J-S35027-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CLAYTON R. CARROLL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 681 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2021,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000965-2020.

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2022

Clayton R. Carroll appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

following his plea of no contest to Unlawful Delivery, Manufacture, or 

Possession with Intent to Deliver a Schedule II Controlled Substance —

Methamphetamine and Involuntary Manslaughter.

1 Additionally, Carroll’s 

counsel filed a petition to withdraw from representation and an accompanying 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Upon 

review, we grant counsel’s petition, and affirm the judgment of sentence.

The facts are as follows. On Sunday, March 22, 2020, Adam Kline called 

911 when his friend, Alexa Byers, became unresponsive. Upon arrival, patrol 

officers found Byers deceased. Kline told them that he and Byers “used 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2506(a) and 2504(a).
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several drugs over the weekend." He told them that they bought 

Methamphetamine and Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) on 

Friday night. On Saturday, he and Byers bought Xanax. Then, late Saturday 

night or early Sunday morning, Kline went with Byers to meet Carroll to get

meth. Byers arranged the transaction with Carroll through texts on her phone. 

When they got there, Kline stayed in the car and slept while Byers purchased 

the meth from Carroll. 

When they got home, Byers went into the bathroom, where Kline 

suspected she used drugs. After she came out, Byers became unresponsive. 

During the investigation, the police searched Byers’ phone and found 

text messages between Byers and Carroll discussing the proposed drug 

transaction. The police then interviewed Carroll. Carroll showed the police 

the text messages on his phone between him and Byers discussing the drug 

transaction. Carroll told the police that Byers came to his house early Sunday 

morning, March 22, 2020, and that there was a man asleep in her car. Carroll

also told police that he used meth with Byers and gave her additional meth to 

take home. 

Following an autopsy and toxicology analysis, the Cumberland County 

Coroner's Office determined that Byers died from Acute MDMA Toxicity. 

Carroll was charged with Drug Delivery Resulting in Death (“DDRID”);

Unlawful Delivery, Manufacture, or Possession with Intent to Deliver a 

Schedule II Controlled Substance — Methamphetamine; and Criminal Use of a 

Communication Facility.
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On November 16, 2020, in contemplation of a plea and by agreement 

of the parties, the information was amended to include an additional count of 

involuntary manslaughter. The same day, Carroll pled no contest to 

Involuntary Manslaughter and Unlawful Delivery, Manufacture, or Possession 

in exchange for an aggregate state sentence of 30 to 72 months. The 

remaining charges were dismissed.

At the sentencing hearing on March 9, 2021, prior to imposition of 

sentence, Carroll made an oral motion to withdraw his plea in which he 

asserted his innocence. The trial court directed him to file a written motion. 

On May 4, 2021, following a hearing, the court denied his motion and 

sentenced Carroll according to the plea agreement. 

Carroll filed this timely appeal. Counsel filed a petition to withdraw from 

representation and an Anders brief with this Court. Carroll did not retain 

independent counsel or file a pro se response to the Anders brief.

Before we may consider the issues raised in the Anders brief, we must 

first consider counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation. See

Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding 

that, when presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous 

and wishes to withdraw from representation, counsel must do the following:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring 
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to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which 

does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the 

brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new 

counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems 

worthy of this Court's attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e., 

the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Once counsel has satisfied the Anders

requirements, it is then this Court’s responsibility “to conduct a simple review 

of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be arguably meritorious 

issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” 

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Here, counsel has complied with each of the requirements of Anders. 

Counsel indicated that he reviewed the record and concluded that Carroll’s 

appeal is frivolous. Further, the Anders brief substantially comports with the 

requirements set forth by our Supreme Court in Santiago. Finally, the record 
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included a copy of the letter that counsel sent to Carroll stating counsel’s 

intention to seek permission to withdraw and advising Carroll of his right to 

proceed pro se or retain new counsel and file additional claims. Accordingly, 

as counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for withdrawing 

from representation, we will conduct an independent review to determine 

whether Carroll’s appeal is wholly frivolous. 

In the Anders brief, counsel sets forth one issue that Carroll wishes to 

raise: Whether the trial court properly denied Carroll’s motion to withdraw 

his no contest plea? Anders Brief at 6.

We note that we review a trial court's ruling on a pre-sentence motion 

to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1187–88 (Pa. Super. 2017). Pre-sentence withdrawal 

of a guilty plea is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 

591(A), which provides:

(A) At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court may, 

in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the defendant, or direct, 

sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 

and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). The official comment to Rule 591 provides: “After the 

attorney for the Commonwealth has had an opportunity to respond, a request 

to withdraw a plea made before sentencing should be liberally allowed.” Id.

cmt. 

However, a defendant does not have an absolute right to such relief. A

presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be granted if supported 
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by a fair and just reason and substantial prejudice will not inure to the 

Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1287 

(Pa. 2015). Id. Nevertheless, the sentencing court may deny the request 

when the reasons offered by a defendant are belied by the record. In 

particular, “[a] bare assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient 

reason to require a court to grant” a pre-sentence motion to withdraw. Id. at 

1285. Rather, the Court concluded that

a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to 

demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for 

presentence withdrawal of a plea. More broadly, the proper 

inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether 

the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the 

circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would 

promote fairness and justice. The policy of liberality remains 

extant but has its limits, consistent with the affordance of a degree 

of discretion to the common pleas courts.

Id. at 1292. 

Thus, our Supreme Court has held that trial courts have discretion to 

assess the plausibility of a defendant’s claim of innocence. In doing so, “both 

the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship 

of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence, are relevant.” 

Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191.

Consistent with the well-established standards governing trial 

court discretion, it is important that appellate courts honor trial 

courts’ discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique 

position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and 

measure, under the circumstances, whether defendants have 

made sincere and colorable claims that permitting withdrawal of 

their pleas would promote fairness and justice.
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Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 121 (Pa. 2019).

Here, Carroll made three arguments to support his claim of innocence: 

(1) he was under the under the influence of drugs when the police interviewed 

him and he made incriminating statements about providing Byers with drugs;

(2) despite the coroner's report, a jury could find that Byers did not die from

methamphetamine; and (3) he did not deliver any drugs to Byers. Trial Court 

Opinion, 7/27/21, at 8. 

Following a hearing, the court concluded that Carroll had no “fair or just” 

reason to withdraw his plea which would “promote fairness and justice.” Id.

at 12. Instead, the trial court found that Carroll’s claim of innocence was 

“insincere, unsupported by the facts, at odds with the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, and manipulative of the court proceedings.” Id. 

In reaching its decision, the trial court first concluded the evidence 

belied Carroll’s claim that he was under the influence at the time of his 

interview. Id. at 8. According to the investigating detective, Carroll did not 

appear to be under the influence of any substances when he interviewed 

Carroll on both occasions. Rather, he was coherent and articulate and asked 

relevant questions about the investigation. The detective “had no reason to 

think [Carroll] was unaware of what was happening or that he was under the 

influence to the point that [they couldn’t] have a conversation’’ which was 

evident from the recordings. Id. at 9.

Additionally, the trial court found that Carroll’s claim of innocence was 

not remarkably plausible or colorable in light of the strength of the 
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Commonwealth’s evidence. Id. During his interviews, Carroll admitted giving 

meth to Byers, doing meth with her, and sending additional meth home with 

her. Carroll showed the detective the texts on his phone between Byers and 

him arranging the drug transaction. Other evidence further corroborated 

Carroll’s guilt. Significantly, Carroll never testified that he did not deliver the 

meth that killed Byers. Instead, he claimed that, “I knew like in my heart I 

am not guilty” and that he never felt right about entering the plea. Id. at 9-

10. 

Lastly, the trial court doubted the sincerity based on the timing of it.

Id. at 10. The court observed:

[Carroll] did not relay his desire to withdraw his plea until 

February 2021, four months after he pled guilty in November 

2020, and at a time when he had just been picked up on a bench 

warrant following revocation of his bail and when circumstances 

indicated that he was going to remain incarcerated. When 

[Carroll] entered his plea, he made clear that he expected to be 

sentenced in May 2021 if he remained on good behavior, and in 

fact notified us of this agreement when we asked if any promises 

were made to him other than the term of imprisonment. Indeed, 

[Carroll] expressed to us no reservations about entering the plea 

outside of ensuring that he would get a six-month continuance of 

the sentencing. It was not until the bench warrant hearing, faced 

with the reality that he would not be released pending sentencing 

and that he had sunk his opportunity to push sentencing to May,

that [Carroll] announced he wished to withdraw his plea and, 

further, that "[t]he only reason that [he] chose the plea that [he]

did was because of the 90 day extension from February 8th. So 

that was never set in stone.”

Id. at 10-11 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

The trial court added:
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Further casting doubt on the sincerity and plausibility of [Carroll’s]

claim of innocence, at the motion hearing, [Carroll] testified he 

"never wanted to take the plea to begin with," and "was honestly 

afraid of the numbers [he] was hearing thrown out," referencing 

the sentencing guidelines on the lead charge. When asked directly 

if he sought to withdraw his plea because he ended up getting

incarcerated and compromising the plan to get his sentencing 

continued to May, [Carroll] said:

No, that was not the only reason. Again, it was a stressful 

situation. I had planned on doing it anyway, that is why I 

was kind of looking forward to the extension so that I could 

have more time to discuss it with my family and everybody 

get on the same page there. Because months prior leading

up to my sentencing date I planned on pulling my plea. It 

was just a discussion that I was still in the process of having 

with my family. 

It appeared to us that [Carroll] had used the plea as a placeholder 

to give him time to decide whether he would stand by his plea. 

We were disturbed by this evidence, coupled with [Carrol’s]

testimony that he entered the plea under stress of hearing the 

guidelines, which suggests to us that [Carroll] took advantage of 

an early plea offer before the offers possibly got worse, all the 

while biding his time prior to sentencing with the plan to withdraw 

the plea whenever he chose.

Id. 11-12 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

Given the trial court’s thorough explanation and consideration of 

pertinent factors when it denied Carroll’s motion, we find that the court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Carroll’s presentence motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. 

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Carroll’s claim on appeal is

frivolous. Further, in accordance with Dempster, we have independently 

reviewed the certified record to determine if there are any non-frivolous issues 

that counsel may have overlooked. Having found none, we agree that the 
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appeal is wholly frivolous. Consequently, we grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/10/2022