NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LANCE ALLEN BRITTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KLAMATH COUNTY; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-35782 

D.C. No. 1:15-cv-02086-CL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2020**

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Lance Allen Britton appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 16 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 19-35782

1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal on the basis of absolute immunity). We 

affirm. The district court properly dismissed Britton’s claims against defendants 

Patridge and Vaughan because Patridge and Vaughn are entitled to prosecutorial 

immunity. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting 

forth the scope of prosecutorial immunity). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s Fourth 

Amendment claim because the claim is time-barred. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) 

(providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Douglas v. 

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the statute of 

limitations for a § 1983 claim is the state law statute of limitations for personal 

injury cases).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s false 

arrest and malicious prosecutions claims because Britton failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether there was no probable cause for his arrest. 

See Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014, n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (the 

absence of probable cause is an essential element of a § 1983 false arrest claim); 

Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (a 

malicious prosecution claim requires the absence of probable cause; a grand jury 

indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s 
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Fourteenth Amendment claim based on his pre-trial detention because Britton 

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his confinement put 

him at a substantial risk of suffering serious harm. See Castro v. v. County of Los 

Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (a pre-trial detainee 

bringing a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim must 

demonstrate that the conditions “put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 

serious harm”). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s 

supervisory liability claims against defendants Rowley, Davidson, and Skrah 

because Britton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

these defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violations, or 

engaged in any wrongful acts causally connected to any constitutional violations. 

See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a 

defendant may only be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 where the 

defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation, or where the 

defendant’s wrongful acts are causally connected to the violation). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Britton’s 

municipal liability claim because Britton failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether the county maintained a custom or policy that inflicted 

any constitutional injury. See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 
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802-03 (9th Cir. 2018) (requirements for municipal liability under § 1983). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Britton’s motions 

for appointment of counsel because Britton failed to demonstrate exceptional 

circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard 

of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).

We reject as without merit Britton’s contentions that the magistrate judge 

engaged in misconduct. 

We do not consider arguments or allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

AFFIRMED.