1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### WHORTON , DIREC TOR, NEV ADA DE PAR T MENT OF C O RR EC T I O N S v . BOCKTIN G CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 05–5 95. Ar g u ed Nov e mber1, 2006 —D ec ided Febr u a r y28, 2007 At r e spon den t ’s tr ial forsex u al as sau l t on h i s 6-y e ar -oldstepd a u g h t er ,

th e c o u r tdeter m in ed th at t h e c h ild w a s too distr e s s ed t o testifyan d a llowed res p ondent ’s wife a n d apolice detect ive t o recou n ther out

- of

c o u r tstateme n t s abou tth e ass a u l ts, as pe r m itted byNev a da law , r e j e ct ing res p ondent ’s cla i m tha ta d mitt ing t h is t e s t imon y would vio

late th e Con f r o n tationC l au se. He w a s c o n v ic ted an d sen t en c e d to pris on. On directa ppea l , t h e Neva da S u preme Courtfoundt h e c h ild’s state m e n t s c o n s titu ti on al u n d er Oh io v. Roberts , 448 U. S. 56, th enth is Cou r t ’s g o v e rn in g pr ec eden t, whic hh a d h e ld th at th e Con

fr on tationCla u se per m ittedth e adm i ss io nof a h e ar sa ystate men t made bya dec l ar an t u n a v a il able to test ifyif th e s t a t eme n t bor e su ffi

c i en t in dic i a of r e liabil i ty , id. , a t6 6

. Respondentrene wed his Con

fr on tationCl au se c l ai m in a su b s equ e n tfeder al h a b e as pe tition , which t h e Dis t rictCourtdenied. While his appea lwa s pending in t h e Nint h Circuit , t h is Court overr u led Rob erts in Crawfordv. Wash

ington , 541 U

. S. 36, h o ldi n gth at “te sti m on ial sta t e m en ts of w i t

n e sses a b sen t fr om tr ial” ar e admi ssi ble “o n l yw h e r e th e dec l ar an t i s una va ilab l e, and only wheret h e defenda n tha s ha d aprior opport u nit yt o cros s - exa m ine [t he wit n es s ] ,” id., at 59, an d c o n c l u d in gth at Rob erts ’ in terpr e tationof th e Con f r o n tatio nClau se w a s u n s ou n d , id., at 60. Re spon den tc o n t en ded th ath a d Crawfordbeenapplied to h i s c a se, th e c h ild’s sta t emen ts w o u l d n o t h a ve beenadmit t e d, an d th at it should have been applied because it was either an old rule in exis

ten c e at th e ti me of h i s c o n v ic tionora “ ‘wa t e rs hed rul[e] of crimina l procedure ’ implica t i ng t h e funda m ent a lfa irnes s a n d accu ra cy of t h e crimina l proc eeding,” Safflev. Parks , 4 94 U. S. 484, 495 (qu o tin g Teagu ev. La ne , 489 U. S. 288, 3 11 (plu r a lityopin ion)). Th e Nin t h2 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Sy llabu s Circuitrevers ed, holding t h a t Crawfordw a s anew rule, b u t awat e r s h ed rule t h a t a pplies ret r oa ct ively t o ca s e s on colla t e ra l review. Held: Crawforda nnou nced anew rule of crimina l proce d ure t h a tdoes

n o t fall w i th inth e Tea g ueexc e ptionfor w ater s h e d r u l es. Pp. 8–14. (a) Under Tea g ue ’s fr amew or k, anold r u l e applies bo thondir e c t a n d colla t e ra l review, b u tanew r u le ge ne ra lly a pplies only t o ca s e s s t ill on direct review a n da pplies ret r oa ct ively inacolla t e ra l proceed

in gon lyif it (1) is su bs tan ti v e or(2) is a w ater s h e d r u l e th at i m pli

ca t e s “t he funda m ent a l fa ir nes s a n d a ccu ra cy of t h e cri mina l proceed

ing.” Res p ondent ’s convict i on b e ca me fina l on directa ppea lwell before Crawfordwas decided, and Crawforda nnou ncedanew rule, i.e., “a r u l e th at .
. . w a s n o t ‘ dictatedby pr ec eden t ex istin gat th e time the defendant’s conviction became fin a l,’ ” Saffle , supra, a t48 8. Itis fla t l y incons is t e ntwit h Rob erts, whic hitoverruled. “ T he explicit overr u ling of a nea rlier holding no doub t crea t e s anew rule.” Saffle , supra, at 488. Pr iorto Crawford, “r eas o n able ju r i st s,” Graham v . Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 46 7 , c o u l d h a v e con c l u d ed th at Rob erts go v er n e d th e admiss ionof tes t imon ialh e ar sayst ate men t s ma de bya n u n a v a ilable de c l ar an t. Pp. 8–9.

(b) Because Crawford a nno u nced anew r u l e a n d b e ca use t h a trule is procedura l a n d not s u b s ta nt ive, itca nn otb e a p plied here unles s it is a “w atershe d rul[e]” that implic ate s “the fundamental fairness and a ccura c yof t h e crimina l proceeding.” This except ion is “ e xt remely na rrow,” Schri r o v. Summerlin , 542 U. S. 3 48, 351, an d si n c e Teag ue, t h is Courtha s rej e ct ed ever y cla i m t h a ta new rule ha s s a t i s f ied t h e r e qu ir emen ts n e c e ssar yto qu alifya s a w ater s h e d. Th e Crawfor d r u l e does n o t meet th ose tw o r e qu ir emen t s . Pp. 10–14. (1) First, the rule does not implic a t e “th e fu n d amen tal fair n e ss a n d a ccura cy of t h e criminal proceeding” b e ca us e it is notneces s a ry to pr ev en t “an ‘ “impermi ss i b ly large risk” ’ ” of a n ina ccura t e convic

tion , Summerlin , supra, at 3 56. Gideonv. Wainwri ght , 372 U. S. 33 5, th e on lyc a se th at th i s Cou r th a s iden t i fie das qu alify i n gu n d erth is except ion, pro v ides guida nce. There, t h e Courtheld t h a tcouns el mu st be ap poi n ted foranin dig e n tdefen d an t c h a r g ed w i tha felon y because, when such a defend a nt is de nied representation, the risk of a nunreliab l e verdictis int o lerab l y high. The Crawfordrule is not c o mpar able to th e Gi deo n r u l e . I ti s m u c h m o r e l i m i t e di ns c o p e , a n d it s rela t i ons h ip t o t h e a ccur a c y of t h e fa ctfinding proces s is fa r le ss directa n d pr ofound. Crawfordove rrul ed Rob erts b e ca us e Rob erts wa s incons is tentwit ht h e origina lunder s t a n ding of t h e Confront a tionClau se, n o t bec a u s e th e Crawford rule’s overall effe ct would be to improve t h e a c cura c yof fa ct fi nding incrimi na l t r ia ls

. With res p ectt o testimonial o u t-of-court statement s, Crawfordis more res t rict ive th an Rob erts , which ma y im prove t h e a c cu ra cy of fa ct fin d ing in s o me3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s crimina l ca s e s. Butw h a t e ver improvementin reliab ilit y Crawford produced mus tb e cons idered t o get h er wit h Crawford ’s elimina t ion of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court n o ntestimoni al statements. It is thus unclear whether Crawford decreased or increased the number of unreliable out-of

c o u r tstateme n t s th at may be adm i tte d i nc r i min a l tr ials. Bu t th e qu estionis n o t w h e th er Cra wford resulted in some net i m provement in t h e a ccura c yof fa ct finding in crimina l ca s e s , b u t , as the dis s e nt b e lown o ted, wheth ertestimo n yadmissi ble u n d er Rob ert s is s o much more unreliab l e t h a t , wit h outt h e Crawfordrule, “ ‘the likelihood o f a na ccura t e c o nvict i on is s e rious l y diminis h ed,’ ” Summerlin , supra, at 352. Crawf o rddid n o t eff ec t a c h a n g e of th is mag n itu d e. Pp. 11– 13. (2) Second, the Crawford ru le did not“ a lter [t his Court ’s ] under

stan din gof th e b edrockproc edu ral elemen ts essentia l to the fa irnes s of a proceeding,” Sawyerv. Smith , 497 U. S. 227, 24 2. Th e Cou r t h a s “n ot h e si tatedto h o ldth a tles s sw eepin gan d fu n d amen talr u l es ” th an Gideon ’s do n o t qu al if y . Beardv. Banks , 542 U

. S. 406, 4 18. The Crawford r u l e, wh ile cer tain l yimpo r tan t, is n o t inth e sam e ca t e gory wit h Gid e on, whi c heffect ed ap r ofound a n d“ ‘s weeping’ ” cha nge . Bea r d , supra, at 41 8. Pp. 13–14. 399 F. 3d 10 10 an d 408 F. 3d 1127, r e v e r s ed an d r e man d ed.

ALITO , J., delivered t h e opini o n forauna ni mous Court

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rma l revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–5 95 

### GLE N WHORT O N, DIRECT OR, NEV ADA DEPAR T MENT OF COR R E C TIONS, PETI TIONE R v. MARVIN HOWAR D B O C KTIN G ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Febr u a r y28, 200 7] 

### J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### delivere dthe opinio n of the Court. This case presents the question whether, under the rules set out in Te ag uev. Lan e , 4 89 U. S. 28 8 (1989), our decision in Cra wfordv. Washing t o n , 541 U. S. 36 (2004), i s retroactive to cases already final on direct review. W e hold that it is not. I A Respondent Marvin Bockting lived in Las Vegas, Ne

vada, withhis wife, Laura Bocktin g , their 3-year-old daughter Honesty, and Laura’s 6-year-old daughter from a previous re lationship, Autumn. One night, while respon

dent was at work, Au tumn awoke from a dream cryin g, but she refused to tell her mother what was wrong, ex plaining: “ ‘[D]addy said you would make him leave an d that he wou l d beat my butt if I told you.’ ” App. 119. After her mother reassured her, Autum nsaid thatrespondent had frequently forced her to en gage in nu merous an d varied sexual acts withhim. Ibid.2 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### The next day, Laura Bocktin gconfronted respondent and asked him to leav e the house. He did so but denied any wrongdoing. Two days later, Laura called a rape crisis hotline and brought Autu mn to the hospital foran examination. At the h o spital , Detective Char les Zinovitch from the L a s Vegas M e tropolitan Police Department Sex

ual Assault Unit a t t e mpted to interviewAutumn but found her too distressed to discuss the assaults. Detectiv e Zinovitch then ordered a rape examination, which re

vealed strong physicalevidence of sexual as saults. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order i n Nevadav. Bockting , Case No. C–83110 (D. Nev., Sept. 5 , 1994); App. 47, 119. Two days later, Detecti ve Zinovitch interviewed Autumn in the presence of her mother, and at that time, Autumn provided a detailed description of acts of sexual assault carried outby respondent; Autu mn also demonstrated those acts using anatomically correct dolls. Id., at 47–4 8; 119. Respondent was then arrested, and a state grand jury indicte d him on f o ur counts of sexual a ssault on a minor under 14 years of age. At respondent’s preliminary hearing, Autu mn testified that she un derstood th e difference between a truth an d a lie, butshe became up set when a s ked about the assault s . Although she initially agreed that respondent had touched her in a way that “[she] didn’t think he wa s supposed to touch [her],” id., at 14, she later s t ated that s h e could not remember how respondent had touched her or what s h e had told her mother or the detective, id., at 19–21. The trial court, however, found the tes t imony of Laura Boc k

ting and D e tective Zinovitch to be sufficient to hold r e spondent for trial. At trial, the courtheld a hearing o u tside the p r esence of the jur yto determine whether Au tumn could testify. Aft e r it became apparent tha tAutumn was too distressed to be sworn in, i d ., at 25–2 6, the State moved under Nev. Rev.3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Stat. §51.3 85 (2003) 1 

### to allow Laura Bockti ng and Detec

tive Zinovit c h to recount Autumn ’s statements regardin g the sexual assaults. App. 25– 27. Under the Neva da statute, out-of-court statements made by a ch ild under 10 years of age describin gacts of sexual assaul t or physical abuse of th e child may be admitted if the cou rt finds that the child is unavailable or unable to testify a n d that “th e time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstanti a l guarant ees of trustworthiness.” §51.385(1)( a). Over defense cou n sel’s objec t ion that ad

mission of t h is testimony would vi olate the Confrontation Clause, id., at 27–28, the trial co urt found s u fficient evi

dence of rel i ability to s a tisfy §51.385. As a result of this ruling, Laura Bocktin gand Detectiv e Zinovitch w e re permitt e d at t r ial t o recount Au tumn’s out

of-court sta t ements about the assaults. Lau r a Bocktin g also testified thatresp ondent was the only m a le who had had the op portunityt o assault Au tumn. Inaddition, t h e prosecution introduce d evidence regar d ingAutumn ’s

——————

1 S e ct ion 5 1

. 3 8 5 provides , in releva ntpa rt : “1. [A] state m e n tmade bya c h ild un dert h e ag e of 10 year s desc r ib

in gan y ac t of sex u al c o n d uct per for med withoron th e ch ild oran y act of ph y s ic al abu se of th e ch ild is ad m i ss ib le in a criminal proceeding r e g a r d in g th at ac t of sex u al con d u c tor ph y s ic al abu se if:

“(a) Th e c o u r t fin d s, ina h e ar in gou t of th e pr esen c e of t h e ju r y , th at th e time, c o n t en t an d c i r cumst an c e s of th e state men tp r ov ide su ffic i en t circums t a n t i a lgua r a n t e es of t rus t w ort h ine s s ; a n d “(b) Th e c h ild testif ies at th e pr oc eedin gor is u n a v a il able oru n able t o testify

.

“2. Indeter m in in gth e tr u s tw or th in ess of a sta t emen t, t h e c o ur t sh all cons ider, wit h outlimita t i on, whet h er :

“(a) Th e state men tw a s spo n tan eou s ; “(b) Th e c h ild w a s su bjec ted to r e petitiv e q u estion in g ; “(c ) Th e c h ild h a d a motiv e t o fabr ic ate; “(d) The child used terminology un expecte dof a child of similar age; an d

“(e) The child was in a stable mental state .”4 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### medical exam. Respondent testified in his own defense and denied the assaults, and the defense brought out th e fact that Autumn, u n like many children her age, had acquired some knowledge about s e xual acts, since she ha d seen respon dent and her mother engaging in sexual inter

course and had become familiar with sexual terms. Id., at 118. The jury found respondent guilty of three counts of sexual assa ult on a minor under the age of 14, and th e trial court imposed t w o consecutive life s e ntences an d another concurrent life sentence. B Respondent tookan appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, whi c h handed down its final decision i n1993, more than a decade before Crawford

. 2 

### In an alyzing respon

dent’ s contention that the admis s ion of Autumn’ s out-of

court statements had violated h i s Confrontation Claus e rights, the Nevada Supreme Court look ed to Ohio v. Rob

erts , 448 U. S. 56 (1980), which was then the governin g precedent o f this Court. See Bockting v. State , 109 Ne v. 103, 847 P. 2d 1364 (1993) (per cu r i am)

. Roberts ha d held that the Confrontation Clause per m itted the admission of a hearsay statement made by a declarant who was u n available to testify if t h e statement bore sufficient indicia of reliabilit y, either b e cause the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay except ion or because there were “particulari zed guarantees of trustworthiness” relating to the statem ent in question. 448 U. S., a t 66. Appl ying Roberts , th e Nevada Supreme Court held that the admis

-

——————

2 Th e State Su pr eme Cou r tin itiallydi smi s sed r e spon den t ’s appe al in 198 9, Bock ting v. Stat e , 10 5 Nev

. 1023, 810 P. 2d 31 7 (u n p u b lish e d table opin ion) , bu t w e g r an ted r e spon den t ’s peti tionfor a w r i t of c e r t i o ra ri a n d va ca t e d a n d rema n d ed t h e ca s e f o r re cons idera t i on in lighto f Idaho v. Wr igh t , 497 U. S. 8 05 (19 90), see Bock ting v. Nev a d a , 497 U. S. 102 1 (19 90).5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### sion of Autumn’s state m ents was constitutional because the circum s tances surrounding t h e making of the state

ments provided partic u larized guarantees of trustwor t h i

ness. The Court cited the “natural spontaneity” of Au

tumn’s initial statemen ts to her mother, her reiteration of the same account to Detective Zinovitch severa l days later, her use of anatomicall ycorrect dolls to demonstrate the assaults, and her deta iled descriptions of sexual acts with which a 6-year-old would generally not be fam iliar. Bock

ting , su pra, at 109–112, 847 P. 2d, at 1368–1370. C Respondent then fileda petitionfor a writ of habeas corpus wi th the UnitedStates District Court for the Dis

trict of Nev a da, arguing that the Nevada Su preme Court’s decision vi olated his Confrontation Clause rights. Th e District Co urt denied the petiti on, holding that respondent was not en titled to re lief under the habeas statute, 2 8 U. S. C. §2 254(d), because the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision was not “cont rary to” an d did not “ i nvolv[e] an unreasonab le application of, clea rly established Federal law, as det e rmined by the Sup r eme Court o f the Unite d States.” Order in Bock ting v. Bayer , No. CV– N–98–0764– ECR (Mar. 19, 2002), App. 69–70. Respond e nt then ap

pealed to the United States Court of Appeals f o r the Nint h Circuit. While this appeal was pending, we issued our opinion in Cra wford , i nwhich w e overruled Roberts a n d held th at “[t]estimonial statements of witn esses absent from trial ” are admissible “only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].” 54 1 U. S., at 59. See als o Davis v. Was h ingt on , 547 U. S. ___ (2006). We noted t hat the outcome in Rober t s—as well as the outcome in all similar cases decided by this Cou rt—was co nsistent with the rule an nounced in Cra wford , but we concluded that6 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the interpretation of t h e Confrontation Clause set out in Roberts wa s unsound in several respects. See Crawford, supra , at 60 (“Although the resul t s of our de cisions hav e generally been faithful to the original meaning of th e Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of ou r rationales”). First, we observed that Roberts potentially excluded too much testimony beca use it impo sed Confron

tation Clause restrictions on non t estimonialhearsay not governed by that Clau se. 541 U. S., at 60. At the same time, we noted, the Roberts test was too “malleable” in permitting the admission of ex partetestimonial state

ments. 541 U. S., at 60

. We conclu ded: “Where testimonial sta t ements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave t h e Sixth Amendment’ s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘ r eliabil

ity.’ . . . Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds w i th the ri gh t to con

frontation. To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate g o al is to ensure reli ability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather tha na substa ntive guara n tee. It commands not that evidence be reliabl e, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the cru

cible of cross-examination. The Cl ause thus r e flects a judgment, not only ab out the des i rability of reliable evidence (a point on which ther e could be little dis

sent), but about how reliability can best be deter

mined.” Id. , at 61. D On appeal from the d e nial of his petition for writ of habeas cor p us, respondent contended that if the rule i n Cra wfordh a d been applied to his case, Autumn’s out-of

court statements could not have beenadmi tted into evi

dence and the jury would not have convicted him. Re

spondent further argue dthat Cra wfordshoul dhave been7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### applied to his case because the Cra wfordrule was eit h er (1) an old rule in existence at the time of his conviction or (2) a “ ‘wate r shed’ ” rule that implicated “the fundamental fairness and accu racy of the criminal proceeding.” Sa f fle v. Parks , 4 94 U. S. 484, 495 (199 0) (quoting Teagu e , 489 U. S., at 31 1 (plurality opinion)). A divided p anel of the Ninth Circ uit reversed the Dis

trict Cour t, holding that Cra wfordapplies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Bockting v. Bayer , 399 F. 3 d 1010, as a m ended, 40 8 F. 3d 112 7 (2005). In the panel ’ s lead opini o n, Judge McKeown concluded that Crawfo rd announced a new rule of criminal procedure, 399 F. 3d, a t 1014–1016, but that the decisionwas nevertheless retro

active on collateral review because it announced a water

shed rule t hat “rework[ed] our understanding of bedrock criminal procedure,” id., at 1016

. 3

### Judge N oonan con curred, but his prefer red analysis differed from Judge McKeown’s. Judge Noonan believed that Cr awfor ddidn o t announce a new rule, 3 99 F. 3d, at 1022–1024, but “[a]s an alternative to [this] a nalysis and in order to provide a precedent for [the] court,” he “also concur[red] in Judg e McKeown’s analysis and opinion, ” id., at 1 024. Judge Wallace, concurring and dissenting, agreed with Judge McKeown that Cra wfo rdannounced a new procedural rule but arguing that Cra wforddid not rise to the level of a watershed rule under this Cour t’s ju rispru dence. Th e Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, withnine judge s dissenting. 418 F. 3d 1055 (2005). The panel’s decision that Crawf o rdis retroactive t o cases on collateral review conf licts with the decision of every other Court of Appeals and State Supreme Court

——————

3 J u dge M cKeo wn t h en held res p ondentmerit e d hab e as corpus relief u n d erth e Antiter r o r i sm a n d Effec t iv e D e athPen a ltyAc t of 1996, b e ca us e t h a t s t at ut e incorpora t e s our Teaguev. Lane, 489 U. S. 28 8 (198 9) r e tr oac t iv ityan aly s is

. 399 F. 3d, at 1021 –1 022.8 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that has addressed this issue. 4 

### We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 547 U. S. ___ ( 2006). II A In Teagu eand subseq uent cases, we have laid out the framework to be used in determining whether a rule an

nounced in one of our opinions sh ould be applied retroac

tively to judgments in criminalcases that are already fin a l on direct r e view. Un der the Te agueframe w ork, an old rule applies both on dir e ct and collateral review, but anew rule is generally applicable on ly to cases that are still on direct review. See Griffithv. K e ntucky , 47 9 U. S. 314 (1987). A new rule a pplies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a “ ‘ w ate r shed rul[e] of crimina l procedure’ implicating the funda m ental fairness and accurac yof the crimin a l proceeding.” Saffl e , su pra, at 495 (quoting Te ague , supra, at 311 (plurality opinion)). B In this cas e , it is und ispu ted that respondent’s convic

tion became final on direct appe al well before Crawfo rd was decide d. We ther efore turn t o the question whether Cra wforda pplied an old rule or a nnounced a new one. A new rule is defined as “a rule that . . . was not ‘ dictatedby precedent existing at t h e time the defendant’s conviction

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4 See, e. g. , Lave v. Dretk e , 444 F. 3d 333 (CA5 20 06); Espy v. Mas s ac , 443 F. 3d 13 6 2 (CA11 200 6 ) ; Murillo v. Frank , 402 F. 3d 786 (CA 7 200 5); Dorchyv. Jon es, 398 F. 3d 783 (CA 6 2 005); Brownv. Uphoff , 3 81 F. 3d 121 9 (C A10 20 04); Mungo v. Du nc an , 393 F. 3d 327 ( CA2 20 0 4 ); Edwards v. People, 129 P. 3d97 7 ( C olo. 2 0 06) (en ban c ) ; Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. ___, 137 P. 3d 10 95 (20 06); Danforthv. Stat e, 718 N. W. 2d 451 (M in n . 2006); Statev. Williams , 695 N. W. 2d 2 3 (Iow a 20 05) ; Chandle rv. Crosby , 916 So. 2d 72 8 (Fla. 2 005); In re Ma rk el , 154 Was h

. 2d 262, 1 11 P. 3d 249 ( 200 5).9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### became final.’ ” Saffl e , sup r a, a t488 (quo ting Te ag ue , supra, at 30 1 (plurality opinion); emphasis in original). Applying t h is definition, it is clear that Cr a wfor dan nounced a new rule. The Cra wfordrule was not “dicta ted” by prior precedent. Quite the opposite is true: The Craw

fordrule is flatly inconsiste nt with the prior governing precedent, Roberts, wh ich Crawfordoverruled. See Davi s , 547 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at ___)

. “The explici toverruling of an earli e r holding no doubt creates a new rule.” Saffle , supra, at 48 8. In concludi ng that Cra wfordmerely applied a nold rule, Judge Noonan relied on our observation in Cr a wfor dth at the holdings in our prior decisions, including those that applied the Roberts rule, had been generall y consistent with the ru le announced in Crawfo rd(and with the Fram

ers’ understanding of the me anin gof the Confrontation Clause, which provide dthe basis for the Crawforddeci

sion). See 541 U. S., at 57–59. But the CrawfordCourt was quick t o note that “the ration ales” of our prior deci

sions had been inconsistent with the Cra wfordrule. Id., at 60. “ ‘Th e “new rule” principle .

. . validates reasonabl e, good-faith interpretati ons of existing precede n ts made b y state courts even thoughthey are shown to be contrary t o later decisions.’ ” Lockhart v . F r e t well , 506 U. S. 364, 372– 373 (1993) (quoting Butler v . M cKellar , 494 U. S. 407, 414 (1990)). And it is stating the obvious to say that, prior t o Cra wford , “reasonable jurists,” Graham v . Collins , 506 U. S. 461, 467 (1993), could have reached the conclusion that the Roberts rule was the rul e that gove rned the a d

mission of hearsay statements made by an unavailable declarant. Because the Crawfo rdrule was not dictate d by th e governing precedent existing atthe time when respon

dent’s con v iction becam e final, the Cra wford rule is a new rule.10 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### III A Because Crawford announced a “n ew rule” and because it is clear a n d undispu ted that th e rule is procedural and not substantive, that rule cannot be applied in this collat

eral attack on respondent’s conviction unless it is a “ ‘wa

tershed rul[e] of crimi nal procedure’ implicating the fun

damental fairness and accura cy of the criminal proceeding.” Sa ffle , 49 4 U. S., a t4 95 (quoting Tea g ue , 489 U. S., at 311 (plurality opinion)). This exception is “ex

tremely narrow,” Schri ro v. Summerlin , 542 U. S. 348, 35 2 (2004). We have observed that it is “ ‘unlikely’ ” that an y such rules “ ‘ha[ve] yetto emerge,’ ” ibid. (quo ting Tylerv. Cain , 533 U. S. 656 (2001); internal quotation marks omitted); see also O’Del l v. Netherl a nd , 521 U. S. 151, 157 (1997); Graham , sup r a, at 478 ; T e ag ue , supra, at 313 (plurality o p inion)

. And in the years since Te agu e , we have reject ed every cl aim that anew rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status. See, e.g., Summerlin, supra (rejecting retroactivity for Ring v. Arizo n a , 536 U. S. 584 (2002)); Beardv. Banks , 542 U. S. 406 (2004) (reject

ing retroactivity for Mills v. Maryland , 486 U. S. 367 (1988)); O’Dell, su pra (rejecting r e troactivityfor Simmon s v. South Carolina , 51 2 U. S. 154 (1994)); Gi lmorev. Tay

lor , 508 U. S. 333 (199 3) (rejecting retroactivity for a new rule relating to jury in structions on homicide); Sawyerv. Smith , 497 U. S. 227 (1990) (rejecting retroactivity fo r Caldwellv. Missis s ippi , 472 U. S. 320 (1985)). In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent “an ‘ “impermissibly large risk” ’ ” of an inaccurat e conviction. Summerli n , supra, at 356; see al so Tyler , 533 U. S., at 6 65. Second, the rule must “alte rour unde r standing of the bedrockprocedural elements essential t o the fairnes s of aproceeding.” Ibid. (internal quotati on marks an d emphasis omitted). W e consider each of thes e11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### requirements in turn. B The Cra wfo rd rule does not satisfy the first requirement relating to an impermissibly large risk of aninaccurate conviction. To be sure, the Crawfordrule reflects the Framers’ preferred m e chanism (cross-examination) for ensuring t hat inaccu rate out-of-court testi m onial state

ments are not used to convict an accused. But in order for a new rule t o meet the accurac yre quirement at issue here, “[i]t is .

. . not enough .

. . to say th at [the] rul e is aimed at improving t h e accuracyof trial,” Sawyer, 497 U. S., at 242 or that the rule “is di rected towa rd the enhancement of reliability a n d accuracy in some sense,” id., at 243. In

stead, the question is whether th e new rule remedied “a n ‘ “impermissibly large risk” ’ ” of an inaccurate conviction. Summerlin , supra, at 3 66. Guidance i nanswerin gthis que stion is provided by Gideonv. Wain wri ght , 372 U. S. 335 (1963), to which we have repeatedly referred in discuss i ng the meaning of th e Tea g ueexception at is sue here. S ee, e.g., Bea r d , supra, at 417; Saffle , supra, at 495; Gilmore , supra, at 364 (Black

mun, J., di ssenting). In Gideon , the only case that we have identi fied as qu alifying under this exception, the Court held that counsel must be appointed for any indi

gent defendant charged with a felony. When a defendan t who wishes to be represented by counsel is denied repre

sentation, Gideon held, the risk of an unreli able verdict is intolerably high. See Mickensv. Taylor , 535 U. S. 162 , 166 (2002); United Statesv. Cronic , 466 U. S. 648, 658– 659 (1984); Gideon , supra, at 3 44–345. The new rule announced in Gideoneliminated this risk. The Cra wf o rd rule is in no wa y compa r able to th e Gideonrule. The Crawfordrule is much more limited i n scope, and the relationship of thatrule to the accura cyof the factfin ding proces s is far less direct a n d profoun d

.12 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Cra wfordoverruled Roberts because Roberts was inconsis

tent withth e original understanding of the m e aning of th e Confrontation Clause, not because the Court reached the conclusion that the o v erall effec tof the Cra wf o rdru le would be to improve the accuracy of fact finding in crimi

nal trials. Indeed, in Cra wford we recogniz ed that eve n under the Roberts rul e , this Court had never specifically approved the introduction of test imonialhe arsay state

ments. 542 U. S., at 57–60. Accordingly, it is not surpris

ing that the overall ef fect of Cra wford with regard to t h e accurac yof fact-finding in criminal cases is not easy t o assess. With respect to testi m onialout-of-court statements, Cra wfordi s more rest rictive thanwas Robert s , an d this may improv e the accuracy of fact-finding in some criminal cases. Specifically, under Roberts , there may have been cases in which courts erron eously determin ed that tes t i

monial stat ements were reliabl e. But see 418 F. 3d, at 1058 (O’Sca nnlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (observing th at it is unl ikely that this occurred “in anything but the exceptional case”). But whateve r improvement in reliability Cra wfordproduced in this respect must be considered together with Crawford’ s eliminationof Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliabl e out-of-court nontesti monial state

ments. Under Robert s , an out-of-court no ntestimonia l statement not subject to prio r cross-examination could not be admitted without a judici al determination regarding reliability. Under Cra wford , on the other ha nd, the Con

frontation Clause has no application to such statements and therefore permits their admission even i f they lack indicia of reliability. It is thus unclear wh ether Cra wford , on the whole, decreased o rincreased the numb e r of unrel iable out-of

court sta t ements that may be ad mitted in c r iminal trials

. But the que stion here is not wheth e r Cra wfordresulted in13 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### some net improvement in the ac curac yof f a ct finding in criminal cases. Rather, “the question is whether testi

mony admissible under Roberts is so much more unreli

able than that admissible under Crawfordth at the Cra w fordr u l e i s ‘ one without which the lik el i h ood of a n accurate co nviction is s eriouslydiminished.’ ” 399 F. 3d, at 1028 (Wall a ce, J., concurring a n d dissenti n g) (quoting Summerlin , 542 U. S., at 352 (in t ernal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Cra wforddid not effec ta change of this magnitude. C The Crawfo rd rule also did not “alter our understandin g of the bedrock proced ural elem ents essential to the f a ir

ness of a proceeding.” Sawyer , supra, at 242 (internal quotations marks omitted and emphasis in original). Contrar yt o the sugg estion of the Court o f Appeals, see 399 F. 3d, at 1019 (relying on the conclusion that “the right of cross-examination as an adjunct to the constitu

tional righ t of confro ntation” is a “bedrock procedural rul[e]”), this requirement cannot be met s i mply by show

ing that a new procedural rule is based ona “bedroc k” right. We have frequ e ntly held that the Te aguebar to retroactivit yapplies to new rules that are ba sed on “bed

rock” constitutional rights. See, e.g., Beard , 542 U. S., at 418. Simil a rly, “[t]ha t a new procedural rule is ‘funda

mental’ in s o me abstra ct sense i s not enough. ” Summerli n , 542 U. S., at 352. Instead, in order to meet this requirement, a new rule must itself constitute a pr eviously unrecognized bedrock procedural element th at is essen t ial to the fairness of a proceeding. In applyi ng this requirement, we again have look ed to the example of Gideon , and “we h a ve not hesi

tated to hold that less sweeping and fundamental rules” do not quali f y. Bea r d , supra, at 41 8. In this case, it is apparent that the rule announced in14 WHORTON v. BOCKTING Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Cra wford , while certa inly important, is not in the same categorywi th Gid e on . Gid e oneffected a profound an d
“ ‘ s weeping’ ” change. Be a r d , s u pr a, at 418 (quoting O’Dell , 521 U. S., at 167). The Cra wford rule simply lacks the “primac y” a n d “cent rality” of the Gideonrule , Saffle , 49 4 U. S., at 49 5, and does not qualify as a rule th at “alter[ed] our understanding of the bedr ockprocedural elemen ts essential to the fairness of a proceeding,” Sa wyer , 4 97 U. S., at 2 42 (internal quotationmarks and emphasis omitted). IV In sum, we hold that Cra wfordannounced a “new rule” of criminalprocedure and that this rule d oes n o t fal l within the Te agueex ception for watershedrules. W e therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.