New Orleans, 

August 30, 2005 

© 2005 The Times-Picayune 

Publishing Co., all rights reserved. 

Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
109

“Hurricane Pam”: 

Warning Flag for Katrina

On the day aft er Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the New Orleans Times-Picayune frontpage banner said it all: “KATRINA: THE STORM WE’VE ALWAYS FEARED.”1

Hurricanes are a fi xture of life on the Louisiana Coast. Years before Katrina, all levels of 

government knew that a large, slow-moving catastrophic hurricane was likely to hit New 

Orleans, fl ood the city, and claim thousands of lives, overwhelming state and local agencies’ ability to respond effectively and requiring assistance from the federal government to 

respond to the disaster.2

Th is understanding prompted eff orts in 1999 to secure federal support to develop a comprehensive plan to respond to a catastrophic hurricane in New Orleans. Following nearly 

fi ve years of delays, in 2004 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided 

funding to begin that development.3

 Th e project, “Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan,” confi rmed the limitations of the state and local agencies. It used an exercise 

scenario known as “Hurricane Pam” that incorporated well-founded assumptions about the 

impact of a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane on New Orleans. Based on scientifi c research 

and dozens of emergency-management studies, the Hurricane Pam scenario predicted:

• Widespread fl ooding throughout the city

• 67,000 dead

• 200,000 to 300,000 in need of evacuation aft er landfall

• Hundreds of thousands displaced

• Sheltering and evacuation needs exceeding state and local governments’ 

capabilities

• Hospitals overcrowded with special-needs patients, with backup generators 

running out of fuel or failing before patients could be moved elsewhere

• Incapacitated fi rst responders and parish resources

• Compromised situational awareness4

Despite the comprehensive foreknowledge of the consequences of a catastrophic hurricane 

hitting New Orleans, underscored and amplifi ed by the Hurricane Pam exercise, emergency-management offi cials were not prepared when Katrina struck. Th ey did, however, recognize that Katrina would have many of the consequences anticipated by the Pam exercise. As 

Katrina approached the Gulf Coast on August 27, two days before landfall, FEMA produced 

slides indicating that the impact of this storm could be worse than Pam’s predictions. A 9 

a.m. FEMA briefi ng document said, “Exercise projection [Pam] is exceeded by Hurricane 

Katrina real life impacts.”5

Hurricane Pam was only the most recent study predicting consequences of a catastrophic 

hurricane. To varying degrees, federal, state, and local governments have long been sounding alarms about virtually every problem that became reality with Katrina – for example, 

evacuation, sheltering, law and order, search and rescue, and a need for leadership.

Chapter 8
Chapter 8

110

Th e exercise addressed their concerns and resulted in an improved response to Hurricane 

Katrina. However, the response could have been far better had Hurricane Pam been completed earlier.6

 Th is section details the signifi cance of Pam and its infl uence on the Katrina 

response. Most important, though, it demonstrates that Katrina was not an unpredictable 

catastrophe, but in fact was predicted. 

Hurricane Pam: In the Beginning

Th e threat of a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans has long been contemplated by 

scientists, planners, emergency-management personnel, and managers. In what was oft en 

called the “New Orleans Scenario,” the worst-case event was imagined as a Category 3 or 

higher hurricane hitting the New Orleans metropolitan area with catastrophic impact.7

 Th is 

would be “worst case,” primarily because the storm surge would cause devastating fl ooding 

in an area that is below sea level and whose protective levees would trap the fl oodwater.8

Th e fl ooding, coupled with an immobile population of 100,000 or more, would contribute 

to a situation that would quickly exceed the response capabilities of both local and state 

resources and would require the assistance of federal resources on a scale never before seen.9

In late September 1998, Hurricane Georges wreaked havoc in the Caribbean before heading across southern Florida on a direct path to Louisiana. At the last moment, the hurricane 

veered away, sparing New Orleans from what could have been a devastating blow.10 Th e 

near miss prompted emergency planners to take stock again of how ill-prepared the region 

was for a major hurricane.11

Planners took their fi rst steps in response to Hurricane Georges in the fall of 1999. Colonel 

Michael Brown – no relation to the Michael Brown who directed FEMA as Katrina struck 

– then Assistant Director of the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, organized 

a meeting with offi cials from FEMA Region VI (the region with emergency-management 

responsibilities over Louisiana), the Army Corps of Engineers, other state agencies, parishes, and his own offi ce to explore the eff ect of Hurricane Georges had it not turned and 

gone north.12

To develop the planning scenario, the group sought input from experts from such institutions as Louisiana State University (LSU) and the Hurricane Prediction Center.13 Th e 

group quickly realized that a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane was suffi cient to cause 

catastrophic damage.14

Over the course of several meetings in the succeeding months, the planning committee put 

together a Statement of Work (SOW, also known as work plan), to be submitted to FEMA 

in support of a request to fund the development of a “working plan for the search and rescue, evacuation, sheltering, provisioning, and infrastructure restoration for the greater New 

Orleans area.”15 On August 14, 2000, Col. Brown requested funding from FEMA. FEMA did 

not respond to the funding request at that time.16

Shortly aft er taking offi ce, President Bush appointed Joe Allbaugh to be the Director of 

FEMA. Allbaugh visited New Orleans in the spring of 2001 and expressed surprise that 

there was no federal plan to respond to a catastrophic hurricane in the region.17 According to one report, Allbaugh pledged to support development of a plan and in August 2001, 

asked the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness and FEMA Region VI offi cials to 

write up a proposal.18

 Th at August, Region VI Director Ron Castleman reiterated to FEMA headquarters the 

urgent need for catastrophic planning, emphasizing that a catastrophic hurricane in the 
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

111

New Orleans area “could aff ect a wide area of Louisiana and neighboring states and would 

present serious response and recovery problems that could exceed collective capabilities.”19

Castleman asserted that the planning proposal “could save many lives.”20

Th e proposal anticipated massive impacts from a major hurricane, including over 1 million 

people evacuating New Orleans, 300,000 to 500,000 people trapped in fl ood areas, a storm 

surge of over 18 feet overfl owing levees and leaving New Orleans under 14 to 17 feet of 

water, rescue operations impeded, hospitals overcrowded with special-needs patients and 

backup generators running out of fuel or failing before patients could be moved.21

Objectives for the work included: (1) plan for direction and control of the response; (2) plan 

for maximizing evacuation; (3) plan for transporting people, supplies, and equipment; and 

(4) plan for rescue and relocation of stranded citizens, hospital patients, and other special 

populations. Th e proposal foresaw the importance of having a plan that took into account 

the thousands that would be unable to leave the area on their own accord, thus it recommended that the future contractor assess existing evacuation plans; recommend changes; 

identify pick up points for people without transportation; identify resources, facilities, and 

services for pre-storm evacuation; and identify additional transportation assets needed.22

An updated SOW was developed in August 2001. Its stated purpose was to enhance “Federal Response Planning activities by focusing on specifi c catastrophic disasters: those disasters 

that by defi nition will immediately overwhelm the existing disaster response capabilities of 

local, state, and federal governments.” It further stated that the “initial area of focus will be 

New Orleans, Louisiana . . . to improve federal, state, local-government, and private-sector ability to respond to a worst-case catastrophic hurricane in the Greater New Orleans 

Metropolitan Area in order to prevent loss of life; minimize the number of injuries; house, 

feed, and protect up to a million survivors and evacuees; and begin long-term recovery in 

the aff ected area.”23

Th is work plan stipulated that the contractor’s work should support eventual development 

of an introductory general plan and sub-plans that would constitute a comprehensive “New 

Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane Plan.” Th e top-priority area of analysis 

was identifying the number and location of potential evacuees and assessing existing evacuation plans.24

URS Corporation, a large fi rm specializing in homeland security, was selected as contractor 

for the project in September 2001, and in October, FEMA paid URS $97,000 to gather information to build a thorough understanding of the nature and magnitude of the hurricane 

problem.25 On December 18 and 19, 2001, the project leadership team of state and federal 

representatives held a kickoff meeting.26 One of several issues discussed was the recognition 

that a hurricane could strand 250,000 to 350,000 people in the New Orleans area, 10 percent 

of whom would likely be people with special needs. Th e team also noted that hospitals 

would probably have diffi culty getting people out of the city, and that the Louisiana Offi ce 

of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) had plans for stranded people to gather on dry stretches of levees or interstate highways where boats or barges could reach them.27

Th e team emphasized that “the fi nal product should be a hurricane operations plan – not 

a mitigation plan.” In essence, it should “[lay] out what the local government can do, what 

the state can do, what the state cannot do, and what the federal government needs to do” 

in response to a catastrophic hurricane.28 Th is operations plan was distinguished from the 

routine response by the federal government in which the government comes in aft er-thefact with a checkbook to pay for damage caused by the storm and the state and locals accept 

the check with the intent of using it to lessen the impact of future storms.29
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112

Th e project moved in “starts and stops” for a year because of budget problems, reassignment of FEMA staff to homeland-security issues, diffi culties in negotiating a subcontract 

with LSU and disagreements between LOEP and FEMA over the scope of work.30 Meanwhile, FEMA collected information from other sources regarding the threat potentially 

facing New Orleans. 

In May 2002, FEMA Region VI published a summary of a Bi-State Evacuation Study that 

unequivocally stated that the metropolitan New Orleans area had very limited evacuation 

routes, and that approximately 100,000 people were without transportation.31 In slides 

dated June 19, 2003, FEMA recognized that a major hurricane striking the New Orleans 

area “would be a disaster of cataclysmic proportion,” and that 250,000 to 350,000 people 

would be stranded. Minutes of a June 2003 meeting regarding the New Orleans scenario at 

FEMA headquarters with FEMA contractors state “that massive federal assistance would be 

expected for this type of event [catastrophic hurricane]. Louisiana won’t be able to deal with 

this. Responders and their families may be the victims themselves.”32

By late July 2003, URS Corporation had made progress on its catastrophic planning work 

for FEMA and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(LOHSEP), which was the successor agency to the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP). Th e Corporation fi nalized maps showing inundation, elevation and water 

depth. In the fall, URS draft ed a white paper on long-term sheltering.33 Th e premise of the 

paper was that 600,000 people would evacuate New Orleans in the event of a catastrophic 

hurricane, and that long-term shelter could be needed for perhaps 90 percent of the evacuees because de-watering of the city could take up to a year.34 Th ese documents completed 

URS Corporation’s contractual obligation to FEMA and LOHSEP.35

In November 2003, the White House Deputy National Security Adviser, General John A. 

Gordon, went to New Orleans to receive a briefi ng on catastrophic hurricane planning efforts for the region. During the comprehensive, detailed briefi ng, he learned about the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 hurricane hitting New Orleans.36 General Gordon 

reported to the White House about this meeting.37 About this same time, FEMA Headquarters informed offi cials of Region VI and LOHSEP’s Chief Planner, Sean Fontenot, that an 

unspecifi ed amount of funding had become available.38 Fontenot was uncertain about how 

they received the funding, but recalled that the money was approved in March 2004 and 

had to be spent by September 30, 2004.39

The Work Begins

Working with staff from Region VI, Fontenot developed a proposal for an exercise that 

encompassed 14 elements ranging from pre-landfall evacuation, to emergency response, to 

post-response recovery, and rebuilding matters. While the customary practice in emergency 

planning was to develop a plan, then to test it with an exercise, the planners concluded that 

the six short weeks that they had been given were insuffi cient to proceed in a traditional 

manner. Th us, the sequence was reversed: they designed an exercise from which to create 

the plan.40

At a meeting in early April 2004, FEMA offi cials deemed the proposal too costly, causing 

LOHSEP offi cials to trim pre-landfall evacuation and fi ve other issues. Witnesses stated 

that pre-landfall evacuation was deleted from the Hurricane Pam exercise because the issue 

had been examined by other studies, as well as state and local plans.41 On the other hand, 

post-landfall response planning had received very little attention, so, according to FEMA 

witnesses, the limited FEMA funds would be best applied to post-landfall planning.42 
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

113

In late May 2004, FEMA notifi ed the state that it had selected Innovative Emergency Management, Inc. (IEM), as contractor for this newer phase of the project, which sought the 

actual development of a catastrophic hurricane plan for southeast Louisiana.43 As distinct 

from the information-gathering process conducted by URS, this phase sought to develop 

the actual plan.44

Between late May and mid-July 2004, LOHSEP worked with FEMA Region VI staff , consultants from IEM, Mark Levitan, Ph.D., of the LSU Hurricane Center, and others to fl esh out 

the details of the exercise. Concluding that it was unreasonable to expect to complete a plan 

in the initial series of workshops, they designed the exercise with the expectation that they 

would ask FEMA to support a series of follow-on meetings.45

Th e initial Hurricane Pam workshops took place from July 16 until July 23, 2004. Attendance included over 300 participants from 15 federal agencies, 20 state agencies, 13 

parishes, fi ve volunteer agencies, LOHSEP, FEMA Region VI, FEMA HQ and IEM.46 Th e 

participants focused on issues relating to schools, search and rescue, sheltering, temporary 

housing, temporary medical care, and debris removal.47 IEM compiled the notes from each 

workshop into a draft plan. On August 6, 2004, IEM produced a 120-page draft “Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan.”48

Shortly aft er the July sessions, LOHSEP asked FEMA for funding for additional workshops. 

Again, obtaining funding was diffi cult.49 A follow-on session set for September 2004 had to 

be postponed when FEMA could not come up with $15,000 to pay travel expenses for participants.50 FEMA offi cials frequently cited “DHS taxes” as the reason for funding challenges 

that delayed the planned additional exercise sessions.51

Eric Tolbert, FEMA’s former Director of Response, recalled many diffi culties in funding 

the scenario and follow-on sessions.52 Th e turning point, he said, was when FEMA Director 

Brown returned from Asia aft er the disastrous, earthquake-driven tsunami of December 

2004. Tolbert described Brown as being “obsessed with catastrophic events.” Tolbert told 

Brown that a large hurricane hitting New Orleans might produce a higher death toll than 

the tsunami.53 Brown expressed support for funding catastrophic planning. Meanwhile, 

IEM consolidated and published the draft plans from the July 2004 portions of the exercise 

in January 2005.54

Follow-up Sessions55

Two follow-up workshops were eventually held: “Transportation, Staging and Distribution” 

in late July 2005, and “Temporary Medical” just days before Katrina struck.56 Notes from 

the transportation session reveal that while the workshop was supposed to deal with issues 

of commodity logistics, participants focused specifi cally on the need for buses to transport 

rescued people to shelters.57 Th e notes also emphasized the importance of marshalling these 

buses before landfall so that, following the storm, they would be immediately available to 

evacuate those stranded in the area. Notably, the participants also reported that planning 

for distribution of commodities was complete, but was “less than 10% done with transportation planning when you consider the buses and the people.”58

In the same transportation session, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness Chief 

Joseph Matthews told the working group at Pam that the city could not execute a massive 

post-landfall evacuation for two main reasons: (1) they had reserved local transit buses and 

school buses, but lacked drivers qualifi ed to participate in evacuations; and (2) city offi cials 

had not completed negotiations with other transportation companies.59
Chapter 8

114

Consequently, with 

recognition of the need 

to transport many tens of 

thousands of people aft er 

landfall, participants in 

the exercise developed 

a timeline that called on 

the agencies to “PreStage buses and drivers” 

50 hours before landfall 

by providing “600 buses 

(Local/State/Federal) and 

1,200 drivers (Local/State/

Federal/Volunteers).”60

Th e shelter chapter of 

the draft plan that arose 

from the Hurricane Pam 

exercise is slightly more 

detailed on the issue 

of transportation, and 

includes references to 

pre-landfall evacuation. It assumes that while the primary means of pre-landfall evacuation 

would be personal vehicles, “school and municipal buses and, where available, specialized 

vehicles will be used to transport those hurricane evacuees who do not have transportation.”61 Federal, state, and local government representatives were keenly aware of the critical need for buses and the corresponding need for sheltering, yet no level of government 

followed through with arranging for the buses and additional shelters to aid post-landfall 

evacuation.62

On August 23 and 24, 2005, the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Temporary 

Medical Care Supplementary Planning Workshop was held. From this workshop, the Temporary Medical Care section was updated. Emergency planners refi ned some of the medical 

support techniques eventually used during Hurricane Katrina, such as the use of centralized, medical triage centers (known as TMOSAs or Temporary Medical Operations Staging 

Areas) to provide medical screening and care for Katrina survivors. However, as discussed 

in greater detail in Chapter 24: Medical Assistance, the Hurricane Pam exercise failed to 

identify solutions to key medical problems it had anticipated, including the need to evacuate patients from hospitals and nursing homes trapped by rising fl oodwaters.63

On August 27, 2005, two days before landfall, IEM hastily published and delivered to FEMA 

a draft transportation plan based on the “Transportation, Staging and Distribution” workshops held July 25 through 29, 2005.

Hurricane Pam in Action 

Hurricane Pam 2004 was more than an exercise. It was a unique planning endeavor that 

resulted in functional plans that were considered for and actually put to use in real-life situations before, during, and aft er Hurricane Katrina. Most exercise participants agreed that 

many of the plans were useful even though they were not fi nal. Th ough they needed some 

cleaning up, the resulting draft s were “fi ghtable,” that is, “detailed enough to be implemented and to guide response and recovery operations.”64

“Pam” come true, New Orleans

Clarence Williams/Iris Photocollective photo
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

115

IEM President and CEO Madhu Beriwal echoed this view, saying, “though the plan was 

not fi nished, many elements of Hurricane Pam still proved to be highly useful in response 

and recovery to Hurricane Katrina days, weeks, and months aft er the massive storm struck 

the Gulf Coast.”65 Senior FEMA offi cials requested, reviewed, or referred to Hurricane Pam 

materials to gauge the potential impact of Hurricane Katrina and to plan response actions. 

According to Brown, “Th e Hurricane Pam book was fl ying everywhere. It was all over 

FEMA; it was everywhere.”66

Slides dated 9 a.m., August 27, 2005, at FEMA headquarters stated, “Current projected 

path takes storm directly over New Orleans.” Th ey also cited the Pam exercise prediction of 

60,000 fatalities and 1 million-plus persons displaced, predicting that Pam’s estimates would 

be “exceeded by Hurricane Katrina real life impacts.”67 Also on August 27, Patrick Rhode, 

FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director, was seeking a copy of the Hurricane Pam plan; he learned 

that numerous copies of the plan were being made for distribution to FEMA employees.68

Th e primary Federal Coordinating Offi cer in charge of response operations in Louisiana, 

William Lokey, actually embedded IEM employees in the National Response Coordination 

Center (NRCC) and the State’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during the response 

to Hurricane Katrina to use their Hurricane Pam and emergency-management expertise.69

Th e night manager of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the federal hub 

for situation information management, sent an e-mail to her director saying that she and 

others had scoured the Pam plan during their overnight shift on August 28 and found that the 

Hurricane Pam plan had identifi ed a number of tasks for federal entities. It further revealed 

that a number of these assigned tasks had not been addressed thus far in the federal response.70

 In particular, during Hurricane Katrina, a “lily-pad” type of search-and-rescue operation 

was implemented.71 By using this methodology, victims were rescued and transported to a 

safe area of high ground. Th e idea was that from there another group would transport them 

to a Temporary Medical Operations Staging Area (TMOSA). Th ere, the rescued would undergo a medical-triage screening process to determine individuals’ medical-care needs.72

During Hurricane Katrina, search-and-rescue crews successfully retrieved thousands of 

people from harm’s way and deposited them on dry land. In some cases, the rescued individuals were deposited at two of the three TMOSAs envisioned during the Hurricane Pam 

planning workshops.73 Unfortunately, the Hurricane Pam concept was only half successful because many people rescued by the search-and-rescue teams were transported to dry 

ground where there was no system to support them and no ground transportation to take 

them to a better place for days. In other words, they were taken to veritable “islands,” only 

to be left there without food, water, and other critical necessities.74

By late August 2005, FEMA had committed more than $1.5 million to developing the Hurricane Pam exercise.75 Because some offi cials took the initiative to press for signifi cant funding and overcome bureaucratic delays, some important lessons from Hurricane Pam were 

available and were put to good use in responding to Katrina – only a few of which were 

noted above. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that Louisiana allowed relatively small 

funding shortfalls – such as FEMA’s inability to fund $15,000 in travel expenses in September 2004 – to delay progress in further plan development. Given the importance to the state 

of the exercise, Louisiana should have considered using its own funds to fi ll these gaps in 

federal funding.

In any event, far too many of the Hurricane Pam lessons were not applied.Despite this being 

“the storm we’ve always feared,” despite awareness of the impact of such a storm on New 

Orleans, and despite the fact that federal, state, and local agencies came together in July 2004 
Chapter 8

116

to do a “live rehearsal” of a response in such a circumstance as Katrina – over a year before it 

made landfall – too little was done to act on the plans resulting from Hurricane Pam.

1 Bruce Nolan, “Katrina: Th e Storm We’ve Always Feared,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 30, 2005, p. A-1. 

2 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 70 (“In the hurricane business in emergency management, 

all of us have known for years and years about the New Orleans scenario. Th at’s what we refer to it as, the New Orleans 

scenario, which was either the overwash or the failure of the dock system, the levee system. Literally, anybody in this 

business that studied hurricanes, if you fl ew into New Orleans all you were looking for was the levee system. You wanted 

to see it because you had heard so much about it. Th e risk was uniformly known by the emergency management professionals.”). Ed Buikema, Acting Director of Response during Katrina, said that a large hurricane hitting New Orleans was 

considered by FEMA to be one of the worst catastrophes that could ever occur in the United States. Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript p. 234. 

3 Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 42-43, 71. 

4 LOHSEP, Hurricane Pam and Related Docs (18). Provided to Committee. 

5 FEMA, Tropical Storm Katrina, briefi ng slides, Aug. 27, 2006, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0055-0002140.

6 Testimony of Madhu Beriwal, President and CEO, IEM, Inc., before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006. 

Beriwal suggested that the response to Hurricane Katrina could have been greater had the exercise been completed 

earlier: “When Hurricane Katrina struck, the Hurricane Pam planning was not complete. No training or exercises had 

occurred using this planning document. Th e fi rst test was Hurricane Katrina. ... However [...] even though the plans 

and planning were incomplete, Hurricane Pam helped save lives and reduce suff ering aft er the massive catastrophe of 

Hurricane Katrina.” Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 8. According to Eric 

Tolbert, “Th e [Pam] exercise was just last year, and then they get hit this year. It takes time to continue developing plans 

and procedures. Th ankfully, we had that exercise last year so that at least federal, state and local had gone through the 

process and had thought about the consequences and had begun draft ing plans or it would not have even gone as well as 

it did.” Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 76. 

7 Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, 

Jan. 2000, Part I, A, Summary. 

8 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 70. 

9 FEMA, Task Order #125, Statement of Work: Catastrophic Hurricane Planning, New Orleans Metropolitan Area, 

Aug. 22, 2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. URS 0000053 [hereinaft er FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 

2001].

10 Mark Fischetti, “Drowning New Orleans,” Scientifi c American, Oct. 2001, pp. 78, 84 (“New Orleans is a disaster waiting to happen.”).

11 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 42-43.

12 Committee staff interview of Matt Farlow, Information Technology Division Chief, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 1, 

2005, transcript p. 11.

13 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, 

transcript p. 7.

14 Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 7.

15 See generally: LOHSEP, Hurricane Pam and Related Docs (18). Provided to Committee. Th e FEMA Statement of 

Work described a scenario of catastrophic consequences from a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane:

• Th e City of New Orleans is fl ooded with 14’ to 17’ of water

• Th e metro area is without power, food, water, medicine and transportation

• 250,000 to 350,000 people remain in stranded conditions with limited self rescue capability

• Up to 50,000 persons are stranded in the surrounding river parishes

• Possible 5,000 dead and 15,000 injured within the city

• Shelters are overcrowded and people stranded throughout the rest of the state

• Hazardous materials released throughout the city

• No or limited traditional access to all area
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

117

• All pumping stations inoperable

• Hospitals overcrowded with special needs patients and family members

• Hospitals have no or limited power

16 Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 11-16.

17 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 59.

18 Scott Wells, e-mail to Mark Wallace R6, Gary Jones, Chuck Gregg, Ron Castleman and Brenda Black, Mar. 18, 2004, 

7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000025 through 0000027.

19 Ron Castleman, memorandum to Lacy Suiter, Aug. 8, 2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0074-0000025. 

20 Castleman, memorandum to Suiter, Aug. 8, 2001; Mr. Fairley stated in his staff interview that a draft of the proposal 

was fi rst sent to Region VI, which returned it with directions to eliminate items outside the scope of FEMA funding. 

Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 49-50.

21 FEMA and LOEP, Proposal for Development of a New Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Aug. 

2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0074-0000027 through 0000028.

22 FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 2001, Bates no. URS 0000055.

23 FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 2001, Bates no. URS 0000052.

24 FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 2001, Bates no. URS 0000055.

25 Scott Wells, e-mail to Mark Wallace R6, Gary Jones, Chuck Gregg, Ron Castleman and Brenda J. Black, Mar. 18, 

2004, 7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000025 through 0000027.

26 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 60. According to Fontenot, there was a short delay from the time of contract 

award to URS to the date of the kickoff meeting due to the 9/11 attack and resulting circumstances. 

27 New Orleans Hurricane Preparedness Project, Meeting of Organizing Committee, Dec. 2001. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0001506 through 0001514. 

28 New Orleans Hurricane Preparedness Project, Meeting of Organizing Committee, Dec. 2001. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0058-0001579.

29 Committee staff interview of Sandy Coachman, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript p. 92. 

30 Scott Wells, e-mail to Mark Wallace R6, Gary Jones, Chuck Gregg, Ron Castleman and Brenda J. Black, Mar.18, 2004, 

7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000025 through 0000027.

31 FEMA, Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study, May 2, 2002. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0058-0001607. 

32 Chuck Gregg, e-mail to John Gambel, Oct. 21, 2005, 3:22 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0025-0002597 through 0002598 (the subject is a June 26, 2003 meeting at FEMA headquarters to discuss the 

Strawman Draft .).

33 FEMA, Task Order Number 125, Work Accomplished February 20, 2004 through March 5, 2004. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates nos. URS 0000115 through 0000116.

34 Long-Term Sheltering Following a Catastrophic Hurricane in Southeast Louisiana, prepared by URS Corporation for 

FEMA, Jan. 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. URS 0000232 through 0000244.

35 Dale Lehman, letter to Carrie Ouellettee, Mar. 5, 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. URS 0000059.

36 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 68-69. 

37 Tony Robinson, e-mail to Wayne Fairley and Mark Wallace R6, May 17, 2004, 1:46 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000077 through 0000078.

38 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 71-72.

39 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 71-72.

40 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 72-73.

41 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 88-90; Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006.

42 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 88-91; Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 2, 57-58. During his interview with 

HSGAC staff ers, Fairley explained why pre-landfall evacuation was not part of the Pam planning: “We, over the course a 

time, working with the state, discussed transportation for evacuation. Th at’s always been something that was recognized 

as a need. Th e state, however, felt that they had that segment in hand. Th e state had a evacuation plan, evacuation routes, 

evacuation maps.” Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 23.

43 Testimony of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, LOHSEP, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, 

Jan. 24, 2006.
Chapter 8

118

44 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 87-88; Fontenot, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 25, 2006.

45 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 78-80.

46 FEMA, Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project, Matrix of Planning Topics and ESFs, Dec. 8, 2004. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000377; IEM, Inc., 2004 Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane 

Planning Exercise, Executive Summary. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. IEM/TEC04-081. 

47 FEMA and IEM, Inc., Hurricane Pam 2004, Breakout Room Topics. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

0001998.

48 IEM, Inc., Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan, Draft , Aug. 6, 2004. Provided to Committee. 

49 Tolbert interview, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 135-136 (“I think lack of funding contributed signifi -

cantly. I was under no pressure to continue with it because I didn’t have money anyway. ... We had a set budget, all the 

money that we could scrape together out of my operating budget and that was the limit. ... Had we had more money, we 

probably would have expanded it.”).

50 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 79-80.

51 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 57-58.

52 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 71-72, 80. Notes of a March 30, 2004 teleconference indicate a concern about 

moving forward quickly to avoid the hurricane season: “Tolbert: Can timeframe slip? To September 30? Sean Fontenot: 

Probably not. And unless Contractor for Exercise can be secured by April 12, Exercise likely not happen because of hurricane seasons.” LOHSEP, Response No. 8, Mar. 30, 2004 Eric Tolbert Teleconference. Provided to Committee. 

53 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 85-86.

54 IEM, Inc., Memorandum, Re: Development of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation, 

Sept. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

55 IEM, Inc., Memorandum, Re: Development of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation, 

Sept. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

56 IEM, Inc., Memorandum, Re: Development of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation, 

Sept. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee.

57 IEM, Inc., Louisiana Catastrophic Planning Phase 1B: Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng Highlights, July 29, 2005. 

Provided to Committee.

58 IEM, Inc., Louisiana Catastrophic Planning Phase 1B: Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng Highlights, July 29, 2005. 

Provided to Committee. Director Joseph Matthews of the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness also pointed 

out at this meeting that the City had a problem with the lack of qualifi ed drivers for buses that could be used in an evacuation. Committee staff interview of Joseph Matthews, Director, Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, City of New Orleans, 

LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript pp. 67-68.

59 Matthews interview, Nov. 23, 2005, pp. 196-200.

60 A FEMA offi cial at the workshop suggested to the other participants that 5,000 buses per day would needed. Committee staff interview of Jules Hurst, Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 27, 2006, 

transcript p. 34 (“At fi rst we were told that – I said you got to give me a number to work with here, and when they said 

how many buses do we need, they said, okay, 75,000 refugees a day – refugees? Evacuees a day for 10 days. And they said, 

What do you need? And I said 5,000 buses a day.”).

61 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for FEMA and LOHSEP, Aug. 6, 2005, p. 72 

[hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Aug. 6, 2005]. 

62 Transportation needs are also addressed in the Search and Rescue chapter, albeit in more cursory terms. Th e section 

describing the execution of the plan includes the notation that post-landfall operations will include “coordination and 

evacuation of the rescued persons.” While there are general references to the possibility that parishes may be so severely 

damaged that they are incapable of even asking for support, the text does not specify whether state or federal support for 

transporting rescued victims will be relied on, stating merely that “ESF-1 [the emergency support function dealing with 

transportation] will provide transportation of rescued victims.” Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Aug. 

6, 2005, pp. 72, 75.

63 Committee staff interview of James Aiken, M.D., Medical Director for Emergency Preparedness, Medical Center 

of Louisiana, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 66-68; EST_ESF08, e-mail to Robert 

Jevec, Jack Beall, and MST-1, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0098-

0003758 through 0003759 (“Advanced planning was never completed on how the patients left in the hospital will be 

evacuated aft er the event. Th e use of boats to support the other ESFs has been fairly comprehensive, and ESF #8 has yet 

to be completed.”).

64 FEMA, Louisiana Project, Phase I-B Proposed Schedule, Jan. 25, 2005, p. 5. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA 0058-0002144. Madhu Beriwal, the president of IEM, told HSGAC staff during a briefi ng that the premise 

of the planning workshops was that the participants were developing actual plans and that IEM’s role was to simply 

clean up the products from the workshop, compile and present them in a fi nal formatted plan.

65 Written Statement of Madhu Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 5.
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

119

66 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 215.

67 FEMA, Tropical Storm Katrina, briefi ng slides, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0055-0002140 (“Exercise projections exceeded by Hurricane Katrina real life impacts.”). 

68 William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode and David Garratt, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860.

69 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, FEMA, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 185 (“One of the things we did do, the contract planners from IEM-I’m 

not sure what IEM stands for, but our contractor we have for catastrophic planning-I got them activated on Saturday to 

embed them, [they] showed up Sunday to help remind people what people had agreed to in the planning process we had 

done in the Hurricane Pam scenarios.”). 

70 Richard Harmon, e-mail to EST-DIR [Mary Ann Lyle], Aug. 28, 2005, 4:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0132-0001814.

71 Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2005.

72 Th e Temporary Medical Care section detailed the concepts of search and rescue bases of operations (SARBOOs) 

and temporary medical and operations staging areas (TMOSAs). As stated in Chapter 24, Medical Assistance: “Th e 

plan called for search-and-rescue teams to drop people at Search-and-Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs) near 

the fl ooded areas, where paramedics would perform initial triage. Rescuees would then be transported to Temporary 

Medical-and-Operations Staging Areas (TMOSAs), larger areas with temporary medical facilities, for care and triage.” In 

response to Hurricane Katrina, the SARBOO/TMOSA approach proved crucial to being able to provide medical services 

when hospitals were fi lled. 

73 Committee staff interview of Jimmy Guidry, M.D., Medical Director and State Health Offi cer, Louisiana Department 

of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 21-22.

74 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 3005, transcript pp. 55-63. 

75 FEMA, Amendment of Solicitation of Contract, Sept. 21, 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0076-0000038 through 0000043.