alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 16.9 Hearing. ( a ) *Request for hearing.* ( 1 ) An employee shall file a petition for a hearing in accordance with the instructions outlined in the creditor agency's notice of offset.
( 2 ) If the NRC is the creditor agency, a hearing may be requested by filing a written petition stating why the employee disputes the existence or amount of the debt or the repayment schedule if it was not established by written agreement between the employee and the NRC. The employee shall sign the petition and fully identify and explain with reasonable specificity all the facts, evidence, and witnesses, if any, which the employee believes support his or her position. The petition for a hearing must be received no later than fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of the notice of offset unless the employee can show that the delay in meeting the deadline date was because of circumstances beyond his or her control or because of failure to receive notice of the time limit (unless otherwise aware of it).
( b ) *Hearing procedures.* ( 1 ) The hearing will be presided over by a hearing official arranged by NRC (an administrative law judge or, alternatively, a hearing official not under the supervision or control of the head of the agency.)
( 2 ) The hearing must conform to procedures contained in the revised FCCS, 31 CFR Chapter IX, 901.3(e). The burden is on the employee to demonstrate either that the existence or the amount of the debt is in error or that the terms of the repayment schedule would result in undue financial hardship or would be against equity and good conscience.
( 3 ) An employee is entitled to representation of his or her choice at any stage of the proceeding. NRC attorneys may not be provided as representatives for the debtor. The NRC will not compensate the debtor for representation expenses, including hourly fees for attorneys, travel expenses, and costs for reproducing documents.
[56 FR 51830, Oct. 16, 1991, as amended at 67 FR 57508, Sept. 11, 2002]
Subpart 1520.1 - General [Reserved]

Parent topic: PART 1520 - LABOR SURPLUS AREA CONCERNS
#### CASSIDY, Appellant, v. DEVOY, County Clerk, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

July 31, 1914.)

In the matter of the application of Joseph Cassidy, for a writ of mandamus against Charles S. Devoy, Clerk of the County of Kings.

No opinion. Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus granted, with $25 costs on authority of Willett v. Devoy, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1002, decided herewith.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 78 FR 34247, June 7, 2013.

#### § 1.26 [Reserved]
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3005.9000 Applicability (USCG).

Contracts awarded by the U.S. Coast Guard using the procedures in (HSAR) 48 CFR 3037.104–91

are expressly authorized for the Coast Guard under 10 U.S.C. 1091, and are exempt from (FAR) 48

CFR part 5.

Parent topic: Subpart 3005.90—Publicizing Contract Actions for Personal Services Contracting
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD MARSHALL, ) 

)

Plaintiff, )

 ) CIV. ACT. NO. 2:06cv701-ID

v. )

)

CHRIS WEST, et al., ) 

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Upon CONSIDERATION of the unopposed Motion to Continue (Doc. No. 50), and

for good cause shown, it is ORDERED that the trial of this cause, presently set on October

20, 2008, be and the same is hereby CONTINUED to the term of court commencing on

December 1, 2008, in Montgomery, Alabama.

The deadlines in sections 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Uniform Scheduling Order (Doc.

No. 22) are adjusted to conform with the new trial date. Otherwise, the deadlines in the

Uniform Scheduling Order shall remain in full force and effect.

DONE this 16 day of July, 2008. th

/s/ Ira DeMent 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00701-ID-CSC Document 51 Filed 07/16/2008 Page 1 of 1
#### In the Matter of Jeffry Witjas et al., Respondents, v. Westchester County Board of Elections, Respondent, and Bernard Aisenberg, Appellant.

In a proceeding styled as one “to correct clerical errors” in petitions designating petitioners as candidates in the Democratic Party Primary Election to be held on June 17, 1969, for the Party position of County Committeeman for the 14th Election District in the 3rd Ward of the City of New Rochelle, the appeal is from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered June 12, 1969, which granted the application and (2) an order of said court entered the same day which denied appellant’s motion (a) to vacate said *815determination granting the application and (b) to dismiss the petition in the proceeding. Judgment and order modified, on the law and the facts, by (1) striking from them the description of the proceeding as being one to correct clerical errors wherever it appears, and (2) substituting therefor the description of the proceeding as one to declare petitioners’ designating petitions valid. As so modified, judgment and order affirmed, without costs. We deem the proceeding to be one under section 330 of the Election Law to declare valid the original designating petitions as filed. We deem the errors in the jurat of the subscribing witness to be insubstantial and are of the opinion that they do not invalidate the petitions. Beldoek, P. J., Rabin, Benjamin, Munder and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
Subpart 1416.2 - Fixed-Price Contracts

Parent topic: PART 1416 - TYPES OF CONTRACTS

1416.203 Fixed-price contracts with economic price

adjustment.

1416.203-4 Contract clauses.

An economic price adjustment clause based on actual cost of labor or material may be used after

approval by the BPC, without the power of redelegation.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                  MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                        774,754
<SECURITIES>                  0                         <F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                 64,735
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        8,933,000                 <F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                10,077,511
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         156,556
<BONDS>                       6,029,325                 <F3>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      0                         <F4>
<OTHER-SE>                    0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  0
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              394,472                   <F5>
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 144,221                   <F6>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              19,134                    <F7>
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            125,514
<INCOME-PRETAX>               0
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           0
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  105,603
<EPS-BASIC>                 0
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0
<FN>
<F1>   "SECURITIES" REPRESENTS INVESTMENT IN JOINT VENTURE
<F2>   "PP&E" REPRESENTS INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE [LAND AND
BUILDING]
<F3>   "BONDS" REPRESENTS MORTGAGES PAYABLE
<F4>   "COMMON" REPRESENTS TOTAL PARTNERS CAPITAL
<F5>   "TOTAL REVENUES" REPRESENTS RENTAL, INTEREST, AND OTHER
INCOME
<F6>   "TOTAL COSTS" REPRESENTS TOTAL EXPENSES LESS INTEREST
EXPENSE
<F7>   "OTHER EXPENSES" REPRESENTS INTEREST IN JOINT VENTURES'
NET INCOME/LOSS
</FN>


</TABLE>
August 

### 18, 2014 Hand Delivered

Barry Stephens, P.E., Technical Secretary Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board William 

### L. Snodgrass Tennessee Tower 

### 312 Rosa 

### L. Parks Avenue, 

### 15th Floor Nashville, Tennessee 

### 37243
Dear Mr. Stephens:
The Chattanooga-Hamilton CountyAir Pollution Control Bureau is submittingthis requestthatthe Hamilton Countyportionofthe Chattanooga,Tennessee-Georgia PM2.5 nonattainment area be redesignated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the provisions ofthe federal Clean Air Actto "attainment" forthe 

### 1997 annual PM2.5 ambient air quality standard of 

### 15 micrograms per cubic meter of air. This recommendation is made following public notice, extensive review by the Tennessee Air Pollution Control Division and Region 4, United States Environmental Protection Agency, public hearing on June 

### 30, 2014, public comments received, and approval by the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Board. The air monitoring data and computer modeling demonstrates that we have achieved this health-based standard and will maintain compliance with it in the future.
Enclosed are two hard copies and two electronic copies on CD of the request which includes:

• Affidavit of publication of legal notice on May 

### 24, 2014; • Draft minutes of the June 

### 30, 2014 meeting of the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Board; • Transcription of Public Hearing, June

### 30, 2104, byWilson Reporting Agency; • Public comments received from U.S. EPA Region 4 andthe Bureau's response to those comments; • Copy of the Certificate of Exemption effective July 

### 1, 2014 for Hamilton County and all included municipalities and Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board Order 

### 14-007 dated May 

### 14, 2014; and

6125 PreservationDrive • Chattanooga,TN37416-3638 • 423-643-5970 " Fax423-643-5972 www.apcb.org• "Redesignation Request and Maintenance Plan for The Tennessee Portion of the Chattanooga/ Tennessee-Georgia/ PM2.5 Nonattainment Area// and Appendices A thru Q. (Due to the volume of data involved/ Appendix L/ which contains the MOVES model input data used/ is included in electronic format on a CD);
We are asking that you schedule this matter for the next meeting of the Tennessee Air Pollution Control Board which we understand will be on October 8/ 2014/ and wanttothankyouforthe assistanceyou and youremployees have provided in this process. It is our understanding that following approval by the Tennessee Air Pollution.Control Board/ the Board will submit its recommendation to U.S. EPA Region 4 as an official revisiontotheTennessee State Implementation Plan fortheAttainment and Maintenance of Air Quality.

Enclosures: Two 3-ring binders w/CDs Sincerely/

Robert H. Colby Director

cc: Hamilton County Mayor Jim Coppinger (w/o enclosures) Chattanooga Mayor Andy Berke (w/o enclosures) All Board Members (w/o enclosures) Beverly Baninster/ US EPA Region 4 (w/o enclosures) Lynorae Benjamin/ US EPA Region 4 (w/o enclosures)
§ 1706.3 Applicability. ( a ) *General applicability.* This part applies to contractors and offerors only, except as otherwise herein provided. This part shall be incorporated by reference and made a part of all Board contracts in excess of the small purchases threshold, except as provided in the last sentence of this § 1706.3(a). In addition, if determined appropriate by the contracting officer for the Board, this part may be incorporated by reference and made a part of Board contracts below the small purchases threshold, except as provided in the last sentence of this § 1706.3(a). This part does not apply to the acquisition of services, including, without limitation, consulting services, through the personnel appointment process or to Board agreements with other federal government agencies, but shall apply to Board agreements with the management and operating contractors (and subcontractors and consultants thereto) of the National Laboratories.
( b ) *Subcontractors and consultants.* The requirements of this part shall also apply to subcontractors and consultants proposed for, or working on, a Board contract, in each case where the amount of the subcontract or consultant agreement under which such subcontractor or consultant is or will be working is expected to exceed $10,000, and in each other case where the contracting officer for the Board deems it appropriate to make the requirements of this part applicable to a subcontractor or consultant proposed for, or working on, a Board contract. The certificates or disclosures submitted by offerors or contractors pursuant to this part shall include certificates or disclosures from all subcontractors and consultants to contractor or offerors in those cases where this part applies by its terms to such subcontractors or consultants or has been applied to such persons by the contracting officer. Contractors and offerors shall assure that contract clauses giving effect to this § 1706.3(b), satisfactory to the contracting officer, are included in subcontracts and consultant agreements of any tier involving performance of work under a prime contract covered by this part.
[57 FR 44652, Sept. 29, 1992; 58 FR 13684, Mar. 12, 1993]
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A22A0366. THE STATE v. CLAYTON WAYNE WARD.

In this pending traffic proceeding, the State filed a notice of appeal from the

superior court’s dismissal of its “Demand for Jury Trial.” For reasons explained

below, however, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

Clayton Wayne Ward was charged with several traffic offenses.

1 Ward waived

formal arraignment and trial by jury and entered a plea of not guilty in probate court.

The State filed a “Demand for Jury Trial,” seeking to transfer the case to superior

court for a jury trial, which the probate court denied. The State then appealed to

superior court. The superior court dismissed the appeal, finding that it was an

impermissible interlocutory appeal from probate court, and transferred the case back

to probate court for further proceedings. This direct appeal followed.

As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he State does not have a right of

appeal in criminal cases, except as provided by OCGA § 5-7-1.” Glenn v. State, 271

Ga. 604, 604 (1) (523 SE2d 13) (1999). And we are required to construe this statute

strictly against the State. See id. at 605 (1). OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) permits the State

to file a direct appeal “[f]rom an order . . . setting aside or dismissing any indictment

. . . [or] accusation.” Although the State posits that this direct appeal is permitted

under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) because the trial court order effectively dismissed an

accusation, the order did not dismiss the accusation. Rather, it dismissed the appeal

1 Ward was charged with violating OCGA § 40-6-391 (A) (1), driving under

the influence of alcohol; OCGA § 40-8-76.1, a seatbelt violation; and OCGA §

40-6-48, failure to maintain lane.

October 25, 2021
of an interlocutory probate court order denying the State’s demand for a jury trial in

superior court. OCGA § 5-3-2 (a) vests the superior court with appellate jurisdiction

over any probate court decision other than an order appointing a temporary

administrator, but an appeal under § 5-3-2 is available only from a final judgment.

See Driver v. State, 198 Ga. App. 643, 644 (402 SE2d 524) (1991) (no right of appeal

to the superior court lies from an interlocutory ruling in the probate court); Sears v.

State, 196 Ga. App. 207, 207 (396 SE2d 1) (1990) (same). The probate court’s order

here was not a final judgment as the case remains pending before that court. 

Strict construction of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1) does not permit us to extend a

direct appeal to an order such as this one dismissing an appeal of an interlocutory

probate court order. See Glenn, 271 Ga. at 605 (1). Accordingly, this appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

10/25/2021
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

 NORTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA * 

 * 

 * 

v. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06cv736-WKW 

 * 

SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN * 

HUNDRED DOLLARS ($74,700) * 

IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, * 

FINAL TRIAL BRIEF

 Comes now the Claimant George E. Jones, Jr., by and through counsel, and 

submits his Final Trial Brief: 

 FACTS

 The facts are stipulated as those adduced at the hearing of Claimant's Motion to 

Suppress. Claimant has filed concurrently herewith his Motion to Strike hearsay (which, 

though admissible at Motion to Suppress, are inadmissible for trial). Claimant has offered 

no facts to assert an innocent owner defense. 

BURDEN OF PROOF

 Whether the government has met the burden of proof. Here, Claimant contends 

that such as not been met by admissible evidence and Claimant relies significantly on his 

Motion to Suppress, contending that it should have been granted. In the absence of the 

evidence that Claimant sought to suppress, the burden could not have been met. Claimant 

relies on the legal and factual arguments submitted on Motion to Suppress previously 

submitted and incorporated herein by reference. 

 Claimant also contends that, even with the denial of the Motion to Suppress, the 

government's burden of establishing that the money is subject to forfeiture has not met. 

The government has shown no basis, other than the mere presence of drugs in the house 

and/or on the person of Claimant, to believe that the money was not honestly earned by 

Case 2:06-cv-00736-WKW-SRW Document 40 Filed 10/29/2007 Page 1 of 2
Claimant through honest employment. 

 CONCLUSION 

 The "document search warrant" was based neither upon probable cause nor full 

disclosure to the magistrate of pertinent facts. The fact of the search warrant's issuance 

under those circumstances, and the testimony of officer that they always get the same 

warrant, plus the general nature of the warrant, prove a "rubber stamp" magistrate. As a 

search warrant lacking in particularity and leaving all decisions to the executing officers, the 

"document search warrant" was a constitutionally intolerable general warrant. The warrant, 

if served at all, was improperly served. As a result of these facts, the "drug search warrant" 

must also be invalid as fruit of the poisonous tree, and all items seized and sought to be 

used as evidence by the government should be suppressed. 

 Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October, 2007. 

 s/Bruce Maddox

Bruce Maddox (MAD013) 

Attorney for George Jones 

6728 Taylor Court 

Montgomery, Alabama 36117 

Phone: (334) 244-7333 

Fax: (334) 260-9600 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 29th day of October, 2007, I electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification 

of such filing to appropriate parties. 

s/Bruce Maddox

Of Counsel 

Case 2:06-cv-00736-WKW-SRW Document 40 Filed 10/29/2007 Page 2 of 2
#### In the Matter of the Application of Robert MACKEY, Petitioner, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, v. JAMES SEEMAN STUDIOS, INC., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Masonite Corp., Respondent.

No. 80 Civ. 7089.

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

March 11, 1981.

Jack B. Solerwitz, Mineóla, N. Y., by Alan Wolin, Mineóla, for plaintiff.

Sullivan & Cromwell by William Ziegler, New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EDWARD WEINFELD, District Judge.

Petitioner Robert Mackey and another employee, Carpenter, members of the same union, were involved in fisticuffs and were thereupon discharged by their employer, respondent James Seeman Studios, Inc. As a result, the union filed separate grievances as provided in the collective bargaining agreement for each employee, and separate arbitrations ensued. The issue before the arbitrator designated to hear petitioner’s grievance was whether his discharge was for just cause. After reviewing the details of the altercation between petitioner and Carpenter, the arbitrator found that “the discharge was for just cause.” The petitioner’s attack upon the award is utterly without substance and requires no discussion other than reliance upon the record. Indeed, the attack upon the award is frivolous.

Equally without substance is petitioner’s contention that because the union filed separate grievances on behalf of petitioner and Carpenter, which were heard by separate arbitrators, there was a conflict of interest which requires the vacation of the award. Not the slightest factual material has been submitted to show bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the union.1 It was not required to be a partisan of either of the antagonists. Indeed, petitioner had his own private attorney present during part of the proceedings who did not object contemporaneously to the union’s conduct of the proceedings. Also without merit is petitioner’s contention that the union was in conflict of interest which inherently dictates that it unfairly represented him. The union was not required to pursue petitioner's grievance at all, much less through arbitration. Further, positions unions take often affect some members adversely, but the union does not breach its duty of fair representation unless it acts in bad faith.2 Absent a showing that the union actually *1047took a position in arbitration adverse to him, petitioner cannot prevail.3

Respondent’s motion is granted in all respects and petitioner’s cross-motion is denied.

So ordered.

1

. *See Vaca v. Sipes,*386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); *Simberlund v. Long Island R. Co.,*421 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1970).

2

. *Humphrey v. Moore,*375 U.S. 335, 349-50, 84 S.Ct. 363, 371-72, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1946).

3

. *Cf. Hill v. Aro Corp.,*275 F.Supp. 482 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
Subpart 2422.14 - Employment of the

Handicapped

Parent topic: PART 2422 - APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITIONS

2422.1408 Contract clause.

(c) The Contracting Officer shall insert the clause at 2452.222-70, Accessibility of Meetings,

Conferences, and Seminars to Persons with Disabilities, in solicitations and contracts when the

contract will require the contractor (including contractor employees and subcontractors) to hold

meetings, conferences or seminars.
#### § 13.42 Judicial review.

Section 3805 of title 31, United States Code, authorizes judicial review by an appropriate United States District Court of a final decision of the authority head imposing penalties or assessments under this part and specifies the procedures for such review.