IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. SANDRA LEE ALLEN, Appellant. No. 73046-1-

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: July 25, 2016 

### Verellen, C.J. —SandraAllenappeals her conviction for firstdegree theft. She 

### argues the State failed to presentsufficientevidence that she exertedunauthorized control over the propertyof another in violation of a partnershipagreementbecausethe 

### term"partnership agreement" islimited to a legal partnership established to engage in business forprofit. She also contends the Statefailed to present sufficientevidence 

### that she committed theft by deception. We conclude that "partnership agreement" does not refer to the technical definition of"partnership," but ratherto the plain, ordinary 

### meaning ofajointactivity undertaken whetheror notfor profit. Because arationaltrier of fact could have found thatAllen violated a partnership agreement and that, but for 

### Allen's deception, thevictim would not havegiven Allen herlife savings, weaffirm.No. 73046-1-1/2

FACTS In2012, Elizabeth Hughes lived in Federal Way, Washington, with her husband, three children, and seven pets. Hughes is a devout Christian. Although she did not 

### belong to a specific church, she attended several churches.1 Shewatched Christian television, and volunteered for Christian organizations. 

### Around June 2012, Hughes saw Sandra Allen at a local Wal-Mart. They had met
once before. After Hughes discovered Allenwas living inher car, Hughes invited Allen 

### to stay the night at her house inFederal Way. Allen told Hughes that she was a prophet and a pastor. Hughes believed her: Imean, she was able to talk like a Christian, knew her Bible very 

### well, knew her scriptures, was very well-presented inher demeanor, you know, had stories aboutwalking withthe Lord, and being a pastor. And there was no reason for me to doubt her, who she said she was at the time.'2] 

### Allen told Hughesthat she and herfriends "were notwalking rightwith theLord."3 When Allen retired to bed, she stayed inHughes's home office. Hughes kept all 

### significantpersonal records in that room, including bank records and tax records. 

### Hughes stayed upuntil 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., and she noticed the lightin the homeoffice remained on. When Hughes knocked on the door to the office the nextmorning, Allen told her to leave her alone, claiming "she needed some time to be alone with God, and 

### she was praying, and not to interrupther."4 Allen remained in the office for another two

1Report ofProceedings (RP) (Jan. 5, 2015) at 20. 2RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 37. 3RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 37. 4RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at40.No. 73046-1-1/3


### hours and then abruptly left "in a real big hurry" because "God was telling her she had to leave."5 

### Soon after, Allencalled Hughes and asked her to pay for a hotel room. On June 

### 15, Hughes paid $276.24 for Allen's hotel room. Hughes also boughtAllen food, vitamins, and a fan. She also paid rentfor Allen's personal storage unit. Hughes 

### "trusted [Allen] quite well."6 Eventually, Allen told Hughes that Hughes owed God

money: Well, [Allen] told me that she was a prophet and that God told her that Iwasn't paying my tithes properly, because you're supposed to pay 10 percent of your income. And so Idid pay donations, but she said that God told herthat they weren't enough, and that Iwasn't trusting him properly, and that Ineeded to go back and review every single amount of money that Iowed the Lord for the past 10 years. And so she said, go home and write out, figure out exactly how much you owe God, 10 percentofyour income, over a 10-yearperiod, and then to report it to her, and tell her exactly how much that Iowe the Lord, like write itoutfor Sandra [Allen] and give it to her. And then she was going to pray and see ifIwas telling the truth. And so then she prayed and she said thatthere was more money that Iowed and that God told her itwas such-and-such amount of money that Iowed him in back 

### tithingJ7) Hughes described how Allen alternated between using love and fear to manipulate Hughes into paying her: Well, she would be very loving and kind on the one end and then very fearful and use scriptures that, ifIdon't do this, I'mdisobeying the 

### prophetof God. And she would send me text messages saying, "God is expecting you to be obedient," and then she would have periods ofsilence when she wouldn'ttalkto me until Idid the next thing she told me Iwas supposed to do. And she told me things like, there was an earthquake coming and bad things would happen to my children if Ididn't fulfill my obligations to 5RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 40. 6RP (Jan. 5, 2015) at 55. 7RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 50. -3-No. 73046-1-1/4 

### God ontithing

... And every timeIbroughtup questions, she would bring up a crisis going on with her and kind of silence me. She'd tell me to be 

### quiet, that Italked too much. She was verycontrolling.w Allen used biblical passages and parables to convince Hughes that God needed her to "obey the prophet ofGod"—Allen, specifically.9 For example, Hughes testified that 

### Allen referenced a passage in Malachi "that talks about robbing Godwith your tithes and offerings. Andifyou don't give God your tithes, you're robbingGod."10 

### OnJune 20, 2012, Hughes withdrew $11,335.84from herfamily's savings account and cashed out her entire retirement accountworth $44,194.87. She gave all the money to Allen in two cashier's checks. The same day, Allenopened an account at 

### Chase bank and deposited $55,330.71. Allen also wrote out a "receipt" to memorialize the money that Hughes had given her.11 The note states thatthe "donation" was intended for ministry work: 

### Receipt ofchecks donated foroutreach work, ministry building, church ministries, music publication, and helps. This is to confirm that I, Pastor Sandra Allen, received a donation of 

### funds from Elizabeth Hughes for the outreach workand forneedy and Federal Way Outreach Ministries to help the indigent and any needy people. Elizabeth Hughes donated these funds freely and to the ministry to help the poor and the homeless. Funds were received on June 20th, 2012, 1:30 p.m. Elizabeth willingly donated these proceeds to help supportthis work and to help feed the needy, total amount, $55,330.71, 

### Pastor Sandra Allen, Elizabeth Hughes, June 20th, 2012J12!

8RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 56-57. 

### 9RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 57. 

### 10 Malachi 3:8-9: "Will a man rob God? Yet you are robbing Me! But you say, 'How have we robbed You?' Intithes and offerings. You are cursed with a curse, for you are robbing Me, the whole nation of you!" RP (Jan. 5, 2015) at 59. 

### 11 Exhibit (Ex.) 27 12 Ex. 27; RP (Jan. 5, 2015) at 51-52. -4-No. 73046-1-1/5 

### Hughes believed this money was specifically for the ministry Allen wanted to found. Hughes testifiedshe would not have givenAllen that amountof money had she believed Allen would spend it on herself: 

### Q. Would you have given her that $55,000 ifshe had told you that she just needed some help? 

### A. No, not that amount ofmoney, no, sir. Q. And why is that? 

### A. Because we didn't have that much amountof money give-able easily. 

### Q. Okay. And you were willing to give this to start a ministry? A. Yes, sirJ13) 

### On June 21, the day after Hughes paid Allen, Allenwithdrew $20,000 incash fromthe 

### Chase bank account. On June 22, Allen paid $7,500 incash for a 2002 Jaguarsedan. Hughes did not know about the carpurchase until a detective told her about it. The nextweek, Allen told Hughes that "she made a mistake" and that "God said 

### [Hughes] actually needed to pay her 12 years oftithing,"14 [Allen] would change her mind [aboutthe amount]. And so when I 

### tried to say, "Well, how come God is not pleased witheverytime Itry to obey him? Then he changes the bar and seems to, like, you know, keep changing his plan," then she would just snap at me and say, "Obeythe prophet," and get mad at me. 

### But first, the purpose of giving herthe money was that she said I owed the Lord 10 years of tithing and then she said, no, itwas 12 years of tithing. And then she said Iowed now on the net, on whateverthe more is, the gross orthe net, whichever is the one before taxes. She said Iowe the money before taxes, not after. So after Igave her all this money, she said, "That's not enough because you didn't do iton the net," whichever 

### the one is where you take the money outor there's no money taken out.[15] Hughes could get cash advances on her credit cards, but she was worried she and her husband—who did not know aboutthese "donations"—would be unable to pay the 13RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 79-80. 14RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 63 15RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 63. -5-No. 73046-1-1/6 

### minimal monthlypayments.16 Allen reassured Hughes bytelling her an upcoming record deal would provide funds to pay her back: 

### She told me that she was a recording artist and that she had a record deal coming up. Ibelieve itwas with Capitol Records. And she 

### was going to get about $300,000 and she would give me $100,000 back as soon as that deal came through and that would cover—Iwas very 

### concerned aboutthe credit card monthlypayments that would begin to come in, that we wouldn't be able to afford. And so she said, "Don't worry about it. My advance is coming reallysoon and I'll give you that money and, before your husband even knows the credit cards have been used, 

### that money will be repaid to you."[17] 

### OnJune 28, Hughes took outcash advances on four creditcards and gave Allen 

### $21,500,which Allen deposited in herChase checking account the next day. Allen did give Hughes some ofthe money. She told Hughes she would be her 

### "ministry assistant" and paid her $500.18 She promised to give Hughes $1000 per month and, inexchange, Hughes would have to complete "assignments" as the ministry assistant.19 Forexample, the two women once went to a local IHOPand met a woman with a sick infant. Allen instructed Hughes to buy an outfitand a prayer blanketforthe child. Allen planned to pray overthe blanket so it would cure the child's illness. Allen did not give Hughes any more money. Instead, Allen made various purchases using a debit card tied to the Chase accountfrom July 9 through July 18. She spent nearly $4,000 on July 9 alone. The various purchases included an insurance bill and storage unit rent, but also retail purchases from Coach, Ross, Nordstrom, and Best Buy. She made two separate 

### 16RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 99. 17RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 80. 

### 18RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 60. 19RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 60.No. 73046-1-1/7 

### withdrawals of$10,000 each on July 16 and 18. On July 18, she opened another account atWells Fargo and deposited around $9,000. 

### On July 9, Allen met Hughes at IHOP again and informed herthat, unfortunately, God was disappointed and required more money: [0]n the last night that Imet her at the IHOP, [Allen] told me, "I hate to tell you this, but Godjusttold me that you need to give more money, like, $12,000 approximately to atone for the sin ofone ofyour ancestors who murdered somebody." Otherwise, my son would be killed.

. . . [Throughout the whole process, she kepttelling me, ifIdo this, then God will be pleased and then it'll be like, "Ijust prayed some more and, now, he told me you didn't tell the whole truth. And now you have to do this. And now he justtold me something else and now you have to do this." And towards the end ofthat particular period oftime, Ibegan getting anxious, and suspicious, and frustrated. And it's like, all Iwanted to do was obey God. And Icouldn't understand why, every time I'd try to obey him, he'd change his mind, according to the prophet... And so then, when she said, "Now you have to come up with more money," Isaid, "I don't have any more money." And she said, "God told me you're clever. You'll be able to figure out how to 

### get some more money."[20] Hughes told Allen she could pay her another $14,000, but never did. That night, Hughes decided to do some research to see if Allen "actually was who she said she 

### was."21 Hughes's research led herto question some of Allen's claims. The next day, July 10, Hughes called the police. After speaking with Hughes, 

### police suspected Allen ofextortion and theft. On July 11, police arrested Allen at the motel she was staying in. Allen gave a lengthy interview. She claimed to be a music 

### writer with a "lucrative salary" as wellas a minister.22 Allenadmitted to taking Hughes's money but told police itwas for founding an outreach center. She told police the money 20 RP (Jan. 5, 2015) at 72-73. 

### 21 RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 77. 22 Ex. 1. -7-No. 73046-1-1/8 

### would not be spenton anything otherthan securing a building and starting the outreach center. She claimed that none ofthe money had been spent, "notone penny."23 She specifically denied buying the Jaguarwith Hughes's money. She later admitted to buying the Jaguar with money from the Chase bank account she set up shortly after receiving money from Hughes. Allen portrayed her alleged "outreach" venture as a cooperative effort between 

### her and Hughes. Allensaid that Hughes wanted to get involved with ministry work, so Allen invited Hughes to help her start a church: [Hughes] said she wanted to make a donation to the church. She said that. Ihave, Ihave a, you know what because Ido work with business. Isaid are you sure you want to give any money to the church? 

### Itold her because I'm trying to find a centerand I'm going to do it.[24] Allen said that Hughes "wantfed] to help the vision" that she had "for a help center" "to 

### do outreach."25 Allen clarified: "exceptwe're non profit."26 She described the outreach center as something they planned to do together: "that's what we talked about, what are
we going to [do], whether I'm going to buy a place or...," and "we need a church 

### building

... and we wantto be more supportive ofoutreach here in our own city."27 Allen later submitted a written statement that also suggested Hughes "had the same 

### desires and wanted to help too."28 Allenclaimed that "Elizabeth [Hughes] said she was 

### tired of being un-involved."29 Hughes "wanted to do outreach to help people with me."30

23 Pretrial Ex. 3 at 52, 54. 24 Pretrial Ex. 3 at 13. 25 Pretrial Ex. 3 at 15. 26 Pretrial Ex. 3 at 15 (emphasis added). 27 Ex. 1. 28 Ex. 22. 29 Ex. 22. -8-No. 73046-1-1/9 

### Over the next few weeks, Allen continued to make large withdrawalsfrom the various bank accounts. She also continued to contact police and sentthem written 

### statements. Inone statement she claimed to be organizing an outreach centerand that 

### she knew manyimportantchurch leaders. She denied threatening Hughes or stealing money from her. She insisted Hughes "was sincerely devoted to this vision."31 She left 

### a lengthy voicemail claimingHughes had "changed her mind," and that "we're justtrying to get something started."32 Inanother meeting with police, she described her bank account as "the money thatwe had, me and Elizabeth [Hughes]."33 By August 16, the original Chase bank accountAllen set up was down to $360.93. Police never recovered any of Hughes's money. The State charged Allen on one count of first degree theft inexcess of$5,000 

### and one countofsecond degree perjury. At trial, Allendenied discussing tithing with Hughes. She denied telling Hughes that she wanted to set up a ministry. She claimed setting up the ministry was Hughes's idea. Allenclaimed Hughes came to herone day, 

### handed her a check, and said, "surprise."34 She testified that Hughes "took it upon herselfto make a blueprint"; she made the plan like "a personal representative would do 

### forany person or a leader."35 Thejury acquitted on the perjury charge, but concluded Allen was guilty of first degree theft with an aggravating factor of a major economic offense. The court

30 Ex. 22. 31 Ex. 5. 32 Ex. 17. 33 Ex. 16. 

### 34RP(Jan. 7, 2015) at 28. 35 RP (Jan. 7, 2015) at 143-44.No. 73046-1-1/10 

### imposed a sentence of 90 days confinementwith 30 days converted to community service and the remainderfor eligible work release. Italso ordered Allen to pay $77,030.41 in restitution. Allen appeals. ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review 

### In a criminal prosecution, the State must prove each elementof the charged 

### crime beyond a reasonable doubt.36 "The test for determining the sufficiencyof the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the lightmostfavorable to the State, 

### any rational trierof fact could havefound guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt. When the sufficiencyof the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, allreasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor ofthe State and interpreted most strongly 

### against thedefendant. Aclaim ofinsufficiency admits thetruth ofthe State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawntherefrom."37 Credibilitydeterminations

are for the trier of fact and are not subjectto review.38 We deferto the trier of fact on 

### issues ofconflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence.39



### Inre Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L Ed. 2d. 368 (1970). 

### State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 38 State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). 

### 39 State v. Walton. 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533 (1992). 36 37

-10-No. 73046-1-1/11

II. Sufficiency ofthe Evidence for Alternative Means 

### Criminaldefendants have a constitutional right to a unanimousjuryverdict.40 This rightincludes the right to unanimity on the means by which the defendant is found 

### to have committed the crime.41 When a crime may be committed by alternative means,

a particularized expression ofunanimity as to the means by which the defendant committed the crime is unnecessary ifevidence is sufficientto support each ofthe 

### alternative means submitted to thejury.42 Here, the State charged Allen with firstdegree theft under RCW 9A.56.030(1)(a), which prohibits a person from committing "theft" of "[property or services which 

### exceed(s) fivethousand dollars invalue

... ."43 Aseparate statute provides two relevant definitions for "theft" (1) Theft" means: (a) To wrongfully obtain or exert unauthorized control overthe property or services of another orthe value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services; or (b) By color or aid of deception to obtain control overthe property or services of another or the value thereof, with intentto deprive 

### him or herofsuch property or services

.. . .[44] A statute defines "exerts unauthorized control" to mean "[h]aving any property or services in one's possession, custody, orcontrol as partner, to secrete, withhold, or appropriate the same to his or her use or to the use of any person otherthan the true

owneror person entitled thereto, where the use is unauthorized by the partnership 40 Const, art. I§ 21. 41 State v. Orteaa-Martinez. 124Wn.2d 702, 707, 881 P.2d 231 (1994). 42Orteaa-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d at 707-08. 43RCW9A.56.030(1)(a). 44 RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a), (1)(b). -11-No. 73046-1-1/12 agreement" RCW 9A.56.010(22)(c) (emphasis added). Italso provides that "'by color or aid ofdeception' means thatthe deception operated to bring about the obtaining of the property or services; it is not necessary that deception be the sole means of obtaining the property or services." RCW 9A.56.010(4). The State submitted an instruction permitting thejury to convictAllen under eitherofthese definitions, thereby establishing alternative means to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: To convict the defendant of the crime of theft in the first degree, as charged in count 1, each ofthe following four elements ofthe crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That during a time between June 3, 2012, and August 16, 2012, the defendant (a) exerted unauthorized control over property ofanother; or (b) by color or aid of deception, obtained control over property of another; and 

### (2) Thatthe property exceeded $5000 invalue; (3) Thatthe defendant intended to deprive the otherperson ofthe property; and 

### (4) That this act occurred in the State ofWashington.!451 The State provided additional instructions defining each alternative means consistent with RCW 9A.56.010(4) and (22)(c). Because thejuryprovided no particularized 

### expression as to the means by which Allen committed the crime, we may affirm her conviction only ifsufficientevidence supports both alternative means submitted to the jury.46

45 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 33 (emphasis added). 46The State can avoid unanimity problems inalternative means cases by using a Petrich instruction or other means to clarifythejury's unanimity as to each alternative 

### means it relies upon. See State v. Petrich. 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683 P.2d 173 (1984) -12-No. 73046-1-1/13

1. Unauthorized control based on a partnership agreement Allen argues the evidence was insufficientto prove that she exerted unauthorized control overthe property ofanotherbecause the State failed to prove she violated a 

### partnership agreement.47 Whether sufficient evidence supports Allen's conviction for exerting unauthorized control based on a partnership agreement depends on whether the term "partnership agreement" refers to a technical definition meaning an agreement to establish a for-profit business or a common usage definition meaning an agreement to jointly pursue common action. Allen contends the term "partnership agreement" refers only to an agreementto engage in a for-profit business. She therefore concludes that her conviction is unsupported by sufficient evidence because the State failed to show thatAllen and Hughes sought to create such a business. But nothing in the statute's plain language or legislative history suggests thatthe legislature intended to strictly limitthe term "partnership agreement" to the technical definition Allen proposes. When determining the meaning of a statute, "[t]he court's fundamental objective 

### is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent."48 The legislature is presumed to intend the plain meaning of its language.49 "Indetermining the plain meaning of a provision, we look to the text ofthe statutory provision inquestion, as well as 'the context ofthe statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the

overruled in part on other grounds bv State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988). The State failed to do so here. 47 See CP at 36; RCW 9A.56.010(22)(c). 48 In re Pet, of Danforth, 173 Wn.2d 59, 67, 264 P.3d 783 (2011). 49 State v. Gibson. 16 Wn. App. 119, 127, 553 P.2d 131 (1976). -13-No. 73046-1-1/14 statutory scheme as a whole.'"50 "Incriminal cases, fairness dictates that statutes 

### should be literally and strictlyconstrued and that courts should refrain from using possible strained interpretations."51 

### When a term is not defined by a statute, judicial opinion, or patternjury instruction, courts employ the common understanding ofthe term ratherthan its 

### technical definition.52 Todetermine the ordinary meaning of a term, courts look to standard Englishlanguage dictionaries.53 Courts typically do not rely on a legal dictionary unless there is some indication the term should be given its technical 

### meaning.54 When "[t]here is no indication that the legislature intended to use the legal definition of the term

... [r]eliance on a legal dictionary definition is

... improper."55 The plain language ofthe term "partnership agreement' is not restricted to only for-profit businesses. The term includes mutual arrangements to pursue a common 

### purpose. The dictionary defines "partnership" as "the fact or state ofbeing a partner."56 

### Itdefines "partner" as "one that shares in the possession or enjoymentofsomething with another," or, alternatively, "one that is associated in any action with another: 

### Associate, Colleague."57 Therefore, the plain, ordinary meaning of"partnership agreement' does not require thatthe arrangement be specifically for profit. The term simply refers to an agreement to associate for specific action. 

### 50 State v. Ervin. 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (quoting State v. Jacobs. 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). 

### 51 State v. Garcia. 179 Wn.2d 828, 837, 318 P.3d 266 (2014). 52 State v. Brown. 132 Wn.2d 529, 611, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). 53 State v. Gonzales. 168 Wn.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010). 54 Prostov v. Dep't ofLicensing. 186Wn. App. 795, 806, 349 P.3d 874 (2015). 55 Prostov. 186Wn. App. at 806. 56Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1648 (2002). 57 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1648 (2002). -14-No. 73046-1-1/15


### Insupportofhertechnical legal definition argument, Allen relies on Black's Law 

### Dictionary, which defines "partnership" as a "voluntary association of two or more 

### persons whojointlyown and carry on a business forprofit."58 But the plainlanguage of the statute does not reveal the legislature intended the term "partnership agreement' be given its technical meaning. Consistentwith the broad dictionary plain meaning, "partnership agreement" includesjoint activities undertaken whether or not for profit. 

### The State presented sufficientevidence to prove Allen and Hughes formed a "partnership agreement" within the term's common meaning—an agreementto associate for a common purpose. Allen convinced Hughes to give her money to build

an outreach ministry. Though Hughes provided the money, she and Allen intended that they wouldjointly participate in its formation. Hughes testified that the money was for 

### the ministry. Allengave Hughes the position of "ministry assistant."59 The "receipt' Allen and Hughes signed reflects the money was part of an agreement between the two


### women to form a ministryand engage incertain charitable pursuits.60 Allen indicated during her interview with police that the ministry was a joint venture she formed with Hughes. Allen said that Hughes "want[ed] to help the vision" 

### that she had "for a help center" "to do outreach."61 She described the outreach center

as something they planned to do together: "that's what we talked about, what are we going to [do], whether I'm going to buy a place or.. .," and "we need a church building

.



### 58 Black's LawDictionary 1295 (10th ed. 2014). 59RP(Jan. 5, 2015) at 60. 60 Ex. 27; RP (Jan. 5, 2015) at 51-52. 61 Pretrial Ex. 3 at 15. -15-No. 73046-1-1/16



### .. and we want to be more supportive ofoutreach here inourown city."62 Allen later submitted a written statementthat also suggested Hughes "had the same desires and 

### wanted to help too."63 Allenclaimed that "Elizabeth [Hughes] said she was tired of 

### being un-involved."64 Hughes "wanted to do outreach to help people withme."65 Viewed inthe light mostfavorable to the State, a rational trier offact could have concluded thatAllen and Hughes agreed to jointly form a ministry and engage in 

### charitable activities.66 Such a jointenterprise is a partnership agreement. Allen contends thatthe legislature added the "partnership agreement' subsection to the criminal code to address theft only in for-profit business partnerships. InState v. Birch.67 the court recognized that "a partnercannot be prosecuted for use ofpartnership 

### propertybecause the theftstatute requires the theft to be property ofanother."68 Because each partner has an undivided interest in all partnership property, it is notthe 

### "property ofanother."69 The legislature amended the theft statute twoyears after Birch to include the "partnership" section at issue here. InCoria. our Supreme Courtcasually 

### observed that the amendmentwas a response to Birch.70 Nothing in the statute's 

### language or legislative historyindicates the amendmentwas limited to a "partnership agreement" of a for-profit business or to the holding inBirch. The legislature could have

62 Ex. 1. 63 Ex. 22. 64 Ex. 22. 65 Ex. 22. 66 Salinas. 119 Wn.2d 192, 201. * State v. Birch. 36Wn. App. 405, 675 P.2d 246 (1984). 68 Birch. 36 Wn. App. at 408. 69 Birch. 36 Wn. App. at 408. 70 See State v. Coria 146 Wn.2d 631, 638, 48 P.3d 980 (2002) ("Inresponse [to 

### Birch] the legislature made ita crime for a partner to steal partnershipproperty."); Laws OF1986, REG. SESS., ch. 257 § 2. -16-No. 73046-1-1/17
included a definition of "partnership agreement" limitingthe term to its technical legal meaning, but it did not do so. Moreover, even ifthe amendment was primarily a response to Birch and the traditional exclusion of partnership property as "property of 

### another,"71 thatdoes not mean the legislature did not also intend to extend this alternative means to theft of property being used in a joint non-profit activity. Allen offers no tenable policy reason to extend theft to embezzlement by for-profit business partners but not non-profitjointventures. Allen's reliance on definitions from the Uniform Partnership Act is also unpersuasive. The Act defines "partnership" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners as a business for profitformed under RCW 25.05.055, 

### predecessorlaw, orcomparable law ofanotherjurisdiction."72 Italso defines "partnership agreement' as "the agreement, whetherwritten, oral, or implied, among the partners concerning the partnership, including amendments to the partnership 

### agreement."73 And the definitions section ofthe Actexpressly declares that "[t]he definitions inthis section apply throughout thischapter unless the context clearly 

### requires otherwise."74 Therefore, the legislature specifically intended thatforpurposes of the Act, "partnership" refers only to a legally formed partnership. But Allenprovides

71 See State v. Eberhart. 106Wn. 222, 179 P. 853 (1919); Annot. Embezzlement, 

### larceny, false pretenses, or allied criminal fraud committed by a partner. 82 ALR3d 822. 72 RCW 25.05.005(6). 73 RCW 25.05.005(7). 74 RCW 25.05.005 (emphasis added). -17-No. 73046-1-1/18



### no authoritythat the definitions under the Act applicable to thatchapteralso extend to the criminal code.75 

### Allen argues that even if"partnership agreement" includes the arrangement between her and Hughes, the receipt they signed did not specifically prevent Allenfrom spending the money on herself. She relies on State v. Jov.76 InJoy, the defendantwas

a contractor who had entered into several contracts to remodel various homes.77 The 

### defendant received advance payments on the projects and failed to complete them.78 The State charged the defendant with six counts oftheft under an embezzlement theory, and thejury convicted the defendant on five counts.79 The court reversed two of 

### the convictionsbecause "there was no testimony about what the parties agreed the money was to be used for, and the written contract does not restrict the use of the 

### advance payments."80 Allen contends that, like Joy, the receipt here does not restrict the use ofthe funds Hughes provided. 

### This argumentfails. The receipt here djd provide restrictions within the meaning of Joy. Hughes and Allensigned a "receipt' stating thatAllen would use the funds "for outreach work, ministry building, church ministries, music publication, and helps."81



### 75 See, e^, State v. Veliz. 176 Wn.2d 849, 854 n.3, 298 P.3d 75 (2013) ("Though the term's 'permanentparenting plan' and 'temporary parenting plan' are defined in RCW 26.09.004(3) and (4), this statute states thatthe definitions 'apply throughout this chapter' signifying that the terms are not meant to define terms appearing in the criminal code."). 76 State v. Jov. 121 Wn.2d 333, 851 P.2d 654 (1993). 

### 77 Joy, 121 Wn.2d at335-38. 78Jov. 121 Wn.2d at 335-38. 79Jov. 121 Wn.2dat335. 80Jov. 121 Wn.2dat342. 81 Ex. 27. -18-No. 73046-1-1/19


### Allenthen spentthe money on a Jaguar and shopping trips to Ross, Coach, Nordstrom, and Best Buy. 

### The receipt here is more likethe contracts involved inthe counts the Joy court affirmed. When the defendant agreed to use an advance payment "to buy equipment and materials," or "to purchase windows," and then did something else withthe money, the court held a jury could conclude the defendant violated the agreement. The receipt here indicated the funds would be used "foroutreach work, ministry building, church 

### ministries, music publication, and helps."82 Like Joy, a jury could conclude thatAllen's purchases violated this agreement. Further, Allen incorrectly suggests that the agreement between Hughes and Allen is limited to the written receipt. In Joy, the court looked not only to written contracts but also testimony about what the parties understood regarding the purpose 

### forthe advance payments.83 Here, thejury may properly considerthe parties' testimony aboutthe surrounding circumstances in addition to the written receiptto determine the scope ofthe agreement between Hughes and Allen. As discussed, the evidence supports the inference that both Allen and Hughes understood the money would be used for building the ministry. Hughes specifically testified she would not have given Allenthat amount ofmoney had she believed she would spend it on herself. Forthe same reason, Allen's argumentthat her purchases did not violate the agreement also fail. She argues that she was "needy," and because the agreement 

### permitted spending money to supportthe needy, her purchases did not violate the

82 Ex. 27. 83Jov. 121 Wn.2d 335-38. -19-No. 73046-1-1/20 

### agreement. This argument ignores the standard of review for a sufficiency claim. We considerthe evidence inthe light mostfavorable to the State, not the lightmost favorable to Allen. We need only considerwhether any rationaljury could have found thatAllen misused the funds underthe agreement she had with Hughes. Viewed in a lightmostfavorable to the State, there is sufficient evidence allowing a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubtthat Allen's purchases violated their agreement. 2. By color or aid of deception Allen argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate she 

### committed theft "bycoloror aid of deception."84 "Bycoloror aid ofdeception" means "thatthe deception operated to bring about the obtaining ofthe property or services; it is 

### not necessary that deception be the sole means ofobtaining the property or services."85 "'Deception' includes a broad range of conduct, including 'not only representations about past or existing facts, but also representations aboutfuture facts, inducement achieved by means otherthan conduct orwords, and inducement achieved by creating a false impression even though particular statements or acts might not be false.'"86 Ifthe victim would not have parted with the property even ifthe true facts were known, there is no theft.87 The State presented ample evidence ofdeception here. Hughes testified that 

### Allenpresented herselfas a well-known pastor and prophet. Allenclaimed to communicate with God, and she told Hughes that God commanded she pay money to
84 CP at 33. 85 RCW 9A.56.010(4); see ajso CP 37 (Jury instruction 9). 86 State v. Mehrabian. 175 Wn. App. 678, 700, 308 P.3d 660 (2013) (quoting State v. Casev. 81 Wn. App. 524, 528, 915 P.2d 587 (1996)). 87 State v. Renhard. 71 Wn.2d 670, 672-74, 430 P.2d 557 (1967). -20-No. 73046-1-1/21


### Allen. Allenconsistently reminded Hughes that ifshe did not obey God or "the prophet," bad things would happen, including earthquakes and even harm to her children.88 Allen also claimed to be a recording artist, and she promised to pay Hughes $100,000 after she received paymentfrom an upcoming record deal. When asked ifshe would have paid Allen $55,000 because shejust "needed



### some help," Hughes responded "No, not that amount of money, no, sir."89 Although this testimony suggests that Hughes would have given Allen some money, there is a reasonable inference she would not have given Allen her life savings. Thejury only needed to find that Hughes would not have given Allen at least $5,001 had Hughes known the truth. Viewing the facts inthe light mostfavorable to the State, sufficient evidence supports such a determination. Allen's reliance on Renhard is mistaken. In Renhard. the defendant was the president of a corporation who asked the assistant secretary for two checks from the 

### corporation.90 The defendantclaimed the checks were to pay forequipment, but he 

### used them to pay for property he was purchasing for his own use.91 The court held the State failed to prove deception because the secretary could not refuse to sign the checks and because the defendant could have obtained the checks even ifhe claimed 

### he needed them for personal use.92 Hughes specifically testified that she would not 

### have given Allensuch a large amount ofmoney had she knownthe truth. Unlike Renhard. she was not required to give Allen money due to an employer-employee 88RP(Jan. 4, 2015) at 56-57. 89 RP (Jan. 5, 2015) at 79-80. 90 Renhard. 71 Wn.2d at 671. 91 Renhard. 71 Wn.2d at 671. 92 Renhard. 71 Wn.2d at 671-72. -21No. 73046-1-1/22 

### relationship, nor could the funds be construed as a "salary."93 Sufficientevidence supports Allen's conviction for theft by deception. CONCLUSION 

### We conclude that "partnership agreement' under RCW9A.56.010(22)(c) refers to the plain, ordinary meaning of a jointactivity undertaken whetheror not forprofit. Here, the State presented sufficientevidence to show that Allen violated a partnership agreement and that, but for Allen's deception, Hughes would not have given Allen her lifesavings. Because sufficientevidence supports both alternative means, we affirmthe judgment and sentence.

WE CONCUR: 

# «£«//

93 Renhard, 71 Wn.2d at 671-72. -22-