Facing the media

U.S. Coast Guard photo
321

Protecting Infrastructure;

Public Communication; 

Role of the Media

Critical Infrastructure

Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on many types of critical infrastructure 

– “Systems and assets,” according to the National Response Plan, “whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 

systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 

national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”1

Th e New Orleans levee system naturally received the most attention, but Katrina also placed 

the nation’s energy supply, chemical-production capacity, and fuel pipelines in serious jeopardy. Th e disaster highlighted the need for industry and government coordination to assess 

the implications of the damage to such infrastructure, to prioritize the restoration of specifi c 

infrastructure, and to have mechanisms in place to facilitate restoration. 

Because of the lack of coordinated restoration plans, signifi cant infrastructure problems 

were left to be addressed in ad-hoc manner:

• Immediately aft er landfall, the Colonial Pipeline, a 5,519-mile system that 

transports fuel from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to distribution 

points throughout 12 states and the District of Columbia, 2 reported that two 

major lines were shut down due to power outages. Th e company dispatched 

generation equipment, but FEMA regional representatives – understandably 

– diverted the generators to hospitals.3

 However, additional planning would 

have readied enough generators for both purposes. It was not until a full week 

aft er the storm that the Colonial Pipeline was restored to full capacity.4

 Th e 

Colonial pipeline is one of two key pipelines that carries up to 100 million gallons of gas, heating oil, and other petroleum products to the Southeast and the 

East Coast.5

 A sustained shut-down could have a serious impact on the nation’s 

energy supply.

• A fl ooded chemical plant that manufactured liquid hydrogen used by NASA 

and the Air Force and in the fi nishing process of some steel parts did not receive dewatering assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers until September 

5.6

 Th is plant alone was responsible for 31 percent of North America’s industrial-hydrogen production, and consequently NASA agreed to share its stored 

supply of hydrogen with the Department of Defense to compensate for this lost 

production.7

• Th e restoration and maintenance of critical telecommunications infrastructure was beset by a variety of security challenges, including the need to provide 

security for facilities and equipment, for repair crews, and for convoys bringing 

in fuel and other supplies.8

 BellSouth’s struggles provide one example of this, 

and the company’s security issues wound up being addressed through a patchwork of means. Th e Louisiana State Police escorted employees out of the buildChapter 20
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322

ing when BellSouth had to evacuate its New Orleans Main Central Offi ce on 

the aft ernoon of Tuesday, August 30 (the day aft er landfall) because of reports 

of violence.9

 Th e following day, BellSouth sought help from the U.S. Marshals 

Service to protect their facility.10 Th e Department of Justice, aft er coordinating 

through FEMA pursuant to Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13) of the 

National Response Plan (NRP),11 agreed to send in U.S. Marshals to secure the 

facility, and sent in FBI agents by helicopter until the marshals could arrive.12

In addition, state police provided security for convoys of fuel and water.13

BellSouth also needed assistance to provide security for their repair crews. Th e 

National Communications System (NCS),14 aft er going through the ordinary 

ESF process, and with the consent of FEMA, sought this further assistance 

from DOD, which forwarded the request to the Louisiana National Guard.15 In 

the end, however, security arrangements with the Louisiana National Guard 

fell through and BellSouth ended up arranging for private security protection 

for its workers.16 Pre-existing arrangements concerning security for such critical infrastructure could have eased these challenges and helped to facilitate the 

speedy restoration of the telecommunications infrastructure.

Th e federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector all are responsible for planning to protect and restore critical infrastructure. Within the federal government, Congress 

has assigned the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a leadership role on critical 

infrastructure, including the task of developing a national plan for protecting it.17 Unfortunately, DHS has lagged in its responsibility to develop this plan and to create a meaningful 

inventory with prioritization for securing the nation’s key assets. Although DHS issued 

an interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in February 2005 and a draft 

version of the fi nal plan in November 2005 that proposes to assess vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and prioritize protective measures, it still has not implemented the fi nal 

plan.18 If the prioritization of vulnerable critical infrastructure had been completed prior to 

Katrina, it may have been helpful for coordinating restoration of that infrastructure. 

Currently, the NRP, the comprehensive federal framework for managing major domestic 

incidents, divides responsibility for restoring critical infrastructure among several Emergency Support Functions, each of which has diff erent lead agencies.19 No cross-cutting entity 

under the NRP takes a comprehensive approach to setting critical-infrastructure restoration 

priorities – or attempts to address the many infrastructure interdependencies that exist. Nor 

does the NRP address the way in which federal agencies should work with state and local 

governments to respond to emergencies that aff ect critical infrastructure in their jurisdictions. It is important that the NRP address the roles of federal, state, and local governments 

and the private sector in restoring critical infrastructure. To this end, the NRP should be 

amended to have an Emergency Support Function that is responsible for assessing the 

damage to critical infrastructure, taking measures to mitigate the impact on the economy 

and national security, and restoring critical infrastructure. Th e Department of Homeland 

Security should be responsible for leading this Emergency Support Function, but it should 

have the involvement of the private sector, other federal agencies, and state and local governments, as appropriate.

Because approximately 85 percent of critical infrastructure in the United States is privately 

owned and operated,20 and because private industry has vital information about its infrastructure, it is critical that industry actively work with the federal government in order to 

establish priorities for restoration. A model for private-sector involvement can be found in 

the DHS’s draft NIPP that will establish 17 sector-specifi c coordination groups and a crosssector council that can consider infrastructure interdependencies.21 According to DHS’s 

draft plan, these sector-specifi c groups will include industry representatives and represen-
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

323

tatives from all levels of government (federal, state, and local) when appropriate that will 

develop sector-specifi c plans for sharing information, assessing the vulnerability of critical 

infrastructure, and implementing protection measures. Th ese sector-specifi c groups would 

be a useful mechanism for acquiring the necessary stakeholder information to set priorities 

for the restoration of critical infrastructure and coordinating private sector and government 

eff orts to achieve prioritization goals.

Media and Public Affairs – ESF-15

Rumors proliferate in times of war, civil unrest, and natural disaster. If widespread and sensational, they can become disruptive – and become news events in themselves. Th e public 

suff ers when federal, state, and local governments tasked with disseminating public health, 

safety, and security information fail to do their jobs as envisioned by emergency-response 

planning. 

Media and Government’s Role

It is essential that the news media receive accurate disaster information to circulate to the 

public. News media can also help inform the public by reporting on rumors and soliciting 

evidence and comment on their plausibility, if any. Th ey may inadvertently do damage by 

reporting on rumors without seeking context or confi rmation, or by presenting them as 

established facts. Th e Evening Sun newspaper of New York City announced this news atop 

its front page on April 15, 1912:

ALL SAVED FROM TITANIC AFTER COLLISION

RESCUE BY CARPATHIA AND PARISIAN; LINER IS BEING

TOWED TO HALIFAX AFTER SMASHING INTO A ICEBERG.22

Th e factual defi ciencies of those headlines – based, if readers dove deeply enough into the 

article’s text, on a passing reference to an unquoted report by parents of a ship’s unnamed 

telegrapher – are now apparent, but they remind us that there is nothing new about the 

phenomenon of news media reporting rumor.

Nearly a century later, the proliferation of news outlets, the competition to be fi rst with a 

powerful story, the technologies that make broad reach and rapid reporting possible, and 

the 24-hour cycle of Web and broadcast news can increase the chance that rumors will 

creep unlabelled or unchallenged into news stories. And when public offi cials fail to provide 

timely, accurate, and credible public information – or stand before microphones and cameras to spread rumors themselves – rumor can become a serious threat to civil order and to 

relief eff orts.

For example, on August 29, the day of landfall, ABC’s “World News Tonight” reported: “In 

New Orleans, entire neighborhoods are underwater, but the levees held. Th e nightmare scenario of an entire city underwater did not happen.” Other broadcasters said: “New Orleans 

dodged the big bullet” (NBC’s “Today” show, August 29) and “Th ey dodged the bullet, but 

they still got a sound bruising” (National Public Radio’s “Talk of the Nation,” August 29).23

As the public learned later, on-the-scene reports by emergency offi cials, residents, and the 

press had already described fl ooding from levee breaches and overtopping several hours 

earlier. For example, Ivor van Heerden, the Director of Louisiana State University’s Center 

for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, relayed that “the National Weather 

Service [is] reporting that one of the levees was breached ... as the reporters have said, 

there’s very, very signifi cant areas of New Orleans that did fl ood from the levee overtopping. In some areas we have about 11 feet of standing water. People have been forced out 
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324

onto the roofs of their homes.”24 Yet as late as the next morning, August 30, there were still 

news items like this Washington Post report:

Some experts predicted the storm could become one of the worst catastrophes in 

U.S. history. But the city managed to avoid the worst of the worst. Th e Mississippi River did not breach New Orleans’s famed levees to any serious degree.25

Others issued confl icting reports, even within their own stories.26 Accurate reporting was at 

a premium, not only concerning the damage to the levees, but also with respect to security 

and law-enforcement issues, as discussed below.

Getting news from the fi eld, through the editing process, and to the public, all under time 

pressure, is a challenge. While modern technology makes correction of mistaken reports easier and faster than in the days of the Titanic, thanks to the same technology, news travels that 

much more quickly in the fi rst place, magnifying the potential damage of erroneous reports. 

Government’s Public-Affairs Responsibilities in the Event of a Disaster

Accurate information is never as critical as during an emergency. It’s also never more 

diffi cult to obtain. Emergency-response planning – in this case, the NRP and the State of 

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan (LA EOP) – tasks federal and state agencies with 

delivering reliable information to the public and the media in the event of a disaster.27

During Hurricane Katrina, however, offi cials at all levels of government either failed to 

comprehend these roles or ignored these obligations, though there were times when offi cials 

understood and carried out their duties. 

Th e NRP’s Public Aff airs Support Annex directs DHS, in coordination with its component 

FEMA, to “mobilize” federal assets to deliver information to the public regarding emergencies as well as “use media monitoring ... and other techniques to identify rumors, misinformation, inaccurate reports ...” and rapidly correct them.28 Th e NRP also calls for establishing a federal Joint Information Center (JIC) to support the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) with 

public-aff airs matters and information dissemination during an emergency, at the location 

of the disaster, depending on the incident’s requirements.29 However, the DHS reported that 

its federal JIC was not established until September 6 – over a week aft er Hurricane Katrina 

made landfall.30

State emergency agencies coordinate with the federal eff ort. Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) has primary responsibility for 

“initiating, organizing and coordinating all aspects of Emergency Public Information,”31 including the activation of a state Joint Information Center which would incorporate federal 

communications activity.32 Yet it is not clear whether during the response to Hurricane Katrina a state JIC was established, although state offi cials maintained an information center 

in a trailer behind the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness in Baton Rouge, which provided 

briefi ngs from this location every four hours. 33

Both federal and state agencies have mutual obligations to formulate a coordinated message. 

Th e NRP envisions the JFO, or federal JIC, to work “in close coordination with other JICs to 

integrate into a Joint Information System (JIS) providing consistent, coordinated, and timely 

information during an incident,”34 and as stated above, the LA EOP envisions integrating 

federal communications activities into the state JIC. However, it appears this goal was not 

immediately carried out, or even understood, during the response to Hurricane Katrina.

A DHS/FEMA aft er-action report attributed some of the diffi culty and, ultimately, the 

failure of federal and state offi cials to ensure a fl ow of accurate, timely information to factors including the overwhelming damage to communication infrastructure, the early lack of 
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

325

co-location between federal (DHS/FEMA) and state public-information centers, reliance on 

fi eld staff to relay information on sporadically functional equipment, and the pressure on 

public-information staff to react to media queries as opposed to pushing out new information.35 Specifi cally, DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner testifi ed before the Committee 

that his department found there should have been more cooperation between federal and 

state public-aff airs offi cials.36

Media Performance During Katrina

As for the media, some of the rumor traffi c in Katrina derived from the reliance of reporters on dubious sources. A New Orleans Times-Picayune reporter later chastised himself for 

passing along unconfi rmed a National Guardsman’s comment that a freezer at the city’s 

Convention Center held “30 or 40” bodies, and another soldier’s comment that the dead included a “7-year-old with her throat cut.” As Brian Th evenot, the Times-Picayune reporter, 

went on to note, “Neither the mass of bodies nor the allegedly expired child would ever be 

found,” but the rumor was eventually traced to gossip in the food line at a nearby casino 

where military and police personnel were staging.37

Th e impact of rumors – sharks swimming in downtown New Orleans, dead babies in trash 

cans, and stacks of bodies at the Superdome and the Convention Center – was compounded 

by misinformation from offi cials. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin told a nationwide TV audience about people “in that frickin’ Superdome for fi ve days watching dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people, raping people.”38 New Orleans Police Superintendent Eddie 

Compass reported that babies were being raped there.39 Both statements were unfounded. 

Inaccurate rumors reported without caveats, particularly with respect to law enforcement, 

included: “Violent gangs are roaming the streets at night, hidden by the cover of darkness” 

(Fox News), troops on rooft ops looking for snipers as “gunfi re crackled in the distance” 

(Los Angeles Times), “a young man run down and then shot by a New Orleans police offi -

cer” (Ottawa Sun), and “Girls and boys were raped in the dark and had their throats cut and 

bodies were stuff ed in the kitchens while looters and madmen exchanged fi re with weapons 

they had looted” (Financial Times of London).40

Th e frequency and apparent authority of rumor-based reporting during Hurricane Katrina 

added to public confusion about events along the Gulf Coast. As two Washington Post

investigators concluded:

Th e sensational accounts delayed rescue and evacuation eff orts already hampered by poor planning and a lack of coordination among local, state, and 

federal agencies. People rushing to the Gulf Coast to fl y rescue helicopters or to 

distribute food, water, and other aid steeled themselves for battle.41

Impact of Misinformation on Response Efforts

At 9:15 p.m. CT on Th ursday, September 1, DHS issued a report that FEMA’s search-andrescue forces “ceased operations until National Guard can assist TF’s [Urban Search and 

Rescue Task Forces] with security.”42 James Strickland, a member of FEMA’s Urban Search 

and Rescue team, explained that throughout the day there had been reports of shootings 

and rioting in the streets.43

And at that point, we said, okay, we’re not sending out any of our teams unless they have 

some type of force protection with them, which at the time was kind of scarce. ... So that 

day, by the time we got force protection kegged up with everybody, we had really lost most 

of the day, the daylight gone...If any went out, it was very limited as to what went out because we didn’t have a suffi cient protection plan.44
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326

Many private-sector telecommunications were delayed by similar anxieties. Jeff Glick, 

the Division Chief for Critical Infrastructure Protection at the National Communications 

System, said “[B]e they true or not, the perception that the [communications sector] crews 

felt that they weren’t safe, and the companies would not let them go into the area because of 

lack of being able to get enough security, slowed initial response and reconstitution of the 

communications net.”45 Christopher Guttman-McCabe, the Vice President for Regulatory 

Aff airs at Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, agreed: workers feared 

they would be “assaulted, stripped of whatever they had with them” when they entered the 

disaster area to conduct repairs.46 Ultimately some companies hired private security guards 

to protect their employees.47

Government’s Responsibilities to Disseminate Information About Public Health, 

Safety, and Security 

Federal, state, and local governments must also disseminate information critical to the 

health, safety, and security of the public, which includes evacuation or decontamination 

instructions and warnings.48 Th e NRP ascribes primary responsibility for this to state and 

local governments; when catastrophic events have overwhelmed state and local authorities, 

the federal government must step in.49 However, no level of government provided adequate 

safety information to the public during Hurricane Katrina.

For example, neither DHS, through its component FEMA, nor Louisiana, nor New Orleans 

issued warnings about levee breaches or rising fl ood waters, though DHS/FEMA issued 

several other warnings, including one cautioning evacuees not to return to disaster areas 

prematurely.50 Nicol Andrews, FEMA’s Deputy Strategic Director for Public Aff airs, testifi ed that she did not consider warning the public about the fl ooding nor even discuss it with 

colleagues, other than FEMA Director Michael Brown and one other FEMA offi cial:51

Th at is not an action that FEMA has traditionally taken in the past; nor would 

I ever assume that it would be appropriate in this case. ... Public safety is not 

in the National Response Plan. It is not a FEMA responsibility. ... I’m not sure 

what good it would do to notify the public that the levees had been breached, 

even if it were a FEMA responsibility – which it’s not.52

When Ms. Andrews, one of only fi ve individuals who accompanied Director Brown to 

Louisiana as staff support,53 was asked why she thought it would do no good to notify the 

public of the levee failures she said:

Where are they going to go? I mean, the city had been evacuated and the roads 

closed. ... And again, evacuation and sheltering – also not roles that FEMA can 

take care of. It would not have helped the situation at all. ... And it certainly, 

again, wouldn’t come from FEMA.54

Th ese comments are inconsistent with responsibilities assigned under the NRP. FEMA’s 

Deputy Director of Legislative Aff airs, Th omas Bossert, has acknowledged that communicating information to the public is “crucial.”55

Th e state also failed to eff ectively notify its citizens of levee failures. Louisiana never activated the Emergency Alert System that could have disseminated both audible and visual warnings to the public through radio and TV stations.56 Th e New Orleans Emergency Operation 

Plan’s Hurricane Annex indicates that the city intended to rely on the Emergency Alert 

System as “the primary means of advising the public of a localized emergency.”57

Th e failure of government offi cials on all levels contributed to rumor mongering and circulation of inaccurate and confusing information, signifi cantly impeding response eff orts. 
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

327

Th is was one of the greatest repercussions of the failure to grasp federal and state emergency-response planning. 

1 U.S Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

Appendix I, p. 64 [hereinaft er NRP]. Th e language mirrors the statutory defi nition at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 

2 Colonial Pipeline Company, “Company Profi le,” 2006. http://www.colpipe.com/ab_main.asp. Accessed on Mar. 16, 

2006; U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 61 [hereinaft er Th e White House, 

Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned].

3 Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, p. 61; Colonial Pipeline Company, “Colonial Pipeline Plans to 

Restore Partial Service by this Weekend,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.colpipe.com/press_release/pr_72.asp. 

Accessed on Mar. 16, 2006.

4 Offi ce of the Vice President, Domestic Policy, “Energy,” Draft , Sept. 6, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

002746; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Spot Report #22, Sept. 6, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 5. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001465.

5 Colonial Pipeline Company, “Company Profi le,” 2006. http://www.colpipe.com/ab_main.asp. Accessed on Mar. 16, 

2006.

6 Paul Adams, “Hurricane washes over U.S. Economy; Katrina’s wake,” Baltimore Sun, Sept. 6, 2005; Sandra I. Erwin, 

“Commerce Dept. Seeks Data on Industries Aff ected by Katrina,” National Defense Magazine, Nov. 2005. ww.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/UF-Commerce.htm. Accessed on Feb. 26, 2006.

7 Sandra I. Erwin, “Commerce Dept. Seeks Data on Industries Aff ected by Katrina,” National Defense Magazine, Nov. 

2005. www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/UF-Commerce.htm. Accessed on Feb. 26, 2006.

8 Testimony of Peter Fonash, Ph.D., Deputy Manager and Director, National Communications System, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006.

9 Written Statement of William L. Smith, Chief, Technology Offi ce, BellSouth Corp., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8.

10 James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 4:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DAG 00000140 through 00000141.

11 NRP, p. ESF#13-1 (providing that DHS and DOJ are responsible for coordinating the federal government’s public 

safety and security support under the NRP). Peter Fonash testifi ed that NCS also played a role in coordinating assistance 

from the FBI and U.S. Marshal Service. Written Statement of Peter Fonash, Deputy Manager and Director, National 

Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a 

Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 7.

12 Robert Trono, e-mail to James McAtamney and Bill Mercer, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:14 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DAG 00000140.

13 Committee staff interview of Jeff rey Glick, Chief, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript p. 59; Written Statement of 

Smith, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8.

14 Th e National Communications System is a component of the Department of Homeland Security which is designed to 

provide communications support during emergencies.

15 Tom Wetherald, e-mail to Peter Fonash and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 9:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-INFP-0002-0000737 through 0000738. See also: Glick interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 60 (explaining NCS’s eff orts 

to work through the NRCC and ESF-13 process as well as with the National Guard).

16 Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006.

17 “Homeland Security Act of 2002,” (P.L. 107-296), 6 U.S.C. § 201.

18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan version 1.0, Base Plan, Nov. 2, 

2005, pp. 50-51. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Nov. 2, 2005]. See 

also: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Feb. 2005. http://www.

newsecurityconcepts.com/DataFiles/interim-nipp.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 28, 2006 [hereinaft er Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Feb. 2005].

19 Th e ESFs include: Transportation, Communications, Public Works and Engineering, Agriculture, and Energy.

20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program: Program Over-
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328

view.” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0465.xml. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006.

21 Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Nov. 2, 2005, pp. 50-51.

22 Southampton, England City Council, “Titanic – A Southampton Story: What the Papers Said,” www.southampton.

gov.uk/leisure/local-history-and-heritage/historical-records/titanic/papers.asp. Accessed on Mar. 1, 2006. Th e Titanic 

sailed from Southampton, which was home for most of her crew. 

23 John Burnett, Talk of the Nation, NPR, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” Aug. 29, 2005, 2 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on 

LexisNexis; Charles Gibson, World News Tonight, ABC, “World New Tonight Introduction,” Aug. 29, 2005, 6:30 p.m. 

ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis; Brian Williams, Today Show, NBC, “Superdome Structurally Sounds Despite 

Loosing Part of the Roof,” Aug. 29, 2005, 7 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

24 Ivor van Heerden, Fox News, “Special Coverage: Hurricane Katrina Pounds New Orleans,” Aug. 29, 2005, 5 p.m. ET. 

Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. In addition, Jeanne Meserve, a CNN Correspondent, described the situation in New 

Orleans: “I am looking over a scene of utter devastation. In an entire neighborhood, water has come up to the eaves of 

the houses and am told this is not the worst of it. ... I’m told the main part of the ward further down is even worse. Th e 

water is over the houses.” Source: Jeanne Meserve, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN, “Hurricane Katrina Slams Gulf 

Coast,” Aug. 29, 2005, 7 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. Also, the Times Picayune reported at 2 p.m. CT 

from the 9th Ward on the day of landfall: “Meanwhile, City Hall confi rmed a breach of the levee along the 17th Street 

Canal at Bellaire Drive, allowing water to spill into Lakeview.” Source: “Hurricane Katrina – Th e Storm Arrives,” New 

Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 29, 2005. Accessed on LexisNexis.

25 Peter Whoriskey and Guy Gugliotta, “Storm Th rashes Gulf Coast,” Th e Washington Post, Aug. 30, 2005, p. A01.

26 National Public Radio reported: “Th ey dodged the bullet, but they still got a sound bruising.” Th e reporter went on 

to say: “Th e levee, ... that surrounds the city of New Orleans has been breached in a couple of places by this storm.” 

John Burnet, Talk of the Nation, NPR, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” Aug. 29, 2005, 2 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on 

LexisNexis.

27 NRP; Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, 

Apr. 2005, pp. ESF-15–1 through ESF-15–7 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan]. Th e discussion in this 

section focuses only on the State of Louisiana, although presumably Alabama and Mississippi confronted similar issues. 

Th e NRP “ensures that suffi cient Federal assets are deployed....to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information 

to aff ected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace.” Source: NRP, p. ESF15–1. Th e Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan “provides information and external communications to inform people 

about the threat from natural...emergencies and disasters and the precautions and response measures that the State and 

local governments are taking to protect and preserve life and property.” Source: Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. 

ESF-15–1.

28 NRP, pp. PUB–1, PUB–8. 

29 NRP, p. 36. 

30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Situation Report #23, Sept. 6, 2005, 6 p.m., pp. 1, 21. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FRNT-0001-0001609, 0001629.

31 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. ESF-15–3.

32 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, pp. ESF-15–1, ESF-15–2.

33 Committee staff interview of Denise Bottcher, Press Secretary, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, 

transcript. p. 22.

34 NRP, p. 36.

35 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, New Orleans, Feb. 13, 2006, pp. 27-30.

36 Written Statement of Richard Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. 

Senate, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reforms, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 17 (“Both federal and Louisiana 

offi cials felt they could have provided a more positive and unifi ed image to the press and the public had they combined 

their eff orts from the beginning.”).

37 Brian Th evenot, “Myth-Making in New Orleans,” American Journalism Review, Dec./Jan. 2006. www.ajr.org/Article.

asp?id=3998. Accessed on Feb. 8, 2006.

38 Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors,” Th e Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 2005. http://www.latimes.

com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-rumors27sep27,0,3794602.story?coll=la-home-headlines. Accessed on Mar.13, 

2006; Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, NBC, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.

oprah.com/tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

39 Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors, Th e Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 2005”; Eddie Compass, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/tows/

slide/200509/20050906/slide_20050906_102.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

40 Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors, Th e Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 2005”; Guy Dinmore, 

“City of Rape, Rumour and Recrimination: Inside New Orleans,” Financial Times, London Edition, Sept. 5, 2005, p. 7. 

Accessed on LexisNexis.

41 Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, “News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid,” Th e Washington Post, Oct. 5, 
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

329

2005, p. A08.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #53, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:15 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0007629.

43 Committee staff interview of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

25, 2006, transcript p. 91.

44 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 91.

45 Glick interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 59.

46 Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory Aff airs, Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 25. 

47 Guttman-McCabe interview, Jan. 24, 2006 p. 25.

48 NRP, p. PUB–2, PUB–6.

49 NRP, p. ESF-15–1.

50 FEMA, “Evacuees Cautioned Not To Re-Enter Damage Areas Prematurely,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.

fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18488. Accessed on Mar. 9, 2006. Under the NRP and LA EOP, federal and state 

offi cials must adhere to responsibilities in emergency-response plans with respect to “immediate and continuing dissemination of health and safety instruction” and “to inform people about the threat from natural ... emergencies.” NRP, 

PUB–6; Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. 15–1.

51 Committee staff interview of Nicol Andrews, Deputy Director, Public Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 18, 2005, 

transcript pp. 13-14. 

52 Andrews interview, Nov. 18, 2005, pp. 13-17.

53 Andrews interview, Nov. 18, 2005, pp. 9, 24-25.

54 Andrews interview, Nov. 18, 2005, pp. 16-17.

55 Committee staff interview of Th omas Bossert, Deputy Director, Legislative Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 20, 

2005, transcript p. 98. 

56 Ken Kerschbaumer, “Broadcasters Seek Better Emergency Alert System,” Broadcasting and Cable, Sept. 12, 2005. 

http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6255755.html?display=Search+Results&text=kerschbaumer. Accessed on 

Apr. 17, 2006. It is all the more important that emergency responders have plans to activate the EAS and exercise those 

plans so that the EAS is actually used, because Congress made a signifi cant commitment to EAS when it authorized up 

to $156 million in funding “to implement a unifi ed national alert system capable of alerting the public, on a national, 

regional, or local basis to emergency situations by using a variety of communications technologies.” (P.L.109-171) 42 

U.S.C. § 3010.

57 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005.