In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-1735 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

ANDRES GARCIA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:12-CR-356-3 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 20, 2019

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. A jury found defendant-appellant Andres Garcia guilty of distributing cocaine—actually 

distributing a kilogram of the stuff—to co-defendant Alan 

Cisneros in violation of 21 US.C. § 841. The government offered no direct evidence that Garcia possessed or controlled 

cocaine, drug paraphernalia, large quantities of cash, or other 

unexplained wealth. There was no admission of drug trafficking by Garcia, nor any testimony from witnesses (undercover 
2 No. 18-1735 

agents, criminal confederates, innocent bystanders, or surveillance officers) that Garcia distributed cocaine. Instead, the 

government secured this verdict based upon a federal agent’s 

opinion testimony purporting to interpret several cryptic intercepted phone calls between Garcia and Cisneros, a known 

drug dealer. 

This case illustrates the role trial judges have in guarding 

the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. It also reminds us of the connection between the 

roles that judges play in criminal cases, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and in civil cases, where motions for 

summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law require judges to evaluate the outer limits of reasonable inferences under the lower civil standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing civil summary 

judgment standards to criminal standard discussed in Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). If the evidence would 

not allow a civil case to survive a motion for summary judgment or a directed verdict, then the case has no business being 

given to a jury in a criminal trial. 

We assume the government’s circumstantial evidence here 

might have supported a search warrant or perhaps a wiretap 

on Garcia’s telephone. It simply was not sufficient to support 

a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for distributing 

cocaine. We reverse the district court’s decisions denying Garcia’s motions for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and reverse his convictions for 

insufficient evidence. 
No. 18-1735 3

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. The Investigation of Cisneros and his Conversations with 

Garcia

Beginning in 2010, federal and state agents spent two years 

investigating an Illinois-based drug trafficking organization 

headed by Alan Cisneros, who, along with most of his co-conspirators, was affiliated with the Latin Kings street gang. The 

evidence against Cisneros included seizures of cocaine and 

cash used in drug deals, controlled buys made by both a confidential informant and an undercover agent, video footage 

from a camera concealed near Cisneros’ two residences, live 

surveillance of his residences, consensually recorded telephone conversations, and judicially authorized wiretaps on 

three of Cisneros’ telephones. The agents built a strong case 

against Cisneros. He ultimately pleaded guilty to possessing 

500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute. United 

States v. Cisernos, 846 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Garcia appeared on stage for only a few days at the end of 

the Cisneros investigation. Between April 17 and April 20, 

2012, agents recorded eight brief conversations between Cisneros and Garcia on one of Cisneros’ wiretapped telephones. 

Garcia and Cisneros had several cryptic exchanges, punctuated by Garcia’s two brief in-person visits with Cisneros. 

These conversations, as interpreted at trial by an ATF agent 

testifying as an expert witness, formed the basis for Garcia’s 

conviction. Garcia did not contest that he was the person 

speaking with Cisneros on the calls, and the government and 

Garcia stipulated to the accuracy of the English translations 

of the Spanish conversations. We review them in detail, for 

their content was the entire case against Garcia. 
4 No. 18-1735 

The first recorded conversation took place on the evening 

of Tuesday, April 17, 2012. After exchanging pleasantries, 

Garcia asked Cisneros if he was “all set to work” and, if so, 

“around how much [did he] count on over there?” Cisneros 

responded, “yes,” and “Like, two-four, something like that.” 

Garcia replied, “That’s not a problem ... I’ll go over there 

later.” About an hour later, after a brief call verifying Cisneros’ location, a surveillance camera showed a person entering 

one of Cisneros’ residences who was “a little shorter” with 

“longer hair”—descriptors that matched Garcia. That same 

person left Cisneros’ residence a “few minutes” later, along 

with another person whom agents never identified. 

The next afternoon, on Wednesday, April 18, 2012, Garcia 

and Cisneros again spoke on the phone. Cisneros queried, 

“Hey, by any chance ... did you see the girl yesterday or not?” 

Garcia demurred, “Noooo ... why?” Cisneros explained, “because I went to the bar afterwards,” and “she’s really ugly ... 

She scared me a little bit.” Garcia expressed skepticism, “I 

took a little taste, I mean, you know? And everything, and she 

was ... fine, you know?” Cisneros insisted, “every time I go to 

that bar, well, she’s ... really hot,” but “now she was a bit fat 

and ... a bit ugly.” Garcia conceded that he would “check 

around and [he’d] call [Cisneros] right back” and “see what 

he says.” 

A few hours later, Garcia told Cisneros that he had 

“talk[ed] to these guys right now” and “it was the ... the last 

of what they had,” and “that everything came the same 

way[.]” But if Cisneros “can work that one,” then “they will 

help us out with it, with something, they will give us a discount.” Cisneros remained unpersuaded, insisting that “she’s 

too fat, like really ... really worn out.” In fact, “she looks as if 
No. 18-1735 5

... she had already been ... worked at two or three bars.” Garcia pushed back, noting that “I even told your brother like I 

... I grabbed some ... And she did give a kick[.]” But, Garcia 

conceded, “let me give them another call right now and, so I’ll 

see what they tell me.” 

Garcia reported back a few minutes later that he “spoke 

with them,” and they wanted Cisneros to “work with her.” 

Garcia had been told that “they already threw the tix forward,” but “for the next one, he says that he could throw it to 

you for twenty-seven[.]” Cisneros objected that, “even if the 

next one were at twenty-five ... if you do the math, no. ... Let’s 

say at around seventy, or, or sixty. Seventy ... eighty ... 

around there. ... [I]t’s not even worth the bad reputation, to 

tell you the truth ... Why get a bad reputation with, with people?” Garcia replied, “So then let me, so let me tell this guy it 

would be better not to and ... and to try with that one or to 

cook this one and we’ll just wait and until he gets the rest.” 

Again, a few minutes later, Garcia was back in touch with 

Cisneros reporting that “the tix have already walked more 

that, that way.” Garcia explained that if Cisneros could “hold 

on to it for about two or so days,” then “he can change it for 

you.” Garcia repeated that he was told, “Tell him to hold on 

to it there and so while we get um, uh, the, the rest and then 

we’ll, we’ll, we’ll exchange it for him.” Cisneros wanted to 

know, “By when, more or less[?]” Garcia replied, “by Friday,” 

and “we’ll give you another one within two days for sure.” 

These conversations sounded suspicious, understandably, 

to the agents monitoring Cisneros’ telephones. Thinking that 

a delivery of drugs could be imminent, agents positioned 

themselves near Cisneros’ two residences to conduct surveillance in person on the evening of Friday, April 20, 2012. 
6 No. 18-1735 

Garcia called Cisneros that evening to say he would “be 

right there so I can talk with you.” Agents observed Garcia 

pull up in a gray Audi and walk to the front porch of one of 

Cisneros’ residences. The agents did not notice Garcia carry 

anything to the residence. A few minutes later, Garcia and 

Cisneros got into the Audi, drove down the street, and entered 

another of Cisneros’ residences. Agents still did not see Garcia 

carrying anything. After about fifteen minutes, Garcia left Cisneros’ residence—again apparently without carrying anything—and drove away in the Audi with agents following 

him. 

While Garcia was still driving, Cisneros and Garcia had 

another phone conversation. Garcia reported: “The little bit 

that I put on my tongue, it looks like it’s, it’s good, man, you 

know?” Garcia told Cisneros, “you test it,” or “like casually, 

just tell one of those guys who are around, give a taste to 

someone around there to find out.” Cisneros replied that he 

was “also the same right now.” Garcia laughed, and said, 

“Yeah, right? Yes, so then, I said, ‘Wow, what the!’ ... So what 

if I had put a good, uh, handful there.” Garcia told Cisneros 

that they would “be in touch. If there’s anything, call me.” 

The agents following Garcia’s car believed he had narcotics with him. They conducted a traffic stop as he was turning 

into the driveway of his house. The agents’ belief was not correct. The agents asked Garcia if they could search his car, and 

Garcia agreed. Although a narcotics-sniffing dog gave a positive indication that some sort of drug (legal or illegal) had 

been or was in the car, the agents found nothing of interest 

except two cellphones. They asked Garcia if they could look 

in the telephones, and again Garcia agreed. Checking the call 
No. 18-1735 7

log, they confirmed that Garcia had indeed been in contact 

with Cisneros. 

The agents then asked Garcia’s family members if they 

could search the house. The family members agreed. The 

agents found nothing of interest—no drugs, no money, no 

drug paraphernalia, no wrappers or presses, no baggies or 

tinfoil, no pipes, no scales or ledgers. 

Desiring to do a more thorough search of the car, the 

agents asked Garcia if he would return with them to the police 

station. Again, Garcia agreed. He was taken to the station and 

fingerprinted. The agents did not find any secret compartments in Garcia’s car, which, according to the lead case agent 

at trial, are often used “for storing drugs, money, guns, things 

of that nature.” Whatever suspicions the agents had were not 

borne out by the searches of Garcia’s person, car, and home. 

Garcia was nonetheless indicted in a thirty-five count indictment charging Cisneros and nine others with various 

drug trafficking and related offenses in connection with the 

Latin Kings’ street-gang activities. Garcia, who was not a 

member of the Latin Kings, appeared in just two counts of this 

far-ranging indictment: supplying cocaine to Cisneros on 

April 17, 2012 (Count 28), and using a telephone to facilitate 

that transaction (Count 27), in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and 843(b), respectively. 

B. The Trial

The government’s theory at trial was that on Wednesday, 

April 17, 2012, Garcia sold “a large quantity of cocaine to Alan 

Cisneros in exchange for $24,000.” The telephone conversations were evidence of this transaction because, the government contended, Garcia and Cisneros used “girl” to mean 
8 No. 18-1735 

“cocaine,” and “two-four” to mean “twenty-four thousand 

dollars.” 

The government presented four witnesses at trial. All were 

ATF agents. None saw Garcia engage in distributing cocaine. 

None saw him in possession of cocaine, large quantities of 

cash, or drug paraphernalia. Three of the agent-witnesses carried out the Cisneros investigation, but they provided no evidence to corroborate the government’s theory about Garcia’s 

calls. Two of those three testified briefly about their first-hand 

observation of Garcia’s visit to Cisneros on April 20, 2012, and 

the fruitless traffic stop and searches. 

The third agent, Andrew Karceski, similarly described 

Garcia’s visits to Cisneros’ house and the traffic stop. He also 

read aloud to the jury the transcripts of Garcia and Cisneros’ 

recorded conversations. Despite Agent Karceski’s experience 

“surveill[ing Cisneros] for many, many, many hours, observ[ing] him throughout two years,” the prosecutor explained to the judge that “we aren’t asking [Agent Karceski] 

to opine or offer any opinions on what is being said in the 

conversations” with Garcia. (This was prudent. See, e.g., 

United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 675 (7th Cir. 2009).) 

For that effort, the prosecution called instead a fourth 

agent, one who had no firsthand knowledge of the Cisneros 

investigation. The government offered Agent Christopher 

Labno as “an ATF special agent with experience interpreting 

drug code.” After reviewing the transcripts, Labno testified 

that when Cisneros said “two-four,” he was “Talking about 

$24,000.” Agent Labno said his opinion was based on his experience that drug dealers will “Typically ... just [use] numbers instead of someone saying I would like, you know, 

$25,000, it will be two-five, that type of thing.” 
No. 18-1735 9

Agent Labno opined further that the type of drug Garcia 

and Cisneros were discussing was “powder cocaine” because 

“some examples of [] code words” used for cocaine include, 

“Work, girl, that white girl.” In contrast, “example[s] of code 

word[s] for heroin” include “Boy, dog food, diesel.” And the 

market price for cocaine in April 2012 determined the amount 

of drugs sold, with Agent Labno testifying, “I would say the 

[cocaine market price] range would be between approximately 24 to $28,000 a kilo.” 

Agent Labno similarly explained the remainder of Garcia 

and Cisneros’ conversations solely by reference to “typical” 

or “common” use of phrases or courses of action by drug dealers in general: 

 Garcia’s use of the term “work”? Labno: 

“Ready to work or set to work and work in 

general is typically what is the code word for 

narcotics.” 

 Cisneros’ reference to “the girl” being “worn 

out”? Labno: “The cocaine has been cut too 

much” because “[t]ypically cocaine come[s] 

into the country at 85 to 90 percent pure 

[and] then is distributed through various individuals and very often the practice is each 

time to add some cut and to take some cocaine out.” 

 What was meant by “tix”? Labno: “Tix refers 

to tickets, which is a common code word for 

money.” 
10 No. 18-1735 

 Why was Cisneros talking about his “reputation”? Labno: “Typically, you want the 

best reputation you can for your product.” 

 And the mention of “cooking”? Labno: It 

meant to “[c]ook the cocaine into crack cocaine” because “I understand that one of the 

ways to recover cocaine that’s been cut too 

much is to cook it into crack cocaine.” 

 What did Garcia mean by “taste”? Labno: 

He was “[t]esting the cocaine” because 

“[t]ypically individuals will either use a 

tester, someone who ... can tell whether it’s 

good or not. Sometimes they’ll — another 

way would be to put it on a mucous membrane, basically your tongue, your nose, 

your mouth, your gum, to see if you get a 

numb sensation or that type of feeling.” 

 What about the reference to a “corner”? 

Labno: That meant “off of the kilo, only a 

small portion, a corner of it, had been sold,” 

as “[t]ypically [cocaine is packaged as] a 

compressed brick ... Sometimes it can be 

packaged in other items ... If they conceal 

[it] in a pipe, it could be a circular puck. But 

very commonly, it’s a brick.” 

Agent Labno testified that he formed an opinion as to 

these conversations based on only his view of how narcotics 

trafficking is “typically ... done on the street in my experience.” He acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not 

know Garcia and Cisneros and that he knew nothing specific 
No. 18-1735 11

about them. Agent Labno agreed that the meaning of code 

words—to the extent they were code words—“would depend 

on the context.” But, he insisted, although “I don’t know the 

individuals, I know the context of narcotics trafficking very 

well.” Defense counsel observed that Agent Labno apparently 

chose the “context” through which to interpret the conversations by “[a]ssuming that someone is guilty of narcotics trafficking.” She thus laid the foundation for the point that, if one 

starts with the assumption that Garcia was trafficking cocaine, 

the conversations makes sense, but if one starts with the presumption of innocence, some further corroboration of actual 

criminal conduct is needed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. She moved for a judgment of acquittal, which Judge 

Der-Yeghiayan denied. 

In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, “when 

you consider all of the evidence, the calls, the code, the surveillance and the traffic stop, you know that [Garcia] sold 

$24,000 worth of cocaine to Alan Cisneros on April 17th, 2012, 

and you also know that he used a cellular telephone to facilitate.” The prosecutor concluded vaguely: “You know that 

what was said during those calls meant something.” The jury 

returned a guilty verdict on both charges, finding that Garcia 

had distributed cocaine and had used a communication facility to distribute the cocaine. Defense counsel renewed her motion for a judgment of acquittal, which was again denied. 

Upon Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s retirement, the case was assigned to Judge Pallmeyer for sentencing. Judge Pallmeyer 

denied Garcia’s post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. She found 

that Garcia sold one kilogram of cocaine based upon the evidence at trial and, with zero criminal history points and a 
12 No. 18-1735 

criminal history category of I, that his sentencing guideline 

range was 51 to 63 months. Garcia was sentenced to 48 

months in prison on each count, to be served concurrently. 

II. Analysis 

On appeal, Garcia argues that the court should have entered a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 29 because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. 

Without corroborating evidence, the agent’s opinion testimony regarding the meaning of Garcia’s allegedly incriminating conversations amounted to educated speculation rather 

than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1

We begin by laying out the general standards for reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, which the Supreme Court has taught can benefit from comparison to 

standards of proof in civil cases, such as when a judge may 

take a claim or issue away from a jury by granting summary 

judgment or judgment as a matter of law. We then review the 

application of the governing standard in relevant case law. 

We conclude by explaining why the chain of logic in the 

 1 Garcia raised two other issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial judge 

abused his discretion by refusing to ask prospective jurors expressly about 

racial bias or anti-immigrant sentiment; and (2) whether the sentencing 

judge erred in finding sufficient evidence to support the drug quantity 

finding. As to the first issue, while more pointed voir dire questions might 

be advisable to elicit specific juror prejudices, existing precedent leaves 

this matter to the trial judge’s discretion unless “racial or ethnic bias ... is, 

or might be, a central aspect of the case”—a situation not present here. 

United States v. Montenegro, 231 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 2000). Because we 

set aside Garcia’s conviction, we need not address the sentencing issue. 
No. 18-1735 13

government’s case failed to establish proof of Garcia’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

A. Standards of Review and Proof 

A trial judge, upon a defendant’s motion or on the judge’s 

own initiative, “must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction,” either after the government has closed its evidence 

or after a jury has rendered a verdict or been discharged. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 29(a), (c). In reviewing a district court’s denial of a 

motion for judgment of acquittal, we do not defer to the district judge’s decision. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 

803 (7th Cir. 2014). 

In applying Rule 29, the court must view the evidence “in 

the light most favorable to the government to determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1159–60 (7th 

Cir. 2013). We have often said that a defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal faces a “nearly insurmountable hurdle.” 

E.g., United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990, 998 (7th Cir. 2017) 

(invoking chain of quotations); see also, e.g., United States v. 

Tantchev, 916 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Maldonado, 893 F.3d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 2018). 

But, to be clear, we have also insisted that “the height of 

the hurdle depends directly on the strength of the government’s evidence.” United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th 

Cir. 2013) (affirming grant of Rule 29 judgment of acquittal). 

Successful challenges are relatively rare, but “a properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it can be 

said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a 
14 No. 18-1735 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979) 

(adding that “the same may be said of a trial judge sitting as 

a jury”). 

The Supreme Court has taught that, in applying Rule 29 

and the reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases, it is useful to compare the similar role that judges play in deciding 

motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter 

of law in civil cases, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

56 and 50. In Jackson, the Court explained that “the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard” requires a “quantum and quality 

of proof” that permits a judge to “distinguish between criminal and civil cases for the purpose of ruling on a motion for 

judgment of acquittal.” Id. at 318 n.11. Similarly, in one of the 

iconic cases on summary judgment in civil cases, the Court 

returned to Jackson’s focus on “the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability,” advising that a 

case should not go to a jury “if the evidence presented ... is of 

insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact 

to find” liability under the applicable standard of proof. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). 

Anderson explained that when a judge considers a motion 

for summary judgment, a directed verdict under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 50(a), or a “First Amendment [case that] 

mandates a ‘clear and convincing’ standard,” it is, “[i]n terms 

of the nature of the inquiry, ... no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the 

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the 

trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 250–52, citing Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318–19. In all of these contexts, the judge must consider 

“the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would 
No. 18-1735 15

apply at the trial on the merits.” Id. at 252; see also Ford v. 

Ahitow, 104 F.3d 926, 938 (7th Cir. 1997) (Jackson inquiry is “no 

different from the consideration of the trial judge’s inquiry in 

a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict,” 

namely a “judge asks whether a fair-minded jury could return 

a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented”). 

The judge must ensure in both civil and criminal cases that 

determinations of credibility and the choices among reasonable inferences from the evidence are left to the jury. But in all 

of these contexts, the judge is still responsible for enforcing 

outer limits on reasonable inferences, guided by the relevant 

standard of proof. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254–55; see also, e.g., 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 595 (1986) (affirming summary judgment in civil antitrust 

suit where “speculative or ambiguous” evidence did not support triable issue under preponderance-of-evidence standard); Willis v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 544–

45 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s grant of judgment 

as matter of law; insufficient evidence to support jury verdict 

that defendants harbored any racial animus or had fired 

plaintiff to retaliate for her claim of employment discrimination). A judge facing a Rule 29 motion in a criminal case might 

benefit from first asking whether, if the evidence had been 

presented in a civil case, it would be sufficient to send the case 

to the jury. 

B. Assessing the Required Quantum and Quality of Evidence 

in a Criminal Case 

As noted, reversals for insufficient evidence in criminal 

cases are relatively rare in modern federal practice. There are 

sufficient examples, however, to show that the evidence 
16 No. 18-1735 

against Garcia fell well short of what could support a finding 

of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

1. Surveying Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Cases 

Comparing the government’s evidence against Garcia to 

the amount and types of evidence that we have previously 

found sufficient or insufficient to carry the government’s burden helps to map on which side of the line Garcia’s case falls. 

To support Garcia’s conviction, the government cites 

United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2014), as comparable in terms of the quantum of proof because no drugs were 

submitted as evidence at trial. In fact, the government’s case 

in Cejas was much stronger than this one. In Cejas, a cooperating co-defendant testified that the defendants sold him drugs. 

Id. at 722. The government also offered surveillance video of 

the defendants leaving the drug deal and placing items in a 

toolbox attached to the bed of their truck. And when the 

agents promptly executed a traffic stop of those defendants, 

the agents recovered the $8,000 cash payment for the drugs 

and a gun from the truck’s toolbox. Id. at 721–22. We found 

that the combination of the testimony of the drug buyer, the 

video of the use of the truck box, and the recovered cash and 

gun was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. at 727. There 

simply is no such corroborating evidence of criminal activity 

in the government’s case against Garcia. 

The remaining cases cited by the government bear even 

less resemblance to the case against Garcia. For example, in 

United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2018), 

the defendant had admitted most of the charged conduct, and 

his admissions were corroborated by substantial amounts of 

recovered narcotics, incriminating recorded calls, and 
No. 18-1735 17

testimony of several witnesses—including a cooperating codefendant. Likewise, in United States v. Mbaye, 827 F.3d 617, 

619–20 (7th Cir. 2016), the defendant had admitted engaging 

in the fraudulent activities and argued only his lack of fraudulent intent. On the issue of intent, the government offered 

testimony of both of his co-conspirators, as well as other actions indicating consciousness of guilt, such as not reporting 

his fraudulent income to the IRS and lying to investigators. Id.

at 620. 

In another case that “skate[d] very close” to the line between sufficient and insufficient circumstantial evidence, 

United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1259 (7th Cir. 1991), the 

government had stronger evidence of the defendant’s involvement in a drug conspiracy. No co-conspirators testified 

that Duarte bought or sold cocaine, and police found no drugs 

or paraphernalia in his presence. But Duarte shared a hotel 

room with another defendant who was arrested as he traveled 

to a second hotel room where the police later found more than 

a kilogram of cocaine. More than 100 telephone calls were 

made from Duarte’s room in two days, and Duarte carried a 

pager, deemed then (it was 1990) a tool of the drug trade. The 

police found notes in Duarte’s wallet that he had written and 

that a government expert said were records of drug transactions. We also emphasized that Duarte had lied to the police 

about just about every subject they asked him about, including providing a false address, using a car registered to a false 

address, and carrying a bogus driver’s license, creating “a 

cloud of suspicion surrounding his presence in Milwaukee.” 

Id. at 1260. Thus, even in Duarte, which marked a point very 

close to the outer bounds of sufficient evidence, there was 

considerably more evidence—the associate headed toward a 

kilogram of cocaine; the drug ledgers; the telephone calls and 
18 No. 18-1735 

pager; and the cloud of lies to the police—than the government offered against Garcia here. 

Further illustrating the weakness of the government’s case 

is the fact that the quantum and quality of evidence offered 

against Garcia were noticeably weaker than the evidence in a 

number of cases where we have reversed convictions for insufficient evidence. 

For example, in United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339–40 

(7th Cir. 2013), the government presented a range of circumstantial evidence in its effort to convict defendant Jones of 

possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. We affirmed the 

district court’s ruling that there was insufficient evidence to 

support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt because 

evidentiary gaps required the jury to speculate as to Jones’s 

guilt. 

The government’s theory was that defendant Jones had 

helped a co-defendant, Finley, cook some cocaine into crack 

to fulfill a drug order from an undercover government informant—a theory supported by some circumstantial evidence. Id. at 341. Government witnesses testified as to their 

“interpretation of two recorded telephone conversations between Jones and Finley,” including Jones seeming to relay his 

intention to pick up items at a CVS or Walmart that could be 

used to cook cocaine. Id. at 341–42. Jones also stated he was 

looking for a blender, which FBI agents testified could be used 

to cook crack. Id. at 343, 349. Two co-conspirators testified, including Finley’s usual cocaine “cooker,” who had not cooked 

for Finley on the day at issue. Id. at 342. The officers who conducted surveillance of Jones and Finley testified as to Jones’s 

movements throughout the day. Id. at 341-45. And the jury 

heard testimony that Jones was in Finley’s car during a police 
No. 18-1735 19

chase on the relevant evening and that the officers recovered 

a plastic bag filled with crack that Finley threw from his car 

during the chase. Id. at 344-45. Finally, the government played 

a recording of Jones reporting to Finley after the police chase 

on his (Jones’s) efforts to find the discarded crack in the neighborhood where Finley had thrown the bag. Id. at 341–45, 349. 

Nonetheless, the circumstantial evidence in Jones was not 

sufficient to permit jurors, in terms of Jackson, “to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319. Despite the temptation to nod along with the 

government’s evidence and think that of course the defendant 

was probably guilty, such gut feelings and suspicions do not 

relieve the government of the burden of offering sufficient evidence to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The government’s evidence in Jones had not connected the links in the 

logical chain: “None of the intercepted telephone conversations showed an agreement between Jones and Finley to have 

Jones cook the cocaine.” Jones, 713 F.3d at 349. “No witness 

testified that Jones cooked any cocaine or was ever in possession of any cocaine.” Id. at 341. “No witness saw Jones in possession of the crack at any time [and] [n]o witness heard Jones 

admit that he had possessed the crack or that he had helped 

Finley cook the cocaine.” Id. at 346. “Jones was never seen 

with any cooking utensils or diluents at any point during the 

day,” nor was he “seen on the grounds of a CVS, Wal-Mart, 

or Walgreens where one might purchase such ingredients.” 

Id. at 349. The search for the blender did not help because Finley’s regular cocaine cooker testified that “he and others typically did not use a blender to cook cocaine, and no one ever 

saw Jones or Finley in possession of a blender.” Id. Of the 

“three latent fingerprints on the bag [of discarded crack] none 

belonged to Jones.” Id. at 345. And “the government could not 
20 No. 18-1735 

establish that any drugs were actually present” in the locations that officers observed Jones visit during the day at issue. 

Id. at 349. Filling this “evidentiary void” with “guesswork” 

and “speculati[on]” was impermissible. Id. at 348. 

Another case in which we found evidence insufficient 

(against one of two defendants), United States v. DiNovo, 523 

F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1975), also mustered more evidence than 

was offered against Garcia. After Myron and Janet DiNovo 

led police and DEA agents on a high-speed chase, they 

searched the couple’s home. In the bedroom, agents discovered two pounds of heroin in the dresser and drug-weighing 

scales in the closet. In the living room, agents found a briefcase with $14,000 in cash, foil packets of heroin, and seven hypodermic needles, six containing heroin. Id. at 199. Although 

there was sufficient evidence to convict Myron, the government did not submit evidence that would permit jurors to find 

that Janet also possessed the heroin: “There was no evidence 

to show that she owned the trailer,” and the “Government offered no evidence of what type of clothing was in the dresser” 

with the heroin, “[n]or ... what was in the portion of the closet 

where the scales were found.” Id. at 201–02. The government’s 

assertions, based on suspicious circumstantial evidence, that 

Janet was sufficiently connected to the heroin were simply not 

adequate. Nothing in DiNovo suggests that the result would 

have changed if the government had offered an experienced 

agent’s opinion that wives usually help their husbands in 

drug-trafficking if the contraband is kept in their shared 

home. 

Even within the limited set of cases in which we have 

found evidence to be insufficient, we could go on. For example, in United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 800–01 (7th Cir. 
No. 18-1735 21

2014), the government presented highly suspicious evidence: 

the defendant, whose van was pulled over in Indianapolis, 

was carrying over 23,000 cigarettes purchased in Kentucky 

and a trash bag with over $15,000 in cash, and the defendant 

admitted that he made some money reselling cigarettes illegally for profit. Yet there was insufficient evidence introduced 

at trial that, as required for conviction, the defendant “intended to sell the cigarettes in Indiana.” Id. at 810. Similarly, in

United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749, 750 (7th Cir. 2009), in an 

effort to convict the defendant of being a felon in possession 

of a firearm, the government presented “testimony from several law enforcement agents, a forensic technician, and tapes 

of two 911 calls, as well as stipulations by the parties”—including the defendant’s ex-girlfriend’s statement in her 911 

call that defendant was holding “a weapon, which she described as a big revolver.” That evidence was insufficient, 

however, because the weapon recovered with defendant’s fingerprints was not a revolver but a 12-gauge shotgun, and the 

forensic technician could not rule out that defendant’s fingerprints pre-dated his felony conviction. Id. at 752. We cautioned: “A jury cannot speculate its way out of reasonable 

doubt.” Id.

Perhaps the most useful case was the most straightforward. In United States v. Allen, 383 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004), we 

reversed defendant David L. Allen’s 2003 conviction for being 

a felon in possession of a firearm because there was insufficient evidence tying him to the predicate felony conviction. 

One David L. Allen had been convicted of dealing in cocaine 

in 1995. Id. at 645–46. The future federal defendant David L. 

Allen was arrested in 1999 on a post-conviction warrant issued in the 1995 case. He did not argue then that the arrest 

was a case of mistaken identity—i.e., that he was not the same 
22 No. 18-1735 

David L. Allen who had been convicted in 1995. But after the 

Allen who was arrested in 1999 was arrested again in 2003 and 

charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, he argued the government could not prove he was the same David 

L. Allen who had been convicted in 1995. Id. at 646. 

The 1995 report contained no identifying information beyond a case number and his name—no fingerprint, photograph, or physical description. But the district court found Allen guilty because (1) he shared the same name with the 1995 

defendant, (2) he had not objected in 1999 to being arrested in 

connection with the 1995 offense, and (3) a common case 

number was associated with all three arrests, making it reasonable to infer that the 2003 defendant was the same person 

convicted in 1995. Id. While the district judge’s inferences 

were reasonable, we reversed. The question was not whether 

a logical set of inferences could show the charge was possibly 

or even likely true, but whether it could be inferred beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as charged. Id.

at 649. Our answer was no.2

 

2 See also Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F.3d 687, 689–90, 693 (7th Cir. 2001), 

where we found the evidence was insufficient to sustain the murder conviction. Our dissenting colleague understates the evidence against Piaskowski. See post at 38. The evidence showed that the defendant had expressed anger at the victim, the defendant had told a witness shortly before the murder that “there was some shit going down,” another suspect’s 

confession placed the defendant at the scene of the murder, and a co-defendant admitted that he had attacked the victim “like everybody else,” 

presumably including defendant. We held that the verdict was premised 

on “conjecture camouflaged as evidence,” and “require[d] a leap of logic 

that no reasonable jury should have been permitted to take”). Other cases 

reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 

693–95, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2012) (insufficient evidence for felon-in-possession conviction despite agents’ seizure at defendant’s residence (owned 
No. 18-1735 23

We have not found other cases in this circuit where the 

government tried to bridge the evidentiary gap, as it did here, 

solely with an agent’s expert opinion, but similar efforts have 

not fared well in the Second Circuit. In United States v. Young, 

745 F.2d 733, 738–39 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit vacated 

the conspiracy conviction of one defendant, Tangee Afflic, 

who had been charged with serving as a courier in a heroin 

network. Afflic shared an apartment with Young, a defendant 

convicted of a larger role in the conspiracy, id. at 744, and she 

lived in what appeared to be an apartment building that was 

“a vertically integrated heroin distribution network.” Id. at 

757. Afflic was also the subject of extensive surveillance, during which she was seen delivering shopping bags or small 

packages to various locations, and was mentioned or recorded on intercepted phone conversations that “the government contended were ‘coded,’” including communications 

 

by his parents) of ten firearms and five sets of ammunition, testimony 

from his probation officer that she told his father there should not be firearms in the house, and slightly inaccurate testimony from jailhouse informant that defendant admitted to owning two of the guns that were 

found in the kitchen; we reasoned that because there was “no evidence 

that [defendant] himself ever had actual physical possession of the shotgun ... no evidence of his fingerprints ... nor did any witnesses testify that 

they had seen [defendant] holding or using them,” the jury was simply 

“speculat[ing] its way out of reasonable doubt”) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Jones, 371 F.3d 363, 364–66, 368 (7th Cir. 2004) (insufficient evidence to convict Jones of transferring gun to another state’s resident despite video evidence of Jones accompanying his co-defendant to 

purchase gun illegally, agent’s testimony that Jones accompanied his codefendant across state lines to sell gun, and admission of co-defendant’s 

statement describing scheme; “[t]he government might have obtained 

support for [its theory] if the ATF had further investigated,” but “[a]ll the 

government brought to trial was its speculation”). 
24 No. 18-1735 

describing efforts at “detecting or eluding surveillance.” Id. at 

742–44. 

The court found that this evidence was sufficient to support probable cause for a search of Afflic’s apartment, during 

which agents found an automatic rifle, two loaded 50-shell 

magazines, fur jackets, and gold jewelry worth thousands of 

dollars. Id. at 744–45, 757–58. This evidence was not sufficient, 

however, to support Afflic’s conviction. Id. at 764. The amount 

of unexplained wealth was “relatively small,” and the “surveillance testimony” describing Afflic’s delivery of “a ‘white’ 

bag’” to other conspiracy participants was underwhelming. 

Id. The court explained that “the most this evidence established was that [she] was aware of the conspiracy and associated with some of its members”—not enough to prove her 

own guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The agent’s expert 

opinion did not carry the day but was still deemed admissible 

because it “was not used to explain the absence of any corroborating physical evidence in the government’s case, but was 

instead used to explain physical evidence that was in the 

case.” Id. at 761. 

Nevertheless, the expert opinion drew a word of “caution” 

because it was “offered to establish that ambiguous conduct

constitutes criminal activity.” Id. at 765 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman explained that one must

question whether an [experienced narcotics 

agent] expert’s opinion that the events he observes constitute a drug transaction provides 

very much, if any, assistance to a jury, beyond 

whatever inference is available to be drawn by 

the jury from all the evidence. ... Whatever 

slight probative value arises from a narcotics 
No. 18-1735 25

expert’s personal opinion that an observed 

transaction involved a sale of drugs must be 

carefully weighed against the distinct risk of 

prejudice. The ‘aura of special reliability and 

trustworthiness’ surrounding expert testimony, 

which ought to caution its use, especially when 

offered by the prosecution in criminal cases, 

poses a special risk in a case of this sort. That 

risk arises because the jury may infer that the 

agent’s opinion about the criminal nature of the 

defendant’s activity is based on knowledge of 

the defendant beyond the evidence at trial. ... 

The hazard of permitting the opinion in evidence ought to make courts cautious in assessing the sufficiency of a case based heavily on 

such an opinion. If the observed actions of a defendant do not establish a prima facie case, I do 

not believe that an expert’s opinion that his actions are criminal may carry the prosecution’s 

proof above the requisite line. It is one thing to 

permit a jury to weigh that opinion in considering an otherwise adequate case; it is quite another matter to let that opinion salvage an insufficient case. 

Id. at 765–66 (internal citations omitted); see also United States 

v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 234–35 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing 

conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 

and endorsing Judge Newman’s concurrence in Young; 

agent’s expert opinion could not supply sufficient evidentiary 

basis to infer intent to distribute beyond reasonable doubt); 

United States v. Sette, 334 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1964) (reversing 
26 No. 18-1735 

conviction because sole evidence that defendant engaged in 

illegal gambling was two agents’ “opinion testimony” based 

on “their observations and their general knowledge of the 

gambling business”; this did not “suffice[] to make a case for 

the jury” where agents “utterly failed” to follow through on 

surveillance and other evidence-gathering efforts—“the 

proper and recognized manner of proving” the offense). 

2. Assessing the Evidence Against Garcia 

Returning to this case here, the government’s case “consists entirely of inferences the government argues may be 

drawn” about Garcia’s conversations, and we must decide 

“whether this evidence permits an inference beyond a reasonable doubt.” Allen, 383 F.3d at 647. “Although a jury may infer 

facts from other facts that are established by inference, each 

link in the chain of inferences must be sufficiently strong to 

avoid a lapse into speculation.” Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F.3d 687, 

693 (7th Cir. 2001). 

In making this assessment, a judge must take special care 

to guard against the possibility that a defendant might be 

found guilty by either speculation or mere association. Circumstantial evidence that leads only to a “strong suspicion 

that someone is involved in a criminal activity is no substitute 

for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 692. And 

evidence that calls for inferences that are “motivated or made 

possible by speculation”—especially inferences “focused on a 

defendant’s presence or association with criminals or their 

criminal activity”—will fail to carry the government’s burden. Jones, 713 F.3d at 347. It is simply not enough to “fill the 

[evidentiary] gaps with inferences of guilt by association or 

evidence of an individual’s mere presence somewhere criminal activity may have occurred.” Id. at 352.
No. 18-1735 27

With our focus on Garcia and Cisneros’ conversations, a 

key government contention is that the use of the word “girl” 

meant “cocaine,” and the word “work” also meant either “cocaine” or “drug dealing.” We do not doubt Agent Labno’s testimony that some drug dealers use these code words for cocaine and drug dealing. But we have also heard expert testimony in other cases regarding other code words used by drug 

dealers. See e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 679 F. App’x 470, 471 

(7th Cir. 2017) (agent testified based on his experience and 

training that defendants used code word “cabbage” to refer 

to cocaine); United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 237 (7th Cir. 

1992) (agent testified that “terms like ‘a gallon of paint’ and 

‘truck,’ ‘van,’ and ‘tractor’ ... indicated the involvement of a 

kilogram quantity of cocaine”). From a two-year investigation 

into Cisneros’ drug-dealing activities, the government did not 

offer any corroboration that Cisneros (and not just a “typical” 

drug dealer) referred to cocaine as “girl” or “work,” such that 

a juror could reasonably infer that Garcia understood Cisneros to be talking about cocaine. 

The next link in the government’s inferential chain is that 

Garcia understood Cisneros’ phrase “two-four,” to mean Cisneros would pay $24,000 for one kilogram of cocaine. Agent 

Labno may have correctly hypothesized that “two-four” 

meant $24,000, which was, perhaps fortuitously, at the bottom 

of his estimated range of market prices for a kilogram of cocaine in Chicago in mid-2012. But like any commodity, cocaine’s market price can fluctuate, which would make any 

corroboration of Labno’s estimate helpful for proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. After all, other agents’ expert testimony in 

other contemporary cases opined that several months after 

Garcia’s alleged sale, the 2013 Chicago-area market price for 

a kilogram of cocaine was—at the low end—$34,000 per 
28 No. 18-1735 

kilogram. See, e.g., United States v. Delgadillo, Case No. 13-cr673, Doc. 111-3 at 1–2 (July 1, 2014) and Doc. 151 at 278–79 

(N.D. Ill. July 22, 2014) (agent offered expert opinion that 2013 

Chicago market price for cocaine purchased in bulk quantity 

of six kilograms was $34,000 per kilogram, but “if the person 

was going to buy less, there is a possibility that the price could 

actually increase”); Vasquez, 679 Fed. Appx. at 471–72 (law enforcement agent’s testimony that defendant sold a kilogram 

of cocaine for $36,000). Again, there was no corroboration 

here. 

Did Cisneros refer to money as “tix” so he would share 

Agent Labno’s suggested understanding of Garcia’s comment? Did Cisneros’ concern about his “reputation” mean his 

reputation as a drug dealer, so that Garcia would take from 

that concern what Agent Labno suspected? Did Cisneros ever 

“cook” his cocaine, so that Garcia’s suggestion was likely to 

be what Agent Labno presumed? Was Cisneros’ cocaine typically packaged in bricks, pucks, or some other form, such that 

one could find Agent Labno’s speculation about the meaning 

of “corner” more helpful than not? We and the jury could 

speculate, but that’s not enough. 

Agent Labno’s experience let him offer informed and perhaps accurate speculation about the likely meaning of Garcia’s calls with Cisneros. Their conversations were certainly 

suspicious. They might well have supported applications for 

search warrants or further wiretaps. We recognize that it is 

possible, perhaps even likely, that Garcia was guilty in fact. 

But “[t]he heavy standard applied in criminal cases manifests 

our concern that the risk of error to the individual must be 

minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go 

free.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). These 
No. 18-1735 29

cryptic conversations, filtered through an agent’s experience 

with other, unrelated cases without any corroboration that 

Garcia was actually trafficking in cocaine, were not sufficient 

to support a criminal conviction. See Piaskowski, 256 F.3d at 

693 (reversing verdict based on “conjecture camouflaged as 

evidence”). 

District judges have a wealth of experience in applying the 

varying standards of proof to gauge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. When considering motions for summary 

judgment or directed verdicts, judges are accustomed to considering carefully whether civil plaintiffs’ “actual quantum 

and quality of proof” are of “insufficient caliber or quantity to 

allow a rational finder of fact to find” liability to send the matter to trial or to the jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254. When faced 

with a close criminal case, the judge’s experience with parallel 

issues in civil cases may prove helpful in deciding the boundaries of permissible inferences when the government must 

prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt—which is so much 

more stringent than the civil standard of proof. California ex 

rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 

92–93 (1981). The evidence here fell well short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the charges against Garcia. 

The judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED. 
30 No. 18-1735 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The jury was 

presented with enough evidence at trial to find Garcia guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing that evidence under the 

controlling legal standard of FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c), I 

respectfully part company with my colleagues and defer to 

the jury’s verdict. 

A. The Trial Evidence 

After a three-day trial, receiving instructions, and 

deliberating, the jury unanimously convicted Garcia on two 

counts: (1) using a cell phone to distribute a controlled 

substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and (2) knowingly 

and intentionally distributing a controlled substance in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).1 The trial evidence did not 

contain the proverbial “smoking gun”—Garcia was not 

caught holding a kilogram of cocaine—but it did include: 

 Eight recorded phone conversations 

between Garcia and a suspected drug 

distributor, Cisneros, with both men using 

multiple coded terms; 

 Unchallenged and unrebutted expert 

witness testimony explaining those coded 

terms, individually and cumulatively, refer 

to the distribution of cocaine; 

 Two cell phones found in Garcia’s 

possession and a corresponding call log 

 1 The jury was properly instructed that it needed to find guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt on each element of the two counts, weigh the evidence, 

and render its verdicts based on that evidence. 
No. 18-1735 31

confirming the calls between Garcia and 

Cisneros; 

 Photographic and video surveillance from a 

pole camera of Garcia on April 17, 2012 

entering a residence owned by Cisneros and 

leaving the residence a few minutes later; 

 Photographic, video, and in-person 

surveillance of Garcia on April 20, 2012 

pulling up to Cisneros’ house, walking to the 

front porch, returning to the vehicle with 

Cisneros, driving to another residence 

owned by Cisneros, entering the second 

residence with Cisneros, and driving away 

alone about 15 minutes later; and 

 The testimonies of three law enforcement 

officers corroborating the surveillance of 

Garcia on April 17, 2012 and April 20, 2012 

and identifying him as the same person who 

entered Cisneros’s residences on both days. 

The majority opinion considers the recorded cell phone 

conversations as interpreted by Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

and Firearms Special Agent Christopher Labno as the entire 

case against Garcia. For the majority, Labno’s testimony was 

insufficient for a rational jury to convict Garcia on the 

distribution charge.2 It labels this evidence uncorroborated—

 2 The majority opinion does not separately address the sufficiency of 

the evidence concerning the cell phone count. Given the stipulation to 

Garcia’s voice on the recorded calls, the sufficiency of the evidence as to 

narcotics “distribution” is presumably dispositive on the cell phone count 

as well.
32 No. 18-1735 

"educated speculation”—rather than proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

This phone call evidence has two parts: the calls 

themselves, and Labno’s expert interpretation of them. 

First, the contents and topics of the phone calls show: 

 The respective roles played by Garcia as the 

seller and Cisneros as the buyer; 

 The roles and reactions of other actors, 

Garcia’s suppliers, including that they 

would be willing to work with Cisneros on 

future deals; 

 The progression of the sale, from how much 

Cisneros wanted to pay, to concerns about 

its quality, discussion as to price, and taste 

testing the product; 

 How Cisneros’s reputation as a seller could 

be adversely affected if Garcia sold Cisneros 

inferior product; and 

 How the product may have to be altered by 

“cooking.” 

In their numerous conversations, Garcia and Cisneros do 

not explicitly reference “cocaine,” as drug dealers almost 

never do and would not. They instead used common terms as 

substitutes (“work,” “girl,” “white girl,” “tix,” “taste,” “worn 

out,” “cook,” “two-four,” etc.). While an untrained juror may 

not be familiar with these terms, federal courts routinely 

permit an expert witness to be “helpful to the jury” in 

interpreting such evidence. See United States v. Ceballos, 

302 F.3d 679, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2002) (DEA agents’ 
No. 18-1735 33

interpretations were “helpful to the jurors” in applying 

“alternative theories of which they ordinarily would not have 

been aware”) (internal quotations omitted); see also United 

States v. Jones, 763 F.3d 777, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (an expert 

witness may “assist the jury” in resolving ambiguities); United 

States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 423 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing expert 

witnesses to translate “drug jargon and code words that 

might seem entirely innocuous to an untrained jury.”). Just as 

a jury may need the assistance of a translator to consider 

whether a foreign-language conversation concerns 

distributing cocaine, the same can be true of coded drug 

jargon. 

This brings us to the second part of the phone call 

evidence, Agent Labno’s testimony. Labno has operated as an 

undercover special agent in Chicago for approximately 16 

years. He testified to his familiarity with the price, quantity, 

and quality of cocaine, including common code words used 

in local drug trafficking. He also testified to his personal use 

of a cell phone to facilitate drug dealings, and his own 

experience cooking “crack” as an undercover agent. It would 

appear there is no aspect of the local cocaine distribution 

process with which Labno is not familiar.3 

 3 The majority opinion notes how Agent Labno “had no firsthand 

knowledge of the Cisneros investigation.” Of course, if he had such 

knowledge and was called as a fact and expert witness, that could be 

criticized as confusing the jury, and require precautions to minimize 

potential prejudice. See United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 

2008) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 496 F.3d 636, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

Given Labno’s role as an expert, his not knowing Garcia and Cisneros 

should not be characterized as a negative. Indeed, this court has stated 

experts need not be familiar with a “particular conspiracy” but “can 

determine, based on their expertise, that certain words have drug-related 
34 No. 18-1735 

At trial, the defendant did not object under FED. R. EVID. 

702 to Labno’s expertise or to the jury’s reliance on his expert 

interpretations when weighing the evidence. Indeed, Garcia’s 

counsel cross-examined Labno only briefly (four pages of 

transcript). The majority opinion credits the crossexamination of Agent Labno for laying a foundation that the 

taped conversations make sense only if Garcia is assumed to 

be drug trafficking. But in his response to that question, Agent 

Labno specifically denied that assumption: “I'm not making 

assumptions about that. I'm just interpreting what the wiretap 

conversations are based on the code words in the context in 

my experience.” 

Garcia’s principal argument at trial was that the recorded 

conversations were so ambiguous the jury could not 

reasonably determine their meaning.4 In helping the jury 

interpret the phone conversations, Labno explained that, in 

his experience, the terms “work” and “girl” refer to cocaine; 

“taste” and “cooking” refer to the quality of cocaine; “tix” or 

“tickets” refer to drug payments; and “two-four” refers to 

 

meanings within the context of a single conversation.” United States v. 

York, 572 F.3d 415, 424 (7th Cir. 2009). 

4 Because Garcia stipulated that the conversations were ambiguous, 

he opened the door to Labno’s interpretation. An expert’s interpretation 

may be helpful to the jury in determining the meaning of words and 

terms—no matter how common they may be—when they are used 

ambiguously in conversation. See York, 572 F.3d at 423 (recognizing 

expert’s interpretation when “six,” “nine,” “five dollar,” and “fifty-five” 

were used ambiguously in defendant’s conversations); see also United 

States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 687-88 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding agents’ 

interpretations of simple pronouns “it,” “them,” and “both” as referring 

to methamphetamine shipments because defendants used those pronouns 

ambiguously in conversation). 
No. 18-1735 35

$24,000, the going market-price for a kilogram of cocaine. We 

have often recognized these same expert interpretations in 

other drug cases. In United States v. Fuller, 532 F.3d 656, 661 

(7th Cir. 2008), we recognized defendant’s use of the code 

word “work” to mean cocaine. See also United States v. Page, 

521 F.3d 101, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting “work” was the 

typical drug-dealers’ code for cocaine); United States v. Benitez, 

92 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). After hearing Labno’s 

interpretation of the phone calls, it was still up to the jury to 

decide how much weight to give his testimony and to draw 

its own conclusions about the actual meaning of the 

conversations. The jurors did just that. 

B. The Legal Standard

Under Rule 29(c), the standard a defendant must meet in 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on a criminal 

conviction is very high. See United States v. Torres-Chavez, 

744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2014) (the defendant’s Rule 29 

burden is “nearly insurmountable”); United States v. Jones, 713 

F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2013) (“a nearly insurmountable 

hurdle”); United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 

2012) (“a heavy burden”); United States v. Bogan, 267 F.3d 614, 

623 (7th Cir. 2001) (“a nearly insurmountable burden”); 

United States v. McCaffrey, 181 F.3d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 1999) (“a 

daunting task”). 

Rule 29 post-verdict review is narrowly limited to 

determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis 

in original). This “does not require [the] court to ask itself 

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established 
36 No. 18-1735 

guilt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (internal quotations 

omitted); see also Jones, 713 F.3d at 340 (“The inquiry does not 

ask what we would have decided if we were on the jury. We 

need not be convinced by the evidence ourselves.”); United 

States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 29(c) 

does not authorize the judge to play thirteenth juror.”). We 

will “overturn the jury’s verdict only when the record 

contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from 

which the factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 

2018) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. 

Farris, 532 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e will overturn a 

conviction based on insufficient evidence only if the record is 

devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

The evidentiary standard of proof—beyond a reasonable 

doubt—does not change during post-verdict review. But, 

unlike pre-verdict, the evidence is construed “in the light 

most favorable to the government,” creating a rebuttable 

presumption of conviction. See United States v. Seidling, 737 

F.3d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. 

Niggeman, 881 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2018) (We “draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution.”). While the evidence must “reasonably support 

a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 318, deference to the jury’s deliberations prevents 

the court from assessing the quality of the evidence any 

further. See United States v. Smallwood, 188 F.3d 905, 913-14 

(7th Cir. 1999) (court defers to the jury’s credibility 

determinations without making its own); see also United States 

v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 111 (1989) (in reviewing a Rule 29 motion 
No. 18-1735 37

the judge must respect “the exclusive function of the jury to 

determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary 

conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences.”). 

The narrow scope of Rule 29 is defined by phrases such as 

“no evidence” and “devoid of evidence.” This language 

focuses the court’s Rule 29 role on assessing the quantum of 

evidence, not its weight or credibility. In conducting a 

quantum analysis, the court must determine whether the 

evidence, “taken as a whole,” is enough for any rational jury 

to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Smallwood, 188 F.3d 

at 913. Unless Garcia rebuts the presumption of conviction by 

showing the government submitted no evidence for a rational 

factfinder to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

standard requires that we defer to the jury’s verdict. 

The standard does not require, though, that we explain 

how the case might fare in the civil context. The majority 

opinion compares the judge’s role under Rule 29 with the 

judge’s role in considering motions for summary judgment 

under FED.R. CIV. P. 56 and judgment as a matter of law under 

FED. R. CIV. P. 50, respectively. This suggestion is fine to the 

extent it repeats current law toward a helpful comparison. But 

“enforcing outer limits on reasonable inferences, guided by 

the relevant standard of proof” does not and should not 

transform the judge’s role under Rule 29 into weighing the 

trial evidence. 

C. Other Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Cases 

The majority opinion compares the evidence in this case to 

other sufficiency-of-the-evidence cases, and concludes it falls 

short because the phone calls and Labno’s testimony are not 
38 No. 18-1735 

corroborated by “actual evidence” of drugs. On comparison, 

that conclusion does not hold up. 

In the case law the majority cites, we have found sufficient 

evidence to support a conviction when there is pole camera 

video surveillance of the defendant (United States v. Cejas, 

761 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2014)), third-party testimony, (Cejas), 

loose association with a co-defendant (United States v. Duarte, 

950 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1991)), carrying a “tool of the drug 

trade” (Duarte), and expert interpretation of defendant’s drug 

deal records (Duarte). Some combination of this evidence has 

been sufficient to convict on drug distribution charges, even 

when there are no drugs (Cejas; Duarte), no cash (Duarte), no 

weapons (Duarte), no drug paraphernalia (Cejas; Duarte), and 

no direct admissions (Cejas; Duarte). In contrast, we have 

found insufficient evidence when recorded phone 

conversations between co-defendants lack detail (United 

States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2013)), and when the 

government’s case is “focused on” (id. at 347) the defendant’s 

“mere presence” at the crime scene (Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F.3d 

687 (7th Cir. 2001)). 

Here, it is undisputed it was Garcia’s voice on the phone 

call recordings with Cisneros; photo and video surveillance 

from a pole camera showed Garcia at Cisneros’s residences 

on April 17 and April 20; police officers were present at the 

exchange on April 20 and later identified Garcia as the same 

person on both days; two cell phones were found in Garcia’s 

possession and call logs corroborated Garcia’s conversations 

with Cisneros; and expert testimony interpreted the terms 

Garcia used and the context of his calls with Cisneros as a 

drug deal. Garcia’s use of his cell phone as a “tool of the drug 

trade” and Labno’s interpretation explaining the coded drug 
No. 18-1735 39

deal is like the Duarte defendant using a pager and that 

expert’s interpretation of the defendant’s notes as records of 

drug deals, which we deemed sufficient. And unlike the 

recorded conversations in Jones, which lacked sufficient 

detail, Garcia’s eight conversations with Cisneros cover every 

aspect of their on-going deal, from price, quality, and quantity 

to maintaining a good reputation as a dealer. All this evidence 

adds up to far more than “mere presence,” and, most 

importantly, far more than “no evidence.” Further 

corroboration is not necessary. See Smallwood, 188 F.3d at 913 

(“[corroborative evidence] need only ensure the reliability” of 

testimonial evidence) (internal citation omitted). 

In comparing these cases, the majority hints at a false 

distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, 

signaling that the strength of the evidence depends on its 

weight. The law makes no such distinction, and 

circumstantial evidence can form the basis for guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Moore, 572 F.3d 334, 337 

(7th Cir. 2009) (“A verdict may be rational even if it relies 

solely on circumstantial evidence.”); see also United States v. 

Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A jury’s verdict may 

rest solely on circumstantial evidence.”). Here, the jury was 

instructed that “[t]he law makes no distinction between the 

weight to be given to either direct evidence or circumstantial 

evidence.” The jurors followed those instructions, and found 

Garcia guilty. 

Based on the evidence the government submitted in this 

case, a rational jury could reasonably conclude: (1) Garcia’s 

phone call with Cisneros on April 17, 20125 was about selling 

 5 In his motion, Garcia incorrectly cited these dates as in 2013.
40 No. 18-1735 

cocaine; (2) Garcia physically delivered cocaine to Cisneros’s 

residence on April 17, 2012; (3) Garcia used the cell phone 

officers found in his possession to communicate with 

Cisneros about the cocaine sale; and (4) Agent Labno’s 

testimony, the pole camera photo and video surveillance, the 

in-person identifications of Garcia at Cisneros’s homes on 

April 17 and April 20, the phones found in Garcia’s possession 

and the call logs all support a drug-related interpretation of 

the recorded telephone conversations between Garcia and 

Cisneros from April 17, 2012 through April 20, 2012.6 

Because Garcia failed to rebut the presumption of 

conviction by showing the government submitted no 

evidence for a rational factfinder to find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the legal standard requires that we defer to 

the jury’s verdict. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent 

from the majority’s opinion. 

 6 Although the Rule 29 motion “need not spell out the particular basis 

for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, when such a motion 

raises specific arguments, any claims not presented in the motion are 

waived.” United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(defendants “lost the right to complain about the failure of proof on a key 

element of the government’s case” that was not specifically argued in their 

Rule 29 motions) (internal citation omitted). Because Garcia raised only 

these specific claims in his Rule 29 motion, he has waived any other 

grounds for acquittal.