SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-4171-17T4

 A-5522-17T4

 

MELISSA MORALES, n/k/a

MELISSA MATTEI,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JULIO MORALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted July 23, 2019 – Decided August 15, 2019

Before Judges Ostrer and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, 

Docket No. FM-19-0181-11.

Julio Morales, appellant pro se.

Melissa Morales, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Julio Morales filed two separate appeals from three Family Part 

orders entered following two plenary hearings. The first order required 

defendant to repay part of the college loans incurred by his daughter Meghan in 

monthly installments. The second order denied reconsideration. The third order 

required defendant to repay part of the college loans incurred by his daughter 

Jodie in monthly installments. We have consolidated the appeals for purposes 

of this opinion.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

We write this opinion primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the 

history of this contentious litigation.2 A brief summary will suffice here. The 

parties were married in June 1983 and divorced in January 2011. Three 

daughters were born of the marriage. At issue in these appeals is defendant's 

responsibility for the college expenses of their daughters Meghan, born in 

November 1989, and Jodie, born in February 1996. 

The parties engaged in mediation during the pendency of the divorce 

action and reached certain agreements set forth in a September 2010 

 

1

 The first appeal relates to the first and second orders; the second appeal relates 

to the third order. 

2

 According to the trial court, the parties have filed twenty-seven post-judgment 

motions that resulted in approximately twenty orders. 
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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU stated its terms were not 

binding until incorporated into a property settlement agreement (PSA) prepared 

by the parties' attorneys and signed by the parties. Paragraph 17 of the MOU 

addressed college choice and expenses. It stated:

A. The children shall apply for all available 

grants, scholarships and student loans. Thereafter, their 

College Bound Funds shall be applied. After applying 

said funding the remainder of the children's costs shall 

be shared in ratio to their incomes at the time after 

adding alimony to Melissa's income and deducting it 

from Julio's income, as per line 6 of the child support 

guidelines.

B. A joint decision as to where Jodie shall 

attend school shall be made between the parties and 

Jodie taking into consideration her academic abilities 

and the parties['] financial circumstances at that time. 

Discussions regarding Jodie's college choice shall 

begin no later than the Fall semester of her junior year 

of high school.

C. College expenses shall be defined as PSAT 

and SAT/ACT prep course and testing fees, application 

fees, tuition, room and board, room set-up costs, books 

and fees, computer costs, agreed upon allowance, and 

reasonable transportation costs, and agreed upon 

college search visits. The parties acknowledge that the 

majority of Meghan's college funds have been utilized 

and that any balance will be used to help her with room 

set up costs, etc., for this coming year. 

The following month, the parties entered into a comprehensive PSA, the 

terms of which were incorporated by reference into the final judgment of divorce 
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(FJOD). Article 10 of the PSA addressed responsibility for college tuition. 

Relevant to this appeal, it provides:

10.1 Husband and wife shall equally contribute 

(50% Husband/50% Wife) to their children's college 

and/or graduate educational expenses including but not 

limited to fees for PSAT and SAT/ACT prep courses or 

tests, college application fees, tuition, room and board 

(whether on or off campus), room set-up costs, books 

and fees, computer costs, agreed upon allowance, and 

reasonable transportation costs, and agreed upon 

college search visits and expenses associated with the 

selection process, mandatory fees, and incidental 

expenses, in accordance with their income and assets 

and ability to pay at the time the cost is to be incurred, 

after all scholarship, grants, loans, work-study, etc. 

have been exhausted by the child.

. . . . 

10.4 Neither party shall commit the other party 

to any post-secondary educational costs. The Husband 

and Wife shall consult with each other and the child 

regarding choice of school and cost associated 

therewith prior to any final decision regarding same. 

The Husband and Wife agree to take into consideration 

the child's desires regarding a choice of post-secondary 

education.

10.5 The children, namely Meghan and Jodie

shall apply for all available grants, scholarships and 

student loans for their college education.

Article 17A was added in an addendum to the PSA. It provided: 

The children shall apply for all available grants, 

scholarships and student loans. Thereafter, their 
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College Bound Funds shall be applied. After applying 

said funding the remainder of the children's costs shall 

be shared in ratio to their incomes at the time after 

adding alimony to Melissa's income and deducting it 

from Julio's income, as per line 6 of the child support 

guidelines.

A. The First Appeal

In March 2015, plaintiff moved to enforce Article 10 of the PSA, seeking 

contribution toward the cost of Meghan's college expenses. Defendant opposed 

the motion, claiming plaintiff failed to keep him informed of Meghan's 

education. Defendant also claimed the proceeds of Meghan's loans were used 

to purchase unnecessary items that were not directly related to college or fiscally 

responsible. In addition, defendant claimed that, pursuant to Article 10 of the 

PSA, he had no obligation to pay for any portion of Meghan's college expenses 

that were paid from the loan proceeds. In essence, he contended he was only 

required to contribute to any remaining college expenses after applying 

scholarship, grant, and loan funds, and if those funds satisfied tuition expenses, 

no contribution was necessary. Defendant contended all of Meghan's college 

expenses were financed entirely by loans. Therefore, he owed no contribution 

toward those expenses. 

The trial court ordered the parties to engage in certain discovery, including 

plaintiff furnishing a statement of account for Meghan's college expenses. The 
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court noted the conflicting terms of paragraph 10.1 of the PSA, which stated the 

parties "shall equally contribute (50% Husband/50% Wife) to their children's 

college and/or graduate educational expenses" then later in the same paragraph 

stated they would contribute to those expenses "in accordance with their income 

and assets and ability to pay at the time the cost is to be incurred, after all 

scholarship, grants, loans, work-study, etc. have been exhausted by the child."

The court rejected defendant's assertion that he had no obligation to contribute 

to college expenses because there was no balance due after applying the loan 

proceeds, stating: 

If this were the case no parent would ever have to 

contribute as loans would almost always be taken out to 

cover the entire cost of the education. The language of 

the PSA is unclear, as is the case with many PSAs, 

regarding the child's obligations after loans, grants, etc. 

The [c]ourt interprets this portion of the PSA to mean 

that the child must obtain any and all scholarships and 

grants available to the child and then apply for the 

maximum amount of Stafford loans which may total as 

much as $33,000 for four (4) years. The parties'

responsibility then is the amount in excess of the 

Stafford loans still needing to be covered. 

A subsequent order established a discovery schedule. The court also 

engaged in a preliminary analysis of Meghan's tuition and loans for 2011 and 

2012 and the parties' relative income. The court concluded defendant's share 

was 46.5 percent, or $10,169.77. The court ordered defendant to remit payments 
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of $500 per month for his share of Meghan's college expenses, commencing 

October 16, 2016, without prejudice to the results of the plenary hearing to be 

conducted. 

After settlement efforts failed, the court conducted a one-day plenary 

hearing on December 4, 2017. Plaintiff, defendant, and Meghan testified. Both 

parties appeared pro se. Plaintiff's exhibits, P-1 through P-355, and defendant's 

exhibits, D-1 through D-15, were moved into evidence. The court subsequently 

issued an order and written statement of reasons on December 22, 2017.

The trial court made the following findings. At the time of the parties' 

divorce, Meghan was about to commence her junior year at East Stroudsburg 

University (ESU). She graduated from ESU in four-and-one-half years. 

Meghan received a cheerleading scholarship of a few hundred dollars and no 

grants. Her college expenses were financed entirely by government and private 

loans. Meghan's maternal grandmother co-signed for the loans; she never asked 

defendant to co-sign the loans. The private loans were consolidated by Lendkey. 

The principal balances were $119,551.48 to Lendkey and $33,988.53 to 

FedLoan, for a total loan balance of $153,540.01. Meghan admitted on crossexamination that she did not comprehend the actual costs she was incurring and 

their impact on her financial future until repayment began. 
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Defendant participated in the college selection process by taking Meghan 

on several college visits. He said he expressed the opinion she should attend 

Montclair State University because she could live at home and reduce her

college expenses. Meghan testified she decided to attend ESU because she 

wanted a true college experience living away from home. 

The trial court found defendant produced no evidence that he was not 

consulted or aware of Meghan's college selection, or that he objected to Meghan 

attending ESU. The court found defendant was aware of her college selection 

because Meghan was living in the marital home with defendant when she 

selected ESU, and her attending ESU was referenced in the parties' PSA. The 

court noted the PSA referred to payment of "expenses relating to room and 

board." The court found defendant was aware of the cost of attending ESU.

The court noted the September 16, 2016 order calculated the parties' 

income percentage as 46.5 percent for defendant and 53.5 percent for plaintiff, 

accounting for the alimony paid by defendant to plaintiff. The court assigned 

those percentages to the college expenses to be reimbursed by each party.

3

 

3

 The 2016 income of the parties after alimony was 45.9 percent for defendant 

and 54.1 percent for plaintiff. The trial court found the difference was not 

material. 
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Based on its analysis of the case law imposing a duty on parents to provide 

financial support to their children attending college, and the May 8, 2015 order,

the court rejected defendant's assertion he was not obligated to contribute to 

Meghan's college expenses. The court concluded the evidence did not suggest 

defendant and Meghan were estranged while Meghan was attending college. On 

the contrary, the court found defendant assisted Meghan in certain physical 

moves to different residences at college. The judge noted "defendant testified 

only he has not spoken with Meghan since her graduation from college in May 

2014." 

The court reiterated its prior finding "that the parents' financial obligations 

were triggered after application of scholarships, grants and the federal (Stafford) 

loans." The court found this rationale consistent with the case law that 

"financially capable parents should contribute to the higher education of 

children who are qualified students," quoting Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 

544 (1982). The court also concluded it was not in "a child's best interest to be 

saddled with insurmountable student loans when parents are capable of paying 

a portion of the child's tuition," citing Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs. v. 

G.D.M., 308 N.J. Super. 83, 88 (Ch. Div. 1997). 
10 A-4171-17T4

The court resolved the conflicting language in paragraph 10.1 of the PSA 

by referring to Article 17A of the addendum. The court concluded:

the parties did not intend to share costs [fifty-fifty], 

otherwise they would not have included two 

independent references to dividing their shares on the 

basis of their percentage incomes. Notwithstanding, 

based upon the parties' actual incomes between the date 

of divorce and now, there is very little difference 

between a [fifty-fifty] split and the split adopted by this 

court—[d]efendant (46.5%) and [p]laintiff (53.5%). 

The court further found the parties were able to contribute to Meghan's college 

expenses based on their case information statements. 

The trial court then noted that, if the parties previously agreed the children 

would be attending college and how those college expenses should be divided, 

the court need not apply the twelve Newburgh factors and "should enforce the 

agreement as written." The court found Moss v. Nedas, 289 N.J. Super. 352 

(App. Div. 1996) inapposite to the facts in this case. 

The court determined Meghan was solely responsible for her federal loans 

totaling $33,988.53. With respect to the private loans consolidated by Lendkey, 

the court found "it inequitable to hold the parties' responsible for more than four 

years of post-secondary schooling," and reduced the amount potentially 

allocated to the parties to $106,267. From that reduced amount, the court found 

it reasonable to allocate fifty percent to Meghan based on six factors described 
11 A-4171-17T4

in its Statement of Reasons, twenty-five percent to plaintiff, and twenty-five 

percent to defendant. Thus each party was held responsible for $26,566.75 of 

the college loans. Defendant was credited for his prior payments totaling $7500 

made pursuant to the September 2016 order. He also received a credit of 

$3921.60 for child support overpayments following the youngest daughter's 

emancipation. This yielded a net balance of $15,145.15 to be repaid at the rate 

of $500 per month until paid in full. 

Defendant moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion

for the following reasons:

Defendant claims that he should be entitled to a 

reconsideration of his college contribution based upon 

Plaintiff's failure to provide proof of college expenses 

and based on Meghan's college expenses being 

"financed entirely by loans." Plaintiff provided the 

court with pre-marked exhibits prior to the plenary, 

which exhibits provided ample evidence of . . . 

Meghan's college expenses. Moreover, the court also 

previously addressed Defendant's argument that he 

should not be required to contribute to Meghan's 

college expenses, because the expenses were entirely 

financed by loans. As set forth in the court's prior order 

dated December 22, 2017, the court made all necessary 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in terms of the 

parties' college contributions, and Defendant raises no 

issues or arguments that were not previously made at 

the plenary hearing.
12 A-4171-17T4

The trial court noted defendant did not "point out any prior evidence that 

was overlooked or demonstrate how the [c]ourt acted in an arbitrary or 

capricious manner." The court further noted defendant did not "cite any law or 

legal precedent that the court overlooked in rendering its decision." The first

appeal followed. 

B. The Second Appeal

Jodie attended the Culinary Institute of America (CIA) from February 

2015 through March 2016, graduating with an Associate's degree. CIA students 

are required to complete an externship in a restaurant. Jodie completed a fourmonth externship at a restaurant in South Carolina in January 2016.

In March 2015, plaintiff moved to enforce Article 10.1 of the PSA by 

compelling defendant to contribute to the cost of Jodie's CIA tuition and related 

college expenses, including "room set-up costs." Defendant cross-moved to 

enforce litigant's rights, alleging plaintiff failed to provide him with up-to-date 

information regarding Jodie's tuition and expenses. He also opposed 

responsibility for Jodie's room set-up costs, claiming many of the purported 

college expenses were duplicate purchases of items and were included within 

defendant's child support obligation.
13 A-4171-17T4

In its May 8, 2015 order, the trial court directed plaintiff to "keep 

[d]efendant apprised of all issues related [to] Jodie's education, including costs, 

and contributions from the children, etc." Following submission of a 

supplemental certification by plaintiff, the trial court entered a September 30, 

2015 order directing defendant to reimburse certain college expenses incurred 

by Jodie. The court noted, however, that certain expenses related to 

recommendations by the school of items to bring to campus rather than 

necessities. The court concluded "[p]laintiff cannot use these recommendations 

as a 'blank check' to purchase anything she sees fit or the children ask for and 

require and/or expect reimbursement from [d]efendant," and limited 

reimbursement for room set-up to $199.30. The order noted several issues 

regarding college expenses but did not determine defendant's obligation to 

reimburse plaintiff for Jodie's CIA tuition. 

In May 2017, plaintiff again moved for contribution to Jodie's CIA tuition. 

The court ordered a plenary hearing and directed the parties to engage in related 

discovery. The one-day plenary hearing was conducted on June 11, 2018. Both 

parties appeared without counsel. Jodie and both parties testified at the hearing. 

Defendant raised the same arguments in opposition to responsibility to 

contribute to Jodie's college tuition that he asserted in opposition to contribution 
14 A-4171-17T4

for Meghan's college tuition. He contended plaintiff failed to consult with him 

on Jodie's selection of CIA and related costs. He argued Jodie was obligated to 

apply for scholarships, grants, and loans, and the parties were only obligated to 

contribute to the extent tuition was not covered by scholarships, grants, and 

loans. Because Jodie was able to borrow the entire amount of tuition, there was 

no remaining balance requiring reimbursement. Defendant also asserted he did 

not receive all of the financial documentation regarding Jodie's tuition and 

related expenses. 

Plaintiff and Jodie testified defendant was aware of Jodie's interest in 

attending culinary school at CIA, the application process, and that working in 

the restaurant industry for one-and-one-half years was an application 

prerequisite. Jodie testified she worked at Panera Bread to qualify for 

admission. 

Plaintiff testified defendant was aware of the cost to attend CIA. She 

acknowledged she did not consult with defendant regarding Jodie's loans 

because defendant had recently filed a bankruptcy petition. The trial court 

inferred defendant had no credit to assist Jodie in obtaining financing at the time 

she applied to CIA. Jodie testified defendant did not provide any input or advice 

during the application process, and did not suggest any alternate schools. Jodie
15 A-4171-17T4

conceded she did not consider the cost of attending CIA because "her heart was 

set on CIA" and she felt there were no other options. She testified she would 

have attended CIA even if defendant had suggested other schools. 

Plaintiff testified all remaining 529 plan funds were exhausted to pay 

Jodie's tuition. Jodie financed her college expenses through an $11,876 Stafford 

loan and fifteen-year private loans in the amounts of $26,000 and $24,000, 

borrowed at the rates of 8.24 percent and 7.74 percent, respectively. The first 

private loan was cosigned by Meghan; the second by her maternal grandmother. 

With interest, the repayment of the two private loans would total $95,166. 

Therefore, Jodie's aggregate loan obligation totaled $107,042 and her monthly 

payment obligation is $560.75. Plaintiff testified she provided defendant with 

the loan documentation. 

Plaintiff testified Jodie lives with her and pays her $100 per week for rent. 

Plaintiff returns those funds to Jodie to apply toward her contribution to Jodie's 

college expenses. Jodie is employed by a restaurant and earns $1000 biweekly. 

As of the date of the plenary hearing, defendant had contributed no monies 

toward Jodie's CIA tuition. 

Defendant testified he was not consulted regarding Jodie's decision to 

attend CIA and was not advised of the tuition at CIA. He contended his advice 
16 A-4171-17T4

to apply to other schools was ignored. Defendant claimed Jodie's decision to 

borrow privately at such high interest rates was irresponsible and he should not 

be responsible for the resulting high loan balances. He also argued he should 

not be required to contribute to Jodie's college expenses because plaintiff makes 

no actual contributions.

The trial court found plaintiff and Jodie were credible, while defendant 

was not. The court found the evidence, including extensive email 

communications, refuted his contentions. The court noted defendant drove Jodie

to work at Panera Bread during high school. The documents evidenced

"[d]efendant's awareness of Jodie's interest in CIA long before the application 

process commenced." Plaintiff sought contribution from defendant for Jodie to 

participate in a program at CIA in 2013, while Jodie was still in high school. 

The evidence demonstrated plaintiff provided defendant with Jodie's enrollment 

information seven months prior to entering CIA and that he was aware of the 

tuition at CIA. With regard to selecting CIA, defendant could not recall the 

names of any other schools or programs he had suggested to Jodie. As to Jodie's 

room set-up costs, defendant told plaintiff he would drop off payments after he 

got paid. 
17 A-4171-17T4

The trial court rejected defendant's contention that he had no obligation to 

contribute to Jodie's CIA tuition, based on "[p]laintiff's credible testimony that 

[d]efendant was apprised of Jodie's plans and the details regarding CIA, which 

testimony was corroborated by [p]laintiff's exhibits documenting the consistent 

communications between the parties regarding CIA and the associated costs." 

The court found defendant did not object to Jodie attending CIA at any stage of 

the application process. It concluded defendant "had an affirmative 

responsibility to assert his objection or lack of consent," and could not "sit idly 

by for several years and subsequently claim he has no financial obligation 

because he was not consulted or did not provide his consent." 

The trial court also rejected defendant's contention he was not obligated 

to contribute to Jodie's college tuition because she was able to borrow the full 

cost of tuition for the same reasons it expressed when defendant made the same 

argument as to Meghan. 

Finally, the trial court rejected defendant's argument he should bear no 

responsibility for Jodie's tuition because he did not receive all of the financial 

information regarding CIA's tuition and costs. The court found "[p]laintiff was 

communicative and attempted to provide [d]efendant with full and complete 

information regarding Jodie's CIA tuition," as "evidenced by the plethora of 
18 A-4171-17T4

communications from [p]laintiff to [d]efendant both prior to and following 

Jodie's matriculation at CIA." As noted by the court, "[m]ost often, [p]laintiff's 

communications were met with silence and there were no communications from 

[d]efendant wherein he opposed CIA or affirmatively sought information from 

[p]laintiff regarding the CIA tuition or related expenses." 

As it had when analyzing Meghan's college expenses, the trial court noted 

that since the parties had previously agreed the children would attend college 

and how those college expenses should be divided, it need not apply the twelve 

Newburgh factors and "should enforce the agreement as written." The court 

again found Moss v. Nedas, 289 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 1996) inapplicable. 

The court also engaged in the same analysis of the language of the PSA

and the parties' similar income levels since the date of divorce as it had when 

considering Meghan's college expenses. Finding the parties' income levels were 

within a few percentage points of being equal after considering the income paid 

by defendant to plaintiff, the court found the parties were able to contribute to 

Jodie's college tuition. 

The court rejected plaintiff's demand that defendant contribute one half of 

the total amount borrowed or $55,187.07, which would leave Jodie with no 

financial obligation for her CIA tuition if plaintiff contributed an equal amount. 
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Adopting the same reasoning it employed in determining responsibility for 

Meghan's tuition, the court held Jodie solely responsible for her Stafford loans 

of $11,876, plus all related interest. The court held Jodie responsible for one

half of the private loans. The court held each party responsible for half of the 

remaining $25,000 principal balance of the private loans, plus interest at a 

reasonable rate and term, ten-year amortization at four percent interest, yielding 

a total repayment by the parties of $30,374 or $253.11 per month for ten years. 

Accordingly, defendant was held responsible for 45.9 percent of that amount, or 

$13,941.67, payable at the rate of $116.18 per month for 120 months. The 

second appeal followed. 

II.

In the first appeal, defendant argues: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE 

HUSBAND TO PAY $26,566.75 TOWARDS 

MEGHAN'S LOANS SUPPOSEDLY USED FOR 

COLLEGE EXPENSES.

A. The Wife's Motion Was Untimely And Barred 

By Laches.

B. The Wife's Motion Was Barred By Res 

Judicata.

C. The Wife Did Not Provide A CIS And Other 

Financial Information Either Prior To Nor During 

The Plenary Hearing.
20 A-4171-17T4

D. The Trial Court Failed To Give Plain And 

Ordinary Meaning To The Parties' Contract – The 

PSA And MOU.

E. The Trial Court Decision Does Not Comport 

With Newburg[h] v. Arrigo.

We are unpersuaded by these arguments and affirm the trial court's college 

loan repayment and denial of reconsideration rulings substantially for the 

reasons expressed by the trial court in its comprehensive fifteen-page Statement 

of Reasons and subsequent order denying reconsideration. We add the following 

comments.

Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We owe substantial deference to Family Part judges' 

findings of fact because of their special expertise in family matters, id. at 413, 

especially where the evidence is largely testimonial and rests on the judge's 

credibility findings, Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). We will not 

"disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we 

are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with 

the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the 

interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. 

v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
21 A-4171-17T4

The trial court's credibility and factual findings are amply supported by 

substantial credible evidence in the record. The court properly applied the facts 

to the relevant principles of law governing responsibility for Meghan's college 

expenses, specifically taking into account the language of the PSA, the manner 

in which the loans were incurred, the parties' relative income, and defendant's 

ability to pay. We discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the first order.

Defendant also appeals from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. 

Defendant did not brief this issue. An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed 

waived. See Woodlands Cmty. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 318-19 

(App. Div. 2017) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived." (quoting 

Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011))). Even if we 

were to consider the issue, we discern no error by the trial court.

A trial court's order on a motion for reconsideration will not be set aside 

unless shown to be an abuse of discretion. Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 

449, 468 (App. Div. 2016), aff'd o.b., 231 N.J. 135 (2017). A motion for 

reconsideration of an order must "state with specificity the basis on which it is 

made, including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which 

counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." R. 4:49-

2. In addition, "[r]econsideration cannot be used to expand the record and 
22 A-4171-17T4

reargue a motion. Reconsideration is only to point out 'the matters or controlling 

decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has 

erred.'" Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 

299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting R. 4:49-2). Reconsideration should only be 

granted in those cases in which the court based its decision "upon a palpably 

incorrect or irrational basis," or "did not consider, or failed to appreciate the 

significance of probative, competent evidence." Granata, 446 N.J. Super. at 468 

(quoting Fusco v. Bd. of Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 468 (App. Div. 2002)). 

The trial court found defendant did not show any evidence that was 

overlooked, cite any legal principles that were ignored, or demonstrate the court 

acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. We agree. The trial court properly 

denied reconsideration. We discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the second 

order. 

III.

In the second appeal, defendant argues: 

THE TRIAL COURT . . . ERRED IN ORDERING THE 

HUSBAND TO PAY $13,931.67 TOWARDS JODIE'S

LOANS SUPPOSEDLY USED FOR COLLEGE 

EXPENSES.

A. The Wife's Motion Was Untimely And Barred 

By Laches And Res Judicata.
23 A-4171-17T4

B. The Wife Did Not Provide A CIS And Other 

Financial Information Either Prior To Nor During 

The Plenary Hearing.

C. The Trial Court Failed To Give Plain And 

Ordinary Meaning To The Parties' Contract – The 

PSA And MOU.

D. The Trial Court Decision Does Not Comport 

With Newburg[h] v. Arrigo.

We are likewise unpersuaded by these arguments and affirm the trial 

court's college loan repayment ruling substantially for the reasons expressed by 

the trial court in its comprehensive twenty-one-page Statement of Reasons. We 

add the following comments.

The trial court's credibility and factual findings are amply supported by 

substantial credible evidence in the record. The court properly applied the facts 

to the relevant principles of law governing responsibility for Jodie's college 

expenses, specifically taking into account the language of the PSA, the manner 

in which the loans were incurred, the parties' relative income, and defendant's 

ability to pay. We discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the third order.

IV.

Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.