2014 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-16-2014

Rhonshawn Jackson v. Unit Manager Whalen

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 14-1316

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DLD-249 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1316

___________

RHONSHAWN JACKSON,

Appellant

v.

UNIT MANAGER WHALEN; CO HUBER; SUPT. HARRY; 

MAYOR PAUL LEGGORE; CAPT. WALKER; UNIT MANAGER STEVEN BUZAS

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00508)

District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

May 8, 2014

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 16, 2014)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Rhonshawn Jackson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the 

District Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss his complaint pursuant to
2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, we will 

summarily affirm.1 

I.

Rhonshawn Jackson, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed an amended complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees at SCI-Camp Hill and SCIFayette. In his complaint, Jackson alleged that Defendants violated his constitutional

rights by depriving him of certain items of personal and legal property following his 

transfer from SCI-Camp Hill to SCI-Fayette. Specifically, Jackson was informed of the 

transfer on July 18, 2012, and subsequently packed two boxes of personal and legal 

material. He was told that he would be given an opportunity to inventory the property, 

but was later told that there was not enough time to do so. When he was taken to 

inventory his property at SCI-Fayette on July 20, 2012, he discovered that his sunglasses 

and cup were broken, and that his seventeen legal books, reconsideration brief, and 

unfiled civil complaint were missing. He claimed that this resulted in the loss of his 

appellate rights in the United States Supreme Court and his ability to pursue his § 1983 

action. He initiated the grievance process and exhausted it without obtaining relief. 

Defendants moved to dismiss Jackson’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment, lack of personal 

 

1 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may 

summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial 

issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We may affirm on any basis supported by the 

record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
3

involvement, and a failure to state claims of deprivation of property and denial of access 

to the courts. The District Court granted the motion, and Jackson filed a timely notice of 

appeal.

II.

We exercise plenary review over an order dismissing a complaint for failure to 

state a claim. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 

Dismissal is appropriate where the pleader has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). This inquiry has three parts: “(1) 

identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory 

allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and 

evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently 

alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). 

Upon review of Jackson’s complaint, we conclude that it was properly dismissed 

by the District Court. Jackson did not state a civil rights claim arising from his 

deprivation of property because adequate state post-deprivation remedies were available 

to him. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. 

Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000). Jackson took full advantage of the 

available grievance process, and the prison responded to each of his complaints and 

appeals. 
4

Jackson’s claim that the deprivation of his legal property resulted in the denial of 

his right to access the courts was also properly dismissed. A prisoner making an accessto-the-courts claim is required to show that the denial of access caused actual injury. 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1996). Actual injury occurs when a prisoner 

demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim was lost because of the denial of 

access to the courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). When a plaintiff

alleges that he was hindered in his ability to file a complaint, “the underlying cause of 

action . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as 

allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Id. Jackson’s initial 

complaint did not describe the underlying cause of action in the complaint at issue, nor 

did his amended complaint or his reply to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 

27, at 7. We therefore agree with the District Court that Jackson failed to state a claim 

involving this deprivation. 

Jackson stated that the deprivation of his reconsideration brief caused him to lose 

his appellate rights in the Supreme Court of the United States. As the District Court 

noted, however, a review of the docket in the relevant case, Jackson v. Taylor, No. 12-

5092 (U.S.), indicates that the petition for certiorari was filed on July 2, 2012, two weeks 

before Jackson’s transfer to SCI-Fayette, and the petition was not denied until October 1, 

2012.2 The initial petition therefore appears to have been unaffected by the transfer, and 

 

2 Courts may take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute in that 

it “(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be 
5

a reconsideration brief would not have been due at the time of the incidents in question. 

As a result, no actual injury could have resulted from the deprivation, and this claim was 

properly dismissed as well.

III.

There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily 

affirm.3 

 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

3 The section of Jackson’s complaint pertaining to jurisdiction suggests that he believed 

his complaint contained state law tort claims. See Dkt. No. 8, at 1. To the extent that 

Jackson raised any state law tort claims, they were not discussed by the District Court. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), it had discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction 

over any such claims after dismissing Jackson’s federal claims. We review such an act 

for abuse of discretion, see De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 

2003), and find none here.