alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IV 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 131

Amending rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives with regard 

to the procedures of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 1, 2005

Mr. MOLLOHAN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Rules 

RESOLUTION

Amending rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives with regard to the procedures of the Committee 

on Standards of Official Conduct.

1 Resolved, That clause 3 of rule XI of the Rules of 

2 the House of Representatives is amended as follows: 

3 (1) In paragraph (k)(1)(B), strike ‘‘(unless, at 

4 any time’’ and all that follows through ‘‘members of 

5 the committee)’’. 

6 (2) In paragraph (k)(1)(C), strike ‘‘in order to 

7 make a recommendation under subdivision (A)’’. 

8 (3) In paragraph (k)(2), strike ‘‘and an inves9 tigative subcommittee has not been established, then 

10 such complaint shall be dismissed’’ and insert in lieu 
2

HRES 131 IH 

1 thereof ‘‘then they shall establish an investigative 

2 subcommittee and forward the complaint, or any 

3 portion thereof, to that subcommittee for its consid4 eration. However, if, at any time during those peri5 ods, either the chairman or ranking minority mem6 ber places on the agenda the issue of whether to es7 tablish an investigative subcommittee, then an inves8 tigative subcommittee may be established only by an 

9 affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the 

10 committee’’. 

11 (4) In paragraphs (k)(3), (k)(4), (p)(7), and 

12 (q)(2)(B)(ii), strike ‘‘adjudicatory’’ each place it ap13 pears and insert in lieu thereof ‘‘investigative’’. 

14 (5) In paragraphs (k)(3), (k)(4), (p)(7), and 

15 (q)(2)(B)(ii), strike ‘‘an adopted statement of al16 leged violation’’ each place it appears and insert in 

17 lieu thereof ‘‘a complaint meeting the requirements 

18 of the rules of the committee for what constitutes a 

19 complaint’’. 

20 (6) In paragraph (p)(11), strike ‘‘of his or her 

21 choice (even if such counsel represents another re22 spondent or a witness)’’. 
3

HRES 131 IH 

1 (7) In paragraph (p)(12), strike ‘‘of his or her 

2 choice (even if such counsel represents a respondent 

3 or another witness)’’.

Æ
PARTS 754–799 [RESERVED]

Parent topic: SUBCHAPTER H—CLAUSES AND FORMS
#### CALDWELL *v.*CALDWELL.

To constitute a conveyance of land there must be sufficient words showing an intention to grant a present estate.

October 15, 1913.

Complaint for land. Before Judge Maddox. Eloyd superior court. October 9, 1912.

*M. B. Eubanks,*for plaintiff.

*J. M. Hunt*and *Barry Wright,*for defendant.

Evans, P. J.

The action was complaint for land by N. M. Caldwell, as administrator • of J. W. Caldwell, against Mrs. Nannie Caldwell. It appears from the record that the locus in quo belonged to John W. Caldwell, and the plaintiff, as his administrator, was entitled to recover it, unless his intestate had conveyed it to the defendant. The paper relied upon as a conveyance of the property is as follows: “State of Georgia, Eloyd County: This •indenture made this 16th day of August, 1904, between J. W. Caldwell of the one part, and Mrs. Nannie E. Caldwell, his wife, of the other part, for the consideration of love and con[af]feetion does will all the tract or parcel of land as follows, twenty acres of land in the South west corner of lot # 52 in 22nd and third district of Georgia. I will that Mrs. Nannie E. Caldwell hold the pond and ginnery on said lot of land. Also twenty acres off of lot 21 in the South East corner of said lot. I will the line of Mrs. Nannie E. Caldwell go to the .railroad. In testimony whereof the said party of the first part has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year above written. [Signed] John W. Caldwell. [Witnesses] B. C. Hueks. S. G. N. Cates, J. P.”

The court was of the opinion that such paper was an effective *737conveyance of the land therein described, which embraced the locus in quo; and directed a verdict for the defendant. Exception is taken by the administrator, on the ground that the paper under which the defendant claims title is not a deed, and is ineffective as a conveyance of title to the premises in dispute.

It may be that the maker intended to execute a deed of the land to his wife, but he signally failed in selecting apt words of conveyance. The office of a deed is to convey title in presentí, and this can not be accomplished without the use of language indicating an intention to transfer title. The provision of the Civil Code, § 4182, that no prescribed form is essential to the validity of a deed, does not dispense with the necessity of using language indicating an intention of the maker to convey a present estate in specific land to a named grantee. *Horton*v. *Murden,*117 *Ga.*72 (43 S. E. 786). The maker of this paper did not usé any word indicating an intention to convey a present estate to his wife. The words that he “does will” the land to his wife mean that he gives it to her at his death; it is the expression of a testamentary act. There is nothing in this paper which can make it effectual as a conveyance of property; and as the defendant’s title was dependent on this paper as a deed conveying title from her husband to herself, it follows that the direction of a verdict in her favor was erroneous.

*Judgment reversed.*

*All the Justices concur,*-
§ 1013.4 Investigation. ( a ) If an investigating official concludes that a subpoena pursuant to the authority conferred by 31 U.S.C. 3804(a) is warranted— ( 1 ) The subpoena so issued shall notify the person to whom it is addressed of the authority under which the subpoena is issued and shall identify the records or documents sought;
( 2 ) The investigating official may designate a person to act on his or her behalf to receive the documents sought; and
( 3 ) The person receiving such subpoena shall be required to tender to the investigating official or the person designated to receive the documents a certification that the documents sought have been produced, or that such documents are not available and the reasons therefor, or that such documents, suitably identified, have been withheld based upon the assertion of an identified privilege.
( b ) If the investigating official concludes that an action under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act may be warranted, the investigating official shall submit a report containing the findings and conclusions of such investigation to the reviewing official.
( c ) Nothing in this section shall preclude or limit an investigating official's discretion to refer allegations directly to the Department of Justice for suit under the False Claims Act or other civil relief, or to preclude or limit such official's discretion to defer or postpone a report or referral to the reviewing official to avoid interference with a criminal investigation or prosecution.
( d ) Nothing in this section modifies any responsibility of an investigating official to report violations of criminal law to the Attorney General.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-20406 Summary Calendar

JOHN W. WINSLOW, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CHARLES SMITH; ET AL., Defendants,

CHARLES SMITH; LINDA PATTERSON; S. O. WOODS; M. COUNTZ, Warden; R. BELANGER, Asst. Warden; R. JONES, Asst. Warden; L. HEUSZEL, Asst. Warden; G. PIERSON, Asst. Warden; H. TERRY, Asst. Warden, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-94-CV-1777

- - - - - - - - - - October 31, 1997 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * John W. Winslow, Texas prisoner # 442811, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment as unopposed andNo. 97-20406 -2- dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for lack of prosecution. Winslow argues that the defendants intentionally used the disciplinary process to prevent him from filing a timely response to the summary judgment motion. Even if his allegations are true, Winslow has not shown prejudice because he was able to respond to the defendants’ summary judgment motion. Lewis v. Casey , 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996). Although the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that Winslow had not responded to the summary judgment motion, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate. Sojourner T. v. Edwards , 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (permitting affirmance of judgment on any basis supported by the record). The defendants met their initial burden of showing that they were entitled to judgment, and Winslow’s conclusional allegations and unsubstantiated assertions failed to carry his burden of showing that they were not entitled to judgment. Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 6267** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. LAFAWN DEWAYNE BOBBITT, a/k/a Mandingo, a/k/a Dingo , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. John A. Gibney, Jr. , District Judge. ( 3:97

- cr - 00169

- JAG

- 1; 3:15

- cv - 00722

- JAG )

Submitted : July 2 1 , 2016 Decided: July 22, 2016

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
. Lafawn Dewayne Bobbitt, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Wiley Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent i n this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Lafawn Dewayne Bobbitt seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003)
. When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S.

a t 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bobbitt has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### In re Loos.

[Cite as *In re Loos,*116 Ohio St.3d 287, 2007-Ohio-6456.]

*288(No. 2006-1724

Submitted November 28, 2007

Decided December 11, 2007.)

David H. Bodiker, State Public Defender, and Jill E. Beeler, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.

{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is vacated, on the authority of *In re C.S.,*115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, to the extent that the court of appeals found that there was a valid waiver, and the cause is remanded to the juvenile court to consider the waiver issue in light of the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in *In re C.S.*

Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.

O’Donnell, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in *In re C.S.*
2943.301 Use of forms.       (a) FAR 43.301(a)(1)(vi) requires the use of Standard Form 30 (SF-30) to execute any obligation or deobligation of contract funds after award. FAR 13.307(c)(3) allows, and the Department of Labor prefers, the use of the SF-30 for simplified acquisitions. The SF-30 also must be used to deobligate funds when effecting contract closeout when obligated funds exceed the final contract costs. In such an instance, the SF-30 may be issued as an administrative modification on a unilateral basis if the contractor's financial release has been separately obtained.          (b) The contracting officer must include, in any unilateral contract modification issued for contract closeout, a statement that the contractor has signed a release of claims and indicate the date the release of claims was signed by the contractor.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 2943.3 - Forms
Jun 16 2010 

Mr. Jared Testa 

Embry-Riddle 

3700 Willow Creek Rd 

Prescott, AZ 86301 

Dear Mr. Testa: 

We have received your June 7, 2010, correspondence withdrawing your March 2010, petition 

for an exemption from § 141.5(d) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. 

Your letter has been placed in the public docket (No. FAA-2010-0362). No further action will 

be taken on your petition. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Ida M. Klepper 

Manager, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with theaccompanying Quarterly Report of Greene County Bancshares, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 (the “Report”), I, R. StanPuckett, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)                                  The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|        |   | /s/ R. Stan Puckett                       |
|--------|--------|-------------------------------------------|
|   |   | R. Stan Puckett                           |
|   |   | Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive |
|   |   | Officer                                   |

 

Date:  August 8, 2006

 

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

HUBERT JACKSON,

Petitioner

v.

THE COMMONWEALTH COURT,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 95 WM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 2018, the Application for Leave to File

Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ Nos. 95-10041 & 95-10238 Summary Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus BENITA ALCALA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:94-CR-043-R

- - - - - - - - - - May 21, 1996 Before WIENER, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Benita Alcala argues that principles of double jeopardy bar her prosecution because she has forfeited $71,000 in cash plus jewelry appraised at $38,259. Alcala's forfeiture of $71,000 was pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), which provides for the forfeiture of proceeds of drug sales or funds traceable to such proceeds and, thus, was not "punishment" implicating principles of double jeopardy. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); United States v.Nos. 95-10041 & 95-10238 -2- Tilley , 18 F.3d 295, 297 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S.Ct. 573, 574 (1994). The court declines to consider Alcala's argument concerning the alleged forfeiture of jewelry because she has not supported her claim with documentation or information as to the nature of the alleged forfeiture. Alcala's conclusional statements that her prosecution is in violation of the Eighth Amendment are insufficient to preserve this issue for appellate review. Brinkmann v. Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987);
F ED . R. A PP . P. 28(a)(6). AFFIRMED.
#### John McDermott, Respondent, *v.*Sarah N. Bull, Appellant.

(Argued June 23, 1884;

decided October 7, 1884.)

*Edward D. Coxoman*for appellant.

*Anthony Barrett*for respondent.

Agree to affirm; no opinion.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.,
#### § 996.14 Person.

*Person* means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, any other business unit or legal entity.
#### Brown *v.*Pinson.

May 13, 1913.

Distraint. Before Judge Frank Park. Worth superior court. April *27, 1912.*

*J. B. Williamson*and *J. H. Tipton,*for plaintiff in error.

*Pope & Bennet,*contra.

Beck, J.

There being evidence to authorise the verdict, and the same, having been approved by the trial judge, it will not be disturbed here.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concv/r.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

vs. ) CR. NO. 2:06CR196-MHT

)

NESTOR AMAIQUEMA-MACIAS )

ORDER

Pursuant to the defendant’s Notice of Intent to Change Plea (Doc. # 14) filed on

October 17, 2006, it is hereby

ORDERED that the defendant’s change of plea hearing be and is hereby set for 

October 23, 2006, at 10:00 a.m., in Courtroom 4B, United States Courthouse Complex,

One Church Street, Montgomery, Alabama. 

The Clerk is directed to provide a court reporter and an interpreter for this

proceeding. If the defendant is in custody, the United States Marshal or the person having

custody of the defendant shall produce the defendant for the proceeding.

Done this 19 day of October, 2006. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cr-00196-MHT-CSC Document 15 Filed 10/19/2006 Page 1 of 1
#### Gloria S. O’Meara, Respondent, v. David O’Meara, Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff. Carla O’Meara, Third-Party Defendant.

Order entered September 9,1965, herein appealed from, which granted plaintiff’s motion for alimony *pendente lite*and counsel fees, and fixed the same at $200 per week and $2,000 respectively, the alimony to commence July 1, 1965, is modified on the law, the facts and in the exercise of discretion, to reduce the award of alimony to $100 per week and counsel fees to $1,000, payable on the same terms and conditions. As so modified the order is otherwise affirmed, without costs or disbursements to either party. The record neither supports nor warrants the award made at Special Term. The parties were married October 28, 1962, it being a second marriage for both. There are no children issue of the marriage, though plaintiff has a daughter by a prior marriage, age 18 years at the time of commencement of the action, for which she was receiving support from the father. The parties separated first in March, 1963, again in September, 1963 and finally in May or June, 1964. Plaintiff by profession is an actress, about age 40, and apparently in good health. The causes of the separation are sharply disputed. The case could and should have gone to early trial (Domestic Relations Law, § 249), it having been so noticed in August, 1965. Order entered January 25, 1966, which granted the plaintiff’s motion to punish defendant for contempt, unanimously modified, on the law and the facts, to reduce the amount payable to $3,200, inclusive of counsel fee as allowed in the companion appeal and otherwise affirmed, without costs or disbursements to any party. Such order is further modified to provide that appellant shall have an opportunity to purge himself of contempt by payment of such sum within 20 days after service of a copy of the order herein with notice of entry thereon upon appellant’s attorney. Execution of any judgment entered thereon shall be stayed for a like period of 20 days. In the event appellant purges himself of contempt by payment in accordance with the terms of the order as modified, an immediate trial of the issues should be had (Domestic Relations Law, § 249). While section 245 of the Domestic Relations Law, by its terms seems to require personal service of a copy of the order or judgment upon the husband as a jurisdictional prerequisite to contempt proceedings, the section is identical with section 1172 of the Civil Practice Act. Under that section it has been frequently held actual knowledge of the terms and provisions of the order is sufficient *(Ziegler*v. *Ziegler,*24 Misc 2d *656139; *Hayes*v. *Hayes,*204 N. Y. S. 2d 195). Settle order on notice. Concur—Stevens, J. P., Steuer, Capozzoli and Rabin, JJ.
###### Editorial Note on Part 10

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear at 70 FR 30897, May 31, 2005; 77 FR 39904, July 6, 2012; 81 FR 86909, Dec. 2, 2016.

#### § 10.30 New evidence.

After the close of the hearing, in the event the individual discovers new evidence not previously available or known to him or her, the individual may petition the Hearing Examiner if the Hearing Examiner's recommendation has not yet been issued, or thereafter, the Director, Office of Administration, to reopen the record to receive that evidence. If the Hearing Examiner or the Director, respectively, deem it material and appropriate, the record may be reopened to accept the evidence either by stipulation, with the agreement of the Hearing Counsel, or in a reconvened hearing.

[47 FR 38676, Sept. 2, 1982, as amended at 52 FR 31610, Aug. 21, 1987; 54 FR 53316, Dec. 28, 1989]
..

17 S. 8th, P.O. Box 91.0

Miles City, MT 59301

August 22, 2013

CITY OF MIDESEitH;TV .,"ll,'Ut 'R' II (If H-.j

t, -, _••••' ••••I " •• ' ••••• ' •

.~~CKETOPERATIONS

ZCIJ AUG 30 A ~: I 0

Telephone: (406) 234-3462

(

Mr. Dennis DeVany

U. S. DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORATION

Office of the Secretary

Washington, D. C.

RE: ESSENTIAL Am SERVICE FOR EASTERN MONTANAj

WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION FORREGONSIDERATION '" ,

Dear Mr. DeVany:

The purpose of this letter is to formally withdraw the City of Miles City 's Petition for

Reconsideration, dated July 2, 2013, regarding Order 2013-6-13. Subsequent to our

submission of such Petition, the matter has been more fully discussed and revi~ed with

the Department of Transportation, with the office of Senator Max Baucus and with other"

communities in situations similar to ours, We have come to the conclusion that even

more investigation is warranted; hence the withdrawal, which we believe is for the good

of our community at this time.

Our community is still very interested in preserving essential air service for eastern

Montana, and may petition the Department of Transportation at a later date.

The City of Miles City thanks you for your consideration of this matter and willingness

to work.with this community .

. /

Yours Truly,

THE CITY OF MILES CITY

x(24~

C. A. GRENZ, Mayor