the trial court observed the following: 

On [May 21, 2015], the [trial c]ourt issued a 1925(b) order, 

directing [Appellant] to file a statement of errors complained of 

on appeal within twenty-one (21) days. 

On June 17, 2015, [Appellant] filed his Statement of 

Matters Complained on Appeal. [Appellant’s] Certificate of 

Service attests that he mailed the statement to all parties on 

June 9, 2015. However, the envelope (attached) received by the 

[trial c]ourt is postmarked June 15, 2015, appearing to be four 

days past the June 11, 2015 deadline to file. Failure to file a 

concise statement within the 21-day time limit set forth in Rule 

1925(b)(2) will result in waiver of all issues not raised by that 

date. Commonwealth v. Gravely, 970 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Pa. 

2009). 

We do recognize that under the prisoner mailbox rule, a 

petition is considered “filed” by a prisoner on the date it is 

deposited with prison authorities for mailing, not postmarked. 

Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super. 

2000). 

Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 6/19/15, at 1-2. Thus, it appears the PCRA 

court accepted Appellant’s assertion that he filed his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement on June 9, 2015, applied the prisoner mailbox rule, and 

considered the filing to be timely. Therefore, because the trial court 

accepted Appellant’s filing as being timely, we will do likewise. 
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PRESENTED AT APPELLANT’S TRIAL IN 1983, WHICH WOULD

RESULT IN NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE PROVING 

APPELLANT’S INNOCENCE. 

II. THE PCRA COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT DEFENDANT 

NOW ADVANCES THE EXACT SAME ARGUMENT HE DID AT HIS 

PCRA HEARING IN 2009, THAT AN UNKNOWN THIRD PARTY DNA 

PROFILE PROVES HIS INNOCENCE, WHEN IN FACT, DEFENDANT 

REQUESTED THAT A NATIONWIDE CODIS SEARCH BE 

CONDUCTED IN HIS CURRENT REQUEST FOR DNA TESTING, 

SINCE THE COMMONWEALTH ONLY DID A CODIS SEARCH FOR 

WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA. 

Appellant’s Brief at 3.3

 This Court has set forth the following standard of review of orders for 

post-conviction DNA testing:4

Post-conviction DNA testing falls under the aegis of the 

Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

9541–9546, and thus, “[o]ur standard of review permits us to 

consider only whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free from 

legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 108 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted). Great deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and 

these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We note with disapproval the fact that the Commonwealth has failed to file 

an appellee’s brief in this matter in addition to failing to comply with the 

PCRA court’s directive to file a response to Appellant’s most recent motion 

for DNA testing. 

4

 We observe that motions for post-conviction DNA testing, while considered 

post-conviction petitions under the PCRA, are “separate and distinct” from 

claims pursuant to other sections of the PCRA; thus, the one-year time bar 

does not apply to them. Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 938 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). 
J-S17017-16 

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certified record. Commonwealth v. Watson, 927 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). Moreover, when reviewing an order denying a motion for 

post-conviction DNA testing, this Court determines whether the movant 

satisfied the statutory requirements of Section 9543.1. Commonwealth v. 

Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1147-1148 (Pa. Super. 2005). It is an appellant’s 

burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred and relief is due. 

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 722 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

 As a prefatory matter, we observe the following. A movant should 

make a request for post-conviction DNA testing in a motion, not in a PCRA 

petition. Commonwealth v. Young, 873 A.2d 720, 724 n.2 (Pa. Super. 

2005). A request for post-conviction DNA testing is not a direct exception to 

the one-year time limit for filing a PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. 

Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2003). Such a request, however, 

allows a convicted person “to first obtain DNA testing which could then be 

used within a PCRA petition to establish new facts in order to satisfy the 

requirements of an exception under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).” Id. 

(citations omitted). Moreover, Section 9543.1 does not grant movants a 

right to counsel. Brooks, 875 A.2d at 1147. 

 Pennsylvania’s post-conviction DNA testing statute provides, in part, 

as follows: 

(a) Motion.-- 

 (1) An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a 

court of this Commonwealth and serving a term of 
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imprisonment or awaiting execution because of a sentence 

of death may apply by making a written motion to the 

sentencing court for the performance of forensic DNA 

testing on specific evidence that is related to the

investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of 

conviction. 

 (2) The evidence may have been discovered either prior 

to or after the applicant’s conviction. The evidence shall be 

available for testing as of the date of the motion. If the 

evidence was discovered prior to the applicant’s conviction, 

the evidence shall not have been subject to the DNA testing 

requested because the technology for testing was not in 

existence at the time of the trial or the applicant’s counsel 

did not seek testing at the time of the trial in a case where 

a verdict was rendered on or before January 1, 1995, or the 

applicant’s counsel sought funds from the court to pay for 

the testing because his client was indigent and the court 

refused the request despite the client’s indigency.

* * * 

(c) Requirements.--In any motion under subsection (a), under 

penalty of perjury, the applicant shall: 

* * * 

(2) (i) assert the applicant’s actual innocence of the offense 

for which the applicant was convicted; and 

* * * 

(3) present a prima facie case demonstrating that the: 

(i) identity of or the participation in the crime by the 

perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings that 

resulted in the applicant’s conviction and sentencing; 

and 

(ii) DNA testing of the specific evidence, assuming

exculpatory results, would establish: 

(A) the applicant’s actual innocence of the 

offense for which the applicant was convicted; 
J-S17017-16 

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* * * 

(d) Order.-- 

 (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall 

order the testing requested in a motion under subsection 

(a) under reasonable conditions designed to preserve the 

integrity of the evidence and the testing process upon a 

determination, after review of the record of the applicant’s 

trial, that the: 

(i) requirements of subsection (c) have been met; 

(ii) evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain 

of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been 

altered in any material respect; and 

(iii) motion is made in a timely manner and for the

purpose of demonstrating the applicant’s actual 

innocence and not to delay the execution of sentence 

or administration of justice. 

 (2) The court shall not order the testing requested in a 

motion under subsection (a) if, after review of the record of 

the applicant’s trial, the court determines that there is no 

reasonable possibility that the testing would produce 

exculpatory evidence that: 

(i) would establish the applicant’s actual innocence of 

the offense for which the applicant was convicted; 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. 

 Before turning to Appellant’s argument, we note the following legal 

principles. A motion for DNA testing must allege a prima facie case that the 

requested testing, assuming favorable results, would establish the movant’s 

actual innocence. Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 582, 583 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). If, after reviewing the record, the trial court determines there 
J-S17017-16 

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is no reasonable probability that the testing would produce exculpatory 

results establishing the movant’s actual innocence, the court shall deny the 

motion. Id. 

 In his first issue, Appellant asserts that various items from the crime 

scene should either be retested or tested for the first time. Appellant’s Brief 

at 6-9. Appellant assumedly believes that his DNA is missing from various 

items present at the scene and that DNA from additional unknown persons 

might be found on various items offered into evidence. Ignoring the fact 

that previous DNA testing was damaging to his argument, Appellant expects 

that new results will somehow prove that he is innocent of the crime. 

 Our review of the certified record reflects the following discussion 

offered by the PCRA court in its order denying Appellant’s most recent 

request for DNA testing of items presented into evidence at Appellant’s trial: 

[Appellant] previously requested and obtained DNA-testing in 

2005-2007. This [c]ourt then held a hearing on the findings and 

denied [Appellant’s] PCRA in 2009-2010. In denying

[Appellant’s] PCRA, we explicitly addressed why an unidentified 

DNA profile on the victim’s sock does not exonerate [Appellant]. 

(PCRA Ct. Op., April 12, 2010). . . . 

 [Appellant] again seeks testing of additional evidence, as 

further specified in his Motion. As reasoning for more testing, 

[Appellant] maintains that improvements in technology will 

vindicate him and find the owner of the third DNA profile, “who 

is actually the murderer.” (Def.’s Mot. ¶ 23-24). Notably, 

[Appellant] now advances the exact same argument that he did 

at his PCRA hearing in 2009, that an unknown third-party DNA 

profile proves his innocence. The Court already ruled on this 

issue in the 2010 PCRA Opinion and found that this argument in 

no way proves [Appellant’s] prima facie case of innocence. . . . 
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Order, 5/11/15, at 2. 

 Our further review of the record reflects the following thorough 

analysis offered by the PCRA court in support of its decision to deny 

Appellant’s previous PCRA petition based upon after-discovered evidence 

once DNA testing had been conducted: 

In this particular case, the new DNA technology[,] which was 

unavailable at the time [Appellant] was convicted, allows this 

petition to be filed over twenty years after the date of 

[Appellant’s] judgment [of sentence]. DNA testing was not 

widely accepted in Pennsylvania until 1994, when the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court first held that evidence of DNA 

testing was admissible in a criminal trial, after finding that such 

testing had become routine and fully accepted in the scientific 

community. See Commonwealth v. Crews, 536 Pa. 508, 640 

A.2d 395, 403 (Pa. 1994). 

* * * 

[The PCRA] statute requires the petitioner to present a prima 

facie case that the DNA testing produced exculpatory results that 

establishes the petitioner’s actual innocence. 

* * * 

 The major issue in this case concerns a minor allele found 

on [the victim’s] navy blue sock identified as Q16 in evidence 

that is inconsistent with [Appellant’s] and [the victim’s] DNA. 

[Appellant] avers that the minor allele[] found on [the victim’s] 

sock reveals the presence of a third unidentified person’s DNA, 

which is exculpatory evidence. 

 [Appellant] has the burden to show that this exculpatory 

evidence establishes his “actual innocence.” . . . In fact, the 

new DNA results may have done the opposite. 

 The Commonwealth agrees with [Appellant] that there is 

an additional minor allele found on the victim’s sock which is 

inconsistent with [Appellant’s] or [the victim’s] DNA. However, 

the Commonwealth pointed out at the hearing that those minor 
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alleles could be obtained in many ways and could be from 

countless individuals that touched the sock at issue during the 

course of investigation. Protocol back in the 1980’s when this 

crime occurred did not require anyone at the crime scene to 

wear gloves and as such both defense and prosecution expert 

witnesses agreed that the source for the minor allele could not 

be determined and might have been from anyone from a police 

officer, detectives, the coroner, or even [the victim’s] wife. 

 However, at the [PCRA] hearing, both experts agreed that 

[Appellant’s] DNA matched the major component of the stain 

obtained from the victim’s sock. [Appellant’s] DNA was also 

found in numerous blood patterns as testified to [at the PCRA 

hearing] by [Commonwealth expert witness] Sarah Kinner 

(hereinafter “Kinner”). Kinner explained the difference between 

passive and transfer stains stating, “passive drops/bleeding are 

bloodstains that are created by the force of gravity acting alone. 

So if you are just standing there bleeding, it is just gravity acting 

on it, they are just going down.” (PCRA t. p. 83). On the other 

hand, a transfer bloodstain, “is when a bloody object comes in 

contact with a clean object and blood is left behind. If you think 

of it, it is kind of like if you had a stamp with ink on it and you 

sat it down on the surface and removed it, the stamp would be 

left behind, the image of whatever it was.” (Id.) 

 Kinner further testified that among other stains: 

“A transfer/contact stain was identified on the front 

lower left pant leg of [the victim] . . . The DNA

from the transfer contact stain on the front lower left 

pant leg and the rounded stain on the back of the 

pants reportedly matched [Appellant].” (Id. at 95.) 

 Moreover, the transfer stains on the shovel handle were 

reportedly consistent with [Appellant’s] DNA as well as transfer 

contact stains that were found on the handle and blade of the 

knife and the cash register handle. [Appellant] testified at trial 

he had never touched any of the enumerated objects on which 

transfer stains with his DNA were found. That appears to be 

demonstrably untrue due to the new DNA results. (Id. at 96). 

 Further, Kinner testified that: 
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“A rounded drop of blood reportedly matching 

[Appellant’s] on the back of [the victim’s] pants 

cannot have been deposited while [the victim] lay in 

his final resting position.” 

When asked by counsel why it was significant that [Appellant’s] 

DNA was found on that particular location, Kinner explained: 

“The location of that stain on his pants, if he was

laying-from the picture that I have of him laying 

there, that portion of his pants was not even 

exposed if somebody had just been standing near 

him and dripping down on him. He had to have been 

manipulated in some way for that stain to be 

deposited.” (Id. at 98). 

 While [Appellant] has continuously asserted his innocence, 

this additional expert testimony is far more inculpatory of 

[Appellant] than the single small minor allele is exculpatory. 

Kinner stated that [the victim’s] “body would have had to have 

been in a different position in order for that stain to be placed 

there.” Id. at 106. While [Appellant] admits to walking around 

the victim in the back room, he has never admitted to even 

touching the victim’s body, much less turning him over. 

 Similar to the victim’s pant leg, Kinner testified that the 

blood on the front of the shovel blade was consistent with 

[Appellant’s] DNA. This stain however was found face down in 

the photographs she saw of the crime scene. Kinner stated “so 

if it is face down like this against the floor with these drips, i[f] 

you are standing over the shovel, you can’t deposit those stains 

in that position as it is photographed[.]” (Id. at 9[9]). 

Therefore, the shovel must have been moved after [Appellant’s] 

blood dropped onto it. [Appellant’s] trial testimony as to what 

occurred that day is completely inconsistent with the new DNA 

evidence. 

 While [Appellant] claims this new evidence is exculpatory, 

the [court] finds that it supports [Appellant’s] conviction. The 

DNA evidence substantiates [Appellant’s] blood was not simply 

passive[ly] dripped as he moved around the scene. Rather, 

[Appellant’s] DNA was the major component of the transfer 

stains found on the victim’s sock as well as his pant leg and 
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numerous other objects such as the knife, shovel and cash 

register handle. 

 Furthermore, while minor alleles were found on the sock, 

there is no other indication of anybody else’s DNA on any of the 

other evidentiary items. Without more than that solitary minor 

allele, the DNA evidence does not establish his prima facie case 

of “actual innocence.” On the contrary, it creates a stronger 

case of his guilt. As such [Appellant’s] PCRA petition must be 

DENIED. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/12/10, at 3-7 (emphasis in original). 

 In his instant motion seeking DNA testing, Appellant has asserted his 

innocence as required under the statute. However, Appellant has failed to 

set forth a prima facie case demonstrating that further DNA testing of the

specific evidence, assuming exculpatory results, would establish Appellant’s 

actual innocence. Indeed, Appellant’s assertion of innocence, while 

necessary, is insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of “actual 

innocence” under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. Appellant must offer more than a 

bald assertion of innocence and must demonstrate that the DNA testing 

“would establish” actual innocence. Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 

542, 547 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

 Moreover, even if the results of the requested DNA testing definitively 

excluded Appellant’s DNA from the scene, further confirmation of this 

absence does not enable Appellant to meet his burden. See Heilman, 867 

A.2d at 547 (“In DNA as in other areas, an absence of evidence is not 

evidence of absence”). Likewise, even if the results of the requested DNA 

testing positively identified someone else’s DNA at the scene, Appellant fails 
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to explain how that necessarily points to a different assailant. Thus, it would 

not exculpate Appellant. See Smith, 889 A.2d at 585 (“Merely detecting 

DNA from another individual on the victim’s fingernails, in the absence of 

any evidence as to how and when that DNA was deposited, would not 

exculpate appellant by pointing to a different assailant.”). 

 Consequently, we are left to conclude that Appellant has failed to 

establish a prima facie case demonstrating that the DNA test, if exculpatory, 

would have established his actual innocence. Because we detect no error in 

the PCRA court’s evaluation of this case, we conclude that Appellant fails to 

qualify for relief. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in 

refusing to conduct a more extensive search of the Combined DNA Index 

System (“CODIS”) of the previous DNA results.5 Appellant’s Brief at 9-12. 

We need not reach the merits of this issue because we are constrained to 

conclude that Appellant’s discussion in the argument section of his brief is 

not properly developed for appellate review. It is well settled that the 

argument portion of an appellate brief must be developed with pertinent 

discussion of the issue, which includes citations to relevant authority. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See Commonwealth v. Genovese, 675 A.2d 331, 334 

(Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that “[t]he argument portion of an appellate brief 

____________________________________________ 

5

 In addition, Appellant attempts to present, for the first time on appeal, a 

claim that his PCRA counsel was ineffective. Appellant’s Brief at 10. 
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must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point which includes 

citations to the relevant authority”). 

 In Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2008), a 

panel of this Court offered the following relevant observation regarding the 

proper formation of the argument portion of an appellate brief: 

In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to 

each question, which should include a discussion and citation of 

pertinent authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). This Court is neither 

obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument 

for a party. Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 577, 

782 A.2d 517, 532 (2001) (Castille, J., concurring). To do so 

places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral 

arbiter. Id. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an 

argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is 

waived. Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 

Super. 1996). 

Id. at 371-372. Thus, failure to cite case law or other legal authority in 

support of an argument results in waiver of the claim. Commonwealth v. 

Owens, 750 A.2d 872, 877 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

 Here, Appellant’s argument pertaining to this issue contains no citation 

to relevant legal authority beyond a cursory legal citation at the beginning of 

his argument. Appellant’s Brief at 9-12. Because Appellant’s argument on 

this issue consists of broad statements and allegations and no analysis with 

relevant law, the argument is not properly developed for our review as it 

fails to apply any law to the facts of the case. This failure to develop a legal 

argument precludes appellate review. Thus, we conclude that this issue is 

waived because the argument is not adequately developed. 
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 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/15/2016