DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY 

BOARD 

January 24, 1997 

A. DOE-RL Reversal on Funding DNFSB 93-5 Commitments: On January 17th, the Board was informed by 

John Wagoner that the 93-5 (Tank Characterization) implementation plan commitments would be funded for 

FY97. Based on discussions with DOE-RL, Fluor Daniel (FDH) and Lockheed Martin (LMHC), we have 

confirmed the following: 

1. DOE-RL, FDH and LMHC management all confirm the 93-5 commitments will be funded; exactly 

how they will do so is unclear: The FY97 funding required to support 93-5 amounts to about $12 million (M). 

Approximately $4M has been identified in a variety of TWRS cost adjustments. The remaining $8M is targeted 

to come out of LMHC's operating budget although the exact location and impacts are unknown. Effective 

immediately, LMHC has placed a hold on all procurements and is initiating a review of all subcontracts to 

identify additional cost reductions. 

2. Tank sampling and analysis staff were not laid off as originally planned: On January 22, 60-day lay off 

("WARN") notices were issued to about 180 contractor employees. Notices to lay off one sampling truck crew 

and about 25 staff at the 222-S lab were pulled back. We are still awaiting confirmation on the exact job 

functions which were affected by this reduction. 

3. DOE-RL does not appreciate the need to issue revised guidance formally: DOE-RL intends to issue the 

formal change order to support the characterization workscope within several weeks. In the absence of formal 

direction to alter LMHC's workscope and staffing plans, LMHC has issued a letter stating its intended action to 

support characterization. (Similar to what occurred recently with the tank farm standing orders, LMHC is 

pushing for formal direction before LMHC takes action.) We have requested to see DOE-RL's change orders 

once they are issued. 

B. WESF Exhaust Filter Flooding: The WESF canyon and hot cells are ventilated by the K-3 exhaust system. 

The K-3's HEPA filters are contained in a sealed steel assembly which sits in a below-grade vault. On January 

1, the WESF stack monitor alarmed. The alarm was cleared by shifting from the east to the west K-3 filter bank. 

On January 14, the east K-3 filter bank vault (and subsequently a portion of the filter box) was found to contain 

2.5 feet of water (presumably from snow melt). Investigation continues to confirm whether water has entered 

the HEPA filters. Roger Zavadoski and Larry Zull have been provided sketches of the K-3 system and are 

monitoring the recovery actions. 

C. Conduct of Operations: This week, the following events occurred which suggest a general degradation of 

conduct of operations. 

1. At PFP, the DOE-RL facility rep identified that removed sanitary system piping had been allowed to sit 

uncontained for two weeks in the PFP ventilation duct level. Investigation found some of the contents had 

been tracked out and that the piping was radiologically contaminated. Cleanup actions are underway. 

2. A waste transfer from tank AN-106 to AP-108 continued for four hours without the knowledge of the 

operations staff. Contrary to procedure, operations personnel did not verify the transfer was stopped when 

a transfer pump alarm was received. 

TO: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director 

FROM: P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives 

SUBJECT: Activity Report for Week Ending January 24, 1997
3. On two occasions, personnel at the 324 lab were radiologically contaminated. The protective clothing 

required for the work was not prescribed (i.e., rain gear for decontamination work using water). 

4. The HEPA ventilation system for the 233-S plutonium concentration facility was deenergized without 

proper authorization or controls by BHI workers who were confirming electrical as-built drawings for the 

building. Subsequent monitoring confirmed the workers were not exposed to airborne contamination. 

We have discussed our concerns with John Wagoner and other DOE-RL management. We believe this decline 

is due to a general lack of contractor management presence and attention at the working level. DOE-RL is 

responding by pressuring contractor management to demonstrate their field presence and impact. 

D. Canister Storage Building Construction: On January 22nd, Mr. Ogg toured the CSB construction site during 

the concrete pour for the vault #1 deck. Project management authorized the placement of concrete after an 

independent Duke review team had verified that all Design Change Notices and associated calculations had 

been properly reviewed through the Independent Design Review process. The constructor placed 1600 cubic 

yards of concrete during the day, and completed the pour safely. 

cc: 

Board Members