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Additional Views

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

1: On Establishing an Independent, Bi-Partisan Katrina Commission

I commend the eff orts of Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman and their 

staff s in putting together a solid, thoughtful, and comprehensive report which chronicles in 

great and grave detail the failures of all levels of government in preparing for and responding to Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent fl ooding. I fully believe that the Chairman and 

the Ranking Member did the best they could, given the diffi cult political circumstances the 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee faced during this seven-month 

investigation.

I say that the Committee labored under diffi cult circumstances because the Administration 

refused to cooperate fully. On page 13 of his dissenting views, Senator Lieberman stated 

that the “worst off ender ... that should have stood above the fray and worked hardest with 

the Committee to uncover the government’s failings in Katrina: the White House.”1

 Senator Lieberman added that “not once in his Senate career of nearly 18 years has he engaged 

a White House less willing to cooperate with a Senate investigation.” Th e Committee 

investigation was the best it could have been given White House intransigence, but what is 

required now is an independent, bi-partisan Katrina Commission with subpoena power.

We all know that the Administration repeatedly failed – or refused – to cooperate with the 

Committee’s Katrina investigation, even aft er assurances by President Bush in September 

2005 to “work with members of both parties to make sure this eff ort is thorough.”2

 In fact, 

the White House became an obstacle to this Committee’s investigation by not producing 

large quantities of information or witnesses the Committee requested. Th e White House opposed Committee eff orts to interview their personnel and interfered with the Committee’s 

ability to get much-needed information from other federal agencies regarding White House 

actions vis-à-vis Hurricane Katrina. Again, in his additional views, Senator Lieberman 

explicitly stated that: 

Th e Committee’s eff orts to understand the role the White House played in events leading 

up to and following the catastrophe were severely hindered by the White House’s failure 

to comply with the Committee requests for information, documents, and interviews. As a 

result, we learned much too little about what the White House and the Executive Offi ce of 

the President were doing during the critical days before and aft er Katrina struck.3

For these reasons, I strongly believe and recommend that an independent commission 

– with subpoena power – should be established immediately to investigate the federal, state, 

and local government preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina and its aft ermath. 

I concur with Senator Lieberman that: 

Th e one thing we do know is that because we were denied the opportunity to fully explore 

the role the White House played in preparing for and responding to Katrina, we have little 

insight into how the President and his staff monitored, managed, and directed the government’s disaster preparedness in the post-9/11 world, how they coordinated the rest of the 

federal bureaucracy in response to Katrina. ... Without this information, the Committee’s 

investigation necessarily lacked the ability to fully and fairly analyze and assess a critical element of the response to Katrina.4

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730

Although Senator Lieberman does not concur with my view that an independent Katrina 

Commission should be established without further delay, his dissenting views eloquently 

make the best arguments for its creation.

From the beginning of this investigation, I – along with Senator Clinton and others – called 

for the creation of a Katrina Commission that would be bi-partisan, modeled very closely 

aft er the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the so-called 

9/11 Commission), which was so successful. Th is commission would be charged with 

examining the federal, state, and local responses to the devastation wrought by Hurricane 

Katrina in the Gulf Region of the United States, specifi cally in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and other aff ected areas. Th e Commission would then make recommendations on immediate corrective measures to improve preparedness for and responses 

to future disasters. 

Th e Katrina Commission would be modeled very closely aft er the 9/11 Commission, but 

would place its primary emphasis on emergency-services preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Th e President would appoint the Chair, and the remaining members 

would be appointed by the Republican and Democrat leadership of the House and Senate 

with no more than fi ve individuals from the same political party. Th e Commission would 

report on its fi ndings within six months of its establishment. Th e Commission would begin 

its work as soon as practicable.

Th is independent approach of the 9/11 Commission served this nation well in the aft ermath 

of the worst terrorist attack upon the United States and will serve the nation well in the 

aft ermath of one of the worst natural disasters to strike the United States. 

Th e many fi ndings and 88 recommendations in the Committee’s Katrina Report are very 

useful, but Americans want and deserve more. Th e government failed its citizens before, 

during, and aft er this disaster. Let’s not fail the American people again by denying them 

access to what the White House knew and when they knew it. Let’s listen to them, and appoint an independent, bi-partisan Katrina Commission to complete an investigation into 

what went wrong and why.

2: On the Need to Account for People with Pets in Emergency Planning

One of the many disturbing and heart-rending developments we saw unfold aft er Hurricane Katrina was the peril many people found themselves in because they could not bear to 

evacuate without their pets, and the anguish of those people who were forced to leave their 

pets behind. 

Th ere was much media coverage, both in print and on television, of distraught pet owners 

and of abandoned animals going hungry, thirsty, and full of fear as their world was washed 

away. Millions of people heard or saw the distressing story of one young boy who was so 

traumatized aft er his dog was taken from him when he boarded a bus to leave the Superdome that he became physically ill. One distraught woman reportedly off ered her wedding 

ring to a shelter aide if he would fi nd out what had happened to her dog, which she was not 

allowed to bring inside with her.

Th e evidence suggests that the attachment people have to their pets was a key reason why 

many decided not to evacuate. According to a recent survey of people aff ected by Hurricane 

Katrina who were living in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama, 44 percent of those who did 

not evacuate by choice (as opposed to those who lacked the means to do so), did not leave 

in part because they weren’t willing to abandon their pets.5

Additional Views
731

Th ese were life-and-death decisions, and for some of these people, the decision to stay 

with their pets cost them their lives. Th e Mississippi Sun-Herald recently identifi ed seven 

individuals who died during or aft er Hurricane Katrina because they did not want to leave a 

beloved pet, and so they stayed in harm’s way.6

Moreover, some of the animals left behind, agitated by hunger, thirst, and fear, presented 

threats to the rescue and response personnel who went door-to-door looking for survivors.

As with other aspects of the disjointed and incomplete preparation for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina, there was no plan in place to help people with pets evacuate, or to ensure there were adequate shelters that could accommodate people and their pets. 

I agree with the Committee Report’s fi nding that the needs of those with pets and service 

animals should be a factor in emergency planning for evacuations and sheltering. While 

I support the Committee’s recommendation that the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) should encourage individuals as well as state and local governments to plan for 

evacuating and sheltering pets, I also think it is important that we do more to address this 

issue. To that end, I joined Senator Stevens in introducing the “Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act,” S. 2548.

Our bill would require state and local emergency-preparedness plans to take into account 

the needs of individuals with household pets and service animals. In addition, our bill 

would authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide technical 

assistance in developing these plans and fi nancial assistance for purchasing, constructing, 

leasing, or renovating emergency shelter facilities that can accommodate people with pets 

and service animals. Finally, our bill would include people with pets and service animals 

among those for whom FEMA may provide essential assistance in response to a major 

disaster. 

I hope that our bill will be included as part of any legislation that this Committee develops 

in response to Hurricane Katrina and its aft ermath.

In addition, I am concerned by reports that despite FEMA’s deployment of more than 200 

veterinarians to assist in the Gulf Coast – the largest simultaneous deployment of veterinary 

relief in U.S. history – the veterinary teams were ill-equipped because of FEMA policies. 

Apparently, FEMA prohibits veterinarians from using their own equipment, accepting 

donations, or buying supplies. As a result, Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs) 

– which are identifi ed in the National Response Plan as the source of federal veterinary 

medical treatment during an emergency – did not have what they needed to carry out their 

mission.7

I believe the Committee should work with FEMA, DHS, and other interested parties to address problems like this to ensure that, like the rest of FEMA, VMATs will be appropriately 

staff ed, equipped, and otherwise prepared to fulfi ll their role within the National Response 

Plan.

Conclusion

It is important to note that what happened in the Gulf Coast could happen anywhere in the 

United States the next time disaster strikes. According to the Humane Society of the United 

States (HSUS), Americans currently have over 358 million pets. Sixty-three percent of all 

American households have one or more pets. So wherever a natural or manmade disaster 

could occur, many of the people who would be aff ected will be pet owners – 61 percent of 

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whom told national pollsters they would refuse to evacuate ahead of a disaster if they could 

not take their pets with them.8

One of the most important lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina is that planning 

and preparedness are essential to avoid aggravating whatever disasters may strike in the 

future. By accounting for the very strong ties that millions of Americans have to their pets 

in preparing for future emergencies, we can ensure a better response and actually save lives. 

As HSUS executive vice president Michael Markarian has said, Hurricane Katrina and its 

aft ermath “made people recognize that helping pets during a disaster is helping people during a disaster.”

1 See, in this Report, Additional Views of Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg and Pryor on White 

House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed 

Command.

2 Speech, President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, LA, Sept. 15, 2005.

3 See, in this Report, Additional Views of Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg and Pryor on White 

House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed 

Command.

4 See, in this Report, Additional Views of Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg and Pryor on White 

House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed 

Command.

5 Fritz Institute, “Hurricane Katrina: Perceptions of the Aff ected,” Apr. 26, 2006.

6 Karen Nelson, “Staying with animals in Katrina was a deadly choice for some, and the hurricane left other owners 

seeking shelter from the storm,” SunHerald.com, posted Apr. 30, 2006. http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/news/

local/14464093.htm.

7 William Wan, “A Lesson from Katrina: Pets Matter,” Th e Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2006.

8 http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1029.

Additional Views