In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-2890

RAY K. HAYNES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:15-cv-01717-LJM — Larry J. McKinney, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 11, 2018 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 4, 2018

____________________

Before BAUER, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Ray Haynes was employed as an assistant professor in the Department of Education at Indiana 

University. At the end of his six-year probationary contract, 

he lost his bid for tenure. Haynes, who is black, alleges that 

the University denied his tenure application because of his 

race in violation of federal law. The district judge entered

summary judgment for the University and we affirm. The 

judge’s evidentiary rulings were sound, and the record does 
2 No. 17-2890

not support an inference that the University denied tenure 

because of Haynes’s race. 

I. Background

In 2008 Indiana University hired Haynes as an assistant 

professor in the Instruction Systems Technology Department

of the School of Education. Roughly three-quarters of 

Haynes’s salary was financed by the Strategic Recruitment 

Fund, which the University established to “facilitate the 

recruitment of underrepresented minorities and women into 

the professoriate.” Haynes was offered a six-year probationary contract, at the end of which the University would 

decide if he qualified for tenure.

Achieving tenure at Indiana University is a multistep 

process fraught with nuanced and highly contextualized 

value judgments. The University’s tenure guidelines provide 

that “[d]ecisions about tenure ... are reached through the 

comprehensive and rigorous peer review of achievements 

and promise.” More specifically, a candidate is evaluated 

across three dimensions: research, teaching, and service. He

must be “excellent” in at least one area of his choosing and 

“satisfactory” in the other two.

After making this selection, the candidate formally begins the tenure application process. He first assembles a

dossier that includes his curriculum vitae, a personal statement, and a list of twelve proposed external reviewers. The 

candidate and the University together select six of these 

reviewers to write letters evaluating the candidate’s application. Once completed, these letters are submitted with the 

rest of the dossier for several levels of faculty review. First, a

committee within the candidate’s department considers the
No. 17-2890 3

application and issues a recommendation. Its findings and 

conclusions are then passed along to a school-wide committee, which does the same. Finally, with the candidate’s 

dossier and two committee reports in hand, the University’s

Tenure Advisory Committee makes a recommendation to the 

Vice Provost, who in turn issues a tenure decision and 

submits it for final approval by the Provost, President, and 

Board of Trustees.

This case centers on Haynes’s experience with this winding tenure process. In April 2013 Haynes submitted his 

dossier to the School of Education, which was responsible 

for reaching out to his proposed external reviewers. Surprisingly, only one of Haynes’s twelve potential recommenders

agreed to evaluate his application. This left Haynes to seek 

out alternates. Thomas Brush, the chair of his department, 

offered a few suggestions, and Haynes put forward a few 

more of his own. Together Brush and Haynes eventually 

secured six reviewers willing to write evaluations, three 

proposed by Haynes and three he adopted on Brush’s 

recommendation.

The letters were largely positive, albeit with a notable exception. Patricia Hardré, one of Brush’s proposed reviewers, 

put Haynes’s “overall research performance in a gr[ay] area 

of clearly satisfactory[] but not clearly excellent.” Her main 

concern was that Haynes’s research was “not as rigorous in 

methods, nor as high-quality in venues, as most candidates” 

she had reviewed from peer institutions. Hardré also opined 

that Haynes offered nothing “new” beyond his “unique 

specialization of ‘inclusion’ and his identity as an AfricanAmerican.” She again commented on Haynes’s race later in 

her evaluation, this time saying she regretted that she was 
4 No. 17-2890

unable to “support and endorse a colleague who is a member of an underrepresented minority.”

These critiques notwithstanding, Haynes took his completed dossier and embarked on the University’s tiered 

review process. Because he selected research as his performance area of excellence, he needed to demonstrate that he 

was “beginning to establish a national and/or international 

reputation as an original contributor through research.” 

Haynes also had to prove that his teaching and service to the 

University community were satisfactory. 

Haynes got off to a good start with his department’s tenure committee, which voted 4–2 in his favor. Brush supported the committee’s recommendation and drafted a summary 

of its findings to be included with Haynes’s dossier. He

remarked that Haynes’s scholarship could “have a huge 

impact in K–12, higher education, and business and industry 

settings.” Despite Hardré’s concerns, he also noted that 

several of “Haynes’[s] peer-reviewed publications [are] in 

well-respected journals.” Finally, Brush compiled a series of 

student reviews that favorably commented on Haynes’s

teaching performance.

Haynes’s dossier was then forwarded to Krista 

Glazewski who presented his case to the School of Education’s tenure committee. There Haynes did not fare as well 

as he might have hoped. The committee voted 6–3 against 

tenure, finding Haynes’s research to be less than excellent 

and his teaching to be unsatisfactory. Gerardo Gonzalez, the

school’s dean, wrote a memorandum adopting and expressing the committee’s concerns. In it he explained that “the 

committee questioned the extent of Dr. Haynes’[s] impact 

based on low citation numbers and low numbers of publica-
No. 17-2890 5

tions in high-quality journals.” As for teaching, the committee noted that Haynes’s “evaluations ha[d] been mixed[]

and particularly low in the online courses.” Gonzalez continued: Haynes failed to show “significant improvement 

over the years[,] and comments from some students indicated that Dr. Haynes sometimes [was] unresponsive to emails 

and questions about course assignments.” In December 2013 

Gonzalez advised Haynes that the School of Education 

would recommend against tenure.

Things only got worse for Haynes at the university-wide

Tenure Advisory Committee. For many of the reasons cited 

by the School of Education, the committee voted unanimously against tenure in a 9–0 vote. All nine members concluded 

that Haynes’s research was not excellent, and eight determined that his teaching was unsatisfactory. The University’s 

Vice Provost adopted these conclusions and informed 

Haynes on March 26, 2014, that tenure was denied. All in all,

27 faculty members voted on Haynes’s application, with 18 

finding his teaching unsatisfactory and 19 concluding that 

his research was not excellent.

Haynes vigorously contested his tenure decision. He began with several layers of academic review, then lodged a 

complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and finally filed suit in federal court against the 

University and several of its administrators in their individual and official capacities. (We refer to the defendants collectively as “the University” unless the context requires 

otherwise.) Haynes alleged that his application for tenure 

was rejected because of his race in violation of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Haynes sought
6 No. 17-2890

several forms of injunctive relief, including reinstatement, 

and monetary damages for lost pay and other injuries.

The case proceeded through discovery, and the University eventually moved for summary judgment. Several issues 

in this appeal involve the ensuing motions filed in the 

district court, which requires us to dive into a bit of procedural minutiae. 

Haynes submitted a declaration from Laura Perna, his

expert on academic tenure, with his response to the University’s motion. The University moved to strike the declaration, both in its reply brief and by adjoining motion, arguing 

that the expert’s opinion did not meet the requirements of 

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. 

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Haynes asked for leave to file a surreply on the admissibility of his expert’s declaration. He also sought to submit a 

lengthier report from Perna and an additional expert report 

from Anthony Greenwald on the subject of implicit bias. 

Haynes argued that these additional materials were relevant 

to the Daubert determination. He filed a separate motion for 

leave to supplement the record with these reports because he 

was presenting them after summary-judgment briefing had 

concluded. He said the reports were late because Perna and 

Greenwald couldn’t prepare them in time to comply with 

the court’s briefing schedule.

The judge excluded Perna’s expert declaration and declined to accept the additional expert reports. Applying 

Rule 702 and Daubert, the judge concluded that the opinions 

in Perna’s declaration were inadmissible because she did not

rely on any specialized knowledge and her testimony would 
No. 17-2890 7

not assist the trier of fact. As for the late expert reports, the 

judge rejected the explanation for their tardiness because 

Haynes had never before suggested that the court’s briefing 

schedule for dispositive motions might interfere with the 

preparation of any expert reports. In fact, he had sought and 

obtained several extensions of time without raising this 

concern. 

With these evidentiary disputes out of the way, the judge 

turned to the motion for summary judgment and ruled that 

Haynes’s claims failed as a matter of law. The judge identified a number of flaws in Haynes’s case, but the primary 

basis for the decision was the lack of record support for 

Haynes’s claim that the University denied his tenure application because of his race.

II. Discussion

Haynes asks us to review the summary judgment and the 

evidentiary rulings that preceded it. We review a summary 

judgment de novo, Manley v. Law, 889 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 

2018), and we set aside the district court’s evidentiary rulings only for an abuse of discretion, see Lewis v. CITGO 

Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 704–05 (7th Cir. 2009) (expert 

testimony); Stinnett v. Iron Works Gym/Exec. Health Spa, Inc., 

301 F.3d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 2002) (motions to strike); Vance v. 

Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 2011) (motions to 

supplement).

We think the judge made the right call on all fronts. Before we turn to these rulings, however, we pause to determine which of Haynes’s claims are properly before us. The 

University argues that the Title VII claim fails on procedural 
8 No. 17-2890

grounds and that part of the § 1981 claim is barred by sovereign immunity.

A. Title VII Claim

A Title VII plaintiff must first file a complaint with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 

300 days of “when the defendant has taken the action that 

injures the plaintiff.” Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 

368, 372 (7th Cir. 2001). Haynes’s complaint was untimely 

under this rule. The Vice Provost notified Haynes on 

March 26, 2014, of the University’s decision to deny tenure, 

so the deadline to lodge a complaint with the EEOC was 

January 20, 2015. He waited until April 10, 2015, to file his 

EEOC complaint.

Haynes asks us to apply equitable tolling to forgive the 

late complaint. We can do so only if a reasonable person in 

his position would not have been “aware of the possibility of 

a claim of discrimination” at the time of the adverse employment action—here the tenure decision. Hentosh v. 

Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Scis./The Chi. Med. Sch., 

167 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Even if this standard is satisfied, we will not grant

“an automatic extension of indefinite duration.” Id. The 

plaintiff is not entitled to a renewed 300-day window even 

when tolling is justified. See Thelen v. Marc’s Big Boy Corp., 

64 F.3d 264, 268 (7th Cir. 1995). Instead, tolling is appropriate

only for a length of time within which it would have been

reasonable to file a complaint. See Hentosh, 167 F.3d at 1175.

Even if we assume tolling is justified here (and we’re 

skeptical), Haynes waited far too long. He alleged in his 

complaint that “on or around October 24, 2014, was the first 
No. 17-2890 9

time that [he] suspected or was aware of racial discrimination against him.” Absent amendment, that amounts to a 

binding judicial admission, and it cannot be controverted on 

appeal. See Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th 

Cir. 1995). Haynes therefore knew he had a possible discrimination claim on that date at the latest. This leaves us to ask 

whether three months—from October 24, 2014, to the original deadline—was enough time for Haynes to file an EEOC

complaint. It clearly was. We have remarked that administrative complaints should be filed “within days, and at most 

weeks,” of discovering a possible discrimination claim. 

Thelen, 64 F.3d at 268. Haynes makes no effort to explain 

why he needed more time. The Title VII claim fails for lack 

of a timely EEOC complaint.

B. § 1981 Claim 

With no Title VII claim left, Haynes’s suit rests entirely 

on § 1981. This venerable civil-rights statute gives “[a]ll

persons within the jurisdiction of the United States” the 

same right “to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed 

by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Haynes sued the 

University, its Board of Trustees, and several of its administrators in their individual and official capacities seeking

various forms of injunctive relief and damages for violating 

his rights under this provision.

Everyone agrees that the claim for injunctive relief can 

proceed against the official-capacity defendants. The 

University argues that sovereign immunity completely bars 

Haynes’s action for monetary damages. This is clearly 

correct with respect to the University and the Board of 

Trustees. A state and its agencies cannot be subject to a 

federal suit without the state’s consent, N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 
10 No. 17-2890

Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006), and this bar applies 

with full force to claims under § 1981, Rucker v. Higher Educ. 

Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1982). The University 

and its Board of Trustees are state agencies for sovereignimmunity purposes, so Haynes cannot maintain an action 

for damages against them. Peirick v. Ind. Univ.–Purdue Univ. 

Indianapolis Athletics Dep't, 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007).

Haynes cannot pursue a damages action against the

University administrators either. A plaintiff cannot bring a 

claim for damages against state personnel in their official 

capacities. See Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 883 (7th Cir. 

2009). Neither can he seek monetary relief from state employees in their individual capacities if the suit “demonstrably has the identical effect as a suit against the state.” Luder 

v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis 

omitted). That is to say, sovereign immunity bars individualcapacity claims for damages whenever “[t]he money will 

flow from the state treasury to the plaintiff[].” Id. at 1024.

Applying this rule can be a knotty and fact-bound inquiry, but clear precedent guides us here. In Omosegbon v.

Wells, 335 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2003), a junior professor brought 

an action for damages and injunctive relief against a number 

of her supervisors in their individual capacities after she was 

fired by Indiana State University. We held that sovereign 

immunity barred her claim for damages for alleged federal 

constitutional violations. We found it “inescapable that any 

resulting judgment will be paid by the state” because the 

professor sought “backpay and other forms of monetary 

compensation based on an employment contract.” Id. at 673. 

We also noted that the individual defendants “were not even 

parties to the contract in their individual capacity.” Id.
No. 17-2890 11

This case is materially the same. Most importantly,

Haynes seeks monetary relief for an injury relating to his 

employment with Indiana University. As in Omosegbon, the 

University administrators were not parties to Haynes’s

employment contract in their individual capacities. We have 

no reason to believe that they, rather than the University, 

would foot the bill for a resulting judgment. Sovereign 

immunity therefore defeats Haynes’s damages action against 

the University administrators, both in their individual and 

official capacities. That leaves us with one claim for review: a 

§ 1981 action for various forms of injunctive relief.

C. Evidentiary Rulings

We have one more issue to resolve before turning to the 

merits. Haynes argues that the judge incorrectly excluded 

his three proffered expert reports: the Perna declaration, the 

Perna report, and the Greenwald report.

Perna’s initial declaration offered two opinions: the 

University granted tenure to an equally qualified white

woman the year before it denied Haynes’s application, and 

“various aspects of [Haynes’s] promotion and tenure process 

were not appropriately executed.” The judge properly 

excluded this proposed testimony. Rule 702 permits a qualified expert to testify to “specialized knowledge” if it “will 

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” The Perna declaration fell short on both 

grounds.

First, Perna lacked the specialized knowledge necessary 

for an opinion on the relative merits of Haynes’s tenure 

application as compared to anyone else’s. Perna specifically 

acknowledged that she had no “expert[ise] in ... Haynes’[s]
12 No. 17-2890

content area.” In other words, she disclaimed the only 

specialized knowledge that would qualify her to offer an 

opinion on Haynes’s fitness for tenure. Her analysis betrayed as much. Perna drew her sweeping conclusion from 

the simple fact that Haynes and the proposed white female

comparator had similar publication rates. This runs contrary 

to the University’s stated tenure guidelines, which stress that 

a candidate’s research acumen “cannot be fully captured by 

the count of publications.” It also doesn’t help the trier of 

fact; a layperson can easily tally up the number of articles 

published.

Similarly, the other opinion proffered in Perna’s initial 

declaration—that “various aspects” of Haynes’s tenure 

process were poorly executed—did not rest on any specialized knowledge. Rather than chronicle the University’s 

procedure and then compare it to what she believes is the 

academic norm, Perna focused myopically on Haynes’s

external reviewers, and even then her “analysis” is little 

more than a series of quotations from the record. She pointed to certain University personnel who expressed concern

with the “probative value” of Haynes’s external recommenders, only to respond with a quote from his mentor who 

admitted she “dropped the ball on external reviewers.” This 

implies at most that some at the University recognized a 

problem with one or more of Haynes’s external reviewers. 

At no point did Perna bring her own specialized knowledge 

to bear and explain the significance of these statements. In 

effect, Perna’s declaration merely flags certain record evidence for the fact-finder’s consideration. That doesn’t assist 

the fact-finder in understanding the evidence.
No. 17-2890 13

The judge also appropriately excluded Perna’s and 

Greenwald’s formal expert reports. Haynes points to nothing in Perna’s more complete report that remedies the 

admissibility concerns with her initial declaration, so we’ll

assume that’s because there’s nothing to find. Greenwald’s 

report addresses the possibility of implicit racial bias, but 

unintentional discrimination is not cognizable under § 1981.

See, e.g., Melendez v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 

1996) (“To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff ultimately must prove that he has been a victim of intentional 

discrimination.”).

Finally, even if the Perna and Greenwald reports were 

otherwise admissible, the judge did not abuse his discretion 

in declining to allow Haynes to add them to the record after 

summary-judgment briefing had ended. The judge was 

motivated by an entirely reasonable concern: he did not 

want Haynes to introduce new evidence without letting the 

University respond. And as we’ve noted, Haynes never 

alerted the judge to any problems his experts had in meeting 

the dispositive-motions deadline until after briefing was 

complete. Indeed, he earlier sought four extensions of time, 

requested further discovery under Rule 56(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, and moved to enlarge time for 

expert discovery without once suggesting that the expert 

reports wouldn’t be ready in time for a summary-judgment 

motion.

Haynes nonetheless asks us to excuse his failure to raise 

the issue earlier. He claims it would have been futile to 

request more time because the magistrate judge’s scheduling 

order instructed the parties “not [to] expect to receive extensions of their deadlines ... that would threaten the ability to 
14 No. 17-2890

have the [summary-judgment] motion ... fully briefed by 

May 26, 2017.” We don’t read this as absolutely foreclosing

any extension requests. More importantly, it’s not an excuse 

for belatedly asking to supplement the record with expert 

reports after summary-judgment briefing is complete.

D. Merits

At last we arrive at the merits. There are several ways to 

present a claim of racial discrimination, but we have recently 

explained that the inquiry can be distilled into a single rule:

The plaintiff’s case may proceed to trial only if “the evidence 

would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 

plaintiff’s race ... caused the discharge or other adverse 

employment action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 

760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).

This burden is especially difficult to meet when it comes 

to academic tenure. We have long recognized the “nuanced 

nature” of tenure decisions and our corresponding reticence 

to “second-guess the expert decisions of faculty committees.” Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 815 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). Scholars, not courts, 

“are in the best position to make the highly subjective judgments related with the review of scholarship and university 

service.” Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 

2005). Accordingly, we closely scrutinize discrimination 

claims in this context to be sure the dispute is not simply one 

of academic disagreement with the underlying decision to 

deny tenure.

The structure of the tenure process stands as an additional obstacle to a successful claim. Because a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that his race precipitated an “adverse employ-
No. 17-2890 15

ment action,” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765 (emphasis added), our 

inquiry centers on the motivations of the ultimate decisionmakers. With tenure this analysis is unusually complex. 

Several “independent and University-wide committees”

conduct “numerous layers of review,” and “the causal 

connection between any possible discriminatory motive of a 

subordinate participant ... and the ultimate tenure decision 

is weak or nonexistent.” Adelman-Reyes v. Saint Xavier Univ., 

500 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

Thus a plaintiff needs compelling evidence that “clear 

discrimination” pervasively infected the final tenure decision. Farrell, 421 F.3d at 609.

This case is not a close one under these standards. In fact,

we need not rely much on the finer points of academic 

tenure and its intersection with antidiscrimination law. 

Haynes’s claim fails for the simple reason that he lacks any 

evidence to suggest that the University denied tenure because he is black.

The bulk of Haynes’s case focuses on his allegations of 

chicanery during the University’s review of his tenure 

application. For example, he contends that Brush, the department chair, recommended critical and unqualified 

external reviewers, wrote the report of his committee’s 

findings in a way that would make support for his candidacy look more tepid, and expressed animosity toward him 

both in person and in correspondence with other faculty 

members. He also alleges that Glazewski and Gonzalez, who 

took the lead when the process moved to the School of 

Education, engaged in similar behavior. Even if we credit

these assertions, there remains a simple and fatal flaw. 

Haynes has no evidence that any of these people sought to 
16 No. 17-2890

sabotage him because of his race. He must base the core of 

his claim on something other than bald speculation. See 

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (holding that the employee bears the burden to prove that “discrimination was the real reason” behind an adverse action) 

(emphasis added).

Haynes next urges us to consider certain indicia of his 

performance as an assistant professor: he once obtained a 

research grant, won a teaching award, and earned an “exemplary” performance review several months before tenure 

was denied. To Haynes’s mind these accolades show that the 

University must have acted out of racial animus because he 

was otherwise qualified for tenure. This argument is twice 

unsound. Again Haynes assumes racism with no proof. And 

as important, Haynes’s argument rests on a premise we 

cannot entertain. To prove pretext he must first prove that

he was worthy of tenure. But as we’ve just explained, we do

not sit as an academic review board and “second-guess the 

expert decisions of faculty committees.” Sun, 473 F.3d at 815.

Haynes must do more than ask us to question the academic 

judgment of the 19 faculty members who decided he was 

unqualified for tenure.

Haynes’s remaining evidence likewise fails to establish 

that racial bias motived the University’s tenure decision. He 

cites the fact that the School of Education has never offered 

tenure to a black man. That’s beside the point. A § 1981 

claim “reaches only intentional discrimination” against the 

particular plaintiff, Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 396 (1982), and the University’s 

track record says nothing about how it treated Haynes. Next,

Haynes was hired through a minority-recruitment initiative,
No. 17-2890 17

which he says is evidence that the University needed to 

address a pervasive bias problem. That can’t possibly be 

right. If anything it shows that the University sought to 

recruit and retain minority scholars, not turn them away.

Finally, Haynes argues that Hardré’s letter evinced unmistakable racial bias that tainted the University’s entire 

review. We disagree on both scores. Hardré cited Haynes’s

race as a factor in his favor; she lamented the fact that she 

could not “support and endorse a colleague who is a member of an underrepresented minority.” But even if this 

comment were somehow problematic, there is little evidence 

that it poisoned the final tenure decision. Gonzalez mentioned the letter in his summary of the School of Education’s 

findings, but Brush explained why its conclusions were 

unwarranted when he offered the departmental review. All 

of the scholars who had a role in this decision could weigh

the letter as they saw fit.

In sum, the sole claim preserved in this case fails for lack 

of evidentiary support. Haynes cannot proceed to trial on a 

claim of racial discrimination without any evidence that the

University discriminated against him because of his race.

AFFIRMED.