374

Offloading drinking water

Army National Guard photo
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Logistics

Although some FEMA witnesses testifi ed that FEMA had pre-positioned more commodities before Hurricane Katrina made landfall than before any other previous 

storm, it was not enough to sustain the tens of thousands of people left stranded by 

the hurricane. FEMA’s logistics system became critical to providing additional food, water, 

ice, portable toilets, fuel, generators, and other necessary supplies to the impacted areas. 

However, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff testifi ed: “FEMA’s logistics 

systems simply were not up to the task.”1

 Former FEMA Director Michael Brown agreed: 

“FEMA has a logistics problem.”2

In some cases, state and local offi cials faced such overwhelming circumstances that they 

could not assess or communicate their needs accurately to FEMA. At other times, the 

system itself revealed fl aws, as red tape prevented the prompt and complete acquisition and 

distribution of assets. To some degree, each level of government shares some of the responsibility for the failure of the FEMA commodities system aft er landfall.

Ordinary people forced to endure inhuman circumstances were the victims of these failures. 

Without generators, plumbing, or portable toilets, the Superdome became a stadium of 

human waste rotting in extreme heat. In Mississippi, victims who took refuge in public shelters found shortages of food and water, sanitation problems, and lack of electricity. 

FEMA

Th e failed response to fulfi ll basic critical needs following Hurricane Katrina highlighted 

long-standing problems with FEMA logistics. With state and local authorities overwhelmed, 

the unprecedented demand for commodities fell – as the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted 

– on the federal government.

FEMA’s logistics failure during the Katrina crisis was no surprise. FEMA already knew it 

lacked staff and systems needed to respond to a large disaster.3

 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in Louisiana, told Committee investigators that FEMA regularly 

fails to track supplies: “It has been a problem at every disaster I’m aware of.”4

In 2004, Ken Burris, the FEMA Acting Director of Operations, initially requested $60 million for modifi ed logistical requirements that included logistical tracking systems.5

 In January 2005, FEMA submitted an initiative to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

to improve its logistics system.6

 Documentation for the request reveals the burdens on 

FEMA’s antiquated logistics systems. For example, warehouse-space requirements in some 

areas have grown as much as 10 times and the transportation mission had grown over 300 

percent in three years, while staff support for these functions had been unchanged for seven 

years.7

 Th e request concluded the logistics system was not functional, resulting in the “total 

inability to accomplish the FEMA mission in accordance with the performance goals.”8

 Th e 

status quo would also “negatively impact the ability to rapidly respond to both no-notice 

incidents and notice disasters and incidents.”9

FEMA’s poor planning for transportation was a key factor in the problems with commodities. Gary Moore, FEMA Director of Logistics, said FEMA had diffi culty moving commodities during Katrina.10 For instance, on Saturday aft ernoon, FEMA realized it did not have 

enough truck drivers to deliver commodities and equipment and started reviewing résumés 

to hire additional drivers.11 By Sunday aft ernoon, August 28, records show that FEMA was 

Chapter 23
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Chapter 23

short 68 of the 94 drivers who would be needed to move commodities for a short response 

eff ort and 162 drivers for a longer response.12 To make matters worse, FEMA’s transportation contractor, Landstar, does not own any vehicles. Instead, it locates independent drivers 

only aft er FEMA asks it to move commodities, which can also lead to delays.13 FEMA then 

had to compete against Landstar for drivers to hire.14 Drivers were also hard to come by 

because the commodities needed to be moved over a weekend.15

Staffi ng shortages hindered FEMA’s logistics response to Katrina. In addition to the shortage of drivers, FEMA did not have enough people in Louisiana to staff a 24-hour operations center aft er the storm hit, which required many people to work more than 50 hours 

straight.16 FEMA’s own evaluation of its response in Louisiana admitted that, “Lack of suffi cient trained logistics staff signifi cantly detracted from our response to Hurricane Katrina 

in Louisiana and jeopardized the overall logistics mission.”17

Unlike many large private shippers, FEMA could not track assets en route to destinations. 

As Moore explained: “I can tell you today when they leave someplace and I can tell you 

when they arrive someplace because they’re manually counted when they got through the 

gate. In the middle of that, I don’t know where they are.”18

FEMA’s decision to wait to determine whether pre-positioned assets were suffi cient – instead of maintaining a constant stream of supplies – compounded the problem, as admitted 

by FEMA Director Brown: “We pre-positioned and then tried to see what was going to happen and then started it back up again. We should have just kept pushing.”19

Th e logistics plan used in Katrina grew out of the Hurricane Pam catastrophic-storm 

exercise begun in 2004, and was still in development when Katrina struck. It envisioned 

a sequence of commodity deliveries from Federal Operational Staging Areas (FOSAs) to 

regional staging areas (RSAs), and then to local points of delivery (PODs). Th e plan assumed that as many as 160,000 people would require supplies.20 Local offi cials viewed the 

commodities distribution plan as one of the most valuable products of the Hurricane Pam 

exercise, 21 and FEMA offi cials scrambled to fi nd, read, and use the Pam documents in the 

days before Katrina’s landfall.22

Th e Hurricane Pam plan guidelines for commodity distribution are internally inconsistent.23 Th e power, water, and ice distribution section states that FEMA will direct the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to have “approximately one-day’s supply of water and ice 

– 1,530,000 gallons of water [322 truckloads] and 5.5 million pounds of ice [137.5 truckloads] – at Camp Beauregard, a federal staging area, in Pineville, LA, before the hurricane 

makes landfall.”24 Camp Beauregard was chosen because it was far enough inland to be 

safe from hurricanes, yet close enough to quickly deliver supplies.25 Later in the document, 

pre-landfall planning charts specify that one day’s supply of ice and water would be 32 to 40 

truckloads each. Th e same sections identify one day’s supply of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) 

and tarps to be 15 to 20 truckloads and 36 to 34 truckloads respectively.26

FEMA had 30 truckloads of water, 17 truckloads of ice, 15 trailer loads of MREs, and 6 

trailer loads of tarps at Camp Beauregard before the storm.27 Th ese commodities had been 

positioned at the beginning of the 2005 hurricane season as part of a new way to speed up 

the response to hurricanes, but FEMA did not get any additional commodities to Beauregard as Katrina moved through the Gulf of Mexico.28 

Despite some eff orts to move some commodities into Mississippi, there were major defi ciencies in commodities prestaging there. FEMA’s FCO for Mississippi, William Carwile, wrote 

several e-mails throughout Sunday to his superiors in which he expressed concern with commodities issues. Despite the fact that FEMA had ordered 400 trucks of ice, 400 trucks of water, 
377

Logistics

and 250 trucks of MREs for the Meridian Naval Air Station in Mississippi, by the evening of 

August 29 only 30 trucks of water, 15 of MREs, two of tarps, and 30 of ice were at the base.29 

FEMA’s action of staging supplies early in the season throughout the Gulf Coast no doubt 

helped the response to Katrina.30 But these supplies were not enough for a storm as strong 

as Katrina. Th e preparations for the hurricane should not have ended with the initial prepositioning of supplies. Burris confi rmed that the initial pre-positioning was only a start, 

and the specifi cs of a storm would dictate whether FEMA should move more supplies to the 

area.31 While some supplies already staged in the Gulf region were moved to Mississippi or 

Alabama, records indicate that relatively few additional truckloads arrived in the primary 

FEMA staging areas in the days before landfall.32 Th e record is not clear whether additional 

supplies were moved into the region, bypassing the primary FEMA staging areas. In any 

event, the Committee believes that with Katrina bearing down on the Gulf Coast as a catastrophic storm, FEMA should have moved additional supplies to its primary staging areas 

in Mississippi and Louisiana.

Commodities such as water, ice, food, tarps, and generators were delivered ineffi ciently 

and ineff ectively to Mississippi and Louisiana both before and aft er landfall. In Mississippi, 

Carwile expressed concerns in a September 1 e-mail to some senior FEMA offi cials, including Director Brown, that the “System appears broken. ... Will now attempt to get product 

in alternate ways.”33

A week aft er landfall, Carwile wrote that the food deliveries were “totally unacceptable.”34 

Robert Latham, Director of Mississippi’s Emergency Management Agency, testifi ed that he 

received only 10 to 20 percent of the food and water he requested during the days he described 

as critical, and did not receive adequate supplies until September 9, 12 days aft er landfall.35

FEMA’s logistics also failed to meet demands in Louisiana. Colonel Terry Ebbert, Director 

of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, told the Committee that he had 

diffi culty getting food and water the week aft er the storm;36 Lokey confi rmed that requests 

were not being met.37 In particular, FEMA was unable to fi ll the number of requests for 

MREs.38 However, as noted by Colonel Al Jones, the Department of Defense (DOD) liaison 

offi cer who started working on logistics issues with Director Brown on September 2, local 

emergency managers had diffi culty articulating an accurate level of demand for commodities given the catastrophic conditions and lack of communications.39

FEMA recognized that it had failed.40 Perceiving an overwhelmed logistics system, FEMA 

Director Brown “reached back to headquarters and had discussions about [how he] wanted 

all logistics turned over to DOD.”41 On September 1, FEMA headquarters contacted the 

Department of Defense, requesting that DOD take over full logistics operations in Louisiana and Mississippi,42 thus proposing the transfer of one of its most important functions to 

another entity. (See Chapter 26 for additional information on this mission assignment and 

DOD’s resulting actions).

Considerable attention has been paid to this attempt to turn over FEMA’s troubled 

logistical eff orts to the Department of Defense. Aft er discussions among FEMA and DOD 

offi cials, on September 2 FEMA issued a $1 billion mission assignment to DOD to plan and 

execute the procurement, transportation, and distribution of commodities in Louisiana and 

Mississippi. FEMA offi cials authorized spending up to $1 billion on this mission, an estimate, as one FEMA offi cial said, that was large enough to give DOD the authority to “cover 

the eventualities” that might arise in accomplishing this mission.43 

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale testifi ed of this mission that DOD “got the largest request for assistance in the history of the United States. And it wasn’t anything other 
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than ... ‘full logistics support throughout the entire area of responsibility.’” McHale continued that he felt that this was a “very broad, fairly loosely defi ned mission requirement” but 

since it was a “crisis circumstance, we felt that we should take that on, and we did.”44

DOD’s performance under this mission assignment was ultimately considerably less than 

full logistical support. DOD appears to have identifi ed certain areas of FEMA’s logistics 

system that required immediate attention – namely sourcing, tracking, and transportation 

– and restored the fl ow and distribution of commodities to both Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Hence, FEMA retained control over many of its traditional tasks.45

Of the billion dollars authorized, DOD has sought reimbursement from FEMA for approximately $100 million of work.46 Billing records compiled by FEMA indicate DOD has sought 

reimbursement from FEMA partly for substantial costs for ship leases, fuel, airlift support, 

personnel travel, and some food.47

Th e day before the mission assignment to DOD, despite FEMA leaders’ acknowledgement 

of the logistics problems, DHS Secretary Chertoff was publicly claiming otherwise:

Th e limiting factor here has not been that we don’t have enough supplies. ... 

We not only had a hurricane; we had a second catastrophe, which was a fl ood. 

Th at fl ood made parts of the city very diffi cult to get through. If you can’t get 

through the city you can’t deliver supplies. ... I’m telling you that we are getting food and water to areas where people are staging. ... Th e limitation here 

on getting food and water to people is the condition on the ground.48

Other factors contributed to the logistics struggle. For example, communications between 

offi cials within Louisiana and with FEMA headquarters were almost nonexistent. As Scott 

Wells, the Deputy FCO in Louisiana said, “Th ere was just a big communications void” in 

Baton Rouge.49 FEMA had done little before landfall to ensure communications capabilities aft er landfall. (See Chapter 18, Communication Voids) Th e FEMA team leader at the 

Superdome had very limited communication capabilities with superiors in Baton Rouge and 

elsewhere, and estimated that this lowered his operational eff ectiveness by 90 percent.50

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 25, both FEMA and state offi cials cited security issues 

as a principal reason for delayed delivery of commodities.51

Problems with Request for Assistance Systems

Louisiana’s Staff and E-Team Server Were Overwhelmed 

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), the 

agency in charge of the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC) under the Louisiana Emergency Plan, uses a computerized request system called E-Team to log requests 

from state or local emergency offi cials. Louisiana offi cials said that the number of incoming 

requests overwhelmed their E-Team server.52 LOHSEP ordered a replacement server for 

overnight delivery, but it was not installed until August 31.53

Parishes that lacked Internet access transmitted their requests to LOHSEP by telephone, 

fax, and ham radio,54 though the loss of key communications infrastructure between New 

Orleans and Baton Rouge undermined these eff orts.55 Although the E-Team system was at 

times interminably slow, it never completely stopped working.56

When the state receives requests for assistance, the state is supposed to validate the requests 

before passing them to FEMA. A validation process eliminates frivolous or low-priority 
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Logistics

requests or those requests best handled by other states through the EMAC system. In Louisiana, offi cials lacked understanding of what assistance FEMA could appropriately provide. 

Th at lack of understanding led to submission of requests that wasted FEMA’s time and 

resources. As Wells put it: 

When the state gets all these requests, they’re supposed to consolidate them 

and see if they can meet those [requests] and they pass them to us. Th at mechanism of the state consolidating and screening requests was nonexistent [in 

Louisiana]. Everything was passed to us.

People wanting pens, paper – and this was back in October – an air-conditioner, a bus for the Mayor to go to Atlanta; all that stuff comes straight to us, ... 

there’s no validation at the state level. We were just – we were getting actually 

thousands of requests.57

At the Committee’s December 8 hearing, Wells further elaborated that requests for ammunition, golf carts, bus rides for Mayor Nagin and his staff , and portable air conditioners were intermingled with legitimate, high-priority requests.58 Wells told the Committee 

that the “hundreds and hundreds” of invalid requests “clogg[ed] down the system for the 

legitimate requests.”59 Wells’ testimony is uncontroverted. Louisiana’s failure to adequately 

prioritize its requests to FEMA wasted FEMA’s time and limited resources.. 

The Systems That FEMA and the States Used to Process Requests for Aid 

Were Incompatible, Delaying Fulfi llment

Requests to FEMA, on the other hand, must be submitted on an Action Request Form 

(ARF). Th e ARFs and the state’s E-Team system are not compatible, so state offi cials had to 

fi ll out both E-Team requests and FEMA ARFs. While Lokey did not think the incompatibility slowed the response to requests, it certainly complicated the tracking of requests, as 

will be discussed below.60

Aft er a standard hurricane, FEMA has 72 hours to establish a Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), which 

uses Mission Assignments – broad orders based on the ARFs – to task various government 

agencies to provide needed assets. Aft er Katrina, however, the JFO in Louisiana did not become fully operational for 12 days aft er landfall, forcing state and FEMA offi cials to send important functions over to the FEMA Regional Operations Center in Denton, Texas.61 Instead 

of coordinating with an on-site JFO, state and FEMA offi cials had to spend time reaching 

regional offi cials62 who were oft en unacquainted with the situation in Louisiana.63

FEMA also didn’t have enough staff .64 Th e FEMA team in Louisiana had a single individual 

who worked 18 to 20-hour shift s to fi ll out and submit ARFs. Despite repeated requests for 

additional staff , Wells was still trying to get more staff as late as September 9. Wells called 

the shortage of people to process assistance requests “our biggest problem.”65

FEMA Could Not Track Requests

Once FEMA submitted requests for assistance to the agencies expected to complete them, 

it had no effi cient way to track progress by those agencies. FEMA’s review of the Katrina 

response in Louisiana found that tracking diffi culties led to duplication of requests, orders, 

and eff orts.66 Th e inability to track left some orders “unfi lled, unchecked, or misdirected.”67

Sometimes, state offi cials had a hard time following up on state E-Team requests they 

had transferred to FEMA’s ARFs, as FEMA oft en failed to record on the ARFs their 

corresponding E-Team request. LOHSEP designated staff ers to manually match up E-Team 

requests with ARFs, but that cumbersome process proved inadequate for the magnitude of 
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Chapter 23

the task.68 Eventually FEMA started logging the state numbers, which made tracking request 

easier, though the system was still far from perfect.69

Judgment Errors Within the System Also Hampered the Response

Th e Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), which represents 80 percent of the 

nursing homes in the State of Louisiana, had a desk at the state EOC in Baton Rouge70

because it had primary responsibility for helping nursing homes coordinate evacuations. 

LNHA submitted E-Team requests during the fi rst days of the crisis, but then LOHSEP 

revoked its privilege71 because LNHA was not a government agency.72 Meanwhile, hundreds 

of nursing-home patients were stranded by rising water. LNHA was forced to set up and 

privately coordinate nursing-home rescue eff orts.73 As a result, rescues were delayed.

FEMA personnel admitted that there was a chance that an approved request would be 

denied at FEMA’s Regional or National Headquarters. For example, FEMA denied a state 

request for 1,000 small rubber raft s because the boats would not be useful for rescues in debris-fi lled water. A state offi cial disagreed and testifi ed that the boats would have been valuable for towing behind motorboats and picking up victims in shallow water.74 LOHSEP’s 

Colonel Jeff Smith felt that reasonable requests were being “fi ltered,” probably because not 

all levels of authority recognized the severity of the situation.75

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts

As noted elsewhere, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement76 to provide mutual aid when disaster strikes.77 Forty-nine states, along with 

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have all enacted legislation to 

become part of the Compact,78 and Congress has given its consent.79 Upon declaration of 

an emergency, states can pre-position assets and wait for a request for assistance from the 

aff ected state.80

Both Louisiana and Mississippi asked for assistance through the EMAC system during the 

Hurricane Katrina disaster. Every member state as well as the District of Columbia and 

Puerto Rico responded, providing a wide range of equipment, medical aid and supplies.81

Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest EMAC response in U.S. history.82

Th e EMAC system demonstrated both its value and limitations during Katrina. Carwile testifi ed that the resources made available through EMAC – almost 25,000 personnel who performed close to 900 missions, were crucial.83 Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour agreed, 

singling out Florida’s search-and-rescue teams and law-enforcement offi cials.84 Th e Louisiana National Guard described EMAC as “the most successful feature of our response.”85

Louisiana Commodities

Th e Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan designates LOHSEP as the lead state agency for 

coordinating the distribution of commodities. In Katrina’s aft ermath, emergency managers in Louisiana faced two distinct logistical challenges aft er landfall: (1) providing massive quantities of commodities to the enormous numbers of victims in the Superdome 

and Convention Center, and (2) disbursing relatively smaller amounts to the thousands of 

victims scattered across southeast Louisiana and the greater New Orleans metropolitan area 

– chiefl y, the collection sites for rescuees along highway overpasses. Not surprisingly, they 

performed best in delivering to locations where the need was rapidly identifi ed and supply 

lines could be established. But LOHSEP failed to coordinate and establish supply lines to the 

ad-hoc, unplanned distribution points. 
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Logistics

Katrina revealed what the Hurricane Pam exercise and resulting plans assumed: the catastrophic storm would severely limit the capabilities of local authorities,86 thereby requiring FEMA and the state to lead the distribution of commodities to the aff ected areas aft er 

landfall. Wells said that FEMA’s responsibility was to get commodities to the federal staging 

areas, and then, according to the planning done during the Hurricane Pam exercise, the 

state and FEMA would decide how they would deliver the commodities the “last mile” to 

the public distribution points.87

Before landfall, FEMA and the state pre-positioned more commodities at FEMA’s Operations 

Staging Area at Camp Beauregard (in Pineville, Louisiana – 220 miles from New Orleans)

than any previous storm (although less than the amount discussed at Hurricane Pam).88

Consistent with the assumptions in the Hurricane Pam exercise, the fl ooding that resulted 

from Katrina left some parish governments’ resources incapacitated,89 making it necessary 

for FEMA and LOHSEP to push commodities to them without waiting for requests.90 Before 

and aft er landfall, LOHSEP’s operating principle for moving commodities was “if you can’t 

get it yourself, then you turn to FEMA.”91

Some parishes, however, asked for more commodities than the state or FEMA could provide.92 LOHSEP and the National Guard also experienced diffi culties in coordinating the 

delivery of commodities and the equipment needed by parishes.93 In some cases a commodity delivery would be made by the National Guard to a parish distribution point, but the 

parish did not have access to a forklift , thus making unloading the delivery unnecessarily 

problematic.94 Although the magnitude of the operation overwhelmed the manpower and 

equipment of Louisiana National Guard, making it necessary to rely on support from other 

states,95 those needs should have been anticipated and planned for accordingly. 

Some of the parishes’ needs could have been met through better long-term planning and 

preparation. First, had FEMA and the state had executed more contracts with vendors 

before the storm for critical supplies, that would have saved time during the post-storm 

crisis.96 Second, key commodities were not sent until two days aft er landfall from Zephyr 

Field, FEMA’s post-landfall operational staging area in Jeff erson Parish, to the Superdome.97

Th ird, high-water vehicles were needed to deliver commodities to fl ooded areas like the 

Superdome. Th e Louisiana National Guard failed to anticipate needing to use its high-water 

vehicles to distribute commodities and failed to anticipate the manpower and equipment 

needs of a large-scale commodities distribution.98 Fourth, planners failed to ensure that all 

supply PODs in aff ected areas would be set up on high ground. Many parish-designated 

PODs were fl ooded.99 LOHSEP and the parishes had to establish alternative drop points.100

Fift h, although Hurricane Pam working groups had discussed establishing Search and 

Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs), temporary collection sites for rescuees on highway 

overpasses, neither FEMA nor the state had planned or prepared for a coordinated system 

of commodities distribution to the SARBOOs, where the situation became critical as transportation to evacuate the rescuees was delayed.101

Sanitation

Masses of people gathered at the Superdome, Convention Center, and various search-andrescue drop points around town without basic sanitation. Superdome plumbing ceased 

to operate shortly aft er a levee breached and the pumps that maintained water pressure 

failed.102 FEMA public-aff airs offi cial Marty Bahamonde characterized the Superdome as 

a shelter of last resort that cascaded into a cesspool of human waste and fi lth. 

Imagine no toilet facilities for 25,000 people for fi ve days. Women and children were forced to live outside in 95-degree heat because of the horrid smell 

and conditions inside. Hallways and corridors were used as toilets, trash was 
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everywhere, and amongst it all children – thousands of them. It was sad, it was 

inhumane, it was heart-breaking, and it was so wrong.103

Sanitary conditions at the Convention Center were little better, although the relatively 

smaller crowd did have more open area available.104

On Tuesday, the New Orleans Police Department and the Louisiana National Guard 

requested portable toilets for the Superdome.105 A FEMA representative at the Superdome 

promised to have toilets delivered the next day, Wednesday.106 But law-enforcement agencies had checkpoints set up on major highways and prevented individuals without credentials from getting past some checkpoints. According to one portable-toilets vendor, he was 

turned away twice at security checkpoints in Plaquemines Parish (where his supply yard 

was located) when he tried to fulfi ll the order. Eventually, the National Guard provided an 

armed escort that enabled him to make the delivery on Saturday. By that time, the Superdome evacuation was nearly complete.107

Superdome 

As the storm approached, city, state, and federal offi cials raced on the day before landfall 

to stock the Superdome with the additional food and water that would be needed for the 

refuge of last resort’s massive incoming population.108

While FEMA and the National Guard were able to provide additional MREs and water before landfall,109 offi cials were able to locate enough food for Sunday and Monday only. Despite some “touch and go” moments as deliveries lagged behind the arrival of more people 

seeking shelter,110 offi cials were able to feed the Superdome population twice a day. 

On Monday and Tuesday, however, federal and state offi cials described the situation at 

the Superdome as “desperate”111 and “beyond critical,”112 as an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 

people gathered there.113

While Superdome residents never experienced an outright food and water shortage (as Bahamonde predicted to Brown), 114 other essential commodities – portable generators, lights, 

and batteries – did not arrive before the evacuation.115 Better long-term planning would 

have avoided these pitfalls. 

On Tuesday, Mayor Nagin asked Brown for many of these commodities, which FEMA 

offi cials knew were staged at Zephyr fi eld, 10 miles west of the Superdome.116 Lack of 

security and usable roadways did not interfere with the delivery of those commodities to 

the Superdome. At any time aft er the storm abated on Monday, offi cials at the Superdome 

could receive commodities at nearby highway overpasses, where they would be loaded onto 

high-water vehicles for delivery to the Superdome.117 It remains unclear which entity bears 

responsibility for the failure to deliver commodities to the Superdome.

Convention Center

Unlike the Superdome, which emergency planners at all levels of government expected to 

become a refuge of last resort, Mayor Nagin’s opening of the Convention Center as a refuge 

two days aft er landfall was largely unplanned. As a result, over the weekend, no food or 

water was pre-positioned there, and no commodities arrived there until Friday, September 

2. Lokey said, “Th e state and the locals did not preplan or preposition anything, and so there 

was obviously a problem there.”118

Although the City made no pre-landfall preparations to use the Convention Center as a 

refuge, Mayor Nagin included the possibility of using the Convention Center in lieu of the 

Superdome on a list he presented to FEMA Director Brown on Tuesday, the same day on 
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Logistics

which Mayor Nagin opened the Convention Center. 

Th e document stated, under the heading “Refuge of 

Last Resort–Superdome”:

(Alternative Need) Access to the Convention 

Center to use it as the refuge of last resort in 

lieu of the Superdome; if this option is exercised, each of the above-listed needs [generators, lights, video equipment, security and 

food and water] would be required for the 

Convention Center and, additionally, vehicles 

and drivers to coordinate the transport from 

the Superdome to the Convention Center 

would be required.119 [Emphasis added.]

Unfortunately, when Mayor Nagin opened the Convention Center as a refuge, the city did not provide 

food and water to those it would house, and did not 

tell federal offi cials that the Convention Center had 

been opened.120

When questioned about opening the Convention 

Center, Mayor Nagin testifi ed that he asked FEMA 

two or three times a day to deliver supplies there.121

But when pressed to provide specifi c examples of 

requests, Mayor Nagin suggested that the Committee speak to Colonel Terry Ebbert, Director of 

the New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security and 

Public Safety, as the person who would have told 

FEMA about the city’s opening of the Convention 

Center as a shelter.122 When the Committee asked 

Colonel Ebbert whether he told FEMA of the city’s 

decision to open the Convention Center, he stated 

that the city never made an offi cial decision to open 

the Convention Center.123 When pressed further on 

whether he made a request for food and water to be 

delivered to the Convention Center, Colonel Ebbert 

said, “I did not make that request.”124 Th e fi rst written request for food and water at the Convention 

Center came on Friday.125

Nevertheless, Lokey said that Colonel Jeff Smith, the 

Acting Deputy Director for the Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 

made him aware on Tuesday or Wednesday that 

thousands of people were beginning to congregate at 

the Convention Center.126 Th e state asked FEMA to 

send food and water to the Convention Center, but security concerns delayed their delivery 

until Th ursday, according to Lokey.127 Lokey also said that he was depending on requests 

from the state before sending any other commodities to the Convention Center.128

Further complicating the response to the developing situation at the Convention Center 

was confusion among Department of Homeland Security HSOC offi cials, who were tasked 

Sorting through donations 

U.S.Coast Guard photo
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with gathering and disseminating critical information, and who erroneously believed the 

Convention Center and the Superdome were the same location.129 

Th e result of Mayor Nagin and Colonel Ebbert’s lack of planning, preparation, action, and 

coordination, combined with security concerns and DHS’s lack of situational awareness, 

was that food and water for the 19,000 people at the Convention Center began to arrive 

on Th ursday, but did not arrive in meaningful quantities until Friday, when the National 

Guard arrived with food and water provided by FEMA.130

Mississippi Commodities

The Federal Logistics System Failed to Provide an Adequate Supply of Commodities in 

the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi

Hurricane Katrina disrupted the state’s economic and physical infrastructure, complicating the ability of authorities and citizens to acquire commodities such as food, water, ice, 

and fuel.131

Th e federal logistics system could not adequately respond. FEMA’s Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer in Mississippi, William Carwile, said that only about 25 percent of requested water 

and ice, and a short supply of MREs arrived in Mississippi in the fi rst week and a half aft er 

landfall.132 Robert Latham, Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management 

Agency (MEMA), estimated that Mississippi had to make do with even less – 10 percent to 

20 percent of requests during the critical days aft er landfall.133

Positioning Supplies Prior to Landfall

Prior to landfall, state authorities realized that the massiveness of the storm required prelandfall preparations. Tom McAllister, MEMA’s Response and Recovery Director, said 

that MEMA requested that FEMA pre-position supplies at Meridian Naval Air Station in 

east-central Mississippi near the Alabama border.134 Bob Fenton, a FEMA Region IX (covering the western United States) offi cial, who served as Director of Operations for Mississippi during Katrina, upped the request.135 Unfortunately, FEMA was unable to provide the 

requested supplies. In fact, McAllister, and apparently Fenton, were never able to discover 

how much had been pre-staged.136 McAllister said the initial failure to pre-position adequate 

supplies left Mississippi “critically shorthanded.”137

Post-landfall State and Federal Supply “Pipelines”

Both the federal and state governments supplied commodities. Because the FEMA logistical system fell short, the State of Florida and the National Guard maintained the “pipeline” 

until FEMA recovered.138 Valuable help also came from Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster (VOADs), such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

Supplies from FEMA 

Local authorities transferred requests they couldn’t fulfi ll to MEMA, 139 which conveyed 

them to FEMA in cases when it couldn’t help. MEMA and FEMA offi cials in Mississippi 

alike complained that requests disappeared as if into a “black hole.” 140 As Carwile said, 

“During Hurricane Katrina we seldom had visibility of critical resources, i.e., body bags, 

refrigerated trucks for temporary morgues, etc., because FEMA does not have a reliable 

system for tracking commodities, equipment, and personnel.”141As a result, local and state 

authorities were oft en “totally in the dark,” causing friction.142 Th e ice, food, and water 

that were delivered went to “staging areas” serving regions within the state,143 and then to 

smaller Points of Distribution (PODs)144 operated by the Mississippi National Guard.
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Logistics

The Florida “Pipeline”

Before entering the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina had passed over south Florida, 

appearing to pose a risk to the Florida Panhandle, as Hurricane Ivan had done in 2004. 

Florida readied emergency-management assets, which were thus readily available when the 

storm fi nally struck further west.145 Using the Stennis Space Center, located near the Gulf 

Coast and close to the Louisiana border, as a staging area, “Task Force Florida” brought 

food, water, and ice, as well as law-enforcement personnel, search-and-rescue assets, and 

other assistance.146 Th e Florida teams “basically circumvented” FEMA’s logistical system, as 

MEMA’s McAllister said.147

Florida’s contributions raised Mississippi to 40 to 50 percent of requested amounts, which 

proved crucial to the distribution of commodities.148 “Robert [Latham] and I continue to rely 

on you all (FL),”149 Carwile wrote in a September 3 e-mail to Craig Fugate, the Director of 

Florida’s emergency-management agency. Florida’s operation in Mississippi lasted for approximately six weeks, with most personnel and assets returned to Florida by October 1.150

The National Guard “Pipeline”

On Wednesday, August 31, the National Guard realized that not only were an insuffi cient 

number of MREs being delivered to south Mississippi, but massive debris fi elds were preventing individuals in need from reaching distribution points.151 In response, Major General 

Harold Cross, the head of Mississippi’s National Guard, requested that Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM), the federal military command responsible for North America, send MREs 

from military stocks.

Within seven or eight hours, aircraft were arriving at the Gulfport Combined Regional 

Training Center (CRTC), the National Guard airbase near the Gulfport airport, with MREs 

and water.152 All vehicles leaving the CRTC were required to take along at least 10 cases of 

water and 10 cases of MREs, to be handed out whenever National Guardsmen encountered 

survivors.153

Starting August 30, the National Guard also delivered commodities by air aft er advance 

helicopters scouted for support needs, oft en by landing and talking with survivors.154 Commissioner of Public Safety George Phillips, whose agency also had helicopters assessing the 

situation, recalled the desperation: “It was horrible ... the minute people heard helicopters, 

... they came, people came running out, holding up signs SOS and need help and food and 

water.”155 If supply helicopters couldn’t touch down, they would drop the supplies.156 Approximately 1.2 million MREs and over 1 million gallons of water were distributed in this 

way, mostly in the September 1 through September 9 period.157

Diffi culties Arise in the Distribution System

While all three of the supply “pipelines” were operational soon aft er landfall, the distribution system did not work smoothly. Michael Beeman, FEMA Division Director for Harrison County, the central county on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast, noted that the fi rst trucks with 

water and ice arrived without notice on August 30.158 Oft en supplies would be discovered 

only when an offi cial happened to spot a truck and approached the driver.159 In an e-mail 

sent on September 4, a FEMA offi cial in Mississippi informed Carwile and Fenton that a 

priority commodity shipment to Pearl River County, a county on the Louisiana border approximately 20 miles north of the coast, was a “no show,” leaving lines of people waiting in 

vain for food and water.160

Many trucks arrived at the Meridian staging area mislabeled. Others bypassed staging areas 

and traveled directly to the coast, with no specifi c destination.161 Stennis Space Center, in essence, became a large terminal where supply trucks were loaded and unloaded, but without 
386

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expert truck management. Th is problem was also refl ected in numerous reports of trucks 

standing idle at Stennis. As one offi cial said, Stennis did not have “real terminal operations 

going on out there.”162

An apparent shortage of trucks aggravated the problem.163 Many truck drivers refused to 

leave staging areas without armed escorts.164 Others, as McAllister explained, did not grasp 

the urgency of their tasks.165 

McAllister estimated that much of the reported confusion at Stennis began ten days aft er 

landfall. He attributed this confusion to diffi culties in determining the rate at which the PODs 

were distributing supplies. Immediately following landfall, the tremendous need for supplies 

ensured that the supplies were sent out of Stennis to the PODs right aft er they arrived. Beginning around day ten, more supplies were fl owing into Stennis than were being distributed to 

the PODs; this resulted in a backlog of trucks. It took four to fi ve days for offi cials at Stennis to 

balance the supply of commodities being delivered to Stennis with the demand for commodities at the PODs Stennis supported. By this point, the PODs were also becoming increasingly 

useful because road-clearing work was enabling more people to get to them.166

Diffi culties with Fuel

Fuel shortages created another problem.167 Th e fuel shortage had a number of causes, 

including damage to Mississippi’s refi ning capacity; fuel suppliers no longer keeping a large 

quantity of fuel in stock due to price fl uctuations; the loss of electricity crippling service 

stations’ ability to pump fuel; and incompatibility between many tankers and vehicles 

requiring fuel.168

Th e emergency manager for Jones County, located approximately 70 miles north of the 

coast, noted that following Hurricane Katrina, “Fuel turned out to be as important as 

food, water, and ice.”169 Th e loss of electricity in Mississippi forced parts of the state’s 

infrastructure to rely on fuel for power. Because of this, the fuel shortage had the potential 

to cause signifi cant problems.170 When the City of Gulfport, located on the central part of 

C-130 transport unloading

U.S. Air Force photo
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Logistics

the coast, loses electricity, as it did following Katrina, its water wells rely on a back-up fuel 

supply. Th e generators contain enough diesel fuel to operate independent of the electric grid 

for 24 hours. If this back-up fuel runs out, Gulfport loses its water supply and depends on 

bottled water. Following Katrina, Gulfport came perilously close to running out of fuel.171

Fuel shortages were also a problem for hospitals, many of which had no more than a threeday supply.172

While state and local offi cials were able to make do with what fuel they had and with what 

was brought into the state through FEMA, the shortage came perilously close to causing 

a crisis. Given the importance of fuel to fi rst responders and private citizens, as well as its 

importance to infrastructure, emergency managers must place a higher priority on ensuring 

an adequate supply in the aft ermath of a disaster.

Private-Sector Logistics

Th e companies that testifi ed at the Committee’s private-sector hearing all had in place 

deliberate plans for deploying and tracking material and personnel. From batteries, fuel, 

and generators to food and water, Wal-Mart, Starwood, IBM, and Mississippi Power knew 

what they would need, had those commodities either in place or at staging areas outside 

the storm’s path, and had a plan for moving them in immediately aft er the storm.173 Th ese 

companies also had employees from unaff ected regions at the ready, to assist in the region 

once the storm passed, and they responded proactively.174

Within seven days of Katrina’s making landfall, Mississippi Power had 11,000 workers on 

the ground from 23 states and Canada.175 Th ey utilized mutual-assistance agreements, in 

place prior to the storm, to “borrow” employees from other utility companies.176 IBM knew 

their services would be needed aft er the storm and deployed a Crisis Response Team to Baton Rouge to immediately begin working with government and non-governmental organizations to address critical needs.177 Starwood also had a corporate-response team staged at a 

safe distance, but ready to move in once the storm had passed.178

Wal-Mart managed logistics eff ectively and delivered commodities quickly when responding to Katrina.179 Wal-Mart has its own fl eet of trucks, 100 distribution centers, and stores 

located all over the country.180 Of the 100 distribution centers, eight have reserved “disaster 

merchandise” square footage, with approximately $4.7 million in “disaster merchandise” 

stockpiled for emergencies, including more than 250,000 gallons of drinking water.181

Wal-Mart also has relationships with vendors that help with surge requests during times of 

emergency.182 Th e company has a specifi c protocol for responding to disasters, and operates 

an emergency operations center year-round to coordinate crises around the country.183

With Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart used its expertise to move in supplies and operate eff ectively.184 In the fi rst three weeks aft er landfall, the company “delivered approximately 2,500 

trailers of emergency supplies ... including trucks of water and supplies that fl owed into the 

New Orleans metropolitan area beginning on Saturday, September 3, for emergency service 

workers, shelters, and hospitals. A total of three temporary mobile pharmacies [were] provided to support communities, and a 16,000-square foot ‘tent store’ was erected to serve a community where the store had been all but demolished.”185 Based on past experience with major 

storms and hurricanes, Wal-Mart knew what supplies would be sought prior to the hurricane 

making landfall and what would be needed for the recovery phase aft er the storm.186
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1 Written statement of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 5.

2 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), before the U.S. 

House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005. 

3 In January 2005, FEMA leaders acknowledged in the internal review called the “MITRE Report” the weakness of 

FEMA logistics with comments such as “We are not good at tracking assets,” “If the White House asks, ‘Where are the 

water trucks?’ I can’t tell them” and “We’ve had 3 or 4 people ordering water for the same people.” Th e MITRE Report 

was a report commissioned by FEMA Director Brown to review FEMA’s “policies, plans, organization and systems 

to increase consistency, eff ectiveness, timeliness, and eff ectiveness in carrying out its core mission.” Participants were 

members of FEMA’s senior leadership. MITRE Corp., Draft Statement of Work, Planning Support for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee.

4 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, 

conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 151.

5 Ken Burris, e-mail to Matt Jadacki, Sept. 18, 2004, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0079-0000120 through 0000121 (“I have broken the request from response and recovery into the following strategic 

areas and the following amounts. Let me know what you think and I will have it put in a formalized document.”).

6 Michael Brown, memorandum to various FEMA offi cials, “Disaster Support Initiatives,” Jan. 3, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000093 through 0000095.

7 Ken Burris, e-mail to Matt Jadacki, Sept. 18, 2004, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0079-0000120 through 0000121. See also: FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business 

Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000130 (“Th e staffi ng 

level of the DSIC, Logistics Centers and transportation support staff has remained at the same level as commissioned 

over seven years ago.”). 

8 FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000133.

9 FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000130.

10 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript 

p. 37. 

11 Th eresa Gauger, e-mail to Lisa Williams, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0069-0000772. See also: Committee staff interview of Marie Sloan, Chief, Disaster Workforce Section, Response 

Division, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript p. 31.

12 Kerry Young, e-mail to Jules Hurst, II, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0127-0011518. 

13 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 35.

14 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 35-37. 

15 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 56. 

16 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 68.

17 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 10 [hereinaft er DHS/

FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006]. 

18 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 59-61 (“I have no idea. I have no way to contact them. ... Th e problem with the 

system is it’s a bit like ... the bombing of Pearl Harbor. ...We don’t know. We mark these things in when it goes through 

the gate. Th ey pass it to another individual, who passes it to another individual, and they get distorted numbers by the 

time it get back to us. It is a nightmare trying to get the right information. ... Not only is it with my shop, it’s also then 

on the other side with the FCO’s log people when they’re trying to get accurate numbers on what they have, and they 

call, they pick the phone up and they got one person and they are also busy and they say, well, you’ve got ten, and they 

fi nd out they’ve got 20, or it’s even more ridiculous. Someone might tell them you’ve got 100 out there and you’ve got 

500 out there.”).

19 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 167.

20 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

(LOHSEP) and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 6 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 

2005]. 

21 Committee staff interview of Col. Jadwin Mayeaux, Louisiana Army National Guard (Ret.), Deputy Director, Homeland Security, LOHSEP, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William 

Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 163-164; Com-
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Logistics

mittee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director, Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana 

National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 1.

22 At 8:19 a.m. on Aug. 27, 2005 FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode e-mailed the Acting Director of Response a request for a copy of the New Orleans Catastrophic Plan. Source: Patrick Rhode, e-mail to David Garratt, Aug. 

27, 2005, 8:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003866. At 9:07 a.m. Lokey replied to 

Rhode, Brown, and others that “Copies are being made as we speak.” Source: William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode 

and David Garratt, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860. At 

10:35 a.m. Sharon Blades e-mailed 25 FEMA personnel including William Lokey, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, and 

Wayne Fairley an electronic version of the plan, and told them that copies were being printed. Source: Sharon Blades, 

e-mail to Michel Pawlowski, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-

0003570. Later that aft ernoon Deputy Chief of Staff Brooks Altshuler e-mailed twice asking for additional copies for the 

front offi ce. Source: Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Sharon Blades, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325. A few minutes later he received a reply that 50 copies were being printed. Source: 

Michel Powlowski, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0085-0003570. At 8:37 p.m. that night Blades again e-mails Altshuler: “We have printed up more plans and they 

are on the mezz in Area A. We are also printing copies of the latest draft s and a preface explaining the planning process 

and the various documents because they all have not been fi nalized and assembled into one document. Th is will, we 

hope, avoid confusion.” Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325.

23 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 5, p. 10.

24 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, p. 24. Th e Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane 

Plan (Hurricane Pam) includes charts to convert individual servings of commodities into truckloads. Example: one 

truckload of water = 4,750 gallons. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 4, p. 8. 

25 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on 

Jan. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19.

26 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 4, Appendix 5, p. 10. 

27 FEMA Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 16-17; FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

28 Committee staff interview of Ken Burris, former Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 14; FEMA, Federal Operational Staging Area, Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0080-0000005 through 0000006; FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017.

29 FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-

0010528. 

30 Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 18-19.

31 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 14.

32 FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017; FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

33 Michael Brown, e-mail to William Carwile, Michael Lowder, Edward Buikema, and Gary Moore, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:35 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000329. 

34 William Carwile, e-mail to Mary Lynne Miller, Michael Lowder, and Edward Buikema, Sept. 6, 2005, 4:47 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000742.

35 Written Statement of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), for 

the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

36 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 

Security, City of New Orleans, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 140.

37 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 150.

38 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 16.

39 Committee staff interview of Col. Al Jones, U.S. Army, Senior Army Advisor, Georgia Army National Guard, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 31.

40 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 158 

(“Our logistics just sucked. It was awful.”); Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2005, transcript p. 71.

41 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 185.

42 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Sept. 1, 2005, 8:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

0000927. Th e mission assignment was later cut to 500 million on Sept. 7. 
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Chapter 23

43 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134. See also: Committee staff interview of Col. Roberta Woods, U.S. Army, Chief of 

Plans and Operations Division, Logistics Directorate, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted 

on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 82-83 (the $1 billion was an estimate).

44 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 

before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006. 

45 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2005, p. 137 (“I’m not sure they ever took over that. . . . Th is, to me, was a broad, encompassing statement to cover any eventuality, and the military may have assisted in moving ice and water, but I’m not aware of 

that. As far as I’m concerned, all the requests came through my logistics train to our people supporting this out of Camp 

Beauregard.”). Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), former Director, 

Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript 

p. 64 (“Q: Do you know whether DOD actually did end up taking over the procurement, transportation, and distribution 

of ice, water, food, fuel, and medical supplies? A: Th ey did not. Th ey augmented and supplemented ... no, not the full 

logistical.”).

46 FEMA, Hurricane Katrina billing spreadsheet. Provided to Committee.

47 Department of the Army, “1604DR-MS-DOD-19 – Uses of Funds.” Provided to Committee (indicating 

$51,122,526.05 designated for “Lunch meals w/ drinks; meals tailored operational; commercial meals; meals individual; 

DLA MRSs; freight charges”); FEMA, Hurricane Katrina billing spreadsheet. Provided to Committee (indicating 

$2,981,123.90 expended for “ship lease, port /canal charges, & prop fuel for Algol, Altair, Bellatrix, Pollux, Pillilaau”; 

$1,084,587.24 for Diesel fuel; $39.56 for “unleaded gasoline”).

48 Sec. Michael Chertoff , All Th ings Considered, NPR, “Michael Chertoff discussed US aid eff ort being criticized in New 

Orleans,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8 a.m.

49 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 116.

50 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript p. 28.

51 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General – Air, Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 65-66; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117.

52 Committee staff interview of Terry Vallarautto, Interoperability Coordinator, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 1, 2006, 

transcript pp. 39-40; Committee staff interview of Matt Farlow, Information Technology Division Chief, LOHSEP, 

conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 53; 

53 Vallarautto interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 39-40; Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 53.

54 Vallarautto interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 42.

55 Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief Technology Offi cer, BellSouth Corp., conducted on Jan. 25, 2006 

(untranscribed).

56 Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 56.

57 Wells interview, Nov. 11, 2004, pp. 205-206.

58 Testimony of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of 

FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005.

59 Wells, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005. 

60 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 128.

61 Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

24, 2006, transcript p. 16.

62 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 53.

63 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency 

Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 108-113.

64 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 51; DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 32 (“It is estimated that 

the ERT had 25% of the staff that were needed.” “DHS/FEMA needs to have 24/7 staffi ng capability for each section. Th e 

agency needs to be willing and able to provide heavy staffi ng at the start of a disaster, and establish minimum staffi ng 

requirements based on responsibilities of the sections. Failure to do so causes fatigue, mistakes and errors in judgments 

in the units.”).

65 Scott Wells, e-mail to Michael Hall, Sept. 9, 2005, 5:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0040-0003030.

66 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 38

67 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 38

68 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. 10 

[hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan]; Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 32.
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Logistics

69 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 35. 

70 Committee staff interview of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Service Corporation, 

conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 6, 12-13.

71 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 35-38.

72 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 36.

73 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 38.

74 Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006.

75 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 108-113.

76 EMAC was established by Congress through Joint Resolution in 1996 (P.L 104-321), 110 Stat. § 3877.

77 For information on EMAC, see http://www.emacweb.org.

78 California joined on Sept. 21, 2005, aft er Hurricane Katrina made landfall. California, Offi ce of the Governor, “Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Emergency Management Compact Legislation,” press release, Sept. 13, 2005. Provided to 

Committee.

79 P.L. 104-321 (Oct. 19, 1996).

80 Once a state requests EMAC support, a team is deployed to the disaster area and works with the state to determine 

requirements and match those needs to available resources. Source: National Emergency Management Association 

(NEMA), “How does EMAC work?” http://www.emacweb.org. Accessed on Apr. 15, 2006. EMAC representatives are located within the NRCC as well, to help facilitate requests and ensure there is no duplication of eff ort at the federal level. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Richard Gray, Team Leader, Information and Assessment Team and Team Leader, 

National Response Coordination Center, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 31-33.

81 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Signifi cant Events,” Nov. 28, 2005, 

pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee. 

82 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 

2006. transcript pp. 63-64.

83 Written Statement of William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of 

FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 5.

84 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006.

85 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Signifi cant Events,” Nov. 28, 2005, 

pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee.

86 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for the LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, 

Transportation, Staging and Distribution of Critical Resources: Draft Functional Plan, p. 1.

87 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 88-89; Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 19-20.

88 To help push these commodities closer to the disaster area, FEMA and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Preparedness worked together at the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge before landfall to 

bring more commodities to the staging area and, therefore, into the “pipeline.” Source: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 

2005, pp. 20-21, 64-65 (acknowledging that Pineville was FEMA’s main operational staging area for commodities). Both 

before and aft er landfall, FEMA sent commodities from Pineville to Regional Staging Areas in Hammond (a city 60 miles 

northwest of New Orleans) and Harrahan (a suburb just to the west of New Orleans). Source: Col. Mayeaux interview, 

Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 64-65. FEMA also drew on supplies stockpiled at Barksdale Air Force Base in northwest Louisiana and 

elsewhere in the country. Source: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 21, 64-65, 98.

89 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Transportation, Staging and Distribution of Critical Resources: Draft Functional Plan, p. 1.

90 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 25-26; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 157 (“We thought about 

... we’ve got to push commodities down regardless, because we know people are going to need food and water. And we 

weren’t – you know, we didn’t wait for a request for that. We said, we know we’re going to need to move food and water 

down to the area.”).

91 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 20-21.

92 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 56-57. See also: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 68-69 (“MR. 

ADELBERG: It was areas that you weren’t staffi ng. It was just places where people were asking for commodities to be 

supplied? COL MAYEAUX: Yes, sir. MR. ADELBERG: And for one reason or another, the word wasn’t getting to you 

that they needed more than you were able to provide? COL MAYEAUX: Th at is correct, more than I could provide. I 

didn’t know there were people there.”).

93 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.
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94 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

95 Committee staff interview Col. Steven Dabadie, former Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 

12, 2006, transcript pp. 138-39 (“We were simply out of capabilities and resources because we got overwhelmed with 

the fl ood, and we needed to get those EMAC forces in. For example, you know, commodity distribution almost took an 

entire brigade. Th ey struck a brigade out of – Pennsylvania National Guard, they were the ones doing the commodity 

distribution when they came in.”).

96 Th e Department of Homeland Security recommended this year that FEMA “establish contracts for priority resources 

prior to the onset of disasters.” Source: DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, pp. 10-11 (stating that the 

“lack of pre-negotiated contracts for large recurring services impacted the overall response”). Th e National Guard acknowledged in its Aft er Action Report that “last minute scrambling to locate & contract required equipment and services 

to support commodity distribution (e.g., forklift s, Port-a-Lets, tents, meal contractors, etc.) created delays in supporting 

Parish requests.” Source: Louisiana National Guard, Aft er Action Report, Task Force Griffi n, Commodities Distribution, 

Jan. 4, 2006 (recommending that LOHSEP, FEMA, and local authorities execute such contracts in advance of future 

storms). Nevertheless, LOHSEP’s Col. Mayeaux claimed that the state did not run out of bulk commodities. Source: Col. 

Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 64.

97 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 

2006.

98 Louisiana National Guard, Aft er Action Report, Task Force Griffi n, Commodities Distribution, Jan. 4, 2006; Col. 

Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

99 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 158-59.

100 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 33-34.

101 While it is diffi cult to quantify the problem, there is anecdotal evidence of people clamoring for food and water 

wherever they could fi nd authorities who might be able to help. For example, Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze had diffi culty establishing a medical evacuation point on Wednesday morning because “we 

had a lot of evacuees who were assembling there and asking for water and food, which was interfering with the medical 

staff who were trying to attend to the patients on the ground.” Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Activity Report on Hurricane 

Katrina, pp. 3-4.

102 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 90. 

103 Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, A 

Chaotic Response, Oct. 20, 2005. 

104 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities 

and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 131.

105 Brig. Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 91; Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 63. 

106 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 89-91, 162-163.

107 Committee staff interview of Chris Villar, Owner, Go-Cans, LLC, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006 (untranscribed).

108 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 66. When NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain arrived at the Superdome on Sunday, 

he immediately called the city’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness and requested food and water, which Deputy Chief 

Swain said the Louisiana National Guard ultimately delivered before landfall. Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 

44-47. Th e National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to provide “some limited support to some special needs 

people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was for our troops. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 

7, 2005, pp. 86-87. Gen. Jones quickly put out a call for MREs and found enough from nearby National Guard contingency stocks to supply people with two servings a day until Tuesday aft ernoon. Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 

66. LANG Col. Glenn Curtis also ordered trucks to move food and water from Camp Beauregard to the Superdome on 

Sunday, Aug. 28, 2005. Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 129-130. As the Louisiana National Guard’s Deputy Commander for Katrina, 

Col. Glenn Curtis, said: “Once it became a shelter of last resort we just knew we would need food and water there.” 

Source: Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 134.

109 Louisiana National Guard offi cials stated that their requests for additional food and water before landfall were 

met. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana Army 

National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 69-74.

110 NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain testifi ed that offi cials were able to feed the population at the Superdome twice 

a day, but that the fl ow of food and water was at times “touch and go” and resulted in periodic frustration. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 65-68.

111 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 86-87 (Th e National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to 

provide “some limited support to some special needs people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was 

for our troops.”).
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Logistics

112 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 

2005, transcript p. 191 (“Th ere was not enough food in the Superdome, there was not enough water in the Superdome 

to properly provide meals and water for the continued growing number of people that were constantly coming to the 

Superdome. It never really stopped. Th ey kept coming. Estimates now were up to 25,000, 30,000 people at the Superdome.”).

113 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 191.

114 Although Bahamonde recalled being “once again consumed with fi nding food” on Wednesday, it does not appear 

that food or water ever ran out at the Superdome. Source: Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 195; Brig. Gen. Jones 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 88. Th e fact that an MRE is designed to feed a person for up to two days helped: “You can 

actually survive for two days on one MRE. So had it gotten really desperate, we would have come up with a plan to bust 

them open and split them up.” Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 87. See also: Col. Curtis interview, 

Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 127-28; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, 

conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 132. 

115 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 65 (“We never received fl ashlights or batteries. We never received generators. 

Period.”).

116 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005; 

Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. 

117 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 93 (“I don’t think they were able to come in – well, on Monday, they would have 

been able to; yes. Tuesday morning is when the water came in. Aft er that, supply trucks were not able to drive into the 

Dome. Th ey were driven up on to the up ramp or down ramp of the interstate, the I-10, and from there I think they were 

unloaded or whatever on to, I guess, the high-water vehicles, and supplies were brought in.”).

118 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 116.

119 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005, 

p. 1.

120 Penya Moses-Fields, letter to Th e Honorable Susan M. Collins and Th e Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Jan. 30, 

2006, “Attachment A: Timeline of Mayor Nagin’s Activities, Aug. 26, 2005 – Sept. 6, 2005.” Timeline entries include: 

Wed., Aug. 31 – “Convention Center – numbers growing, no food or water Still no food and water”; Th urs., Sept. 1 

– “Center – numbers growing, no food or water.”

121 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

122 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

123 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 131.

124 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 139.

125 FEMA, Action Request Form, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

126 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 116 (“Q: When did you become aware of any problems or issues at the convention 

center? A: Sometime Tuesday or Wednesday, when we got word from Jeff Smith that people were showing up at the convention center. Th e fi rst thing we heard, there were 5,000 people there. Th en we heard there were 25,000 people there. ... 

But early in the game, we heard that people were congregating there, too, mainly probably late Tuesday, because Tuesday was when the fl ooding really--when people started leaving their homes and wading and swimming and everything 

toward the Dome and the convention center.”).

127 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117:

Mainly what I did was respond to the State’s request to get food and water to them, because again, the States and the locals did not preplan or preposition anything, and so there was obviously a problem there. And I remember sending, and 

again, I don’t know how many, but trucks of food and water. And aft er they were dispatched from Camp Beauregard, 

I remember hearing all the things about loss of control and law and order and things like that and I got worried about 

my truck drivers driving into a situation like that and getting mobbed. Th en I heard that the local offi cials, whoever that 

is, the National Guard was holding the trucks and were going to go in the next morning, whatever morning that was, 

probably Wednesday or Th ursday morning, when they went in with security to establish order. And they would have to 

speak to that, exactly what they did, but again, we got a lot of the rumors about the law and order breakdown and what 

not. But I do remember that my trucks didn’t go down there without appropriate protection when they went in on the 

morning, so I’m guessing that might have been Th ursday morning with just all the things that were going on, but I do 

not know for sure.

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117.

128 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 117-118 (“Well, again, some of our medical assets may have been sent [to the 

Convention Center], but again, we respond to requests from the State as a result of requests from the local governments, 

and other than getting the people out of there and getting food into them, I don’t have a recollection of another specifi c 

request from Jeff Smith at the time relative specifi c to the [Convention Center], other than the evacuation and the lifesustaining food and water.”).

129 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 171-172.

130 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events for Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005. Provided to Com-
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Chapter 23

mittee. Th e National Guard did not move to the Convention Center until noon on Friday. When the Guard did arrive 

at the Convention Center on Friday, they saw people barbecuing food outside the Convention Center. Source: Lt. 

Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 122-123, 126-127. It is not clear from the record where the people at the 

Convention Center obtained the means to grill food outside, but the Guard who approached the Convention Center 

for the fi rst time on Friday correctly saw the outdoor cooking as a sign that their missions to establish law and order 

and to provide relief there would be executed without incident. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 

126-127 (“It was an extremely heart moving thing to see these people that needed help come to you and say ‘thanks, I 

appreciate you guys are here.’”); Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 194-195 (“In fact, quite the contrary to 

what we thought, or what our intelligence had told us the situation was, and what the Mayor and some of the other folks 

told us, the people actually cheered us, you know, as we came in. And we had absolutely no problem getting control of 

the Convention Center, setting up the food distribution point. Th ey were very orderly.”). In contrast to the optimism 

engendered from seeing a working barbecue outside the Convention Center, LANG offi cials became pessimistic when 

they fi rst entered the structure because they saw what seemed to be about 100 people lying dead all over the fl oor of the 

building. But when those offi cials returned to the inside of the structure, hours aft er they had provided food, water, and 

medical relief to the crowd, not one of the people they had presumed to be dead were there: they were never dead; they 

were asleep, passed out from exhaustion, dehydration and malnourishment. Th is turn of events came as a great relief to 

the LANG offi cials at the Convention Center. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 159-60. Within 

fi ve hours of their noon arrival, the Guard had brought in food and drink for the people there. Source: Brig. Gen. Veillon 

interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 66-67 (“Th e crowd did that in a very orderly manner. We had no problems. We fed them. 

We gave them all they wanted and told them that we would be shortly evacuating them.”); Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, 

Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127, 141-142 (“We drove down in there and immediately began to interact with the crowd. Th e questions that – the comments they made to us is ‘we need help.’ ‘We need food, water. How are we going to get out of here. 

Please just help us. What is going on. Th ank you. Th ank you so much for coming here.’”). Troops patrolled throughout 

the night, encouraging people to eat as much as they wanted and informing them of the following day’s evacuation. 

Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 157.

131 While there is a consensus that food and water are vital, lifesaving commodities, some dispute exists as to whether 

ice belongs in that same category.

132 Written Statement of Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 6.

133 Written Statement of Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 3.

134 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 

2006, transcript pp. 5-7.

135 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 5-7.

136 In an interview with Committee staff , McAllister explained: “I never saw them. And the problem we had on my 

side as far as stateside, I never had visibility of those. I never knew how many we actually had. And I kept trying to fi nd 

out, you know, how many do we have staged? How much is there? ... I never got an answer of any kind. ... It was in 

the pipeline, it’s en route or it’s – you know, it was those type of answers we were getting out of Nashville in logistics. I 

mean, Bob [Fenton] was even frustrated ... because he couldn’t get any visibility on them either. You know, he couldn’t 

– he wanted to be able to tell me I’ve got 250 ice sitting in Meridian. Well, we never did know that. We never knew what 

was actually there at Meridian, or I didn’t.” McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 7-8. 

137 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

138 Committee staff interview of Mike Beeman, Director, National Preparedness Division, Region II, FEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 168.

139 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 32-34.

140 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 27-30.

141 William L. Carwile III, White Paper, “Th e Response and Initial Recovery to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi: A 

Field Perspective,” Feb. 22, 2006, p. 25. Provided to Committee.

142 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 27-30.

143 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, Mar. 1, 2004, p. 136.

144 In Harrison County, the county operated an LSA within the county that would receive supplies from Stennis and 

then distribute them to the PODs. Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 74-76.

145 Florida had prepositioned supplies off of I-10 near Jacksonville, Florida and was prepared to move into Mississippi 

to respond to the storm’s impact. Committee staff interview of Mike DeLorenzo, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Preparedness 

and Response, Florida Division of Emergency Management, conducted on Feb. 9, 2006 (untranscribed).

146 DeLorenzo interview, Feb. 9, 2006.

147 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

148 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 32-34.

149 William Carwile, e-mail to Craig Fugate and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 3:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS 0003582.

150 DeLorenzo interview, Feb. 9, 2006.
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Logistics

151 In an interview with Committee staff , Lieutenant Colonel Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support for the Mississippi Army National Guard, stated that: “Getting on into the 31st of Aug., 1st of Sept. we were getting some commodities 

in and we realized really on the 31st of Aug. that there was no way given what we thought the number of people who did 

not evacuate was, which my rough estimates was about 100,000 people along. . . the six coastal counties. . . . we knew that 

there was no way that with central distribution points, with the debris fi elds that were out there, that people could come 

in and get water, ice and MREs.” Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 43-45.

152 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi Military Department, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 21-22, 28.

153 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General’s Offi ce, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” 

Oct. 20, 2005, p. 2.

154 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General’s Offi ce, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” 

Oct. 20, 2005, p. 3.

155 Committee staff interview of George Phillips, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Public Safety, conducted on 

Jan. 26, 2006, transcript p. 41.

156 Lt. Col. Smithson explained this process during an interview with Committee staff : “[W]e would send our small helicopters out and they would fi nd pockets of displaced Americans or whatever you want to call them, and it was really easy 

to fi nd them because they’d hear the helicopters coming and they’d make signs and hold them up. So they would radio 

back and that’s where we would go in and drop things.” Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 44.

157 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General’s Offi ce, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” 

Oct. 20, 2005, p. 3.

158 Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 61.

159 Mike Beeman related the following anecdote in an interview with Committee staff :

Th ere were times when the trucks would just pull off the highway. We’d fi nd them parked along [U.S.] 

49. ...One of the requirements for the sheriff ’s department and the local police departments was whenever they saw a diesel truck sitting somewhere that might be idling the engine and all that, the truck 

driver was asleep, go over and fi nd out who he was, what he had in the back end, because we many 

times [we] knew items were sent to us, but we didn’t know where they were because the system, once 

[Stennis] sent it out, we had no idea what was sent. ... We knew that we were expecting ice, water, and 

food, but if something else were sent, we wouldn’t know it, because again, we had no notifi cation process and information process that it was coming to us. ... We’d fi nally fi nd maybe fi ve or six truckloads 

of water or ice that were sitting off the roadway in some apron at a supermarket or whatever and we’d 

just send them on down to this site, get them back on track. Some of them sat sometimes two or three 

days. I found 25 trucks one day, all with blue tarps on them, that were sitting down at the Wal-Mart [on 

U.S. 49]. ... But they were sitting there. Somebody told me all these trucks were down there, so I drove 

down there and started knocking on the truckers’ doors and I said, ‘What do you have in the back end?’ 

And they said, ‘Tarps.’ And I said, ‘Tarps?’ Well, ultimately it turned out to be blue roof, the stretch 

material, but they were just sitting, and sitting there for three or four days. Th ey were just sitting there, 

waiting for somebody to tell them where to go with the loads of blue tarp, blue stretch material. ... I 

have no idea where they came from. ... Th ey just appeared.

Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 80-82.

160 James Russo, e-mail to William Carwile and Robert Fenton, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:01 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0094-0002227.

161 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 55-57.

162 He described management of the trucks as amounting to: “Guys in golf carts going up and waking up a truck driver 

saying, what have you got in the truck, that kind of thing. And then, okay, take this truck and go over two roads because 

there’s just – I mean, there were literally – the road network out at the ammunition plant looks like this calendar, you 

know, you’ve got a lot of east-west, north-south roads that just go nowhere, they’re just a road with trees on either side 

of them. So there were at times hundreds of trucks just parked out there. And, you know, that took them a while to get it 

under control.” Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 103-104.

163 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 34.

164 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 105-106. Th is was confi rmed in an interview with offi cers of the 

Gulfport Police Department. Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Alan Weatherford, Gulfport Police Department, MS, 

conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript p. 90.

165 As he explained during an interview with Committee staff : “Truck drivers are not emergency [personnel]. Th ey may 

load up and go to the house for two days. Th ey may park it. Th ey’re going to take their days off . And that load that you 

loaded out on Friday, you may not see it until Tuesday. And that caused us frustrations, you know. Some days we had 

big loads – you know, you can always count on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday you had a bunch of trucks because 

everybody that loaded out at the end of the week can take a couple days off . Now, Monday, they’re ready to roll.” McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 34-35.

166 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 40-45.
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Chapter 23

167 Latham testifi ed before the House that, “Th e fuel issue was something that, to be honest with you, just caught us out 

of left fi eld.” Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

168 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 75-77.

169 Don McKinnon, e-mail to James McKay, Senate Committee staff member, Feb. 16, 2006, 5:53 p.m.

170 Th ese problems were oft en made worse because of the apparent diffi culties with FEMA even acquiring generators. In 

a questionnaire submitted for an aft er action report, Gulfport Public Works Director Kris Riemann wrote that: “FEMA 

support for items such as generators oft en took 2-4 days to get. In many cases we already had a generator from another 

source by the time FEMA went through their long process. I would think there would be a faster way to get generators in 

place especially for the water and sewer system when every day counts so much to our residents.” Kris Riemann, Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, MS, “Hurricane Katrina Post-Incident Survey,” sent to Crystal Johnson, Nov. 3, 

2005.

171 Committee staff interview of Kris Riemann, Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 60-62.

172 Committee staff interview of Jim Craig, Director of Health Protection, Mississippi Department of Health, conducted 

on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 44.

173 Written Statement of Jason Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc. for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6; Written Statement of David M. 

Ratcliff e, President and CEO, Southern Company, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 

16, 2005, p. 2; Written Statement of Kevin T. Regan, Regional Vice President, Hotel Operations, Starwood Hotels and 

Resorts Worldwide, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

174 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 7; Written Statement of Ratcliff e, Senate 

Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2; Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

175 Written Statement of Ratcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

176 Written Statement of Ratcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2

177 Written Statement of Stanley S. Litow, Vice President, Corporate Community Relations, IBM Corporation, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can 

Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

178 Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

179 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

180 Testimony of Jason Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can 

Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005.

181 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

182 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

183 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

184 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

185 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 9.

186 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.
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