## In the Court of Appeals S e c on d Appellate Distric t of Texas

at Fort Worth

________________________ ___ No. 02

- 23

- 00480

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 36 0th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 360

- 701090

- 21
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum O pinion by Justice Womack 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### S.O., A 

### C HILD2 ME M ORANDUM OPINION
I
. I NTR O DUCTIO N
I n this private terminati on case brought by Appellees V.S. (Mother) a nd J.S. (James) against pr o se appellant M .O. (Father) , Father a ppeals the trial court ’ s order terminating his parental righ ts to his son , S.O. (Sam)

. 1 In thirty enumerated issues
spa nn in g nine argument sections of his b rief

— sec tions labeled “ R eproductive
Co erci o n, ” “ Spousal Aband on ment and Falsifying a Pr otecti ve Or der, ” “ U nlaw ful Control, ” “ Unlawful Relocation of the Child, ” “ Adoption Fraud, ” “ Involunt a ry Servitude , ” “ Crime Victi m ’ s Ri g h t s Act, ” “ Ex Post Facto, ” and “ Mother ’ s Motives and Best Interest ”

— F ather of fers a myriad of complaints attacking the trial court ’ s termination order. 2

1 To prot ect the identi t

y of the child, we use ali ases to refer to h im, h i s paren ts , and others con nected to this cas e. Se e Tex. Fa m. Code A nn. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. A pp. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2 While Father has listed thirty iss ues in the “ Issues Pres ented ” se ction of hi s b rief , he does not mention th ese listed issues in the “ Ar gumen ts ” section of his br ief. Thus , in addressi ng his issues, we will r efer to the iss ues that are raised in the nine argument sections of his brief. S ee In re J.R. , No. 02

- 2 3

- 00071

- C V, 2024 WL 191 211, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort W orth Jan. 18 , 2024 , pet. fil ed) ( me m. op.) (ad dressing iss u es raised in four argume nt sectio ns of app ellant ’ s brief where appell ant listed thirty

- five issues but did not mention the lis ted issues in the ar gum e nt se ction of he r b rief ). To the extent that a ny of Father ’ s thirty listed issu es are not covered in the nine argum ent sect ions o f his bri ef, those issues are not preserved, and we overrule them. See id. ( “ Accordingly, we initi all y hold that Mother h as failed to preserv e a ll i ssues sans those covered in her argument sectio n, an d we ov errule th ose unpreserved issues. ” )

.3

We will ho ld that Father has inadequat ely briefed all of his issues in t h e first seven argument sections of his brief with the exception that he has raised a challenge
to the trial cou rt ’ s subject matter jurisdiction

. We will address that challenge, and we
will als o address the issues raised in the f inal two argument sec tions o f Father ’ s brief

— his “ Ex Post F acto ” complaint and his challenge to the sufficien cy of the jury ’ s best

- interest finding . We will hold that the trial court p ossessed subject matter juri sdiction, we will reject Fat her ’ s “ Ex Post Facto ” complai nt, a n d we will hold that legally and factually sufficient e vidence support s the jury ’ s best

- interest finding.
Acc ordingly, we will affirm the trial court ’ s terminati on order.
I I
. B ACKGROU ND A. Mother and Father ’ s M arriage, Sam ’ s Birth, Mother and F a t her ’ s S eparat ion and Di

vorce, M other and Father ’ s Involvement with t he No rth Carolina Court System, and Mother and Sam ’ s Move to Texas Mother and Fat her married in January 200 8. In September 2011, Sam was born in No rt h Carolina

. A mon t h after Sa m was born, Mo ther an d Father separated. 3
Acc ording to Father, he and Mother attempted to reconcile in August 2012, but in
O ctober 2012 , Mother requeste d and obtained an ex parte domestic violence protect ive order from a North Car o l i na c ourt. 4

3 At tr ial, Fat her testi fied th at he “ moved out because [M other] admitted to birth control sabotage. ”

4 Father sta tes that he also tri ed to obtai n a dom estic violence protective order
a gainst Mother aro un d tha t same time but th at his request wa s denied

.4

Also in October 2012, Mother filed a “ Complai nt for Child Custody or
Visitation ” in cause number 12

- CVD

- 9 661 in a district court in Guilford County,
North Carolina (the N o rth Carolina Case)

. L ater that month, Mothe r and Father sign ed a handwritten temporary custo dy order ( the Tempora ry Custody Order) in the North Carolina Case to address the temporary custody of Sam. The Temporary
Cu stody Order established that the parties agreed: (1) to joint l egal custody o f Sam , (2) that Mother would be granted primary physic al custody of Sam, and ( 3) that Father would be granted visitation with Sam a s mutually agreed upon by the parties. In April 20 13, Mother filed a motion to modif y the Temporary Custody Order
in the North Carolina Case , which she later dismissed without prejudice. Th at same year, Mot her filed for divor ce in a different Nor th Carolina proceeding. In January 2014, Mother to l d Father that she intended to move with Sam from North
Carolina to Te xas after her employer offered her a pay increase to take a new posi tion
in Te xas. 5 In or around February 2014, F ather filed a counterclaim i n the North Carolina Case seeking s o l e physical c ustody of Sam. Later that mon th, Mother and Sam moved to Texas. In March 2014 , Mother and Fat her were divorced

. 6 In
Dec ember 2 014, the North Caroli na Case was calendared for “ the an n u al civil c lea n

5 During 20 14 , Father was living in Afghanistan and workin g as a government contractor.

6 The divorce ju d gment ind icated that the claims rela ting to child custody in the North Car olina Case r ema ined pending.5

u p calendar ” due to the age of the case. That sa me month, the court presiding over
the North Carolin a Case signed an “ Inactive Status Order, ” placing the Nort h
Carolina Case on inacti ve st atus. 7
B. Mot h e r ’ s Relationsh ip with Ja mes, Father ’ s Visits with Sam and Monthly Su pport Payments Through April 2017, Sam ’ s Visit with Father in April 2017, and Father ’ s April 2017 Email to Mother
In 201 5 , Mother sta rted a relationsh ip with James

. James an d S am developed a good relationsh ip and bonded, and Sam began to refer to James as “ Dad

. ” Mother and J ames married in September 2017. Following Mother and Sam ’ s move to Texas, Fa ther saw Sam every six t o eight
months

. Father also made monthl y payments to Mother to help support Sam

. Those payments stopped around April 2017, after Sam visited Father in North Carolina.
Durin g that visit, Mother dropped Sam off at on e of her friend ’ s hous e s, and Father later picked u p Sam from the house. 8 Appr ox imately thir ty minutes after Mot her dropped Sam off, t he friend called Mother and told her that Father was back at the
house with Sam. A s Fath er explained it , S am h a d an “ o utb urs t, ” so Fathe r returned
Sam to Mo ther. As Mother explaine d it , Father go t u pset after Sam started asking for James.

7 That order provided that the Nort h Carolina Case “ is considered inactive and the case filed i s placed among t he Court ’ s clo sed files

. ” The order furt her pr ovi ded that the North Carolina Case “ may be opened by appr op ria te motion i n the cause and noti ce of hearing. ”

8 Sam wa s five years o ld during the April 20 17 visit.6

Later that month , Father sent Mother an email in which he indicated that he wanted Mother out of his l i f e and that he was willing to not see Sam in order to sever
ties with Moth er. That email stated, in pertinen t part, [James ] has assume d the father role over [Sam ] aga inst my wishes. You are a lso c ohabit[at]ing with him and y ou have publicly ann ou n ced your eng a gement. I no longer ha ve any le ga l obligation to pay child support, in fact I have been paying without order or agre ement, and w il l n ot continue to do so.

. . . This is not a legal acquiesc ence to you removing me from [Sam ’ s] l ife. Plan ni n g a pregnanc y without my consent, getting me to love the child, and then breaking my relationship with him is the wo rst thing anyb ody has ever d on e to me
. . . . I consider it worse than rape, and women do n ’ t have to deal with their rapist i f a child ca me out of the c r ime. Honestly

. . . I just want you out of my lif e so I can start m y new one, and I ’ m tir ed of thinkin g about what y ou ’ ve done eve ry time I want to talk to him because I have to go through yo u to do it. I want you out of my li fe so badly th a t I am willi n g to give up seeing our son to do it, and [Sam] repeatedly saying th at he wanted [James] to be his Dad in the middle of an ice cream sh op was all the excuse I needed

. A nd at this point I ’ m n ot sure it [ ’ ] s healthy to ke ep changing
a round the m al e figure i n [ Sam ’ s] life or what effect it will have on him. I am not a fan o f the two dad

. . . scenario. So y ou win for now , and [James] is going to be his Dad

. In the mean [

] time, I hope to not ha ve contact with you for seve ral years and ha ve mov e d w ell past t he damage you ’ ve done to me. Please don ’ t make any attempt to get m y address or new cell phone number. I do not wis h to be co ntacted on eit her me t hod

. . . . If [Sam ] is gravely ill you can contact me via my voip numbe r and leave a message, ema il or Red Cr oss message . When he is old enough, you will provide [Sam] the al lo wed contact information and he ca n contact me o n his own, if that [ ’ ]s what he wants, and I will prepare fo r that occasion.
This le tter isn ’ t desig

ned to hurt you. . . . I never had a shot at keeping a fatherly role after you moved [Sam] to Te xas, an d you can ’ t7

keep living in denial a bout it just s o we can continuously inject ourselves in to each othe r ’ s lives. C. Mother and James ’ s Termination Suit, th e T ria l Court ’ s In itial Termination Or der, and the Trial C ourt ’ s Order V acating th e Initial Termination Order In June 2021, Mother and James fil ed their petitio n seeking the termination of
Fa th er ’ s parent al rights to Sam based on th e predicate terminatio n g rou nds set fort h in Subsections (C) and (F) of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Fam ily Code (the Texas Case)

. See Te x. F a m. Code Ann . § 161.001(b) (1)(C), (F). Father an swered the petition , and the case proceed e d to a bench tria l in November 2022. In February 2023, the trial cour t signed a termination order (the In itial Termination Order) finding that Father had engaged in conduct und er Subsections (C ) and (F) and
that terminati on of his parental rig h ts wa s in Sam ’ s b est int erest. In March 2023, Father filed a mo ti on t o vacate the Initial T ermination O rder

. In that motion , Father argued, among other things, that the trial court lac ked jurisdicti on o ver the ter mination pr o ceeding due t o the North Carolina Case

. Mother

an d James ’ s counse l later wrote a letter to the trial court requesting that it grant
Father ’ s motion to vacate the In itial Termination Order “ for the limited purpose o f
p roviding mo re time for the Court to ob tain answers to [certain juri sdictional questions] and for the Cou rt to communica te with the North Carolina court under Texas Family Code sections 152.110, 152.20 6, 152.207(a) , and NC Genera l Statu tes section 50A

- 20 7(a

). ” See Te x. Fam. Co d e Ann. §§ 152. 11 0, .206, .207(a); N .C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50A

- 207(a). In April 2023, t he trial court signed an orde r vac ating the8

In itial T ermination O rder “ pending further consideration of th e North Carolina procedures an d consult ation with th e North Caroli na Court. ” 9 See Tex

. Fam. Co de Ann. § 152.110. D. T h e Conference Between the Trial Court and the North Carolina Trial Cou r t R egarding the Texas Case and the N orth Carolina Case In May 2023, the trial cou r t sent to the trial court in the No rt h Carolina Case a synop sis o f i ts understan ding of the procedural history of the North Carolin a Case,

a long with a syn opsis of the procedural history of the Texas Case

. See id

. ; N.C. Gen. Stat. A nn . § 5 0A

- 110. The trial co u r t i ndicated th at i t sought a conference with the North Carol in a trial court regard ing the Texas Case and the North Carolina Case. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.110 ; N.C. Gen . Stat. Ann. § 50A

- 110. L ater t hat mon t h,
the two courts conferenced

. 10 In June 20 23, the t rial court in the North Car olina Case signed an order detai ling the course of proceedings in the North Carolina Ca se and the Texas Cas e . In that or der, the Nort h Carolina trial court stated , “ This Court determines that the
State of Tex as is the more appro priate forum t o exercise jur is diction over the p arties and the minor child subject to th is action pursu ant to N.C.G.S. § 50A

- 2 02 because

9 Fa ther also filed an appeal of the Initial T ermination O rder. We later dismissed that a ppe al as moot because of t he tria l court ’ s gra nting of Father ’ s motion to vacate. See In re S .O. , No

. 02

- 23

- 00065

- CV, 2023 WL 3643637, at *1 (Te x. App.

— Fort Worth May 2 5 , 2023, no p et.) (mem. op. )

.

10 A n order pertainin g to the conference mentions that both Mo ther and Father we re pr es ent f

or the c onfer ence an d a ppeared pr o se.9

No rth Carolina no longer has c on tin uing exclusive jurisdiction

. ” See N.C . Gen

. Stat. Ann. § 50 A

- 202. The North Caroli na trial court further determined t hat “ the State of Texas, rather than North Carolina, is the more con ven ient for um to exercise jur isdiction over the parties and minor child subject to this action pu rsuant to N.C.G.S. § 50A

- 20 7(b). ” See i d . § 50 A

- 207(b). Accor dingly, the North Carolina court ordered, among other t hings, that (1) al l pe n ding litigation in the N o rth C arolina Case

was stayed; (2) Mother should promp tly pursue or continue to pursue any custodial action in the Texas Case; and (3) upon the con clusion of the Texas Case, the North
Carolin a Case would be di smissed.
E . The Termi nation Trial
A fter the North Carolina t rial court declined jurisdiction , the Texas Case
proce eded to a jury tri a l in October 2023

. Mother , J ames, and F a ther te stified a t t r ia l. We g ive a brief summ ary of their pertinent t es timony below

. 1. Mothe r ’ s Testimony
Mo ther testified that Sam has lived with her since his birth

. 11 She stated that following her and Sam ’ s move to Texas in 2014, Father visited Sam in Texas on

a pproximately t hre e occasions between 20 1 4 a nd 2016. She also te st ifi ed about Sam ’ s April 2017 visit to Fathe r in North Carolina. She stated that Sam ha d been looking forward to seein g Father on that trip and that he was happy with having both Father

11 Sam was twelve years old at the tim e of trial

. Sam did not testify.10

and James in his l ife at that time. Follo wi ng that visit , however , Sam “ withdrew into
hims e lf ” and did not ta lk about Father “ for a whole year. ” Mother testified that Father has not made any attempt to see Sam or communic ate with him since Apr i l 20 17.
A s to child s u ppo rt, Mother testified that Father initially paid around $300 a month to help support Sam. 12 She state d that around th e t ime that she and Sam moved to Texas, Father started pay ing around $600 a mont h in child support. She said that F a ther stop ped making chi ld sup port payments after the April 2017 visit, indicating that Father ’ s last payment was in March 2017.
Mother testified that Sam calls Jame s “ Da d , ” that James thinks o f Sa m as his son, and that Jam es and Sam ha ve a good relationship and have bon ded

. She stated
tha t James taught Sam how to ri d e a bicycle, that James has helped Sam with his schoolwork, and that James has provided for Sa m. She also indi cated that Sam wants James to be his “ l eg a l f

ather. ” She testified that Sam has autism and that he ha s received occupational therapy, spee ch therapy , and behaviora l therapy. She stated
that Sam sees a p syc h o logist every other we e k to manage his anxiety, depres sion , and
ADH D. She testified that it was in Sam ’ s best interest for Father ’ s par ental rights t o be terminated and for James to bec ome S am ’ s “ legal father

. ” S he believed that there

was no “ emot

ional benef

it ” to havi n g Fa ther in Sam ’ s l ife.

12 Mother stat e d that the payments were mad e w ithout a child support order, testifying that a child suppo rt or de r h ad nev er been signe d pertain in g to Sam.11

2
. James ’ s Testimony James testified that he first met Sam when Sam was three years ol d. H e stated
that Sam be gan re ferring to him as “ Dad ” around a year after he married Mother. Jam es test

i fied that he wanted to become S am ’ s “ le gal f at her

. ” James indicated that
Father has not visi ted Sam or sent any support for Sam since James ’ s marriage to
Mother

. 3
. Father ’ s Testimony Father testified that following Mother and S am ’ s mo ve to Texas in 2014, he

s aw Sam eve ry si x to eight months. That changed, however , following Sam ’ s visi t to No rth Carolina in April 2017. Father test ified that he has no t seen Sam sin ce that
visit , nor has he made any a tt emp ts to speak with Sam since then, s tating t hat he

“ didn ’ t want to disturb him. ” As to the email he sent Mother in April 2 017, Father said, “ I believ e boys really need a str ong male presence, a consiste nt presen ce. A nd I was willing to le t [James ] do that, but it ’ s not so methin g that I really wanted to
watch. ”
As to c hild support, Father stated that he initially provided Mother $400 a

mon th in child support, but that , after Mother asked for more mone y , he gave h e r $6 00 a month. Fath er testified th at he last paid support for Sam in either 2016 or 2017, which he a dmitted was more than six months before the ter mination case was fil ed. Father explained that he stopped paying money to suppor t Sam because it was
his “ u nderst anding th at [h e ] d idn ’ t legally have to. ” Father stated that in 2020, h e12

made around $65,000 or $70,000. He admitted, howeve r , that he paid zero child
sup port that year. F. The Terminati o n Ord er At the conclusion of t rial, the jur y ret urned a v erdict finding that Father ha d engaged in conduct under S ubsections ( C) and (F) of Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code and that t ermination of his p arental rights was in Sam ’ s best interest. See
Tex. Fam. Code An n. § 161

. 001(b)(1)(C), ( F ), (2). The trial court later signed a
termi nation order in acc ordance with the jury ’ s findings. Father filed various motions to set aside the jury ’ s verdict , w hich were d enied b y the trial court after a hearing

. Father appeals from the trial court ’ s t e rmina t ion ord er. III. D I SCUSSION A. Briefing Waiver We begi n our discussion by addressing whether Father h as waived some of his
i ssues due to inadequate briefin g. 13

13 On the day t his case was set for submission, F ather filed a reply brief and a let ter brief. T hose briefs appear to raise several new issues that were not raised in Father ’ s initial brief

. We cannot consider n ew issues at t his juncture of the appeal. See City of El Paso v. Pickett

, 662 S .W.3d 592, 59 8 n.3 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 20 22, n o pet.) ( “ New or addi tional issues raised in a reply brief are untimely and will not be consi dered absent express permission from t he appellate c ourt allowi ng the new or additional issues. ” ); Flack

- Batie v . Ci ma rron , No. 05

- 11

- 00024

- CV, 2013 WL 485750, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Da llas Feb. 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ Additional iss ues raised only in a r eply brief or post

- submission brief wi ll not be cons idered b ecause they are
u ntimely. ” ); In re K.R.S. , No. 14

- 07

- 000 80

- CV , 200 8 WL 2520812, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 4th Dist.] June 2 4, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ Issues not raised u ntil a reply br i ef are waive d. ” )

. W e also note that in his let ter brief, Father details alleged13

1. App li cable L aw Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure contains sp e cific
requ ire ments for an appellant ’ s brief. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1. To comply with
Rule 38.1, an appellant ’ s brief must, among ot h er th ings, contain a cle ar and concise
argum en t for t he contentions made, with appr opriate citations to legal authori ty a nd
to the rec ord. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); In re A.N.G. , 631 S. W. 3d 471, 476 (Tex. Ap p.

— El Paso 2021, no pet.)

. Merely uttering brie f , conc lusory statem ents

uns uppor ted by citati on to l e gal authori ti es does not satisfy briefing requirements

. A .N.G. , 63 1 S .W. 3d at 47 6; Val a dez v. Avitia , 238 S.W. 3 d 843, 8 45 (Tex. App

. — El Paso 2007, no pet. ). Indeed, “ [f]ailure to cite legal authority o r pr ovide substantive analysis of the legal i ssue pre s ented results in waiver of the complaint. ” V aladez , 238 S.W.3d at 845.
In re viewing for briefing waiver, we are required to con strue briefs liberally so

as not to waive the ri ght to appellat e revie w. In r e I.J.K. , No. 08

- 2 2

- 00055

- CV, 2023
W L 3 15 3645, at *4 (Tex. App.

— El Paso Apr. 28, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (c i ting Lion Cop olymer Hol

dings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC , 614 S.W

. 3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020)).
contact that he has recently had with Sam

. But evidence of that alleged contact is n ot pa rt of the appellate record; thus, we cannot consider it on appeal. S ee Lyons v. Polymathic Props. , Inc. , No. 05

- 15

- 004 08

- CV, 201 6 W L 3564210, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Dallas June 29, 2016, n o pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ [S]tatements in a brief that are unsupport ed by the record cannot be accepted as facts b y an appel late court. ” ); see al so In re A.H. , No. 02

- 21

- 00402

- CV, 2022 WL 1682422, at *5 ( Tex . A pp.

— Fort Worth May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (d ec lining to consider documents a ttached to appellant ’ s brief that we re no t included in the appellate record).14

Similarly, we should hesitate to resolve c ases on procedu ral defects and in st ead work

to r esolve cases on their merits. See St. John Missionary Ba p tist Church v. F

lakes , 595 S. W. 3d. 211, 213

– 14 (Tex. 2020). Even still, “ [w ]e a re not responsible for identifying possible tria l court error, se archi ng t he record for facts favorabl e to a party ’ s posi tio n, or conduc ting legal research to support a party ’ s contentions

. ” In re J.O.A.M

. , No

. 01

- 23

- 00691

- CV, 2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (Tex . App.

— Houston [1 st Dist. ] Mar. 19, 2024, no pet
. ) (mem. op.). “ We re w e t o engage in such activitie s, we would b e abando ning our role as judges and taking on the role of advocate for t hat
pa rty. ” Id

. (ci ting Valadez

, 238 S.W. 3d at 845).
Pro se liti gants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must

co mply wi th all applicable rules of procedure. Ma nsfiel d State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W. 2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978 ) ; In re A.W

. , N o. 02

- 21

- 00317

- C V, 2022 W L 1496545, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wo rth May 12, 202 2 , no pet.) (mem. op.)

. 2. Co mp laint Regarding R eprodu ctiv e C oercion In an argument se ction un der t he head ing “ Reproductive Coercion, ” F ather argues, as best as we can gl ean , t hat Mother be c a me pregna nt with Sam while representing t o Fath er that she was using oral contraceptives. Acc ordi ng to F ather,
this a mount ed to “ r eproductive c oe r cion. ” F ather, however, does not cite a ny specific page in the record to support this argu m en t, 14 nor does h e explain how his

14 Father ’ s brief does not con ta in any record references.15

complaint pertaining to “ repro ductive coercion ” would nec essitate a reversal of the

t ermin a tion order. Accordingl y, we hold that Father has i nadequately briefed the issues under the “ Reproductive Coercion ” hea ding of his ar gument section

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38 .1(i); J.O.A.M. , 2 024 WL 116943 2, at *23 ( “ An appellate i ssue that is n o t supported by argument or that contains an argument without ci tation to the record

. . . presents nothing for re view. ” ); A.H

. , 2022 WL 168242 2 , at *5 (holding that
mother i n adequately briefed issue where she did not provide any record c itations pertaining to the issue or expla in how the issue she compla ined of caus ed the rendition of an imp roper judgment ).
3. C ompl ai nt Rega rding Spousal Aband o nm ent and Falsif yin g a Protec tive Order
In a half

- page argument section under the heading “ Spousal Abandonment and Falsifying a Protective Order, ” Father argue s, a s best a s we can deduce , that Moth er falsified informatio n wh en she made h er request in 2 0 1 2 for an ex par te domestic
vi olence protective order in North Carolina

. But F ather fails to identify what information was supposedly falsif ied , fails to provide any record refer enc es in support of h is arg ument, and fai ls to explain how t h is complaint wo u ld necess itat e a revers al
of the termin ation order. Accordingly, we hol d that Father has inadequately briefed
the i ssues under the “ Sp o usal Abandonment and Fa lsif ying a Prot ect

ive Order ” heading of his argume nt section. See Tex . R. App. P . 38.1(i); J.O. A .M

. , 2024 WL
116 94 32 , at *23; A.H. , 2022 WL 1682 422, at * 5.16

4. Complaint Regarding Unlawful Control
In an argum ent section under th e hea ding “ Unl awful Con trol , ” Father a rgu es, as best as we can ascertain , that t he Tempo ra ry Custody Ord er should not h a ve provided for visitation as mutually ag reed up on by the parties because such visitation would give unlawful contro l to the custodial p arent. See In re Custody of Stancil , 179 S. E. 2d 844, 849 (

N.C. Ct. App. 1971) ( “ Usually those who are involved in a

co n tr oversy ov er th e cust ody of a child have been unable to come to a satisfactory

mu tual agreem ent concerning custo dy and visitation right s. To give t he c ustodian of the child autho rity to decid e when, where and under what circumstance a parent may
visit h i s or her child c ould r esu lt in a complete denial of the right. ” )

. But Fath er once again fails t o prov

ide any record references or to provide any analys is as to how t his

co mp laint would neces sitate a reversal of t he termination order. Accordingly, we hol d

t hat Father has inadeq uatel y briefed the issu es u nder the “ Unlawful Co nt rol ” heading
of his argument sec ti on . See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 ( i ); J.O.A.M. , 2 024 W L 1169432,

at * 23; A.H. , 2022 WL 1 68 2422, at *5.
5. Co mpl aint Regarding Unlawful Relocation of t he Child
In an a rgument sect

ion under the head ing “ Unlawful Relocation of the Child , ”
Father argues , as b es t as we can gather , that Mother and Sam ’ s 201 4 move fr om N o rth Carolina to Texas was unlawful and constitu ted parental kidnapping. But Father does not p rovide any r ecord refe rences to support this complaint, nor does h e explain how it would necessitate a re versal of the termi natio n order. Arguably,17

Father ’ s com pla int under this heading d oes raise an issue that the trial court lack s subje ct matter ju ris dictio n due to the No rth Carolina Case, and we will address that complaint later in the opinion. Acco rding ly, we hold that Father has inadequately briefed the iss ues under the “ U nlawful Re l ocation of the Child ” h eadi ng of his
argumen t se cti on, with the ex ceptio n of his com pl aint that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1( i); J.O.A .M. , 2024 WL 1169432, at *23;
A.H. , 2022 WL 168 242 2, at *5. 6. Complain t R egarding Adoption Fra u d
In a one

- paragrap h arg ument section und er t he hea ding “ A do ption Fraud, ” Father argues, as best as we can extract , that Mother ’ s alleged fa ilu re to mention certain aspects of the North Carolina Case i n c ert ain pleadings in the Te x as Case should subject her to criminal liabi lity un der Sections 16 2.107 and 162. 421(g ) o f the
Te xas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 162 .107, 162.421(g). But Fat her fails to prov

ide any record ref

ere nces in support of his c ontention that M other m ade

om issions in the Texas C ase, and he fails to provide any a n a lys is as to how t his complaint would necessitate a reversal of the termin ation or der. Accordingl y, we hold
th at F ath er ha s inadequately bri e f ed t h e issue s under the “ Adoption Fraud ” he ading

o f hi s a rgu ment se ct

ion. See Tex. R. App. P. 38 .1( i); J.O.A.M. , 202 4 WL 1169 432, at *23; A.H. , 2022 W L 1682422, at *5 ; see a lso In re M. G. , No. 02

- 23

- 00074

- CV, 2023 WL
400868 7, a t * 4 (Tex . App.

— Fort Worth June 15, 2023, p et . denied) (mem. op.) ( “ Ess entiall y, M other leave s it up to us to brief her issue, but we have no dut y to do18

so. T hus, M other has forfeited the issue due to inadequate briefing. ” ( citations omitted)).
7. Com pla int Re garding Invol untary Ser vit ude In an argument sectio n under th e headi ng “ Involuntary S er vitude , ” Father cites two North Carolina stat ute s concerning t he cr im e of involu n tary servi tude. See N .C. Gen. Stat. Ann

. §§ 14

- 43.10( 3), 14

- 43 .12. In a one

- paragrap h a rgument that follows
those citations , Father argues, as best as w e can cull , that he has been forced into
inv oluntary serv

itude due t o Mother ’ s acti ons. But Father fails to provide any record
referen ces in suppor t of his contention tha t h e has been forced into invo lunta ry servitude, an d he fails to p rovide any analysis a s to ho w t his complaint would necessitate a reversal of the term ina tion order. A ccordingly, we hold that Fa ther has inadeq uat ely briefed the issues under the “ Involun tary Se r v itude ” headi ng of his argument se c tion

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); J.O.A.M. , 2024 WL 1169432, at * 23;
A.H. , 2022 WL 16824 22 , at *5. 8. Comp lai nt Regarding t he Crim e Victim ’ s R ight s Ac t In an argume nt section under the heading “ C rime Victim ’ s Rights A ct, ” Fat her
ci tes a section of the Texas Constitution stating that a crime victi m has “ the right to be t reated with fairness and with respect fo r t he victim ’ s di gnity and privacy

t hroug hou t the criminal ju stice process ” and “ the righ t to be reasonably pr ot ected
from th e accused throughout the criminal justice process. ” Tex. Const. ar t. I, § 3 0 (a)(1), ( 2 ). In a one

- sentence argument that compris es Father ’ s e nt ir e a r gu me nt19

in this section, Father states, “ Fath er h old[s] th e clause ‘ t o be reasonably prote cted ’ to

mean not terminating his p arental right s when the court gave total contro l over
visitation to his baby rapist and thin gs didn ’ t turn out wel l. ” Father do es not cite any portion of t he record in su pport of this argument, nor does he provide any

su bstantive analysis or legal authority (other than the above

- cited section of the T exas Cons titution

) to suppo rt his argument that his righ ts shou l d n ot be terminat ed due to the North Carolina trial court ’ s rulings on visitation and due to “ his baby ra pist

. ” Accordingly, we hold that Father has inadequately briefed the issues un der the “ Crime
Victim ’ s Rights A ct ” headi ng of his argument sect io n. S e e T ex. R . App. P. 38.1(i ); J .O.A.M. , 2024 WL 1169432, at * 23 ; A.H. , 2022 WL 1682422, at *5; see also I.J.K. , 2 023 WL 3153645, at *4 ( “ And failing to cite legal authority or provi de substantive analysis results in waiver. ” )

. B. Complaint Regarding t he T r ia l Court ’ s Subj e ct Matter Juris diction and Fat her ’ s Ex Post F acto C omplaint We now turn to Father ’ s argument that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and to his complaint in th e arg ument section of his br ie f under the heading “ Ex Post Fa ct o . ” Because these arguments relate to one another , we will discuss them together. As best as we c an gather , t he thrust of these argumen ts is that
the t rial cour t lac ks subject matter juris di c tion d u e to the North Carolina C a se and
that the term ination ord er v iolates ex p o st facto principles becau se “ Father went from being subject t o North Carolina termination sta ndards to Texas termination standards20

on June 8 , 20 2[3 ] , ” when the N o rth Caroli na trial court signed it s order dec l in ing jurisdiction.
1. Appl ica ble L aw Texas has adopted the Uniform Child Custo dy Jurisdiction and Enfor cem ent Act (UCCJEA), which is co dified in Chapt er 152 of the Texas Fam il y Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § § 152.00 1

– .317 . The UCCJEA encou ra ges national uniformity in child

- c ust ody dis putes and is an attempt to addres s the problem s of competing jurisdictions entering conflicting interst ate child

- custo dy orders, forum shoppi ng , and the dra wn out and complex c h il d

- cust ody legal pr oceedings oft en encountered by parti es where mul tipl e s tates are invo lved. In re J.P. , 598 S.W.3d 789, 794

– 95 (Tex. Ap p.

— Fort Worth 2020, pet. denied); In re T.B

. , 497 S.W .3 d 6 40, 644

– 45 (Tex. App.

— F or t Worth 2016, p et. denied). The U CC JEA li mits the j uri sdiction o f one state to modify the child

- custo dy o rde rs of another state. T.B. , 497 S.W.3d at 645.
Most state s, including Texas and North Carolin a, ha ve adopt ed the UCC JEA i n order to reduce confl

ic ting orders regarding the custody an d plac ement of child ren. See Tex

. Fam. Code Ann . §§ 1 52.001

– .317; N.C . G en. Stat. Ann. §§ 50A

- 101

– 50A

- 3 49; T.B. , 497 S.W.3d at 645. Whether a trial court has juris diction under the U CCJE A is a ma tter of subj e ct

matter ju risdiction. S ee In re Salmin e n , 492 S .W.3d 31, 38 ( Tex. App.

— Hou st on [1 st Dist .] 2016, orig. proc eedi ng) ; Waltenburg v . Waltenburg

, 270 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2008 , no pet.). Whether the trial court has subjec t matter jurisdictio n is21

a quest io n of law that we review de no v o. Tex. Dep ’ t of Park s & W

ildlife v. Miranda , 133 S. W.3d 2 17, 224 (

Tex. 20 04). We deter mine jurisdiction under th e UCCJEA based upon the circ umstances as they exi s te d on the date t hat suit w a s filed.
Walt enburg , 270 S.W.3d at 3 14

. Several provisions of the U C CJEA are pertinent to our analys is , including
Section 152.2 01 ( Ini tial Child C us tody Jurisdiction), Section 152.202 (Exclusive Continuing Jurisdiction

) , Section 152.203 (Jur isd iction to Modify Deter mination), and
Section 15 2.206 (Simultaneous Pro c ee dings)

. See Tex. Fam Code Ann. §§ 152. 20 1, .202, .2 03, .206.
P ursu ant to Section 15 2.201, a court of this state has jurisdiction to ma ke an initial child custody dete rmination only if on e of four circu mstance s exists. Id

. § 15 2.201(a); see N.C. Gen

. S tat. A nn . § 50A

- 201 (similar s tatute). Per ti nent to this

case , one of th ose situations is if “ this state is the home state of the child on the date
of the commencement of the procee ding

. ” Te x. Fam. Code An n. § 152.201(a)(1); see N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann

. § 50A

- 20 1(a) (1). “ H ome state, ” unde r Chapter 152 , is defined

as “ the stat e i n which a chil d lived with a pa rent or a person act ing as a parent for at least si x con secutive months immediat ely before the commenceme nt of a child custody p roc eeding. ” T e x. Fam. Co d e Ann. § 1 52.102(7); see N.C. Gen. Stat. An n . § 50a

- 102(7).
Pursu a nt to Section 15 2.202, except in cases of emerg e ncy under
Section 152.204, a court of the state that made a child custody de termination22

con sist ent with Section 15 2.2 01 or 152.203 has excl u si ve c on ti nuing jurisdiction ov er the determ in ation until either: (1 ) a court of t his state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a per son acting as a parent, h ave a significant conne cti on with this state and th at s ubst antial evidence is no longer avail ab le in this state conc e rn ing the child ’ s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or (2) a court of this state or a court of anothe r state determi nes that the child, the ch ild ’ s parents, and any pe rson act ing as a parent do no t presently r es ide in this state.
T e x. Fam . Code Ann . § 152.202 (a); see N.C. Gen. Stat . Ann. § 50A

- 202(a). Even if the child acquires a new home stat e, the sta te that m ade th e initial child custody de termination retains ex c lu sive cont inuing jurisdiction s o long as the g eneral requisites of th e “ s ub stantial connection ” jurisdiction provisions are met. Cortez v

. Cortez , 6 3 9 S.W.3d 2 98, 307 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [1 st Dis t.] 2021, n o pet.) ( op. on reh ’ g ). “ T he state that made th e i niti al ch ild custody determinat ion ‘ is the s ol e determ inant of wh e t h er juris dictio n continues. ’ ” Id . ( quoting In re Tieri

, 283 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.

—

Tyler 2008, or i g. pro ceed ing ) ); see In re J.P. , 59 8 S.W.3d. 789,
7 96 (Tex . A pp.

— Fort Worth 202 0, p e t. den ied) ( “ The UCCJEA gives [ the court that

m ad e an initial child cu sto dy determin ation ] the sole power to decide whether it will
continue to exercise that jurisdiction. ” )

. Pursua nt to Se ct

ion 1 5 2.203 , ex cept in cases of emerge ncy under
Section 152.204 , a Tex as cou r t can only m od i fy ord ers affecting t he parent

– child23

re l at ionship f rom a nother state if a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Sect ion 152.20 1(a)(1) or ( a)( 2) and (1) the court o f t he other state determi n es it no lon ger has exclusive cont inuing jurisd ic tion unde r Section 15 2.202 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum unde r Section 152.207 ; or (2) a court of t his state or a cou rt of t he other state determin es th at the child, the ch i ld ’ s p arents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently re s id e in the other state. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152 .203; see N

. C . Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50A

- 203.
Pu rsuant to Section 1 5 2.206 (a) , ex cept in c ases o f emer gency unde r Secti on 152 .2 04, a Texas court ma y not exercise its jurisdiction u nder the UCC JEA if,
at the ti me o f the proc e ed ing ’ s commenc eme nt, a proceeding concerning child custody has been commenced in a court of another st ate having jurisdic tion

“ substantially in confor mit y ” wi th the UCCJEA, un l es s th e proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other sta te because the Texas c ourt is a

m ore convenient forum under Section 152.207. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1 52. 206 (a) ;

se e N.C. Gen . Sta t . Ann. § 50A

- 206 (a) . If a T exas c ourt determin e s t ha t a child

custody proceeding has been commenced in a cou rt in anot her sta te having UCCJEA jurisdiction, the Texas court “ s hall stay its proceeding and communicate with the
court of the other state. ” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2

. 20 6(b ); s ee N .C. Gen. Sta t. An n. § 50A

- 206(b).24

2. Application of the Law to the Fa ct s Here, when M other, Father , and the N o rth Carolina trial court signed the Temporary Custody Order in October 2012, North Carolina became the firs t state to make a n init

ial chi ld custody det er min at ion regarding Sam. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2

. 20 1 ( a

) ( 1 ) ; see N .C. Gen . Stat. Ann. § 50A

- 20 1 ( a ) (1); see al so Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2 .10 2 ( 4

) (defining “ [ c ] hild custody proceedi ng ” as “ a proceeding in w hich legal custod y, phy sic al c us tody, or vis it ati on with respect to a child is an is s ue ” ) ; N.C. Gen.
Stat. Ann . § 50A

- 102(4) . As such, North Carolina had ex cl usive continuing jurisdiction over the child custody determination regar ding Sam. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2

. 2 0 2 ( a

); se e N

. C. Gen. Stat. An n. § 50A

- 20 2 ( a ). When Mother and James filed their termina tio n petit ion in 2021, Texas had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination becau se Texas was Sam ’ s ho me st ate. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2

. 20 1 ( a ) (1) ; N .C. Gen

. Stat. Ann. § 5 0A

20 1 ( a ) ( 1)

. To that end, Sam had been living with Mother i n T exas si nce Feb ruary 2014

— more than six consec utive months prior to the filing of the termination petition. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2 .1 0 2 ( 7 ); N .C. Gen. Stat. A nn. § 50A

- 1 0 2 ( 7 ). De spite th e f ac t th at T e xas had jurisdiction to ma ke an initial child

c ust ody det erminat

ion, the trial court could only modify the North Caro lina cu stody orders pertaining to Sam if the N o rth Car olina t ria l court determ ined, among other
thin gs, th at it n o l onger h ad co nt inuing jurisdiction under Section 152.202 or if it deter min ed that Texas w ou ld be a more con venient f orum under Section 15 2 .207. See25

Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 15 2

. 20 3 ; N .C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50A

- 20 3

. Similarly, due to
the s imultaneous North Caro lin a Cas e, the t ria l court could not exercise its jurisdiction under t he U CCJEA until s uch time that the North Carolina tr ial court stayed or terminated the N o rth Carolina Case or determined that Texas was a mor e

conv enient forum under Sect ion 152. 20 7. Tex. Fam. Code A nn . § 1 5 2

. 20 6 ( a ); N .C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 50A

- 206( a ).
Af ter the trial c our t entered the Initial Termination Order, it vacated the order and communicated with the N orth Carolina trial co urt regard in g th e respe ctive juris dicti ons of t he two state s under th e U CC JE A. In June 2023, the North Carolina
trial co ur t si gned an order in which it determined that Texas w as “ the more
approp riate f

orum to exercise jurisdiction

. . . because N o r th C aro lina no longer h as

c ont inuing e xclusive jurisdiction , ” an d it further determined that Texas was “ the more convenient forum t o e xercise jurisd iction. ” Thus, the North Carolina trial court stayed all pending litigation in th e Nort h Carolina Case and ord ere d Moth er to pursue her custod ial a ctions concerning Sam in the Texas C ase. At that po int, the trial court had the ability to ex ercise its UCC JEA jurisdiction regarding custodial action s pertain ing to Sam

. See T ex. Fam. Code Ann. § § 15 2

. 20 3,

. 206 ( a ); N .C. Gen. Stat. Ann

. § § 50A

- 20 3,

- 206 ( a

). T h us , the trial court did not l ack subject matt er jurisdiction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § § 1 5 2

. 20 3, .206 ( a ); N .C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § § 50A

- 20 3,

- 206 ( a ) ;26

Walten burg , 270 S.W.3d at 314

. W e thus overrul e Fath er ’ s c omplain t re garding the tr ial

c ourt ’ s purported lac k of subject matter jurisdicti on. 15
As to Fa ther ’ s ex post facto complaint, he argu es that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction until June 2023, and given the s pecific ti me requirements of
S ubs ect ions 161. 00 1 (b )(1)(C) and (F ), he asserts that ex post facto pr inciples 16 were vi olated when the jury trial commenced in October 2023. See Tex. Fam . Cod e Ann. § 161.001(b) ( 1)(C) (stating that the par ent

– ch ild relationship may be ter min ated whe n the court finds by c le ar and convincing evi dence that the parent “ voluntarily left th e

15 In one senten ce of his brief, Fa th e r also contends that the t ri al court lacks p ersonal jurisdiction o ver h im. But Father ha s provide d no analysis to sup port t hat contention, and w e thus overrule it as inadequately briefed. See Tex

. R. App. P. 38. 1(i). M o reover, Fath er has not preserve d h is co mp laint regarding personal juris diction. S ee Tipton v. State ex r e l. Lottery Comm ’

n , No

. 03

- 21

- 00133

- CV, 2022 WL 3722 389, at *3 (Tex. App.

— A ustin Aug. 30, 2022 , no pet.) (mem. op.) ( “ Bu t [Ap pellant] did not make a s pecial appea rance as required t o a void ma king a general appearance and to preserve a claim of lack of pers o nal juris diction

. ” ); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a.

16 The term “ ex post facto ” refers to any law that is passed after t he c ommission of an act w hich retrospecti vely changes the co ns e quenc es of the act. Bowers v. State , 914 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. App.

— El P aso 1996, pet. ref ’ d)

. A law violates ex post fact o principles if it (1 ) makes criminal an a c t that was innocent when d one, (2 ) increases th e pu nishm ent for an offense after its c omm issio n, ( 3 ) deprives one of a de fense available at the time of the act, o r (4) alters the legal rules of evidence and receiv es less or different evidence to convict than the law required at the tim e the act was com mitt ed. Id

. (citing Collins v. Youngbl

ood , 4 97 U .S. 37, 42, 110 S. Ct. 2 715, 2719 (1990)). Although ex post fact o conce rns generally arise in the criminal context, “ [t]he prohibition ag ainst ex post facto laws found in the Texas Cons titu tion applies both to civil and crimin al laws. ” In re Sh aw , 966 S. W.2 d 174, 179 (Tex. A pp.

— El Paso 1998, no pet.) (op. on reh ’ g). I ndeed, the Texas Constitutio n “ invalidates retroact ive applications of l aws that destroy or impair vested rights. ” Id .; see Tex. Const. ar t
. I , § 16.27

chil d alone or in the poss ession of an other without providi ng adequate suppo rt of the child and remained away for a perio d of at leas t six months ” ); id

. § 1 61. 001(b)(1 )(F) (stating tha t t he p are nt

– child relationship may be terminated when the court finds by
cl ear and convincing evidence that the parent “ failed to sup port the child in accordance with the parent ’ s ability during a p erio d of one year endin g wi thi n six

mo nths of the date of th e fi ling of the petition ” ). We find Father ’ s argument un availing. The T exas Supreme Court has state d , in the context of a case in volving the te rmination of parental rights, that “ [a] law tha t does n ot upset a per son ’ s s et tled expectat ions in reasonabl e r el ia nce upon the law is not unconstitutionally retroactive

. ” In re A.V. , 1 13 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003). And, here , Father ha d n otice

— as of at least the June 2021 filing of the term ination petit ion 17

— that Mother and J a mes wer e seekin g the termination of hi s parental rights under Subsections ( C ) and (F)

. Thus, F ather cannot c laim that his settled expectations were that Texas law wou ld not apply t o any custody dispute involving
Sam. See i

d

. Moreover, th e Texas Su prem e Court, in re jecting a si mil ar argument

r elating to the retroactive application of Subsection 16 1.001(b)(1)(Q) , has stated that

“ the purpose of t he Stat e ’ s intervent ion in the parent [

– ]child relationship is to protect
th e best i nterests of the child re n, n ot to pun ish parents for t hei r conduct ” an d that courts should not “ ignore [Section 161.001 ’ s ] re medial purpose of protecting abused

17 At tria l, Father testified th at he h ad received advice fr o m an attorney in 2014 that jurisdict

ion und e r the U CCJEA had tra nsferred to Texas

.28

and negl ected children

. ” Id. We ov errule Father ’ s issues under the “ Ex Post Facto ”
hea ding of his argument section

. 18 Se e id

. C. Com plaint Regar din g Best Intere st We now turn to the argument section in Father ’ s bri ef under the h eading

“ Mother ’ s Motives and Best Interest. ” As best a s w e can deduce , Father argues in
that secti on that the eviden ce i s legally and fa ctually in suf fi cient to support the jury ’ s best

- interest finding. 19

18 To suppor t his ex pos t facto argument, Father cites S haw

. 966 S.W. 2d at 179. We f in d that case distinguishab le . In Shaw , the El Paso Co urt of Appe a ls held that

“ by measuring t he requi site statutory perio d of co nstructive abandonment from the date of September 13 , 199 4, nearly a year before the e ffe ctive da te of [ S u bsec tion ( N ) ] , ” the statute was “ applied retroa ct ively in violation of [the pa rent ’ s] constitutional protections. ” Id

. at 182. H ere, however, w e are not dealing with a situ ation involvi ng a re cently

- e n acted provision of the Texas Fam ily Code. Rather, we are deal ing wi th th e situ ation where Mother an d Sam have been living in Te xas since 2014, and Father has had knowl edge sin ce at least June 2021 tha t Mother and J ames were seeking the ter minati on of his parental rights under Subsections ( C ) and (F).

19 Th is s ection of F a ther ’ s brief simply lists t he factors stated in Ho lley v. Ad ams , 544 S.W .2d 367, 3 71

– 72 (Tex. 1976). Thus, any issues cont ained in tha t sect ion were likely wai ved d ue to inade quate brief ing. See Tex. R. Ap p. P. 3 8.1(i) . But in the

“ Summary of the Argume n ts ” section of his bri ef, Father state s that the e vidence i s i nsuffi cient to support the jury ’ s best

- interest fin d ing. Thus , aft er li be rally const ruing his b rief, and in an abund ance of caution, we will address the sufficiency of the jur y ’ s bes t

- interest finding. S ee In re H. D. D

. B. , No

. 01

- 20

- 00723

- CV , 2022 WL 2251655, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] J une 23, 2022, no pe t.) ( mem. o p. ) ( “ Given the signif icant deprivati on of rights that results from the termination of t he parent[

– ] child rela tionship . . . we c ons true Father ’ s br iefs l iberally to rea ch his appellate issues on the merits, where possible. ” )

.29

1
. Sta ndard of Re view
For a trial court to terminate a parent

– child relationship, the party see kin g termi nati on must es tablish , by cle ar an d convincing evide nce, that (1) the pa rent ’ s

a ction s satisfy just one o f th e many predic ate grounds listed in Family Co de
Section 161.001(b)(1), a nd (2) term ination is in the child ’ s best in terest un d er Section 1 61. 0 0 1(b)(2). 20 Tex. Fam . Code Ann. § 1 61.001 (b); In re E.N.C. , 3 8 4 S. W. 3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012 ) ; In re J.L. , 163 S.W.3d 79, 8 4 (Tex. 200 5). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “ will produce in the mind of the t rier of fac t a fi rm belief or

con viction a s t o the truth of the al legatio ns sough t to b e established. ” Tex. Fa m. Code Ann. § 101.00 7.
T o determine whether the evidence is l egally sufficient in p arental

- t ermination cases, we look at all the e viden ce in the light most fa vo rable to the challenged
f in d ing

— here the best

- int erest f

inding

— t o det ermine whether a r easo nab le factfinder

c ould f orm a f irm belief or conviction that the f in ding i s t r ue. In re J.P.B. , 180 S. W

. 3 d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005); see T ex. Fam. Code Ann . § 161.001(b)(2). We assume that the
fa ct find er settled any evident iary con flict s in favor of its find ing s if a reasonab le
fac tfind er coul d have done so. J.P.B. , 180 S .W.3d at 573. We dis regard all evidence that a reasonab le factfinder could have disbelieved , and we con sider undi sputed
evi den ce eve n if it is cont rary to the fin dings

. Id . That is , w e co ns ider evi dence

20 Father does not c halle nge t he suf ficiency of the e vidence with re spect to the predicate

- gro und findings.30

f avorabl e to th e findings if a reasonable factfind er could, and we disre g ard cont rary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could n ot. See id . The f actfinder is t he sole jud ge of the witnesses ’ cr edibi lity and dem eanor. In re J.O.A

. , 2 83 S. W .3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009 ).
We must perform “ an exacting re view of the entire reco rd ” in d etermin ing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supportin g the termination of a parent

– chi ld
rela tionship. In re A.B. , 4 37 S.W. 3 d 49 8, 500 (T e x. 2014). N e verth eless , we give due defe r en ce to the fa ctfinder ’ s findings and do no t supplant them w ith our own. I

n re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 10 8 (Tex. 2006). Here , we review the whole record to dec ide whether a fact finder could reasonab ly f o r m a firm convicti on o r belief that the
termin ation o f Father ’ s parental rights is in Sa m ’ s best interest. See Tex. Fa m. Co d e Ann. § 161.001(b)(2). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction

o r belief, then the evi dence i s factua lly sufficient. In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 18

– 19 (T ex. 2 00 2). 2. Applicable Law Although we generally presume th at keep ing a ch ild with a parent is in the
ch ild ’ s best interest, In re R.R. , 209 S. W.3d 112, 116 (T ex. 2006), the best

- inte rest

an alysis i s ch ild

- centered, focus ing on the child ’ s well

- bein g, sa f e ty, and development,
In re A.C. , 56 0 S.W. 3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Evidenc e that is proba tive of the
pre dicate ground s under Section 161.001( b )(1) may also be pro bative of best inter e st unde r S e ctio n 16 1 .001( b ) ( 2). In re E.C .R. , 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex

. 2013); C.H

. ,31

89 S.W. 3d at 28. We a lso consider the evidence in li ght of th e following nonexclusive
fact ors that the factfinder may apply in d etermining the ch ild ’ s best interest:

• t he chil d ’ s desi res;

• the child ’ s emotio nal and physical n eeds now a nd in t he future ;

• the emot

io nal and physic al danger to the child now and in the fut ure ;

• the par enting abilities of the individual s seeking custo dy ;

• the programs avail abl e to assist these ind ividual s to pro mote the c hild ’ s best i nter est;

• the plans for the chil d by these i ndividuals or by the agen cy seeking custody;

• the stab ili ty of the ho me or proposed placem ent ;

• the parent ’ s acts or omissions that may indicate that t he existing parent

– child relati onship i s not a p roper one; and

• the parent ’ s excuse, if any , for t he acts or omissions. Holley , 544 S .W.2d at 371

– 72; s ee E.C.R. , 40 2 S. W.3d at 249; E.N.C

. , 384 S.W.3d at
807. T hese factors do not form an exhaus tive list, an d s ome factors may not a pply to

some ca ses. C. H

. , 89 S.W.3d a t 27 . Fu rthermore, undisput ed ev id ence of just one factor may suffice in a particular case to suppo r t a finding th at termination is in the child ’ s best interest. Id

. On the other hand, the pr ese nce of paltry evidenc e relev ant

to e ach facto r will not sup port such a finding. Id .; I n re Z. G. , No . 02

- 23

- 00038

- CV,
2023 WL 352 1848, at *4 ( Tex. App.

— Fort Wor t h May 18, 2023, pet. denied) (me m. op .); In r e C.G. , No. 02

- 20

- 00087

- CV, 2020 WL 45 18590, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Fort
Wort h Aug. 6, 2020, pet. denie d) (mem. op. )

.32

3. Best

- Interest An a l

ysis
A s to Sam ’ s desires, Mother testifie d that Sam wanted James to be h i s “ legal
father

. ” The reco rd also re flects that Sam refers to James as “ Dad ” and that Sam a nd James have bo nded. I n co ntra st , the reco rd reflects that Fa ther ha s not seen or communicated with Sam since April 2017. The jury was entitled to find that this factor weigh ed in favor of te rminating Father ’ s paren tal righ ts t o Sam

. Se e In re
P .L

. G

. , No. 07

- 18

- 00206

- CV , 2 018 W L 4101095, at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Aug. 28,
20 1 8, pet. denied) ( m e m. op.) (h olding that t h is fact or weighed in favor of termination where record indicated that childr en had bonded with foste r parent and desired t o stay wi th h er

)

. As to the emotiona l a nd p hysical needs of Sam now and in the future, the

reco rd reflects th at Sam h as autism, anxi ety, dep ression, and ADH D

. M other testified that Sam has received occupation al therapy, speech therapy, and b ehavioral the rapy, and sh e stated th a t he se es a psyc hologist every other week. The record furth er

r eflects that Sa m has bonded with James and is happy l iving with Mother and James. In contrast, follo wing his last visi t w ith Father in April 2017, Sam “ withdre w int o himself ” a nd did not t alk about Father “ f or a whole year. ” The jury was entitled to find that this factor weigh ed in fa vor of termin at ing Father ’ s parental r ights to Sam.
See In r e S.D. , 98 0 S.W.2d 758, 764 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1998, p et. denie d) ( holding th at it was in children ’ s best intere sts to p lac e them “ in a st able environment where they can receive proper care for their specia l needs ” ).33

As to the parental abilitie s of the individua l s seeking cu stod y, the plans for Sam, an d the s tability of the home or proposed placement, the record ref lects th at F ather h a s not s een or communicated with Sam since April 2017. When asked about
th e l ac k of c omm unic atio n at trial, Fath er s tated that it was be cause h e “ didn ’ t want to disturb ” S am. The record also contai n s an e mail that Fathe r sent Mother in April 2017 , in which he indicated that he was willing to not see Sam in order to sever
ties wi t h Mother. The r ec ord further reflects tha t Fat he r stopped providing financial support to Sam in or around April 20 17 , wit h F ather stating that he stopped
suppo rting Sam becau se it was his “ understanding the [he] d idn ’ t le gally have to. ” In contrast, the record refle ct s that Sam has bonded with James, that Sam and James
h ave a good r elatio nship, and th at Sam is happy living wit h Mother and James.
Mor eover, Jame s testified that he wants t o be Sam ’ s “ legal f ather, ” and Moth er testified that Sam de sires t he same. The jury was entitled to find that t hese factors weigh ed in favor of ter minating Father ’ s parental rights to Sa m. See In re C. M .T. , No.
0 7

- 14

- 0030 0

- CV, 2014 W L 7149263, at * 3 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo Dec. 12, 2014 , no pet. ) (me m. op.) (holding t hat factfinder could have reasonably concluded th at fa ther did not h ave the abil ity to meet his child ’ s needs when he had not seen the child for

“ nearly two year s ” and had n ot maintain ed “ any type of contact with him ” ). As to Fath er ’ s ac ts or omissions that may indicate that the existing parent

– ch ild

r e lationship is not a proper one and Father ’ s excuses, if any , for such ac t s or omissions, the record re fl ects that Fa th er in tent iona lly removed himself from Sam ’ s34

li fe in April 2017. To t ha t end, the recor d reflects that Father stopp ed v isiting Sam ,

commu nicating with Sam , and providing financial support for Sam in or a round
A pri l 2017. In his April 2017 em ail to Mot her, Fath er i ndic ated that he was will ing to

not see Sam in order to seve r ties with Mot her

. At trial, F ather stated that he stoppe d

cont acting Sam because he “ didn ’ t want to disturb him. ” The jury was ent itl ed to find
that the se factors wei gh ed in favor of terminating Father ’ s parental rights t o Sam

. See id . at *3

– 4 (holding that evid ence tha t father had fa iled to support child an d constructively aband on ed child supported best

- interest finding )

. 4. Bes t - I nterest C onclusion Viewing th e e vid e nce in the lig ht most favorable to the jury ’ s best

- i nterest finding, we hold that a fac tfinder could have reas onably f ormed a firm conviction or belief that termination of the parent

– child relationship between Fat her and S am is in
Sam ’ s best int eres t, and we therefore h old that th e evidence is legall y suf fi cient to support the jury ’ s best

- int erest finding. See Tex . Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); J.P. B. , 180 S.W.3d at 573. Based on our exacting review o f t he entir e re cor d a nd giving d ue defe rence to the factfind er ’ s fi ndings, we likewise conc lude th at the evidence is also factually s ufficien t to support th e jury ’ s best

- interest finding. See
C. H. , 89 S.W.3d at 18

– 19. Accordingly, we overrul e Fath er ’ s issues under the

“ Mother ’ s Mot

ives and Best Intere st ” heading of his argument section.35 IV
. C ONCLUSIO N Having overruled every issue r aised in the ni ne argume nt sections of Father ’s brief, we affi rm the t rial court ’s termination order. /s/ Dana Womack
D ana Womac k J us tice

D elivered: May 9, 2024