United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT 

Comprehensive 

Strategy and Annual 

Reporting Are Needed 

to Measure Progress 

and Costs of DOD’s 

Global Posture 

Restructuring 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-852 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

Comprehensive Strategy and Annual 

Reporting Are Needed to Measure 

Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global 

Posture Restructuring 

Highlights of GAO-06-852, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee 

on Armed Services, House of

Representatives 

The Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) Integrated Global Posture 

and Basing Strategy calls for a 

comprehensive restructuring of 

U.S. forces overseas. DOD’s 

planned changes will require

billions of dollars to implement at a 

time when DOD is supporting 

operations in Iraq and realigning

domestic bases. As requested, 

GAO examined (1) the extent to 

which DOD has articulated a global

posture strategy that has the

characteristics necessary to guide 

its efforts and to achieve desired 

results and (2) the challenges that 

could affect DOD’s implementation

of its strategy and the mechanisms 

DOD has in place to inform 

Congress of its overall progress in

achieving global posture goals. 

What GAO Recommends

To facilitate DOD’s management of 

global restructuring, GAO 

recommends that the Secretary of

Defense take specific steps to

improve the strategy, periodically 

report to Congress on cost and 

host-nation negotiation status, and

address management and funding

issues for new operating locations. 

In responding to a draft of this 

report, DOD partially agreed with

GAO’s recommendations. However, 

it did not specify any actions it

plans to take in response to our 

recommendations. Because DOD’s

response was unclear, we have

added a matter for congressional 

consideration suggesting that

Congress require DOD to report

annually on its strategy and 

implementation. 

DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four principal documents, 

but these documents fully address only three of the six characteristics that 

GAO’s prior work has identified as useful components of an effective 

strategy. Specifically, DOD’s strategy documents state the purpose, scope, 

and methodology for changing its global posture; define the problems its 

strategy is directed against; and describe how the strategy is to be integrated

with related strategies. However, the documents do not fully address other 

important characteristics such as performance metrics to measure intended 

improvements in operational effectiveness and service members’ quality of 

life; sources of funding for implementing global restructuring initiatives; or 

methods of resolving conflicts that may arise during implementation. In the 

absence of a comprehensive strategy that addresses important 

characteristics such as performance measures, Congress will lack sufficient 

information to evaluate funding requests and assess whether the strategy is 

improving operational capabilities, quality of life, and alliances as intended. 

Ongoing negotiations between the United States and host nations, evolving 

cost estimates, and difficulties establishing service management and funding 

responsibilities for new overseas sites contribute to the complexity and 

uncertainty of DOD’s overseas restructuring effort. In addition, DOD has not 

established a comprehensive and routine process to keep Congress informed 

on its progress dealing with these issues and the overall status of

implementing the strategy. First, negotiations between the United States and 

host nations continue to evolve, causing periodic adjustments to the pace

and scope of DOD’s plans and making it difficult to determine the overall 

status of this effort. Second, DOD’s initial cost estimate of $9 billion to 

$12 billion will continue to change, reflecting uncertainties such as those 

related to host-nation negotiations and burden-sharing, and total costs may 

be understated. Third, DOD has not yet fully determined how it will allocate 

responsibilities for managing and funding its planned worldwide network of 

smaller operating sites to the services, and therefore, it is still uncertain who 

will manage these sites and how they will be paid for. DOD has not 

established a comprehensive, routine method of informing Congress of 

ongoing changes to the strategy and its total costs. Reliable and timely 

information about the full costs, activities, and outputs of federal programs 

is important as Congress makes decisions about allocating resources in an 

environment of competing demands. DOD has not established a 

comprehensive and periodic reporting process because DOD officials 

believe that current congressional briefings and reporting requirements, 

which largely focus on military construction requirements, provide Congress

with sufficient information. However, these existing reports do not provide 

comprehensive information on total costs, overall progress, or changes to 

DOD’s plan. Without a periodic reporting process focused on overall 

progress and costs, Congress may not be well positioned to evaluate funding 

requests for implementing the strategy.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-852. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Defense Management

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 6

DOD Has Included Some but Not All Important Characteristics of 

an Effective Strategy in Its Global Basing Strategy Documents 9 

Key Challenges Contribute to Uncertain Strategy Outcomes, and 

No Routine, Comprehensive Mechanisms Exist to Report on 

Progress 18

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 28 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I GAO’s Identification of the Six Characteristics of 

an Effective National Strategy 32 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 38 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 42 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44 

Tables 

Table 1: Principal U.S. Global Defense Posture Strategy Documents 

Identified by DOD 10 

Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective 

National Strategy 12 

Table 3: Extent to Which the Four Principal Global Posture 

Strategy Documents Collectively Address GAO-Identified 

Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 14 

Table 4: Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 36 

Page i GAO-06-852
Defense Management

Figure 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands’ Areas of 

Responsibility and Areas Affected by the Global Posture 

Strategy 8

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

IGPBS Integrated Global Posture and Basing Strategy 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-852
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 13, 2006 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

In August 2004, President George W. Bush announced what has been 

described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces

overseas since the end of the Korean War. In his announcement, the 

president stated that this restructuring is intended to increase U.S. military 

capabilities and combat power in every part of the world, provide service 

members with more time at home, reduce the number of moves service

members must undergo over a military career, and significantly reduce the 

number of overseas facilities. 

In August 2004, President George W. Bush announced what has been 

described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces

overseas since the end of the Korean War. In his announcement, the 

president stated that this restructuring is intended to increase U.S. military 

capabilities and combat power in every part of the world, provide service 

members with more time at home, reduce the number of moves service

members must undergo over a military career, and significantly reduce the 

number of overseas facilities. 

In September 2004, shortly after the president announced this new policy, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Report to Congress entitled 

Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. This report outlined DOD’s 

proposed changes, which were aimed at implementing the president’s new 

policy and which DOD called the “Integrated Global Posture and Basing 

Strategy” (IGPBS). Overall changes involved in this shift in overseas 

posture would be significant. For example, DOD plans to transfer home to 

American territory up to 70,000 service members and about 100,000 family

members and civilian employees currently living overseas. The 2004 

Report to Congress also described DOD’s strategy to transform the U.S. 

posture abroad into a network of worldwide locations of three types: main 

operating bases, which will be enduring, large sites with permanently 

stationed service members and their families; forward operating sites, 

which will be smaller but expandable sites that can support rotational 

forces; and cooperative security locations, which will be small, rapidly 

expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence. According to 

DOD’s Report to Congress, many advantages would be gained by using this

network of locations. The new U.S. overseas posture is intended to 

position U.S. forces to better conduct the Global War on Terrorism, ease 

the burden of the post-9/11 operational tempo on members of the armed 

forces and their families, and improve the U.S. ability to meet its alliance 

commitments while making these alliances more affordable and 

In September 2004, shortly after the president announced this new policy, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Report to Congress entitled 

Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. This report outlined DOD’s 

proposed changes, which were aimed at implementing the president’s new 

policy and which DOD called the “Integrated Global Posture and Basing 

Strategy” (IGPBS). Overall changes involved in this shift in overseas 

posture would be significant. For example, DOD plans to transfer home to 

American territory up to 70,000 service members and about 100,000 family

members and civilian employees currently living overseas. The 2004 

Report to Congress also described DOD’s strategy to transform the U.S. 

posture abroad into a network of worldwide locations of three types: main 

operating bases, which will be enduring, large sites with permanently 

stationed service members and their families; forward operating sites, 

which will be smaller but expandable sites that can support rotational 

forces; and cooperative security locations, which will be small, rapidly 

expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence. According to 

DOD’s Report to Congress, many advantages would be gained by using this

network of locations. The new U.S. overseas posture is intended to 

position U.S. forces to better conduct the Global War on Terrorism, ease 

the burden of the post-9/11 operational tempo on members of the armed 

forces and their families, and improve the U.S. ability to meet its alliance 

commitments while making these alliances more affordable and 

Page 1 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
sustainable. DOD will be making these global posture changes, which will 

entail significant amounts of funding, at a time when it is also supporting 

operations in Iraq and implementing other initiatives such as those 

approved by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission. DOD has 

reported to Congress that it will cost $9 billion to $12 billion to implement 

the strategy over a period of several years. 

In our report on 21st Century challenges facing the federal government, 

we cite some of the most urgent issues the Department of Defense must 

address as it seeks to meet the demands of the new security environment.1

One of the issues cited is whether DOD’s plans to restructure its overseas 

posture provide a significantly improved capability to respond to global 

threats in the new security environment, considering diplomatic, 

operational, and cost factors. We have also issued reports on DOD’s plans 

to build new facilities overseas, as reported to Congress in master plans 

for overseas infrastructure.2

 These reports have discussed the degree to

which the information provided by DOD to Congress on the military 

construction costs at overseas locations was complete and reliable, and 

we have made recommendations for improvement. 

You requested that we assess DOD’s efforts to realign its military posture 

overseas. Specifically, we examined the following questions: (1) To what 

extent has DOD articulated a global posture strategy that addresses the 

characteristics necessary to guide its efforts and achieve desired results? 

(2) What key challenges, if any, could affect DOD’s implementation of its 

strategy, and does DOD have mechanisms in place to inform Congress of 

its mitigation plans and overall progress in achieving IGPBS goals? 

To determine the extent to which DOD’s IGPBS contains all the desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy, we evaluated the content 

of each of the four principal global posture strategy documents identified 

by DOD officials using six desirable characteristics of effective national 

 1

 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government,

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

2

 GAO, Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for 

Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 

2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
strategies we have developed in prior work.3

 In this prior work, we 

identified a set of desirable characteristics by reviewing several sources of 

information, such as the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

and guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the 

President’s Management Agenda. We also researched recommendations 

from various research organizations that have commented on national 

strategies, such as the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution. 

To identify key challenges that could affect DOD’s implementation of its 

strategy, we examined global posture strategy plans, programs, cost 

estimates, and other documentation obtained from the geographic 

combatant commands, service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, and State Department Headquarters. To identify the mechanisms 

DOD has in place to inform Congress of its efforts to overcome these 

challenges and report on overall progress in achieving the strategy’s goals, 

we reviewed congressional testimony, briefings prepared for 

congressional Members and other organizations, and reports produced as

a result of legislative requirements. We assessed the reliability of the data 

used in this report and determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our

purposes. Appendix I provides additional information on the six 

characteristics of effective national strategies. Appendix II provides 

additional information on our scope and methodology. We conducted our 

review from November 2004 through January 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated May 

2006.

4

 That report provides additional details on the proposed changes to 

the U.S. military posture overseas and specific examples that highlight the 

challenges faced by DOD in implementing its strategy. 

 3

 GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). In this

testimony, we identified the six characteristics of an effective national strategy as the 

following: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk 

assessment; (3) goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, 

investments, and risk management; (5) roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and 

(6) integration.

4

 GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Periodic Reporting Are 

Needed to Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-

486C (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
The Department of Defense has articulated its strategy to restructure the 

U.S. military overseas posture in four principal documents, but the 

characteristics of effective national strategies have not been fully 

addressed in these documents, which may limit the department’s efforts to 

implement the strategy and achieve desired results. In prior work, we 

identified six characteristics of an effective national strategy that can 

assist organizations to develop and implement strategies, to enhance their 

usefulness in resource and policy decisions, and to better assure 

accountability. DOD’s four principal strategy documents for restructuring 

overseas presence address three important characteristics of effective 

national strategies: the overall purpose and scope of changing the global 

military posture, the problems the strategy is intended to address, and the 

way the strategy is to be integrated with other related strategies. However, 

the following three other important characteristics have been only 

partially addressed by the documents: 

Results in Brief 

• Establishing goals, subordinate objectives and activities, and performance 

measures—DOD has not established ways to measure the extent to which 

intended improvements in operational effectiveness or quality of life are 

occurring. 

• Identifying resources, investments, and methods of managing risk—DOD 

has not identified sources of funding (for example, specific appropriations 

or military services) for the network of smaller operating locations it plans 

to establish. 

• Defining organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordinating 

mechanisms—DOD has not identified a process for resolving conflicting 

priorities either within DOD or between DOD and other government 

organizations, such as the State Department. 

Without clearly and fully identifying these elements, the Secretary of 

Defense and other stakeholders may be limited in their ability to 

demonstrate progress toward achieving DOD’s identified goals, such as 

improving worldwide response times and quality of life for service 

members. Moreover, Congress will lack assurance that funds allocated to

implement the strategy will produce the benefits DOD intends. 

Three significant challenges exist that contribute to the complexity and

uncertainty of the overseas basing restructuring effort. DOD is taking 

some steps to address these challenges; however, many actions are 

incomplete, and the department has not established a comprehensive, 

routine method of informing Congress on its progress toward addressing 

these issues or its progress toward implementing the strategy. Up-to-date

and reliable information on issues such as these is important to Congress 

Page 4 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
and the Secretary of Defense in helping to shape decisions about funding 

policies and defense-related programs. The three challenges we identified

that limit DOD’s ability to implement its IGPBS strategy are the following: 

• DOD faces a challenge in determining how to adjust its global basing 

strategy as negotiations with host nations evolve.

• DOD faces a challenge in accurately estimating the costs of implementing 

the strategy as its plan matures and changes. 

• DOD is encountering difficulties in establishing management and funding 

responsibilities as it develops its worldwide network of smaller operating 

sites. 

These issues will continue to make the restructuring of overseas military 

posture a dynamic process and contribute to the uncertainty of the costs 

and overall progress of the department’s efforts. DOD has not yet 

established a comprehensive and routine method of keeping Congress 

informed of its progress. Reliable and timely information about the full 

cost, activities, and outputs of defense-related programs is important to 

Congress in making decisions about allocating resources, authorizing and

modifying programs, and evaluating program performance. Although DOD 

has provided a September 2004 Report to Congress on the strategy and has 

periodically testified and briefed various Members of Congress and their 

staffs, DOD has not established a mechanism for providing comprehensive 

and routine reporting of the overall program status and costs. As a result, 

Congress may not be fully informed of DOD’s progress and challenges in 

implementing the strategy or have a complete understanding of the 

potential financial obligations on the horizon. 

To facilitate DOD’s management of its global basing strategy and to 

establish a routine method of keeping Congress informed of progress in 

achieving its goals, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense 

fully address the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, 

develop a periodic reporting process that summarizes important 

information such as up-to-date costs to increase the transparency of this 

process, and address management and funding issues for new operating 

locations. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 

our recommendations. However, DOD’s response to our recommendations 

was unclear in that the department did not cite any specific actions it 

planned to take to implement the recommendations. Specifically, the 

department did not acknowledge the need to update its strategy document 

or to provide Congress with routine updates on host-nation negotiations

Page 5 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
and cost. Also, while DOD emphasized that improving the management 

and funding of new operating locations should be synchronized with other 

DOD initiatives, it did not indicate how it planned to synchronize these 

efforts. As we state in our report, we continue to believe that the 

department needs to identify specific actions it will take to ensure that our 

recommendations are implemented. Because DOD’s response to our 

recommendations does not clearly indicate how it plans to provide 

comprehensive and routine information to Congress, we have included a 

matter for congressional consideration to suggest that Congress may wish 

to consider requiring that DOD report annually on its global posture 

strategy, costs, and implementation plans. 

In September 2001, DOD issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

which addresses, among other issues, the need to reorient the U.S. military 

global posture. The report called for developing a permanent basing 

system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of 

the world as well as providing temporary access to facilities in foreign 

countries that enable U.S. forces to train and operate in the absence of 

permanent ranges and bases. 

In April 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began an 

initiative to explore the issue of U.S. global posture and presence in more 

detail.5

 OSD developed a broad set of ideas and assumptions about the 

strategic environment facing the United States in the 21st Century, the 

most critical of which was the uncertainty facing the United States and its 

allies in the post-Cold War world. In May 2003, an integration team was 

formed to help guide the IGPBS process. This team was led by OSD Policy 

and included officials from the Joint Staff; the Office of the Director of 

Program Analysis and Evaluation; and the Office of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. This 

group held working-level and senior-level meetings that helped steer the 

early analysis and all the decision briefings for the Senior Level Review 

Group and the Senior Planning Committee.6

 In mid-2003, four geographic 

Background 

 5

 The Office of the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy is the DOD lead 

for IGPBS. 

6

 The Senior Leader Review Group is composed of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the service Secretaries, and a select few Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The Senior 

Planning Committee is composed of the Senior Leader Review Group plus the combatant 

commanders. In December 2003 and January 2004, these two groups had six meetings 

during which IGPBS was discussed. 

Page 6 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
combatant commands—the U.S. European, Pacific, Southern, and Central

Commands7

—started presenting their proposals, which were reviewed by 

the OSD-led integration team. The team evaluated the proposals against 

four risk categories.8

In the September 2004 Report to Congress, DOD stated that the United 

States had held Ambassadorial-level consultations with over 30 countries

on five continents.9

 According to DOD, allies stated that they understood 

and shared the U.S. general perception of the need to update its force 

posture globally to meet 21st Century challenges. DOD officials also stated 

that allies expressed their appreciation for the opportunity to suggest 

adjustments to U.S. proposals. 

In August 2004, the president announced the proposed restructuring of the 

U.S. military posture overseas. As previously discussed, in September 

2004, DOD issued a Report to Congress – Strengthening U.S. Global 

Defense Posture, which listed the specific locations for 87 proposed 

“changes and continuities” in positioning U.S. forces worldwide by U.S. 

combatant command and by country. Figure 1 provides a map of the areas 

of responsibility for the geographic combatant commands. 

 7

 The five geographic commands—U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S.

Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command—are responsible 

for all U.S. military operations within their geographic areas of responsibility. 

8

 The four risk categories were “political-military risk,” “force structure risk,” “operational 

risk,” and “cost risk.” 

9

 In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the United States visited 

“over 20 countries.” 

Page 7 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands’ Areas of Responsibility and Areas Affected by the Global Posture Strategy 

a

The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility. Forces based 

in Alaska, however, remain assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command. 

Page 8 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
DOD has articulated its global posture strategy in four key documents but 

has not addressed all of the characteristics of effective national strategies,

which may limit its ability to guide implementation efforts and achieve 

desired results. In prior work, we identified six characteristics of an 

effective national strategy that can aid organizations to develop and 

implement their strategies, to enhance their usefulness in resource and 

policy making, and to better assure accountability.10 DOD has generally 

addressed three of these characteristics, for example, the overall purpose 

and scope of this effort, but the documents only partially address three 

other characteristics. Specifically, DOD does not (1) establish 

performance measures such as ways to measure the extent to which 

intended improvements in operational effectiveness or quality of life are 

occurring, (2) identify sources of funding for the network of smaller 

operating locations it plans to establish, or (3) identify a process for 

resolving conflicting priorities either within DOD or between DOD and 

other government organizations. In addition, the dispersion of the strategy 

in a collection of documents and briefings limits its overall clarity. Without 

clearly and effectively addressing the desirable characteristics that would 

shape the policies, programs, priorities, and resource allocations in a 

single document, DOD and other stakeholders may be limited in their 

ability to implement the strategies and to demonstrate progress in 

achieving the identified goals. 

Officials in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

for Strategy (OSD/Strategy) identified four documents that they believe

are key to describing the global defense posture strategy: (1) the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001) and its Terms of 

Reference (June 2001); (2) the National Security Strategy of the United 

States (September 2002); (3) Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report to 

Congress (September 2004); and (4) the National Defense Strategy of the 

United States of America (March 2005). Table 1 describes these four 

documents and how they relate to the U.S. global defense posture. 

DOD Has Included 

Some but Not All 

Important 

Characteristics of an 

Effective Strategy in 

Its Global Basing 

Strategy Documents 

Global Posture Strategy 

Articulated in Four 

Principal Documents 

 10 GAO-04-408T. 

Page 9 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Table 1: Principal U.S. Global Defense Posture Strategy Documents Identified by DOD 

Strategy document Description of strategy 

September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

and its June 2001 Terms of Reference

Issued by the Secretary of Defense 

The Quadrennial Defense Review and its Terms of Reference provide a broad 

framework for guiding the development of U.S. forces and capabilities. The

Quadrennial Defense Review also describes DOD’s current security environment, 

defense strategy, changes in force planning, transformation of operations and 

capabilities, and a risk management framework. The Quadrennial Defense Review

also devotes one section to reorienting the U.S. global defense posture to focus on 

new challenges the military will face, new ways to deter conflict, plans to place 

forces in forward areas to respond to threats, goals to reorient global defense 

posture, and general activities that each of the military services should take to 

address those goals. 

September 2002 National Security Strategy of 

the United States

Issued by the President 

The National Security Strategy provides a broad framework for strengthening U.S. 

security in the future. It identifies the national security goals of the United States, 

describes the foreign policy and military capabilities necessary to achieve those 

goals, evaluates the current status of these capabilities, and explains how national 

power will be structured to utilize these capabilities. The strategy highlights the 

need but does not provide specific guidance on how to reorient DOD’s global 

defense posture. 

September 2004 Strengthening U.S. Global 

Posture -Report to Congress 

Issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy 

The Report to Congress on Strengthening U.S. Global Posture identifies the 

reasons for the restructuring and defines the key elements of global posture as 

relationships, activities, facilities, legal arrangements, and global sourcing and 

surge. It also describes the key objectives for changing the U.S. global defense 

posture, provides a region-by-region synopsis of those changes, and highlights 

diplomatic relationships and interactions with Congress. Further, it provides a 

rough order of magnitude cost estimate and describes how the restructuring is 

integrated with DOD’s Base Realignment and Closure process. 

March 2005 National Defense Strategy of the 

United States of America

Issued by the Secretary of Defense 

The National Defense Strategy provides a general planning framework for DOD to 

address current and future defense challenges. The strategy describes U.S. 

defense strategic objectives, actions to accomplish these objectives, and 

implementation guidance for strategic planning and decision making. It devotes 

one section to the key aspects of reorienting the U.S. global defense posture, 

which were outlined in the 2004 Report to Congress. 

Source: GAO.

In addition to these four principal documents, OSD officials stated that 

congressional testimonies and briefings, the military service 

implementation plans, budget documents, senior-level review board 

meetings, and the overseas master plans provide additional details on 

DOD’s strategy and plans.

Page 10 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
In our February 2004 testimony related to combating terrorism, we 

identified six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies.11 In 

our testimony, we reported that there are no legislative or executive

mandates identifying a single, consistent set of characteristics for all 

national strategies. Given that there is no such mandate, we identified a set 

of desirable characteristics by reviewing several sources of information. 

For example, we consulted the Government Performance and Results Act 

of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and 

guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President’s 

Management Agenda. In addition, we studied our past reports and 

testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to desirable 

elements of a national strategy. Similarly, we researched 

recommendations from various research organizations that have 

commented on national strategies, such as the ANSER Institute on 

Homeland Security, the RAND Corporation, and the Brookings Institution. 

Table 2 provides a summary of the six characteristics we identified. 

GAO-Identified 

Characteristics of an 

Effective National Strategy 

 11 GAO-04-408T. 

Page 11 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

Desirable Characteristic Description

Purpose, scope, and methodology Addresses why the strategy was produced, 

the scope of its coverage, and the process 

by which it was developed. 

Problem definition and risk assessment Discusses the particular national problems 

and threats the strategy is intended to 

address. 

Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, 

and performance measures 

Addresses what the national strategy 

strives to achieve and the steps needed to 

garner those results, as well as the 

priorities, milestones, and performance 

measures to gauge results. 

Resources, investments, and risk 

management 

Addresses what the strategy will cost, the 

sources and types of resources and 

investments needed, and where those 

resources and investments should be 

targeted. 

Organizational roles, responsibilities, and 

coordination 

Addresses what organizations will 

implement the strategy, their roles and 

responsibilities, mechanisms for 

coordinating their efforts, and a process for 

resolving conflicts. 

Integration Addresses how a national strategy relates 

to other strategic goals, objectives, and 

activities. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: See GAO-04-408T. Our prior work identified the sixth characteristic as “integration and 

implementation.” For the purposes of this report, we decided not to evaluate the extent to which the 

four principal strategy documents addressed “implementation” because our second reporting 

objective addresses challenges associated with implementation in more detail. 

In our prior testimony, we stated that a clearly defined set of desirable 

characteristics would aid responsible parties in further developing and 

implementing their strategies, in enhancing their usefulness in resource 

and policy decisions, and in better assuring accountability. Although the 

authors of national strategies might organize these characteristics in a 

variety of ways and use different terms, we present them in this order 

because we believe that they flow logically from conception to 

implementation. Specifically, the strategy’s purpose leads to specific 

actions for tackling those problems and risks, allocating and managing the 

appropriate resources, identifying different organizations’ roles and 

responsibilities, and integrating actions taken by all relevant parties 

implementing the strategy. See appendix I for additional details on these 

Page 12 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
characteristics, and see appendix II for our scope and methodology in 

developing them. 

DOD Has Not Fully 

Developed Some 

Important Strategy 

Characteristics 

In the four principal global posture strategy documents discussed above, 

DOD generally addresses three of the desirable characteristics to guide the 

overseas posture initiatives. Specifically, DOD addresses the overall 

purpose and scope for changing its global posture, the problems and 

threats its strategy is directed against, and how the strategy will be 

integrated with those of other governmental organizations. However, the 

four principal strategy documents only partially address aspects of three

other important characteristics of an effective national strategy, including

(1) milestones and outcome–related performance measures, such as tools 

to gauge the extent to which intended improvements in operational 

effectiveness or quality of life are occurring; (2) sources of funding and 

types of resources; and (3) a description of how conflicts will be resolved. 

According to our methodology, a strategy “addresses” a characteristic 

when it explicitly cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks 

specificity and details and thus could be improved upon. A strategy 

“partially addresses” a characteristic when it explicitly cites some but not 

all elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of “partially 

addresses,” there is a wide variation between a strategy that addresses 

most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses few 

of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy “does not address” a 

characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any elements of a 

characteristic, and/or any implicit references are either too vague or too 

general.12 Table 3 summarizes the extent to which the principal global 

posture strategy documents collectively address, partially address, or do 

not address the six characteristics. 

 12 See app. II for more details on our methodology. 

Page 13 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Table 3: Extent to Which the Four Principal Global Posture Strategy Documents Collectively Address GAO-Identified 

Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

Desirable characteristic 

Extent to which 

characteristic is 

addressed Description

Purpose, scope, and 

methodology 

Addressed The stated purpose of the strategy is to reorient the current global 

defense posture to meet the threats of the new strategic environment. 

Key terms were defined, such as global posture, main operating bases, 

forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations. The key 

elements that guided the development of the strategy include strengths, 

vulnerabilities, opportunities, and challenges that DOD faces in the 21st 

Century. 

Problem definition and risk 

assessment 

Addressed The strategy is intended to address a combination of changes in U.S. 

forces’ operating patterns, advances in military capabilities, and an 

increasingly uncertain global security environment, in particular the threat 

of terrorism. Risks were discussed as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, 

and disruptive. 

Goals, subordinate objectives,

activities, and performance 

measures 

Partially addressed The overall goal articulated by the strategy is to strengthen U.S. global 

defense posture while providing U.S. service members and their family 

members with more predictability and stability. Subordinate objectives 

include expanding allied roles and building new security partnerships, 

developing rapidly deployable capabilities, and positively affecting 

service members and their families. The activities are identified by a list 

of specific initiatives DOD intends to implement. The strategy does not 

address, however, milestones and outcome-related performance 

measures (such as metrics to demonstrate improvements in operational 

response times or in quality of life for service members) that would 

identify progress in achieving the stated goals and objectives. 

Resources, investments, and 

risk management 

Partially addressed The cost to implement the strategy was estimated at $9 billion to 

$12 billion, but there were no detailed estimates, such as costs for each 

global posture initiative or costs incurred by the military services, to 

support that estimate. The strategy does not address sources of funding, 

types of resources, or a mechanism to prioritize and allocate resources. 

Further, there is no discussion of the timing of how the initiatives will be 

funded over the next decade. (We discuss the uncertainty and 

understatement of the reported estimate in more detail later in the 

report.) 

Organizational roles, 

responsibilities, and 

coordination 

Partially addressed In the strategy, DOD is assigned the lead role and responsibility for 

strategy implementation and accountability. The military services were 

assigned lead and supporting roles and responsibilities to implement 

specific initiatives. DOD coordinates the implementation of the strategy 

with the Department of State. However, the strategy does not describe a 

process for how conflicts will be resolved within and outside of DOD. (For 

example, the documents do not describe a process that would resolve 

interagency conflicts.) 

Integration Addressed According to the strategy, the global posture strategy helped inform 

DOD’s 2004 Base Realignment and Closure process. 

Source: GAO analysis.

Page 14 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
The following is a more detailed discussion of the characteristics that are 

partially addressed in the key documents we examined. 

The global posture strategy addresses its goals, subordinate objectives, 

and activities, but performance measures are not developed. Specifically, 

the overall end-state of the global defense strategy is to strengthen DOD’s 

global defense posture while providing U.S. service members and their 

families with more predictability and stability over the course of a military 

career. The overarching defense policy goals are to assure allies and 

friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats and coercion 

against U.S. interests; and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence 

fails. Subordinate objectives related to global posture include 

(1) expanding allied roles and building new security partnerships; 

(2) creating greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing 

agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations; 

(3) focusing within and across regions by complementing regional military 

presence with the capability to respond quickly to a location across the 

world; and (4) developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and 

operating from the premise that forces will not likely fight where they are 

stationed. The Report to Congress – Strengthening U.S. Global Defense 

Posture provides a general description of activities within each geographic 

region as well as a detailed list of specific IGPBS initiatives, many of which 

require discussions and negotiations with host nations. 

Goals, Subordinate Objectives, 

Activities, and Performance 

Measures 

The principal strategy documents did not address milestones and 

outcome-related performance measures. For example, the 2004 Report to

Congress highlighted the positive effect on service members and their 

dependents as a key strategy goal but did not identify related performance 

measures to gauge how the quality-of-life goal would be achieved. Also, 

the global posture strategy identified the development of rapidly 

deployable capabilities and the improvement of operational flexibility as

subordinate objectives but did not identify related performance measures. 

Furthermore, officials at the Pacific Command, the European Command, 

the Central Command, the Southern Command, the Special Operations 

Command, and the military service headquarters told us that they had not 

conducted detailed analysis, including performance metrics, to support 

Page 15 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
how quality of life or operational capabilities would be improved by 

implementing the global posture strategy.13

The 2004 Report to Congress estimated rough order of magnitude costs to 

implement the strategy at $9 billion to $12 billion over the 2006-2011 future 

years defense program. (We discuss the uncertainty and understatement of 

the reported estimate in more detail later in this report.) However, the

2004 Report did not provide any details beyond this overall estimate, such 

as costs for each global posture initiative or costs incurred by the military 

services, to support the reported estimate. Further, the principal strategy 

documents did not identify sources of funding, such as military service or 

combatant command funds; types of resources, such as military 

construction or operations and maintenance funds; or a mechanism to 

allocate resources. OSD officials told us that information related to the

sources of funding and types of resources and investments is contained in

the regional combatant commands’ overseas master plans and does not 

need to be included in the principal strategy documents because it would 

be duplicative. However, in prior work, we reported that overseas master 

plans do not provide a definitive picture of future U.S. funding

requirements, particularly for future locations.14 In addition, there is no 

discussion in the principal strategy documents of when the initiatives will 

be funded over the next decade. OSD officials told us that DOD had 

programmed about $3.9 billion to implement the global posture strategy in

the 2006-2011 future years defense program and that the services will 

program additional funds in the fiscal year 2008 budget submission as 

initiatives move toward implementation. Regarding risk management, the 

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review’s Terms of Reference generally 

identified overall defense priorities for investment in areas such as people, 

intelligence, precision strike, rapidly deployable maneuver forces, and 

infrastructure and logistics. However, these priorities are not sufficient to 

determine how DOD will manage the cost risk associated with 

implementing the global restructuring, such as the potential for cost 

estimates to change and for unexpected costs to be incurred without 

Resources, Investments, and 

Risk Management 

 13 According to an OSD official, OSD compared the current global defense posture with the 

future desired global defense posture to determine the effect of these planned changes on 

response times. The OSD analysis indicated that response times for the larger-sized forces 

would not be substantially improved. Improvements could be expected, however, in

response times for the deployment of smaller, more mobile forces, such as special 

operations forces. This information was not contained in the strategy documents. 

14 Specifically, the master plans only provide information on U.S. funding sources for

military construction costs. 

Page 16 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
sufficient time to budget for them and to make appropriate tradeoffs with 

other competing DOD demands. 

The global posture strategy addresses which organizations will implement 

the strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and a mechanism for parties 

to coordinate their efforts. For example, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review assigned lead responsibilities to each of the services to plan and

implement specific global posture initiatives. Regarding coordination, the 

2004 Report to Congress identifies a process for coordinating DOD’s global 

posture strategy with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 

Commission’s relocation of service members and dependents from 

overseas locations to the United States. The 2004 Report to Congress also 

describes coordination with the State Department regarding consultations 

with host nations. For example, in the 2004 Report, DOD states that it had 

consulted closely with the Department of State, especially with regard to

the diplomatic arrangements needed to secure the desired changes in 

foreign countries. 

Organizational Roles, 

Responsibilities, and 

Coordination 

The global posture strategy does not address, however, a process for how 

conflicts will be resolved either within DOD or between DOD and other 

government organizations. While the Secretary of Defense can resolve 

conflicting priorities within the Department of Defense, the four 

documents do not describe how interagency conflicts will be resolved if 

they arise during the strategy’s implementation.

DOD officials agreed that the six characteristics of an effective national 

strategy were not fully addressed in the four documents we reviewed but 

pointed out that there are other documents, such as the March 2004 

Strategic Planning Guidance, the June 2004 Joint Programming 

Guidance, and the overseas master plans, that contain additional 

information on some of the identified characteristics. We reviewed these 

supporting documents and others, such as combatant command 

proposals, and found that they individually or collectively did not fully 

address the desired characteristics. For example, none of these additional 

documents provided outcome-related performance measures or described 

a process for how conflicts will be resolved either within DOD or between 

DOD and other government organizations. Moreover, while it may be true 

that alternative documents in the department may help it manage this 

effort, we believe that relying on numerous documents written by different

organizations at different points in time underscores the lack of clarity in

how the strategy is articulated and reduces the overall effectiveness of 

these management tools. 

Page 17 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Three significant challenges exist that contribute to the complexity and

uncertain outcome of the overseas basing restructuring effort. DOD has 

taken some steps to address these challenges, but many actions are 

incomplete, and the department has not established a comprehensive, 

routine method of informing Congress of its progress in addressing these 

issues or the overall results of its efforts to implement the strategy. The 

three challenges include (1) determining how to adjust the global basing 

strategy as negotiations with host nations evolve; (2) accurately estimating

the cost of implementing the strategy as DOD’s plans evolve; and 

(3) assigning management and funding responsibilities for establishing and 

maintaining DOD’s planned network of worldwide locations. These issues 

will continue to make the restructuring of overseas military posture a 

dynamic process and contribute to the uncertainty of the global posture 

strategy’s end-state. Despite this uncertainty and the changing nature of 

DOD’s global posture plans, DOD has not established a comprehensive 

and routine method of informing Congress of adjustments to its plans and 

estimated overall costs. Department officials we spoke with believe that 

current reporting mechanisms such as testimonies and briefings to 

Members of Congress are adequate in keeping Congress informed of their 

efforts and that no additional formal reporting mechanisms are needed. 

The Congress, however, has expressed concern over the information it 

receives on the global posture strategy and recently required DOD to 

provide additional information in several areas, such as the status of hostnation agreements and funding for critical infrastructure at new locations. 

These collective reporting requirements, however, do not provide a 

comprehensive and routine representation of the overall status of DOD’s 

efforts. Without such information, Congress may not be fully informed and 

remain abreast of changes in military capabilities, relationships with U.S. 

partners and allies, and future financial requirements. 

One challenge in the implementation of DOD’s global posture strategy 

relates to the need to adjust the pace and scope of DOD’s announced 

restructuring as negotiations with host nations evolve. Before the United 

States can establish a U.S. presence in a host country, many complex and 

critical legal arrangements must be made between the two countries. The 

time it takes to finalize these agreements can vary from days or months to 

years; involves close coordination between DOD, the Department of State, 

and host nation governments; and frequently involves having the 

countries’ legislative bodies formalize the agreements. The arrangements 

typically cover issues of interest to DOD, such as U.S. forces’ access to 

training areas, U.S. forces’ ability to conduct operations and deploy from 

the countries where they are located, and arrangements with the host 

Key Challenges 

Contribute to 

Uncertain Strategy 

Outcomes, and No 

Routine, 

Comprehensive 

Mechanisms Exist to 

Report on Progress 

Complexity and Sensitivity 

of Host-Nation 

Negotiations Continue to 

Alter Planned Moves 

Page 18 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
nations for sharing the costs of maintaining these locations. The types of

provisions found in these legal arrangements include access/use 

provisions, status provisions, and general provisions on cooperation. 

Many of the initiatives identified in the September 2004 Report to 

Congress have already been changed, are still being negotiated with the 

host countries, or have been put on hold until DOD can ascertain whether 

negotiations will allow U.S. forces the access they need. These changes 

sometimes involve significant political sensitivities and large amounts of 

investment by the United States and the host countries. If one of DOD’s 

proposed initiatives must be changed, corresponding changes may need to

be made to DOD’s overall IGPBS plans to accommodate the new 

conditions. The classified version of this report provides specific examples 

that illustrate how sensitive DOD’s overall IGPBS plans are to negotiations 

with individual host countries. 

DOD’s Estimate of Global 

Posture-Related Costs Is 

Uncertain and May Be 

Understated 

In September 2004, DOD estimated one-time, nonrecurring costs to 

implement the global posture strategy at $9 billion to $12 billion over the 

fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program. However, significant 

cost uncertainties still remain, and the cost to implement the strategy may 

be understated. In some cases, host-nation negotiations have necessitated

adjustments to initial plans and estimated costs. In other cases, the 

services did not prepare detailed cost estimates for the network of smaller 

operating locations because limited planning had been done at the time 

the estimates were submitted. Because the costs of implementing IGPBS 

may be higher than what is now reported, the services may be forced to 

make difficult funding tradeoffs when the actual costs are identified, or 

Congress may be required to allocate more resources to implement IGPBS 

than what are now expected. 

In 2004, DOD estimated costs of $9 billion to $12 billion to implement its 

global posture strategy. DOD’s estimate of the cost of implementing its 

global posture strategy was based on a cost methodology developed by the 

Office of the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation. This office 

distributed the methodology to the services to use in estimating initial onetime nonrecurring global posture-related costs to the United States in the 

fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program. DOD grouped these 

costs into three categories: (1) costs related to vacating current facilities, 

such as the cost of environmental cleanup; (2) costs of transporting 

equipment, personnel, and families; and (3) costs related to the facilities 

that would be receiving personnel, including the construction of new 

facilities, the renovation of old facilities, and the establishment of new 

Global Posture-Related Costs 

Were Estimated at $9 Billion to 

$12 Billion

Page 19 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
leases. The methodology also sought to estimate savings from the closure 

or consolidation of facilities and operations. The estimate excludes 

burden-sharing contributions by host nations because cost-sharing 

agreements generally had not been completed when the report was issued

in September 2004. An OSD official told us that the reported cost estimate 

of $9 billion to $12 billion represents a reasonable range of the projected

costs. Further, the costs are dynamic and continually refined over time as 

better data becomes available. For example, OSD officials stated that since

the September 2004 reported estimate, DOD has included recurring costs 

when they have been available. The new estimated costs reflect the 

difference between the current recurring costs and future recurring costs. 

OSD officials pointed out that, despite the cost estimate’s evolution, it has 

continued to stay within the $9 billion to $12 billion range over the past 2 

years. They also stated that, though the $9 billion to $12 billion was 

estimated to be spent during the years covered by the future years defense

plan (2007-11), adjustments might require that global posture moves be 

paid for in years further into the future. 

Negotiations between the United States and host nations contribute to 

cost uncertainty because they will determine, among other things, specific 

locations where U.S. forces will have a presence and the nature of that 

presence. This information is critical to developing detailed cost estimates. 

In addition, cost-sharing agreements will determine the financial 

responsibilities of host nations and the United States, which will also be 

critical to estimate accurately the cost of implementing the global posture 

strategy. Until negotiations between the United States and host nations are

completed, there will be significant uncertainty with the reported 

estimates of IGPBS initiatives, and costs may be understated.15

Negotiations with Host Nations 

Contribute to Cost Uncertainty 

The classified version of this report provides specific examples of cases in 

which host-nation negotiations may significantly alter the initially planned 

costs. 

 15 According to DOD officials, the amount of burden-sharing that the United States can 

expect varies widely by country and by type of operating location. Also, in countries where 

smaller operating sites are located, the United States will not be using military construction 

funds to build large-scale family support infrastructure. 

Page 20 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
There is uncertainty regarding the estimated costs for the network of 

smaller operating locations16 partly due to limited planning at the time the 

estimate was reported in September 2004. For example, because precise 

estimates had not been developed for all cooperative security locations in 

the plan, DOD used a rough order of magnitude estimate in the $9 billion 

to $12 billion estimate to cover the cost of these locations. In addition, it is 

unclear what the comprehensive costs for all forward operating sites 

anticipated in the strategy will be. 

Detailed Cost Estimates Not 

Prepared for the Network of 

Smaller Operating Locations 

Two factors primarily contributed to the limited planning for smaller 

operating locations and their cost estimates. First, senior DOD leadership 

had decided to first concentrate its planning efforts on initiatives that 

involved moving large numbers of forces around the world, such as 

returning the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions from Germany to the 

continental United States. Second, the services generally had not 

conducted site surveys, partly because negotiations with host nations were 

in the early stages and the services were often reluctant to fund low-use 

sites, according to an OSD official. Site surveys are critical to developing

comprehensive cost estimates but depend on specialists’ visiting and 

assessing the current state of facilities at given locations. 

Management and Funding 

Challenges Exist with 

Establishing the Network 

of Operating Locations 

The third challenge that creates uncertainty about the status of the global

posture strategy involves difficulties DOD is encountering in establishing 

management and funding responsibilities and synchronizing service 

priorities as it develops its planned network of smaller operating locations. 

Specifically, although combatant commanders have developed a plan for 

assigning executive agent responsibilities for each of these locations to 

individual services, some services are reluctant to assume “host” status for 

these locations because of the potential funding responsibilities they may 

entail. The department has recognized that new funding mechanisms may 

be needed to overcome this issue and is examining alternative ways of 

addressing this issue. Similar challenges have arisen in cases where a 

service operates a base used jointly by other military services. The 

classified version of this report provides examples of challenges the 

services have encountered in managing and funding what are envisioned 

to be multiservice sites.

 16 Forward operating sites are planned to be smaller but expandable sites that can support 

rotational forces, whereas cooperative security locations are planned to be small, rapidly 

expandable sites with little or no permanent U.S. presence. 

Page 21 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
In prior work, we have reported on long-standing challenges DOD has 

faced at military installations managed by one service but used by multiple 

services.17 For example, in late 2004, DOD formed a Senior Joint Basing 

Group to address installation management issues, such as problems 

involving support agreements where one service is a tenant on an 

installation operated by another service. A lack of common definitions 

among the services can lead to differing expectations for base operating 

support services, and it obscures a full understanding of the funding that is

required for these support services. The working group planned to develop

common definitions and DOD-wide standards, metrics, and 

reimbursement and costing rules for base operating services and programs 

of all military services. DOD completed a base operations assessment 

study in March 2005 and funded an extensive cross-department initiative 

to develop definitions for the common delivery of installation services. 

Similarly, in recognition of funding issues at joint use bases, the Joint 

Governance Working Group of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review 

Committee is responsible for developing alternatives for prioritizing and 

funding joint projects18 desired by the combatant commanders. One option 

envisions that the Deputy Secretary of Defense will have the authority to

assign “executive agency” or “host” status for joint locations to the military 

services. Any military construction projects for these locations would be 

vetted through a Joint Infrastructure Working Group that will qualify and 

accept the projects, validate the project plans, prioritize the projects, and 

recommend funding levels. It is envisioned that a joint funding mechanism 

would be used to fund these projects either directly or on a reimbursable 

basis. Officials initially hoped that a process for assigning responsibility 

for managing overseas operating sites that benefit more than one service 

would be finalized during the Quadrennial Defense Review. However, the 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued in February 2006 did not 

identify a solution, and the issue is still unresolved. As a result, it is not 

 17 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and Funding 

Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005). 

18 In this context, “joint” is applied when combatant commanders have an interest in the

project for the good of the joint force, but no single service has a major interest. “Joint” 

projects traditionally fare poorly under standard service rating schemes for determining

funding priority because they do not directly support the service’s daily activities. Projects 

eligible for being considered “joint” include joint command headquarters buildings, some 

en route infrastructure (generally overseas), and designated joint forward operating sites 

and cooperative security locations. 

Page 22 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
clear whether or how the services will plan for costs associated with these 

sites in preparing upcoming budget submissions. 

No Routine, 

Comprehensive 

Mechanism Exists to 

Report on Progress 

Toward Achieving Strategy 

Goals 

Reliable and timely information on the full costs, activities, and outputs of 

federal programs is important to Congress and the Secretary of Defense in

making decisions about allocating resources, authorizing and modifying 

programs, and evaluating program performance. In some cases, DOD has 

established mechanisms to provide routine reporting on program status 

and performance information for large-scale, complex efforts. For 

example, DOD determined that a new initiative to improve stability 

operations capabilities was important enough to require, among other 

things, a semiannual report to the Secretary of Defense that includes 

identifying performance metrics and evaluating progress made in 

achieving the stated policy goals.19 This type of reporting mechanism can 

provide the Secretary of Defense with timely information to shape 

decisions about authorizing and modifying programs and evaluating 

program performance. 

In contrast, DOD has a more fragmented approach to provide Congress 

with information on selected aspects of the global posture restructuring 

effort. In June 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy testified 

before the House Armed Services Committee on the Integrated Global 

Posture and Basing Strategy, preceding the president’s announcement of

the strategy. This testimony was followed by the September 2004 Report to 

Congress – Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture. The Secretary of 

Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders of the 

regional commands have also testified before some congressional 

committees. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it 

had provided “over 40 briefings to the Hill” on its global basing strategy. 

According to OSD/Strategy officials, the department believes that these 

existing reporting mechanisms provide Congress with sufficient 

information on the status of the restructuring effort. 

However, the Senate Committee on Appropriations has expressed concern 

about the use of military construction budget authority and has directed 

 19 In a November 2005 Directive, DOD identified stability operations as a core U.S. mission 

that is to be given priority comparable to combat operations and specifically addressed and 

integrated across all DOD activities. DOD defines stability operations as “military and 

civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or 

maintain order in States and regions.” 

Page 23 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
DOD to provide information on various aspects of the global posture 

strategy. The Senate report to the fiscal year 2004 military construction 

appropriations bill20 required those plans to identify precise facility 

requirements and the status of properties being returned to host nations. 

The report also states that the plan should identify funding requirements 

as well as the division of funding responsibilities between the United 

States and cognizant host nations. The Senate report directed us to 

monitor the master plans developed and implemented for the overseas 

regional commands and to provide congressional defense committees with 

annual assessment reports. Additionally, the House conference report 

accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation 

bill21 directed DOD to prepare comprehensive master plans for overseas 

military infrastructure and provide them with its fiscal year 2006 budget 

submission with yearly updates on the status of those plans and their 

implementation with annual military construction budget submissions 

through fiscal year 2009.

In addition, the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility 

Structure of the United States was created by Congress in the Military 

Construction Appropriations Act of 2004 and was required to report on its 

findings, conclusions, and recommendations for legislation by August 15, 

2005.

22 The Commission provided Congress with a report that contained

several conclusions.23 For example, the Commission stated that Congress 

should provide more rigorous oversight (including hearings) of the global

basing process, given the scope and impact of DOD’s rebasing plans. 

Particular attention, the Commission believed, should be paid to the 

timing, synchronization, and cost of all the related efforts. The 

Commission was also concerned about the costs associated with IGPBS 

and whether budgetary forecasts had adequately addressed the 

investments that will be required to meet the implementation timelines set 

for fiscal years 2006-2011. Furthermore, the Commission expressed great 

concern on quality-of-life issues and their ultimate impact on DOD’s ability 

to maintain a volunteer force. For example, the Commission stated that 

 20 S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003). 

21 H.R. Conf. Rep. No 108-342, at 17 (2003). 

22 Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-132, § 128 (as amended 

by Pub. L. No. 108-324, § 127 (2004)). 

23 Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, 

Report to the President of the United States, August 15, 2005. 

Page 24 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
DOD should further analyze what the impact would be on a volunteer 

force of frequently lengthy peacetime rotations abroad. 

Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directs 

the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on specified global basing 

issues by no later than March 30, 2006.

24 The Act states that the Secretary 

of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

shall develop criteria for assessing, with respect to three kinds of 

facilities25 to be located in a foreign country, several factors,26 as well as 

develop a mechanism for analyzing overseas basing alternatives, 

incorporating factors (1) through (5) referenced in footnote 26. The act 

also directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to congressional defense 

committees, not later than 30 days after an agreement is made, a written 

notification of agreements with a foreign country to support the 

deployment of elements of U.S. forces in that country. 

We believe that the current reporting requirements, while providing 

Congress with significant information on some aspects of the global 

posture strategy, do not provide a periodic mechanism through which 

DOD’s progress in achieving the overall goals and objectives of the 

strategy can be reported. For example, none of the reporting requirements 

addresses the extent to which DOD will achieve its strategic goals, such as 

expanding allied roles, providing service members with more time at 

home, developing greater operational flexibility, or developing rapidly 

deployable capabilities. In addition, DOD’s master plans provide annual 

 24 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1233

(2006). 

25 These facilities are main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative 

security locations. 

26 Factors these criteria should address include (1) the effect of any new basing 

arrangement on DOD’s strategic mobility requirements, (2) the ability of U.S. forces 

deployed to overseas locations in areas to which forces have not traditionally been 

deployed to meet mobility response times required by operational plans, (3) the cost of 

deploying units overseas to the locations required in (2) on a rotational basis, (4) the 

strategic benefit of rotational deployments through countries with which the United States 

is developing a close or new security relationship, (5) whether the relative speed and 

complexity of conducting negotiations in a particular country is a discriminator in the

decision to deploy U.S. forces in a country, (6) the appropriateness and availability of 

funding mechanisms for the establishment, operation, and sustainment of specific facilities 

referenced in footnote 25, (7) the effect of proposed unaccompanied deployments of new 

units to new facilities in overseas locations on quality of life, and (8) other criteria as the 

Secretary of Defense determines appropriate. 

Page 25 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
information on expected military construction costs, but none of the 

reports provides Congress with complete and up-to-date information on 

the total costs to implement the global restructuring, including operations

and maintenance costs. Further, the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2006 only provides for a one-time report to the Congress on 

aspects of the plan, written notification of host-nation agreements once 

they are concluded, and information regarding the funding sources for the 

establishment, operation, and sustainment of the main operating bases, 

forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations as an element 

of the annual budget request. As a result, Congress will not have a clear 

understanding of the extent to which global posture objectives are being 

achieved or whether resources are being efficiently and effectively 

applied. 

Restructuring the U.S. military presence overseas is a complex and 

dynamic process that will require a significant investment in resources, 

time, and commitment by military and civilian leaders. The goals of this 

effort—a repositioning of U.S. military forces to enhance warfighting 

capabilities, quality of life for service men and women, and alliances with 

host nations while reducing overall costs to the American taxpayer—are 

important to the successful execution of the Global War on Terror and the 

transformation of the Department of Defense. Accomplishing these goals 

efficiently and effectively will require a comprehensive strategy, periodic 

review and evaluation of progress, and a mechanism to communicate 

program status to key decision makers and Congress. To its credit, the 

department has recognized the importance and need to change the 

overseas military presence and has begun to articulate a strategy to 

achieve this goal, but we have highlighted key characteristics of effective 

strategies that the department has not fully addressed. For example, the 

department has not established results-oriented performance measures 

and therefore is not in a position to demonstrate whether the actions it 

takes to change overseas presence are in fact achieving its goals in the 

most efficient and effective manner.

Conclusions 

The challenges DOD faces in implementing this strategy, as discussed in 

this report, add to the uncertainty of the costs and potential outcomes of 

DOD’s efforts, and current reporting mechanisms will not give Congress 

routine and comprehensive information to facilitate effective oversight. 

DOD is challenged to develop complete and accurate cost estimates 

because ongoing negotiations with host nations will significantly influence 

the planned moves and burden-sharing between the United States and host 

nations. The challenges the department faces in establishing operating 

Page 26 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
locations that may be jointly used by more than one service, yet funded by

a single service through the traditional budget process, are delaying the 

establishment of these locations, which are the backbone of the new 

strategy. These and other uncertainties, while understandable considering 

the magnitude and complexity of the changes underway, present a 

significant challenge to the Department of Defense to effectively manage. 

Similarly, Congress is presented with the challenge of conducting 

oversight responsibilities and allocating resources over the long term with

incomplete information, while the program matures and more refined 

estimates of cost, operational capabilities, and other aspects of overseas 

presence are developed. Without a routine reporting mechanism that can 

clearly communicate the extent to which these uncertainties exist and, 

more importantly when they are resolved, Congress may not have the 

information it needs as it evaluates and prioritizes these requirements with 

other aspects of government operations. 

To facilitate DOD’s management and implementation of its global basing 

strategy and to establish a clear and routine method of informing Congress 

of significant changes to the strategy and progress in achieving its goals, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 

actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Develop an updated strategy document that includes the six 

characteristics of an effective national strategy as discussed in this report, 

including performance measures and metrics for assessing progress in 

achieving stated goals. 

• Summarize the status of host-nation negotiations and annually update 

DOD’s global basing strategy to reflect changes resulting from these 

negotiations. 

• Periodically update DOD’s estimate of the total cost to implement the 

global basing strategy and identify the extent to which these costs are 

included in DOD’s future years defense program. 

• Establish a process to prioritize, assign management responsibility for, 

and fund the network of operating locations DOD is planning.

• Develop a periodic reporting process that summarizes to Congress the 

above information, includes progress in achieving performance goals, and 

complements but does not duplicate information contained in DOD’s 

annual comprehensive master plans for overseas military infrastructure. 

Page 27 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
The Congress should consider requiring that DOD report annually on the 

status and costs of its plans to implement global basing initiatives to 

ensure that it has more comprehensive and routine information to guide it

in overseeing this important effort. Congress may wish to require that 

DOD include in such a report all the elements of an effective national 

strategy—such as performance metrics—as well as the status of hostnation negotiations, the evolving costs of global posture initiatives, and a 

process for assigning management responsibility for operating and funding

the locations DOD is planning in its worldwide network of sites. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with 

our five recommendations. (DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in 

app. III of this report.) However, the department did not describe what 

actions, if any, it plans to take to implement our recommendations. 

Because DOD’s response is vague and ambiguous in describing its planned 

actions, we have added a matter for congressional consideration that the

Congress require DOD to report annually on its global posture strategy, 

costs, and implementation. 

In overall comments on the report, DOD pointed out that the information 

we present represents snapshots at different points in time on the status of 

negotiations, cost estimates, and force posture changes. As we discuss in 

the report, this information has been in constant flux since it was 

summarized in DOD’s Report to Congress in September 2004. To clarify 

the report, we have added additional dates to our discussions of changes

to the global posture strategy. DOD also stated that it did not believe that 

“creating new formal processes for decision-making and assessment” was 

called for in implementing its global posture strategy. In our 

recommendations, we are not suggesting that DOD create new formal 

processes for decision making and assessment. We are recommending that

DOD add a formal and regular reporting requirement to communicate to 

Congress on the implementation of DOD’s global posture strategy so that

Congress will be kept more fully informed. 

Regarding our recommendation that DOD develop an updated strategy 

document that contains all six characteristics of an effective national 

strategy, DOD agreed that the strategy framework we suggested may serve 

as a helpful tool for the future. However, it stated that it is unnecessary to

update its global posture strategy at this point in time. DOD also stated 

that its September 2004 Report to Congress was not intended to serve as a 

formal, comprehensive management mechanism for posture changes. We

continue to believe that developing a comprehensive, single, consolidated

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 28 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
strategy document with all six characteristics of an effective national 

strategy would be useful for DOD in managing the complex, long-term 

effort that its global posture strategy represents. At present, some 

elements of such a management tool are contained in different, isolated 

documents, and other elements of an effective strategy are not articulated 

at all. We believe that such a comprehensive, consolidated strategy 

document will not only allow DOD to more effectively manage its future 

implementation of the strategy but also could become a basis for satisfying 

the periodic reporting process we are recommending in this report. 

In response to our second recommendation—that DOD summarize the 

status of host-nation negotiations and annually update its global strategy 

to reflect changes resulting from these negotiations—DOD believes that its 

current reporting requirements on host-nation agreements after they have

been signed are sufficient. DOD also states that changes are reported in 

combatant commanders’ master plans and in service implementation 

plans. We agree that DOD is not currently required to report to Congress 

on the status of host-nation agreements until after they have been entered 

into. However, we believe that Congress should be kept apprised of the 

status of host-nation negotiations as they evolve because the resulting 

agreements could involve significant commitments of U.S. resources to 

other countries and have foreign policy implications. We acknowledge that 

combatant commanders’ master plans include information on planned 

military construction for many global basing initiatives, but the master 

plans do not contain detailed information on the status of host-nation 

negotiations before or after they occur. In fact, in a prior report,27 GAO 

recommended that the department provide more detailed information on 

the status of host-nation negotiations to Congress in the comprehensive 

overseas master plans. DOD did not agree with that recommendation, 

stating that they did not believe the master plans were the appropriate 

vehicle in which to report this information. Further, the services’ 

implementation plans do not contain a complete listing of all global 

posture initiatives, and these plans are not routinely provided to Congress. 

In response to our third recommendation—that DOD periodically update 

its estimate of the total cost to implement the global posture strategy and

report this information to Congress—DOD states that it plans to 

“internally update and keep Congress informed of estimated programmed 

costs.” As we state in our report, DOD’s current method of informing 

 27 GAO-05-680R.

Page 29 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Congress of global posture costs is not comprehensive or routine. At 

present, DOD reports annually to Congress on some of the military 

construction costs of global posture initiatives. Also, once, in September 

2004, DOD reported its estimated cost of the entire global basing effort. 

However, as we discuss in this report, DOD has no routine, comprehensive 

method of keeping Congress informed of changes to its cost estimates as 

they evolve over time, and DOD’s global posture restructuring effort will 

take place over several years to come and will compete with other 

government initiatives for resources. DOD and Congress will need 

accurate information on the costs of its overseas basing initiatives so that 

they can make informed decisions about spending future budget dollars. 

In responding to our recommendation that DOD establish a process to 

prioritize, assign management responsibility for, and fund the network of 

operating locations DOD is planning, DOD states that the department has 

cited this need in its recently issued Quadrennial Defense Review Report

and that establishing this process should be synchronized with existing 

execution processes in the department. As we state in our report, the 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report cited joint funding issues as an area

that required further study. In that report, DOD states that it is

implementing a Joint Task Assignment Process that will centrally assign 

and oversee joint management arrangements. However, the report does 

not state how this process will work or how it will be applied to assigning 

management responsibilities to the services for jointly used overseas 

locations. We agree that any effort to establish such a process should be 

synchronized with existing processes in the department. 

In response to our fifth recommendation—that DOD develop a periodic 

reporting process that summarizes to Congress comprehensive 

information on DOD’s global posture strategy and its costs—DOD agrees 

that keeping Congress informed of posture changes is important. 

However, DOD believes that its current informal processes of briefing and 

testifying before Congress when Congress requests such information are 

sufficient. We disagree. As we state in our report, we believe that the 

current methods do not provide Congress with the regular and 

comprehensive information on DOD’s global posture strategy that would 

enable Congress to fully perform its oversight functions. In March 2006,

DOD provided Congress a briefing on changes in its planned overseas 

posture and cost estimates. However, this briefing was developed in 

response to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act and 

is intended to be a one-time report. We continue to believe that DOD 

should be required to report annually to Congress comprehensive 

information on the implementation of DOD’s global posture strategy 

Page 30 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
because this initiative will entail significant investments on the part of the 

United States, will involve fundamental changes in our relationships with 

U.S. allies, and will take place over an extended period of time. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Janet St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 31 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix I: GAO’s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National Appendix I: GAO’ Strategy 

s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National 

Strategy 

In a prior report, we identified what we consider to be six desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy that would enable its 

implementers to effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource 

allocations, and standards and that would enable federal departments and 

other stakeholders to achieve the identified results.1

 To develop the six 

desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, we reviewed 

several sources of information. First, we gathered statutory requirements 

pertaining to national strategies as well as legislative and executive branch 

guidance. We also consulted the Government Performance and Results Act 

of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and 

guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President’s 

Management Agenda. In addition, we studied its past reports and 

testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to desirable 

elements of a national strategy. Simultaneously, we consulted widely 

within GAO to incorporate the most up-to-date thinking on strategic 

planning, integration across and between the government and its partners, 

implementation, and other related subjects. 

We used our judgment to develop desirable characteristics based on their 

underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the frequency 

with which they were cited in other sources. We then grouped similar 

items together in a logical sequence, from conception to implementation.

This was GAO’s first effort to develop desirable characteristics for an 

effective national strategy, so they may evolve over time. The desirable 

characteristics are the following: 

• Purpose, scope, and methodology: This characteristic addresses why the 

strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by 

which it was developed. For example, a strategy might discuss the specific 

impetus that led to its being written (or updated), such as statutory 

requirements, executive mandates, or other events. Furthermore, a 

strategy would enhance clarity by including definitions of key, relevant 

terms. In addition to describing what it is meant to do and the major 

functions, mission areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy would 

ideally address its methodology. For example, a strategy might discuss the 

principles or theories that guided its development, what organizations or 

offices drafted the document, whether it was the result of a working 

group, or which parties were consulted in its development. A complete 

description of purpose, scope, and methodology would make the 

 1 GAO-04-408T. 

Page 32 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix I: GAO’s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National

Strategy 

document more useful to the organizations responsible for implementing 

the strategy as well as to oversight organizations, such as Congress. 

• Problem definition and risk assessment: This characteristic addresses the 

particular national problems and threats the strategy is directed toward. 

Specifically, this means a detailed discussion or definition of the problems 

the strategy intends to address, their causes, and operating environment. 

In addition, this characteristic entails a risk assessment, including an 

analysis of threats to, and vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations. 

If the details of these analyses are classified or preliminary, an unclassified

version of the strategy could at least include a broad description of 

analyses and stress the importance of risk assessment to the implementing 

parties. A discussion of the quality of data available regarding this 

characteristic, such as known constraints or deficiencies, would also be 

useful. More specific information on both problem definition and risk 

assessment would give the responsible parties better guidance to 

implement those strategies. Better problem definition and risk assessment 

also provide greater latitude to responsible parties to develop innovative 

approaches that are tailored to the needs of specific regions or sections 

and can be implemented as a practical matter, given fiscal, human capital, 

and other limitations. Such assessments help identify desired goals and 

end-states without one-size-fits-all solutions. 

• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures: This 

characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve and 

the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At the highest 

level, this could be a description of an ideal “end-state,” followed by a 

logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and specific 

activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be helpful if the strategy 

discussed the importance of implementing parties’ efforts to establish 

priorities, milestones, and performance measures, which help ensure 

accountability. Ideally, a national strategy would set clear desired results 

and priorities, specific milestones, and outcome-related performance 

measures while giving implementing parties the flexibility to pursue and 

achieve those results within a reasonable timeframe. If significant 

limitations on performance measures exist, other parts of the strategy 

might address plans to obtain better data or measurements, such as 

national standards or indicators of preparedness.2

 Elements of this 

characteristic provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures 

upon which to assess and improve global posture. A better identification 

 2

 For more information on the importance of national indicators for measuring problems,

see GAO, Forum on Key National Indicators: Assessing the Nation’s Position and

Progress, GAO-03-672SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 

Page 33 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix I: GAO’s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National

Strategy 

of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid 

implementing parties in achieving results in specific time frames and 

would enable more effective oversight and accountability. 

• Resources, investments, and risk management: This characteristic 

addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of resources 

and investments needed, and where those resources and investments 

should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would also identify appropriate 

mechanisms to allocate resources, such as grants, in-kind services, and 

loans, based on identified needs. Alternatively, a strategy might identify

appropriate “tools of government,” such as regulations, tax incentives, and

standards, to mandate or stimulate federal organizations to use their 

unique resources. In addition, a national strategy might elaborate on the 

risk assessment mentioned earlier and give guidance to implementing 

parties to manage their resources and investments accordingly—and begin 

to address the difficult but critical issues about who pays and how such 

efforts will be funded and sustained in the future. Furthermore, a strategy 

might include a discussion of the type of resources required, such as 

budgetary, human capital, information technology, research and 

development, procurement of equipment, or contract services. Finally, a

national strategy might also discuss in greater detail how risk management 

will aid implementing parties in prioritizing and allocating resources, 

including how this approach will weigh costs and benefits. Guidance on 

resource, investment, and risk management would help implementing 

parties allocate resources and investments according to priorities and 

constraints, track costs and performance, and shift such investments and 

resources as appropriate. Such guidance would also assist Congress and 

the administration in developing more effective federal programs to 

stimulate desired investments, enhance oversight, and leverage finite 

resources. 

• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: This characteristic 

addresses what organizations will implement the strategy, their roles and 

responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating their efforts. It helps to 

answer the fundamental question of who is in charge, not only during 

times of crisis, but also during all phases of DOD activities. This 

characteristic entails identifying the specific federal departments, 

agencies, or offices involved, and where appropriate, the different sectors, 

such as state, local, private, or international sectors. A strategy would 

ideally clarify implementing organizations’ relationships in terms of 

leading, supporting, and partnering.3

 In addition, a strategy should 

describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for 

 3

 By partnering, we refer to shared, or joint, responsibilities among implementing parties 

where there is otherwise no clear or established hierarchy of lead and support functions. 

Page 34 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix I: GAO’s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National

Strategy 

accountability and oversight, such as the National Security Council, the 

Office of Management and Budget, Congress, and other organizations. 

Furthermore, a strategy might also identify specific processes for 

coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations—and 

address how conflicts would be resolved. These elements would be useful

to agencies and other stakeholders in fostering coordination and clarifying

specific roles, particularly where there is overlap, and thus enhancing both 

implementation and accountability. 

• Integration: This characteristic addresses how a national strategy relates 

to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal integration)

and how the strategy relates to subordinate levels of government and 

other organizations and their plans to implement the strategy (vertical 

integration). For example, a national strategy could discuss how its scope 

complements, expands upon, or overlaps other national strategies. 

Similarly, related strategies could highlight their common or shared goals, 

subordinate objectives, and activities. In addition, a national strategy 

could address its relationship with relevant documents from implementing 

organizations, such as the strategic plans, annual performance plans, or 

the annual performance reports that the Government Performance and 

Results Act of 1993 requires of federal agencies. A strategy might also 

discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and plans produced by the state, 

local, private, or international sectors. A strategy could also provide 

guidance such as the development of national standards to link together 

more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the 

implementing parties. More information on this characteristic would build 

on the identified organizational roles and responsibilities—and thus 

further clarify the relationships between various implementing parties, 

both vertically and horizontally. This identification would in turn foster 

effective implementation and accountability. 

Table 4 provides the desirable characteristics and examples of their 

elements. 

Page 35 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix I: GAO’s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National

Strategy 

Table 4: Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

Desirable characteristic Description Examples of elements 

Purpose, scope, and 

methodology 

Addresses why the strategy was 

produced, the scope of its 

coverage, and the process by 

which it was developed. 

• Statement of broad or narrow purpose, as appropriate. 

• How it compares and contrasts with other national strategies. 

• What major functions, mission areas, or activities it covers. 

• Principles or theories that guided its development. 

• Impetus for strategy, e.g., statutory requirement or event. 

• Process to produce strategy, e.g., interagency task force. 

• Definition of key terms. 

Problem definition and risk 

assessment 

Addresses the particular 

national problems and threats

the strategy is directed toward. 

• Discussion or definition of problems, their causes, and operating 

environment. 

• Risk assessment, including an analysis of threats and 

vulnerabilities.

• Quality of data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and 

“unknowns.” 

Goals, subordinate 

objectives, activities, and 

performance measures 

Addresses what the strategy is 

trying to achieve, steps to 

achieve those results, as well as 

the priorities, milestones, and 

performance measures to 

gauge results. 

• Overall results desired, i.e., “end-state.” 

• Hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives. 

• Priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance 

measures. 

• Specific performance measures. 

• Process for monitoring and reporting on progress. 

• Limitations of progress indicators. 

Resources, investments, 

and risk management 

Addresses what the strategy will 

cost, the sources and types of 

resources and investments 

needed, and where resources

and investments should be 

targeted by balancing risk 

reductions and costs. 

• Resources and investment associated with the strategy. 

• Types of resources required, such as budgetary, human capital, 

information technology, and research and development. 

• Sources of resources, e.g., federal, state, local, and private.

• Economic principles, such as balancing benefits and costs. 

• Resource allocation mechanisms, such as grants, in-kind services, 

loans, or user fees. 

• “Tools of government,” e.g., mandates or incentives to spur action.

• Importance of fiscal discipline.

• Linkage to other resource documents, e.g., the federal budget. 

• Risk management principles. 

Organizational roles, 

responsibilities, and 

coordination 

Addresses who will be

implementing the strategy, what 

their roles will be compared to

others, and mechanisms for 

them to coordinate their efforts. 

• Roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, 

departments, or offices. 

• Roles and responsibilities of federal, local, private, and 

international sectors. 

• Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities. 

• Accountability and oversight framework. 

• Potential changes to current organizational structure. 

• Specific processes for coordination and collaboration. 

• How conflicts will be resolved. 

Page 36 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix I: GAO’s Identification of the Six 

Characteristics of an Effective National

Strategy 

Desirable characteristic Description Examples of elements 

Integration Addresses how a national 

strategy relates to other 

strategies’ goals, objectives, 

and activities. 

• Integration with other national strategies (horizontal). 

• Integration with relevant documents from implementing

organizations (vertical). 

• Details on specific federal, state, local, or private strategies and 

plans. 

Source: GAO. 

Notes: See GAO-04-408T. Our prior work identified the sixth characteristic as “integration and 

implementation.” For the purposes of this report, we decided not to evaluate the extent to which the 

four principal strategy documents addressed “implementation” because our second reporting 

objective addresses challenges associated with implementation in more detail. 

Page 37 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which DOD’s IGPBS contains all the desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy, we evaluated the content 

of each of the four principal global posture strategy documents identified 

by OSD officials using six desirable characteristics of effective national

strategies developed by GAO in prior work.1

 According to officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOD’s articulation of its IGPBS 

strategy is contained in the following four principal documents: 

• the Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001) and its Terms of 

Reference (June 2001); 

• the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002); 

• Strengthening U.S. Global Posture, Report to Congress (September 2004); 

and 

• National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005). 

We evaluated the content of each of the four principal global posture 

strategy documents identified by OSD officials using our six desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy. We developed a checklist 

based on our criteria, which enabled us to apply the criteria to the relevant 

documents. The team pretested the checklist to verify its relevance and 

the team’s ability to apply the checklist to the information contained in the 

documents. Two readers independently assessed a selected strategy 

document to pretest the checklist. The team concluded that the checklist 

was relevant and appropriate for assessing the principal global posture 

documents. 

Next, we independently read through each strategy document to apply our 

characteristics and record the results on separate checklists. We gave each

of the elements a rating from one of three potential scores: “addresses,” 

“partially addresses,” or “does not address.” According to our 

methodology, a strategy “addresses” a characteristic when it explicitly 

cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity and details 

and thus could be improved upon. Within our designation of “partially 

addresses,” there is a wide variation between a strategy that addresses 

most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses few 

of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy “does not address” a 

characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any elements of 

that characteristic and/or any implicit references are either too vague or 

too general to be useful. The analysts’ ratings were the same in 67 percent

 1 GAO-04-408T. 

Page 38 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

of the cases. The two analysts then met to discuss similarities and resolve 

differences in their respective checklist analyses. On the basis of those 

discussions, both analysts developed consolidated, final checklists for 

each of the four principal IGPBS documents. Because we examined four 

principal strategy documents and each document may not contain all of 

the elements, we decided to rate the strategy element as “addresses” if one 

of the documents provided sufficient information. For example, if the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Security Strategy, and the 

Report to Congress are all rated as “does not address” in a particular 

element, but the National Defense Strategy is rated “addresses” for the 

same element, then the overall rating for DOD is “addresses.” We assessed 

the reliability of the data used in this report and determined that it was 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To identify key challenges that could affect DOD’s implementation of its 

strategy, we examined global posture strategy plans, programs, cost 

estimates, and other documentation obtained from the geographic 

combatant commands, service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, State Department Headquarters, and U.S. embassies in six 

countries. Specifically, we identified the status of the proposed and 

ongoing initiatives associated with DOD’s overseas posture strategy by

reviewing DOD’s September 2004 Report to Congress, Strengthening U.S. 

Global Defense Posture; various congressional testimonies; 

implementation plans of combatant commands; and briefings by service 

components and OSD. 

To understand the challenges associated with host-nation negotiations, we 

obtained documentation of various types of legal arrangements to be 

negotiated with host countries, information papers, briefings, and legal 

analyses of international agreements that affect IGPBS prepared by OSD, 

U.S. European, Pacific, Central, and Southern Commands, and the military 

services’ 2004 and 2005 implementation plans. 

To examine cost and funding issues related to implementation, we 

reviewed OSD/Program Analysis and Evaluation estimates that supported 

costs reported in the September 2004 Report to Congress – Strengthening 

U.S. Global Defense Posture; the military service’s 2004 and 2005 

implementation plans; the February 2005 comprehensive master plans 

prepared by the U.S. European, Pacific, and Central Commands; the 

European Command’s Strategic Theater Transformation Strategy, 

January 2005; and the Pacific Command’s Operationalizing the AsiaPacific Defense Strategy 2003 and 2005. We also reviewed prior GAO 

work related to DOD’s overseas master plans. Further, we discussed 

Page 39 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

DOD’s cost-estimating methodology with knowledgeable officials at the 

Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation. 

To identify challenges in establishing a worldwide network of operating 

locations, we obtained briefings that included information on joint 

infrastructure funding, proposed assignments of executive agency 

responsibilities for new locations, and U.S. European and Pacific 

Command implementation plans for IGPBS. We also reviewed legislation 

relating to the funding of DOD infrastructure, as well as prior GAO reports 

on the subject.2

 In addition, we visited selected cooperative security 

locations and spoke with officials concerning implementation issues. 

To identify the mechanisms DOD has in place to inform Congress of its 

efforts to overcome these challenges and report on overall progress in 

achieving the strategy’s goals, we reviewed congressional testimony, 

multiple briefings conducted for congressional Members and their staffs, 

and reports produced as a result of legislative requirements. Specifically, 

we examined existing reporting requirements in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the House conference report 

accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill, 

the Senate report on the fiscal year 2004 military construction 

appropriation bill report, the 2005 report by the Commission on Review of 

Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, and prior GAO 

reports on overseas military infrastructure. We assessed the reliability of

the data used in this report and determined that it was sufficiently reliable 

for our purposes. 

To obtain the information described above, we contacted officials at the 

following organizations:

• Pentagon. 

• DOD’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy 

and Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.

• The Joint Staff (J-5 and J-8). 

• Service headquarters: Army Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations and Plans; Marine Corps Headquarters, Plans, 

Policies, and Operations Department/Plans and Strategy Division; Navy 

Headquarters, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, 

Policy, and Operations/Strategy and Policy; Air Force Headquarters, Office 

 2

 H.R. Conf. Rep. No 108-342 (2003); S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003); GAO-05-556; and

GAO-05-680R. 

Page 40 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Combat Support and

Analysis. 

• U.S. European Command Headquarters; U.S. Army, Europe; Special 

Operations Command, Europe; U.S. Air Forces, Europe; and U.S. Naval 

Forces, Europe. 

• U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters; U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific; U.S. 

Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Army Forces, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. 

Special Operations Forces, Pacific; U.S. Eighth Army, Korea; U.S. Forces

Korea. 

• U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters.

• U.S. Transportation Command. 

• State Department Headquarters and U.S. Embassies in Bulgaria, Italy, 

Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. 

• U.S. Southern Command Headquarters. 

• U.S. Central Command Headquarters.

We conducted our review from November 2004 through January 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 41 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-06-852 Defense Management
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 44 GAO-06-852

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Robert Repasky, Assistant 

Director; Kelly Baumgartner; Kenneth Daniell; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; 

Guy Lofaro; Charles Perdue; Maria-Alaina Rambus; Terry Richardson; and 

Beverly Schladt made key contributions to this report. 

Defense Management

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350884) 
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