Grounded, Mississippi

U.S. Coast Guard photo
99

Emergency Management: 

Mississippi

Mississippi emergency-management law gives the Governor broad powers during disasters, and establishes the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

(MEMA) as the agency responsible for carrying out emergency management in 

the state. Th e system places signifi cant, front-line responsibility for disaster preparedness 

and response on local governments. 

State Powers and Responsibilities

Mississippi law provides that a state of emergency exists when a disaster is of a magnitude 

beyond the control of any municipality or county, and “requires combined forces of the 

state to combat.”1 Th e Governor is empowered to declare a state of emergency.2

During a disaster, the Governor serves as a bridge between federal and local governments. 

Mississippi law authorizes the Governor to direct the various state agencies, including the 

Mississippi National Guard, to take measures necessary to combat a disaster and to direct 

local law enforcement in order to keep good order.3

 Th e entity primarily responsible for 

emergency-management planning and direction is MEMA.4

 Th e Governor appoints the 

head of MEMA.5

Mississippi law authorizes the creation of mutual-aid pacts both within the state and 

between Mississippi and other states.6

 Mississippi is a signatory to the state-to-state Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); MEMA directs its participation.7

 An 

intrastate mutual-aid pact, established in 1995,8

 sets out the mechanism for counties and 

municipalities to contribute, via MEMA, emergency-management assets and personnel to 

disaster-hit areas.9

 All of the coastal counties are part of this agreement.10

Emergency Management: Hurricanes

Th e state hurricane plan details the four key hurricane hazards – storm surge, high winds, 

tornadoes, and fl ooding from rain – and notes the challenge facing emergency managers 

along the Gulf Coast: “Th e tremendous commercial and residential development along the 

coast due to the advent of dockside gambling has greatly increased the potential devastation 

of a major hurricane.”11

Th e Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (the Hurricane Plan), created in 1999, correctly assumed that a major hurricane (category 3 or higher) would strike 

the Mississippi coast within the next 10 years.12 It also assumed that residents, as well as 

local and state responders, would be on their own aft er landfall: “Due to multi-state infrastructure damage, assistance will not be available from the federal government or non-affected states for at least 72 hours aft er the hurricane.”13

Th e plan places responsibility for pre- and post-landfall sheltering on local governments, 

encouraging cooperation agreements with local American Red Cross chapters. 

A unique feature of the Hurricane Plan is its provision for pre-landfall deployment of small 

engineering units of the Mississippi National Guard to the coastal counties when a major 

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100

storm approaches. Th e engineer units’ high-clearance 

equipment and vehicles 

allow them to operate in 

fl ooded areas, especially for 

search-and-rescue missions, 

when local fi rst responders like fi re departments 

cannot do so. Accordingly, 

MEMA and the Mississippi 

National Guard dispatched 

small engineering detachments and other National 

Guard personnel to the 

three coastal counties before 

Katrina hit.14

MEMA hosts an annual 

hurricane conference which 

focuses on the state’s southernmost 12 counties, those 

most exposed to hurricanes. 

Offi cials from Louisiana 

and Alabama oft en attend.15

State programs also include 

twice-yearly training on 

HURREVAC, the computer 

program used to forecast hurricanes, for emergency managers, fi rst responders, staff from 

Mississippi’s Keesler Air Force Base, and other federal personnel on the coast, as well as offi cials from Stennis Space Center, located in southwestern Mississippi.16

Counties and Cities

Under Mississippi’s emergency-management system, local governments and their fi rst responders form the fi rst line of response. Localities must update their response plans at least 

every fi ve years.17 MEMA must review them for consistency with the state’s own plan and 

legal requirements.18

During a disaster, the state activates an emergency operations center (EOC) to guide 

response, working in conjunction with EOCs operated by individual counties.19 Th e state 

plan also allows local governments to proclaim local emergencies, establish their own 

emergency-management systems, and seek support from state and federal governments.20

MEMA directs each locality to appoint an emergency-management coordinator and give 

that coordinator direct, personal responsibility for organizing, administering, and operating 

the local system.21

When Katrina hit, each of the Gulf Coast counties had its own EOC, an emergency-management director, and local responsibilities parceled out according to the 16 emergencysupport functions (ESFs) in the state plan. In the coastal counties, local fi re departments 

and law enforcement (both county sheriff s and municipal police) have lead roles in emergency response. For example, in Harrison County, personnel from the largest fi re departRuined homes, Bay St. Louis, MS

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
Emergency Management: Mississippi

101

ments (Gulfport, Biloxi, and Long Beach) and police departments helped staff the county 

EOC, in addition to their responder duties.22

Mass Care 

By Sunday evening, August 28, thousands of people displaced by Katrina were in shelters 

across the region.23 At the peak, September 5, the state had 121 shelters open, with an additional 12 on standby. Over 15,000 people were registered in these shelters – about half of 

their total capacity.24 Th e state was able to provide suffi cient shelter for the special-needs 

population, although it oft en had to move these individuals further inland for appropriate 

accommodations. 

Many residents found shelter conditions quite diffi cult because of shortages of food and 

water and sanitation problems. Some shelters were closed to consolidate operations, 

forcing residents to relocate. Th ough their challenges were formidable, state and local 

governments and the American Red Cross could have prepared better. Planning needed 

to be more detailed for such a catastrophic disaster, during which residents typically need 

longer-term shelter. 

State and Locals Select and Manage Shelters

Federal, state, and local governments worked with the American Red Cross and other nonprofi t organizations and opened or placed on standby at least 133 shelters, with room for 

almost 31,000 people.25 Many of these shelters had been approved by the Red Cross before 

the storm made landfall, which meant that, initially, the Red Cross would staff and manage 

them. Red Cross criteria include a building’s location, at least 18 feet above sea level, and 

its capability to withstand high winds.26 Local Red Cross chapters worked with emergencymanagement and state offi cials to identify and select shelters.27 Th e Red Cross is responsible 

for providing food, water, and ice to its own shelters.

MEMA and the Mississippi Department of Human Service (MDHS), working with local 

governments and the Red Cross, fi rst opened shelters north of Interstate 20, a major eastwest highway that runs through Jackson.28 Th is took evacuees out of the coastal area and 

accommodated evacuees from Louisiana.29 Th e state preferred to open more and smaller 

shelters than fewer and larger ones because, as Jim Craig of the Mississippi Department of 

Health explained, it is more diffi cult to monitor and control illness with a large group of 

people in a single confi ned location.30 

Local governments decided to open additional, non-Red Cross designated shelters to accommodate evacuees who preferred to stay close to home. As Gulfport Police Commander 

Alfred Sexton explained:

Most citizens are of the mindset they’re not going to go far from their homes. ... 

We had offi cers actually stopping and picking up people on the side of the road 

and taking them to the closest shelters ... a lot of people ... historically ... wait 

until they see rain or wind and then they want to move to a shelter.31

Local emergency-management shelters must have met MEMA or local standards. Th ese 

shelters are initially under the direction of the local emergency-management agency and are 

staff ed by county and MDHS personnel. MDHS is notifi ed by MEMA or the county emergency-management agency that its assistance is needed to staff and/or operate a shelter.32 

Local governments are responsible for providing food, water, and ice to non-Red Cross 
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102

designated shelters, though they can request help with operations and supplies from the 

Red Cross and MDHS.

Local organizations such as churches also operated independent shelters. Th ese groups, 

according to state and local offi cials, were “pretty much on their own” for staffi ng, supplying, and managing the shelters.33 Richard Dawkins of the MDHS estimated that about 60-70 

percent of shelters opened for Hurricane Katrina were Red Cross designated; the remainder 

consisted of local emergency-management and independent shelters.34 Residents were notifi ed of shelter locations and capacity levels through the news media. 

Coastal County Shelters Were Options of Last Resort

Shelters of last resort – places protecting from high winds, heavy rains, and storm surge, but 

with little food and water – were needed for those who could not, or chose not to, evacuate. 

On August 27, MEMA urged coastal counties not to open local shelters in order to encourage people to evacuate north. However, Tom McAllister, MEMA’s Director for Response 

and Recovery, estimated that the coast ended up opening a lot of shelters:

Granted, they don’t meet the Red Cross standard ... but it’s better than being 

out on the highway. And we identifi ed a lot of those, school buildings, churches, 

... large community buildings, so we could get people off the road at the last 

minute.35

In some cases, the Mississippi Department of Health (MDH) had to place nurses in shelters 

of last resort because they became special-needs shelters.36

Special-Needs Shelters Posed a Challenge for State and Local Governments

Th e special-needs population on the Gulf Coast includes older adults and individuals with 

disabilities. For example, in Biloxi, a city of about 50,000 people, 26 percent are residents 

with disabilities.37

A special-needs shelter is intended for individuals who have no other resources and who 

need assistance that cannot be guaranteed in a regular shelter (e.g., medication that requires 

refrigeration, oxygen equipment, etc.). It is not intended for patients who need substantial 

or constant medical care.38

Robert Latham, MEMA’s Executive Director, described special-needs sheltering as a “tremendous problem.”

When I took this job in 2000 that was one of the biggest issues. ... How do we 

take care of the special needs population, especially on the Gulf Coast where 

you have a lot of retirees and there are a lot of people with health needs?39

Aft er the 2004 hurricane season, MEMA had asked local emergency managers to designate 

shelters in each county for citizens with special needs. According to MEMA, this would 

have ensured that a location had everything needed for special-needs citizens during an 

evacuation.40 While local offi cials agreed that counties needed such shelters, some counties 

did not have adequate resources to purchase supplies and equipment, such as backup generators, beds, and medical equipment for these facilities.

41 Staffi ng was another challenge; 

special-needs shelters require MDH medical staff with appropriate training.42

Four special-needs shelters were open aft er the storm made landfall, in Lincoln and Jones 

Counties, at Biloxi High School, and at Pearl River Community College in Hattiesburg.43 As 

needs grew, three others were opened on September 2.44 Since many of the coastal counties 

did not have special-needs shelters, these vulnerable populations were forced to go as far 
Emergency Management: Mississippi

103

as Jackson, about 150 miles from the coast.45

Individuals and caregivers faced the diffi cult 

choice between the dangers of evacuation and 

attempting to ride out the storm.

Many of the coastal counties used hospitals or 

other facilities for their special-needs populations. For example, Butch Loper, Director of 

Jackson County’s Emergency Management 

Agency, utilized the county’s two hospitals for 

special-needs patients.46 

Since Katrina, the state has developed a plan 

to provide an additional 1,500 beds for the 

special-needs population, on a more statewide 

basis. During the next disaster, it will utilize 

the state’s 15 community colleges and their 

multiple campuses, as special-needs shelters. 

According to Craig, the Pearl River Community College, because of its ample facilities 

and personnel, including a cafeteria with an 

on-staff nutritionist, water and wastewater 

systems, and a police force, worked very well 

as a special needs shelter for Katrina victims.47

He described it as a self-contained city.

Shelters Suffered From Overcrowding and 

Commodity Shortages

Many residents who took refuge in a public 

shelter found conditions extremely diffi cult. 

Shelters had shortages of food and drinking 

water, sanitation problems, lack of electricity, 

and no running water for bathing. Kristen 

Dellinger, a volunteer, described the shelter 

at Bay St. Louis High School, in Hancock 

County:

Th is “shelter” had no resemblance to 

the “neat cots-in-a-row” kind of place 

that oft en comes to mind. ... Most people had staked out areas on the sidewalks outside under covered walkways. Th ey had thin pieces of blue plastic to 

sleep on. ... Th e school hallways were dark and fi lled with streaks of mud. Th e 

odor was horrendous. Raw sewage, I think.48

Shelters without running water gave doctors concerns about the use of portable toilets, and 

about the lack of equipment to test the safety of drinking water.49 Offi cials in Biloxi suspected an outbreak of dysentery and closed a shelter. About 400 people had been staying 

there, and many ignored warnings to stay away from the water. Although no one developed 

dysentery, many shelter residents had developed the Norwalk virus, an intestinal illness also 

known as the “cruise ship virus.”50 

State and local offi cials acknowledged that conditions at many of the shelters were less 

than ideal. Th e state had problems obtaining some of the supplies and equipment, such as 

Wrecked bridges, Ocean Springs, MS

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
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104

generators, that were desperately needed at the shelters given the extreme heat and crowded 

conditions.51

To make matters worse, the Red Cross failed to provide adequate supplies and services at 

both designated and local shelters. According to Gulfport Police offi cers who were providing security at the shelters, many of the shelters ran out of food and water. Th is was a 

chronic problem for the fi rst two weeks aft er landfall.52 

Aft er food and water fi nally arrived in the county, Colonel Joe Spraggins, Harrison County’s 

Emergency Manager, asked Oscar Barnes, the local Red Cross representative why the Red 

Cross was not delivering the items to the shelters and was told that Red Cross volunteers 

and staff were prohibited from driving at night during a disaster.53 In order to get the supplies to the shelters, Gulfport Police took over distribution duties.54

Lack of communication and transportation infrastructure problems made it diffi cult for 

the Red Cross and other agencies to get needed supplies and services to the shelters. Due to 

the severity of Katrina, the larger shelters fi lled up fast, forcing the Red Cross to open up its 

additional shelters on a tiered basis, rather than open all sites simultaneously. Shelters were 

placed in tiers based on their location and were opened from fi rst to fourth tiers consecutively. In some areas, the agency even had to do quick impromptu assessments, using a 

checklist, to validate compliance with criteria before opening up additional shelters. Th is is 

extremely unusual for the Red Cross.55 

Th e magnitude of the disaster may have overwhelmed the Red Cross’ ability to provide 

adequate shelter conditions for an extended period of time. According to Robert Latham, 

MEMA’s Executive Director, the Red Cross was not prepared to handle such a large catastrophe. In Mississippi, organization was extremely short-staff ed and as a result was not able 

to adequately serve all coastal counties. In addition, the Red Cross, like MEMA, suff ered 

from commodity shortages due to logistical problems.56 John McGuire, Red Cross’s interim 

chief, while defending the organization’s performance, said that with Hurricane Katrina, the 

Red Cross’s biggest sin was reacting based on its response to previous hurricanes: “We had 

a failure of imagination. We didn’t think big enough.”57

1 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-5(f). 

2 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11(b)(17).

3 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11. 

4 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-7. 

5 Among its responsibilities, Mississippi Emegency Management Agency (MEMA) is required to: 

• Prepare a state comprehensive emergency plan to be coordinated with the plans of the federal government and 

other states. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14(2)(a).

• Assign lead and support roles to state agencies and personnel for emergency support functions and other activities. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14(2)(a)(viii)(1).

• Provide for the deployment of state resources in case of disaster, including specifi cally the deployment (and 

pre-disaster deployment in certain circumstances) of the Mississippi National Guard. Direct and support the 

preparation of emergency plans and organizations by local governments. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14 

(2)(a)(v) and (b).

• Provide personnel, equipment, and other resources from state agencies and from other Mississippi localities to 

reinforce areas stricken by disaster. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-15(a).

6 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-19. 

7 Committee staff interview of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 11. 
Emergency Management: Mississippi

105

8 MEMA, “Statewide Mutual Aid Compact.” http://www.msema.org/SMAC. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

9 MEMA, Th e State of Missississippi Statewide Mutual Aid Compact (SMAC), June, 2000. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. MEMA-00023847 through 00023857. 

10 MEMA, Th e State of Missississippi Statewide Mutual Aid Compact (SMAC), County and City Members, p. II–B–1. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-00028968.

11 MEMA, Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan, Volume II: Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 

(CEMP), May 14, 1999, p. APP B–1. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mississippi CEMP, May 14, 1999].

12 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. APP B–2. 

13 Mississippi CEMP, May 14, 1999, p. APP B–3. 

14 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 24; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16. 

15 Committee staff interview of Brenda Rembert, Director, Planning, Training and Exercise Bureau, MEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 27-28.

16 Rembert interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 29-31.

17 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, pp. Basic–21 through Basic–22. 

18 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14(2)(d); Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. Basic–21. 

19 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-17(c)(3). 

20 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. Basic–22. 

21 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. Basic–21.

22 Committee staff interview of Pat Sullivan, Fire Chief, Gulfport Fire Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, 

transcript pp. 58-59. 

23 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #8, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, 9:30 p.m. CT, p. 7. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010884.

24 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #40, Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 5, 2005, 2:35 a.m. CT, p. 8. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011290.

25 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #40, Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 5, 2005, 2:35 a.m. CT, p. 8. Provided to Committee, 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011290.

26 Jenny Lee Allen, “Don’t Bother Looking for a Red Cross Shelter in Charlotte,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Aug. 13, 

2004, p. A4. 

27 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript pp. 49-50. Th e local American Red Cross will open the shelter and begin the management of it. Department of Human Services is called, in some cases, to help manage and/or staff the shelters. Committee staff interview of 

Richard Dawkins, Program Manager, Division of Economic Assistance, Mississippi Department of Human Services, 

conducted on Dec. 13, 2005, transcript pp. 19-20. 

28 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 51-52. “Th e Shelter Resource Directory provides for shelter activation for 

Louisiana evacuees starting in the north end of the state and moving south as they fi ll up, thereby leaving the shelters 

nearest to the Mississippi Gulf Coast accessible to Mississippi residents should the need for coastal evacuation occur.” 

Mississippi CEMP, May 14, 1999, p. ESF–6–2. 

29 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 108. 

30 Committee staff interview of Jim Craig, Director, Offi ce of Health Protection, Mississippi Department of Health, 

conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 47.

31 Committee staff interview of Alfred C. Sexton, Commander of Administration, Gulfport Police Department, MS, 

conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 58-60.

32 Emergency management agency designated or approved shelters are initially under the direction of the local EMA 

Director, who would be responsible for opening and staffi ng the shelter, most oft en using MDHS personnel. Dawkins 

interview, Dec. 13, 2005, pp. 5-6. 

33 Dawkins interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 56.

34 Dawkins interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 58.

35 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 50-52.

36 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 18. 

37 National Council on Disability, NCD Brief on Hurricane Katrina Aff ected Areas, Sept. 2, 2005. http://www.jfanow.

org/jfanow/index.php?mode=A&id=2497. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

38 See e.g.: Harrison County and Hancock County Emergency Medical Services Districts, “Guidelines for Evacuation 

and Management of Individuals with Disabilities and Special Needs During Disasters,” May 28, 2001. Provided to Committee.
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106

39 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 109.

40 MEMA, “Hurricane Awareness Week May 30 – June 3,” news release, May 28, 2005, p. 3.

41 Committee staff interview of Butch Loper, Emergency Management Director, Jackson County, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 11.

42 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 14; Dawkins interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 14.

43 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #20, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 31, 2005, 1:30 a.m. CT, p. 7. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011000.

44 Special-needs shelters were opened in Newton, Attala, Clarke, Lauderdale, Lincoln, Harrison, and Forrest Counties. 

MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #28, Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 2, 2005, 1 a.m. CT, p. 11. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011104.

45 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 71. 

46 Loper interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 11. 

47 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 19-20.

48 Kirsten Dellinger, Hurricane Katrina Kirsten Dellinger, Society for the Study of Social Problems, Sept. 5, 2005. http://

www.sssp1.org/index.cfm/pageId/540. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006.

49 Kellogg Schwab, Ph.D., “Assessing the Aft ermath of Hurricane Katrina,” John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 

Health, Sept. 12, 2005, pp. 1-2. http://www.jhsph.edu/Katrina/schwab_aft ermath.html. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006.

50 Jerry Mitchell, “Biloxi Woman Feels Like Nomad in GA,” Th e Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 23, 2005. http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050923/NEWS0110/509230373/1260. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006; “Dysentery 

Fears Closes Shelter in Biloxi,” My DNA, Sept. 4, 2005. http://www.mydna.com/health/digestive/news/resources/

news/200509/news_20050904_dysen.html. Accessed on Apr. 10, 2006; Th e Norwalk virus is passed in the stool of 

infected persons. People get infected by swallowing stool-contaminated food or water and usually recover in 2 to 3 days 

without serious or long-term health eff ects. Directors of Health Promotion and Education, “Norwalk Virus Infection.” 

www.dhpe.org/infect/norwalk.html. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006.

51 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 53-55.

52 Sexton interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 62-65.

53 Committee staff interview of Col. Joe Spraggins, Director, Emergency Management Agency, Harrison County, MS, 

conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript pp. 119-121.

54 Sexton interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 48-51.

55 Committee staff interview of Ellen Noble, Chapters Solution Manager, Southeast Service Area, American Red Cross, 

conducted on Dec. 13, 2005, transcript pp. 29-32.

56 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 117-120.

57 Jacqueline L. Salmon, “Th e Clock’s Ticking on Red Cross Overhaul,” Th e Washington Post, Mar. 21, 2006, p. A04.
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