U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Swimming Pool

Chemical Plant Fire

Springfield, Massachusetts

USFA-TR-027/June 1988

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA appreciates the cooperation received from the Springfield, Massachusetts, Fire Department 

and Civil Defense office for this report. Particular thanks go to Fire Chief Raymond Sullivan and Fire 

Lieutenant Robert Callahan of the Springfield Fire Department and James Controuvich, Emergency 

Response Coordinator and Director of Civil Defense of Springfield.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Swimming Pool Chemical Plant Fire

Springfield, Massachusetts

Investigated by: Richard L. P. Custer

This is Report 027 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-88-C-2649 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE BUILDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE INCIDENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The First Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Second Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO FIGHT THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

POSTSCRIPT – CHLORINE PLANT FIRE IN GLENDALE, ARIZONA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Appendix A: General Layout of the Second Floor of Advanced Laboratories. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix B: Second Floor Storage Area and Blending Room. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Appendix C: List of Slides, Selected Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Appendix D: A Material Safety Data Sheet for Trichloroisocyanuric Acid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendix E: Guidelines for Safe Handling and Storage of Calcium Hypochlorite and 

 Chlorinated Isocyanurate Pool Chemicals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1

Swimming Pool Chemical Plant Fire

Springfield, Massachusetts

Local Contacts: Fire Chief Raymond Sullivan

Fire Lieutenant Robert Callahan

Springfield Fire Department

605 Worthington Street

Springfield, MA 01105

(413) 787-6411

OVERVIEW

One of the most challenging problems facing the fire service today is the combined fire and hazardous/toxic chemical incident. Decisions have to be made regarding the timing of firefighting activities with respect to evacuation priorities. In many cases, a decision must be made as to whether or 

not to fight the fire at all. Where the chemicals or products involved are water reactive, fighting the 

fire may make matters worse, endangering the firefighters or the general population.

Just such a situation presented itself to Chief Raymond Sullivan of the Springfield, Massachusetts, 

Fire Department and the city’s hazardous materials (Hazmat) incident response team on Friday, June 

17, 1988.

The incident occurred in the part of an 87-year-old industrial building housing a company that produced water treatment chemicals for swimming pools. Rain leakage wetted chemicals that released 

chlorine along with sufficient heat to cause ignition of ordinary combustibles. In the course of the 

incident, large amounts of chlorine gas were released, triggering several levels of evacuation involving more than 6,000 people.

The fire resulted in the collapse of a portion of the roof. The fire and corrosive action of the chlorine 

gas resulted in almost complete loss of the contents of both floors and caused significant structural 

damage prompting razing of the second floor. At the time this report was written it was not known 

whether the building would be reoccupied.
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Cause of Fires First fire – Rain leaking in mixed with chlorine chemical compounds, releasing heat.

Second fire – Lack of complete protection of the premises from weather after first fire allowed 

rainwater in, which started the second fire.

Evacuations Gaseous chlorine generated by mixing chemicals with water and from products of combustion 

required several levels of evacuation as incident progressed. Approximately 6,000 people were 

evacuated.

Firefighter Protective 

Equipment

City found itself short of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for an incident of this magnitude, for both firefighters and police. Consideration is being given to providing cartridge-type 

masks for police and other emergency personnel.

Sprinkler System Building was sprinklered, but part of the system had been disconnected because of the presence 

of water-reactive chemicals.

The part of the sprinkler system remaining in service did operate, but was shut down by fire 

department in an attempt to reduce production of chlorine gas.

Incident Command Duel problem: Hazmat incident and fire with Hazmat properties.

Size of incident was large relative to forces available.

In the second incident, mixed scientific advice was received on whether to flood the building or 

not apply water at all, causing delay in action. In retrospect, permitting the sprinkler system to 

continue operating supplemented with copious quantities of water is most likely the best option for 

such an incident.

Duration of Incident Lasted four days; fire department remained on-scene for cleanup operations for 27 days. Eleven 

of the city’s thirteen companies were involved.

Firefighting Agents Six million gallons of water. Sixty-five tons of neutralizing agents were required to treat the 

chemicals before removal.

Soda ash used successfully in first fire.

In second fire, due to presence of water, soda ash used but ineffective.

Cost of Incident Two million dollar loss to building and contents; 500,000 dollar cost to fire department, including 

overtime and actual and anticipated damage to equipment from chlorine exposure; 700,000 dollars 

other costs to city. 

During the incident, which lasted 31 days, eleven of the city’s thirteen engine companies were 

involved and over six million gallons of water used to extinguish the fire and to wet down the scene 

sufficiently for the chemicals to be removed and neutralized. It is estimated that 65 tons of neutralizing chemicals were employed.

Over 100 buses and 35 ambulances participated in the evacuation of the areas affected by the chlorine. Forty firefighters and approximately 275 civilians were treated for chlorine exposure at local 

hospitals and released. Principal means of exposure to firefighters was inhalation when changing 

breathing apparatus. Some firefighters received chemical burns on exposed skin and through turnout gear, especially when perspiring. Total dollar loss to the structure and contents was estimated to 

be over 2 million dollars. Costs from overtime and chlorine damage to fire department equipment 

are expected to exceed 500,000 dollars, and the cost to the city is estimated to approach on additional 700,000 dollars 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 3

THE BUILDING

The two-story brick building at 1 Allen Street was built in two sections. The first section was built as 

an armory in 1858. A second section added in 1901 which paralleled Allen Street was the location 

of the incident. This “newer” section was constructed of brick and cast iron. Its floors were brick 

arches supported on cast iron beams, with a concrete cover on top overlaid with heavy wood plank. 

In the interior of the building, the floors were supported by cast iron columns. The slate roof was 

placed on wood purlins supported by cast iron truss work.

The occupant of the area in which the incident occurred was Advanced Laboratories, Inc., manufacturers of tablets for chlorination of swimming pools. They occupied the first and second floors of 

the newer section of the building.

The “chlorine” tablets were produced by mixing raw materials including trichloro-S-triazinctrione 

known as TCT (trichloroisocyanuric acid) in a mechanical blender and pressing the resulting mixture into tablets. When TCT is exposed to water, heat is released. In the presence of heat, TCT will 

break down to form chlorine gas. An intermediate product of TCT breakdown is nitrogen chloride, 

which presents a severe explosion hazard when heated or exposed to shock.

Two types of tablets were produced by Advanced Laboratories – a “quick” tab that was a blend of TCT 

and soda ash with other chemicals, and a “slow” tab that did not contain soda ash. TCT blended with 

alkaline materials such as soda ash is subject to more rapid decomposition in the presence of water 

than TCT alone and produces temperatures sufficiently high to ignite paper products or wood.

Mixing was accomplished on the second floor where the raw materials were stored. Three blenders 

were in use, two for the Quick Tab product and one for Slow Tab blend. The mixing area on the second floor was called the “Blending Room.” The blended mixture was discharged into chutes leading 

down to the tablet presses (one for each blender) on the first floor in the “Tab Room.” The general 

layout of the (south) end of the second floor is shown in Appendix A.

A pneumatic dust collection system was employed to recover products from the blender and discharge areas on the second floor. The dust was deposited in a collection bin on the second floor. 

Recovered dust and reground broken or defective tablets were saved to be added later, in small 

amounts, to new batches of raw ingredients in the blenders. This recycled material, called “remix,” 

was stored in paper drums against the (east) wall (see Appendix B). In addition to the remix, 

approximately 1,000 polyethylene lined paper drums of pure TCT, each weighing 300 pounds, were 

stored two to three pallets high on the (east and west) sides of the second floor.

The building was equipped with a dry pipe automatic sprinkler system. On the second floor, however, the sprinkler piping had been disconnected by the occupants in the area where the chemicals 

were mixed. The first floor also had a partial sprinkler system.

THE INCIDENT

The incident actually took place in two phases and, although very closely related, could actually be 

considered two separate fires. For ease of discussion, the incident will be treated in that way.

The First Fire

At 0959, Springfield Fire Alarm was notified of a fire in the dust collection system at Advanced 

Laboratories. The department had previously responded to small fires at this company involving 

floor sweepings in a dumpster.
4

Arriving firefighters went to the second floor and attacked a small fire in the dust collection duct 

with soda ash (sodium carbonate) as called for in the most recent fire department pre-fire plan 

(March 1987). The use of soda ash to quench the reaction was reported to be the employee practice 

at Advanced Laboratories. This procedure was effective so long as no moisture was present. (As 

noted earlier, soda ash speeds the decomposition reaction in the presence of water.) Flames were 

noted in the dust collector. In order to reduce the high level of chlorine fumes in the Blending Room 

area, doors were opened and windows opened or broken out.

At about 1015, the command post vehicle arrived and was setup. After surveying the conditions and 

the spread of chlorine gas odor, orders were given to evacuate the schools in the area. Residents were 

warned to stay inside with the windows closed and to leave if they smelled chlorine.

The school evacuation was initially carried out in the downwind direction for about half a mile. 

Schools on the perimeter were also evacuated and the students moved to other schools.

Firefighting continued employing soda ash and at 1129 hours the fire was out. Hot dust had been 

removed from the ducts and the dust collector, mixed with soda ash, placed in drums and disposed 

of in the alley.

The fire and chlorine release were considered under control at 1148. At this time the evacuation 

order was rescinded. People were allowed to return home and the school board was notified. The 

fire department remained on the scene until approximately 1515 to 1530. During this time period, 

the Advanced Laboratories fore-person and the employees were engaged in cleaning up the debris 

and boarding over the windows that had been broken to ventilate the chlorine fumes.

The cause of this first fire was most likely rainwater blowing in under the sliding door at the south 

end of the building and entering the dust collection duct.

In post-fire interviews with employees, the fire department was told that the windows on the east 

wall in the vicinity of the remix and dust storage were not boarded over. This was reportedly due 

to the difficulty in reaching the windows over the pallets of TCT drums. It was also reported that in 

the past, a number of dust and remix drums had split or been broken discharging their contents into 

inaccessible areas under the pallets where the material could not be cleaned up.

The fore-person was reported to have left the building at approximately 1615.

The Second Fire

Weather records indicate that at approximately 1700 hours there was a light rainfall in the area driving rain against the east wall that contained the open windows.

At 2254, a police patrol reported “smoke” coming from the second floor of Advanced Laboratories 

in the area of the blending room. At 2256, the first arriving firefighters on the second floor reported 

seeing orange flames in the TCT drum storage area and applied soda ash with some success, reducing 

the fire to intermittent flare-ups. After approximately 10 minutes, the chlorine levels were so severe 

that the firefighters had to leave the building.

The command post had been activated at 2300 hours. At 2316, shortly after the firefighters were 

driven from the building, the second alarm was sounded.

The dry pipe automatic sprinkler system operated at 2317, most likely controlling the fire, but discharging water over the stored TCT and remix materials. After about 20 minutes of operation, water 

supply to the system was cut off in the street because of concern that the water would do more harm 

than good among the water reactive chemicals.
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 5

Evacuation of the area began for the second time that day at 2320, when local residents were again 

asked to leave.

Throughout Friday night, sounds were heard attributed to rupturing barrels on the second floor. 

Although no flaming was noted, chlorine gas and hydrochloric acid fumes continued to be released 

in large quantities from the building.

Early Saturday, June 18, conditions improved and the evacuation was called off at 0400 hours. At 

0550, personnel from Clean Harbors, a contract hazardous waste disposal company retained by the 

State of Massachusetts, arrived on the scene. At this point, most areas of the city were reportedly 

clear of chlorine odor.

By 0900 hours, fire department and Clean Harbors personnel in Hazmat entry suits were engaged 

in attempting to remove drums of reacting material from the second floor and releasing the blended 

mixture from two hoppers. At 0940, another local evacuation was initiated. By approximately 1000 

hours, conditions began to worsen again and by 1100 hours orders were given to clear the building 

and the evacuation was expanded again.

The perimeter was established by roving police and fire department vehicles, and the decision to 

expand or contract the evacuation zone was based on the presence or absence of the chlorine odor 

(chlorine can be detected by smell at a level about one tenth of the danger level). At its greatest 

extent, the evacuation zone was approximately 6 to 7 miles long and 1-1/2 miles wide. At 1220, one 

of the drums “blew,” pushing a firefighter back, and all personnel left the building.

Around 1900 hours, the fire began developing on the second floor and flames appeared on the first 

floor. Water was discharged on the first floor fire at 1915. As the fire continued to grow, the city 

solicitor gave the authority to forcibly evacuate the area and preparations were made to attack the fire 

and flood the building with as much water as possible in order to minimize heating of the TCT. This 

was the procedure recommended by the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) and CHEMTREC.

A portion of the roof collapsed near the center of the building at 2200 hours, and the fire extinguishment and flooding operations continued throughout the night.

By shortly after 0500 hours on Sunday, June 19, the chlorine conditions were improving once more 

and the fire was nearly under control. Clean Harbors prepared a powder mixture of sodium sulfate 

and boric acid to be used in neutralizing the TCT, allowing its clean up and disposal. During Sunday, 

areas affected by the chlorine were checked and if found to be clear, people were allowed to return.

All hoselines were shut down at 0619 Monday morning. By 1230, Clean Harbors had spread the 

neutralizing powder throughout the building. Checks were made of schools and other facilities by 

the Federal and State Environmental Protection Agencies during the day as a removal of the chemical 

debris from the building was underway.

At 1840 Monday, after almost four days, “Recall” was sounded for the second fire and Hazmat incident. Some fire department apparatus and personnel stood by at the scene during final clean up for 

an additional 27 days, until July 17, 1988.

The remaining chemical sludge was removed by Clean Harbors and placed in 10 above-ground 

swimming pools. After neutralization in the pools, the water, now chlorinated, was disposed of in 

the city storm sewer system.

The second fire was determined to have originated within the remix storage area. The cause was 

thought to most likely have been water from rain storms following the first fire entering through the 

open windows on the east wall.
6

DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO FIGHT THE FIRE

In dealing with Hazmat incidents, the Incident Commander must rely heavily on information from 

published sources and available experts. Many resources are available to assist command officers in 

making these tough decisions. Included are manuals, such as National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) 49 Hazardous Chemicals Data, the United States Coast Guard’s Chemical Hazard Response Information 

System Manual (CHRIS) Volume II and Sax’s Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, industry “hot lines” such as 

CHEMTREC, and computerized Hazmat information systems such as CAMEO. Frequently, “experts” 

from nearby industry also will be available to assist. In some instances, however, the various sources 

will provide incomplete data or conflicting instructions, and the information provided may not fit 

exactly with the situation at hand.

Nevertheless, the command officer must sift through the available information, suggested procedures, expert advice, and past experience and develop a strategy to minimize the effects of both the 

fire and hazardous materials aspects of the incident. To further complicate matters, as the incident 

develops the initial strategies may have to be alerted rapidly to react to changing conditions.

Chief Sullivan and the Springfield Hazmat Response Team had literature available to them, including 

NFPA 94, Sax, CHRIS, and the MSDS for TCT.

Additional guidance was obtained from the Chlorine Institute (prior to the fire), CHEM-NET, 

CHEMTREC, and even a phone call from a chemist who learned of the incident on cable television. 

In addition, the local Monsanto plant, a key participant in Springfield’s Hazmat response planning, 

had a representative on the scene to advise.

Based on all the information and advice reviewed, the following choices were available:

• 

• 

Let the reaction run its course.

Fight the fire using large volumes of water.

In the first choice, evacuation of the area would be carried out and attempts made to control the fire 

with soda ash, as had been done in the first fire incident. One advisor had suggested that the reaction 

might last two to three days if left alone.

In the second choice, the scope of the evacuation may have quickly increased in the event that the 

fire streams released additional chlorine. Once the fire was out, the chlorine would be controlled 

chemically.

Many factors relating to the actual incident conditions need to be considered when selecting an 

option or seeking others in a situation such as this. These factors include:

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

presence or absence of fire

size and growth rate of the fire

location of the fire

need to minimize injury to public

need to minimize fire loss

fire control resources available

present amount of chlorine being produced
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 7

• 

• 

• 

• 

effect of firefighting on chlorine

wind direction and speed

status of evacuation

Hazmat control resources

Taking the above into consideration, Chief Sullivan first treated the incident as a minor fire in which 

soda ash was applied. The area was evacuated. During Friday night, the chlorine conditions varied. 

By early Saturday, conditions were clear, and the evacuation order was rescinded. By early Saturday 

evening, however, the chief was faced with a significant fire. In addition, not only was more chlorine 

being generated, but the plume of hot gases from the fire could aid in the spread of the gases throughout the community. At this time, aggressive firefighting with large amounts of water was initiated.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Managing combined fire and Hazmat incidents often requires access to in-depth technical 

expertise.

The chief needs the best possible technical information, but still may have to make a decision 

in the face of conflicting expert opinion. The Incident Commander needs to quickly gather all 

the relevant information regarding the chemicals involved, the properties of their decomposition products, the danger of explosion, and the danger of toxic by-products. In addition to the 

literature and “hot lines,” efforts should be made to contact industry experts directly. Do not 

expect strong positive recommendations from “hot lines.” They usually can not and will not 

do more than offer options. And the technical experts and sources may disagree. The Hazmat 

incident control options must be evaluated in light of the incident conditions before decisions 

are made. This remains a major problem for today’s chiefs.

A recently released (1989) set of guidelines for handling chlorinated pool chemicals is now 

available. Produced by Monsanto, Olin, and PPG, manufacturers of the chlorine compounds 

used in these products, the guidelines address hazards, storage, processing, protective equipment, emergency procedures, and other safety related aspects. A list of emergency telephone 

numbers is also included. Copies may be obtained by contacting any of the following:

Monsanto (314) 694-1519

Olin (203) 271-4161

PPG (412) 434-3556

The guidelines recommend that if “there are any signs of fire, the building should be evacuated and the fire department called immediately, even if the building has a sprinkler system. 

In extinguishing a fire, copious amounts of water should be used. Do not use dry powder 

extinguishers.”

2. Hazmat incident response planning makes a difference.

The value of a Hazmat incident response organization was proven again. This incident had 

excellent interdepartmental cooperation. This was largely due to the fact that the major actors 

in dealing with Springfield’s Hazmat incidents had met regularly for planning sessions and table 

top incident exercises. In fact, 1 Allen Street was the subject of a chlorine leak exercise prior to 
8

the incident. Participants in this group included the fire, police, health, and public works departments; emergency medical services; and a representative of the local Monsanto facility. Other 

groups were the Red Cross, the school board, area hospitals, and the Springfield Civic Center.

The command post vehicle was a project that evolved from this Hazmat response group. The 

truck was donated by Coca Cola, and Monsanto split the cost of equipment for the command 

post with the city of Springfield.

3. There may be “hidden” costs to the fire department associated with a Hazmat incident 

involving corrosives such as chlorine.

After the Allen Street incident, the Springfield Fire Department rebuilt and tested all regulators 

on their breathing apparatus as a precaution. In addition to thorough steam cleaning, the oil 

and oil filter were changed on all exposed vehicles. Even with washing and treatment, the life 

of firehose and turnout gear is expected to be reduced. All exposed firehose had to be tested. 

Electrical and electronic equipment needed cleaning and overhauling. The department already 

has replaced two generators that failed after being used at Allen Street. Overtime was paid as well 

as “stand-by” time for mutual aid companies. It has been estimated that cost to the Springfield 

Fire Department will exceed 500,000 dollars.

4. Evacuation plans should incorporate clearly defined zone boundaries.

Although the evacuations went well, they would have been easier and less complicated if evacuation zones had been established citywide prior to the incident. It was suggested that street 

maps showing the boundaries of the zones should be placed in police patrol cars. Planned use 

of public transportation buses for the evacuation proved to be highly successful.

5. Multiple channel radio communications are essential in an evacuation situation.

The greatest communications problem in the incident was the limitation of fire department 

radio channels. The current system has only one channel. The city had previously addressed this 

problem but new equipment had not yet been installed. Cellular phones proved to be extremely 

helpful as did the services of amateur radio operators. The command post was also equipped 

with radios on the bus frequency. Having direct communication with the buses not only helped 

coordinate the evacuations but provided an additional means for obtaining chlorine condition 

reports.

6. It was useful to have the city attorney on the Hazmat team and available at the incident.

The city attorney can provide valuable advice in such matters as evacuation authority, issuing of 

evacuation orders, arrests, and city liability.

In summary, the Allen Street incident points out the problems of dealing with Hazmat information 

as well as the importance of planning and inter-departmental cooperation before the incident. The 

value of communications and the need for legal assistance were also pointed out. It is hoped that the 

lessons described above can be applied by others in order to learn from Springfield’s experience.

POSTSCRIPT – CHLORINE PLANT FIRE IN GLENDALE, ARIZONA

Following the Springfield fire, a fire in a Glendale, Arizona, warehouse storing similar swimming 

pool chemicals totally destroyed the building on August 21, 1988. Rainstorms had moved through 

the area shortly before the fire. On arrival, the building was well involved in fire. Heavy red-brown 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 9

smoke, probably due to nitrogen-trichloride, was issuing from the building, and explosions could 

be heard inside the structure.

The warehouse was fully sprinklered, but it is possible that the sprinkler piping may have been damaged, since only a slight amount of water was coming from the water motor gong. Eventually, the 

roof collapsed. Extinguishment was accomplished through an external attack. Approximately 200-

300 people were evacuated from the area. (For more information, contact Lt. Greg Victor, Glendale 

Fire Department, 7505 North 55th Avenue, Glendale, AZ 85301, (602) 931-5614.) 

Even though the cause is officially listed as undetermined, review of the circumstances of the 

Springfield fires suggested rain leakage as a possible cause scenario for the Glendale fire. The most 

likely explanation of the red-brown smoke was the presence of nitrogen oxides that were released 

along with chlorine when trichloroisocyanuric acid breaks down in reaction to heat.
10

Appendices

A. General Layout of the Second Floor of Advanced Laboratories

B. Second Floor Storage Area and Blending Room

C. List of Slides, Selected Photographs

D. A Material Safety Data Sheet for Trichloroisocyanuric Acid; Courtesy of Monsanto Chemical 

Company

E. Guidelines for Safe Handling and Storage of Calcium Hypochlorite and Chlorinated Isocyanurate Pool Chemicals, 

Monsanto, Olin, and PPG; Reproduced with Permission of Monsanto Chemical Company, 800 

North Lindbergh Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63167.
11

Appendix A

Appendix A
12

Appendix B
13

Appendix C

List of Slides, Selected Photographs

The slides with an asterisk have been made into photos and are reproduced following this list.

1. Interior view of the command post showing the communications position. The wall-mounted 

status board can be seen as well as the cellular telephone and radios for the police, fire, and 

public transit busses. The status board is covered with plastic and notes can be made using 

wax pencils.

2. Same as number 1 but with a wider view showing a map of the city. The map is also covered 

with plastic and was used to plot areas of evacuation.

3. Outside view of the command post.

4. Springfield Fire Department Hazmat Team vehicle. View of the driver’s side showing open 

compartments and their contents.

5. Close-up of the communications compartment-containing the Hazmat reference library.

6. Springfield Fire Department Hazmat Team vehicle. Right side compartments opened to show 

SCBA equipment and Hazmat suits.

*7. Interior view of the second floor looking at the east wall in the area of the “remix” storage. 

This is believed to be the area of origin. Deep burning of the wood floor can be seen as well 

as the window reportedly left open following the first fire.

*8. Interior view of the second floor looking south. One of the blending machines can be seen 

as can the door opening in the south wall. Rain that reportedly resulted in the first fire was 

blown in under the door that was in this opening.

9. View of the second floor ceiling over the “remix” storage area. The disconnected and capped 

sprinkler branch line can be seen in the center of the shot.

10. View of the “remix” storage area looking south. Burning of the floor through to the concrete 

sub floor is shown in the foreground.

11. View of the second floor looking north into the container storage area showing collapsed 

structural members.

12. Same view as number 18 showing a close-up of the structural collapse.

13. Outside view of the west side of the building showing the damage to the south end of the 

building on the second floor.

14. Outside view of the west side of the building showing the portable swimming pools used to 

dilute the chemicals removed by Clean Harbors during the clean-up.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*

*16. Close-up of the swimming pools. The area of roof collapse can also be seen.

17. Overview of the west side of the building from the north end showing the swimming pools 

and damage to the storage area at the north end.
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 157. Interior view of the second floor looking at the east wall in the area of the “remix” storage.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

8. Interior view of the second floor looking south.
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 1715. Long shot of the west side of the building including the swimming pools and showing damage to the second floor.
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

16. Close-up of the swimming pools. The area of roof collapse can also be seen.
19

Appendix D

Appendix D

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 1 of 7

MONSANTO COMPANY

800 N. LINDBERGH BLVD.

MONSANTO PRODUCT NAME ST. LOUIS, MO 63167 

ACL® 90 PLUS CHLORlNATlNG Emergency Phone No.

COMPOSITION (Call Collect)

314-694-1000

PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION

Synonym(s): 1,3,5-Trichloro-s-triazine-2,4,6(1H,3H,5H)-trione;

Trichloroisocyanurate acid; Trichloro-s-triazinetrione

Chemical Name: 1,3,5-Triazine-2,4,6(1H,3H,5H)-trione, 1,3,5-trichloro-,

Chemical Formula: C3N3O3CL3

Chemical Family: Chlorinated isocyanurates

CAS No.: 87-90-1

EPA Reg. No.: 524-107

TSCA lnventory: 1,3,5-Triazine-2,4,6,(1H,3H,5H)-trione, 1,3,5-trichloroappears on the Inventory of Chemical Substances published

by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under

authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).

DOT Proper Shipping

Name: Trichloroisocyanuric Acid, dry

DOT Hazard Class/

I.D. No.: Oxidizer/UN2468

DOT Label(s): Oxidizer

U.S. Surface Freight 

Classification: Trichloroisocyanunc Acid

(Bleach Assistant Compound, NOIBN, dry) 

Reportable Quantify (RQ)

Under U.S. EPA CERCLA

Regulations: Not Listed

Hazardous Chemical(s)

Under OSHA Hazard

Communication Standard: This substance is identified as a hazardous chemical under

the criteria of the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard

(29 CFR 1910.1200):

Trichloroisocyanuric acid, CAS Reg. No. 87-90-1
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (Continued)

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 2 of 7

WARNING STATEMENTS

Keep out of reach of children.

DANGER!

HIGHLY CORROSIVE.

CAUSES IRREVERSIBLE EYE DAMAGE.

CAUSES BURNS TO SKIN.

IRRITATING TO NOSE AND THROAT.

MAY BE FATAL IF SWALLOWED.

WILL BURN WITH THE EVOLUTION OF CHLORINE AND EQUALLY TOXIC GASES.

STRONG OXIDIZING AGENT.

CONTACT WITH WATER SLOWLY LIBERATES IRRITATING AND HAZARDOUS CHLORINECONTAINING GASES,

DECOMPOSES AT 460°F TO 460°F WITH LIBERATION OF HARMFUL GASES.

Mix only with water. Use clean dry utensils. Do not add this product to any dispensing device containing

remnants of any other product. Such use may cause a violent reaction leading to fire or explosion.

Contamination with moisture, organic matter, or other chemicals may start a chemical reaction with

generation of heat, liberation of hazardous gases, and possible generation of fire and explosion.

Directions for Use:

It is a violation of Federal Law to use this product in a manner inconsistent with its labeling.

FOR INDUSTRIAL USE ONLY. FOR REPACKAGING OR FORMULATING AS A DISINFECTANT,

SANITIZER, BACTERICIDE, FUNGICIDE OR ALGICIDE. Repackagers or formulators must obtain

their own EPA Registration Number to legally market this product for these uses.

Note: Drum contains absorbent packets. Remove packets before using contents. Discard packets with reuse.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

Do not get in eyes, on skin, or on clothing.

Wear goggles or face shield and rubber gloves when handling.

Avoid breathing dust or fumes.

Wash thoroughly with soap and water after handling.

Remove and wash contaminated clothing before reuse.

EMERGENCY AND FIRST AID PROCEDURES

IF SWALLOWED, drink promptly a large quantity of milk, egg whites, gelatin solution, or, if these are

not available, drink large quantities of water. Avoid alcohol.

IF ON SKIN, immediately brush off excess chemical and flush with plenty of water. Remove contaminated

clothing. Wash clothing before reuse. lf irritation persists, call a physician.

IF IN EYES, flush with plenty of water. Get medical attention.

IF INHALED, remove person to fresh air. Call a physician. 

Note To Physician: Probable mucosal damage may contraindicate the use of gastric lavage.

IN CASE OF: FIRE, if possible, isolate container in open air or well ventilated area. Flood with large

volume of water.

IN CASE OF: CONTAMINATION OR DECOMPOSITION, do not reseal container.

Appendix D (cont'd)
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 21

Appendix D (Continued)

Appendix D (cont’d)

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 3 of 7

OCCUPATIONAL CONTROL PROCEDURES

Eye Protection: Wear chemical splash goggles and have eye baths immediately available where

there is potential for eye contact.

Skin Protection: Wear appropriate protective gloves and protective clothing that provide a banter

to prevent skin contact. Consult glove manufacturer to determine appropriate type

glove for given application. Wash immediately if skin is contaminated. Launder

contaminated clothing and clean protective equipment before reuse. Provide a

safety shower at any location where skin contact can occur. Wash thoroughly

after handling.

Respiratory

Protection: Avoid breathing dust or vapor. Use NIOSH/MSHA approved equipment when airborne exposure limits are exceeded. Full facepiece equipment is recommended

and, if used, replaces need for face shield and/or chemical splash goggles. Consult respirator manufacturer to determine appropriate type equipment for given

application. The respirator use limitations specified by NIOSH/MSHA or the manufacturer must be observed. High airborne concentrations may require use of

self-contained breathing apparatus or supplied air respirator. Respiratory protection programs must be in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.134.

Ventilation: Provide ventilation to control exposure levels below airborne exposure limits.

Use local mechanical exhaust ventilation at sources of air contamination such

as open process equipment.

Airborne

Exposure Limits: Typical Product Composition:

Active Ingredient: Trichloro-s-triazinetrione 99%

Inert Ingredients 1%

Available Chlorine 90%

OSHA PEL: None Established

ACGIH TLV® None Established

3 Monsanto has adopted an internal limit of 0.5 mg/m TWA, 1.5 mg/m3 STEL for ACL 90 PLUS chlorinating

composition.

Chlorine

OSHA PEL/C: 1 ppm (3 mg/m3

)

ACGIH TLV®/TWA: 1 ppm (3 mg/m3

)

TLV®

STEL: 3 ppm (9 mg/m3)

FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION

ACL® 90 PLUS chlorinating composition is not flammable, but if heated by an outside source to a

temperature of 460-480°F, this material will undergo self-sustaining decomposition with evolution of

heat and dense noxious gases.

Extinguishing Media: A thermal decomposition can be extinguished by flooding with copious quantities of water or by isolating the decomposing material and allowing it to be consumed.

Special Firefighting 

Procedures: Firefighters and others subjected to products of decomposition should wear

full protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus. Chlorine containing gases with traces of phosgene can be liberated at temperatures in

excess of 400°F.

(Fire Protection Information Continued On The Next Page)
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (Continued)

Appendix: D (cont’d)

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 4 of 7

FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION (Continued)

Unusual Fire and

Explosion Hazards: Small quantities of water react with ACL 90 PLUS to form hazardous quantities of nitrogen trichloride which is violently explosive. See Technical Bulletin

IC/WT-104 for further information.

REACTIVITY DATA

Materials to Avoid: Avoid contact with water on concentrated ACL 90 PLUS in the container. Concentrated ACL 90 PLUS in the container reacts with water

to form hypochlorous acid and cyanuric acid. Also avoid contact with

easily oxidizable organic material; ammonia, urea, or similar nitrogencontaining compounds; inorganic reducing compounds; calcium

hypochlorite; alkalis. 

Hazardous Decomposition

Products: Chlorine-containing gases can be produced. Traces of phosgene can

be liberated at high temperatures 400°F.

Hazardous Polymerization: Does not occur.

HEALTH EFFECTS SUMMARY

The following information presents both human experience and the results of scientific experiments

used by qualified experts to assess the effects of ACL 90 PLUS on the health of industrially exposed individuals and to support the Precautionary Statements and Occupational Control Procedures recommended in this document. To avoid misunderstanding, the data provided in this section should be interpreted by individuals trained in evaluation of this type of information.

Human Experience

Dermal contact and inhalation are expected to be the primary routes of occupational exposure to ACL

90 PLUS. ACL 90 PLUS is considered to be corrosive to the eyes and skin. Exposure to ACL 90 PLUS 

dust or fumes has been reported to produce eye, nose, throat and respiratory tract irritation.

On contact with moisture ACL 90 PLUS readily decomposes to chlorine, hypochlorous acid and cyanuric

acid. The tissue damage resulting from contact with ACL 90 PLUS is considered to result, in part, from its

chlorine and hypochlorous acid decomposition products. Exposure to chlorine gas has been reported to

cause burning of the eyes with lacrimation; burning of the nose and mouth with minorrhea; and irritation of

the linings of the entire respiratory tract with coughing, a choking sensation, substernal pain, vomiting,

nausea, headache, dizziness and syncope. The onset of severe respiratory symptoms following exposure

to chlorine, including pulmonary edema and pneumonitis, may be delayed.

Toxicological Data

Data from Monsanto studies and from the scientific literature indicate the following:

ACL 90 PLUS

Oral LD50 (Rat): 600 mg/kg, Slightly Toxic

Dermal LD50 (Rabbit): 7,600 mg/kg, Practically Nontoxic

Eye Irritation (Rabbit, 24-hr): Corrosive

Skin Irritation (Rabbit, 24-hr): Corrosive

DOT Skin Irritation (Rabbit, 4-hr): Not Corrosive

3 Rats were exposed by inhalation to dust of ACL 90 PLUS at exposure levels of 3.2, 10.1 and 31 mgm

for 6 hours/day, 5 days/week for 4 weeks. Signs of irritation including lacrimation, salivation and labored

breathing were observed at the mid- and high-exposure levels. Increased adrenal weights and blood

chemistry parameter alterations were also noted in the mid- and high-exposure groups. No adverse 3 histopathological effects were observed. The no-effect level is considered to be 3.2 mg/m .

(Health Effects Summary Continued On The Next Page)
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 23

Appendix D (Continued)

Appendix D (cont’d)

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 5 of 7

HEALTH EFFECTS SUMMARY (Continued)

Additional information

Contact of ACL 90 PLUS with moisture will produce cyanuric acid and hazardous chlorine gas and

hypochlorous acid. A Threshold Limit Value (TLV®) has been established by the American Conference of

Governmental Industrial Hygienists-for chlorine. For further information on chlorine, please refer to the

current edition of the Documentation of Threshold Limit Values. For information on cyanuric acid, please

refer to the Cyanuric Acid Dry Material Safety Data Sheet.

PHYSICAL DATA

Appearance and Odor: White crystalline solid; slight chlorine odor

Melting Point: 225-230°C (decomposes)

Loose Bulk Density (Ibs./cu. ft.): 56 (regular) 

57 (granular and extra granular) 

pH (1% solution @ 25°C): 3.0

Solubility @ 25°C: 1.2 g/100 g H2O

Note: These physical data are typical values based on material tested but may vary from sample to sample.

Typical values should not be construed as a guaranteed analysis of any specific lot or as specification Items.

SPILL, LEAK & DISPOSAL INFORMATION

THIS SPILL, LEAK AND DISPOSAL INFORMATION IS APPLICABLE FOR CONCENTRATED ACL.

Emergency Spill and

Leak Information: Contain spilled material. Any spillage of ACL should be cleaned up as soon as

possible to prevent contamination with foreign material with which it may react.

See “Reactivity Data” section of this document.

KEEP SPILLED MATERIAL DRY. If allowed to stand in damp or wet areas,

tear-producing vapors may result.

Sweep, scoop, or vacuum up all spilled material, contaminated soil, and other

contaminated material and place in clean, dry containers for disposal. Complete

cleanup on a dry basis if possible. Floor sweeping compounds should not be

used in the removal of ACL as fuming, fire or explosion may result. Follow all

protective measures indicated in the “Occupational Control Procedures” section

of this document.

As currently defined, unneutralized ACL is a hazardous substance under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(CERCLA). If 100 pounds or more are released into the environment, it must be

reported to the National Response Center (800-424-8802 or 202-426-2675). 

Since local, state and federal laws may vary, consult your attorney or appropriate

regulatory officals for information relating to spill reporting.

Keep unneutralized ACL out of sewers, watersheds and water systems.

(Spill Leak & Disposal Information Continued On The Next Page)
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (Continued)

Appendix D (cont'd)

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 6 of 7

SPILL, LEAK & DISPOSAL INFORMATION (Continued)

Disposal Information:

Waste Disposal: Dispose of in accordance with all local, state and federal regulations.

As currently defined in Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

(RCRA) regulations, ACL 90 PLUS, when discarded, is a hazardous waste exhibiting the characteristics of ignitability (D-001) and reactivity (D-003). See 40 CFR

261.23. Its disposal, therefore, is regulated by Federal RCRA regulations. Consult

your attorney or appropriate regulatory officials for information regarding additional state and local waste disposal requirements.

Do not dispose of filled or partially filled containers in a common waste compactor. Contaminants in the compactor such as oil, sawdust, floor-sweeping

compound, etc. could cause spontaneous decomposition and fusion of the material at ambient temperatures resulting in rupture of the drum.

If material is dry, disposal by incineration is recommended.

Do not transport wet material. An alternate method for disposal is by neutralization to a non-oxidizing residue which can then be discarded safely. This procedure should be undertaken only after reviewing the details of the method in

Monsanto Technical Bulletin IC/WT-104 on storage and handling of ACL.

Wastes of this pesticide may cause irreversible eye damage and bums to skin

and may be dangerous. Improper disposal of excess pesticide, spray mixture, or

rinsate is a violation of Federal law. If these wastes cannot be disposed of by use

according to label instructions, contact your State Pesticide or Environmental

Control Agency, or the Hazardous Waste representative at the nearest EPA

Regional office for guidance.

Container Disposal: Completely empty liner by shaking and tapping sides and bottom to loosen clinging particles. Empty residue into application equipment. Then dispose of liner in a

sanitary landfill or by incineration if allowed by State and local authorities. Rinse

empty container with water, and dispose of in the same manner.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

The preparation of concentrated solutions or slurries of ACL® 90 PLUS chlorinating composition is not

recommended. Also, ACL 90 PLUS is not recommended for formulated bleaches containing strong alkali,

surfactants or hydrated chemicals.

Environmental Toxicity Information:

48-hr LC50 Daphnia magna: 0.21 ppm, Highly Toxic 

96-hr LC50 Bluegill Sunfish: 0.30 ppm, Highly Toxic 

96-hr LC50 Rainbow Trout: 0.32 ppm, Highly Toxic 

Oral LD50 Mallard Duck: 1,021 mg/kg, Slightly Toxic

8-Day Dietary LC50 Mallard Duck: Greater than 10,000 ppm, Practically Nontoxic

8-Day Dietary LC50 Bobwhite Quail: Greater than 7,422 ppm, Practically Nontoxic

This product is toxic to fish. Do not discharge into lakes, streams, ponds, or public waters unless in accordance with NPDES Permit. For guidance contact the regional office of EPA.

Storage: Retie polyethylene liner after each use and keep container tightly closed. Store in a cool 

dry place. Do not allow water to get into container. Keep containers off wet floors. Do not

contaminate water, food, or feed by storage or disposal.

Refer to Monsanto Technical Bulletin IC/WT-104 for detailed information on handling and storage.
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 25

Appendix D (Continued)

Appendix D (cont’d)

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA Page 7 of 7

DATE: 11/25/85 SUPERSEDES: 11/25/84

MSDS NO.: S00010524

FOR ADDITIONAL NON-EMERGENCY INFORMATION, CONTACT:

MSDS Coordinator

Specialty Chemicals 

Monsanto Chemical Company

314-694-1000

(A Unit of Monsanto Co.)

Although the information and recommendations sot forth herein (hereinafter "lnformation") are presented in good faith and believed to be

correct as of the data hereof, Monsanto Company makes no representations as to the completeness or accuracy thereof. Information is

supplied upon the condition that the person receiving same will make their own determination as to its suitability for their purposes to

use. In no event will Monsanto Company be responsible for damages of any nature whatsoever resulting from the use of or reliance upon

Information. NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES. EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A

PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR OF ANY OTHER NATURE ARE MADE HEREUNDER WITH RESPECT TO INFORMATION OR THE

PRODUCT TO WHlCH INFORMATION REFERS.

ACL® is a registered trademark of Monsanto Company.

TLV® is a registered trademark of American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (Continued)

Appendix D (cont'd) 

Monsanto MATERIAL SAFETY DATA 
27

Appendix E

(Reproduced with permission)
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

NOTICE: Although the information and recommendations contained in this publication (hereinafter “Information”) are presented in good faith and 

believed to be correct as of the date of this publication, Monsanto, Olin and PPG make no representations or warranties as to the completeness or 

accuracy thereof. You must make your own decision as to its suitability for your purposes prior to 

use. You must also determine what laws, rules, and 

regulations apply at your location, including, 

without limitation, state and local codes. Nothing 

contained herein is intended to supersede or conflict 

with Information contained in Material Safety Data 

Sheets or other Information provided by the supplier of product. In no event will Monsanto, Olin 

and PPG be responsible for damages of any nature 

whatsoever resulting from the use of or reliance 

upon Information or any product to which Information refers. Nothing contained herein is to be 

construed as a recommendation to use any product, 

process, equipment or formulation in conflict with 

any patent, and no representation or warranty, 

express or implied, is made that use thereof will 

not infringe any patent. No representations or 

warranties, either express or implied, of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or of any

other nature are made with respect to Information 

or the products to which Information refers. 

For more detailed information on specific 

topics, or additional copies of this publication, 

contact:

Monsanto Chemical Company 

800 North Lindbergh Blvd. 

St. Louis, MO 63167 

(314) 694­1519 

Olin Chemicals 

3.50 Knotter Drive 

Cheshire, CT 06410 

(203) 271­4161 

PPG Industries 

One PPG Place 

Pittsburgh, PA 15272 

(412) 434­3556 

ACL is a registered trademark of Monsanto Chemical Company.

CCH, CDR, Constant Chlor, HTH, Pace, Prochlor, Pulsar, Sock 

It, Sun, Sun Burn, and Sun Burst are registered trademarks of 

Olin Corporation. 

Induclor, Pittabs, Pittclor, Repak, Sustain, and Zappit are registered trademarks of PPG Industries. 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 29

Appendix E (Continued)

Table of Contents

Introduction 2

Trademarks 3

Product Nomenclature 4

Incompatibilities and Hazards 6

Storage 7

Processing Guidelines 16

Transportation Guidelines 17

Personal Protective Equipment 18

First Aid 18

Emergency Procedures 18

Handling Minor Spills 19

Do’s and Don’ts 21

Emergency Telephone Numbers 22

1 
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

2 

Appendix E (Continued)

Introduction

Two types of chemicals used to disinfect swimming pool water are calcium hypochlorite and 

chlorinated isocyanurates (chlorinated­s­triazinetriones). These pool chlorinating chemicals are sold 

by the manufacturers in various forms, under a 

number of different trademarks (see page 3). 

Calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocy 

anurates are incompatible with each other. And

they are incompatible with most other chemicals 

used in pool water treatment, such as algicides, 

clarifiers, pool conditioners and tile cleaners. 

Therefore, it is important to follow proper storage 

and handling procedures in order to prevent conditions which might cause emergencies. 

This publication was prepared by representatives of Monsanto Chemical Company, Olin 

Corporation and PPG Industries. The objective is to 

provide a reference on the safe handling and storage 

of calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurate pool chemicals. It is not intended to supersede, 

or be used in place of, information provided by the 

supplier of the pool chemical being used. Such 

information provided by the pool chemical supplier 

should always be followed. 

It is for use by processors and repackers of 

these chemicals, as well as for distributors, wholesalers and retailers. It is also intended for fire chiefs 

and building inspectors. 

This publication includes guidelines, definitions and storage arrangements, many of which are 

excerpted from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 43A, Storage of Liquid and 

Solid Oxidizing Materials, 1980. It provides data on 

the properties of pool chlorinating chemicals and 

their NFPA ratings and it contains information on 

personal protection and first aid. 

It also covers the containment of small spills 

(less than 100 lbs.). In the event of a larger spill, you 

should call your pool chemical supplier for information on how to deal with it. (See back cover for 

emergency phone numbers.) 

In the event of any fire, you should immediately call your local fire department­even if the 

building has a sprinkler system. In extinguishing a 

fire, copious amounts of water should be used. Do 

not use dry chemical fire extinguishers. After the 

fire department has been summoned, call your pool 

chemical supplier for additional assistance. 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 31

Appendix E (Continued)

Trademarks

Calcium Hypochlorite 

Olin trademarks for calcium hypochlorite 

products include: 

CCH®

Constant Chlor®

HTH®

Pace®

Prochlor®

Pulsar®

Sock It®

Sun Burn®

Sun Burst®

PPG trademarks for calcium hypochlorite 

include:

Induclor®

Pittabs®

Pittclor®

Repak®

Sustain®

Zappit®

Chlorinated Isocyanurates 

Olin trademarks for chlorinated isocyanurates 

include:

CDB®

CDB Clearon®

Constant Chlor®

HTH®

Pace®

Prochlor®

Sun®

Monsanto trademark for chlorinated isocyanurates is: 

ACL®

Note: Many of these pool chemicals are sold 

to processors and repackers who resell under 

various brand names. Such packages will 

always identify the product inside by its 

chemical name. 
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Product Nomenclature 

Calcium hypochlorite is sometimes called "cal 

hypo" for short. It is available in two forms: hydrated (more than 5.5% water, but not more than 

10% water) and anhydrous (less than 5.5% water). 

The properties are similar, although the anhydrous 

material is more susceptible to the initiation of a 

self­sustained decomposition due to contamination, 

heat or fire. 

Calcium Hypochlorite 

Anhydrous Hydrate

CAS Number: 7778-54-3 7778-54-3

Formula: Ca(OCl)2 Ca(OC1)2 • H2O

NFPA Oxidizer Class 3 3

Manufacturer Olin Olin and brands: HTH CCH

Constant Chlor 

HTH

Pace Prochlor

Pulsar Sock It

Sun Burn

Sun Burst

PPG

lnduclor Pittabs

Pittclor

Repak

Sustain

Zappit

Chlorinated isocyanurates are also known as 

chloroisocyanurates or chlorinated­s­triazinetriones. They are sometimes called "isos" for short. 

These names describe four chemically related 

products

One of them is the acid form: trichloroisocyanuric acid, also known familiarly as "trichlor." 

The other three are salts. One of these is the 

potassium salt: potassium dichloroisocyanurate. 

The other two are sodium salts: sodium dichloroisocyanurates. One of these sodium salts is anhydrous; the other is a dihydrate (two molecules of 

bound water). Any of these may be known by the 

nickname "dichlor." 

For any of the chlorinated isocyanurates, if 

there is a number following the trademark (e.g. 

CDB 90 or ACL 90), it indicates the approximate 

percent available chlorine for the product, If there 

is no number following the trademark, read the 

package or the label on the container; the percent 

available chlorine will be displayed there. 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 33

Appendix E (Continued)

Chlorinated Isocyanurates 

Chemical Name: 

CAS Number: 

Chemical

Structure:

NFPA Oxidizer 

Class:

Manufacturer

and Brands: 

Acid Potassium Salt 

Trichloro-s- Potassium dichloro-striazinetrione triazinetrione

Trichloroisocyanuric Potassium dichloroisoacid cyanurate

87-90-1 2244-2 1-5 

2 3

Monsanto Monsanto

ACL 90 ACL 59

Olin

CDB 90

Constant Chlor 

Pace

Prochlor

Sun

Chemical Name: 

CAS Number: 

Chemical

Structure:

NFPA Oxidizer 

Class:

Manufacturer

and Brands: 

Sodium salt-anhydrous 

Sodium dichloro-striazinetrione

Sodium dichloroisocyanurate

2893-78-9

Sodium salt-dihydrate 

Sodium dichloro-striazinetrione dihydrate 

Sodium dichloroisocyanurate dihydrate 

51580-86-0

3

Monsanto

ACL 60

Olin

CDB 63

Constant Chlor 

Pace

Prochlor

Sun

1

Monsanto

ACL 56

Olin

CDB Clearon

Constant Chlor

Pace

Prochlor

Sun

5 
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

6 

Appendix E (Continued)

Incompatibilities and Hazar

Calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates are dry solids with strong oxidizing properties. 

They are stable when stored in a cool, dry, ventilated area...and not contaminated by other chemicals such as acids, alkalis or easily oxidizable materials.

However, if these pool chemicals are mishandled, improperly stored or contaminated, they 

can become unstable and dangerous. 

Incompatibility 

Calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates are chlorinating agents. They are also highly 

reactive oxidizing agents and are classed as "oxidizers" by the NFPA and the Department of Transportation (DOT). Because of their composition and 

properties, special precautions should be taken to 

prevent their contact and reaction with other 

chemicals during storage, handling, processing or 

shipment. 

Each of these pool chlorinating chemicals is 

incompatible with each of the others. Therefore, 

special care should be taken to separate these 

chemicals in storage by using a buffer zone, wall or 

appropriate distance. They should also be separated 

from liquids since they will react when wet. 

Some of the chemicals that are incompatible with 

calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates are: 

Acetic acid 

Paint, oils and greases 

Glycerin 

Petroleum products (gasoline, kerosene, etc.) 

Ethers 

Amines 

Ammonia and ammonium salts 

Quaternary ammonium compounds ("quats" 

such as algicides) 

Solvents (toluene, xylene, turpentine, etc.) 

Alcohols (methyl, ethyl, propyl and higher 

alcohols)

Phenols

Aliphatic and aromatic unsaturated 

compounds

Peroxides (hydrogen, sodium, calcium, etc.) 

Reducing agents (sulfides, sulfites, bisulfites, 

thiosulfates, nitrates, etc.) 

Floor sweeping compounds 

For more detailed information on the incompatibilities between pool chemicals and other chemicals, please contact the appropriate pool chemical 

manufacturer (see inside front cover). 

ds

Fire and Fume Hazards 

Calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates are not combustible. However, they do have 

thermal decomposition points. Calcium 

hypopochlorite decomposes above 350°F (177°C). 

Isos decompose in the range of 428°­482°F (220°­ 

25O°C). For trichlor, decomposition requires heat. 

However for dichlor, the decomposition itself 

generates heat...enough heat to ignite paper and 

wood and cause a fire. There will also be a dense 

white cloud of gases characteristic of any thermal 

decomposition of pool chemicals. This smoke is 

toxic and very difficult to see through. 

Examples of heat sources capable of raising 

product temperatures above their decomposition 

points include: 

Lighted cigarette or match 

Hot welding rod or molten particles from a 

welding operation 

Hot bearing on a conveyor 

Hot spot on conveying equipment caused by 

friction from metal­to­metal contact 

The spark from static electricity may have a 

temperature considerably higher than the decomposition point of cal hypo or isos. However, a spark 

cannot transfer enough heat to cause thermal decomposition

On the other hand, if the pool chemicals are 

contaminated with easily­oxidized materials (e.g. 

gasoline, oil, sawdust, or floor sweepings) a reaction can start, even at temperatures well below 

their decomposition points. In fact, contamination 

can cause spontaneous combustion at room temperature.

Each of the pool chemicals has different 

thermal characteristics, 

Calcium hypochlorite: Temperatures above 

350°F (177°C) cause rapid decomposition which 

generates oxygen and heat. A fire of great intensity 

may result. Direct exposure to an external fire will 

cause decomposition, eruption of the container and 

greatly increased intensity of the fire. Decomposition results in an inert white residue consisting 

mainly of calcium chloride. 

Dichloroisocyanurates: After the loss of any 

hydrate water, both the potassium and the sodium 

products will sustain thermal decomposition above 

428°F (22O°C), even in the absence of oxygen. 

Decomposition results in a yellow or brown porous 

inert residue. 

Trichloroisocyanuric acid: Once the heat 

source is removed, trichlor will not continue to 

decompose. Partial decomposition leaves a yellow 

or brown residue. Complete decomposition leaves 

very little residue. 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 35

Appendix E (Continued)

Storage

Proper storage of calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates is essential in order to minimize the possibility of an emergency. For added 

protection against that possibility, a site­specific 

emergency plan should be drawn up and checked 

with local fire and hazardous materials officials. 

The plan should be reviewed with them annually 

(or sooner, if changes are made). An emergency drill 

involving facility staff and public response agencies 

should be held at least once per year. 

The storage facility should be cool, dry and 

well­ventilated. Stock should be rotated on a "firstin, first­out” basis (FIFO). In addition, stock should 

be properly arranged. The following sections are included to help you in determining your storage 

requirements. They include: 

Definitions (classes of oxidizers and types of 

storage) 

Identification (of fire hazards of materials bei

stored) 

Storage arrangements (for buildings and retail

shelves, based on NFPA Guidelines and 

Bulletin NFPA 43A­1980)

Other storage considerations (general 

guidelines, based on NFPA Bulletin 43A­198

Definitions 

Oxidizing material: Any solid or liquid that 

readily yields oxygen or other oxidizing gases or 

readily reacts to oxidize combustible materials. 

Oxidizers are divided into four classes (1 to 4), 

based primarily on their effect on the burning rat

of materials with which they come in contact. 

Class 1 has the least effect on burning rate; Class 

the most. None of the pool chlorinating chemica

falls into Class 4 (see Box). 

Class 1 Oxidizer: An oxidizing material who

primary hazard is that it may increase the 

burning rate of the combustible material wit

which it comes in contact. 

Class 2 Oxidizer: An oxidizing material that

will moderately increase the burning rate or 

may cause spontaneous ignition of the combustible material with which it comes in 

contact. 

Class 3 Oxidizer: An oxidizing material that 

will cause a severe increase in the burning rate 

of combustible material with which it comes 

in contact or which will undergo vigorous selfsustained decomposition when catalyzed or 

exposed to heat. 

‘Excerpted with permission from NFPA 43A­1980, Code for the 

Storage of Liquid and Solid Oxidizing Materials. Copyright©,

1980, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02269. 

This reprinted material is not the complete and official position 

of the NFPA on the referenced subject which is represented 

only by the standard in its entirety. 

Incompatible materials: Those materials that, when 

mixed with oxidizing materials, can cause hazardous reactions or can catalyze decomposition of the 

ng oxidizer. See page 6 for typical examples. 

Storage type: The type of separation between 

different kinds of oxidizing materials required 

when they are in storage. Storage type is deter­ mined by the nature of the material and various 

conditions of the room in which the materials are 

0) being stored. There are three types of storage: 

Segregated: Storage in the same room, but 

physically separated by space from incompatible materials, using sills or curbs to maintain spacing, or by using intervening storage of 

nonhazardous, compatible materials.

Cutoff: Storage in the same building or area, e but physically separated from incompatible 

materials by partitions or walls. 

4 Detached: Storage either in the open or in a 

ls separate building, located well away from all 

structures, except those housing operations se related directly to the production of the stored 

materials.

h Warehouse: Those facilities where oxidizing 

materials are received and stored, and from which 

they are subsequently shipped. 

NFPA Oxidizer Class of

Pool Chlorinating Chemicals

Class 1 Sodium dichloroisocyanurate, dihydrate

Class 2 Trichloroisocyanuric acid

Class 3 Calcium hypochlorite, anhydrous, greater than 39% by weight

Potassium dichloroisocyanurate, anhy­ drous

Sodium dichloroisocyanurate, anhydrous
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Identification of Materials in Storage 

All storage areas should be conspicuously identified 

with the words 

Class [number] Oxidizer 

They should also be identified by their hazard 

identification in accordance with NFPA 704, 

Standard System for the Identification of Fire 

Hazards of Materials. 

When materials having different hazard identifications are stored in the same area, the area 

should be marked to indicate the most severe of the 

health, flammability and reactivity hazards present 

in the area. l 

All packages should be individually marked with 

the chemical name of the oxidizer, or with other 

information which adequately permits accurate 

area identification.

Storage Arrangements for Buildings 

In general, oxidizers should be stored to avoid 

contact with incompatible materials such as 

ordinary combustibles, flammable liquids, greases 

and those materials­including other oxidizersthat could react with the oxidizer or catalyze its 

decomposition. 

Approval of the storage arrangement should 

also take into consideration the potential evolution 

of large quantities of toxic fumes resulting from 

decomposition which are severely hazardous to 

surrounding communities. 

The arrangement and quantity of oxidizers in 

storage depends on a number of factors: 

Class of oxidizer (1, 2 or 3) 

Storage type (segregated, cutoff or detached) 

Building usage (manufacturing or processing, 

warehouse or retail store] 

Building fire protection (sprinklered or nonsprinklered)

Note: For oxidizers, if the storage is to be considered sprinklered the sprinkler protection must be 

installed in accordance with NFPA 231, Standard

for Indoor General Storage, or NFPA 23 1 C, Standard for Rack Storage of Materials, whichever is 

applicable. Such a system should be able to provide 

a minimum water density of 0.2 gallons/minute 

per square foot (8.2 liters/minute per square meter) 

over an area not exceeding 5000 square feet (465 

square meters). 

To determine the storage arrangement for your 

building, first use Chart 1 as a key to the tables on 

pages 10 to 13 which contain: 

l Permissible size of the pile (length, width 

and height) 

l Minimum separation distance (to next pile 

and to walls) 

l Maximum quantity limit (per pile or per 

building, in tons). 

...for pool chlorinating chemicals stored in sprinklered and non­sprinklered buildings. 

Simply select the column which corresponds to 

the oxidizer class (1, 2 or 3) being stored and the 

row which corresponds to the type of storage (segregated, cutoff or detached) to be used. 

At the intersection of the selected column and 

row is the number of the table which contains the 

storage arrangement information. 

Note that for Class 1 oxidizers, Table 1 covers 

all types of storage arrangements. However, for 

Class 2 and Class 3 oxidizers, selection of the 

proper table depends on storage type. 

Chart 1. Key to Tables

Storage Type

Oxidizer Class

1 2 3

Segregated Table 2 Table 5

Detached Table 1 Table 3 Table 6

Cutoff

I I I

Table 4

I

Table 7

I

Associated with each of the tables is a diagram in 

which is shown the location of the various 

dimensions referred to in the table. 

For Class 1 oxidizers and Class 2 or Class 3 

segregated storage, use Diagram 1. 

For Class 2 or Class 3 detached storage, use 

Diagram 2. 

For Class 2 or Class 3 cutoff storage, use 

Diagram 3. 

8 

‘Hazard identifications for many oxidizing materials will be 

found in NFPA 49, Hazardous Chemicals Data, and in NFPA 

491M, Manual of Hazardous Chemical Reactions. 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 37

Appendix E (Continued)

Diagram 1. General Arrangement for Class 1 Oxidizers or 

Segregated Storage for Class 2 and Class 3 Oxidizers (All distances in feet) 

L = Length of individual pile

W = Width of individual pile H = Height of individual pile

Dl = Distance between compatible piles

D2 = Distance from pile to wall

D3 = Distance between incompatible piles

Diagram 2. Detached Storage for Class 2 and Class 3 Oxidizers (All distances in feet) 

L = Length

W = Width

H = Height

of

of

of

individual

individual

individual

pile

pile

pile

D1

D2

= Distance between

= Distance from pile

partition

compatible

to wall or

piles

Diagram 3. Cutoff Storage for Class 2 and Class 3 Oxidizers (All distances in feet) 

PARTITION OR WALL

L = Length of individual pile

W = Width of individual pile

H = Height of individual pile

D1 = Distance between compatible piles

D2 = Distance from pile to wall

9 
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Table 1. Class 1 Oxidizers­Segregated, Cutoff or Detached

Refer to Diagram 1 for location of dimensions Storage

Dim. Unit

Sprinklered

Building

Non­Sprinklered

Building

Pile Dimensions:

Length L Feet

Width W Feet

No Limit

50

50

50

Height H Feet

Pile Distance:

To Next Pile D1 Feet

20

3 .

15

6

To Walls D2 Feet 2 4

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons No Limit No Limit

Total Building Tons No Limit No Limit

Table 2. Class 2 Oxidizers­Segregated Storage

Refer to Diagram 1 for location of dimensions

Dim. Unit

Sprinklered

Building

Non­Sprinklered

Building

Pile Dimensions:

Length L Feet

Width W Feet

No Limit

No Limit

No Limit

No Limit

Height H Feet

Pile Distance to: Next Pile Dl Feet

10

10a

8

8a

Walls D2 Feet 2 4

Incompatible Storage D3 Feet

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons

12

20

10

5

Total Building Tons 200 100

a Aisle width must be equal to or greater than pile height.

10 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 39

Appendix E (Continued)

Table 3. Class 2 Oxidizers­Detached Storage Refer to Diagram 2 for location of dimensions

Sprinklered Non­Sprinklered Building

1a 2b Dim. Unit Building Type Type

Pile Dimensions:

Length L Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit

Width W Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit

Height H Feet 12 8 No Limit

Pile Distance to: 8c Next Pile Dl Feet 12c No Limit

2d Wall D2 Feet 2 2

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons 200 100 500

Total Building Tons No Limit No Limit 500

Type 1 Detached Storage is designed to limit a fire to a single block of material with reasonable manual fire fighting. Type 2 Detached Storage limits the total quantity in a single building because the possibility of successfully limiting damage

with manual fire fighting is questionable.

Aisle width must be equal to or greater than pile height.

Required for combustible buildings only.

Table 4. Class 2 Oxidizers­Cutoff Storage

Refer to Diagram 3 for location of dimensions

Sprinklered Non­Sprinklered

Dim. Unit Building Building

Pile Dimensions:

Length L Feet No Limit No Limit

Width W Feet No Limit No Limit

Height H Feet 12 8

Pile Distance to:

8a Next Pile D1 Feet 12a

Wall or Partition D2 Feet 2 4

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons 100 25

Total Building Tons 2000 500

Aisle width must be equal to or greater than pile height.

11 
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Table 5. Class 3 Oxidizers­Segregated Storage

Refer to Diagram 1 for location of dimensions

Manufacturing Plant Processing Plant

or Warehouse or Retail Store

Dim. Unit Sprink. Non­Sprink. Sprink. Non­Sprink.

Pile Dimensions:

Length L Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit No Limit

Width W Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit No Limit

Height H Feet 8 6 8 6

Pile Distance to:

8a 6a 8a 6a Next Pile D1 Feet

Walls D2 Feet 4 4 4 4

Incompatible Storage D3 Feet 10 8 10 8

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons 20 5 5 1.2

Total Building Tons 100 60 50 25

a Aisle width must be equal to or greater than pile height.

Table 6. Class 3 Oxidizers­Detached Storage

Refer to Diagram 2 for location of dimensions

Sprinklered Non­Sprinklered Building

Dim. 1a 2b Unit Building Type Type

Pile Dimensions: Length L Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit

Width W Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit

Height H Feet 10 6 No Limit

Pile Distance to:

Next Pile D1 6c Feet 10c No Limit

4d Wall D2 Feet 4 4

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons 150 75 300

Total Building Tons No Limit No Limit 300

Type 1 Detached Storage is designed to limit a fire to a single block of material with reasonable manual fire fighting.

Type 2 Detached Storage limits the total quantity in a single building because the possibility of successfully limiting damage

with manual fire fighting is questionable.

Aisle width must be equal to or greater than pile height.

Required for combustible buildings only.

12 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 41

Appendix E (Continued)

Table 7. Class Refer 3

to Oxidizers­Cutoff Storage Diagram 3 for location of dimensions

Dim. Unit

Manufacturing Plant

Processing Plant

or Warehouse Retail Store

Sprink. Non­Sprink. Sprink. Non­Sprink.

Pile Dimensions:

Length L Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit No Limit

Width W Feet No Limit No Limit No Limit No Limit

Height H Feet 10 6 10 6

Pile Distance to:

Next Pile D1 Feet 10a 6a 10a 6a

Wall or Partition D2 Feet 4 4 4 4

Maximum quantity:

Individual Pile Tons 60 15 30 7.5

Total Building Tons 1200 300 600 150

a Aisle width must be equal to or greater than pile height.

13 
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Storage Arrangements for Retail Store Shelves 

The same principles which are used for storage in 

buildings apply to storage on shelves. That is a pool 

chemical should be stored in such a way as to avoid 

contact with incompatible materials­including 

other oxidizers­which could react with the pool 

chemical or catalyze its decomposition. Use solid 

shelving so no loose or dripping material can fall 

through on the items beneath. 

In deciding how to place various types of pool 

chemicals on shelves, use the following guidelines: 

Always create barriers between incompatible 

pool chemicals. 

If possible, keep incompatible pool chemicals 

on their own shelves, in their own compartments, 

separated by solid vertical partitions. 

Try to avoid putting compartments containing 

incompatible pool chemicals next to one another. 

If it is not possible to provide vertical partitions on a shelf, use packages of inert products 

(such as filter aids like diatomaceous earth) to 

separate incompatible materials from one another. 

Place liquids on bottom shelves to prevent 

dripping on other pool chemicals in the event of 

breakage or leakage. 

Due to the almost infinite variety of shelving sizes 

and arrangements, and to widely varying pool 

chemical stocking requirements, it is obviously 

impossible to cover every situation. However, the 

following two diagrams may be of assistance in 

planning shelf storage. 

If the shelves contain only calcium hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates, follow the 

suggested plan shown in Diagram 4. 

If shelves also contain other types of pool 

chemicals (acid, pH adjusters, algicides, etc.), see 

Diagram 5. 

Additional Storage Considerations 

The general rules of safety, fire protection, housekeeping and strict stock rotation (first­in, first­out) 

should be followed closely when handling and 

storing pool chlorinating chemicals. 

The following recommendations are based 

primarily on NFPA Bulletin 43A (1980). 

Fire Protection: Fire hydrants, water supplies 

and sprinkler systems should be provided in accordance with the authority having jurisdiction. 

Installation should be in accordance with NFPA 

standards.

Fire hydrants: Conditions that affect the need 

for hydrant protection include: 

Nearness of exposures 

Size and construction of the building 

Amount and Class of NFPA oxidizer stored 

Availability of public fire protection 

Hydrants should be installed in accordance with 

NFPA 24, Standard for Outside Protection. 

Water supplies: Water supplies should be adequate for the protection of the oxidizer storage by 

hose streams and automatic sprinklers. 

Where protection is by means of hose streams 

alone, the water system should be capable of 

producing not less than 750 gpm (gallons per 

minute). Where there are automatic sprinklers, the 

system should provide 500 gpm in excess of the 

sprinkler water demand. 

Duration of the water supply should be in accordance with NFPA 231, Standard for Indoor 

General Storage and NFPA 231C, Standard for the 

Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems. 

Automatic sprinkler systems: The need for 

automatic sprinkler protection is determined by 

the nature of the materials, the manner of storage 

and the construction of the buildings under consideration. When automatic sprinkler systems are required, they should be installed in conformance 

with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of 

Sprinkler Systems. 

However, as previously noted (page 2), an 

oxidizer fire probably will not be contained by the 

sprinkler system alone. The fire department must 

be called. 

Smoking: Smoking should be prohibited in all 

storage areas which contain oxidizing materials. 

“No Smoking” signs should be placed conspicuously within the area and at all entrances to such 

storage areas. 

Waste disposal: The accumulation of combustible waste should be prohibited. Spilled materials, 

and leaking or broken containers, should be immediately removed to a safe area to await disposal. 

See Handling Minor Spills, page 19. 

Disposal should be in accordance with the 

manufacturers’ instructions and with all Federal, 

state and local regulations. 

Disposal Equipment: Items such as brooms and 

shovels should be dedicated to this use and kept 

clean, dry and uncontaminated. Clean polyethylene­lined drums for disposal of spilled material 

should be kept nearby. 

Forklifts: To minimize danger of contamination from spillage, forklifts should be either electric 

or propane. Diesel­ or gasoline­powered forklifts 

are not recommended. 

4 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 43

Appendix E (Continued)

Diagram 4. Retail Store Suggested Shelf Arrangement for 

Calcium Hypochlorite and Chlorinated Isocyanurates 

Shelf 1: Cal. Hypo. Shelf 2: Cal. Hypo.

Shelf 3: Cal. Hypo.

Shelf 4: Dichlor Shelf 5: Dichlor

Shelf 6: Dichlor

Shelf 7: Trichlor Shelf 8: Trichlor

Shelf 9: Trichlor

Diagram 5. Retail Store Suggested Shelf Arrangement for 

Pool Chemicals and Acids, pH Adjusters, Algicides, etc. 

Shelf 1: Cal. Hypo.

Shelf 2: Diatomaceous

earth

Shelf 3: Dichlor

Shelf 4: Trichlor

Shelf 5: Dry pH

adjusters Shelf 6: Muriatic acid

Shelf 7: Trichlor

Shelf 8: Diatomaceous

earth

Shelf 9: Algicide

15 
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Processing Guidelines 

Pool chemicals are sometimes sold to other companies for further processing, repackaging or tableting. 

If these companies are using various incompatible 

pool chlorinating chemicals (such as calcium 

hypochlorite and chlorinated isocyanurates) they 

must provide means of completely segregating 

their processes. 

The processing area should be a cool, dry, wellventilated location, preferably air­conditioned. The 

room should be under a slight negative pressure 

provided by a suitable vapor and dust removal 

system. See Dust Disposal, page 17.

Presses, conveyors and equipment associated 

with each processing operation­­including dust

collection systems­must be dedicated to that 

particular product line. Mixing of the products can 

result in serious fire and/or explosion and release of 

toxic gases. 

Forklifts should be electric­ or propane­powered to reduce the hazards from spillage of flammable or reactive products. Diesel­ or gasolinepowered forklifts are not recommended. 

It is recommended that operators of forklifts 

and mixing equipment wear safety glasses or 

goggles and protective clothing to prevent contact 

between pool chemicals and eyes or skin. The 

operator should also carry appropriate respiratory 

equipment. See Personal Protective Equipment, 

page 18. 

Formulating 

Before manufacturing large quantities of material 

containing chlorinated pool chemicals, performance and stability tests should be run with smaller 

quantities of the formulation. This enables the 

processor to determine­among other things­the

compatibility of all ingredients, the formulation’s 

stability in mixing and storage, and differences 

which may be caused by batch size alone. Details of 

such tests should be discussed with the manufacturer of the pool chemicals. 

Chlorinated pool chemicals should be moved 

with care from storage to the processing area. For 

the protection of the handlers, the drums should be 

opened in such a manner that any chlorine vapors 

sealed in the drums will be vented to the exhaust 

system. If desiccants are present in the drums, they 

should be removed and disposed of as instructed by 

the supplier. 

Once chlorinated pool chemicals have been introduced into the formulation, mixing should be 

continued only for the length of time needed to 

insure homogeneity of the blended product. Overmixing will, in most cases, expose the product to 

moisture pickup. It will also cause product attrition 

(by grinding) of particles in the formulation. This, 

in turn, leads to increased segregation of individual 

components, as well as excessive fines or dust. 

Excessive mixing of formulations containing 

chlorinated pool chemicals leads to undesirable and 

irritating dust in the air. Contact with moisture 

may then produce caked deposits in the mixer and 

less than the desired stability of the contained 

chlorine.

Use silicone or fluorocarbon lubricants on 

packaging and processing machines. For specific 

recommendations, contact the appropriate pool 

chemical manufacturer (see inside front cover). 

Special Precautions When Formulating With 

Trichloroisocyanurates 

Certain formulations of trichloroisocyanurates may 

create hazards involving preparation, storage and 

use. 

It is hazardous to formulate trichlor with nitrogen­containing organics such as quaternary ammonium algicides ("quats"). Trichlor can react with 

the quat and result in decomposition, gas generation and even fire under certain storage conditions. 

Certain mixtures of trichlor and soda ash 

(“fast­tabs”), or other alkaline materials, are not 

recommended.

For example, combinations of trichlor with alkaline materials which bring the solution pH into 

the range of 4.5­l 1, and the concentration of 

trichlor above 0.1% could be hazardous. Under 

these conditions, there may be sufficient decomposition with attendant release of gases, to create a 

potentially explosive situation. 

A dry mixture of about 70% trichlor and 30% 

sodium carbonate would have a solution pH of 

6­8.5 if everything were dissolved. At this pH, 

trichlor is unstable. Moisture reaching the dry 

mixture during preparation or storage will lead to 

gas generation and possible explosion. 

Use of granular trichlor, cut or uncut, is not 

recommended for routine sanitation of swimming 

pools.

Storage and use of the granular trichclor is 

more hazardous than that of trichlor which has 

been compressed into tablets or sticks. 

16 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 45

Appendix E (Continued)

Dust Disposal 

Dust from chlorinated pool chemicals is neither 

combustible nor explosive. It will, however, cause 

irritation to the eyes, skin and respiratory tract. 

Therefore, provision should be made to conduct any dust from the mixer away from the area 

by a suitable dust collecting system. Such a system 

should consist of: 

Ducts of either plastic or epoxy­coated metal, 

located as close to the mixer or tablet press as 

possible.

Cyclonic collector made of epoxy­coated steel 

or fiberglass­reinforced polyester to receive 

dust from the ducts. 

Filter, fiberglass mesh type. 

Fan to exhaust into the outside atmosphere. 

Material which accumulates in this system must 

be collected and disposed of daily, according to 

applicable Federal, state or local regulations. 

Transportation Guidelines 

The Department of Transportation [DOT] regulates 

the transportation of calcium hypochlorite and 

chlorinated isocyanurates in commerce under 

49 CFR.

These swimming pool chlorinating chemicals 

are oxidizing agents and are very reactive with 

other pool chemicals, as well as with many other 

products.

Therefore, any vehicle loaded with 1,000 lbs. or 

more of DOT­regulated dry chlorinator products 

must display “oxidizer” placards in the proper 

manner, along with adequate bill of lading descriptions governing pool chemicals. 

DOT regulations must be followed when 

making mixed shipments of pool chemicals and 

other products. 

Every effort must be made to segregate incompatible products by establishing buffer zones of 

compatible materials, such as plywood. 

17 
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Personal Protective 

Equipment

In normal handling of calcium hypochlorite and 

chlorinated isocyanurates, the following personal 

protective equipment is recommended. 

At all times: 

Goggles/safety glasses 

When handling chemicals or cleaning a spill: 

Impervious gloves 

Impervious boots 

Coveralls

Aprons

When in dusty areas: 

NIOSH/MSHA approved chlorine gas/dust 

cartridge respirator 

When fighting a fire: 

NIOSH/MSHA approved positive pressure selfcontained breathing apparatus 

NOTE: The “Buddy System” is mandatory in fire 

fighting. Therefore, duplicate sets of equipment are 

required.

First Aid 

In the event of an emergency, follow these three. 

steps:

1. Remove contaminated clothing. 

2. Perform the first aid procedures indicated 

below.

3. Call a physician immediately. 

First Aid Procedures 

Skin contact: Immediately flush the skin with 

water for 15 minutes.

Eye contact: Immediately flush eyes with 

water for 15 minutes.

Ingestion: Immediately drink large quantities 

of water. Do not induce vomiting. 

Inhalation: Immediately remove victim to 

fresh air. 

Any clothing which has come in contact with pool 

chemicals should be washed before reuse. 

Emergency Procedures 

Any spill involving chlorinated pool chemicals can 

lead to an emergency. The only emergency which 

you should consider handling without assistance 

from the manufacturer or the fire department is the 

cleanup of dry, uncontaminated minor spills, less 

than 100 lbs. (See page 191. 

In all cases, alert the supervisor and report: 

�  Which chemical has spilled 

�  How much has spilled 

�  The condition of the spilled material 

­Is it dry or damp? 

­Is there evidence a reaction has started 

(bubbling, fuming, hissing, bulging drums)? 

­Are there signs a fire may have started? 

If there are signs of fire, the building should be 

evacuated and the fire department called immediately, even if the building has a sprinkler system. 

In extinguishing a fire, copious amounts of water

should be used. Do not use dry powder fire 

extinguishers.

Whether or not there is a fire, the supplier 

should then be called for instructions on how best 

to clean up and remove spilled material prior to its 

disposal according to regulations. See the list of 

Emergency Telephone Numbers on the back cover 

of this brochure. 

While Waiting for Instructions 

If the spill is dry and uncontaminated, follow these 

steps: 

1. Have other personnel leave the immediate area. 

2. Provide ventilation. 

3. Mark off the area and make sure no foreign 

material enters it. 

4. Obtain protective clothing (see above). 

5. Get clean, dry drums for holding the spilled 

material and the leaking containers. 

6. Get clean brooms and shovels for picking up the 

spilled material. 

7. Be sure there is a clear, unobstructed route from 

the spill area to the outside of the building. 

18 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 47

19 

Appendix E (Continued)

Handling Minor Spills 

Minor spills (less than 100 lbs.) of calcium hypochlorite or chlorinated isocyanurates must be 

cleaned up promptly. Proper safety precautions 

should be followed at all times. 

Preparation 

Before attempting to clean up a small spill be 

Certain that the material is uncontaminated and 

dry. If there is any sign that a reaction has begun 

bubbling, smoking, burning, hissing, even a strong 

smell), evacuate the area and contact the manufacturer immediately for assistance. If there is any 

evidence of a fire, call the fire department 

immediately. See preceding section. 

In cleaning up a spill, use a clean, dedicated 

broom or shovel (dirt or oil could contaminate the 

chemicals).

Do not use floor sweeping compounds when 

cleaning up chlorinated pool chemicals; they may 

cause a reaction. 

Have two clean drums available; an overpack 

drum to receive the damaged container and another 

for the spilled chemical. 

Do not put spilled chemicals back into the 

original container. They have been contaminated 

by other material on the floor. Returning them to 

the original container can cause a reaction. 

Do not put spilled product into the trash. 

Contact with incompatible materials could cause 

a reaction. 

Keep spilled material dry. If allowed to stand in 

damp or wet areas, tear­producing vapors may 

result. And do not dampen the product with 

water during the cleanup process; a reaction may 

occur. However, see Neutralizing Calcium Hypochlorite or Dichlor, below. If the material is 

trichlor and has been wet or contaminated, contact 

the manufacturer for neutralizing methods. 

Keep unneutralized and/or chlorinated compositions out of sewers, watersheds or water systems. 

Procedure for Cleaning up Small, Dry Spills 

In cleaning up a minor spill (less than 100 lbs.), 

follow the recommended steps, below. (There is 

one possible alternative: If the spilled material is 

calcium hypochlorite or dichlor, and involves 

about 10 lbs. or less, you may choose to neutralize 

the material. If so, see the next section, Neutralizing Calcium Hypochlorite or Dichlor. 

1. Notify the supervisor of the situation. 

2. Put on the appropriate protective gear (see page 

18).

3. Place the damaged container in a clean overpack 

drum. It is important that the drum be clean so 

the spilled chemical does not react with dirt or 

any other contaminant. 

4. Place the lid loosely on the drum and leave it 

unsealed.

5. Sweep up any dry, spilled material and place in 

another clean, dry, DOT­approved container for 

proper disposal. 

6. Apply appropriate labels to both containers. 

7. Contact the manufacturer for further 

instructions.

Neutralizing Calcium Hypochlorite or Dichlor 

This optional procedure is for small spills (10 lbs.

or less) of calcium hypochlorite or dichlor. All 

spills of trichlor should be kept dry, and handled as 

described in the preceding section, This procedure 

may be used only if local regulations permit disposal of solutions containing 1 ppm available 

chlorine in the sewer. 

If the spill includes both calcium hypochlorite 

and dichlor, they must be neutralized separately. 

These products are incompatible with each other 

and therefore must not be neutralized together. 

To neutralize small spills, take the following 

steps:

1. Notify the supervisor of the situation. 

2. Put on the appropriate protective gear (see page 

18).

3. Place the damaged container in a clean overpack 

drum. It is important that the drum be clean so 

the spilled chemical does not react with dirt or 

any other contaminant. 

4. Place the lid loosely on the drum and leave it 

unsealed. Put an appropriate label on the container and contact the manufacturer for further 

instructions

5. Place a clean 55­gallon drum out of doors and 

away from the spill, Fill the drum with tap 

water.

6. Sweep up any spilled material and place in the 

water­filled drum. 

NOTE: Always put calcium hypochlorite or dichlor 

in the water; do not add water to a vessel which 

already contains calcium hypochlorite or 

dichlor. If contaminated, toxic fumes may be 

evolved and a reaction may occur. 

7. Allow the calcium hypochlorite or dichlor to 

decompose.

8. When the available chlorine is less than 1 ppm 

(as determined with a pool water test kit) it may 

be flushed to the sewer, assuming local regulations permit. 
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

DO’s and DON’Ts 

For Storing and Handling 

Calcium Hypochlorite and 

Chlorinated Isocyanurates 

DO:

Have an established emergency response plan in 

place

‘Maintain good housekeeping standards 

Separate incompatible materials 

Store in a cool, dry, well­ventilated space 

Store on pallets or shelving at all times 

Clean all equipment thoroughly prior to changing 

product lines 

Empty all hoppers at the end of each day 

Wear or carry appropriate personal protective 

equipment

Keep clean overpack drums nearby in case of 

emergency

Notify supervisor of an emergency situation 

Keep spilled material dry and free of moisture 

DON’T:

Store liquid materials above solids 

Allow oil, grease or organic material to accumulate 

on the floor 

Smoke where chlorinating chemicals are stored or 

processed

Use a common dust exhaust system for incompatible products 

Operate diesel­ or gasoline­powered forklifts 

Use floor sweeping compounds when cleaning up 

chlorinating chemicals 

Put spilled material back in the original container 

Allow material in the container to come in contact 

with water 

Dispose of spilled material in trash or waste container

Allow unneutralized and/or chlorinated materials 

into the sewer 

Use dry powdered fire extinguishers 

20 
USFA-TR-027/June 1988 49

Appendix E (Continued)

Notes

21 
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (Continued)

Emergency

Numbers

Telephone

For assistance, call the

purchased the product:

company from which you

Calcium hypochlorite supplier:

Tel.

Chlorinated

Name

isocyanurate supplier:

Tel. Name

If you do not have an emergency telephone number

for your supplier, you may use any of the following

emergency numbers:

l­800­325­1 110 Monsanto Chemical Company

(regarding trichlor and sodium or

potassium dichlor)

l­800­OLIN­911 Olin Corporation Emergency

Action Network [OCEAN)

(regarding calcium hypochlorite,

trichlor or sodium dichlor)

l­304­843­1300 PPG Industries (regarding calcium hypochlorite)

l­800­424­9300 CHEMTREC (regarding calcium hypochlorite or any chlorinated

isocyanurates, in transit)

Local Emergency 

Numbers

Fire Department

Police Department

Physician

Other:

3409­89 22 Printed in U.S.A.