N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
SHAR ON JEANNE SHUB IN,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt,
v. UNIVER SAL VAC ATION C LUB , a C a l ifornia nonprofit C orporation; VILLA GR OUP HOTEL AND R ESOR TS, S.A. DE C .V in Pue rto Va lla

rta ; VILLA DEL AR C O B EAC H RESOR T AND SPA C AB O SAN LUC AS; DOES, 1 through 10, inc lusive ,

De fe nda n ts-Appe lle e s. No. 23-55016 DC No. 2:22-c v-02748-R SW L
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia R ona ld S.W . Le w , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 12, 2024 Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : TASHIM A , C ALLAHAN, a nd JOHNSTONE, C irc uit Judge s.



# F IL ED
APR 1 2024 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.Sharon Je anne Shubin purc ha se d a tim e sha re m e m be rship in theUnive rsa l Va c ation C lub (UVC ) from C onstruc tora Los Arc os de l C a bo, S.A. de C .V., a M e x ic an c o rporation. Shubin wa s injure d while sta y ing a t a re sort in M e xic o
arrange d through he r tim e sha re m e m be rship. Shea

ppe a ls from

an orde r of the distric t c o urt gra

n ting without le ave to a

m e nd UVC ’ s m otion to dism iss the
c om pla i nt for fa ilure to sta

te a c la im
. Se e Shubin v . Univ e r sal Vac a tion C

lub , 622 F. Supp. 3d 849, 853 (C .D. C a l. 2022). Thedistric t c ourt ha d jurisdic tion ove r this dive rsity of c itiz e nship a c tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1332. W e have jurisdic tion pursua nt to 28 U.S.C
. § 1291, a

nd we a ffirm
. 1. The distric t c ourt did not err in dismissing Shubin’ s ne glige nc e a c tion
a s tim e -barre d. S

e e P uri v . K

halsa , 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th C ir. 2017) (“ W e
re vie w de novo a

distric t c ourt’ s dism issa l for fa ilure to sta te a c la im upon whic h
re lie f c an be grante d .” ). As thedistric t c ourt c onc lude d, C a lifornia ’ s borrowing

2sta

tute , C a lifornia C ivil Proc e dure C o de § 361, a pplie s be c a

use the c a u s e of a c tion
arose in M e xic o, whe re it is time -barre d, a nd Shubin is not a

C a lifornia

re side nt. 1 Shubin c onte n ds tha

t the tim e sha

re m e m be rship a gre e m e nt provide s tha t the
m e m b e rship is governe d by

C a lifornia

la w. Howe ve r, if C a lifornia la w gove rns, the n § 361 a pplie s a s we ll. C ontra

ry to Shubin’ s a

rgum e n t, the injury

oc c urre d a

nd the c a use of a c t i on a

rose in M e xic o, not C a lifornia
. Se e M c C a nn v . Foste r W

he e le r LLC , 225 P.3d 516, 525 (C a l. 2010) (“ Se c t ion 361 . . . c re ate s a ge ne ra l rule tha t whe n a c a use of a c tion ha s a

rise n in a nothe r jurisdic tion but c annot be m a inta ine d
a ga inst a pa

rtic ula r de fe n d ant in tha

t jurisdic tion be c a

u se of the la

p se of tim e , the
a c tion c annot be m a inta ine d a ga inst tha

t de fe nda nt in a C a lifornia

c o urt.” ); se e also S.F. Unifie d Sc h. Dist. v

. W .R. Grac e & C

o . , 44 C a l. R

ptr. 2d 305, 309 (C t. App. 1995) (sta ting tha t “ no c a use of a c tion a c c rue s in a

tort a c tion until da

m a ge ha s
oc c urre d” ).

1 The sta

tute provide s: Whe n a c a use of a c tion ha s a

rise n in a nothe r Stat e , or in a

fore ign c ountry , a nd by the la ws the re o f an a c tion the re on c annot the re be m a inta ine d a ga inst a

pe rson by re a son of the la pse of tim e , a

n a c tion the re on sha ll not bem a inta ine d a g a inst him in this Sta

te , e xc e pt in favor of one who ha s be e n a c itiz e n of this Sta te , a nd who ha s he ld the c a use of a c tion from

the tim e it a c c rue d. C a l. C iv. Proc . C ode § 361. 3Shubin’ s a rgum e nt tha

t UVC owe d he r a

duty of c a re tha t arose in C a lifornia fa ils. Eve n if UVC owe d Shubin a duty of c are and tha

t duty of c are arose in C a lifornia , the a lle ge d tortious c onduc t a nd da m a ge oc c urre d

in M e xic o suc h tha

t Shubin’ s c a

use of a c tion a

rose the re . Nor doe s Em e rge nc y R

ule 9, a dopte d by

the Judic ia l C o unc i l of C a l ifornia in re sponse to the C OVID-19 pa nde m ic , he lp Shubin. R

ule 9 provide s in pe rtine nt pa rt tha t, “ [n] otwithsta

nding a ny othe r la w, the sta t ute s of lim ita

t ions a nd re pose for c i vil c a

use s of a c t ion tha

t e x c e e d 180 da

y s a re tolle d from

April 6, 2020, until Oc tobe r 1, 2020.” C a l. R . C t., a pp. I. R ule 9 doe s not a

pply he re be c a

use § 361 m e re ly

provide s tha

t if the a c tion is tim e -barre d in thejurisdic tion whe re the c a use of a c t ion a

rose , the a c tion “ sha ll not be m a inta ine d” in C a lifornia , “ e xc e pt in fa vor of one who ha s be e n a c i tiz e n of [C a lifornia ] , a

nd who ha s he ld the c a

use of a c tion from

the tim e it a c c rue d.” C a l. C iv. Proc . C ode § 361. Thesta tute doe s not c onta in its own period of limi tations, but inste a d, ba

rs a non-re side n t from

filing a n a c tion in C a l ifornia if the a c tion is tim e -barre d whe re the a c tion a rose , re ga rdle ss of a

ny C a lifornia

tolling provisions. Se e H atfie ld v . Halifax PLC , 564 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th C ir. 2009) (disc ussing § 361 a nd re a soning, “ [i] f non-re side nts a re de nie d the opportunity

to ta ke a dva nta ge whe re C a lifornia

la w provide s a

longe r statute of lim ita

tions for its c itiz e ns, the y
4c e rta inly

should not be

pe rm itte d to ta

ke a dva nta g e of the sta

te ’ s tolling doc trine , whic h le n gthe n s tha

t lim ita tions pe riod” ). M ore ove r, a s the distric t c ourt re a sone d , it doe s not m ake se nse to a pply a C a lifornia

tolling provision to the

M e xic an sta tute of lim ita

tions. 2 Shubin , 622 F. Supp. 3d a t 853. 2. The distric t c ourt did not err in dismissing without le ave to a m e nd Shubin’ s bre a c h of wa

rranty c la im s. Se e Hoope r v . Shinn , 985 F.3d 594, 615 (9th C ir. 2021) (“ Whe n a

distric t c ourt de nie s le av e to a

m e nd ba se d on a

de te rm ination

2 W e disa gre e , howe ve r, with thedistric t c ourt’ s se c o nda ry finding tha

t R ule 9 doe s not a

pply be c a use Shubin fa ile d to pre se nt e vide nc e tha t she ne e de d a dditiona l tim e to file the a c tion dueto the pa nde m ic
. Shubin , 622 F. Supp. 3d a t 853. R u le 9 doe s not c onta in a

ny suc h e vide n tia

ry re quire m e nt. Inste a d, it a pplie s “ broa dly to toll a ny sta tute of lim ita

tions on the

filing of a

ple a ding in c o urt a sse rting a

c i v il c a use of a c tion.” C a l. R
. C t., a pp. I, a dvisory

c om m itte e ’ s c om m e n t to 2020 a

m e ndm e nt. W e a lso que stion whe the r R ule 9 c an e ve r a

pply in a dive rsity a c t ion pe nding in fe de ra l c ourt. B ut be c a use we hold, a

bove , tha t R ule 9 doe s not a

pply in this c a se , we ne e d not de c ide the ge ne ra l a pplic a bility of R ule 9. R ule 9 is a rule a dopte d by

the Judic ia l C ounc il of C a lifornia . Unde r artic le VI, § 6, of theC a lifornia

C onstitution, the

Judic ia l C o unc i l is a

uthoriz e d to “ a dopt rule s for c ourt a dm i nistra tion, pra c tic e and proc e dure . . . not inc onsiste n t with sta tute .” Thus, it a

ppe ars tha

t R ule 9 wa s a dopte d a s a

rule of proc e dure . And, unde r long-e sta

blishe d doc trine , while sta te substa ntive la w gove rns in dive rsity c a se s, fe de ra l proc e d

ura l rule s a

pply
. Se e , e . g., Hanna v . Plume r , 380 U.S. 460 (1965); ErieR.R. v . Tompk ins , 304 U.S. 64 (1938). If R ule 9 is a sta te proc e dura l rule , it would not a

pply in a dive rsity c a se pe nding in fe de ra l c o urt. On the othe r ha nd, sta te sta tute s of lim i tations ha

v e long be e n c onside re d to be pa rt of a sta te ’ s substa ntive la w. It is, howe ve r, highly

doubtful tha

t the Judic ia l C ounc il is a uthoriz e d to a dopt a

substa ntive rule of la

w. B ut this is a

que stion for a

nothe r da y . 5that

the propose d

c l a im would be futile , we re vie w the de te rm ination of futility de novo.” ). The distric t c ourt pre viously grante d Shubin le ave to a m e nd he r c la im s for bre a c h of im

plie d wa rranty and bre a c h of e xpre ss wa rranty . Shubin , 622 F. Supp. 3d a

t 855. None the le s s, a s the distric t c ourt found, thea lle gations of the First Am e nde d C om

pla int (FAC ) are not suffic i e nt to a l le ge tha t Shubin wa s in a la ndlord-te na

nt re l ationship with UVC (e ithe r dire c tly

or through a ge nc y princ iple s) or tha

t UVC m a de any

wa rran ty a bout thec onditions a

t the re sort. Nor doe s Shubin e xpla in how she c ould a m e nd the c om

pla int to a lle ge fa c ts tha

t would
e sta blish a bre a c h of wa

rran ty . As to thebre a c h of e xpre ss wa rranty c la im , the FAC fa ils to identify any
e xpre s s sta

te m e n ts by

e ithe r UVC or the re sort wa rranting thesa fe t

y of Shubin’ s hote l room . The only

sta te m e nts a lle ge d a

re too va gue to c onstitute wa rrantie s
a bout thec onditions a

t the re s ort. Se e Gle n Holly Ent. Inc . v . Te k

t ronix , Inc

. , 352 F.3d 367, 379 (9th C ir. 2003) (a ffirm ing dismissa l of fra ud c la i m s whe re the subje c t sta

t e m e nts we re “ ge ne ra liz e d, va gue and unspe c ific a sse rtions, c onstituting
m e re ‘ p uffe ry ’ upon whic h a re a sona ble c onsum e r c ould not re ly ” ). As to thec la im

for bre a c h of the im

plie d wa rranty of ha bita bility , the FAC fa ils to ple a d the e xiste n c e of a n a ge nc y re lationship be twe e n UVC and the re sort, the o nly a sse rte d la

ndlord or le ssor in this c a se . Se e Gre e n v . Supe rior C t. , 517
6P.2d 1168, 1178 (C a l . 1974) (e sta blishing tha

t “ a wa rranty of ha bita bility is im plie d by la

win re side ntia l le a se s in C a lifornia ” ). De spite re c e iving the opportunity

to a m e nd, Shubin fa ile d to a sse rt a ny spe c i fic , nonc onc l usory
a lle gations tha

t UVC ha d

the right to c ontrol there s ort’ s be havior or pre m i se s. Thus, theFAC fa ils to ple a d tha t e ithe r UVC or the re sort m an ife ste d a n inte nt for the re sort to a c t on UVC ’ s be ha lf, whe the r im plic itly or e xplic i tly
. Se e De suza v . Ande rsac k, 133 C a l . R

p t r. 920, 924 (C t. App. 1976) (“ The right of thea lle g e d princ ipa l to c ontrol thebe havior of the a l le ge d a ge nt is a n e sse n tia l e le m e nt . . . to
e sta blish thee xiste nc e of a ge nc y .” ); s e e also Batze l v . Smith , 333 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th C ir. 2003) (a

pply ing this rule

of C a l ifornia

a ge nc y la w), s upe rse de d in part by statute on othe r grounds as state d in Bre aze a lev . Vic tim Se rv s ., Inc

. , 878 F.3d 759, 766–67 (9th C ir. 2017). Ac c ordingly , the FAC fa ils to sta te an im plie d wa rranty of ha bita bility c la im a g a inst UVC , e ithe r dire c tly or through there sort. The distric t c ourt orde r is AFFIRM E D.

7