See Attachment “A.” Notably, Lee County investigators did not search Brian Cofield’s 1

residence or Michael Cofield’s residence. Investigators only searched Willis “Kenny” Cofield’s

residence and Jason Cofield’s residence.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 )

 v. ) CR. NO. 03:06cr208-MEF

 )

JASON EDWARD COFIELD )

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Comes now the United States of America, by and through Leura Garrett Canary, United

States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama, and hereby requests that this Honorable Court

deny Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. As grounds in support of this Response, the United States

sets forth the following: 

FACTS

On January 24, 2006, Lee County deputies executed a duly authorized Alabama search

warrant on the property of four family members all residing at 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee

County, Alabama. According to the search warrant, the individuals and places to be searched were:

The residence of Willis “Kenny” Cofield, alias, Brian Cofield, alias, Jason

Cofield, alias and Michael Cofield, alias, which is located at 5766 Lee Road 270,

Valley, Lee County, Alabama, and any and all vehicles and/or buildings (above

ground and below ground) to include two manufactured homes, which is located

within the curtilage of said property. (Emphasis added). 1

In his “Application and Affidavit For Search Warrant,” Lee County Sheriff’s Investigator

Donnie Surrett identified four individuals (all living on the same property) as likely possessing

controlled substances. Specifically, Investigator Surrett identified Willis “Kenney” Cofield, Brian

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 25 Filed 10/23/2006 Page 1 of 11
According to Lee County Investigators Surrett and Jordan, they have collectively visited 2

the Cofield property approximately 10-15 times prior to the execution of the search warrant.

2

Cofield, Jason Cofield, and Michael Cofield. Likewise, Investigator Surrett identified two

“manufactured homes” as the primary target of the warrant. Importantly, Investigator Surrett noted

in his application that, “It was determined that the Cofields’ address is 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley,

Lee County, Alabama.”

According to Lee County investigators, the entire Cofield family lives on approximately 49

acres of contiguous property in Lee County, Alabama. The collective address for the Cofield family

is 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee County, Alabama. Prior to applying for their search warrant, Lee

County investigators queried the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center’s (“ACJIC”) Law

Enforcement Tactical System (“LETS”) for current information on Jason Edward Cofield.

According to LETS, Jason Edward Cofield’s current address was 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee

County, Alabama. 

Significantly, Lee County investigators also visited the Lee County Tax Assessor’s Office

to check registered land descriptions and tax records for individuals residing at 5766 Lee Road 270,

Valley, Lee County, Alabama. Using this information, Lee County investigators confirmed the

location of the property and residents thereof.

Based upon this information, and information previously known to Lee County investigators

(including previous visits to the Cofield property ), the search warrant specified 5766 Lee Road 270, 2

Valley, Lee County, Alabama, as the place to be searched. The search warrant also identified, by

name, all four individuals known to reside there. Prior to executing the search, Lee County

investigators devised an operational plan for the search of the buildings located on the property.

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3

As a result of this duly authorized and executed search warrant, Lee County investigators

searched the Cofield property. During the search of Jason Cofield’s residence, law enforcement

recovered firearms and stolen vehicles. The recovery of these firearms and stolen vehicles from

Jason Cofield’s residence led to an additional investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Based upon ATF’s investigation, agents discovered that Jason

Cofield was a convicted felon and could not lawfully possess firearms. Furthermore, ATF

discovered that the vehicles recovered from Jason Cofield’s residence had recently been stolen from

the State of Georgia. 

Consequently, on August 15, 2006, a two count federal indictment was returned against

Jason Cofield. The indictment charged Cofield with being a felon in possession of firearms and

possessing stolen motor vehicles that had moved in interstate commerce.

ANALYSIS

In his motion, Jason Cofield attacks the particularity of the instant warrant. The United

States provides this Honorable Court with a discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity

requirement. 

I. PARTICULARITY OF SEARCH WARRANTS

According to settled law in this Circuit, 

A warrant’s description of the place to be searched is not required to meet technical

requirements or have the specificity sought by conveyancers. The warrant need only describe

the place to be searched with sufficient particularity to direct the searcher, to confine his

examination to the place described, and to advise those being searched of his authority. An

erroneous description of premises to be searched does not necessarily render a warrant valid.

See United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1091 (11 Cir. 1986). th

Furthermore, “[t]he fourth amendment requires merely that the search warrant describe the

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4

premises in such a way that the searching officer may ‘with reasonable effort ascertain and identify

the place intended.’” See United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1532 (11 Cir. 1985). Finally, th

“[T]he validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers

disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the issuing Magistrate.” See Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (S.Ct. 1987).

In the case at bar, Lee County authorities sought to search a large area of rural property,

inhabited by multiple members of the same family, containing multiple structures. The search

warrant specifically identified the property, the individuals who reside on the property, and the type

of structures found on the property. Moreover, Lee County authorities, including the investigators

who applied for and executed the search warrant, are personally familiar with the Cofields and their

property.

In United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490 (6 Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit was faced with th

a strikingly similar situation. In Gahagan, Defendants were charged with possessing narcotics after

evidence was recovered from a warranted search of their residence. See id. at 1491. Defendants

pleaded guilty, but preserved their right to attack the search warrant’s particularity. In short, the

contested warrant authorized the search of a “rural, large piece of property with multiple dwellings

and structures” with four separate dwellings located in the general area. See Gahagan at 1493.

According to Defendants, the search warrant was defective because the address listed in the warrant

was insufficient to include the structure containing the contraband. See id. Like Cofield, Gahagan

claimed the structure with the contraband was a separate area with its own address and the warrant

failed to specify it sufficiently. See id. To resolve the issue, the Six Circuit applied a two-part test.

According to the Six Circuit:

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5

The test for determining the sufficiency of the description of the place to be searched is

whether the place to be searched is described with sufficient particularity as to enable the

executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there

is any reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched. See

United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6 Cir. 1989); United States v. Gitcho, 601 th

F.2d 396, 371 (8 Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979). See th

United States v. Collins, 830 F.2d 145, 146 (9 Cir.1987); United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d th

280, 387-88 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 114, 50 L.Ed.2d 109 (1976). th

More precisely, the components of the test are: (1) whether the place to be searched is

described with sufficient particularity as to enable the executing officers to locate and identify the

premises with reasonable effort; and (2) whether there is reasonable probability that some other

premises may be mistakenly searched. See United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6 Cir. th

1989); United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 1509 (9 Cir. 1985). th

Applying this test, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Gahagan search. First, although the warrant

itself did not contain a sufficient description of the exact location containing contraband, the affidavit

did. See Gahagan at 1497. Moreover, an affidavit can be relied upon, “in addition to other facts

known by the executing officers, to cure the defect in the warrant.” See id. According to the Court,

the description in the affidavit was sufficient to include the structure containing the contraband. See

id. Notably, the Sixth Circuit also cited to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Burke,

784 F.2d 1090 (11 Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S.Ct. 2901(1986), for the proposition that th

courts can take into account facts “known by the executing officer but not specifically stated in the

affidavit or warrant to validate a search.” See Burke at 784.

Second, the Court found there was no risk that a mistaken search of another premises was

possible because of the length of the investigation; and, the agents familiarity with the property.

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 25 Filed 10/23/2006 Page 5 of 11
Arguably, the Cofield warrant does not appear to specifically incorporate, by reference, 3

Investigator Surrett’s affidavit. Likewise, the Gahagan warrant did not “specifically incorporate

the affidavit;” yet, the trial judge found the warrant to “cross reference the affidavit.” See id. at

1497. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090

(11 Cir.), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S.Ct. 2901(1986), authorizes courts to take into

th

account facts “known by the executing officer but not specifically stated in the affidavit or

warrant to validate a search.” (Emphasis added).

6

Importantly, the Court noted the fact that there were no other residences on the property except those

described in the affidavit. See Gahagan at 1498-1499.

Based upon this analysis, the Gahagan Court upheld the validity of the search and declined

to reach the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d

677 (1984).

Applying Gahagan to the case at bar, the search of Jason Cofield’s residence should be

validated. First, like Gahagan, the Cofield warrant identifies the specific address to be searched,

5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee County, Alabama. However, the face of the Cofield warrant itself

provides even greater detail than Gahagan’s. Indeed, the Cofield warrant specifies the exact

individuals to be searched, Willis “Kenny” Cofield, Brian Cofield, Jason Cofield and Michael

Cofield. In addition, the face of the warrant includes a description of the types of structures found

on the Cofield property, two manufactured homes.3

Second, like Gahagan, Lee Countyinvestigators were veryfamiliar with the Cofield property

and very unlikely to mistakenly search any other residences. Importantly, their familiarity with the

property itself can be considered in evaluating the validity of the warrant. According to their

affidavit, investigators developed information over January 2006 linking the Cofield family to the

possession or manufacture of methamphetamine, including the strong odor of ammonia (a known

component of methamphetamine) emanating from the property. Likewise, investigators also knew

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 25 Filed 10/23/2006 Page 6 of 11
7

the scope of the property and the fact that the entire property is inhabited by the Cofield family.

Clearly, investigators knew the exact property to search and could not mistake another large rural

tract of land with any other premises. Exactlylike Gahagan, an unauthorized search of another house

was minimal because there were no other homes in the area besides theCofield homes on the Cofield

family property.

Based upon the fact that Lee County investigators knew the exact identity and location of the

place to be searched; and, the extremely low risk of mistakenly searching the wrong residence,

Cofield’s motion to suppress should be denied.

II. GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION

Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its good faith jurisprudence. The most recent case

on the exclusionary rule, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), makes clear that the district

court was correct in not applying the exclusionary rule expansively. In Hudson, the Court noted that

“[s]uppression of evidence . . .has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” See id. at 2163.

According to the Court:

The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs, which sometimes include setting the

guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been cautious against expanding

it, and have repeatedly emphasized that the rule’s costly toll upon truthseeking and law

enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging its application. We have

rejected indiscriminate application of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only where

its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served - that is, where its deterence

benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. Id. (Quotations, citations, and alterations

omitted).

Likewise, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), the Supreme Court

addressed the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule and the admissibility of evidence obtained by

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8

officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate

judge. According to Leon, “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be

ordered only in a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further

the purpose of the exclusionary rule.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 918. Furthermore, according to Leon, if

the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to “deter unlawful police conduct,” then “evidence obtained

from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had

knowledge, or may be properly charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under

the Fourth Amendment.” See id. at 919.

Importantly, “it is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s

allegations establish probable cause, and if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the

requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to

question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant

is technically sufficient.” See id. at 921 (Emphasis added). Clearly, “penalizing the officer for the

magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth

Amendment violations.” See id.

Finally, in United States v. Cancela, 812 F.2d 1340 (11 Cir. 1987), the Eleventh Circuit th

discussed Leon and the applicability of the good faith exception. In Cancela, the Court took a close

look at the actions of the police officer in relation to the application for a search warrant. See id. at

1342. The Court, in upholding the validity of the search, emphasized the fact that “there was no

pervasive or credible evidence of record that any police officer knowingly acted in bad faith or

intentionally misled the magistrate or knowingly or recklessly falsified the affidavit or that the

magistrate performed in anything but a neutral and detached jurisprudential function.” See id.

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9

Thus, the teaching of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit is that an

officer should not be punished with the suppression of evidence if the magistrate committed an error

in determining sufficient probable cause. In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Investigator

Surrett misled Lee County Circuit Judge Walker or that he falsified the affidavit. According to all

the evidence, Investigator Surrett presented reliable facts to Judge Walker about criminal activity at

5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee County, Alabama. Based upon those facts, Judge Walker made the

legal determination that probable cause existed to search 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee County,

Alabama. Lee County investigators should not be punished with suppression of evidence they

discovered because Judge Walker’s determination may have been faulty (though the United States

asserts that it was not). “[P]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own,

cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). 

There is no evidence, and Cofield does not argue, that LeeCounty investigators misled Judge

Walker, or that they knowingly or recklessly falsified the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence,

and Cofield does not argue, that Judge Walker issued the warrant in a biased or compromised

judicial manner. In the absence ofthese factors, case law overwhelmingly supports the admissibility

of the evidence found in Jason Cofield’s possession located at 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Lee

County, Alabama.

For the reasons stated above, the defendant's motion should be DENIED.

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10

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of October, 2006.

LEURA GARRETT CANARY

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/ Verne H. Speirs

VERNE H. SPEIRS

Assistant United States Attorney

1 Court Square, Suite 201

Montgomery, Alabama 36104

(334) 223-7280

(334) 223-7135 Fax

verne.speirs@usdoj.gov

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 25 Filed 10/23/2006 Page 10 of 11
11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

 )

 v. ) CR. NO. 03:06cr208-MEF

)

JASON EDWARD COFIELD )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 23, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk

of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to Pate

DeBardeleben.

Respectfully submitted,

 

LEURA GARRETT CANARY

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/ Verne H. Speirs

VERNE H. SPEIRS

Assistant United States Attorney

1 Court Square, Suite 201

Montgomery, Alabama 36104

(334) 223-7280

(334) 223-7135 Fax

verne.speirs@usdoj.gov

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 25 Filed 10/23/2006 Page 11 of 11