[Cite as State v. Watts, 2023-Ohio-42.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF WAYNE )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

MERLIN GLEN WATTS

Appellant

C.A. Nos. 21AP0024

21AP0025

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT

COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO

CASE Nos. 2021 CR-B 0054

2021 CR-B 0055

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 9, 2023

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, Merlin Glen Watts, appeals from his convictions in the Wayne County

Municipal Court. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} In case number 2021 CR-B 000054, Mr. Watts was charged with criminal trespass, 

a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. In case number 2021 CR-B 000055, he was charged with 

telecommunications harassment, a misdemeanor of the first degree, making false alarms, a 

misdemeanor of the first degree, and criminal trespass, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.

{¶3} At his arraignment, the court gave an “en masse” explanation of rights to multiple 

defendants before further engaging each one in individual colloquies. Mr. Watts was informed of 

his rights, indicated to the court that he understood them, and signed a written explanation of rights 

before the court. Mr. Watts failed to appear at his first bench trial and was later arrested on a 
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warrant. He appeared at another arraignment via video conferencing, and the court again informed 

the defendants “en masse” of their rights. While addressing Mr. Watts individually, the court 

confirmed that he had spoken with his attorney and then set a new trial date for him. Mr. Watts 

again failed to appear at his bench trial and was later arrested on another warrant. At his third 

arraignment proceedings, again via video conferencing, the court gave the same “en masse” 

explanation of rights before addressing Mr. Watts personally, ensuring that he will contact his 

attorney again and also setting a third trial date for him.

{¶4} On the day of trial, defense counsel verbally informed the court that Mr. Watts was 

requesting a continuance and a jury trial despite being within the 10-day timeframe provided by 

Crim.R. 23(A). The request was denied. Instead of proceeding with a bench trial that day, Mr. 

Watts chose to plead guilty to one count of criminal trespass and one count of telecommunications 

harassment, with the remaining charges being dismissed. The court later sentenced him to 20 days 

in jail and a $150 fine for criminal trespass, and 90 days in jail and a $500 fine for 

telecommunications harassment. The court ordered the jail terms to be served consecutively to 

each other. Mr. Watts appealed, and the cases were later consolidated for appellate purposes.

{¶5} Mr. Watts now appeals from his convictions and raises one assignment of error for 

our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

DENIED WATTS HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY.

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Watts argues that the trial court erred in denying 

him his right to a jury trial. We find no merit in this claim, as Mr. Watts waived this argument by 

pleading guilty in this matter.
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{¶7} The parties do not dispute that Mr. Watts was initially entitled to a jury trial on the 

charges filed against him in this matter. See the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 

Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 5 and 10; R.C. 2945.17(A). The Supreme 

Court of Ohio has held, however, that the right to a jury trial

is not an absolute and unrestricted right in Ohio with respect to misdemeanors, and 

a statute, ordinance or authorized rule of court may validly condition the right of a 

jury trial in such a case on a written demand therefor filed with the court a specified 

number of days before the date actually set for the trial for the offense charged.

Mentor v. Giordano, 9 Ohio St.2d 140 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accord State v. Tate, 

59 Ohio St.2d 50, 52 (1979). Crim.R. 23(A) thus provides:

In petty offense cases, where there is a right of jury trial, the defendant shall be tried 

by the court unless he demands a jury trial. Such demand must be in writing and 

filed with the clerk of court not less than ten days prior to the date set for trial, or 

on or before the third day following receipt of notice of the date set for trial, 

whichever is later. Failure to demand a jury trial as provided in this subdivision is 

a complete waiver of the right thereto.

Accord R.C. 1901.24 (stating that a defendant in municipal court must demand a jury trial in the 

manner prescribed under the criminal rules or else the right to a jury trial is waived). See also

State v. Feliciano, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009595, 2010-Ohio-2809, ¶ 61 (Dickinson, P.J., 

concurring) (“Although failing to demand a jury trial looks a lot like what in other situations would 

be forfeiture, in petty offense cases it is waiver.”)

{¶8} The parties do not dispute that the alleged violations in these cases qualified as 

“petty offenses” for purposes of Crim.R. 23. See Crim.R. 2(C)-(D) (defining a “petty offense” as 

any misdemeanor for which the penalty includes confinement for six months or less). Mr. Watts 

appears to argue on appeal that he was never properly informed of his right to a jury trial or of the 

requirement to file a written jury demand in petty offense cases. See Crim.R. 5(A)(5) and 23(A). 
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More specifically, he seems to take issue with the court’s “en masse” explanation of rights to 

multiple defendants during the three separate arraignments he attended.

{¶9} Crim.R. 10(D) permits judges or magistrates to conduct joint arraignments and 

advise multiple defendants of their rights with general announcements. The transcripts in this case 

reveal that the arraignment court conducted both joint and individual advisements of rights. Mr. 

Watts was present for three different arraignments, in which the court advised the defendants 

collectively of their rights, including their right to a trial by jury and the need to request a jury trial 

in writing. The court further explained that if the defendants entered pleas of guilty or no contest, 

they would be giving up substantial constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial or bench 

trial. The court then conducted individual colloquies with each defendant. In addressing Mr. 

Watts personally, the court explained the substance of each charge against him along with the 

maximum penalties for each, and Mr. Watts indicated to the court that he understood the charges 

against him. Mr. Watts also signed a written explanation of rights and verbally informed the court 

that he read the form, understood it, and had no questions regarding its contents. The form is 

contained in the record before us and states, in part:

JURY TRIAL - If you are charged with an offense that carries the possibility of a 

jail term or a fine in excess of $1,000, you are entitled to a trial by jury. You must 

request a jury trial in writing.

It also states:

IF you enter a plea of “guilty” or “no contest[,”] you will be giving up the following 

rights: * * * My right to a Court or Jury Trial. I understand that I have a 

Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial unless my violation is a minor misdemeanor or 

unless the potential penalty does not include the possibility of a prison or jail term 

and for which the possible fine does not exceed $1,000.

Directly above Mr. Watts’ signature at the end of the form, it states in bold lettering:

I have read this explanation of rights document and understand its contents. 

I understand that I have the opportunity to ask questions to the Court about 
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the rights contained in this notice. I understand if I have further questions 

about the rights contained in this notice, I may request a continuance of my 

arraignment to speak with an attorney.

{¶10} Accordingly, upon our review of the record, we cannot agree that the arraignment 

court erred by explaining to multiple defendants “en masse” their rights through a general 

announcement; nor can we conclude that the court erred in informing Mr. Watts both of his right 

to a jury trial and of the need to file a written jury demand to receive said jury trial.

{¶11} If Mr. Watts sought a jury trial in either of his cases, he was required to file a timely, 

written jury demand in accordance with Crim.R. 23(A). Instead, Mr. Watts’ attorney only verbally 

informed the court on the day of trial as follows:

Your Honor, I met with Mr. Watts the first time last week. He is requesting a jury 

trial less than the ten-day requirement. The first time we met it was not within time. 

He would ask for a continuance to re-set the matter for jury.

The trial court denied the request for a continuance, explaining that it was already past the 

scheduled start time for Mr. Watts’ trial that day and noting that the parties were ready to proceed. 

Upon review, we determine that Mr. Watts’ failure to file a timely, written jury demand in these 

cases was a complete waiver of his right to a jury trial under Crim.R. 23(A), and the trial court was 

therefore not obligated to provide him with a jury trial. See Elyria v. Schramm, 9th Dist. Lorain 

No. 4244, 1987 WL 31930, *2 (Dec. 23, 1987).

{¶12} Notwithstanding our above analysis, however, the record is clear that Mr. Watts 

pled guilty in this matter to two misdemeanors, with the remaining charges being dismissed. A 

guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). When a defendant knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel, he may not 

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 

prior to the entry of the guilty plea. State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 
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78. This Court has also explained that a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to appeal all 

nonjurisdictional issues arising at prior stages of the proceedings, although he may contest the 

constitutionality of the plea itself. State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26804, 2015-Ohio-579, ¶ 

25. Mr. Watts has not challenged the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of his guilty pleas 

in this matter, see id. at ¶ 26, and this Court will not create and then address such an argument on 

his behalf. See App.R. 16(A)(7); Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 

224934, *8 (May 6, 1998) (“If an argument exists that can support this assignment of error, it is 

not this [C]ourt’s duty to root it out”). We can only conclude that, by pleading guilty, Mr. Watts 

waived the right to challenge the propriety of any action taken by the trial court prior to entering 

his guilty pleas. See State v. Phillips, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010883, 2016-Ohio-8094, ¶ 10;

Smith at ¶ 26.

{¶13} Mr. Watts’ sole assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶14} Mr. Watts’ sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Wayne 

County Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County 

Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A 

certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

THOMAS A. TEODOSIO

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.

CONCURS.

CARR, J.

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.

APPEARANCES:

WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

JOEY MARULLO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.