United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

MILITARY 

TRANSFORMATION 

Additional Actions 

Needed by U.S. 

Strategic Command to 

Strengthen 

Implementation of Its 

Many Missions and 

New Organization 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-847 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 

Additional Actions Needed by U.S. 

Strategic Command to Strengthen 

Implementation of Its Many Missions and 

New Organization 

Highlights of GAO-06-847, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

In 2002, the President and 

Secretary of Defense called for the 

creation of the United States 

Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM) to anticipate and 

counter global threats. Currently,

USSTRATCOM has responsibility

for seven mission areas including 

nuclear deterrence and integrated 

missile defense. GAO was asked to

determine the extent to which 

USSTRATCOM has made progress 

in (1) implementing its new 

missions and assessing mission 

results and (2) defining

organizational responsibilities and 

establishing relationships with 

other Department of Defense

(DOD) commands and 

organizations. To assess progress,

GAO compared USSTRATCOM’s 

efforts with lessons learned in 

implementing successful 

organizational transformations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that

USSTRATCOM take actions to 

provide more guidance to its 

mission and service component 

organizations, improve 

communications, and evaluate

mission performance. DOD agreed

with some recommendations but 

disagreed with others, including 

that it develop a results-oriented

management process. Therefore,

GAO included a matter for

congressional consideration that

would require DOD to develop 

such a process given the

importance of the role assigned to

USSTRATCOM. 

Since its establishment in 2002, USSTRATCOM has made progress in 

implementing its new missions by taking a wide range of actions such as 

developing concepts of operations for its new missions, establishing 

processes and procedures, and identifying and obtaining personnel and 

resources needed to begin operations. However, further steps are needed to 

build on this progress in order to achieve the broad goals envisioned by the 

President and Secretary of Defense in creating the command. While the 

command’s leadership recognizes the need to build on progress to date and 

has some additional actions underway to expand and enhance capabilities in 

its seven mission areas, GAO identified several areas in which more specific 

actions are needed to help the command achieve its vision. Specifically, the 

command has taken initial steps to include its new missions in its exercise

program but has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that 

integrates exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, 

which can provide USSTRATCOM with several planning, training, and 

evaluation tools. In addition, most of USSTRATCOM’s new mission 

organizations have not established clear criteria for determining when they 

will reach full operating capability. Furthermore, USSTRATCOM has not 

developed performance measures and criteria for assessing results across 

the command and in each of its mission areas. GAO’s prior work examining 

organizational change and defense transformation shows that each of these 

tools is important for transforming organizations to increase their likelihood 

of success, particularly when multiple organizations are involved in mission 

execution. Developing plans in each of these areas should help the command 

demonstrate it can provide added value to the combatant commanders and 

give the President an expanded set of military options for responding to 

future threats—two key DOD goals. 

USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall 

organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission organizations 

that have responsibility for the daily management of operations. However, it 

has not fully clarified roles and expectations of its service component 

organizations and had not developed a commandwide approach for 

enhancing outreach to other DOD organizations. While USSTRATCOM has 

provided some guidance to its service component organizations, because 

this guidance has not been specific or well documented, the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force do not fully understand their expectations in providing support to

the command. In addition, while USSTRATCOM conducts some outreach 

with other combatant commands and organizations, it lacks a commandwide 

approach to effectively manage outreach activities. GAO has previously 

found that it is essential for organizations to develop a comprehensive 

communication strategy that seeks to engage customers and stakeholders. 

Providing additional guidance and developing a communications strategy

should help USSTRATCOM’s service component organizations to better 

understand their roles and enable the command to build effective 

relationships with other commands. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-847.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

USSTRATCOM Has Made Progress in Implementing New Missions, 

but Efforts Are Incomplete 11 

USSTRATCOM Lacks Specific Service Component Guidance and a 

Commandwide Outreach Strategy 26 

Conclusions 34

Recommendations 35

Matter for Congressional Consideration 37 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38 

Appendix I GAO Analysis of Trends and Changes to the 

United States Strategic Command’s Budget 43 

Appendix II GAO Analysis of Trends in the United States 

Strategic Command Military and Civilian Authorized 

Personnel Level 46 

Appendix III Scope and Methodology 52 

Appendix IV United States Strategic Command Organizations 

and Responsibilities 58 

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 61 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66 

Tables 

Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from 

Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011 10 

Page i GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New 

USSTRATCOM Mission Organizations 20 

Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles 24 

Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM’s New 

Mission Organizations as of February 2006 48 

Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and 

Military Positions in October 2007 50 

Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review 57 

Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities 59 

Figures 

Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization 8

Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM’s Headquarters and 

 Subordinate Mission Organizations 58 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

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Page ii GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 8, 2006 

The Honorable Terry Everett 

Chairman 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

In 2002, following a series of high-level Department of Defense (DOD) 

studies including the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear 

Posture Review, the President and Secretary of Defense called for the 

creation of a new unified command, the United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM),1

 to effectively and efficiently anticipate and counter the 

diverse and increasingly complex global threats the United States faces for 

the foreseeable future. USSTRATCOM was initially assigned responsibility 

for nuclear deterrence, space, and computer network operations. 

The President, in January 2003, expanded USSTRATCOM’s global 

responsibilities and capabilities to include global strike planning and 

execution; integration of global ballistic missile defense; oversight of 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and global command and 

control; and DOD information operations. In January 2005, the Secretary 

of Defense also assigned the command with responsibilities for integrating 

and synchronizing DOD’s efforts in combating weapons of mass 

destruction. Each of USSTRATCOM’s seven missions has a significant role 

in implementing DOD’s New Triad concept for transforming U.S. strategic 

 1

A previous unified command, also called U.S. Strategic Command, had been established in

1992 and had primary responsibility for strategic nuclear forces. The new USSTRATCOM 

was formed from combining the nuclear deterrence mission of the previous command and

the space and computer network operations missions of the also disestablished U.S. Space 

Command. 

Page 1 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
capabilities.2 DOD envisions that the combination of capabilities provided 

by these global missions would potentially add value for the combatant 

commanders in conducting operations in and across regional areas and 

provide the President and Secretary of Defense with an expanded range of 

military options for responding to future threats, including those involving 

weapons of mass destruction. 

The set of diverse global missions assigned to USSTRATCOM span 

multiple levels and lines of authority, cross combatant command regional

boundaries, and intersect with various national and international 

organizations. Under USSTRATCOM’s most recent reorganization, which it

began implementing in late 2004, the command has assigned day-to-day

operations and management responsibility for most of its mission areas to 

five new subordinate organizations.3

 These new organizations are 

geographically dispersed and most are aligned with key DOD agencies or 

military services to provide leadership and access to their competencies, 

such as the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare 

partnering with the National Security Agency. 

USSTRATCOM is attempting to transform its organization to better meet 

the security challenges of the new century and effectively anticipate, 

counter, and eliminate the emergence of unconventional threats overseas 

and at home. In our prior work to identify useful practices and lessons 

learned in implementing successful organizational mergers and 

transformations, we found that in successful transformations, 

organizations undergo a change of their cultures to become more resultsoriented, client- and customer-oriented, and collaborative in nature. Such 

high-performing organizations create a culture that includes moving from 

 2

DOD’s New Triad concept is intended to bring together nuclear and conventional offensive

strike, active and passive defense, enhanced command and control, planning, and 

intelligence capabilities and a revitalized defense infrastructure to provide the President 

and Secretary of Defense with a broad array of military options to better address the

spectrum of potential opponents and contingencies that may arise in the coming decades. 

We issued a report on the New Triad that discusses the progress made by DOD in

determining and allocating resources needed to implement the concept today and in the 

future. See, GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly 

Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, 

GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).

3

The new organizations are the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and 

Global Strike; Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense; Joint 

Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Joint 

Functional Component Command for Network Warfare; and USSTRATCOM Center for

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

Page 2 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
outputs to results; stovepipes to matrixes; hierarchical to flatter and more 

horizontal structures; an inward to an external focus on customers and 

other stakeholders; reactive behavior to proactive approaches; hoarding 

knowledge to sharing knowledge; and protecting “turf” to forming 

partnerships. To successfully transform, an organization must 

fundamentally reexamine its processes, organizational structures, and 

management approaches.

4

At your request, we reviewed the progress made by USSTRATCOM in 

developing and integrating its missions to provide new capabilities and 

expand U.S. options for responding to global threats. Specifically, we 

assessed the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress in 

(1) implementing its new missions and assessing mission results and 

(2) defining organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships 

with other DOD commands and organizations. 

To obtain information on USSTRATCOM’s efforts to implement and assess 

its new missions, define its organization, and establish relationships with 

other organizations, we reviewed USSTRATCOM, DOD, Joint Staff, and 

military service guidance, concepts, directives, briefings, status reports, 

and other pertinent documentation. We observed a major USSTRATCOM 

command exercise, Global Lightning, in November 2005, at the command’s 

headquarters near Omaha, Nebraska; discussed the results with 

participating officials; and reviewed the command’s after-action report and 

associated documentation. We also interviewed USSTRATCOM officials at 

headquarters; subordinate mission organizations; Army, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps service components; and the Navy Fleet Forces Command. 

In addition, we reviewed organizational assessments prepared by think 

tanks, such as LMI Government Consulting and RAND Corporation, and 

discussed the assessments with their staffs to obtain their perspectives on

 4

We have issued several reports addressing best practices followed by federal government 

agencies and private-sector organizations in implementing successful mergers and 

transformations and building high-performance organizations. These reports include GAO,

Highlights of a GAO Forum on High-Performing Organizations: Metrics, Means, and

Mechanisms for Achieving High Performance in the 21st Century Public Management 

Environment, GAO-04-343SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004); Highlights of a GAO 

Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland

Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); 

21st Century Challenges: Transforming Government to Meet Current and Emerging 

Challenges, GAO-05-830T (Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005); and Results-Oriented Cultures: 

Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, 

GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

Page 3 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
USSTRATCOM’s approach for organizing and managing its missions. We 

also obtained and analyzed information on USSTRATCOM’s budget and

authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the resources, 

staff levels, and skills needed to implement the command’s missions (see 

apps. I and II). 

We assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses, and 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We 

conducted our review from May 2005 through June 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix III 

for a more complete description of our scope and methodology. 

USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions but 

additional steps are needed to expand upon this progress in order to 

achieve the vision and goals underlying the command’s establishment. 

To date, the command has made progress in developing concepts of 

operations; establishing plans, guidance, and policy for its missions; and 

obtaining personnel and resources needed to begin operations. For 

example, in implementing its intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance mission, the command has partnered with the Defense 

Intelligence Agency to improve its access and coordination with DOD and 

national intelligence agencies. In addition, to prevent and defend against 

intrusions into DOD’s critical information network systems, the command 

has recently instituted new controls and trained system users to reduce 

system vulnerabilities. However, while the command’s leadership 

recognizes the need to build on its progress to date and has some 

additional actions underway in its seven mission areas, more 

comprehensive plans and actions are needed in several areas to help the

command achieve DOD’s vision. First, while USSTRATCOM has taken 

initial steps to include its newer missions in its training exercises, the 

command has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that 

integrates the exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command’s Joint Warfighting Center, whose mission includes providing 

planning tools and independent observer teams to strengthen exercises. 

Our prior work has shown that robust exercise programs are important for 

assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly when multiple 

organizations are involved in mission execution. Second, USSTRATCOM 

has established specific milestones for its mission areas to achieve full

operating capability but neither the command nor its subordinate mission 

organizations have established clear criteria to use in assessing whether 

mission organizations have reached full operating capability. Third, the 

command has not developed a results-oriented management approach 

with strategic goals and performance measures and criteria for 

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
continuously assessing results across the command and in each of its 

mission areas. Our prior work has shown that organizations undertaking 

complex transformations can increase their likelihood of success by 

adopting a results-oriented management approach to guide and measure 

progress. Developing plans in each of these areas should better position 

the command to meet two of DOD’s major goals for the command—

providing combatant commanders with added value in conducting 

operations and giving the President and the Secretary of Defense an 

expanded set of military options for responding to future threats. 

USSTRATCOM has also made progress in establishing an overall 

organizational framework and identifying subordinate mission 

organizations that have responsibility for daily operations. However, 

opportunities exist to clarify and improve the command’s relationships 

with subordinate organizations and other commands. The command’s new 

organizational framework, while still being implemented, has led to better

identification of resources, staffing, and skills for each of USSTRATCOM’s 

diverse missions. Also, many of the actions the command has taken to 

implement its latest reorganization—such as establishing a matrixed, 

horizontal organizational structure that openly shares information—are 

consistent with transformation approaches that have been used by highperforming organizations. However, moving forward, two areas warrant 

additional attention. Specifically, while USSTRATCOM has provided some 

guidance to its service component organizations, this guidance has not 

been specific or well documented and Army, Air Force, and Navy service

component officials told us that additional guidance is needed to more 

clearly define responsibilities and relationships. In addition, while the 

command conducts some outreach with other combatant commands and 

organizations, USSTRATCOM has not developed a commandwide strategy 

to effectively manage and coordinate its external outreach activities. 

Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of 

commands and organizations in executing its diverse missions, the 

command considers effective relationships and communications essential. 

However, providing coordinated, consistent outreach to other DOD 

organizations, such as combatant commands, has become more difficult 

since USSTRATCOM established separate subordinate organizations for 

several of its missions. Developing additional strategies and plans to 

address these two challenges should help USSTRATCOM’s service 

component organizations better understand their roles and the command 

build more effective relationships with other commands. 

To strengthen USSTRATCOM efforts to implement its missions and 

establish its most recent organizational approach, we are recommending 

Page 5 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
that the Secretary of Defense take seven actions; three actions that are 

designed to improve the command’s access to the services and resources 

that the U.S. Joint Forces Command can provide to support 

USSTRATCOM’s exercise program and four other actions intended to 

(1) clarify guidance on the criteria to be used by USSTRATCOM mission 

organizations in declaring full operating capability, (2) improve evaluation 

of the command’s longer-term progress in its mission areas, (3) provide 

more complete guidance to its service component organizations, and 

(4) strengthen its external communications with other organizations and 

commands. DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, generally 

agreed with our three recommendations regarding U.S. Joint Forces 

Command’s support of USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. DOD disagreed 

with our four other recommendations. In its comments, DOD stated that 

measures are already in place that address the issues raised by the report. 

We disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the 

intent of our recommendations and are complete. While USSTRATCOM 

has taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not believe that the 

command’s actions go far enough in providing a clear and transparent 

process for evaluating the command’s progress in implementing its 

mission areas, provide more complete guidance to its mission and service

component organizations, and strengthen its external communications 

with other organizations and commands. For example, while 

USSTRATCOM organizations routinely conduct outreach activities to 

promote its missions and capabilities, we found that these activities are 

often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to achieve the most 

optimal benefit for the command. USSTRATCOM commander’s summary 

reports prepared after its two most recent Global Lightning exercises in 

2004 and 2005 recommended that the command develop a comprehensive 

outreach strategy to increase understanding among other combatant 

commands about USSTRATCOM’s capabilities. However, command 

officials told us that the command does not have any current plans to 

develop such a strategy. Additionally, because of the importance of the

command’s new role in expanding the military options for addressing 

emerging threats, we continue to believe that creation of a longer-term, 

comprehensive, results-oriented management process is needed that 

would improve transparency and accountability of the extent to which the 

command is achieving the desired outcomes of its overall goals and 

objectives in each of its mission areas. Therefore, we are now suggesting 

that Congress consider requiring the Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command, to develop such a process and report to Congress on 

command’s progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD’s comments are 

reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and our evaluation of its 

comments is on page 38.

Page 6 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
USSTRATCOM’s global missions provide a wide range of capabilities that 

are intended to respond to a dramatically changing security environment 

brought about by emerging global, transregional, and asymmetric threats 

to U.S. national security. Unlike the command’s nuclear deterrence and

space operations missions, the command’s global strike; integrated 

ballistic missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 

information operations; global command and control; and combating 

weapons of mass destruction missions had not been previously assigned to 

a unified command. These newer missions have been performed, mostly 

ad hoc, by multiple DOD organizations and the military services but did 

not have a primary joint sponsor and central focus within DOD. 

Background 

The command’s most recent reorganization, begun in late 2004, shifted the 

day-to-day planning and execution responsibility for most of its missions 

from its headquarters to several new subordinate organizations. 

USSTRATCOM intends that its latest organizational construct will provide 

greater focus, continuity, and performance for its missions and better 

accommodate the execution of the command’s global responsibilities by 

reducing organizational layers and enabling communication and 

information to flow more easily from the most senior levels of leadership

to those producing the information. The command envisions that this new 

organizational construct will reduce the cycle time for reaching and 

implementing decisions for its missions, increase the effectiveness of the 

products and services it provides in support of the regional combatant 

commands, and provide improved access to all of the command’s 

capabilities. USSTRATCOM, for example, has recently established a joint

space operations center, under its Joint Functional Component Command 

for Space and Global Strike, to more effectively respond to requests from 

regional combatant commands for space capabilities. As shown in figure 1, 

the current USSTRATCOM organization is comprised of a command 

headquarters, service component or supporting commands, joint 

functional component commands, centers, and task forces. 

Page 7 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Figure 1: USSTRATCOM Organization 

Tactical

Control Joint Information

Operations Center

U.S. Strategic Command

Headquarters Nuclear Task Forces C2

Air Force Service

Component

Army Service

Component

Navy Supporting

Command

Marine Corps

Service Component

JFCC–Space and

Global Strike

JFCC–Integrated

Missile Defense

JFCC–Intelligence,

Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

JFCC–Network

Warfare

USSTRATCOM

Center for

Combating WMD

Joint Task Force

for Global Network

Operations

Coordination

Source: USSTRATCOM.

Notes: C2= command and control; JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons 

of mass destruction. 

Under the new organization, USSTRATCOM’s headquarters would focus 

primarily on overseeing tasks for command and control; strategic-level 

integration; and advocacy, including developing strategy and plans, 

managing command and control operations and support, and advocating 

for mission capabilities. It also has responsibility for designating 

objectives; assigning missions, tasks, forces, and resources; defining policy 

and concepts; and providing direction to the command’s subordinate 

organizations. Additionally, USSTRATCOM headquarters has 

responsibility for planning and deploying forces for the command’s 

nuclear mission. 

The reorganization created four new joint functional component 

commands for (1) space and global strike; (2) integrated missile defense;

(3) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and (4) network 

warfare. These commands have day-to-day responsibilities for operational 

and tactical-level planning and execution and management of forces. The 

new organization also includes the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Information Operations Center, and 

Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations that work with the 

command, the unified commands, and mission partners to provide 

operational solutions to mission-related problems. 

Page 8 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
The command has also geographically aligned many of its subordinate 

organizations with supporting military services and Defense agencies to 

leverage the expertise and resources in their respective mission areas. For 

example, the command has partnered and co-located its Joint Functional 

Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

with the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., area to take 

advantage of the agency’s capabilities and improve access and 

coordination with DOD and national intelligence agencies. To further 

strengthen the partnership between the organizations, the commander of 

the component command is also the Director of the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. In response to intelligence information requests from the 

combatant commanders, the agency would globally prioritize intelligence 

collection requirements and the joint functional component command 

would then prioritize and task the appropriate intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance assets to best meet those requirements. Appendix IV 

provides additional information about the command’s key mission 

organizations. 

Additionally, the reorganization established new command relationships 

with the military services to better focus service support. USSTRATCOM 

accesses capabilities from each of the services through its three service 

component commands—the Army Forces Strategic Command, Air Force 

Forces Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces Strategic 

Command—and the Commander, U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command. 

Unlike the other services, the Navy Fleet Forces Command is a supporting 

command rather than a designated service component command to 

USSTRATCOM.5

 However, Fleet Forces Command’s overarching 

responsibilities in supporting USSTRATCOM are consistent with those of 

the other service components. Each service command acts as the primary 

focal point for its respective service capabilities and has responsibilities 

for ensuring that forces provided to USSTRATCOM are organized, trained,

and equipped to support the command in carrying out its missions and 

 5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Unified Action Armed Forces, Joint Publication 0-2, defines a

service component command as a command consisting of the service component

commander and all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,

organizations, and installations under the command, including the support forces that have

been assigned to a combatant command. Service component commands report directly to

the Commander, USSTRATCOM. A supporting commander, in the context of a support

command relationship, is a commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains

another commander’s force, and is responsible for providing the assistance required by the

supported commander.

Page 9 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
providing the administrative chain of command and control for its 

respective service forces. 

Because of its expanded set of missions, USSTRATCOM’s budget has 

grown significantly from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in 

then-year dollars in fiscal year 2003 to $500.4 million in fiscal year 2006, 

excluding appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM 

service component commands and other supporting agencies.

6

 The 

command’s annual budget is expected to increase to $551.4 million by 

fiscal year 2011. Table 1 details the command’s historic and projected 

budget by major appropriations account from fiscal years 2003 through 

2011. The command’s budget is comprised mostly of operation and 

maintenance funding, with lesser amounts of research and development 

and procurement funding associated with programs for intelligence, 

information operations, network warfare, command and control, and 

planning systems. Appendix I provides more details about 

USSTRATCOM’s budget. 

Table 1: USSTRATCOM Historical and Projected Budgets from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011 

Total obligation authority in millions of then-year dollars 

Fiscal year

Appropriations

account 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Operation and 

Maintenance $253.2 $353.5 $408.6 $417.3 $438.6 $442.6 $457.9 $467.6 $477.6

Procurement 23.6 44.3 45.0 33.9 31.9 35.3 39.0 34.3 34.9

Research and 

Development 0 8.8 36.2 49.2 51.4 37.6 34.9 38.3 38.9

Total

a

$276.8 $406.6 $489.9 $500.4 $521.9 $515.5 $531.8 $540.2 $551.4

Source: USSTRATCOM. 

Notes: Data for fiscal years 2003 through 2005 are actual command expenditures, data for fiscal year 

2006 are funding distributions, and data for fiscal years 2007 through 2011 are funding projections 

current as of the President’s budget submission for fiscal year 2006. Totals do not include Air Force, 

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps military personnel appropriations and appropriations made to 

USSTRATCOM service components and supporting agencies, because these appropriations are not 

managed by the command in performing its operations. a

Totals may not add due to rounding. 

 6

Appropriations for military personnel and USSTRATCOM service component commands 

and other supporting agencies are not managed by the command in performing its

operations, and are therefore not part of the command’s annual budgets. 

Page 10 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM’s authorized number of military 

and civilian positions7

 has increased by about 300. As of October 2005, the 

command’s overall authorized personnel level was composed of 

2,947 military and civilian positions, of which 91 percent were filled. Of the 

2,947 positions, military positions comprise about 72 percent of the 

positions (2,122), with the Air Force providing the largest number of 

positions (1,256). Civilian positions make up the remaining 28 percent 

(835). The command has begun to fill positions in its new mission 

organizations from within its existing authorized personnel levels by 

transferring positions from its headquarters to the new organizations over 

a 3-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005. The command’s authorized 

personnel levels are made up of a relatively few number of skills, although 

the mix of military skills has changed since 2002. Additional information 

about USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel levels is in appendix II. 

USSTRATCOM has made progress in implementing its new missions and 

has taken a number of positive actions in each of its mission areas to 

prepare or update concepts of operations, plans, guidance, and policy; 

identify resources needed for mission planning and execution; and 

establish an organization to more effectively manage its responsibilities 

and provide the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the 

command’s actions are consistent with the useful practices and lessons 

learned with high-performing organizations undergoing successful 

transformations that we have identified in our past work. However, further 

steps are needed to build on this progress in order to achieve the broad 

goals envisioned by the President and Secretary of Defense in creating the 

command. While the command has taken initial steps to include its new 

missions in its exercise program, USSTRATCOM has not yet fully 

developed a robust exercise program that integrates exercise support 

available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which can provide 

planning, training, and exercise tools. In addition, while USSTRATCOM’s 

leadership has provided general guidance to its mission organizations, it 

has not provided specific information or identified consistent 

requirements for achieving full operating capability and most of the 

command’s new mission organizations have not established clear criteria

for determining when they have reached this milestone. Also, while the 

USSTRATCOM Has 

Made Progress in 

Implementing New 

Missions, but Efforts 

Are Incomplete 

 7

USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel levels are defined as the number of authorized

positions for civilian and uniformed military personnel that are funded by the services and 

assigned to the command. 

Page 11 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
command has adopted some key management principles, the command 

has not yet developed strategic goals and outcome-oriented performance 

measures and criteria for assessing results across the command and in 

each of its mission areas. 

USSTRATCOM Has Made 

Progress in Implementing 

Its New Missions 

Since its establishment, USSTRATCOM has made progress in 

implementing its new missions and has taken a wide range of positive 

actions to integrate these missions into its organization, such as 

developing various plans, concepts, and guidance; establishing procedures 

and processes; identifying personnel and funding resources; developing

new relationships; building communication networks; and providing 

education, training, and exercises. For example, the command has 

prepared concepts of operations for its missions and organization, such as 

operations for network warfare and global integrated missile defense, and

has recently approved a concept of operations describing the processes it 

will use in integrating its diverse capabilities and providing warfighting 

options to regional combatant commands. Additionally, USSTRATCOM 

has taken other actions, including (1) establishing collaboration tools and

processes to improve communication for planning, execution, and 

evaluation among its organizations and customers; (2) creating various 

processes and groups within the command to advocate for the capabilities 

necessary to accomplish its missions, such as advocating for modification 

of the Trident II missile to provide an improved near-term conventional

global strike capability; and (3) upgrading and expanding its facilities, 

such as improvements to the command’s headquarters command center. 

The command has also taken actions to demonstrate the value added of its

missions for other combatant commands and DOD organizations. For 

example, to implement its mission responsibilities for preventing and 

defending against intrusions into DOD’s critical information network 

systems, the command’s Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations 

has recently instituted stringent use controls and trained system users to 

improve security and reduce vulnerabilities for these systems. 

As its missions have matured, USSTRATCOM has also undertaken several 

reorganizations to more effectively manage its responsibilities and provide 

the range of capabilities across its mission areas. Many of the actions the 

command has taken to implement its latest reorganization are consistent 

with the useful practices and lessons learned with high-performing 

organizations undergoing successful transformations that we have 

identified in our prior work, including establishing a matrixed, horizontal 

organizational structure that provides a greater external focus for its 

customers, forms partnerships with key organizations, and openly shares

Page 12 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
information. As discussed earlier, its latest reorganization intends to 

leverage essential competencies of associated components and key 

supporting agencies and decentralize the responsibility of its headquarters 

for the day-to-day planning and execution of its primary mission areas to 

several interdependent mission organizations. While the command’s 

mission organizations differ in the extent of their maturity, USSTRATCOM 

has focused considerable attention over the past year on establishing their 

responsibilities, command and agency relationships, and operational 

competencies, and assigning personnel to these new organizations. Its 

senior leadership has also taken an active and visible role in supporting 

the organizational changes underway. 

USSTRATCOM’s Exercise 

Program Has Not Fully 

Integrated Support 

Available from the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command 

USSTRATCOM has restructured its exercise program to better incorporate 

its missions and has conducted a few training exercises involving all of its 

missions and new organizations. While the command is taking steps to 

address the challenges in more fully including its missions in its exercises, 

it has not yet fully developed a robust exercise program that integrates 

exercise support available from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s 

Joint Warfighting Center, which can provide planning, training, and 

exercise tools.8

USSTRATCOM restructured its exercise program in 2003. It began 

incorporating its newer missions into its exercises beginning in 

November 2004 and brought together all of its missions in the same 

exercise in its two most recent exercises, Global Lightning in 

November 2005, and Global Thunder in April 2006. Global Lightning is an 

annual USSTRATCOM-sponsored command-post exercise, which involves 

the commander and his staff in testing and validating the communications 

within and between headquarters and simulated forces in deterring a 

military attack and employing forces as directed. The annual Global 

Thunder exercise is the command’s main nuclear deterrence field training 

exercise, which uses actual forces in training commanders, staff, and 

individual units at all levels of their warfare skills. Another command-post 

exercise, Global Storm, is designed to cover the command’s missions that 

Exercise Program Must 

Overcome Challenges 

 8

The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center assists the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commanders, and chiefs of the services in their preparation for 

joint warfare both in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and 

future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint exercises and training. It provides 

the core expertise to assist in the planning, execution, and assessment of joint exercises 

and training activities. 

Page 13 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
are most relevant in the early stages of conflict, such as information 

operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 

command plans to conduct this exercise annually depending on 

scheduling and resource considerations. 

The command faces challenges in effectively executing its exercise 

program across its missions and new organizations. However, the 

command is taking some actions to overcome these challenges, and some 

of these challenges should lessen over time as the command’s missions 

and organizations mature. First, many of the command’s operational 

concepts, directives, and instructions used in designing and executing 

exercises have not yet been approved, developed, or revised to reflect its 

new organization. For example, at the time of the November 2005 Global 

Lightning exercise, some USSTRATCOM mission organizations were 

executing their processes and procedures without the benefit of complete 

and approved doctrine because several key concepts of operations for its 

missions, such as the concept of operations for horizontally integrating its 

missions, were still in draft form. According to USSTRATCOM officials, 

the command has to prepare plans for an exercise many months in 

advance even if its doctrine continues to evolve. The officials said that 

USSTRATCOM incorporates any changes to doctrine and guidance as it 

develops its exercise plan, but these changes are more difficult to make as

the plan becomes more complete and the exercise nears. A USSTRATCOM 

official told us that doctrine and guidance should become more stable and

change less frequently as the command’s missions, organization, and 

processes mature. 

Second, several of the command’s new mission organizations are still 

being established, which has affected their ability to fully participate in the 

command’s recent exercises and identify exercise objectives. For example, 

at the time of the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, the new joint

functional component commands had existed for less than 1 year, and the 

Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction had been established 

for only 3 months. According to the Chief of Staff for the intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance component, the component was not able 

to establish full connectivity during the exercise because it was still 

operating out of temporary facilities. Further, the new mission 

organizations were too immature, did not have staff in place, and lacked 

the established processes and procedures needed to plan their own 

objectives for the November 2005 exercise, according to USSTRATCOM 

officials. Instead, the new organizations’ exercise objectives for the 

November 2005 Global Lightning exercise were established by the 

command’s headquarters and linked to a broader set of critical tasks and 

Page 14 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
responsibilities. Moreover, while the command’s Center for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction personnel participated extensively in the 

November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, no specific exercise objectives 

had been developed for the center’s mission area. To begin addressing the 

challenge of increasing involvement of its new organizations in exercise 

development, the command has advocated the establishment of an 

exercise or training group within each of its mission organizations and 

some groups have been created, such as in the space and global strike and 

integrated missile defense components. Additionally, in preparation for 

the next Global Lightning exercise in fall 2006, the mission organizations 

plan to be more involved in preparing exercise objectives for their mission 

areas and intend to send their personnel to training workshops conducted 

by the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to learn how 

to develop these objectives. 

Third, the command has found it difficult to design an exercise that fully 

covers all of its responsibilities because its missions are so diverse and 

their relevancy to the exercise is dependent on the type and stage of a 

particular crisis. USSTRATCOM’s intent is to design its exercises so as to 

integrate the unique and interdependent capabilities of its global missions 

to provide a range of options throughout the various stages of a crisis and 

possible conflict. For example, the command has found that some of its 

missions, such as information operations, quickly become overlooked 

during its exercises as events move from crisis into actual conflict. 

Moreover, the command believes that its exercise program needs to place 

greater emphasis on the early stages of a crisis because much of 

USSTRATCOM’s daily operations are conducted before and just after a 

crisis has begun. To foster greater inclusion of its missions into its 

exercises, the command used a series of brief, scripted training events that 

preceded its first Global Lightning exercise in November 2004 to provide 

opportunities to incorporate some of its missions, particularly intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance. During the November 2005 Global 

Lightning exercise, the command incorporated a timeline that extended

from the early to the later stages of conflict to allow designers to prepare a 

scenario suitable for a more complete range of the command’s missions. 

The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, also has directed that the 

annual Global Thunder exercise and other training events incorporate 

multiple missions to provide additional evaluation opportunities. 

Additionally, the command has designed its Global Storm exercises to 

specifically focus on those missions that are most pertinent before conflict

begins. 

Page 15 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
USSTRATCOM has not fully made use of the exercise support available 

from the U.S. Joint Forces Command. While USSTRATCOM has taken 

steps to obtain greater assistance from the Joint Forces Command’s Joint 

Warfighting Center to help the command address its challenges in 

executing a robust exercise program, the command and the center have 

not reached agreement on the extent of support the center will provide. 

Our past work has shown that robust exercise programs are important for 

assessing and improving mission capabilities, particularly when multiple 

organizations are involved in mission execution.9

 Moreover, DOD’s 

recently issued Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training10

supports an increased training focus for many missions assigned to 

USSTRATCOM, including combating weapons of mass destruction, global 

strike, information operations, and ballistic missile defense. 

Long-term U.S. Joint Forces 

Command Support Not Fully 

Identified 

U.S. Joint Forces Command has lead responsibility for joint force training, 

and is responsible for helping combatant commanders to identify training

requirements and methods, and for assisting them with executing 

exercises and other training events. As part of U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, the Joint Warfighting Center provides support to combatant 

commands in identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for 

planning, implementing, and evaluating exercises. The center trains 

combatant command staff to better design exercise objectives that are 

clearly linked to the command’s essential tasks. It can also send 

independent observer teams to an exercise to assess the command’s 

performance and prepare after-action reports and related assessments. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall

responsibility for ensuring that DOD’s joint training programs and 

resources are sufficient to produce ready forces and overseeing the 

implementation of DOD’s training transformation strategy. 

USSTRATCOM has taken steps to obtain greater assistance from the 

Joint Warfighting Center in recent exercises. The command, for example, 

obtained limited support from the center during its April 2006 Global 

Thunder exercise, including teams to observe the participation and 

 9

For example, GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from 

Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005)

and Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, 

GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001). 

10DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2006). 

Page 16 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
activities of its space and global strike component. However, 

USSTRATCOM’s requirements have not been typically identified far 

enough in advance for the center to assign staff and commit resources in 

providing the full range of requested support. For example, command 

officials told us that USSTRATCOM sought extensive Joint Warfighting 

Center support for the November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, but the 

center had already committed to supporting a U.S. Northern Command 

exercise that was scheduled over the same time period. The center was 

able to provide USSTRATCOM indirect support, such as providing 

simulated video news clippings to add context to the events in the 

exercise scenario, when the command linked its Global Lightning exercise

to the U.S. Northern Command exercise. 

USSTRATCOM’s relationship with the Joint Warfighting Center is still 

developing. In the past, the center had a limited working relationship with 

USSTRATCOM and involvement in its exercises because the command’s 

exercises had been largely focused on its nuclear deterrence mission, 

which limited the involvement of other DOD organizations. As a result, the 

center had not included the level of support for USSTRATCOM’s program 

that it provided to other combatant commands in its past plans. However, 

to provide Joint Warfighting Center observers with access to more areas 

and aspects of its exercises, including activities involving the command’s 

nuclear deterrence mission, USSTRATCOM is changing its security 

procedures to grant center observers temporary clearances during the 

exercises. 

The Joint Warfighting Center’s recent support for USSTRATCOM’s 

exercise program has helped the command to better define its 

requirements for future support, but these requirements continue to 

evolve. USSTRATCOM officials told us that since requirements for future 

support from the center have traditionally been determined from prior 

support experience, the command’s limited relationship with the center in

the past and the recent restructuring of the command’s exercise program 

have not yet provided a basis for determining the support needed from the 

center. The officials said that the specific requirements for the center’s 

assistance would be easier to determine as more exercises with the 

center’s involvement are completed. According to a USSTRATCOM 

official, a key exercise objective in its April 2006 Global Thunder exercise

was to expose center personnel on a limited scale to the command’s 

exercise program. At the same time, the command would gain exposure to

the services provided by the center. A center official told us that this type

of interaction with the center would help USSTRATCOM to better define 

and identify its future requirements for center support. 

Page 17 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Over the long term, USSTRATCOM plans to seek much greater support 

from the center but has not yet fully defined its requirements. While the 

Joint Warfighting Center currently supports only one of USSTRATCOM’s 

exercises each fiscal year, USSTRATCOM officials told us that the center 

has committed to supporting both of its annual Global Lightning and 

Global Thunder exercises for fiscal year 2007, including the use of 

observation teams to help the command evaluate its performance. 

However, as of March 2006, center officials told us it was unclear how the 

center would adjust its current resources to support the November 2006 

Global Lightning exercise because of the timing of that exercise and its 

linkage to a U.S. Pacific Command exercise, for which the center is 

already planning to provide support. In the long term, a center official told 

us that while the center plans to provide greater support to 

USSTRATCOM, the center can better plan and make resources available if 

it is provided with well-defined requirements 3 to 5 years in advance as 

other commands do. As a result, without fully providing the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command with well-defined requirements to plan the necessary 

resources to support USSTRATCOM’s program, USSTRATCOM may not 

be able to receive the supported needed to execute a robust exercise 

program to effectively implement its missions. 

New USSTRATCOM 

Organizations Lack 

Adequate Direction and 

Criteria for Declaring Full 

Operating Capability 

USSTRATCOM had provided overall guidance to each of its subordinate 

organizations for assessing two key milestones–initial operating capability 

and full operating capability–used to implement these organizations. 

However, this guidance does not fully establish clear and well-documented 

objectives, goals, or criteria to use in determining when these milestones 

have been achieved. Our prior work shows that it is important that 

organizations undergoing major transformations provide clear and 

complete guidance to subordinate organizations on the requirements and 

expectations for successful implementation of organizational changes. 

Each of the new subordinate mission organizations has already declared 

initial operating capability—the first milestone in implementing these 

organizations. However, without applying specific criteria, such as the 

extent to which mission organizations are staffed and trained and their 

mission tasks implemented, in determining when full operating capability–

the second milestone–is achieved, the command may not have an accurate

understanding of the extent to which its mission organizations are 

prepared to effectively carry out their missions. 

After its most recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM issued 

implementation directives that provide general guidance for establishing 

each of the five new subordinate organizations. The directives broadly 

Page 18 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
describe the organizations’ responsibilities, authorities, tasks, personnel 

and resources requirements, and schedules for implementation. 

Additionally, the command prepared an implementation plan that 

summarizes the implementation directives and provides additional 

direction for establishing the new subordinate organizations, including 

timelines and implementation tasks. USSTRATCOM also created a 

reorganization management team working group comprised of 

representatives from headquarters and the new organizations to assist 

with and coordinate the reorganization activities. 

USSTRATCOM’s implementation guidance11 calls for each new 

organization to declare initial operating capability and full operating 

capability, which are key milestones used to indicate the organization’s 

progress in implementing plans, procedures, and structures and achieving

the readiness required to perform its missions. In addition, the guidance

provides some general criteria to follow before declaring initial operating

capability or full operating capability. For example, the guidance requires 

that prior to the initial operating capability milestone, each new 

organization would develop a mission statement; a detailed concept of 

operations for the organization to manage and execute its assigned forces

and missions, including personnel requirements; and a task hand-over plan 

for the transfer of functions from headquarters. The guidance also requires 

formal updates on the new organizations’ progress toward achieving the 

milestones during quarterly command conferences. 

Table 2 shows that each of the new organizations stated that it had 

achieved initial operating capability in 2005. The Joint Functional 

Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense achieved full 

operating capability in February 2006 and the other four organizations 

plan to reach this milestone between September 2006 and January 2007.

 11Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction was

established in August 2005, after the initial implementation guidance was issued, the center 

followed the same implementation process as the other four new organizations. 

Page 19 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Table 2: Key Dates for Establishing and Implementing New USSTRATCOM Mission Organizations

USSTRATCOM organization Date established

Date initial operating

capability achieved 

Date full operating 

capability planned or 

achieved

JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense January 2005 April 2005 February 2006

JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance

January 2005 May 2005 September 2006

JFCC-Space and Global Strike January 2005 November 2005 December 2006

JFCC-Network Warfare January 2005 September 2005 January 2007

USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction 

August 2005 December 2005 December 2006

Source: USSTRATCOM. 

Notes: Dates as of June 2006. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command. 

While the implementation guidance provides general criteria for achieving

initial and full operating capability, it lacks clarity and specificity for 

reaching these milestones. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has 

delegated authority for establishing the new mission organizations and 

decisions for declaring initial and full operating capability to the senior 

leaders of these organizations. Headquarters representatives of the 

reorganization management team told us that a good deal of subjectivity is 

involved in deciding when each milestone has been achieved. In addition, 

we found that the commander or director of each new organization has 

interpreted the milestones differently when developing the organization’s 

approach and assessment criteria for achieving the milestones. For 

example, the criteria used by each organization to determine initial 

operating capability last year varied greatly among the organizations: 

• The commander of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

component declared reaching the milestone based on such factors as the 

component having its deputy commander in place, establishing the 

component’s online Web portal that facilitates external communication 

across various classified links, and beginning its intelligence campaign 

planning support for three regional combatant commands. 

• The commander of the integrated missile defense component declared 

reaching the milestone based on completing preparation of several 

documents, for example, ballistic missile defense emergency activation 

plans and a supporting plan for one of the command’s contingency plans; 

undertaking the process of making operational several required functions, 

such as ballistic missile defense situational awareness and operational 

Page 20 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
oversight of the ballistic missile defense command and control system; 

and assuming responsibility for performing most of its directed tasks. 

• The acting deputy commander of the network warfare component told us 

the component declared initial operating capability on the basis that its 

mission responsibilities were already being performed by a predecessor 

organization that became the new component. 

• Space and global strike component officials told us that the component 

based its initial operating capability decision largely on the results of its 

performance in events before and during USSTRATCOM’s November 2005 

Global Lightning exercise. However, the component did not publish and 

make available the criteria that would be used to evaluate the component’s

performance during the exercise, according to the component’s chief of 

staff. 

Similarly, the objectives, goals, and criteria that would be used for 

determining full operating capability vary among the organizations. 

According to network warfare component officials, the component plans 

to base its full operating capability decision on 8 to 10 items that were 

explained during a briefing to USSTRATCOM officials in early 2005, which 

include the component having adequate staffing and funding; its tactics, 

techniques, and procedures guidance approved; and its functions, tasks, 

and authorities clearly defined. The chief of staff for the space and global 

strike component told us that the component has considerable criteria for 

evaluating full operating capability. For example, several concepts of 

operations related to the component’s mission areas contain tasks that the 

component needs to perform. Other criteria include such goals as setting 

up a training program for new staff and developing a visual information 

panel in its command center. However, the official said that the 

component has not clearly assembled all of its criteria to make them 

readily accessible to those outside the component. The integrated missile 

defense component, which declared full operating capability in 

February 2006, used criteria that included the component’s assuming 

responsibilities and tasks delineated in the USSTRATCOM implementation 

directive, completing facility construction, getting staff trained and 

certified, developing approved joint mission essential tasks, and initiating 

reporting of operational readiness. The component considered its full 

participation in USSTRATCOM’s November 2005 Global Lightning exercise 

and the incorporation of the lessons learned from the exercise into its 

participation in a subsequent U.S. Pacific Command exercise as critical 

factors for declaring full operating capability. 

Page 21 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Additionally, although the target dates for declaring full operating 

capability are soon approaching, some of the new organizations have not

fully developed the criteria that will be used to assess their milestone 

decisions. Although the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of

Mass Destruction plans to achieve the milestone in December 2006, center 

officials told us in February 2006 that the center is still deciding how to 

define full operating capability. Similarly, the deputy commander for the 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance component told us in 

April 2006 that the component, which plans to reach the milestone in 

September 2006, has not fully decided on the criteria it would use because 

the selection of criteria has not been a high priority among the 

component’s implementation activities. However, the official told us that 

the component needs to have its criteria approved about 3 months before 

it decides to declare its milestone achieved. 

USSTRATCOM has adopted some key management practices, but the 

command has not yet fully developed a results-oriented management 

approach for continuously assessing and benchmarking its performance in 

achieving desired outcomes and for identifying actions to improve 

performance. Our prior work and the work of others show that 

organizations undertaking complex transformations can increase their 

likelihood of success by adopting a results-oriented management 

framework, which includes key management practices and resultsoriented management tools to guide implementation efforts and progress 

toward achieving desired outcomes.12 These tools and practices include 

establishing long-term goals and objectives and performance measures 

and criteria for assessing results and value added; strong and inspirational 

leadership to set the direction, pace, and tone and provide a clear, 

consistent rationale for implementing the framework; and timelines to 

achieve results. While USSTRATCOM uses different techniques to review 

its progress in implementing its missions and responsibilities, these 

techniques do not provide the range of quantifiable metrics and criteria 

needed to fully assess the command’s progress toward achieving its goals 

and objectives and value added. 

The command’s senior leadership has taken an active role in articulating

and supporting the command’s transformation, a factor that we have 

USSTRATCOM Has Not 

Fully Implemented a 

Results-oriented 

Management Approach for 

Evaluating its Performance 

 12See GAO, Defense Management: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to 

Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts, GAO-06-232 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2006).

Page 22 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
identified in prior work as critical to success. The Commander, U.S. 

Strategic Command, has addressed a variety of audiences to discuss the 

need for changing the way the command is organized in order to be more 

effective, and has described the needs and reasons for change in command 

concepts of operations and guidance. USSTRATCOM has also prepared 

guidance that assigns responsibility and describes the processes for 

implementing and integrating its missions. For example, to support its 

most recent reorganization, the command has prepared a draft integrating 

guidance document intended to provide a consolidated, objective 

framework describing how the command is organized, as well as its 

responsibilities, relationships, and processes. It also has issued a more 

detailed horizontal command-and-control integration concept of 

operations to identify how it brings together all of its missions and 

capabilities to support national objectives. Our prior work has shown that 

successfully transforming organizations have leaders who define and 

articulate a compelling reason for change; set the direction, pace, and tone

for transformation; and assign accountability for results.13

The command has also created a collection of first principles to better 

align the command with national defense priorities, focus its efforts for 

integrating and synchronizing its missions, and provide advocacy for its 

missions as they mature. Table 3 provides USSTRATCOM’s nine 

principles, which include establishing a globally focused organization built 

to collaborate with all elements of national power; establishing 

operationally interdependent components; and embracing effects-based 

operations. The command also identified areas of emphasis that contain

several key objectives for mission support, such as (1) for combating 

weapons of mass destruction, integrate and enable capabilities across the 

DOD enterprise; (2) in organizing for the global fight, embrace horizontal 

integration; and (3) for global force management, optimize the 

employment of low-density and high-demand intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance systems. 

 13GAO-06-232. 

Page 23 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Table 3: USSTRATCOM First Principles 

Principle 

1. Establish a globally focused organization built to collaborate with all elements of national power. 

2. Focus USSTRATCOM headquarters on strategic-level command and control, integration, and advocacy.

3. Conduct decentralized operational/tactical-level planning and execution through USSTRATCOM components. 

4. Establish operationally interdependent components. 

5. Exploit mission-area-unique competencies in other organizations. 

6. Expand partnerships across departments, academia, industry, and allies. 

7. Create a USSTRATCOM web of global capabilities with multiple entry points.

8. Leverage the full capabilities of a global command, control, communications, and computer architecture. 

9. Embrace effects-based operations. 

Source: USSTRATCOM. 

However, USSTRATCOM has not yet developed clear, well-defined, 

outcome-based goals and measures to indicate how the command will 

measure success, track the progress it is making toward its goals, and give

its leaders critical information on which to base decisions for improving 

the command’s implementation efforts. While the command’s first 

principles and areas of emphasis provide direction for better focusing its 

implementation efforts, these principles are process-oriented, tactical 

goals, rather than long-term, results-oriented strategic goals and objectives

that can provide the basis for determining the command’s performance 

and progress. 

Our prior work has shown that long-term strategic goals and objectives are 

important for an organization to explain the results it expects, what it 

intends to accomplish, and how these goals would be assessed. Outcomebased performance measures should be objective and results oriented 

with specific target levels to meet performance goals. Measuring 

performance allows organizations to track progress toward goals and 

provides crucial information on which to base organizational and 

management decisions.14

The command has adopted some processes and metrics to monitor its 

performance and provide information on its progress in implementing its 

missions; however, these processes and metrics are largely subjective and 

 14GAO-06-232. 

Page 24 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
do not provide the command with the full range of both quantitative and

qualitative outcome-based performance measures it needs to fully assess 

progress in achieving its goals. Organizations use evaluation and 

corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to 

improve performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those 

goals that were not met. In contrast, USSTRATCOM’s current processes 

result in largely subjective assessments and are intended to support more 

limited purposes. For example, according to an official responsible for 

coordinating the command’s readiness reporting, the command has 

adapted its readiness reporting process to include inputs from each of the 

command’s mission organizations and service components. The official

said that this process gives the USSTRATCOM commander access to a 

broad perspective on the command’s overall readiness. However, the

readiness reports resulting from the process discuss the commander’s 

subjective assessment of USSTRATCOM’s ability to execute its missions, 

based on short-term internal and external factors affecting the command’s 

operations. Similarly, the command’s annual training assessments are 

subjective evaluations, based on observations of prior training, exercises,

real-world operations, and other factors, which are used to set priorities 

for future training priorities. 

USSTRATCOM senior officials told us that the command has not yet 

established strategic goals and outcome-based performance metrics to 

fully assess the command’s progress because the command is still sorting 

out the implementation of its new organizational construct. Although 

command officials stated they believe such metrics are needed and the 

command should begin to develop them, they have not yet developed a 

process or assigned responsibility for developing metrics. While the 

development of such metrics will present a significant challenge due to the 

complex nature of the command’s missions, such an effort is needed so 

that the command can assess its progress and identify areas that need

further improvement. For example USSTRATCOM officials believe they 

can and should develop metrics to assess the extent to which they are 

efficiently allocating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

systems to optimize the use of high-demand aircraft. Without developing 

strategic goals and the full range of outcome-based performance 

measures, the command will lack a process to evaluate its performance, 

identify areas that may need improvement, and take corrective actions. 

Page 25 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
USSTRATCOM has not clarified the roles and responsibilities of its service 

component organizations and lacks a commandwide outreach strategy for 

enhancing its relations with other DOD organizations. Since its most 

recent reorganization, USSTRATCOM has provided some guidance to its 

service component commands. However, the command’s guidance is not 

always specific and service officials believe that additional guidance from 

USSTRATCOM would help to more clearly define their responsibilities, 

expectations, and relationships with the command, particularly with its 

new mission organizations. In addition, USSTRATCOM lacks a 

commandwide strategy to effectively manage and coordinate its external 

outreach activities with the large number of commands and organizations 

it interacts with in executing its diverse missions. Without clear service 

component guidance and a comprehensive communications strategy, 

USSTRATCOM’s service components will not have complete information 

on the command’s expectations for their support and the command may

not have the most effective approach for building relationships, promoting 

its capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other 

combatant commands and organizations. 

While USSTRATCOM has provided broad guidance to its service 

components, Army, Navy, and Air Force component officials told us they 

lack specific guidance that clarifies and provides more detailed 

information on their responsibilities, requirements, expectations, and 

relationships with the command and, particularly, its newer mission 

organizations. Our prior work has shown that it is important for 

organizations undergoing significant change to provide clear and complete 

guidance to their subordinate organizations. Without clearly defined, 

specific guidance, it can be difficult for the service components to 

effectively organize, plan, and identify resources to provide the expected 

support. Moreover, the lack of this guidance can also limit the 

understanding that USSTRATCOM’s headquarters and its organizations 

have about the components’ organizations, organizational relationships, 

and range of support they provide. 

USSTRATCOM Lacks 

Specific Service 

Component Guidance 

and a Commandwide 

Outreach Strategy 

USSTRATCOM’s Guidance 

to Its Service Components 

Is Not Specific 

USSTRATCOM has provided guidance to its service components in its 

concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other documents and through 

meetings and other activities between command and service component 

staffs, such as conferences, videoconferences, and command exercises. 

Guidance and expectations have also been provided during routine and 

Page 26 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
crisis-oriented collaborative planning15 activities among the command’s 

organizations and service components. However, USSTRATCOM Army 

component officials told us that much of the command’s overall guidance,

such as USSTRATCOM’s standing operational order for its global strike 

mission and its overarching concept of operations, is too general and often 

does not provide enough specific information for the service components 

to fully understand the command’s requirements and expectations. 

Our review of USSTRATCOM guidance found that key guidance lists the 

overarching responsibilities for the command’s service components, such 

as providing support for the command’s operations and planning and 

advocacy activities. Some mission-specific guidance, such as the concept 

of operations for the space and global strike missions, provides additional 

responsibilities for each of the components that relate to a specific 

mission area or organization. In particular, this concept of operations 

assigns the Air Force service component responsibility for establishing an 

operations center for global strike planning and execution, and for 

performing day-to-day command and control of space forces assigned to 

the command. In contrast, much of the remaining guidance we reviewed 

provided few specific details on what is expected or required to carry out 

the components’ responsibilities, such as the type of military personnel 

skills, planning systems, or secure communications lines that are needed 

to effectively support the command. 

Additionally, several guidance documents we reviewed that contain 

references to the services are still in draft, such as the command’s 

integrating guidance, or need revision as a result of the command’s recent 

reorganization. For example, in 2004 the command drafted a concept for 

integrating its missions that included detailed annexes describing the how 

the command’s service components were to monitor global events 

affecting U.S. interests; analyze, evaluate, and communicate information; 

predict likely consequences of military operations on U.S. and adversary 

forces; and plan and execute operations in support of each of the 

command’s mission areas. However, according to a USSTRATCOM official 

the command leadership decided not to include specific expectations for 

its service components following the decision to reorganize the command 

and establish the joint functional component commands in late 2004. As a 

 15The use of collaborative planning intends to create an environment that allows 

commanders to share planning data and generate integrated lists of courses of action in 

greatly compressed time frames, making options and recommendations readily available to 

the Secretary of Defense and the President. 

Page 27 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
result, the command’s most recently drafted guidance does not yet 

completely reflect service responsibilities and expectations and unique 

support that may be required to support USSTRATCOM’s new 

organization. According to USSTRATCOM officials, the command does not 

plan to provide additional formal guidance to its service component 

organizations at this time. 

The relationships between the command’s service components and new 

subordinate mission organizations are still evolving. Army component 

officials told us that USSTRATCOM’s new mission organizations have not

yet developed a full understanding of the Army service component’s 

responsibilities, and as a result, USSTRATCOM’s expectations may not be 

consistent with the support that can be provided by the Army. For 

example, the acting chief of staff for USSTRATCOM’s Army service 

component told us that according to the Joint Staff’s Unified Action 

Armed Forces policy publication,16 which clarifies all command 

relationships and other authorities, the Army’s service component has 

responsibility for providing Army personnel with training in servicerelated tasks. The official told us the USSTRATCOM command assumed 

that training in the use of joint systems, such as secure communications 

lines operated by the USSTRATCOM command for integrated missile 

defense, would be done by the service component. However, the 

respective USSTRATCOM command is responsible for providing any joint

training to service personnel. The official said the Army could provide this

training if USSTRATCOM defined this requirement in its guidance. 

Army component officials also told us that the Army can better respond to 

USSTRATCOM requirements when expectations are more clearly 

described in guidance and related documents. For example, 

USSTRATCOM cited a requirement in its draft concept of operations for a 

small Army detachment to be assigned to USSTRATCOM’s intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance command. The Army provided this type 

of detachment based on that requirement. Similarly, the head of the 

Eighth Air Force’s air operations center, which is part of the 

USSTRATCOM Air Force service component, told us that the component 

has clear guidance about its responsibilities to provide direct support to 

USSTRATCOM’s space and global strike command, and therefore, has a 

clear understanding of what is required to support the component. The 

 16Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 

(Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2001). 

Page 28 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
space and global strike command has provided information on the direct

support expected from the Air Force in its concept of operations. 

However, the official said the requirements and expectations for 

supporting other USSTRATCOM mission organizations, such as the Joint 

Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance and Network Warfare, are not as clearly known because 

USSTRATCOM has not yet provided guidance on the required Air Force 

support for those organizations. 

According to Navy Fleet Forces Command officials, USSTRATCOM has 

not provided clear and specific guidance on the command’s 

responsibilities and expectations, despite its unique relationship to 

USSTRATCOM. Officials of the Navy Fleet Forces Command told us that

the Fleet Forces Command has a unique relationship to USSTRATCOM 

because it is a supporting command and not a traditional service 

component. The officials said their command is not formally assigned to 

and under USSTRATCOM’s operational chain of command, but rather 

their command provides advice to USSSTRATCOM on the best use of 

Navy forces and capabilities in support of its missions. The officials said 

that clear and specific guidance is necessary to provide an understanding 

of their command’s unique relationship to USSTRATCOM headquarters 

and organizations. In March 2006, USSTRATCOM, in consultation with the 

Fleet Forces Command, did issue a command instruction that clarifies the

Fleet Forces Command’s relationship with USSTRATCOM and its 

responsibilities, which include taking part in the command’s collaborative 

planning processes, participating in its exercise program, and helping 

USSTRATCOM prepare its readiness review reports. However, while this 

document helps to clarify the Navy component’s support responsibilities, 

it neither sets priorities for the Fleet Forces Command nor includes 

mission-specific requirements. 

According to service officials, USSTRATCOM’s unique organization, 

complex planning processes, and global focus are very different than more 

traditionally organized combatant commands that have clearly defined

geographic areas of responsibility. In contrast to more traditional regional 

combatant commands, USSTRATCOM has constructed a collaborative 

planning process, which is globally focused, and involves a much broader 

range of military capabilities. As this planning process continues to evolve,

the role and involvement of the service components will change. For 

example, the director of the Army component’s planning and exercise 

group told us that USSTRATCOM’s new mission organizations have not 

always provided well-documented requirements for certain Army 

capabilities, which has delayed the Army component’s ability to provide 

Page 29 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
the needed capabilities to these organizations. The official told us that in 

the summer of 2005 the Army component had difficulty in both staffing its 

office and initially providing information operations capabilities to support 

command missions because USSTRATCOM had not documented the Army 

requirements for these capabilities. The Army official said that although 

the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has been satisfied with the 

Army’s support for this mission area, greater clarity about 

USSTRATCOM’s expectations would have helped the Army component to 

better identify its authorized personnel requirements and ensure that the 

required Army capabilities were more quickly available. 

Unlike the other service components, however, the Marine Corps Forces 

component is satisfied with the guidance that has been provided, 

according to a Marine Corps component official. The official said the 

component does not need additional guidance at this time because the 

component has a more limited role and fewer responsibilities than the 

other services in supporting USSTRATCOM and its organizations. The 

official said that the Marine Corps’ component of about 20 people largely 

serves as a conduit to USSTRATCOM to ensure Marine Corps 

representation and provide inputs, when needed, on command issues. 

USSTRATCOM Lacks a 

Coordinated, External 

Outreach Strategy 

While USSTRATCOM routinely conducts outreach with other combatant 

commands and organizations, it lacks a common approach across the 

command because it has not developed a comprehensive, commandwide 

outreach strategy to effectively manage these activities. Without an 

outreach strategy, the command and its organizations do not have a 

consistent, coordinated approach to use in developing and expanding 

relationships, educating other organizations on the command’s 

capabilities, and providing the most effective level of support to other 

commands and organizations. 

In our prior work17 in identifying key practices adopted by organizations 

undergoing successful transformations, we found that it is essential for 

organizations to adopt a comprehensive communication strategy that 

reaches out to customers and stakeholders and seeks to genuinely engage

them in the organization’s transformation. In particular, successfully 

transformed organizations have found that by communicating information 

early and often, organizations are able to build trust and increase 

 17GAO-03-669. 

Page 30 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
understanding among their stakeholders about the purpose of planned 

changes. Organizations use these communication strategies to provide a 

common framework for conducting consistent and coordinated outreach

throughout their organizations by clearly presenting the organization’s 

rationale, specific objectives, and desired outcomes of outreach efforts. 

These strategies also cover the range of integrated information activities to 

be implemented and clearly articulate how all the various components of 

the strategy will be coordinated and managed in order to achieve the 

objectives most efficiently and effectively. Additionally, outreach 

strategies provide measurable criteria against which to evaluate the 

outcomes of organizations’ outreach efforts and determine whether any

adjustments are necessary. 

Because USSTRATCOM supports or is supported by a large number of 

commands and organizations in executing its diverse set of global 

missions, the command considers its external outreach efforts essential to 

(1) develop effective relationships and communications, (2) promote and 

educate others about the value of its missions and capabilities, and 

(3) obtain information on how the command can best support other 

organizations. USSTRATCOM and its organizations regularly use a wide 

range of methods and activities to promote its missions and capabilities to 

combatant commands, military services, and DOD and other government 

organizations. These methods and activities include conferences and 

symposia, exercises and training events, senior leadership visits, exchange 

of liaison staff, routine meetings, and voice and electronic communication. 

The command has also established a strategic knowledge integration Web 

site, which is called SKIWeb, on DOD’s classified computer network to 

provide information about the command and the status of its activities and 

allow open exchange among its staff and other individuals with access to 

the network. 

Command Considers External 

Outreach Essential 

While USSTRATCOM officials told us that USSTRATCOM has developed

good working relationships with other combatant commands and 

organizations across DOD since its establishment in 2002, they believe that

the command’s missions, capabilities, and authorities are not yet fully 

understood by others. The USSTRATCOM commander’s summary report 

for its November 2005 Global Lightning exercise states that while the 

command has expended a great amount of effort in developing processes 

and strategies to integrate the command’s missions, the organizations it 

supports, particularly other combatant commands, have a vague 

understanding of the “value added” by USSTRATCOM capabilities. The 

report states that USSTRATCOM’s ability to provide capabilities and 

influence global events are not clearly understood, nor do some other 

Page 31 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
commands’ headquarters completely understand how to access that 

capability. For example, in observing the Global Lightning exercise, 

U.S. Central Command and other participants told us that they were 

unsure of value added by USSTRATCOM in planning for global strike 

operations in their theater. However, USSTRATCOM officials said 

USSTRATCOM brings the full range of capability options into global strike 

planning, particularly nonkinetic capability options18 such as computer 

network operations; other commands are just beginning to see the 

potential value of these options. 

Additionally, USSTRATCOM has also had to change the perceptions held 

by other organizations that the command is responsible only for nuclear 

deterrence, which was the case with the previous U.S. Strategic Command, 

but has other essential missions that are global in scope and span all levels 

of military operations. While some missions, such as nuclear deterrence 

and military space, are well practiced and have established histories and 

interactions with outside organizations, others, such as its combating 

weapons of mass destruction and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance missions, are less mature and still evolving. Further, many 

of USSTRATCOM authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities are still 

being refined, clarified, and demonstrated to other organizations in 

exercises and training events and in real-time military activities. For 

example, the deputy commander of USSTRATCOM’s intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance command told us that USSTRATCOM’s 

evolving role in providing support for decisions on allocating intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance assets is not yet clear to all of the 

regional combatant commands. The official said that some combatant 

commands have concerns about how USSTRATCOM responsibilities could 

affect their ability to exercise operational and tactical control over any 

assets assigned to their commands. According to the official, these 

commands do not yet understand that USSTRATCOM’s role is to provide 

overall management for these assets rather than control their operational 

use. 

Moreover, DOD commands and organizations are still getting acquainted 

with USSTRATCOM’s new organizational construct, particularly the new 

subordinate organizations that are responsible for the day-to-day 

 18Nonkinetic capabilities are those capabilities that produce effects without the direct use 

of the force or energy of moving objects, including such means as information operations, 

electromagnetic radiation, and directed energy. 

Page 32 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
management of several command missions. The command’s new 

organization does not follow the headquarters-centric model, in which 

information flows vertically, that is used by other combatant commands. 

According to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, horizontal flows 

of information and command and control run counter to traditional 

military thinking, which prefers a vertical chain of command. While the 

new organizational structure has the potential to greatly expand the 

command’s opportunities to conduct external outreach, relationships and 

communication links are still being developed or reestablished with other 

organizations. 

Each of the command’s organizations conduct numerous outreach 

activities daily, but these efforts are often not well coordinated and 

consistently conducted to achieve the most optimal benefit for the 

command. We also found that USSTRATCOM does not have an approach 

for comprehensively collecting information on the needs and priorities of 

the combatant commands and other stakeholders who use its capabilities, 

information which USSTRATCOM could then use to determine how it can 

provide the most effective level of support. 

Outreach Efforts Lack 

Common Approach 

USSTRATCOM has recognized the need to develop a comprehensive 

outreach strategy to increase understanding among other combatant 

commands about the specific capabilities and contributions that the 

command can provide to their operations. Both of the command’s 

summary reports for its October 2004 and November 2005 Global 

Lightning exercises recommended development of an outreach strategy 

for identifying USSTRATCOM capabilities for the benefit of combatant 

commands and stakeholders. The November 2005 report recommended 

that the strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting 

effective outreach and education of the command’s capabilities. The 

report also recommended (1) improving the command’s SKIWeb Web site

to allow outside users to more easily identify capabilities, (2) providing 

briefings and seminar support to the Defense and interagency community, 

and (3) developing outreach products to provide key information about 

the command. The report states that much of the understanding and 

credibility of the command can be achieved though an effective outreach 

plan that is focused at other commands, at the interagency level, and with 

the services to demonstrate and provide understanding about its global 

support capabilities. USSTRATCOM headquarters officials told us that the 

command does not have any current plans to develop an outreach strategy

as recommended in each of the two exercise reports. 

Page 33 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
To provide the most effective level of support to other combatant 

commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command recently developed an approach 

that could serve as a best practice in identifying the priorities of the 

commands it supports for inclusion in an external outreach strategy. 

Under U.S. Joint Forces Command’s approach, the command asks each of

the other combatant commands to provide a list of its top priorities for the 

type and level of support needed from the command in the coming year. 

These lists are incorporated into the command’s annual plans and are used 

to make adjustments in its activities and resources to best meet the needs 

of its customers. During the year, the command schedules periodic 

updates with staffs of the other commands to determine to what extent the 

command is addressing these priorities or whether the priorities have 

changed. A USSTRATCOM headquarters official responsible for 

coordinating the command’s priorities with the U.S. Joint Forces 

Command told us that approach has been helpful for USSTRATCOM in 

communicating the command’s priorities for support. The official said that 

USSTRATCOM added to the effectiveness of the approach by preparing a 

detailed matrix that identified and ranked the command’s priorities and 

provided contact information for command staff. 

USSTRATCOM has been assigned a new role in providing the President 

and the Secretary of Defense with an expanded set of military options to 

more effectively respond to emerging global, transregional, and 

asymmetric threats to U.S. national security, including those involving 

weapons of mass destruction. While the command has made progress in 

implementing its global missions, its ability to strengthen implementation 

efforts and ensure that its leadership has critical information on the 

effectiveness of its missions and organizations will continue to be limited 

until it identifies long-term support requirements for its exercise program; 

establishes clear, consistent criteria for assessing the establishment of its 

newest mission organizations; and fully implements a results-oriented 

approach for evaluating its progress. The U.S. Joint Forces Command 

offers a range of capabilities and resources for supporting command 

exercises. Until it clearly identifies the long-term support it requires from 

the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Forces Command 

incorporates these requirements into its plans, USSTRATCOM will 

continue to lack a robust exercise program, which is essential for 

evaluating its capabilities and identifying areas in need of improvement. 

Additionally, absent clear, consistent guidance from the command, four 

new mission organizations that have not yet achieved full operating 

capability are establishing their own criteria for this milestone, which 

results in different understandings of what it means to reach this 

Conclusions 

Page 34 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
milestone and how it would be evaluated. Without establishing clear, 

consistent criteria at major points in implementation, the command cannot 

create a foundation on which to assess and measure the success of these 

organizations even after full operating capability has been declared. 

Further, while the command has adopted some elements of a resultsoriented management approach, without a process that includes criteria 

and benchmarks for measuring the progress toward mission goals at all 

levels of its organization, the command will be limited in its ability to 

adjust to the many uncertainties surrounding its mission areas, measure 

the success of its efforts, and target shortfalls and gaps and suggest 

corrective actions, including any needed adjustments to future goals and 

milestones. 

Similarly, without complete and clearly articulated expectations and 

requirements, the service components will not have the information 

needed to fully determine the personnel, resources, and capabilities 

required to support the command and respond to its requests and tasks in 

a timely way. In addition, in the absence of a commandwide 

communications strategy to conduct consistent, coordinated outreach to 

other commands and organizations, USSTRATCOM cannot effectively 

develop and expand relationships, foster education about its capabilities, 

and provide the most effective level of support to other commands and 

organizations. Lastly, without incorporating into its external outreach 

strategy a systematic tool to help identify the priorities of the combatant 

commands and organization it supports—similar to one used by the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command—USSTRATCOM is limited in its ability to 

fully address the priorities for support of the other commands and 

organizations, improve feedback, and identify resources needed to 

respond to these priorities. 

To better determine and obtain the assistance that can be provided by the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center in supporting 

USSTRATCOM’s exercise program, we recommend the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to fully identify 

and request in a timely manner the long-term services and resources 

required from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center

to support the command’s program and to reach agreement with the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command on the support to be provided. We further 

recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, (1) in the near term, to make any possible adjustments among 

the Joint Warfighting Center’s current resources to more fully support 

Recommendations 

Page 35 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
USSTRATCOM’s exercise program; and (2) in the long term, incorporate 

USSTRATCOM requirements for support in the center’s plans to provide 

the full range of assistance necessary to help USSTRATCOM execute a 

robust exercise program. 

To strengthen USSTRATCOM’s efforts to implement its missions and 

provide greater visibility of its progress, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to take the 

following four actions: 

• Provide clear and complete guidance to the Joint Functional Component 

Commands for Space and Global Strike, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance, and Network Warfare, and the USSTRATCOM Center for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction that clearly defines full 

operating capability and provides specific, common criteria for 

determining what is required and how it will be assessed. This guidance 

should be developed, in consultation with these organizations, before each 

organization declares full operating capability. 

• Develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management process for 

continuously assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress 

in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to 

enhance the command’s efforts to implement and integrate its missions. 

Develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate 

performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down 

through the command; assign clear leadership with accountability and 

authority to implement and sustain the process; and develop and ensure 

that goals and objectives are clear and achievable and timelines are 

established. Set a specific time frame for completing development of this 

process. 

• Provide additional guidance to the command’s service components that 

clearly defines and provides more specific information about their 

responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and expectations for 

supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate mission 

organizations. Set a specific time frame for approval of this guidance. 

• Develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to 

guide and coordinate USSTRATCOM’s efforts to conduct outreach with 

other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations to 

develop effective relationships and communications, promote and educate 

others about the value of its mission and capabilities, and obtain 

information on how the command can best support other commands and 

organizations. This strategy should include the command’s rationale, 

Page 36 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
specific objectives, desired outcomes, and strategies for conducting 

outreach with other commands and organizations, and criteria against 

which the command can evaluate the success of its efforts. 

Given the importance of the new role assigned to USSTRATCOM by the 

President and the Secretary of Defense to provide an expanded set of 

military options to more effectively respond to emerging threats to 

U.S. national security, Congress should consider requiring the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop a longer-term, 

comprehensive and transparent, results-oriented management process for 

continuously assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress 

in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to 

enhance the command’s efforts to effectively carry out its missions, as 

outlined in our recommendation to DOD. In developing this process, the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

• develop and ensure that long-term goals and objectives are clear and 

achievable and milestones and timelines for achieving desired outcomes 

are established; 

• develop or refine performance measures that clearly demonstrate 

performance results and ensure that those measures cascade down 

through the command; and 

• assign clear leadership with accountability and authority to implement and 

sustain the process. 

The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, should set a specific time 

frame for developing and implementing this process. Additionally, the 

Commander should periodically report to Congress on the command’s 

progress in achieving desired outcomes. 

Page 37 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 

provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD generally agreed 

with our three recommendations regarding U.S. Joint Forces Command’s 

support of USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. DOD did not agree with our 

other four recommendations that USSTRATCOM provide clear and 

complete guidance to its joint functional component commands on 

achieving full operating capability; develop a comprehensive resultsoriented management process to assess and benchmark the command’s 

overall progress; provide additional guidance to its service components; 

and develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy. 

In regard to these four recommendations, DOD commented that measures 

are already in place that address the issues raised by the report. We 

disagree that the actions taken by USSTRATCOM to date fulfill the intent 

of our recommendations and are complete. While USSTRATCOM has 

taken some positive actions on these issues, we do not believe that the 

command’s actions go far enough, are specific enough, or are sufficiently 

transparent in improving evaluation of the command’s progress in 

implementing its mission areas, providing more complete guidance to its 

mission and service component organizations, and strengthening its 

external communications with other organizations and commands. 

Therefore, we believe our recommendations are still warranted and we 

have added a matter for congressional consideration for Congress to 

direct the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to develop and 

implement a longer-term results-oriented management process for 

assessing the command’s overall progress and periodically reporting to 

Congress its progress in achieving desired outcomes. DOD’s comments are 

reprinted in their entirety in appendix V and more specific information on 

DOD’s comments on our recommendations and our assessment of these 

comments follows below. 

DOD generally agreed with our recommendations regarding 

USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. Specifically, DOD agreed with our 

recommendation that USSTRATCOM should identify and request, in a 

timely manner, the long-term services and resources required from the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center to support 

USSTRATCOM’s exercise program. In its comments, DOD said that while 

the center had provided limited exercise planning, execution, and 

assessment support to USSTRATCOM, the command and the center have 

steadily built a relationship over the past year to support USSTRATCOM’s 

seven mission areas and are jointly solving problems that hindered the 

center’s support in previous USSTRATCOM exercises. The department 

partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, U.S. Joint 

Page 38 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Forces Command, in the near term make any possible adjustments among 

the Joint Warfighting Center’s current resources to more fully support 

USSTRATCOM’s program. DOD commented that the Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is currently 

conducting an in-depth review of the joint training programs to determine 

how it can provide better flexibility and synergism through joint training 

investments. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Commander, 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, in the long term, incorporate 

USSTRATCOM’s requirements for support into the Joint Warfighting 

Center’s plans. DOD commented that its current review of joint training 

programs intends to match, to the greatest extent possible, joint training 

requirements and resources, including the training support provided by

the U.S. Joint Forces Command. DOD also said while USSTRATCOM’s 

requirements must compete with other training priorities for joint training

funding, the center can better plan and make resources available if 

USSTRATCOM provides the center with well-defined requirements 

3 to 5 years in advance. 

DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, 

U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to its joint 

functional component commands that clearly defines full operating 

capability and provides specific, common criteria for determining what is 

required and how it will be assessed. DOD commented that the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has provided specific guidance in 

the form of a tailored implementation directive that assigns specific duties, 

responsibilities, tasks, and authorities to the components. DOD also said 

that the Commander is continuing to work closely with the component 

commanders to develop, implement, and assess the measures of progress 

by which full operating capability will be declared and will report to the 

Secretary of Defense when the milestone is achieved for each mission 

area. We believe that the command’s tailored implementation directives do

not go far enough in providing clear and specific criteria for assessing 

whether specific duties, responsibilities, tasks, and authorities assigned to 

each organization have been met. For example, during our review we 

found that the components had different interpretations as to what criteria 

might apply for declaring full operating capability. We believe that it is 

important for USSTRATCOM and its organizations to have a clear 

definition of full operating capability and the criteria, or measures of 

progress, in place as early as possible, by which the achievement of the 

milestone will be assessed for each of the new mission organizations. 

These criteria should be complete and readily accessible so the command 

and its mission organizations will have confidence in the extent that 

Page 39 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
planned capabilities will be achieved at full operating capability. After 

declaring full operating capability, each of the new organizations will 

require further actions to more completely implement and enhance their 

mission capabilities and responsibilities. Establishing clear, documented 

criteria for assessing and measuring success for declaring full operating 

capability can provide a baseline and a sound foundation for assessing the 

future progress of the organization in carrying out its mission

responsibilities. 

DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM 

develop a comprehensive results-oriented management process for 

continually assessing and benchmarking the command’s overall progress 

in achieving desired outcomes and for identifying corrective actions to 

enhance the command’s efforts to implement and integrate its missions. In 

its comments, DOD stated that a variety of directives, including concepts 

of operations, articulate the command’s goals and objectives. The 

department also stated that the command conducts periodic exercises, 

external inspections, and in-progress reviews to help assess the 

command’s effectiveness in making operational the assigned mission areas 

and achieving stated objectives. While these actions by USSTRATCOM 

may be helpful to the command’s leadership, they do not represent a 

comprehensive and transparent plan for assessing progress in achieving 

desired outcomes. Moreover, DOD interpreted our recommendation as 

being directed at the metrics to be used by the command’s organizations in 

declaring full operating capability for its missions, which are scheduled to 

occur by early 2007. However, our recommendation calls for creation of a 

longer-term, comprehensive, results-oriented management process that 

would provide the command with a framework for continuously assessing 

its future progress in achieving desired outcomes in each of its mission 

areas and the command’s overall goals and objectives. Because of the 

importance of the command’s new role in providing expanded military 

options for addressing emerging threats, we continue to believe that 

creation of a results-oriented management process that establishes 

long-term goals and objectives, milestones and timelines for achieving 

desired outcomes, performance measures that clearly demonstrate 

performance results, and clear leadership to implement and sustain the 

process is needed. Therefore, we have included a matter for congressional 

consideration to require the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to 

develop such a process that would improve transparency and 

accountability of the extent to which the command is achieving desired 

outcomes in each of its mission areas. 

Page 40 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
DOD also did not agree with our recommendation that the Commander, 

U.S. Strategic Command, provide additional guidance to the command’s 

service components that clearly defines and provides more specific 

information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and 

expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate 

mission organizations. In its comments, DOD said that the duties and 

responsibilities of USSTRATCOM and its service components are 

documented in Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. 

The department also stated that day-to-day liaison activities between the

command and the services are provided by on-site service component 

representatives. While broad guidance is provided in the Joint Staff’s 

Unified Action Armed Forces publication on the relationships and 

authorities of the military services in supporting combatant commanders 

and by USSTRATCOM in various documents, we continue to believe that 

additional guidance from the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, to the 

command’s service components is needed to provide clear and specific 

information about their responsibilities, requirements, relationships, and 

expectations for supporting the command’s headquarters and subordinate 

mission organizations, particularly since the components have expressed a 

desire for further guidance from the command. As USSTRATCOM 

continues to implement its new organization and develop capabilities in 

each of its mission areas, this additional guidance can strengthen 

relationships with the services by (1) providing better information for the 

components in effectively organizing, planning, and identifying resources 

to support the command; and (2) increasing understanding among the 

command’s headquarters and its organizations about the components’ 

organizations, organizational relationships, and the range of support they 

provide. 

Lastly, DOD disagreed with our recommendation that USSTRATCOM 

develop and implement a commandwide communications strategy to 

guide and coordinate the command’s efforts to conduct outreach with 

other combatant commands and Defense and other organizations. DOD 

commented that USSTRATCOM provides and promotes insight to all its 

activities through its classified Web site; maintains a senior officer 

representative at each of the combatant commands and with the Joint 

Staff; and, as a supporting command, conducts continuous liaison 

activities with other combatant commands. DOD also stated that Webbased mission area training for USSTRATCOM missions is available on the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Web site. However, as discussed in our 

report, we found that while USSTRATCOM organizations routinely 

conduct outreach activities to promote its missions and capabilities, these 

activities are often not well coordinated and consistently conducted to 

Page 41 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
achieve the most optimal benefit for the command. Both of USSTRATCOM 

commander’s summary reports prepared after its two most recent Global 

Lightning exercises in 2004 and 2005 recommended that the command 

develop a comprehensive outreach strategy to increase understanding 

among other combatant commands about the specific capabilities and 

contributions that the command can provide to their operations. The 

November 2005 Global Lightning report also recommended that the 

strategy provide an integrated methodology for conducting effective 

outreach and education of the command’s capabilities. Therefore, we 

continue to believe that USSTRATCOM needs a commandwide 

communications strategy to provide a framework to effectively manage 

these activities and a common approach for conducting consistent and 

coordinated outreach across the command. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Commander, U. S. Joint 

Forces Command. We will make copies available to others upon request. 

In addition the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 

at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-4402

or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in 

appendix VI.

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 42 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix I: 

Changes

Comma

GAO Analysis of Trends and

 to the United States Strategic 

nd’s Budget 

Page 43 GAO-06-847

Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and 

Changes to the United States Strategic 

Command’s Budget 

This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified

in the United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) historic and 

projected budget, from fiscal years 2003 through 2011. 

Since its establishment in fiscal year 2003, USSTRATCOM’s budget has 

grown significantly, from $276.8 million of total obligation authority in 

then-year dollars to $500.4 million in fiscal year 2006, excluding military 

personnel funds. The command’s budget comprises mostly operation and

maintenance funding, with lesser amounts of research and development 

and procurement funding associated with programs for intelligence, 

information operations, network warfare, command and control, and 

planning systems. Funding projections prepared to support the fiscal year 

2006 President’s budget submission show that USSTRATCOM’s budget is 

expected to decline between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, from 

$521.9 million to $515.5 million, as research and development funding is 

reduced. However, beginning in fiscal year 2009, the command’s budget is

expected to increase each year to $551.4 million in fiscal year 2011, as 

operation and maintenance funding increases by $35 million compared to 

the fiscal year 2008 projection. Procurement funding projections remain 

relatively stable through fiscal year 2011. 

USSTRATCOM officials told us that the command’s budget projections 

have changed since the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget was submitted. 

However, these changes, prepared to support the President’s fiscal year 

2007 budget submission, had not been finalized at the time our work was 

completed in March 2006 because the Department of Defense (DOD) was 

still making adjustments to the command’s budget projections for fiscal 

year 2007 and thereafter, even after the fiscal year 2007 budget was 

submitted. USSTRATCOM officials expect that the command’s annual 

budgets for fiscal years 2007 though 2011 will be lower than the 

projections prepared for the fiscal year 2006 budget submission. At the 

same time, the command has been directed to allocate funding for new 

activities that had not been part of the fiscal year 2006 submission, 

including $11 million to $13 million per year in new total obligation 

authority for mission activities for combating weapons of mass 

destruction and about $7 million per year for missile defense operations. 

USSTRATCOM’s budget increases have included new total obligation 

authority to fund the command’s new mission responsibilities. For 

example, the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget submission included 

$78.7 million in new funding for USSTRATCOM to support additional 

USSTRATCOM’s Budget 

Has Grown Significantly 

Since Its Establishment 

Budget Increases Reflect 

New Mission 

Responsibilities 

Military Transformation
Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and

Changes to the United States Strategic 

Command’s Budget 

planning, command and control, and information operations 

responsibilities that were assigned to the command following the 

completion of DOD’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.1

 About $50.9 million of

this request was for improvements to USSTRATCOM’s command and 

control systems, including $25.9 million to upgrade the USSTRATCOM 

command center and about $10.5 million for a mobile command center 

capability. Of the remaining $27.8 million, about $13.5 million was for new 

information operations activities and $14.3 million was to improve the 

command’s planning systems. In addition to the funding associated with 

the Nuclear Posture Review, the fiscal year 2004 budget request included 

about $44.5 million for USSTRATCOM to support classified programs 

formerly managed by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense. 

The fiscal year 2005 and 2006 budget requests included USSTRATCOM 

funding increases associated with new missions assigned to the command 

in January 2003—global strike; integrated missile defense; command, 

control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; and DOD information operations. To support these new 

responsibilities, the fiscal year 2005 budget request included about 

$61.8 million in new total obligation authority. This amount included about 

$23 million in new operation and maintenance funding, which the 

USSTRATCOM commander had discretion to allocate among the 

command’s missions, according to a command official. According to the 

official, the fiscal year 2005 request also included about $15.3 million in 

new funding to support activities at the Joint Information Operations 

Center, and what would later become the Joint Task Force for Global 

Network Operations and the Joint Functional Component Command for 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The 2005 budget request 

also included additional increases to the command’s planning and 

command and control systems. Similarly, the fiscal year 2006 budget

request included about $33.7 million in new funding, mainly to support 

new information operations programs. 

 1

DOD’s December 2001 report on the results of its Nuclear Posture Review introduced the 

concept of a New Triad of strategic capabilities that include a mix of nuclear and 

nonnuclear strike forces; defenses, including missile defense; and a responsive 

infrastructure, which are all enhanced by an integrated and adaptive approach to 

intelligence, planning, and command and control. As reflected in its expanding set of

mission responsibilities, USSTRATCOM has a significant role in implementing the New 

Triad.

Page 44 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix I: GAO Analysis of Trends and

Changes to the United States Strategic 

Command’s Budget 

USSTRATCOM has recently developed an internal model to determine 

how its programs will be allocated to its various mission organizations and 

headquarters activities in DOD’s budget and future funding plan. 

According to a USSTRATCOM official, the model is designed to help the

command manage and prioritize its funding allocations and understand the 

risks associated with any changes made to its future funding plans. The 

command is using the model to allocate fiscal year 2006 funding to 

USSTRATCOM’s subordinate organizations and headquarters divisions. 

According to information provided by command officials, the largest 

funding allocations for fiscal year 2006 are to support the Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space and Global Strike, followed by command 

and control activities performed at headquarters, including nuclear 

command and control. The smallest allocations are to support the Joint 

Functional Component Commands for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance and Integrated Missile Defense. According to a command 

official, activities performed at headquarters to support one or more 

mission areas accounted for about 40 percent of the command’s fiscal 

2006 budget.

To perform our analysis, we identified trends and changes in 

USSTRATCOM’s budget since its establishment in October 2002 by

obtaining and analyzing the command’s historic, current, and projected 

funding for fiscal years 2003 through 2011. We used data prepared to 

support the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request, which were the 

most current official data available when we conducted and completed 

our work. We also discussed with USSTRATCOM officials anticipated 

changes to the budget resulting from the fiscal year 2007 President’s 

budget request, and efforts taken by the command to identify how its 

funding is allocated by mission responsibility and subordinate 

organization. We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in this

analysis, including (1) performing electronic testing of required data 

elements, (2) comparing the data to another independently prepared data

source, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the 

data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. 

USSTRATCOM Is 

Determining How Funding 

Will Be Allocated Among 

Its Missions 

Scope and 

Methodology 

Page 45 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix II: 

United States

and Civilian

GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

 Strategic Command Military 

 Authorized Personnel Level 

Page 46 GAO-06-847

Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

United States Strategic Command Military 

and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 

This appendix provides information on trends and changes we identified

in the United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) military and 

civilian authorized personnel levels1

 since its establishment in 

October 2002. Our analysis shows that USSTRATCOM’s overall authorized 

personnel level has remained relatively stable since 2002, and that the 

percentage of filled military and civilian positions has increased. The 

command is transferring positions to its new mission organizations from 

its headquarters organization, rather than increasing its overall 

commandwide authorized personnel level. Although the command has 

expanded the number of professional military skills2

 of its authorized 

personnel, the majority of its military positions encompass relatively few 

types of skilled positions. We also determined that while Air Force and 

Navy military positions continue to make up most of USSTRATCOM’s 

authorized personnel, the proportion of civilian positions is increasing. 

USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel level has remained relatively stable

since the command’s establishment in October 2002. The command’s 

overall authorized personnel level has increased since that time by about

300 positions, through October 2005; however, the command expects to 

have slightly fewer positions than it started with by October 2006. 

The command’s authorized personnel level increased from 2,646 positions

upon its establishment in October 2002 to 2,965 authorized positions by 

October 2004. The largest increase occurred between October 2002 and 

October 2003, when the command added 318 positions, including 

291 positions to support four additional missions—global strike; integrated 

missile defense; command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and DOD information 

operations. Among these 291 positions, 108 positions were transferred to 

USSTRATCOM from the cruise missile support activities, which were 

formerly part of U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Pacific Command. 

Overall Authorized 

Personnel Level Has Been 

Relatively Stable and 

Percentage of Filled 

Positions Has Increased 

 1

USSTRATCOM’s authorized military and civilian personnel level is the number of

authorized positions for service members and civilians that are funded by the services and 

assigned to the command. 

2

Military skills refer to personnel designations developed by each of the military services. 

In this report, “skill” refers to specific Air Force Specialty Codes, Army Areas of 

Concentration (officer) and Military Occupational Specialties (warrant officer and 

enlisted), Navy Billet Designator Codes (officer) and General Ratings (enlisted), and 

Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialties. 

Military Transformation
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

United States Strategic Command Military 

and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 

In October 2005, USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel decreased to 

2,947 positions, a reduction of 18 positions from October 2004, as the 

command transferred positions to other combatant commands to provide 

expertise in integrating USSTRATCOM’s global missions into their theater 

operations. According to a command official, there was no authorized 

personnel level increase associated with the combating weapons of mass 

destruction responsibilities assigned to the command in January 2005. A 

larger reduction is expected by October 2006, mainly as a result of a 

planned transfer of about 340 positions currently supporting intelligence 

activities, which would bring the command’s authorized personnel to 

2,605 positions, which is 41 fewer than authorized when the command was 

established.

USSTRATCOM’s ability to fill positions has increased steadily since the 

new command was established in 2002, when only 1,828, or 69 percent of 

the command’s 2,646 authorized positions, were initially filled. According 

to command officials, many of the service members and civilians from the 

former U.S. Space Command, located near Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

did not immediately transfer to USSTRATCOM headquarters, located near 

Omaha Nebraska, leaving many positions initially unfilled. However, as 

individuals transferred to the command, the rate of filled positions 

increased to 83 percent (2,467 filled positions) as of October 2003, 

87 percent (2,564 filled positions) in October 2004, and 91 percent 

(2,670 filled positions) in October 2005. 

To meet the staffing requirements for its five new mission organizations, 

USSTRATCOM is transferring positions to the new organizations from its 

headquarters, rather than seeking to increase its overall personnel 

authorization. To minimize the cost to the services of relocating people to

fill the transferred positions, the command is first transferring positions 

that either do not need to be relocated or are not filled by service 

members, and then relocating and filling the remaining positions during 

the course of normal military personnel rotations. Under the command’s 

plan, the first 30 percent of the transferred positions were to have been 

filled at each organization by September 2005, 60 percent of the positions 

are to be filled by September 2006, and 90 percent are to be filled by 

September 2007. 

By February 2006 the command had approved the transfer of 793 positions

to the new mission organizations. Of this number, about 444 positions 

(56 percent) had been filled, including about 76 percent of the 

431 positions approved for the Joint Functional Component Command for 

Personnel Requirements 

for New Organizations Are 

Being Met Within Existing 

Authorization 

Page 47 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

United States Strategic Command Military 

and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 

Space and Global Strike, which is co-located with USSTRATCOM 

headquarters and where few positions needed to be relocated.

3

 In contrast,

fewer than one-third of the positions had been filled at three of the four 

remaining organizations, which are not located in the Omaha, Nebraska, 

area, although a command official told us that he believes that positions at 

these organizations will be close to 60 percent filled by September 2006, 

under current projections. To minimize the impact of not filling positions, 

officials told us that the supporting services and Defense agencies are 

providing the new organizations with their own filled positions, until 

USSTRATCOM positions are filled. Table 4 summarizes the status of filling 

positions at the new mission organizations as of February 2006. 

Table 4: Approved and Filled Positions at USSTRATCOM’s New Mission 

Organizations as of February 2006 

USSTRATCOM organization 

Positions

approved

Positions

filled

Percentage of

positions filled

JFCC-Space and Global Strike 431 326 76

JFCC-Network Warfare 120 38 32

JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 102 33 32

JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense 90 34 38

USSTRATCOM Center for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 50 13 26

Source: USSTRATCOM. 

Notes: Data do not include contractors or positions provided by supporting services and Defense 

agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command. 

USSTRATCOM has expanded the number of military skills of its 

authorized personnel since its establishment. As of January 2003, 3 months 

after it was established, USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel included

those with 241 different military skills; by January 2006, the command 

added 51 skills and lost 44 skills, leaving 248 different military skills at the 

command. Skills added by the command include Navy officer positions for 

information technology planning and Marine Corps officer positions for 

space operations, while those dropped include Air Force maintenance 

officer positions. 

USSTRATCOM Has 

Expanded Its Military Skill 

Set, but Most Positions 

Remain Concentrated in 

Relatively Few Specialties 

 3

The space and global strike joint functional component command also has positions 

assigned to other locations, including the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, and U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. 

Page 48 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

United States Strategic Command Military 

and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 

While USSTRATCOM has changed the composition of its skill set, 

relatively few skills comprise the majority of the command’s authorized 

military positions. For example, as of January 2006, 33 of the command’s 

248 skills (13 percent) made up 1,364 of the command’s 2,094 military 

positions (65 percent). USSTRATCOM officials told us that several of the 

most prevalent skills are easily adaptable and capable of being performed 

in a broad range of responsibilities. For example, Air Force space and 

missile operations officer positions increased from 134 in 2003 to 140 in 

2006, and this skill remains the largest military specialty at the command. 

The command also has increased the number of positions for Navy 

officers with warfare qualifications or air warfare qualifications skill 

designations, Army officers skilled in space operations, and Army officers 

specializing in information operations. 

USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel are mainly composed of Air Force 

and Navy positions, although the number and percentage of civilian 

positions have increased since the command was established. As of 

October 2005, USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel included 

2,112 military and 835 civilian positions. Among the 2,112 authorized 

military positions: 

Air Force and Navy 

Positions Predominate, but 

Percentage of Civilian 

Positions Is Increasing 

• 1,256 were Air Force positions (59 percent of the authorized military 

positions), 

• 564 were Navy positions (27 percent), 

• 227 were Army positions (11 percent), and 

• 65 were Marine Corps positions (3 percent). 

Since the command’s establishment, the number and percentage of civilian

positions relative to military positions have increased. From October 2002 

to October 2005, civilian positions increased from 676 to 835, an increase

of 26 to 28 percent of the command’s overall authorized personnel level. 

The command expects to continue to increase the proportion of 

authorized civilian positions, particularly at USSTRATCOM headquarters, 

as positions are transferred to the new mission organizations and as a few 

hundred military positions are converted to civilian positions through 

October 2007. Command officials responsible for overseeing the 

reorganization told us that civilians have lower turnover rates than the 

military service members who regularly rotate through the command. The 

command believes that lower turnover among its civilian workforce will 

bring greater continuity and stability to the headquarters’ chief 

responsibilities, including strategic-level planning and advocacy for new 

capabilities. Table 5 presents the projected distribution of the command’s 

civilian and military positions in October 2007. 

Page 49 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

United States Strategic Command Military 

and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 

Table 5: Projected Distribution of USSTRATCOM Civilian and Military Positions in October 2007

Organization 

Civilian 

positions

Military 

positions

Percentage

civilian 

positions

Percentage

military 

positions

USSTRATCOM headquarters 616 592 51 49

JFCC-Space and Global Strike 77 354 18 82

Othera54 217 20 80

Joint Information Operations Center 77 124 38 62

JFCC-Network Warfare 31 89 26 74

JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 19 83 19 81

Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations 69 63 52 48

JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense 25 65 28 72

USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 18 32 36 64

Total 986 1,619 38 62

Source: USSTRATCOM. 

Notes: Projections current as of February 2006. Data include both military and civilian positions at 

USSTRATCOM headquarters and at other locations. They do not include contractors at 

USSTRATCOM headquarters, or contractors or positions at mission organizations that are provided 

by supporting services and agencies. JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command. a

Includes authorized personnel assigned to the National Airborne Operations Center, Nebraska; 

Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colorado; various combined task forces, Atlantic and Pacific 

cruise missile support activities; various liaison offices; and national laboratories. 

To determine how USSTRATCOM’s authorized personnel level has 

changed since its establishment in 2002, we obtained and reviewed 

USSTRATCOM projections and historic data that identify (1) the number 

of authorized civilian and military positions assigned to USSTRATCOM, 

(2) the number of authorized positions filled by individuals assigned to the 

command, and (3) the professional military skills associated with the 

command’s military positions. The data we obtained include 

USSTRATCOM positions assigned to the command’s headquarters near 

Omaha, Nebraska, its mission organizations, and to various other locations

and assignments.4

 We also obtained the command’s projections for 

authorized personnel levels for the new mission organizations, and 

discussed these projections with officials responsible for managing the 

command’s authorized personnel. In our analysis, we did not consider 

Scope and 

Methodology 

 4

In addition to its headquarters and mission organizations, USSTRATCOM has authorized 

personnel assigned with the National Airborne Operations Center, Nebraska; Cheyenne

Mountain Operations Center, Colorado; various combined task forces; Atlantic and Pacific 

cruise missile support activities; liaison offices; and national laboratories. 

Page 50 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix II: GAO Analysis of Trends in the 

United States Strategic Command Military 

and Civilian Authorized Personnel Level 

staff positions from organizations that are supporting several of 

USSTRATCOM’s mission organizations, such as the Air Force Space

Command, Eighth Air Force, Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, and Defense Information Systems Agency. The data

also do not include part-time reservists or contractors. We took steps to 

assess the reliability of the data used in this analysis, including 

(1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) comparing 

the data to another independently prepared data source, and 

(3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

Page 51 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology Appendix III: Scope and Methodology 

To address the extent to which the United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) has made progress in implementing its new missions and 

assessing mission results, we reviewed a wide range of Department of 

Defense (DOD) and command documentation including USSTRATCOM 

guidance, plans, directives, speeches and testimony statements, and 

reports; implementation plans and directives for creating its new mission 

organizations; and documentation related to DOD’s implementation of its 

New Triad concept to transform U.S. strategic capabilities. We also spoke 

with various officials involved in the command’s implementation efforts 

about their roles, related plans, and actions. When possible, we met with

the command and other organizations’ senior leadership to discuss and 

obtain their views on various command issues, including: 

• Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; 

• Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; 

• Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Network 

Warfare/Director, National Security Agency; 

• Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 

Missile Defense/Commander, Army Space and Missile Defense Command; 

• Commander, Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations/Director, 

Defense Information Systems Agency;

• Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction/Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; 

• Commander, Air Force Space Command; and 

• Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command. 

To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has a robust exercise 

program for demonstrating its capabilities, we reviewed the command’s 

annual training plan, which describes the command’s individual exercises, 

establishes an exercise schedule, and sets expectations for the 

participation of the command’s mission organizations. For the 

November 2005 Global Lightning exercise, we reviewed the exercise plan, 

collection management plan, after-action report, and final exercise report. 

We also observed that exercise and discussed the exercise results with the 

participants. We also reviewed the collection management plan and the 

after-action report prepared for the April 2006 Global Thunder exercise, 

and after-action reports prepared for the April 2005 Global Thunder, 

October 2004 Global Lightning, and October 2003 Global Guardian 

exercises. We obtained guidance from the Joint Staff that describe the 

roles and responsibilities of U.S. Joint Forces Command for supporting 

combatant command exercises. In addition we held discussions with 

command officials from the exercise and training branch and with other 

Page 52 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

exercise observers to obtain their views on USSTRATCOM efforts to plan 

and schedule its exercises. We also met with officials from the new joint

functional component commands as well as the Joint Task Force for 

Global Network Operations and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating 

Weapons Of Mass Destruction to identify challenges to more fully 

including their missions in the commands exercises and assist in our 

understanding of the extent to which the command’s mission

organizations were able to participate in the command’s exercises. 

Command officials also briefed us on the evolution of the command’s 

exercise program since its establishment, and plans for the future. Finally, 

we met with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint 

Warfighting Center to determine the extent to which they have been 

involved in identifying requirements, objectives, methods, and tools for 

planning, implementing, and evaluating USSTRATCOM exercises to 

strengthen the design and execution of the command’s exercises, such as 

participant training and independent observer team support and 

evaluation. 

To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM and its mission 

organizations had developed criteria for assessing their progress toward 

achieving full operating capability, we reviewed documents from the 

command and each of the new mission organizations. These documents 

included the command’s implementation directives for each new mission 

organization and the overarching command reorganization 

implementation plan for the current reorganization. We also reviewed 

briefings from each of the mission organizations that gave status 

information on the organizations’ efforts towards achieving full operating 

capability. We held discussions with USSTRATCOM officials who were 

part of the command’s reorganization management team and with the 

senior leadership, when possible, to determine their roles and 

management approach in assisting the mission organizations’ efforts to 

reach full operating capability and to obtain an understanding of what 

reaching full operating capability means as a milestone in developing the 

new USSTRATCOM organization. We met and held discussions with the 

senior staff of each mission organization on their criteria for measuring 

the organization’s progress toward full operating capability. 

To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a resultsoriented management approach to establish goals, continually track its 

progress, achieve better synergy among its missions, and gauge the results 

Page 53 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

of its efforts, we reviewed key documentation and interviewed officials to

determine what steps, if any, the command has taken to develop and 

follow this approach. We reviewed relevant GAO reports1

 that identified 

and reviewed management approaches of other government and private 

sector organizations. We used the practices and implementation steps 

identified in these approaches as criteria for reviewing USSTRATCOM 

documents and for discussions with command officials about their 

approach to transforming the USSTRATCOM organization. We then 

compared USSTRATCOM’s approach against these examples of success 

that we had identified in other organizations to determine the extent to 

which USSTRATCOM had these elements in place. 

We reviewed key USSTRATCOM documents, including its first principles 

(i.e., its long-term goals) related to reporting on the command’s 

performance and those from its biannual readiness reporting and its 

annual training assessments. We reviewed the command’s implementation

plan and related directives for establishing USSTRATCOM’s joint 

functional component commands. We compared these documents to 

implementation plans used by other organizations, including the 

U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Northern Command, and reorganization 

plans, such as the Report to Congress on the Plan for Organizing the 

National Nuclear Security Agency and the Department of Homeland 

Security Reorganization Plan, to determine any differences in the 

elements and details for implementation that were considered in these 

plans and the extent to which they had developed, used, or planned to use 

outcome-based performance goals and measures. 

To assess the extent to which USSTRATCOM has made progress defining 

organizational responsibilities and establishing relationships with other 

DOD commands and organizations, we obtained and reviewed relevant

documents and spoke with various officials involved in implementing and

advocating for the command’s new missions about its roles and related 

plans and actions. To determine the extent to which the command has 

clarified the roles and expectations of its service component 

organizations, we reviewed command documentation including draft 

integrating guidance, concepts of operations, orders, plans, and other 

 1

Our prior work on organizational transformation includes GAO, Managing for Results: 

Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for Management Decision Making,

GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO-03-293SP; GAO-03-669; and Homeland

Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address Challenges Facing the Federal

Protective Service, GAO-04-537 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004). 

Page 54 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

documents. We met with officials from each of the command’s service 

component/supporting commands and discussed the extent to which they 

believed the command’s guidance and expectations was sufficiently clear

about their supporting roles. We also discussed with command officials 

the extent to which guidance was provided to the service components 

through meetings and other activities. 

To determine the extent to which USSTRATCOM has developed a 

common approach and comprehensive strategy to enhance its outreach to

numerous DOD organizations on which its success depends, we met with 

the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and with officials in the 

command’s directorate responsible for advocacy. We also met with senior 

leadership in all of the subordinate mission organizations to understand 

the extent to which a clear, coordinated, and unified outreach strategy is 

in place and to identify the range of methods and activities the command 

and its subordinate mission organizations use to engage and promote its 

missions and capabilities with combatant commands, military services, 

and DOD and other government organizations. We met with officials at the 

U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Northern Command and discussed 

command relationships, the ways that USSTRATCOM officials performed 

outreach with these organizations, sought their viewpoint on lessons that 

should be learned in communicating the command’s missions and 

responsibilities, and their perspectives on USSTRATCOM progress. During 

USSTRATCOM’s Global Lightning exercise in November 2005, we also 

obtained insights from participants on the command’s effectiveness at 

performing its outreach activities. 

We also reviewed several GAO reports2

 that addressed key practices 

organizations should implement during a significant reorganization or 

transformation. We used the reports to identify successful communication 

and outreach practices employed by other U.S. and foreign government 

organizations. We reviewed the USSTRATCOM commander’s summary 

report for its November 2005 Global Lightning exercise to identify any 

lessons learned, from participating in the exercise with two other 

combatant commands, on the success of the command’s outreach efforts. 

 2

See for example, GAO-03-293SP, GAO-03-669, and GAO, Defense Management: Key

Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business Operations, GAO-05-629

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005). 

Page 55 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

During our review, we obtained and analyzed USSTRATCOM budget and 

authorized personnel data to identify trends in acquiring the resources, 

personnel levels, and skills needed to implement the command’s missions. 

We took steps to assess the reliability of the data used in these analyses, 

including (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, 

(2) comparing the data to other independently prepared data sources, and

(3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. For 

additional methodological details about how we performed our analyses, 

see appendixes I and II. We performed our work from May 2005 through

June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

In conducting our work, we contacted officials at the command’s 

headquarters, service, and functional components; think-tank

organizations; and other relevant stakeholders. Table 6 provides 

information on the organizations and offices contacted during our review. 

Page 56 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

Table 6: Organizations and Offices Contacted during Our Review

Organization/office contacted

Department of Defense

• Office of the Secretary of Defense 

• International Security Policy 

• Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Staff Directorate 

• J-1 (Manpower and Personnel) 

• J-3 (Operations) 

• J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy) 

• Defense Information Systems Agency 

• Defense Intelligence Agency 

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

• National Security Agency 

USSTRATCOM subordinate functional organization 

• Joint Information Operations Center 

• Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations 

• USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

• Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike 

• Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

• Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare

• Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense 

USSTRATCOM service component/supporting command 

• Department of the Air Force Headquarters 

• U.S. Air Force Space Command 

• Eighth Air Force 

• U.S. Navy Fleet Forces Command 

• U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

• U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command 

Combatant command 

• U.S. Northern Command

• U.S. Joint Forces Command

• Joint Warfighting Center 

• U.S. Central Command 

Other organization 

• LMI Government Consulting 

• RAND Corporation 

Source: GAO.

Page 57 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix

Comma

 IV: United States Strategic 

nd Organizations and Responsibilities 

Page 58 GAO-06-847

Appendix IV: United States Strategic 

Command Organizations and Responsibilities

The United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) organization is 

comprised of a command headquarters, joint functional component 

commands, task forces, and centers, which are located around one of four 

metropolitan areas: Omaha, Nebraska; Colorado Springs, Colorado; 

San Antonio, Texas; and Washington, D.C. 

Figure 2: Locations of USSTRATCOM’s Headquarters and Subordinate Mission

Organizations

Washington, D.C. area

JFCC–Network Warfare

JFCC–Intelligence, Surveillance,

and Reconnaissance

Joint Task Force for Global

Network Operations

USSTRATCOM Center for

Combating WMD

Omaha, Nebr. area

USSTRATCOM headquarters

JFCC–Space and Global Strike

San Antonio, Tex. area

Joint Information Operations Center

Colorado Springs, Colo. area

JFCC–Integrated Missile Defense

Source: USSTRATCOM.

Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass destruction. 

Each of the command’s organizations is supported by a primary Defense 

agency or service partner organization. Table 7 shows the primary 

responsibilities and related information for key USSTRATCOM 

organizations. 

Military Transformation
Appendix IV: United States Strategic 

Command Organizations and Responsibilities 

Table 7: Key USSTRATCOM Organizations and Responsibilities 

USSTRATCOM organization, 

location, and date established Primary responsibilities 

Primary supporting 

service or agency partner

USSTRATCOM headquarters

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr. 

October 2002 

Responsible for exercising command authority over 

USSTRATCOM’s joint functional component commands (JFCC), 

task forces, and centers and has strategic responsibility for 

integrating all of USSTRATCOM missions of space operations; 

information operations; integrated missile defense; global command 

and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; global 

strike; and strategic deterrence, and is the lead combatant command 

for integrating and synchronizing DOD-wide efforts in combating 

weapons of mass destruction.

Service component 

commands, JFCCs, joint 

task forces, and centers. 

JFCC-Integrated Missile Defense 

Shreiver Air Force Base, Colo. 

January 2005 

Responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile

defense operations and support. The command conducts the day-today operations of assigned forces and coordinates activities with 

associated combatant commands, other USSTRATCOM JFCCs, and 

the Missile Defense Agency. 

The Commander, JFCCIntegrated Missile Defense, 

is also the Commander, 

U.S. Army Space and 

Missile Defense 

Command/Army Forces 

Strategic Command. 

JFCC-Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance 

Bolling Air Force Base, D.C. 

January 2005 

Responsible for coordinating global intelligence collection to address 

DOD worldwide operations and national intelligence requirements. It 

will serve as the focal point for the planning, execution, and 

assessment of the military’s global intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance operations; a key enabler to achieving global 

situational awareness. 

The Commander, JFCCIntelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance, is 

also the Director, Defense 

Intelligence Agency. 

JFCC-Space and Global Strike

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr. 

January 2005 

Responsible for integrating all elements of military power to conduct, 

plan, and present global strike effects and also direct the deliberate 

planning and execution of assigned space operation missions. For 

plans not aligned with a specific mission set, the command is tasked 

to work in close coordination with USSTRATCOM headquarters as 

the lead component responsible for the integration and coordination 

of capabilities provided by all other JFCCs. 

The Commander, JFCCSpace and Global Strike, is 

also the Commander, 

Eighth Air Force. 

JFCC-Network Warfare 

Fort Meade, Md. 

January 2005 

Responsible for facilitating cooperative engagement with other 

national entities in computer network defense and network warfare 

as part of the global information operations mission. This coordinated 

approach to information operations involves two other important 

supporting commands: Joint Task Force for Global Network 

Operations and Joint Information Operations Center. 

The Commander, JFCCNetwork Warfare, is also 

the Director, National 

Security Agency. 

Joint Information Operations 

Centera

Lackland Air Force Base, Tex.

September 19991 

Responsible for integrating information operations into military plans 

and operations across the spectrum of conflict. 

The Commander, Joint 

Information Operations 

Center, is also the 

Commander, Air 

Intelligence Agency. 

Joint Task Force for Global 

Network Operations 

Arlington, Va. 

August 2005 

Responsible for supporting USSTRATCOM in defending DOD’s 

information infrastructure. This is done by integrating the task force’s 

capabilities into the operations of all DOD computers, networks, and 

systems used by DOD, combatant commands, services, and 

agencies. 

The Commander, Joint 

Task Force for Global 

Network Operations, is also 

the Director, Defense 

Information Systems 

Agency. 

Page 59 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix IV: United States Strategic 

Command Organizations and Responsibilities 

USSTRATCOM organization, 

location, and date established Primary responsibilities 

Primary supporting 

service or agency partner

USSTRATCOM Center for 

Combating WMD 

Fort Belvoir, Va. 

August 2005 

Responsible for integrating and synchronizing DOD-wide efforts in 

support of the combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

mission and serves to plan, advocate, and advise the Commander, 

USSTRATCOM, on WMD-related matters. The center provides 

recommendations to dissuade, deter, and prevent the acquisition, 

development, or use of WMD and associated technology. Through 

collaboration with U.S. and allied organizations, the center leverages 

around-the-clock situational awareness of worldwide WMD and 

related activities, as well as provides day-to-day and operational 

crisis support via the operations center. The Defense Threat

Reduction Agency provides critical reachback and resources to the 

center and USSTRATCOM, and other combatant commands. 

Director, USSTRATCOM 

Center for Combating 

WMD, is also the Director, 

Defense Threat Reduction

Agency. 

Source: USSTRATCOM. 

Note: JFCC= Joint Functional Component Command; WMD= weapons of mass destruction. a

 The Joint Information Operations Center was assigned to the new USSTRATCOM in October 2002.

Page 60 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix V: Comments from the Department Appendix V of Defense : Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 61 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 62 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Now on p. 18. 

Page 63 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 64 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 65 GAO-06-847 Military Transformation
Appendix VI: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 66 GAO-06-847

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant 

Director; Alissa H. Czyz; David G. Hubbell; Amanda M. Leissoo; 

Kevin L. O’Neill; Roderick W. Rodgers; and Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Analystin-Charge, made key contributions to this report. 

Military Transformation

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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