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AMERICA AND ASIA IN A CHANGING WORLD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

Serial No. 109–229

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Vice Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LISA M. WILLIAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN M. DONALD, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Aaron L. Friedberg, Ph.D., Professor of Politics and International Affairs, 

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ............................ 6

Jonathan D. Pollack, Ph.D., Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, Strategic 

Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College ........................................................................................................................ 13

The Honorable Teresita C. Schaffer, Director, South Asia Program, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 20

Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino, Visiting Associate Professor of Southeast Asian 

Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University ......................................................................................................................... 26

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Joseph Crowley, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 4

Aaron L. Friedberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 10

Jonathan D. Pollack, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................. 16

The Honorable Teresita C. Schaffer: Prepared statement ................................... 24

Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino: Prepared statement ...................................................... 29

(1)

AMERICA AND ASIA IN A CHANGING WORLD 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Committee will come to order. On behalf of the 

Subcommittee, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our exceptionally distinguished panel of witnesses. We appreciate your 

appearance before us and look forward to your remarks and the 

dialogue to follow. 

I should note that Chairman Hyde had planned to be with us 

this morning to offer his insights and perspective on several of the 

key issues facing the United States and Asia, but scheduling conflicts prevented his appearance. We regret not being able to gain 

from his wisdom and experience in these matters, but we understand the demands of his schedule. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to review the main strands of 

United States policy in Asia and the Pacific with a goal of seeking 

something in the nature of a net assessment of our current and future strategic prospects in this vast and dynamic region. 

Before turning to our witnesses, I would like to make a few brief 

comments. Despite the urgency of multiple crises confronting 

America in the Middle East, it is my belief that it is Asia where 

the United States will face its largest challenges in the years 

ahead. 

It is in this context that the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st century will be between China and the United 

States and that the most important regional relationship will be 

between America, China, a hopefully unified Korea, and Japan. 

Attentive American concern, continued engagement and steady 

U.S. leadership are vital to peace and prosperity to be preserved 

in this historic cockpit of great power conflict. 

With respect to North Korea, there are few parallels in history 

in which the United States has found itself with a less appealing 

menu of options than with the DPRK. Pyongyang’s ongoing nuclear 

program, its missile test and illicit exports have profound implications for regional stability, the international nonproliferation regime and the national security of the United States. 

As perplexing as our options are, it is increasingly difficult to resist the conclusion that our approach toward North Korea during 

2

the past few years has been marked by a lack of strategic imagination, most acutely reflected in a stubborn aversion to bilateral diplomacy. 

I agree with those voices who insist that the United States 

should be principled and consistent in its approach to North Korea, 

but ours should be a consistency in pragmatism, not dogmatism. 

In this regard, deterrents and engagement are not mutually exclusive. Even in the face of DPRK provocations, the United States 

can afford to be bold in its diplomacy with North Korea. The SixParty process is a good framework, but it is likely to be bolstered 

rather than undercut if we augment it with bilateral initiatives. 

In South Asia it strikes me that this is an extraordinary time of 

opportunity for the United States. Never before have we been so 

positively engaged in the region on such a wide variety of important economic, political and people-to-people initiatives. 

The most difficult long-term challenge will be to maintain constructive relations with the two most populous states in the region, 

India and Pakistan. There is virtually no dissent in Washington 

from the precept that a rising India and the United States are natural partners with compelling incentives over time and to cooperate 

closely on a host of regional and global concerns. 

With respect to Pakistan, it is likely self-evident that our relationship must be based on more than cooperation in the campaign 

against terrorism and that our objective is the establishment of a 

lasting economic and strategic partnership. 

President Musharraf will be meeting with the Committee later 

this afternoon, and we look forward to hearing in detail his plans 

for combating the resurgent Taliban and other extremist groups, as 

well as in the political realm, the outlook for what we hope will be 

a credible democratic election in 2007. 

Finally, southeast Asia has been thrust back into the headlines 

with the deeply distressing news this week of a military led coup 

in Thailand. My sense is that Washington and the world were 

genuinely shocked by the stunning development, and based on the 

assumption that political differences, however stark, would ultimately be resolved by the Thai people in a peaceful and democratic 

way. 

Thailand is a close friend and ally of the United States and a region which remains integral to United States interests. For the 

sake of our bilateral relations, as well as the aspirations of the 

Thai people, I would urge the coup leaders to restore constitutional 

democratic rule as swiftly as possible. 

Mr. Crowley? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our 

exceptionally distinguished panel of witnesses. We sincerely appreciate your appearance before us and look forward to your remarks and the dialogue to follow. 

I should note that Chairman Hyde had planned to be with us this morning to 

offer his insights and perspective on several of the key issues facing the United 

States in Asia, but that scheduling conflicts ultimately prevented his appearance. 

We regret not being able to gain from his wisdom and experience in these matters, 

but we understand the demands of his schedule. 

3

The purpose of today’s hearing is to review the main strands of U.S. policy in Asia 

and the Pacific, with goal of seeking something in the nature of a net assessment 

of our current and future strategic prospects in this vast and dynamic region. 

Before turning to our witnesses, I would like to make a few brief comments. 

Despite the urgency of multiple crises confronting America in the Middle East, it 

is my belief that it is in Asia where the United States will face its largest geopolitical challenges in the years ahead. It is in this context that the most important 

bilateral relationship of the 21st Century will be between China and the United 

States; and that the most important regional relationship will be between America, 

China, a hopefully unified Korea, and Japan. Attentive American concern, continued 

engagement, and steady U.S. leadership are vital if peace and prosperity are to be 

preserved in this historic cockpit of great power conflict. 

With respect to North Korea, there are few parallels in history in which the U.S. 

has found itself with a less appealing menu of options than with the DPRK. 

Pyongyang’s ongoing nuclear program, its missile tests and illicit exports have profound implications for regional stability, the international nonproliferation regime, 

and the national security of the United States. But as perplexing as our options are, 

it is increasingly difficult to resist the conclusion that our approach toward North 

Korea during the past few years has been marked by a lack of strategic imagination, 

most acutely reflected in a stubborn aversion to bilateral diplomacy. 

I agree with those voices who insist that the United States should be principled 

and consistent in its approach to North Korea. But ours should be a consistency of 

pragmatism, not dogmatism. In this regard, deterrence and engagement are not mutually exclusive. Even in the face of DPRK provocations, the U.S. can afford to be 

bold in its diplomacy with North Korea. The Six Party process is a good framework, 

but it is likely to be bolstered rather than undercut if we augment it with bilateral 

initiatives. 

In South Asia, it strikes me that this is an extraordinary time of opportunity for 

the United States. Never before have we been so positively engaged in the region 

on such a wide variety of important economic, political, and people-to-people initiatives. 

The most difficult long-term challenge will be to maintain constructive relations 

with the two most populous states in the region, India and Pakistan. There is virtually no dissent in Washington from the precept that a rising India and the U.S. 

are natural partners with compelling incentives over time to cooperate closely on a 

host of regional and global concerns. With respect to Pakistan, it is likewise selfevident that our relationship must be based on more than cooperation in the campaign against terrorism, and that our objective is the establishment of a lasting economic and strategic partnership. President Musharraf will be meeting with the 

Committee later this afternoon, and we look forward to hearing in detail his plans 

for combating a resurgent Taliban and other extremist groups, as well as in the political realm the outlook for what we hope will be credible democratic elections in 

2007. 

Finally, Southeast Asia has been thrust back into the headlines with the deeply 

distressing news this week of a military-led coup in Thailand. My sense is that 

Washington and the world were genuinely shocked by this stunning development, 

based on the assumption that political differences, however stark, would ultimately 

be resolved by the Thai people in a peaceful and democratic way. 

Thailand is a close friend and ally of the United States in a region which remains 

integral to United States interests, and for the sake of our bilateral relations, as 

well as for the aspirations of the Thai people, I would urge the coup leaders to restore constitutional democratic rule as swiftly as possible.

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Chairman Leach. First let me thank 

you for your continued cooperation with all the Members of this 

Committee and in particular with Ranking Member Faleomavaega, 

who unfortunately could not be here this morning. He is on his way 

back from a funeral of the King of Tongo, and I am honored to fill 

in for him to discuss the relationship between the United States 

and Asia. 

I have had the incredible opportunity to travel throughout Asia 

over my 8 years in Congress and have seen dramatic changes 

throughout Asia. Most of my travel has been focused on south Asia, 

but I have traveled to China and several of the ASEAN nations. 

4

We can’t talk about a relationship with Asia without first talking 

about the two major players in the region, India and China. Our 

relationship with India, while it is not yet where I would like it to 

be, has taken tremendous steps forward during both the Clinton 

and Bush Administrations. The July 18 joint statement signed in 

2005 is moving our two nations closer together on such issues as 

economics, environment, democracy, and building nuclear power. 

While we are defining our relationship with the world’s second 

most populous country, the United States continues to struggle 

with our foreign policy goals for China. The Asia we thought we 

knew and interacted with has dramatically and drastically changed 

as China continues to grow their economy and seek out natural resources and trade agreements around the globe. 

We have options on how to deal with China, and I hope the witnesses will go into their thoughts on what the United States’ policy 

toward China ought to be. I believe we must continue to engage 

China to bring them into the international system. When China 

sees that their economic and national security lies in a strong 

international system, the more positively engaged they will hopefully be within that system. 

China must come to understand that they are linked with the 

rest of the world, and being a responsible citizen will benefit them. 

That means tackling issues like enforcing global trade rules to 

pushing for reform in nations like Burma, Iran and North Korea. 

Instability in China’s backyard in the Middle East will not benefit anyone’s economic growth. We would continue to engage in 

strengthening our business interests in China, but it has to be balanced with our support for global human rights. The lack of human 

rights and stability in Asia is still a threat as we saw on Tuesday 

during the coup in Thailand. 

How should we react to this? I have seen tepid responses from 

our State Department in reviewing our relationship with Thailand, 

but these are not the statements I expected coming from President 

who spoke of spreading democracy around the world at the UN just 

this week. 

Another nation in Asia that is a struggling, but stable, democracy is Bangladesh. Bangladesh has an incredible opportunity to 

show the world that they are the moderate Muslim nation they 

claim to be by holding free and fair elections this January. 

An NDI mission just came back from Bangladesh, and their report raised concerns on the state of affairs in the run-up to those 

elections. Thankfully the situation is not dire and can be worked 

out if the parties put the people of Bangladesh before themselves. 

I could go on about other trouble spots in Asia like North Korea, 

Sri Lanka, Taiwan, the Taiwan Straits, Pakistan, but I am interested to hear the testimony of our distinguished witnesses here 

today. I hope our witnesses will be able to touch on the issues that 

I have raised here this morning. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crowley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CROWLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Chairman Leach, I would like to thank you for working with Ranking Member 

Faleomavaega to organize this mornings hearing. 

5

Unfortunately, Mr. Faleomavaega is unable to be here today but I am honored 

to fill in for him to discuss the relationship between America and Asia. 

I have had the incredible opportunity to travel throughout Asia over my eight 

years in Congress and have seen dramatic changes throughout Asia. 

Most of my travel has been focused on South Asia but I have traveled to China 

and several of the ASEAN nations. 

We can’t talk about our relationship with Asia without first talking about the two 

major players in the region, India and China. 

Our relationship with India, while it is not yet where I would like it to be has 

taken tremendous steps forward during the Clinton and Bush Presidency’s. 

The July 18th Joint Statement signed in 2005, is moving our two nations closer 

together on issues of economics to the environment, democracy building and nuclear 

power. 

While we are defining our relationship with the world’s second most populous 

country, the United States continues to struggle with our foreign policy goals for 

China. 

The Asia we thought we knew and interacted with has drastically changed as 

China continues to grow their economy and seek out natural resources and trade 

agreements around the globe. 

We have options on how to deal with China and I hope the witnesses will go into 

their thoughts on what the United States policy should be. 

I believe we must continue to engage China and bring them into the international 

system. 

When China sees that their economic and national security lies in a strong international system, the more positively engaged they will hopefully be in that system. 

China must come to understand that they are linked with the rest of the world 

and being a responsible citizen will benefit them. 

That means tackling issues like enforcing global trade rules to pushing for reform 

in nations like Burma, Iran, and North Korea. 

Instability in China’s backyard and the Middle East will not benefit anyone’s economic growth. 

We should continue to engage on strengthening our business interests in China 

but it has to be balanced with our support for global human rights. 

The lack of human rights and stability in Asia is still a threat as we saw on Tuesday during the coup in Thailand. 

How should we react to this, I’ve seen tepid responses from our State Department 

on reviewing our relationship with Thailand, but not these are not the statements 

I expected coming from a President who spoke of spreading democracy around the 

world at the UN this week. 

Another nation in Asia that is a struggling, but stable democracy is Bangladesh. 

Bangladesh has an incredible opportunity to show the world that they are the 

moderate Muslim democracy they claim to be by holding free and fair elections this 

January. 

An NDI mission just came back from Bangladesh and their report raised concerns 

on the state of affairs in the run up to the elections. 

Thankfully, the situation is not dire and can be worked out if the parties put the 

people of Bangladesh before themselves. 

I could go on about the other trouble spots in Asia like North Korea,Pakistan, Sri 

Lanka and the Taiwan Straits, but I am interested to hear the testimony of our distinguished witnessed today. 

I hope our witnesses will be able to touch on the issues that I have raised. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEACH. If I could ask the panel to come forth? Let me just 

by background provide a little background for the Committee and 

the audience. 

Dr. Aaron Friedberg holds degrees from Harvard. He is Professor 

of Politics and International Relations at the number one ranked 

university in the United States of America according to U.S. News 

and World Reports, and he is a former Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office 

of the Vice President when he was on leave from Princeton. 

Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack is a Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Asia Pacific Studies Group at the United 

States Naval War College. His major research interests relate 

6

heavily to China, and fortunately Dr. Pollack has some midwestern 

education at the University of Michigan. I appreciate that. 

Ambassador Teresita Schaffer is the Director of the South Asia 

Program at CSIS. She is a former Ambassador to Sri Lanka, 

former Deputy Secretary of State for South Asia and a long friend 

of the Committee and this Member in particular. Welcome, 

Teresita. 

Catharin Dalpino is Director of Thai Studies and Visiting Associate Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service 

at Georgetown. She is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State during the Clinton Administration, and we welcome you, 

ma’am. 

Why do we not begin in the order I have introduced unless you 

by arrangement have made a different decision. By unanimous consent, all statements will be placed fully in the record for each of 

you. You may proceed as you sit fit. 

Dr. Friedberg? 

STATEMENT OF AARON L. FRIEDBERG, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF 

POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Mr. FRIEDBERG. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee. I am honored to be here. 

I have been asked to offer an assessment of the broad strategic 

environment in northeast Asia and to comment on the issues that 

I think should receive priority attention from United States policymakers. 

I would like to respond by focusing on what seems to me to be 

the most essential piece of that large, complex and critically important region, namely the relationship between the United States 

and the People’s Republic of China. 

I believe that over the course of the next several decades the 

state of our relations with China will go a long way to determining 

not only the peace and stability of northeast Asia, but of the entire 

planet. 

The United States-China relationship is clearly mixed. It contains elements of competition, as well as cooperation. On the other 

hand, the two Pacific powers have entered into an increasingly 

deep and on balance mutually beneficial economic relationship. The 

overall diplomatic climate is generally warm with frequent high 

level visits by top officials and ongoing discussions about how best 

to deal with a variety of issues. The links between our two societies 

are denser and more varied than they have ever been. 

At the same time, however, there obviously are elements of contention and friction, for example, over trade and human rights. Albeit still in a comparatively low key way, the United States and 

China are also I believe already engaged in a military rivalry with 

one another in the sense that both are beginning to shape their 

forces and strategies with an eye toward possible future conflict. 

Tensions over Taiwan are lower than they were a few years ago, 

but the issue remains unresolved and potentially dangerous. Despite all the talk about converging interests and good relations, 

Washington and Beijing are involved in an increasingly far-flung 

7

competition for diplomatic leverage and political influence both in 

Asia and beyond. 

United States policy for dealing with China has been a subject 

of debate and disagreement over the past 15 years, but since the 

early 1990s I think it has actually been fairly consistent. Current 

strategy consists of two essential components. This Administration, 

like its predecessors, is deeply committed to a policy of engaging 

China economically, diplomatically and in expanding contacts between the two societies. 

At the same time, the United States remains determined to 

maintain what this Administration has labeled a balance of power 

that favors freedom in Asia, as in other parts of the world. What 

this means in practice is that the United States has sought to preserve and where possible to strengthen its traditional alliances to 

develop new cooperative relationships with other strategic partners 

and to enhance our capacity to project and sustain military power 

into the region through a variety of measures. 

In the near to medium term, the goal of American strategy is to 

create conditions that will encourage China to become what former 

Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick referred to last year as 

a responsible stakeholder in the current international system. As 

they become ever more deeply enmeshed in trade, international institutions and cooperative relations with others, China’s current 

leaders should see that they have much more to gain by upholding 

the status quo than by attempting to overturn it. 

In the longer run, United States leaders clearly hope that engagement will help to promote a fundamental change in the character of the current Chinese regime away from one party authoritarian rule and toward liberal democracy. As China grows richer, 

the hope is that it will also become more open politically, and this 

is a goal that Americans sometimes tend to regard as benign and 

uncontroversial, even though its achievement would clearly threaten the power and privileges of the unelected Communist Party elite 

that still rules China. 

We don’t know clearly enough about Chinese strategy, nor about 

the country’s current leaders’ definition of their own objectives, especially in the long run. My own view, and it is only an opinion, 

not something I think I could prove, is that current Chinese strategy can be summed up in three axioms. 

First, avoid conflict, especially with the United States. Many in 

the Chinese leadership are deeply suspicious of American intentions. They believe that behind the friendly smiles, the upbeat 

rhetoric, the United States is in fact out to contain China and ultimately either to transform its system of government or to undermine its stability. 

They believe that if China is to continue to rise, its leaders will 

have to navigate through a period of comparative weakness and 

vulnerability that could last for several more decades. A sharp 

worsening relations with the United States, to say nothing of open 

conflict, would be extremely dangerous for China. It would disrupt 

plans for continued development and even risk a humiliating defeat. 

Second, build comprehensive national power. This is the aggregate measure of economic, technological, military, diplomatic and 

8

so-called soft power that Chinese strategists use to assess the relative strength of nations. China’s current emphasis on promoting 

economic development is aimed, it is true, at improving the welfare 

of its citizens, but also at enhancing the nation’s strength and its 

ability to defend and advance its interests in Asia and beyond. 

Third, advance incrementally. Chinese strategists don’t appear to 

believe that they can simply sit back and wait while they pursue 

domestic development. While seeking to avoid any moves that 

might provoke dangerous responses from the United States or from 

Chinese neighbors, Beijing is nevertheless attempting to expand its 

influence and strengthen its position while simultaneously weakening that of the United States. 

China’s current rulers aim to preserve and protect the leading 

role of the Communist Party. This requires avoiding or suppressing 

domestic upheavals, while at the same time fending off potential 

external threats that might encourage internal unrest, including a 

Taiwanese declaration of independence, the establishment of a radical Islamic republic across China’s western frontiers or I believe 

the creation of a United States-oriented unified democratic state on 

the Korean peninsula. 

In the long run, China’s leaders likely hope to establish their 

country as the preponderant power in east Asia, and this will involve continuing to increase their own capabilities and influence, 

even as they seek to constrict America’s presence and to weaken 

its longstanding alliances. 

In recent years, Beijing has clearly made significant progress on 

at least two parts of its three-prong strategy. Regarding the accumulation of comprehensive national power, China’s economic 

growth continues at an impressive rate as it has done now for over 

two decades. The development of its military capabilities has in 

many respects been faster than most observers anticipated only a 

few years ago, and China’s international prestige is probably higher than that it has ever been in large part because of its economic 

success. 

Especially since September 11, 2001, China has also been extremely successful in cultivating good relations with the United 

States. Beijing has managed to win what I would describe as hopeful appreciation from Washington for its expressed willingness to 

help confront the dangers of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, 

but to date it has actually not done very much to deal with the 

most urgent aspects of either problem on the North Korean issue, 

for example. 

Most notably, China has hosted talks and it has applied periodic 

mild pressure to Pyongyang, but it has been unwilling to use more 

than a fraction of its potential leverage to bring the crisis to a successful resolution. I would argue that Beijing has thus far also been 

rather unhelpful regarding Iran. 

China’s efforts to expand its influence in east Asia while constraining that of the United States have met with mixed results. 

On the plus side, from Beijing’s perspective the U.S.-ROK alliance 

has grown weaker under the strains of the nuclear crisis, while 

China’s economic and diplomatic links with Seoul have grown 

stronger. 

9

For a variety of reasons, the United States-Taiwan relationship 

has also deteriorated in recent years, while China has gained 

ground in its attempts to arrive at an eventual settlement through 

a mix of threats and inducements. Somewhat further afield, Beijing 

has used a combination of its growing market power and deft diplomacy to raise its profile in southeast Asia. 

Finally, with the launch of the so-called East Asia Summit, 

China has taken the first significant step toward building an alternative regional institutional structure, one from which the United 

States is conspicuously excluded. 

Offsetting and to a certain extent overshadowing all of this is the 

marked deterioration in relations between China and Japan that 

has taken place in the past 5 years. Thanks in no small part to 

Beijing’s bullying and its continuing military buildup, Japan has 

taken significant steps toward beginning a so-called normal nation, 

increasing its own defensive capabilities and bolstering its alliance 

with the United States. 

If you look at the balance sheet from the U.S. side, you also see 

a mix of pluses and minuses. As seen from Washington, Japan’s 

new assertiveness represents an important contribution to longterm United States efforts to preserve a favorable balance of power 

in east Asia. 

The ongoing repositioning of United States forces to increase 

their flexibility while decreasing friction with host nations, the forward deployment of more air and naval assets to Guam, enhancements in strategic cooperation with Australia and Singapore and 

outside the region the development of a new and promising relationship with India are all positive developments. 

While the task will likely become more difficult as China’s power 

grows, for the moment at least the United States is doing well at 

maintaining a satisfactory balance of power. 

The success of the engagement half of American strategy is I 

think more open to question. Trade and talk are good things to be 

sure, but in the case of relations between the United States and 

China they cannot be regarded merely as ends in themselves. 

While it is too early to reach any definitive judgment, there are, 

as I have already suggested, reasons to question the extent to 

which China has truly become a responsible stakeholder in the contemporary international system. Certainly if Beijing fails to do all 

it can to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to regimes as dangerous as those in Pyongyang and Tehran, this characterization 

will be increasingly difficult to sustain. 

As to the current character of China’s political regime, I think 

there is little good news to report. China’s current rulers face a 

multitude of domestic challenges, but they have thus far shown no 

inclination to loosen their grip on political power. 

Indeed, to the contrary, in recent years the Communist Party 

leadership has redoubled its efforts to control the internet and the 

foreign press, crack down on dissidents, to regulate non-governmental organizations and to prevent the emergence of any group or 

movement that could challenge its authority. 

Economic growth has raised the living standards on average of 

Chinese people, but it does not appear yet to have created an irresistible upsurge in demand for political rights. The PRC is getting 

10

richer and stronger and more powerful in every respect, but it 

shows few signs of becoming freer. The gamble that is at the heart 

of American strategy for dealing with China has yet to pay off. 

In closing, let me just briefly note two sets of issues that I think 

require particular attention from policy makers. On the balancing 

side of United States policy, despite all the progress that has been 

made in strengthening the United States-Japan alliance it certainly cannot be taken for granted and will require continual tending, especially as Prime Minister Koizumi leaves office and his successor comes to power. 

In my view, worries about resurgent Japanese nationalism are 

greatly overstated. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Tokyo’s failure to deal adequately with the history issue has made it easier for 

China to keep Japan isolated and off balance. 

Finding ways to repair and strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance 

and to rebuild relations between Tokyo and Seoul have become I 

think matters of considerable urgency. More broadly, the United 

States should be seeking to encourage greater strategic cooperation 

among all of Asia’s democracies. 

On the engagement side of the equation, finally, I think we have 

to ask the question what are the indicators that we might set of 

success or failure? How should we measure the extent to which 

China has in fact or is in fact becoming a responsible stakeholder, 

whereas moving toward meaningful political reform? 

If we don’t talk about what those indicators are ahead of time, 

we are at risk of constantly accepting some downgrading in our expectations and moving the markers further and further out into the 

future. 

Last, what, if anything, can we do to ensure that our policies encourage rather than impede this kind of progress? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AARON L. FRIEDBERG, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Introduction 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee. I 

am delighted and honored to be here. 

I have been asked to offer my assessment of the broad strategic environment in 

Northeast Asia and to comment on the issues that should receive priority attention 

from U.S. policymakers. 

I would like to respond by focusing on what seems to me to be the most essential 

piece of that large, complex, and critically important region, namely the relationship 

between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. I believe that, over 

the course of the next several decades, the state of our relations with China will 

go a long way to determining, not only the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, 

but of the entire planet. 

A mixed relationship 

The U.S.-China relationship is clearly mixed. As has been true since the end of 

the Cold war, the relationship contains elements of competition as well as cooperation. 

On the one hand, the two Pacific powers have entered into an increasingly deep 

and, on balance, mutually beneficial economic relationship. The overall diplomatic 

climate is generally warm, with frequent high level visits by top officials, and ongoing discussions about how best to deal with a variety of issues, from currency valuation and intellectual property rights, to terrorism, proliferation, and the continuing 

nuclear standoffs with North Korea and Iran. The links between our two societies—

11

the two-way flows of students, scientists, business-people and tourists—are also 

denser and more varied than they have ever been. 

At the same time, however, there are obviously elements of contention and friction. As recent disputes over trade issues remind us, increasing economic interdependence between two countries does not always lead to higher levels of amity 

and trust but can instead be a cause of controversy and resentment. The U.S. government remains troubled by what it perceives to be abuses of human rights in 

China, including denial of freedom of political expression and religious practice. (The 

Chinese government, of course, regards expressions of American concern on these 

issues as cynical ploys designed to embarrass and weaken it.) Albeit still in a comparatively low key way, the United States and China are already engaged in a military rivalry with one another, in the sense that both are beginning to shape their 

forces and strategies with an eye towards possible future conflict. Tensions over Taiwan are lower than they were a few years ago, but the issue remains unresolved 

and potentially dangerous. And, despite all the talk about converging interests and 

good relations, the Washington and Beijing are involved in an increasingly far-flung 

competition for diplomatic leverage and political influence, both in Asia and beyond, 

as China begins to use its growing economic weight to try to win friends and shape 

events in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Europe. 

U.S. strategy 

U.S. policy for dealing with China has been a subject of debate and disagreement 

over the past fifteen years, but since the early 1990s it has actually been fairly consistent. 

Current strategy consists of two essential components: 

This administration, like its predecessors, is deeply committed to a policy of engaging China, economically, diplomatically, and in expanding contacts between the 

two societies. 

At the same time, the United States remains determined to maintain what this 

administration has labeled ‘‘a balance of power that favors freedom’’ in Asia, as in 

other parts of the world. What this means in practice is that the U.S. has sought 

to preserve, and where possible to strengthen its traditional alliances in Asia (most 

notably those with its long-standing allies: Japan, South Korea, and Australia); to 

develop new cooperative relationships with other strategic partners (including 

Singapore and, most recently, India); and to enhance our capability to project and 

sustain military power into the region through a variety of measures, including the 

consolidation and repositioning of forces based on allied soil, and the expansion of 

bases and facilities on U.S-controlled territory. These measures are intended to 

leave the U.S. military better prepared to deal with a variety of contingencies, including a possible deterioration in relations with an increasingly powerful and ambitious China. 

In the near to medium term, the goal of U.S. strategy is to create conditions that 

will encourage China to become what former Deputy Secretary of State Robert 

Zoellick referred to last year as ‘‘a responsible stakeholder’’ in the current international system. As they become ever more deeply enmeshed in trade, international 

institutions, and cooperative relations with others, China’s current leaders should 

see that they have much more to gain by upholding the status quo than by attempting to overturn it through force or coercion. 

In the longer run, U.S. leaders clearly hope that engagement will help promote 

a fundamental change in the character of the current Chinese regime: away from 

one-party authoritarian rule and towards liberal democracy. As China grows richer 

the hope is that it will also become more open politically. This is a goal that Americans sometimes tend to regard as benign and uncontroversial, even though its 

achievement would clearly threaten the power and privileges of the unelected Communist Party elite that still rules China. 

Chinese strategy 

We do not know nearly enough about Chinese strategy, nor about how the country’s current leaders define their objectives, especially in the long term. 

My own view is that current Chinese strategy can be summed up in three axioms: 

First, avoid conflict, especially with the United States. Many in the Chinese leadership are deeply suspicious of American intentions. They believe that, behind the 

friendly smiles and upbeat rhetoric, the United States is out to contain China and 

ultimately either to transform its system of government or to undermine its stability. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the world’s most 

powerful nation, a position it is likely to hold for some time to come. If China is 

to continue to rise, its leaders will have to navigate through a period of comparative 

weakness and vulnerability that could last for several more decades. A sharp worsVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
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ening of relations with the United States, to say nothing of open conflict, would be 

extremely dangerous for China, disrupting plans for continued development and 

even risking a humiliating defeat. For this reason it is essential to maintain strong 

ties and good relations with Washington. 

Second, build ‘comprehensive national power.’ This is the aggregate measure of 

economic, technological, military, diplomatic and ‘‘soft’’ power that Chinese strategists use to assess the relative strengths of nations. China’s current emphasis on 

promoting economic development is aimed at improving the welfare of its citizens, 

but also at enhancing the nation’s strength and its ability to defend and advance 

its interests in Asia and beyond. 

Third, advance incrementally. In part because of their assessment of American 

power and intentions, Chinese strategists do not appear to believe that they can 

simply sit back and wait while they pursue domestic development. While seeking 

to avoid any moves that would provoke dangerous responses from the U.S. or China’s neighbors, Beijing is nevertheless attempting to expand its influence and 

strengthen its position, while simultaneously weakening that of the United States. 

The recent shift in American attention away from Asia and the prospects of a ‘‘peer 

competitor’’ and towards the challenges of terror and Middle East turmoil, has 

proved new opportunities in this regard 

China’s current rulers aim to preserve and protect the leading role of the Communist Party. This requires avoiding (or suppressing) domestic upheavals while at 

the same time fending off potential external threats. Included here are developments that might challenge the legitimacy of CCP rule (such as a Taiwanese declaration of independence) or increase the danger of outside support for internal subversion (such as the establishment of a radical Islamic republic in Central Asia, or 

a unified, U.S.-oriented democracy on the Korean peninsula). 

In the long run, China’s leaders likely hope to establish their country as the preponderant power in East Asia. This will involve continuing to increase their own 

capabilities and influence, even as they seek to constrict America’s presence and 

weaken its long-standing alliances. 

Net assessment 

In recent years, Beijing has clearly made significant progress on at least two parts 

of its three-pronged strategy. 

Regarding the accumulation of comprehensive national power: China’s economic 

growth continues at an impressive pace, the development of its military capabilities 

has, in many respects, been faster than most observers anticipated only a few years 

ago, and its international prestige is probably higher today than it has ever been. 

Especially since 9/11, China has been extremely successful in cultivating good relations with the United States. Beijing has managed to win hopeful appreciation 

from Washington for its expressed willingness to help confront the dangers of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. To date, however, it has not actually done very 

much to deal with the most urgent aspects of either problem. On the North Korean 

nuclear issue, most notably, China has hosted talks and applied periodic, mild pressure to Pyongyang, but it has been unwilling to use more than a fraction of its potential leverage to bring the crisis to a successful resolution. (Beijing has thus far 

been even less helpful regarding Iran.) 

China’s efforts to expand its influence in East Asia while constraining that of the 

United States have met with mixed results. On the plus side (from Beijing’s perspective) the U.S.-ROK alliance has grown weaker under the strains of the nuclear 

crisis, while China’s economic and diplomatic links with Seoul have grown stronger. 

For a variety of reasons, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has also deteriorated in recent years, while China has gained ground in its attempts to shape an eventual settlement through a mix of threats and inducements. Somewhat further afield, Beijing 

has used a combination of market power and deft diplomacy to raise its profile in 

Southeast Asia. Finally, with the launch of the so-called East Asia Summit, China 

has taken the first significant steps towards building an alternative regional institutional structure, one from which the U.S. is conspicuously excluded. Offsetting and 

to a certain extent overshadowing all of this is the marked deterioration in relations 

between China and Japan that has taken place in the past five years. Thanks in 

no small part to Beijing’s bullying, and its continuing military buildup, Japan has 

taken significant steps towards becoming a ‘‘normal nation,’’ increasing its own defensive capabilities and bolstering its alliance with the United States. 

The balance sheet for American strategy is also mixed. As seen from Washington, 

Japan’s new assertiveness represents an important contribution to long-term U.S. 

efforts to preserve a favorable balance of power in East Asia. The ongoing repositioning of U.S. forces to increase their flexibility while decreasing friction with 

host nations, the forward deployment of more air and naval assets to Guam, enVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
13

hancements in strategic cooperation with Australia and Singapore stimulated in the 

first instance by the war on terror and, outside the region, the development of a 

new and promising relationship with India, are all positive developments. While the 

task will become more difficult as China’s power grows, for the moment, at least, 

the United States is doing well at maintaining a satisfactory regional military balance. The success of the engagement half of American strategy for dealing with a rising 

China is more open to question. Trade and talk are good things, to be sure, but in 

the case of relations between the U.S. and China they cannot be regarded merely 

as ends in themselves. While it is too early to reach any definitive judgment, there 

are, as I have already suggested, reasons to question the extent to which China has 

truly become a ‘‘responsible stakeholder’’ in the contemporary international system. 

Certainly if Beijing fails to do all it can to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to 

regimes as dangerous as those in Pyongyang and Tehran, this characterization will 

be increasingly difficult to sustain. 

As to the character of China’s political regime, there is little good news to report. 

China’s current rulers face a multitude of domestic challenges, but they have thus 

far shown no inclination to loosen their grip on political power. Indeed, to the contrary, in recent years the Communist Party leadership has redoubled its efforts to 

control the internet and the foreign press, crack down on dissidents, regulate nongovernmental organizations, and prevent the emergence of any group or movement 

that could challenge its authority. Economic growth has raised the living standards 

of China’s people, but it does not appear yet to have created an irresistible upsurge 

in demand for political rights. The PRC is getting richer and stronger, but it shows 

few signs of becoming freer. The gamble that is at the heart of America’s China 

strategy has yet to pay off. 

Critical issues 

In closing let me note two issues that require particular attention from policymakers: 

Despite all the progress that has been made in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, it cannot be taken for granted and will require continual tending, especially 

as Prime Minister Koizumi leaves office and his successor comes to power. Worries 

about resurgent Japanese nationalism are, in my view, greatly overstated. Still, the 

fact remains that Tokyo’s failure to deal adequately with the history issue has made 

it easier for China to keep Japan isolated and off-balance. 

Finding ways to repair the U.S.-ROK alliance, and to rebuild relations between 

Tokyo and Seoul, have become matters of considerable urgency. More broadly, the 

U.S. should seek to encourage greater strategic cooperation among all of Asia’s democracies.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Dr. Friedberg. 

Dr. Pollack? 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN D. POLLACK, PH.D., PROFESSOR 

OF ASIAN AND PACIFIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES, NAVAL 

WAR COLLEGE 

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you very much. I want to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to share my views on U.S. regional 

strategy this morning, which I have spelled out more fully in the 

written statement that I provided. 

Let me emphasize that these are my personal views. They are 

not the views or should not be attributed to the U.S. Government, 

the Department of Defense or the Naval War College. 

The Asia-Pacific region has entered a period of transition and potentially lasting transformation with northeast Asia at the epicenter of these changes. The stakes for the United States could 

hardly be higher. When we include the United States as part of the 

regional equation, northeast Asia encompasses four of the world’s 

10 largest economies and three of the top four. 

Three of the world’s established nuclear weapons states interact 

here, and a fourth state, North Korea, now also claims nuclear 

14

weapons status. Others, most notably Japan, are clearly capable of 

undertaking a nuclear program as well, and some prominent Japanese, most notably and recently former Prime Minister Nakasone, 

are now urging that this possibility be ‘‘studied.’’ The conventional capabilities of nearly all regional actors continue to be enhanced with many now able to extend their military 

power beyond the simple defense of the homeland. There are, moreover, inherent risks, ongoing risks of highly destructive conflicts on 

the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait and an incipient maritime rivalry between China and Japan. Any armed conflict or severe crisis could have devastating effects on the global 

economy, including the disruption of commerce and potentially of 

energy flows. 

We should not lose sight of this region’s extraordinary economic 

and political successes, ones that have greatly benefitted the 

United States. Where the region was once vulnerable and hugely 

dependent on American power, we now see growing stability, confidence and capability with states increasingly able to articulate 

and pursue their own interests. There has not been an acute military crisis in the region for decades. 

The region’s economic success, though at times engendering complex disputes between the United States and its major trading 

partners, has enabled extraordinary transitions within various societies, including prosperity and stability where both were previously 

lacking. 

This is all the good news. Where does northeast Asia go from 

here, and what is the role of American power in a transformed region? As I see it, underlying the changes that we observe here 

across all states is heightened national identity and growing expectations of citizens that their country’s leaders will defend their interests and protect their security and well-being. 

The challenge, however, is that northeast Asia traditionally relied on a United States-dominated so-called hub and spokes security system. This system is largely a legacy of the Cold War and 

needs to be rethought. If the system is to be supplanted, however, 

what will replace it, and how does the United States ensure that 

its interests are protected in this context? 

On these questions I am less confident of the answers. The 

United States, as we all know, has been hugely preoccupied in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world. As a consequence, there has been a very episodic, even distracted quality to 

much of America’s regional strategy and diplomacy. This has not 

escaped the region’s notice. 

Though all are mindful of American power and though no one 

doubts the United States’ capability to amass extraordinary military capabilities in the event of an acute crisis, this capability does 

not guarantee subordination or deference to American policy preferences. All regional actors, including our allies, are intent one way 

or another on enhancing their autonomy and redefining their strategic identities, including their relationship with the United States. 

It is therefore incumbent on the United States to devise a larger 

regional strategy that can harness disparate national identities to 

shared purpose or at least move toward complementary reinforcing 

political, economic and security goals. 

15

This process must begin with China and Japan. China’s political, 

economic and military ascendance of the past several decades and 

Japan’s economic recovery and increased political self-confidence of 

the past few years constitute the largest changes in northeast Asia. 

Both are major powers. Though Japan is clearly closely linked to 

the United States by treaty and by history and by the character of 

its political system, both seek more equitable long-term relationships with the United States. Both want seats at the great power 

table. 

Amidst their respective strivings, there is a growing risk of an 

incipient power rivalry between China and Japan that could increasingly dominate regional politics and security. The United 

States, to be sure, has explicitly encouraged Japan’s pursuit of normal power status, including revisions or reinterpretations of the 

U.S. written post war constitution that long precluded Tokyo from 

assuming a security role beyond the defense of the home islands. 

By contrast, the United States voices continued wariness at what 

it sees as China’s military modernization and larger strategic goals, 

even as China deems these pursuits entirely commensurate with 

its increased international role and its economic advancement. 

The United States therefore finds itself uneasily positioned between two major powers in east Asia. It must seek I think as a 

long-term goal the simultaneous legitimation of the role of both 

states at the great power table, which will ultimately entail not 

only seats at the table, but a capacity for both to shape global politics, economics and security in the 21st century. 

It is true that we have this notion of the responsible stakeholder, 

the presumption that China in particular has been a major beneficiary of the international system. No dispute there, but it does 

seem to me that these issues of transition go to the core of how 

much the United States is prepared to share international responsibilities at that notional table. 

A China-Japan rivalry for regional dominance would be a disaster for American interests, and the United States, despite its 

close alliance ties with Japan, must actively seek to discourage any 

such possibility. 

At the same time, the United States faces enormous challenges 

on the Korean peninsula, combining North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and an increasing estrangement in the U.S.-ROK 

alliance. There is plenty of blame to be shared on both fronts for 

how these circumstances have come to pass, but there are shared 

incentives to mitigate the potential dangers and to avoid triggering 

a much larger crisis that could engulf the region. 

Despite the enormous stakes involved for both regional security 

and for the nonproliferation regime and despite the explicit identification of the risks of nuclear proliferation as the preeminent danger to United States’ national security strategy, our behavior in recent years has not matched our words. This, in my view, finds the 

situation much worse today than it was 5 years ago when a renewed nuclear weapons crisis first began to bubble up. 

The United States, as all of us know, has been otherwise engaged. It is time, even amidst the upheaval that we still confront 

in the Islamic world, for a recalibration of American attention and 

16

policy purpose to east Asia and to northeast Asia and not simply 

for the extreme crisis-driven scenarios. 

The United States should not presume that northeast Asia will 

otherwise take care of itself, nor does the United States want to 

find itself on the outside looking in. The U.S. must therefore rededicate itself to patient and determined efforts to shape a more 

collaborative regional order where competition and rivalry can be 

kept bounded and where regional states move toward a more mature and stable order in which the United States constitutes a full 

and effective presence. 

Without such efforts, we may well look back at this period of 

transition where we were not present at the creation of changes potentially as consequential as those that marked the emergence of 

containment in the Cold War. 

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollack follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN D. POLLACK, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF ASIAN AND

PACIFIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

(The views in this testimony are entirely my own, and should not be attributed 

to the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Naval War College.)

Northeast Asia is undergoing a major strategic realignment. The sources of 

change vary from system to system, but heightened nationalism within each country’s internal politics is consistent across all of them. A fundamental challenge confronting US policy makers is to understand the sources of national identity and cohesion, even as they differ from case to case. Nationalism often gets a bad press, 

but it need not, especially if it can be harnessed to credible policy goals. But it is 

critically important that the United States grasp how US strategies filter through 

the prism of different national identities, thereby affecting whether leaders actively 

collaborate with the US, pursue more measured, conditional engagement, or overtly 

oppose American policy. Such understanding seems essential if the United States, 

already hugely burdened by its involvements in the Islamic world, is not to run 

afoul of potentially volatile internal forces within various regional states. 

The evidence of heightened national identities is incontestable. China, Japan, both 

Koreas, and Russia (some more seriously than others) are all seeking to redefine 

their roles in regional politics, economics, and security. Though the contours of a 

new regional order remain subject to major uncertainties and risks, Northeast Asia 

over the longer term seems likely to assume a more regional flavor than was evident 

during the Cold War. The US will still be deeply enmeshed in regional politics, economics, security, and technological development, but in a geographic sense it will 

remain an outsider. When Northeast Asia was far weaker and more vulnerable, the 

American presence (especially the US military presence) was not open to serious 

question. This era is passing, but this attests to American policy success, not to failure. As indigenous identities, self confidence, capabilities, and competence grow, it 

begs an obvious question: how does the United States reconfigure its regional role 

to ensure that American strategic interests are protected, and that US influence 

does not diminish as Northeast Asia increasingly comes of age? 

This challenge will not be met by reinventing past policies. The Cold War may 

have ended a decade and a half ago, but many of its vestiges have persisted in 

Northeast Asia, even when they have long outlived their utility. An American-designed ‘‘hub and spokes’’ system long defined regional security, but these bilateral 

arrangements are demonstrably insufficient to address the transition and transformation under way in Northeast Asia, including the potential for a larger crisis 

related to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. With the United States still 

deeply preoccupied by events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Islamic 

world, American attention to the region seems episodic and distracted, and hardly 

commensurate with the strategic stakes for US interests. For example, the heated 

debate in South Korea over return of operational control of the ROK’s armed forces 

from Washington to Seoul, though unhelpfully embroiled in Korean internal politics, 

reflects a long-deferred issue that touches on deeply held beliefs about sovereignty 

17

and national autonomy. Past policies cannot simply be jettisoned; they need to be 

supplanted by approaches that are viable in a domestic context within various societies, and provide clear incentives for regional actors to sustain collaboration with 

the United States, rather than pursue alternatives to close ties with the United 

States. 

The strategic stakes for the United States across Northeast Asia could hardly be 

higher. According to OECD data, four of the world’s ten largest economies (the US, 

Japan, China, and South Korea) are present in Northeast Asia, including those 

ranking first, second, and fourth in aggregate national power. Moreover, these societies constitute some of the principal engines of growth in the global economy. The 

immediate security implications are at least as pronounced. Three of the world’s long established nuclear powers (the US, Russia, and China) interact here. North 

Korea also claims standing as a nuclear weapons state, potentially triggering reassessment of the non-nuclear policies of other states, most notably Japan. The strategic reach and conventional military capacities of various regional actors continue 

to grow, all largely in the absence of discernible arrangements to inhibit power rivalries or limit the potential risks of armed conflict. The consequences of a major 

political-military crisis or of renewed warfare in the region for the global economy 

would be unimaginable. 

The states of Northeast Asia, moreover, are no longer passive or compliant, simply 

waiting for America to decide and to act. China’s quest for wealth and power and 

Japan’s more assertive international role are at the center of such change, but all 

regional states are seeking to enhance their autonomy and assert their political and 

strategic identities. There is undoubted respect for American power (especially 

American military power), but this does not imply automatic subordination or deference to American policy preferences. Though none dispute the singularity of 

America’s global reach, US military power cannot stand alone as an instrument of 

American influence. The United States still looms very large in regional policy calculations, but all regional states seem intent on redefining their relationship with 

American power. The United States must therefore devise a larger regional strategy 

that can harness disparate national identities and capabilities to shared or complementary ends. It is easier said than done. 

The ascendance of China and the recovery of Japan constitute the largest changes 

in Northeast Asia. Beijing’s development-oriented policies now span almost three 

decades, which constitutes nearly half the political life of the People’s Republic of 

China. Various US officials characterize China as a state facing a ‘‘strategic crossroads,’’ but this label must seem oddly quaint to China’s citizens and leadership and 

to the region as a whole. China’s leaders long ago decided to pursue the comprehensive enhancement of national power and market-oriented development; this is not 

a decision that still hangs in the balance, as implied by the above label. China has 

not employed military force on a significant scale since its attack on northern Vietnam in the spring of 1979, and its leaders seem increasingly mindful of the risks 

and liabilities that would be entailed in resuming coercive strategies. Beijing enjoys 

ever more enhanced ties with every state of consequence in the international system. It has resolved or amply diminished border disputes with nearly all its continental neighbors, though maritime rivalries persist, especially with Japan. China’s 

economic, political, and military centrality is acknowledged and accepted virtually 

without exception. Moreover, China continues to pursue national development without a declared major threat, and with no evident interest in acquiring one, even as 

it steadily builds a more credible, modernized military capability. Pronounced 

unease about ‘‘China’s rise’’ is limited principally to the US and Japan (with Taiwan 

as a special case), even as all three largely exempt economic ties from these expressed concerns. 

Following a decade and a half of stagnation and contraction, Japan is experiencing an economic recovery and is vigorously pursuing a more meaningful political 

identity. Renewed growth is attributable in part to privatization and enhanced economic efficiency, but even more to greatly expanded economic links with China. 

Japan, first under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and very shortly under his 

presumptive successor, Shinzo Abe, is assuming a much more engaged international 

role, with this activism explicitly endorsed and encouraged by the United States. 

The US-Japan alliance may be achieving new heights, but there has been no commensurate rise in Japan’s influence in East Asia. Tokyo voices increasing anxiety 

about developments in both Koreas and in China, and all three states exhibit comparable wariness or outright animosity toward Tokyo. This creates a growing possibility of an imbalanced Japanese strategy—i.e., one that draws Tokyo ever closer 

to the United States while being explicitly or potentially alienated from its neighbors. This is not a formula for longer-term regional stability, nor is it one that advances longer-term US or Japanese interests. 

18

The United States therefore finds itself uneasily positioned between East Asia’s two major powers. Though America’s natural affinities align with a democratic 

Japan that is emerging as a ‘‘normal power,’’ the appeal of relying on Japan as a 

presumptive balancer of an ascendant China is more illusory than real. Washington 

cannot expect to effect longer term regional stability without a durable accommodation with China as a fully legitimated major power. Though characterizing China 

(in the words of former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick) as a ‘‘responsible 

stakeholder’’ would seem to move US policy in such a direction, the United States 

in a longer run sense will not be able to pick and choose which dimensions of China’s pursuit of major power status are acceptable or unacceptable. Beijing seeks an 

unquestioned seat at the table, not simply a notional one, and Tokyo’s goal seems 

much the same. Indeed, despite prevailing Sino-Japanese animosities, the only realistic alternative is for both countries to seek a tolerable equilibrium in bilateral relations, on the assumption that neither opts for an adversarial strategy toward the 

other. Though some US strategists anticipate and almost seem to welcome a contest 

between China and Japan for regional dominance, this would be a disaster for 

American interests, and the United States should actively seek to discourage these 

possibilities. 

China is ever more an arrived power, and it is not realistic to assume that the 

US will somehow be able to deny China such status. The Bush Administration increasingly recognizes that as China’s economic and political reach continue to grow 

and diversify, there is an ever larger need for multiple channels for high level policy 

interaction and coordination. These extend to a growing web of consultative arrangements on economics, science and technology, energy development, and (to a 

lesser but growing degree) military to military relations. These mechanisms include 

the establishment of a semi-annual US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, announced on September 20 during Treasury Secretary Paulson’s visit to Beijing. But 

there is an incompleteness and tentativeness to this accommodation. The Bush Administration and the Congress continue to voice major dissatisfaction about many 

areas of Chinese policy, at least as they are perceived by the United States. In the 

prevailing critique, the United States claims that China’s long-term ‘‘strategic intentions’’ remain unknown; that China lacks transparency in its defense goals and programs; that its military build-up is ‘‘outsized’’ and therefore disproportionate to the 

presumed challenges to Chinese security; that China is pursuing a neomercantilist 

strategy, especially with respect to energy resources; that China’s economy (despite 

its membership in the World Trade Organization) is insufficiently rule-based and 

skewed in Beijing’s favor by an undervalued currency; and that China continues to 

deny its citizens their legitimate rights, open access to information, and unhampered pursuit of their political aspirations. As a consequence, the United States continues to pursue an engagement strategy with China, but with a declared hedge as 

a strategic alternative should more optimistic renderings of China’s longer-term relations with the United States not materialize. 

Time does not permit a detailed rendering of the Chinese rebuttal to these criticisms; suffice it to say that many Chinese (and not simply government officials) 

would object to most of them. Indeed, Chinese strategic observers offer a parallel 

critique focused on American strategies toward China. There is an abiding Chinese 

wariness about US strategic intentions that resonates with American unease about 

China’s rapid development. At bottom, most politically attentive Chinese believe 

that the US is not prepared to accord China full legitimacy and acceptance as a 

major power. As a consequence, even as China seems intent on keeping its powder 

dry, the leadership has concluded that it must have the capability to protect Chinese vital interests in the face of either benign or malign possibilities, including the 

appreciable enhancement of Chinese military capabilities. A darker view is that the 

United States actively conspires to keep China divided and weak. But this argument 

seems forced in the context of a US $200 billion bilateral trade deficit (though much 

of this deficit is attributable to exports of US multinationals based in China), burgeoning US foreign direct investment in China, and the major role of American universities in educating Chinese students, both in China and in the US. 

The mainstream view in China continues to favor cooperation and enhanced ties 

with the United States, irrespective of underlying suspicions about longer-term US 

intentions. Beijing continues to pursue a ‘‘walking on two legs’’ strategy—i.e., keeping off America’s strategic radar screen and fostering collaborative ties wherever 

possible, while diversifying China’s political and economic options and developing 

sufficient military capabilities to inhibit any use of US power against China’s vital 

interests. In essence, Beijing is pursuing an ‘‘engagement and hedging’’ strategy of 

its own. This encompasses ‘‘market tests’’ of Beijing’s indigenously-developed political and security concepts, premised on efforts to diminish regional tensions wherever feasible, and avoiding any test of wills with the United States. In addition, 

19

China now regularly asserts that it has no intention to undermine US military deployments or alliance strategies in East Asia, provided that US strategies are not 

directed against China. At the same time, Beijing has steadily but unmistakably redefined its strategy toward Taiwan, insisting that it seeks to forestall permanent 

separation between Taiwan and the mainland, not compel national unification. In 

their totality, these policies comprise China’s alternative to threat-based planning, 

even as this alternative does not place any limitations on China’s pursuit of longerterm military development. 

As seen from Beijing, this strategy has enabled China to successfully manage but 

not fully inhibit the exercise of American power in the West Pacific. However, the 

threat of Taiwan independence has been reduced; the role of Taiwan’s president 

Chen Shui-bian has been marginalized; and the Chinese Communist Party (through 

its normalized ties with Taiwan’s leading opposition parties) has been able to insert 

itself into the island’s domestic politics. At the same time, China has made steady 

inroads with key long-term US allies (most notably, South Korea and Australia), 

both of whom view ever larger political and economic ties with Beijing as integral 

to their future national strategies. Thus, an ascendant Japan (encouraged and abetted by Washington) looms as China’s primary external political and security challenge. 

Despite the clear US focus on China’s international behavior, internal challenges 

and uncertainties weigh much heavier on Chinese leadership calculations. Senior 

leaders, beginning with President Hu Jintao, explicitly recognize that a host of internal problems—encompassing income inequality, corruption, societal alienation, 

environmental degradation, and latent instability within the population—constitute 

far more pressing threats to their hold on power than any prospective external challenges. China is governed by a technically competent but largely risk-averse leadership that seeks above all to avoid abrupt surprises or shocks to the Chinese system, 

thereby endeavoring to keep a lid on the possibility of ‘‘bottom up’’ pressures for 

change. The leadership therefore faces two simultaneous challenges: can the Chinese Communist Party deflect heightened pressures for internal change and manage 

a restive society? And can the leadership cope with unforeseen events and the loss 

of information control without undermining China’s continued economic success? 

But leaders in Beijing understand keenly that external uncertainties and risks 

could also impinge in a major way on internal stability and development. Four 

major questions loom. Can China avoid renewed regional polarization that would 

limit its modernization prospects? Can China (in conjunction with the US and 

Japan) devise ‘‘rules of engagement’’ in areas of potential conflict? Can China move 

toward durable security understandings (i.e., mutually agreed restraints on the exercise of military power) with both its continental and maritime neighbors? And can 

China prevent or avert a strategic breakdown or major crisis that destabilizes the 

region and undermines the prospects for national development? 

The latent possibilities of an acute crisis related to Taiwan or to North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons development loom as the largest concerns. Both cases highlight the 

inherent limits and potential liabilities of the United States and China proceeding 

in largely autonomous fashion, without developing mechanisms for addressing and 

managing the risks that a major crisis would pose to both states. For example, if 

it ultimately proves impossible to prevent North Korea from more fully pursuing a 

nuclear weapons capability, an additional risk is that the ‘‘blame game’’ will begin 

in earnest, when the US and China should be far more perturbed by the North’s 

overt nuclearization and focused on mitigating the potential consequences. Moreover, there would be ample collective responsibility for failing to prevent nuclear 

weapons development in the North. Finger pointing will do no good, and could well 

deflect attention away from Pyongyang’s actions and the acute risks they would 

pose to the region as a whole. 

Though the Bush Administration has undertaken significant steps to stabilize and 

advance Sino-American political, economic, and security relations, far larger efforts 

have focused on reconfiguring the US-Japan alliance. The United States has explicitly encouraged Japan’s pursuit of ‘‘normal power’’ status, thereby seeking to directly 

influence Japanese internal debate. Washington deems such changes wholly inappropriate and long overdue. Tokyo therefore remains America’s unquestioned ‘‘partner of choice.’’ By contrast, the US alliance with the South Korea continues to experience acute strain and its future prospects seem increasingly uncertain. Heightened 

Korean nationalism is therefore viewed as undermining political and security collaboration with the United States, whereas heightened Japanese nationalism is 

viewed as advancing the possibilities for alliance cohesion. Enhanced alliance bonds 

with Washington provide Tokyo ample political cover for an enhanced, more outwardly oriented defense capability, even as they also advance the administration’s 

policy goals. The Bush Administration clearly seeks Japan’s operational 

20

enmeshment in US global defense planning, beginning with much augmented US 

access to Japanese facilities and bases. North Korea’s July 2006 ballistic missile 

tests have made this transition ‘‘easier,’’ providing Tokyo with additional running 

room in pursuit of more assertive policies and more autonomous capabilities. 

When weighed against the DoD’s declared need to deploy American air and naval 

power in and through the West Pacific, the gains for US military strategy are self 

evident. But there are clear political liabilities and costs in a regional context. Japan’s internal political realignment has not garnered acceptance or enhanced legitimacy for Tokyo within East Asia; if anything, it has undermined it. A Japan that 

remains alienated from its neighbors will not be able to assume a regional role commensurate with its national power and aspirations, and that the United States 

clearly seeks to advance. A major looming test of the post-Koizumi era is whether 

Japan will be able to reestablish its legitimacy in regional politics and security, either by its own efforts or with the encouragement of the United States. Does the 

US urge a larger Japanese effort at regional reconciliation as Tokyo advances toward more ‘‘normal nation’’ status, or does the US (perceiving clear benefits to US 

interests) continue to opt for a Japan-dominated US regional strategy, no matter 

what the potential liabilities and limitations these entail elsewhere in Northeast 

Asia? 

In recent years, with the United States preoccupied by crises in the Islamic world, 

Northeast Asia has not received the sustained focus it unquestionably warrants. Yet 

the policy record of recent years suggests that the US lacks a larger regional strategy that would entail the ample commitment of the time and attention of senior policy makers. The explicit outsourcing of the North Korean nuclear issue to China, 

the degrading of the US-Korea alliance (no doubt in part given US unhappiness over 

President Roh Moo-hyun’s open-ended accommodation with North Korea, despite 

Pyongyang’s nuclear defiance), the singular attention to enhancing the alliance with 

Tokyo irrespective of regional reactions beg a larger issue: beyond immediate US defense planning requirements, is there an underlying concept that animates and integrates American regional strategy? Or is the United States largely content to let the 

political-security identities of China and Japan increasingly define Northeast Asia’s 

future, with the US role characterized primarily by its proven capability to amass 

military power for a major regional contingency? 

America’s fundamental long-term interests would be ill served by a strategy 

skewed disproportionately to crisis planning, presuming that the region will somehow otherwise take care of itself. The United States does not want to find itself on 

the outside looking in. It needs to devote continued, diligent efforts to shaping the 

incentives of all regional states to move toward more mature, collaborative relations 

with one another, and in which the United States also constitutes a full and effective presence. Without such a US role, the states of Northeast Asia could well pursue unilateral advantage both in national strategies and in longer-term weapons development, thereby rendering the region as a whole far less predictable or stable. 

Avoiding such an outcome must remain a central US policy objective in a region of 

paramount importance to American political, economic, and security interests, which 

will only be realized through continued US engagement in all its forms.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Dr. Pollack. 

Ambassador Schaffer? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to share 

some thoughts on the strategic environment in Asia and the Pacific 

and the implications of key regional trends for U.S. policy toward 

the region, but may I start by thanking you for the warm welcome 

and for the recollection of our having worked together in one of my 

previous incarnations. It is good to see you sitting in the Chairman’s seat. 

While most of my remarks will address southern Asia, I think it 

is essential to look at this region in a larger Asian context. South 

Asia today is shaped, I would argue, by three principal trends. 

First, the rise of India and China, Asia’s two giant powers; second, 

21

the continuing danger of violent extremism; and, third, the rather 

mixed track record of the India-Pakistan dialogue. 

I believe United States policy has been reasonably effective in 

addressing the rising of the two Asian giants. On the India-Pakistan relationship, United States impact has been modest, but positive. U.S. policy I think has been much less successful in dealing 

with violent extremism in the region. 

On this last subject, our task is made much harder by the news 

that the U.S. Administration is looking for ways to continue abusive interrogations of detainess and by the perception that U.S. 

calls for democracy are highly selective. 

Let me look at each of the big themes I have outlined in turn. 

The most important United States policy addressing India’s rise to 

greater global prominence is the development of a strategic partnership with India. This is still a work in progress, but I think its 

chances of success are excellent. 

The Administration describes the partnership as a long overdue 

understanding between two democracies. I agree, but I think it has 

a hard strategic justification as well. With China on the rise, as my 

two colleagues have eloquently outlined, Japan in some economic 

difficulty, the Korean peninsula volatile and uncharacteristically 

difficult relations between Seoul and Washington, the United 

States cannot afford to treat the other Asian giant as a secondary 

player. 

Moreover, India has a new strategic convergence with the United 

States. Both countries have a strong interest in the security of the 

Indian Ocean, from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca. Some 65 percent of the world’s oil supply goes through this 

area. 

Nothing in this idea of a partnership with India implies hostility 

to China. Indeed, India is currently expanding its political and economic ties with China at an unprecedented rate, a development 

that can only contribute to the United States goal of a peaceful 

Asia, but it does make the idea of a serious relationship with India 

in an effort to bring our strategic views into alignment where that 

is possible, it makes this more important. 

The United States and Indian Governments have built much of 

the bilateral infrastructure they need. Their security relationship 

has grown in ways I could not imagine during the earlier incarnation when I testified before this Subcommittee from a government 

perch. 

The two navies, which had been the services most suspicious of 

one another 15 years ago, now have the closest strategic outlook. 

This reflects both countries’ interest in protecting the oil lanes, but 

it also reflects a very effective expansion of military interaction. 

Economic ties have grown as well. Two-way trade has risen by 

a factor of almost five since India introduced market-oriented economic policies in 1990. United States exports to India went up by 

over 20 percent last year. 

The best and best known current illustration of the partnership 

the U.S. is trying to develop is the proposed United States-India 

agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. I am pleased that the enabling legislation passed the House with such a large bipartisan majority and hope it will soon pass the Senate as well. I know you 

22

and I have disagreements on this, Mr. Chairman, but that is my 

view. 

There is still work to do. New Delhi and Washington have barely 

begun to develop elements of a common vision of the world. This 

will involve tough discussions not just on the easy ones like the Indian Ocean, but also on issues where we differ, notably Iran. While 

democracy is a bond between us, democratic politics are going to 

be a complication in managing the relationship. 

Our partnership has, in my view, two key strengths. First, it is 

based on common strategic interests, especially those touching Indian Ocean and Asian security. Second, it has been developed and 

supported by both major parties in both countries. This makes me 

optimistic about its prospects. 

Moving to the second trend I raised, dealing with violent extremism is at the top of the Administration’s foreign policy agenda, 

but U.S. policies in the region have been, in my view, less successful. Sadly, there are at least half a dozen relevant examples in the 

region, from the growing violence and danger of state failure in Afghanistan to the renewed war in Sri Lanka. 

If you want to talk about Bangladesh, Mr. Crowley, I would be 

delighted to talk about that with you. I very much share the concerns you have expressed. 

I would like to focus primarily on Pakistan. Our partnership with 

Pakistan is important, and President Musharraf has provided very 

important support for the vital United States antiterrorism effort. 

However, I believe we have not succeeded in getting all Pakistan’s 

policy instruments lined up behind this effort. Antiterrorism runs 

into powerful resistance even among some of Musharraf’s political 

allies, and we have not given support to the rebuilding of Pakistan’s battered political institutions. 

The tangled relationship between Pakistan’s Afghan policy and 

its domestic politics illustrates the first two problems I just mentioned. President Musharraf wants Hamid Karzai’s Government in 

Kabul to succeed. This is one of the highest priorities for the 

United States. However, Pakistani intelligence sources continue to 

maintain links with the Taliban insurgents who today represent 

the greatest threat to Karzai’s Government. 

Ending this involvement has now been complicated by the recent 

eruption of two longstanding problems. The first of these is the 

agreement ending the Pakistan army’s effort, under United States 

pressure, to take control of the tribal area in Waziristan. That 

agreement leaves our adversaries with considerable freedom of action. It makes the government and the army look weak, and it 

fuels domestic political opposition to antiterrorism policies that are 

truly critical to U.S. interests. 

The second recent crisis stems from the death of the Baloch leader, Akbar Bugti, apparently killed by the army, and from the government’s decision to keep his family at arm’s length during the funeral. These actions have added to the existing alienation in that 

troubled but resource-rich province. 

A political reconciliation, coupled with improved mechanisms for 

giving Balochistan a higher share of revenues from the province’s 

gas, would be the best possible backdrop for increasing the effectiveness of Pakistan’s antiterrorism efforts. That, alas, seems farVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
23

ther away than ever. I hope that the planned meeting among Presidents Bush, Musharraf and Karzai will address these issues with 

candor, as well as determination. 

To make things worse, United States actions in the region and 

worldwide have led both supporters and opponents of the Pakistan 

Government to conclude that United States calls for democracy in 

the Muslim world are cynical and do not apply to Pakistan. I am 

sure this is not the message the Administration wanted to convey, 

but I think it is the message it has conveyed. 

The United States has lost important opportunities to help Pakistan strengthen the institutions on which decent government depends. We looked the other way as Musharraf rode roughshod over 

his country’s established political institutions. Pakistanis of all political stripes drew their own conclusions. Will next year’s elections 

reverse this trend? The U.S. should be insisting on much better 

performance than we saw in last year’s local election. 

Anti-American sentiment is also at an all-time high, even among 

those who have traditionally been friends with the United States. 

The current debate in the United States on detainee legislation in 

which the United States Administration is working hard to retain 

the flexibility to conduct abusive interrogations is doing terrible 

damage. It leaves Pakistanis, and I would suspect many others, 

with the impression that our calls for human rights are hypocritical and that our adversaries’ commendations of the United 

States may have a point. 

The final trend I would like to address is the India-Pakistan relationship. The two countries have kept a ceasefire in Kashmir for 

nearly 3 years. Very good news. For over 21⁄2 years they have kept 

a peace dialogue alive, but in recent months it has been far from 

healthy, and it badly needed an infusion of energy from the two 

leaders. 

The joint announcement of President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh following their meeting in Harvara was certainly welcome news. The specific steps the two leaders pledged to 

take would all be valuable steps forward. 

I am optimistic that some form of dialogue will survive, and 

United States diplomacy has been effective in reinforcing the two 

countries’ determination to keep it going, but I unfortunately do 

not expect dramatic results. Both India and Pakistan would face 

domestic opposition if they made any significant policy changes, 

and without significant policy changes I fear there won’t be significant results. 

The United States, in summing up, is the most influential outside country in Asia. That comes through from both of my colleagues’ testimony, and I will be very surprised if Catharin Dalpino 

disputes that. Our influence isn’t infinite, and it differs from one 

issue to another, but I think we can influence how the balance of 

power develops in Asia. We can and should use that influence to 

secure Asian peace and prosperity. 

The fight against extremism needs to be carried on chiefly by the 

governments and societies of the region, but the United States 

needs to support the development of stronger political institutions 

and to be much more sensitive to the widespread perception of U.S. 

hypocrisy. 

24

A breakdown in India-Pakistan relations has greater potential 

for harm than any of the other contingencies I have mentioned. 

The United States has been very effective in crisis management in 

the past, but should not assume that what worked in the past will 

always work in the future. This is the hardest trend to influence. 

It will need more sustained attention from the United States than 

it has received in the recent past. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Schaffer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I am delighted to share some 

thoughts on the strategic environment in Asia and the Pacific and the implications 

of key regional trends for United States policy toward the region. 

While most of my remarks will address southern Asia, I think it is essential to 

look at this region in a larger Asian context. South Asia today is shaped by three 

principal trends: first, the rise of India and China, Asia’s two giant powers; second, 

the continuing danger of violent extremism; and third, the rather mixed track 

record of the India-Pakistan peace dialogue. 

I believe U.S. policy has been reasonably effective in addressing the rise of the 

two Asian giants. On the India-Pakistan relationship, U.S. impact has been modest 

but positive. U.S. policy has been much less successful in dealing with violent extremism in the region. On this last subject, our task is made much harder by the news 

that the U.S. administration is looking for ways to continue abusive interrogations 

of detainees, and by the perception that U.S. calls for democracy are highly selective. Let me look at each of these areas in turn. 

The most important U.S. policy addressing India’s rise to greater global prominence is the development of a strategic partnership with India. This is still a work 

in progress, but its chances of success are excellent. 

The Administration describes the partnership as a long-overdue understanding 

between two democracies. I agree, but it has a hard strategic justification as well. 

With China on the rise, Japan in economic trouble, the Korean peninsula volatile, 

and difficult relations between Seoul and Washington, the United States cannot afford to treat the other Asian giant as a secondary player. Moreover, India has a new 

strategic convergence with the United States. Both countries have a strong interest 

in the security of the Indian Ocean, from the straits of Hormuz to the straits of Malacca. Some 65 percent of the world’s oil supply goes through this area. Nothing in 

this partnership implies hostility to China; indeed, India is currently expanding its 

political and economic ties with China at an unprecedented rate, a development that 

can only contribute to the U.S. goal of a peaceful Asia. 

The U.S. and Indian governments have built much of the bilateral infrastructure 

they need. Their security relationship has grown in ways I could not imagine during 

my government career. The two navies, which were the services most suspicious of 

one another fifteen years ago, now have the closest strategic outlook. This reflects 

the strategic interest both countries have in protecting the oil lanes; it also reflects 

a very effective expansion of military interaction. Economic ties have grown as well. 

Two-way trade has risen by a factor of almost five since India introduced marketoriented economic policies in 1990; U.S. exports were up by over 20 percent last 

year. 

The best current illustration of the partnership the U.S. is trying to develop is 

the proposed U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. I am delighted that 

the enabling legislation passed the House with such a large bipartisan majority, and 

hope it will soon pass the Senate. 

There is still work to do. New Delhi and Washington have barely begun to develop 

some elements of a common vision of the world. This will involve tough discussions 

on some issues on which we differ, notably Iran. And while democracy is a bond, 

democratic politics can be a complication. But our partnership has two key 

strengths: first, it is based on common strategic interests, especially those touching 

Indian Ocean and Asian security; second, it has been developed and supported by 

both major parties in both countries. That makes me very optimistic about its prospects. 

Moving to the second trend, dealing with violent extremism is at the top of the 

Administration’s foreign policy agenda, but U.S. policies have been less successful. 

Sadly, there are at least half a dozen relevant examples in the region, from the 

25

growing violence and danger of state failure in Afghanistan to the renewed war in 

Sri Lanka. But I will focus on Pakistan. 

Our partnership with Pakistan is important, and President Musharraf has provided very important support for the vital U.S. anti-terrorism effort. However, I believe we have not succeeded in getting all of Pakistan’s policy instruments lined up 

behind this effort; anti-terrorism runs into powerful resistance even among some of 

Musharraf’s political allies; and we have not given enough support to the rebuilding 

of Pakistan’s battered political institutions. 

The tangled relationship between Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its domestic politics illustrates the first two problems. President Musharraf wants Hamid Karzai’s government to succeed, and this is one of the highest priorities for the United 

States. However, Pakistan intelligence sources continue to maintain links with the 

Taliban insurgents who today represent the greatest threat to Karzai’s government. 

Ending this involvement has now been complicated by the recent eruption of two 

longstanding problems. The first is the agreement ending the Pakistan army’s effort, under U.S. pressure, to move into the tribal area in Waziristan. The agreement 

leaves our adversaries with considerable freedom of action. It makes the government and the army look weak, and it fuels domestic political opposition to critical 

anti-terrorism policies. The second recent crisis stems from the death of the Baloch 

leader Akbar Bugti, apparently killed by the army, and the government’s decision 

to keep his family at arms length during the funeral. These actions have added to 

the existing alienation in that troubled but resource-rich province. A political reconciliation, coupled with improved mechanisms for giving Balochistan a higher 

share of revenues from the province’s gas, would be the best backdrop for increasing 

the effectiveness of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism efforts. That seems farther away than 

ever. I hope that the planned meeting among Presidents Bush, Musharraf and 

Karzai will address these issues with candor and determination. 

To make things worse, U.S. actions in the region and worldwide have led both 

supporters and opponents of the Pakistan government to conclude that U.S. calls 

for democracy in the Muslim world are cynical—and that they don’t apply to Pakistan. The United States has lost important opportunities to help Pakistan strengthen the institutions on which decent government depends. We looked the other way 

as Musharraf rode roughshod over his country’s established political institutions. 

Pakistanis of all political stripes drew their own conclusions. Will next year’s elections reverse this trend? The U.S. should insist on much better performance than 

we saw in the local elections. 

Anti-American sentiment is also at an all-time high, even among those who have 

traditionally been our friends. The current debate on detainee legislation, in which 

the U.S. administration is working hard to retain the flexibility to conduct abusive 

interrogations, is doing terrible damage. It leaves Pakistanis (and many others) with 

the impression that our calls for human rights are hypocritical, and that our adversaries’ condemnations of the U.S. have a point. 

The final trend I’d like to address is the India-Pakistan relationship. The two 

countries have kept a ceasefire in Kashmir for nearly three years. For over 2 1/2 

years, they have kept a peace dialogue alive, but in recent months it has been far 

from healthy, and it badly needed an infusion of energy from the two leaders. The 

joint announcement of President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 

following their meeting in Havana could not have come at a better time. The specific 

steps the two leaders have pledged to take would all be valuable steps forward. I 

am optimistic that some form of dialogue will survive. U.S. diplomacy has been effective in reinforcing the two countries’ determination to keep it going. But I do not 

expect dramatic results. Both India and Pakistan would face domestic opposition if 

they made any significant policy changes; and without significant policy changes, 

there will be no significant results. 

The U.S. is the most influential outside country in Asia. I believe we can influence 

how the balance of power develops in that region. We can and should use that influence to make Asia a more peaceful and prosperous region. The fight against extremism needs to be carried on by the governments and the societies of the region. The 

U.S. needs to support the development of stronger political institutions in the region, and to be much more sensitive to the widespread perception of U.S. hypocrisy. 

A breakdown in India-Pakistan relations has greater potential for harm than almost 

any other contingency. The U.S. has been effective in crisis management in the past, 

but should not assume that the techniques of the past will work in the future. This 

is the hardest trend to influence, and will need more sustained attention in the future.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

Ms. Dalpino? 

26

STATEMENT OF MS. CATHARIN E. DALPINO, VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Ms. DALPINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the invitation to speak, and I appreciate your including southeast Asia in 

this important discussion. 

I would like to talk about new power dynamics in the region, 

which largely converge around China’s new role in southeast Asia, 

the role of other rising powers, a couple of bilateral challenges the 

United States has and U.S. policy toward ASEAN. 

I would very much like to discuss the present Thai situation perhaps in a question and answer period. It is a very complicated one 

and a challenge to United States policy. 

It is obvious that in the past 15 years China has forged a new 

relationship with southeast Asia in every possible direction, and 

they were aided in great part in that by the Asian economic crisis 

in 1997–1998. They appear to have a complex set of policy goals 

in the region. Much of their trade and assistance is intended to increase access to the region’s natural resources and to fuel domestic 

Chinese development, primarily in the southern province of 

Yunnan, which abuts southeast Asia. 

Although China’s intentions appear to be primarily commercial 

at this time, there are clear security implications even to these. For 

example, China’s close political relationship with Burma has 

helped it develop overlap pipelines for the transport of oil and gas 

for an eventual alternative to shipping vital resources through the 

Straits of Malacca. This is beginning to alarm Japan that China 

can have this alternative guarantee for its energy. 

Recently China has been a little more active at conventional security in the region, very cautiously and remaining below the 

United States radar. It did sign a memorandum in 2002 with 

ASEAN on the South China Sea which helped to start a new positive momentum after the 1990s and particularly after tensions over 

the Spratly Islands. 

More recently China’s role has been to spark a defense ministers 

meeting, an annual meeting in the ASEAN regional forum that is 

clearly seen as a China initiative. What we have to counter that 

is Cobra Gold exercises with Thailand, Singapore and Japan, which 

have become increasingly multilateral, but China is subtly setting 

up security competition there. 

The United States—I do agree with Ambassador Schaffer—still 

has tremendous influence in the region. It is still unquestionably 

the security guarantor. It is also a major economic power, and our 

markets are not going to be minimized by southeast Asians as they 

expand their trade relations with China. 

Nevertheless, the attractions of China to southeast Asia are unmistakable. The size of their market, their large aid packages for 

the poor countries of the region which come with apparently few 

strings, joint development efforts for the Spratlys, which have 

helped to lower tensions, frequent diplomatic missions from Beijing’s A team to the region and also a potential counter rate to 

western backed institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. 

27

When Laos was seeking funding for the Nam Theun II dam and 

it looked as though the World Bank would not give guarantees for 

the financing, China stepped in and said we will finance it if the 

Bank won’t. The Bank eventually did come around. 

Beijing also appears to embrace southeast Asia more as a group 

than the United States does. We are perceived as being primarily 

bilateral. Also, southeast Asians see their new relationship with 

China as an insurance policy against a distracted superpower that 

has historically at some times in the past occasionally been less 

than attentive in their view. 

Beyond these narrow advantages, the real pull of this new relationship with China is that southeast Asia is on that country’s 

southern shores, and a peaceful China is irresistible. Certainly 

southeast Asians will do anything they can to maintain that relationship. 

I think it is inaccurate, however, to assume as some people in the 

Washington policy community do that southeast Asia is on the 

verge of moving ‘‘into the China camp’’ and away from Washington. 

For most of the nations of ASEAN, particularly the larger, more developed ones, they see no contradiction in a strong relationship 

with Washington and one with Beijing. They don’t want a zero-sum 

equation here. If we insist on one, it will be a self-fulfilling prophecy, but most of these countries have built in brakes. Many of them 

have close security relations with the United States. 

I think the cause for concern are the poor countries of mainland 

southeast Asia, specifically Burma, Laos and Cambodia, which 

have received inordinate attention from China in terms of aid and 

diplomatic and political attention and which get very little attention from us or get narrow attention from us. 

This is not to make judgments on our specific bilateral policies, 

but in the aggregate we isolate Burma, we ignore Laos, and we 

give Cambodia fitful attention whenever there is a political or 

human rights crisis. Taken together, this gives China an advantage 

to develop a geographic sphere of influence in mainland southeast 

Asia, and it is certainly doing so. 

There are several other contenders who are trying to increase 

their role in the region. Japan, ever since the crisis, has tried to 

play more of a regional role. It tried after the crisis to spark an 

Asian currency regime. They were not successful, but a successor 

model, the Chiang Mai initiative, is now in progress. 

More recently Japan was in back of the antipiracy agreement for 

Asia that just got into effect this month with the eleventh country 

that has signed it. That in turn was sparked by us with our regional security initiative, which did not succeed in that form, but 

I think has had a good effect on the region. 

India is a relatively new entrant into the southeast Asia power 

dynamic. It takes a strategic approach. It is focused on Burma, 

quite understandably, and on Vietnam. I think it has less power 

obviously. It could rival China at some point in the future, but is 

not likely to in the near future. 

Australia and Russia are also increasing activities in the region. 

Both have joined the East Asian Summit and in doing so had to 

sign the treaty of amity and cooperation with ASEAN. Russia’s political role is not really clear. Its main role is to provide arms, midVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
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level arms that are less expensive than American arms. Even Thailand, which has almost exclusively bought United States weapons, 

is starting to purchase Russian arms. 

Much of this activity by the external powers is focused on southeast Asia itself for its strategic position, its natural resources, its 

aggregate market, but it is also focused because ASEAN is the bedrock of all of the new regional regimes, and in order to get to 

ASEAN+3 or the East Asian Summit you have to go through 

ASEAN, and you have to sign on to the ASEAN way, which has 

become the modus operandi for all of these. 

The United States since September 11 has given greater attention to southeast Asia, but that has had a concentration on radical 

Islam and on counterterrorism. Some southeast Asians believe that 

United States policy is too myopic as a result. We have recently 

taken note of that and begun some modest initiatives with ASEAN 

that I will mention in a minute. 

We have a couple of bilateral policy challenges in the next few 

months. One, as you said, Mr. Chairman, and as Congressman 

Crowley spoke of, is trying to craft an appropriate response to the 

coup in Thailand this week. It is not easy, given the circumstances. 

We obviously want to maintain the fundamentals of our relationship with Thailand—it is a treaty ally—but we also want to make 

sure that we appropriately encourage its democratic development. 

This is a good time for us to review and update some of our other 

democracy promotion policies in southeast Asia. Cambodia is moving toward election in 2008, and the coalition politics are beginning 

to change. I think we want to rethink some of our past affiliations 

or support. 

Burma is the greatest challenge in democracy promotion in the 

region and possibly the world. Many people believe that reversing 

our policy of sanctions would promote liberalization. I certainly 

don’t, but I do think it is time to consider a cautious civil society 

approach to supplement and support that decree and some democratic space for democratic politics eventually. That doesn’t mean 

necessarily supporting the regime, but there are some particular 

angles that we can apply. 

The second major task is consolidating and solidifying some of 

the positive momentum in United States-Vietnamese relations in 

recent months through President Bush’s visit to Hanoi in November. Much of that momentum is because of increased cooperation 

from the Vietnamese side, and I think the most important deliverable in President Bush’s briefcase has to be permanent normal 

trade relations for Vietnam. If that is not accomplished by the time 

he comes to Hanoi, there will be a serious break in momentum, and 

that would be a shame. 

Some other deliverables include agreeing finally on the introduction of the Peace Corps to Vietnam. The two governments have 

agreed in principle, but still have to work out the details. 

Lastly, I do think that we do need to show appropriate and official concern for the continuing impact of Agent Orange in Vietnam. 

It continues to be a very sensitive issue in the relationship. 

There is one thing the American Government can do that American civil society and veterans groups can’t do, which is to help 

with base cleanup, to ameliorate some of the continuing impact of 

29

the hot spots where dioxin is still reaching into the soil and into 

the water. I would suggest that is a good place to start. 

As we said, we have recently put forward a couple of modest initiatives to increase our relationship, to strengthen our relationship 

with ASEAN, primarily the ASEAN–U.S. enhanced partnership 

and the new U.S.–ASEAN TIFA that the USTR signed last month. 

Both of these are hindered by the fact that we still have not been 

able to forge a policy with ASEAN that also is consonant with our 

policy with Burma. That is not an easy thing. I don’t have a solution for that. We just have to be cognizant that there is a real 

trade-off there. 

My advice on ASEAN is to not worry about trying to match or 

outdistance China, but to make our own policies work with that organization, to fill in the blanks that we have already laid out rather than trying to launch new initiatives there. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalpino follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. CATHARIN E. DALPINO, VISITING ASSOCIATE PRO- FESSOR OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN

SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Thank you for this invitation to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss US 

policy in Southeast Asia in light of changing dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region. 

My views on this subject are informed by my work as Visiting Associate Professor 

in the Asian Studies Program and Director of Thai Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh 

School of Foreign Service, and as director of the Stanley Foundation’s project on ‘‘New Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia.’’ The opinions expressed in this statement 

are my own, and not those of the School of Foreign Service or The Stanley Foundation. 

Power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region are changing rapidly and Southeast 

Asia, as a crossroads region, is affected by these changes in every sector: political, 

economic, security, and social. Asians are attempting to capture and regulate these 

shifts in new regional groups, some of which do not have an explicit role for the 

United States. At the same time, there is considerable continuity and many of the 

fundamentals in US relations with Southeast Asia are undisturbed. The United 

States continues to play a critical role as guarantor of the region’s security, and as 

a major economic market. 

Equally important, Southeast Asians still look to the United States to play a leadership role, albeit one that recognizes other regional powers and acknowledges that 

Southeast Asians are moving toward more omni-directional foreign policies. The 

challenge for the United States is not to try to resurrect the status quo ante but 

to make adjustments in our own policies that incorporate, and even capitalize, on 

these changes. Put another way, we need to do a better job of going with the flow. 

RISING POWERS

China 

The obvious (but not only) catalyst in this new dynamic for Southeast Asia is Chi- na’s growing presence—in diplomatic, economic, cultural, educational and even demographic terms—in the region. There is little doubt that China has increased its 

influence in Southeast Asia in the past fifteen years, aided in no small part by the 

1997–98 Asian economic crisis and persistent perceptions that the United States did 

not come to Southeast Asia’s assistance at the time. 

China appears to have a complex set of policy goals in Southeast Asia. Much of 

its trade and assistance is intended to increase access to the region’s natural resources and markets to fuel domestic Chinese development, especially in the southern province of Yunnan, which borders Southeast Asia. But although China’s intentions seem to be primarily commercial at this time, there are strong implications 

for security in its new economic push into Southeast Asia. For example, China’s close political and economic relationship with Burma enables it to develop overland 

pipelines to transport oil and natural gas. This expanding pipeline system may in 

time offer China a serious alternative to volatile sea lanes for transportation of vital 

natural resources. 

Recently, however, China has been more active in conventional regional security. 

The 2002 Memorandum with ASEAN on the South China Sea has helped to deVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
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crease tensions that arose in the mid-1990’s over the Spratleys. A bolder move was 

China’s role in adding the Defense Ministers Meeting to the annual ARF agenda. 

In these initiatives, China has taken care to stay below the US radar, but Beijing 

seems to envision a new, if restrained, security role for itself in Southeast Asia. 

The attractions of a benign China for Southeast Asia are unmistakable: the size 

of the Chinese market; large aid packages for the poorer countries that come with 

few, if any strings; joint development efforts in contested islands of the Spratleys; 

frequent diplomatic missions from Beijing’s ‘‘A Team’’; and a potential counterweight to the demands of the West and institutions perceived to be in the Western 

camp (the IMF, the World Bank). At present, Beijing appears to be more willing to 

embrace Southeast Asia as a whole group—evidenced by the China-ASEAN Free 

Trade framework and the proliferation of looser arrangements in the works—than 

is the United States. Moreover, a closer relationship with China is seen as insurance against the policy swings and other distractions of the world’s sole superpower. 

Beyond these narrow advantages, to the subregion that lies on its southern shores, 

the prospect of China as a peaceful partner is the greatest inducement of all for a 

closer relationship. 

It would be inaccurate, however, to assume that Southeast Asians have entered 

this new era of relations with China without reservations or limits. The larger and 

more developed states, particularly those with close security ties to the United 

States, have built-in brakes. At bottom, analysts who maintain or fear that these 

states are willing to abandon a relationship with Washington for one with Beijing 

are missing the point. Many Southeast Asians do not view their relations with 

China and the United States as a zero-sum game. 

However, there is some cause for concern with the poorer Southeast Asian countries—particularly Laos, Cambodia and Burma—that do not have the options the 

richer states do to balance regional powers. China gives these states special attention in the form of large-scale aid packages that focus on building infrastructure. 

This assistance is largely unconditional and contrasts favorably to US aid, which is 

smaller in scale and often encumbered (or withheld) by sanctions. China’s growing 

dominance in these countries is exacerbated by US policy: Washington isolates 

Burma, ignores Laos and deals fitfully with Cambodia when political crises or 

human rights issues erupt. On a bilateral basis there may be justification for some 

of these policies; taken together, however, they help China to carve out a geographic 

sphere of influence on mainland Southeast Asia. 

Other Contenders 

Several other external powers seek to strengthen or reinvent their roles in Southeast Asia at this time. Japan, valued for decades for its large-scale aid and investment and more recently for its ‘‘checkbook diplomacy,’’ has intermittently attempted 

to spearhead regional initiatives since the 1997 crisis. These have met with varying 

degrees of success. Japan’s proposal to form a common Asian currency stabilization 

fund in the wake of the 1997 crisis was not adopted, but a successor model—the 

Chiang Mai Initiative—was. The activation this month of the Asian agreement to 

combat maritime piracy, another Tokyo initiative, is a positive chapter in this new 

policy. Early indications from the Abe administration are that Japan will pay greater attention to its Asian friends and allies. 

Indian is a relatively new entrant in the Southeast Asian power dynamic and popular estimations of its impact in the region are probably over-estimated at this time. 

New Delhi has taken a targeted approach to the region, concentrating on Burma 

(where Chinese influence in Southeast Asia is arguably greatest) and Vietnam, 

whose brisk economic growth rates make it an attractive trade partner. But although India shares a cultural heritage with much of Southeast Asia the historical 

pathways still run to China. Moreover, the assumption in some quarters of the 

American policy community that India will join the Western democracies in pressuring Asian authoritarian regimes, most notably Burma, to liberalize are unrealistic. 

Australia and Russia are also tailoring their Asian policies to gain greater profile 

and leverage. Like Beijing, Tokyo and New Delhi, Canberra and Moscow were represented at the first East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting last December in Kuala 

Lumpur. Although the Howard government is close to the US administration, Canberra did sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), an EAS pre-requisite, despite reservations over its implied nuclear clause. Russia’s political role in 

Southeast Asia is unclear at this time, but it is carving a niche for itself by offering 

mid-level arms that are less expensive than American military equipment to the region’s defense establishments. 

Much of this new activity by external powers is focused on Southeast Asia itself, 

because of its strategic position (particularly with the Straits of Malacca); its natVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
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ural resources; and its aggregate market. As well, Asian leaders are aware that 

ASEAN is the gateway to the expansion of many regional frameworks in Asia. The 

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT); and the East Asia Summit itself have ASEAN as their organizational center and all follow ‘‘The ASEAN 

Way’’ as a modus operandi. 

THE US RESPONSE

For most of this decade US policy in Southeast Asia has had a strong focus on 

counter-terrorism, with both positive and negative factors. An Al-Qaeda presence in 

the region for two decades has helped to foster such affiliates as the Jemmah 

Islamiyah. The 1997 crisis, and the resulting political, economic and social instability, also provided Islamic extremists with new openings. On the positive side, Indonesia offers the example of a Muslim-majority democracy, and Malaysia has crafted a modern and moderate Muslim state. The US was quick to declare Southeast 

Asia a ‘‘second front’’ against terrorism quickly after September 11, 2001. 

While many Southeast Asian leaders and diplomats express approval that the region has returned to the US policy screen, they also maintain that an intense focus 

on Islamic radicalism and terrorism makes US policy in Southeast Asia myopic. 

Counter-terrorism has strengthened some bilateral Southeast Asian relations with 

the US and increased intra-regional cooperation in selected areas of law enforcement, but US policies after September 11 have also created problems for Southeast 

Asian leaders with their domestic populations. The war in Iraq caused a sharp 

downturn in public approval of the United States in Southeast Asia, tracked by numerous opinion surveys. 

Ironically, at a time when the United States is paying greater attention to the 

region, it has encountered a serious problem with its image or, to use a popular 

term, ‘‘soft power.’’ Reversing this trend requires balancing a focus on counter-terrorism with greater attention to other Southeast Asian concerns. It also requires acknowledging the growing global Muslim consciousness in Southeast Asia that makes 

US policy in other regions, particularly the Middle East, an immediate concern to 

Southeast Asians. 

In this regard, the US concept of public diplomacy should be redirected, away 

from whirlwind trips by US officials and toward regular, long-term dialogues and 

public statements indicating that Southeast Asian views on US policy in the Muslim 

world are taken seriously. Investing in educational infrastructure in Southeast 

Asian Muslim communities will also provide exponential benefits, to the host community and to US relations with the host country. A solid educational assistance 

program in Indonesia, for example, is a far better public diplomacy tool than packaged public relations campaigns. 

Bilateral Policy Challenges 

Although many Southeast Asians complain that the United States prefers a bilateral policy approach to a multilateral one, this too is not a zero-sum matter. 

Strengthening US relations in the region will require both bilateral and multilateral 

efforts. 

On the bilateral side, the United States must address two tasks in particular in 

the next few months: crafting a response to the dramatic political events in Thailand this week, and preparing for President Bush’s trip to Vietnam in November. 

The first involves maintaining the fundamentals in a longstanding relationship with 

a treaty ally while also supporting its democratic development. The latter is a particular challenge, because the protracted political crisis that has played out in Thailand over much of this year does not lend itself to the Manichean, black-and-white 

interpretations that are often typical of US democracy promotion policies. 

Arriving at an appropriate policy toward Thailand at this time provides an opportunity to examine, and update, US democracy promotion policy in other Southeast 

Asian countries. It is important that we do so, to counter a growing perception that 

US policy seeks to impose a cookie cutter formula on other countries regardless of 

local history or conditions—an image of the United States that China implicitly nurtures in the region. 

As Cambodia prepares for national elections in 2008, old coalitions are breaking 

down and new political alliances are forming. We cannot advocate for democracy effectively if we take an overly partisan approach to these changes, or the election 

in general. 

Burma is without doubt the greatest challenge for democracy promotion in Southeast Asia, and possibly in the world. While there is little reason to believe that lifting sanctions on the regime would promote political liberalization at present, it is 

time to consider adding a cautious civil society approach to our policy. We might 

begin by removing some of the currency and licensing restrictions placed upon interVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:27 Nov 30, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\092106\29971.000 DOUG PsN: DOUG
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national non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief in the country. These INGO’s are showcases for civil society, without which democratic space 

in Burma cannot develop. By hampering them, we are pushing our own goals farther from our grasp. 

A second major task is that of advancing US-Vietnam relations, using the occasion 

of President Bush’s visit to Hanoi. Some of this can be achieved simply by solidifying recent positives trends. We have seen tangible indications that Vietnam is prepared to address longstanding and sensitive issues in ways that are both practical 

and prompt. I participated in the first US-Vietnam track two dialogue on religious 

freedom earlier this year and was impressed by the openness with which our Vietnamese interlocutors approached the issue. A refugee relief organization in the 

United States recently asked the President of the US–ASEAN Business Council, a 

former US official involved in refugee policy, to help secure exit permits for a group 

of Montagnards. The Vietnamese central government moved quickly and approvals 

were granted in as little as ten days. 

Reciprocating cooperation from Vietnam will yield policy dividends for the United 

States for years to come. The most important ‘‘deliverable’’ in the President’s briefcase when he goes to Hanoi should obviously be Permanent Normal Trade Relations 

(PNTR) status for Vietnam. Hanoi is poised to enter the WTO and, technically, does 

not need PNTR to do that, but US-Vietnamese economic relations will suffer if 

PNTR is withheld after Vietnam’s accession. Another tangible but far-reaching policy initiative is the introduction of the Peace Corps to Vietnam. The two governments have agreed on this in principle but still need to work out the modalities and 

the details of the first Peace Corps programs. 

Last but by no means least, the United States needs to develop an appropriate 

and official response to the continuing impact of Agent Orange in Vietnam. US veterans organizations have built ‘‘Friendship Villages’’ to provide treatment to individuals, especially children, with disorders believed to be linked to dioxin exposure but 

much more needs to be done, and some tasks can more easily be accomplished by 

the US Government than by American civil society. A logical first step in this process would be to offer technical and financial assistance to clean up ‘‘hot spots,’’ areas 

around former US bases where Agent Orange was stored and where it continues to 

contaminate the soil and water. 

Strengthening US–ASEAN Relations 

In the past year, US policymakers have begun to respond to the need for a stronger multilateral approach to Southeast Asia through a series of modest initiatives, 

primarily with ASEAN. However, it is well-worn principle of government that initiatives are easier to launch than to see through to fulfillment. In this respect, the US 

should first focus on implementing these plans on the table—filling in the lines—

before considering new policies. Failure to do so will risk criticism that the United 

States is interested only in ‘‘talk shops,’’ a description that some US officials and 

analysts have used to describe ASEAN. The focus should not be on attempting to 

‘‘catch up’’ with or overtake another power’s policies in the region, but on fully realizing our own. 

Some specific measures include:

1. Operationalize the ASEAN–US Enhanced Partnership. Getting the partnership out of the ‘‘vision’’ stage is critical. Educational exchange, technology 

transfer and cooperation in the energy sector are all good starting points.

2. Similarly, move quickly on the US–ASEAN Trade and Investment Agreement 

(TIFA) signed by the USTR last month. A US–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, along the lines of the one signed by China and ASEAN, is not likely 

to be on the immediate horizon but the regional TIFA should push the edge 

of the envelope as much as possible. Two important features are the ASEAN 

Single Window, which will provide a common system for the entry of goods 

into the United States, and harmonized standards for pharmaceutical registrations and approvals.

3. Advance bilateral Free Trade Agreement negotiations in Southeast Asia to the 

extent possible in the next several months. In practical terms, since the political situation makes the fate of US-Thai FTA negotiations unclear, this boils 

down to negotiations with Malaysia.

4. Give Laos an extra assist in its quest to join the World Trade Organization.

5. Support the entry of the remaining Southeast Asian economies into APEC 

when the moratorium on membership is lifted next year. A larger issue is the 

need to reinvigorate APEC as a regional institution. Many Southeast Asians 

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taken by other regional institutions, but they still value APEC as a mechanism for regular engagement with the United States.

The policy measures above might be viewed as low-hanging fruit, easily within 

reach. Even so, pursuing them will be neither automatic nor easy. For example, in 

any attempt to strengthen relations with ASEAN, the United States will soon be 

on a collision course with itself, since a complete and genuine ASEAN initiative will 

by definition include Burma. There is no easy way out of that box, and the United 

States must weigh the costs and benefits of bilateral versus multilateral policy, and 

the value of democracy promotion versus regional relations. 

Parallel to this first set of policy measures, US policymakers should open a dialogue within the broader US foreign policy community on signing the Treaty of 

Amity and Cooperation. For the past year, this has been a submarine issue, surfacing occasionally, only to sink out of sight. A decision on this issue will not come 

quickly, but frank and open discussion on it is appropriate at this stage in US relations with Southeast Asia.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. 

We will proceed under the 5-minute rule. Let me first ask the 

panel. In many ways the most immediate pressing issue relates to 

North Korea. We all recognize it has been a year now—in fact, a 

year as of yesterday or the day before—that the Six-Party Talks 

have not reached any fruition on a statement of principles that 

have been signed. 

Do any of you have any suggestions on how to give more meaning to a diplomatic approach? Where do you see this going? Dr. Pollack? 

Mr. POLLACK. To say that this issue is intractable is a big understatement. I do think that what has happened, however, has led at 

least to an extent to some rethinking on the part of China. I don’t 

want to overstate it, but——

Mr. LEACH. On the part of? Excuse me. 

Mr. POLLACK. On the part of China. I am persuaded that China 

was not informed in advance of the impending missile tests. 

Whether or not there have been consultations or discussions 

about the possibility of an actual nuclear weapons test, the Chinese 

are clearly on record and in their body language are very strongly 

opposed. There seems to be some erosion in the bilateral relationship for these and related reasons, a feeling that some recent Chinese visitors have been to some extent stiffed by the North Koreans 

and so forth. 

Now, the flip side of that, and Aaron Friedberg alluded to that, 

is that the Chinese involvement or presence in the north has grown 

significantly. This of course is more in the economic arena. The 

question is whether or not that gives China any conceivable leverage that it simply has chosen not to employ. 

Here again despite China’s disaffection, what the Chinese are indicating is that they do not see it advisable under prevailing circumstances to push North Korea even more into a corner. They are 

on record as opposed to any additional financial sanctions and the 

like, whereas the United States and Japan seem to be moving and 

pressing more in that direction. 

You know, I don’t know whether we are all just whistling past 

the graveyard here. Clearly a test, an outright nuclear weapons 

test, would be an unmitigated disaster, and it is my own view that 

the Chinese have been very, very clear with the North Koreans 

about that. 

34

The problem is even if they don’t test they continue to pursue, 

and so state, the accumulation of fissile material and the advancement of their missile program. Whether those missiles could be nuclear armed or not though, is a debatable proposition. 

We are kind of stuck. The Administration clearly despite occasionally some signs of a degree of flexibility and some efforts by Assistant Secretary of State Hill to open the door just a crack even 

to have some consultations with North Korean officials, has not 

been able to make any headway. Of course, the North Koreans insist that unless the ‘‘sanctions’’ are removed they are not coming 

back to the Six-Party Talks. 

My suggestion would be as follows. Though the Six-Party Talks 

as a venue are important, I don’t think we should be overly beholden to them. They are an unwieldy endeavor to begin with from 

the point of view of it meeting very, very episodically at best and 

requiring multiple language translation. 

Even if it does provide off-line opportunities for bilateral interaction, there are other ways to skin this cat. It is at least worth 

some exploration and testing so that the situation doesn’t go even 

in a worse direction. 

Again, I think here we just don’t have closure on how to proceed, 

and frankly under those circumstances the North Koreans not 

sensing acute pressures on them so they don’t see any particular 

reason to accommodate further either. 

I guess my bottom line is that if Chinese disaffection were more 

compelling you might—might; I emphasize might—see some movement back to the talks, but under prevailing circumstances it 

hasn’t happened. Kim Jong Il, so far as we know, has not traveled 

lately to China as many expected, so we continue to be stuck without any clear sense of initiative or momentum or alternative policies. 

I wish I could be more encouraging, but I think the fundamental 

drift of policy is toward more of a constriction of North Korea, more 

efforts in the context of their missile tests to press ahead obviously 

with missile defense and so forth, but this isn’t a solution. 

It does manage and mitigate some of the more extreme potential 

consequences, but it doesn’t really get to the nub of the issue, 

which is their continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. 

I wish I had a magic answer, but I don’t. 

Mr. LEACH. Dr. Friedberg? 

Mr. FRIEDBERG. It seems to me that the only way to reach a successful resolution to this stand-off, which from our point of view 

would be the complete verifiable, irreversible nuclear disarmament 

of North Korea, is to combine diplomacy with pressure. 

We have had continued efforts at diplomacy, and we have had 

sporadic efforts at applying pressure. Part of the reason is we have 

gotten very good cooperation from Japan, but less cooperation from 

China and from South Korea, which for their own reasons have 

been very reluctant to do anything which might provoke the North 

or perhaps increase the risks of internal disorder and collapse. 

Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the financial measures 

that the United States took a year ago had the effect of getting the 

attention of the North Korean regime. Despite the fact that they 

have used this as an excuse for not coming back from the table, it 

35

is the one avenue that I see by which we might through our own 

actions and actions with other cooperative governments and preferably ultimately and I think necessarily if it is going to be successful with the cooperation of China, we could greatly increase pressure on the regime. 

What was targeted were financial institutions that were involved 

in funneling money into North Korea directly more or less into Kim 

Jong Il’s pocket where he uses it, as far as we know, to keep himself in whiskey and whatever it is that he consumes in large quantities these days, but also to keep the people around him happy 

and, in addition, use his hard currency that he earns through illicit 

activities—drug smuggling, counterfeiting and so on—in efforts to 

sustain and, if he can, to advance his special weapons programs. 

It is really a jugular vein. Cutting off or constricting that flow 

of dollars back into North Korea wouldn’t have the impact, the effect of making the lives of ordinary North Koreans any worse than 

they already are, unlike some kinds of overall economic sanctions, 

but they would impinge on the lifestyle of leadership. 

They have shown I think by their behavior that this is what concerns them most, so although it is a longshot—we don’t know 

whether it would succeed; it has some risks—it seems to me that 

that is the way to progress, and I think, in our discussions with 

the Chinese, we have to make clear that this is an issue to which 

we attach enormous importance. 

I think if a year from now or 2 years from now we have clearly 

failed and North Korea has established itself once and for all as a 

nuclear weapons state and China has not or did not do all that it 

could to try to prevent that, the future of our relationship is going 

to be in some doubts. 

Mr. LEACH. Ambassador Schaffer? 

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I agree with that. 

Mr. LEACH. Okay. Mr. Crowley? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Chairman Leach. Daunting is the 

word that comes to mind at the moment. Complex is another word 

in terms of our relationship with China. 

It seems as though all of the panelists this morning in their testimony, whether they were talking about China directly or other 

countries, it all ties in to their relationship with China and our relationship with them and its meaning toward our relationship with 

China. It is interesting to hear your perspective. 

I want to know because as we have this growing relationship 

with India—Ambassador Schaffer, you mentioned in terms of your 

support for the Indian civilian nuclear agreement, which I also am 

supportive of and supported in the House. One, I would like to 

know what your sense is if we fail to do that, if we fail to reach 

that agreement, what impact that will have on Indo-American relations in this century. 

Also if I could from you as well, but also the other panelists, this 

sense of the Chinese reaction to this agreement as it moves forward, recognizing that the civilian nuclear aspect is the biggest 

part of that agreement. There are other agreements that were entered into on July 18 of last year as well. 

Ambassador Schaffer? 

36

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Well, as far as your first question goes, 

what if the nuclear deal fails to be implemented, if it looks like we 

are simply dealing with delay I think that both political systems 

can manage that. 

If it is actually turned down in some process, first of all, I think 

that would come as a great surprise to a lot of people, including 

the Government of India, given that this legislation has received 

remarkable bipartisan support, much more so than a lot of other 

pieces of legislation that the Congress has had under consideration 

in the past couple of years. 

By the same token, I think that such an outcome would be taken 

in India as an ominous expression of United States unwillingness 

or inability to follow through on an initiative that was taken at the 

highest level. 

I am hopeful that that won’t happen, but obviously I can’t predict 

what is going to happen on the other side of this Hill. That kind 

of outcome, however, would clearly be a serious downer in United 

States-India relations and would raise questions about the ways in 

which we have started talking about working together on strategic 

issues. 

You asked about the Chinese reaction. What I have seen, and I 

would defer to my colleagues who follow China much more closely 

than I do. What I have seen suggests a fairly cautious reaction. It 

doesn’t sound at least to my ear as if China is trying to make the 

agreement crash in some sense. 

China and India have an increasingly close relationship these 

days, and you can measure that politically, VIP visits, politically 

again by the fact that they are starting to talk seriously about their 

border dispute. You can measure it economically by the rise in 

trade. China is now India’s second largest trading partner. 

You can even measure it commercially by the growing number of 

tie-ups between India’s world class information technology companies and business partners that they have developed in China so 

that while the China-India relationship has always been quite 

asymmetrical and has usually mattered a whole lot more to India 

than to China, I think the degree of that asymmetry is down. This 

is a process that is beginning to matter more to China. What exactly they want to do with it is a little bit less clear. 

China of course always has a very important relationship with 

Pakistan. Is China working for ways to give Pakistan the same 

kind of benefits that India has received? An exactly parallel deal 

strikes me as a very long shot because I don’t think that the international bodies that may be willing to consider making an exception for India, I don’t think they would be willing to make the same 

exception for a country the head of whose nuclear program is 

known to have sold nuclear technology and stuffs to some of the 

worst customers in the globe. 

There could well be some kind of bilateral understanding between China and Pakistan. Stranger things have happened before. 

My own view though is that whatever China does with Pakistan 

on the nuclear front, it is going to do so because it is useful in its 

own concept of how to manage the Pakistan relationship and not 

so much as a response to whatever is happening between the 

United States and India. 

37

Mr. POLLACK. I would agree very much that there has been a 

qualitative change in the Sino-Indian relationship in recent years; 

some increased interest on the part of China and less of an asymmetrical relationship as noted before. 

The Chinese of course in all of this still don’t see contradiction 

between the kinds of relationships they have with India and their 

continued sustaining of relationship with Pakistan. It may be, however, that the United States-Indian agreement does give China a 

little more latitude in some of the reactor sales and the like that 

they have had under discussion with Pakistan, so they may feel 

that they have a little more running room there. 

You know, I think after initial suspicions on the part of the Chinese that I interact with about the purposes that were underlying 

this effort to cultivate Indo-U.S. ties there is more of an acceptance, 

a relaxation if you will, a belief that given the advancement of this 

relationship, of the Indian-Chinese relationship, this need not be 

something that is going to be used in some kind of exploitative way 

against Chinese interests. 

More to the point, it is very, very clear from some of my discussions with Indian specialists that given what they see as their 

breakthroughs on multiple fronts, their ability to have simultaneous advancing relationship with every other major power, the Indians don’t want to blow it. They don’t want to see themselves back 

in a situation where it looks as if they might be used for someone 

else’s advantage. 

They are very clear-eyed about this. They see these opportunities, and they are going to go to I think some significant length to 

try to make sure that they are able to realize them without some 

kind of major cost for their relationship with China. 

Mr. LEACH. We have had a vote placed on, and I want to if possible turn to Congressman Paul before we leave, so if I could do 

that at this time? 

Mr. PAUL. Okay. Thank you very much. I will try to keep it 

short. Thank you. 

To me this is a very important subject that we are discussing, 

and you have made a lot of points about the political instabilities 

and military problems that this region of the world faces. 

I think there was a lack of emphasis on trade. I think Ms. 

Dalpino did mention some international trade agreements. I happen to follow the old adage that when goods don’t cross borders armies do. This certainly has been true. In the 1960s we weren’t 

trading with Vietnam, and armies went across borders, as it was 

in the 1950s with China. 

I am a real proponent of free and open trade. Iraq is a problem. 

We don’t trade with them. Iran is a problem. We don’t trade with 

them. Cuba we haven’t traded with, and 4 years of sanctions 

haven’t really done much good, so I really want to emphasize this 

trade. 

At the same time I have reservations about international trade 

agreements because too often I think they are very complex. They 

are very political. They are driven by special interests. At the same 

time it offers an opportunity for retaliation. It is almost the concession that low tariffs are bad, and therefore you have to retaliate 

against them, so I am for low tariffs. 

38

In the Congress right now I think the biggest concern is the 

anger of many Members toward China. They want to tax and put 

them on tariffs. It is not our responsibility. It is all their fault. The 

current account deficit is negative with China. Two hundred billion 

dollars was mentioned. 

Yet we have some advantages by that by just demanding. See, 

the big demand here is currently right now the Administration is 

going over there and telling China you need a stronger yuan, and 

we need a weaker dollar. A weaker dollar just means higher prices 

for the United States and takes away the advantage. 

If we print the money and spend it over there we have a tremendous advantage. I see all of this as negative for what we need to 

do. I want to argue for the trade, and of course a sound currency 

would help us. 

There is a story out recently about a regional Asian currency led 

by China. What do you know? Does anybody know anything about 

it, and what do you think the significance of this move is? 

Ms. DALPINO. Just briefly, this is the Chiang Mai initiative, 

which is the second generation attempt to have a regional currency 

stabilization scheme after the Asian economic crisis. 

It was initiated by Japan. At the time the United States and 

China opposed it, and then China’s agreement to it in Chiang Mai 

basically put it over the top. I am not sure I would characterize it 

as being led by China entirely. 

Mr. PAUL. Is this a good move, or how do you interpret this? 

Ms. DALPINO. Well, I think the central bankers in Asia realize 

they have a very uphill battle to have a viable stabilization scheme, 

but this is a lesson they learned from the 1997 crisis that if they 

don’t take care of their own regional currency problems somebody 

else will do it for them, and they won’t like it. 

Mr. PAUL. Okay. I can yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Does anybody else want to comment? 

Mr. PAUL. Okay. 

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Mr. Paul, I would only add that the expansion of United States relations with India really started with 

economics. Trade was increasing. India’s growth was increasing. 

That has been in a very real sense the origin of all of the transformation that you have seen. 

Trade has continued to grow since that time, so I would only reinforce your point that trade is a powerful transformer of the situation. Economists would stoutly support your view that open trade 

benefits consumers in the receiving country. Producers tend not to 

see it the same way, and I suspect that most of you hear more from 

producers than you do from consumers. 

Mr. PAUL. Right. 

Mr. POLLACK. If I could, Congressman Paul, although a lot of 

people emphasize these arcane issues of exchange rates and so 

forth, the dynamics of the trade relationship with China specifically cut at multiple levels. 

First of all, a lot of that imbalance reflects really not Chinese 

business, but Taiwanese business, Hong Kong business, others that 

have sent their factories onto the mainland. Again, when we do the 

counting that comes across as goods coming from China. 

39

Add to this, of course, a great deal of it is the production of 

American multinationals, WalMart and others, that are basically 

using Chinese factories for the production of their goods, which 

they then bring here. 

The Chinese seem of a mind, as is so often the case in their initiatives, to very guardedly and carefully allow some modest 

changes in exchange rates, moving by the way, I might add, more 

to a basket of currencies over time, which may or may not really 

help us. 

I mean, this resonates so much with our debates about Japan before the Plaza Accord, and the presumption was if you could get 

some kind of a recalibration, a significant recalibration of exchange 

rates, that the trade imbalance would go away. 

Obviously that was clearly not the case, so there we are. We do 

like the goods. We buy them and use them. Of course, in return 

the Chinese hold onto a lot of our Treasury notes. 

Maybe that is not optimal, but the sheer scale of it, some people 

are arguing that this is almost the new form of deterrence, if you 

will—not nuclear deterrence, but economic deterrence—given the 

scale and scope and implications of all of this. 

Even yesterday in Beijing Secretary Paulson is trying to find 

again one more channel, one more high level mechanism that will 

be very, very high level to address these issues because these 

things don’t admit to easy solution even if you take very, very abrupt actions like imposing of significant tariffs on Chinese goods. 

Mr. LEACH. 1 minute for Dr. Friedberg. 

Mr. FRIEDBERG. As a student of history, I feel compelled to make 

the point that I would sometimes make to my students, which is 

that although trade of course is a good thing and preferable to the 

absence of trade, it doesn’t or hasn’t always historically led to 

peace between nations. 

Think of the relationship between Britain and Germany before 

the first world war. They were intense trading partners, as well as 

trade rivals. 

Also, trade and economic development as we have seen in the 

case of China don’t always lead or lead as quickly as one might 

hope to meaningful political reform, so it is conceivable, as I said, 

that we could trade with China, China could grow wealthier and 

more powerful, but that its political system might not change or 

might not change in ways that we would like for a long time. 

That I think is going to present serious challenges to us, practical challenges as well as theoretical challenges. 

Mr. LEACH. Let me thank you all very much. I apologize. I wanted to do a second round of questions, but we do not only have a 

vote; it is a series of votes, so I think it would be impractical. 

Thank you. I appreciate your outstanding testimony. The Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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