United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Addressees

DEFENSE TRAVEL 

SYSTEM 

Reported Savings 

Questionable and 

Implementation 

Challenges Remain 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-980 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

DEFENSE TRAVEL SYSTEM 

Reported Savings Questionable and 

Highlights of GAO-06-980, a report to Implementation Challenges Remain 

congressional addressees

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-980.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact McCoy 

Williams at (202) 512-9095 or Keith Rhodes 

at (202) 512-6412. 

In 1995, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) began an effort to

implement a standard 

departmentwide travel system. The 

Defense Travel System (DTS) is

envisioned as DOD’s standard endto-end travel system. This report is 

a follow-up to GAO’s January 2006,

report which highlighted DTS 

implementation problems. Because 

of continued congressional interest

in DTS, GAO initiated this followup audit under the Comptroller 

General’s statutory authority. GAO 

determined whether (1) two key 

assumptions made in the 

September 2003 economic analysis

were reasonable, (2) DOD is taking

action to ensure full utilization of 

DTS and gathering the data needed

to monitor DTS utilization, and 

(3) DOD has resolved the 

previously identified problems with

DTS flight information. To address 

the above objectives, GAO 

(1) reviewed the September 2003

DTS economic analysis, 

(2) analyzed DTS utilization data, 

and (3) analyzed DTS flight

information. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four

recommendations to DOD aimed at

improving the management 

oversight of DTS including periodic

reports on DTS utilization and 

resolution of inconsistencies in 

DTS’s requirements. DOD

generally agreed with the 

recommendations and described its 

efforts to address them. DOD also 

strongly objected to a finding that

the reported personnel savings 

were unrealistic. 

GAO’s analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the 

two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on 

reliable information. Two cost components represent the majority of the 

over $56 million in estimated net savings—personnel savings and reduced 

commercial travel office (CTO) fees. In regard to the personnel savings, 

GAO’s analysis found that the $24.2 million of personnel savings related to 

the Air Force and the Navy was not supported. 

• Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not 

anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting 

of staff from the travel function to other functions. 

• The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any

tangible personnel cost savings from the implementation of DTS. 

In regard to the CTO fees, the economic analysis assumed that 70 percent of 

all DTS airline tickets would either require no intervention or minimal 

intervention from the CTOs, resulting in an estimated annual net savings of 

$31 million. However, the sole support provided by the DTS program office 

was an article in a trade industry publication. The article was not based on 

information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private 

sector company. Furthermore, the economic analysis was not prepared in 

accordance with guidance prescribed by OMB and DOD. 

• DOD guidance stated that the life-cycle cost estimates should be verified 

by an independent party, but this did not occur. 

• The economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of 

the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs. Because 

an economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that 

the imprecision in both the underlying data and assumptions be 

understood. Such an assessment is referred to as a sensitivity analysis. 

DOD acknowledged that DTS is not being used to the fullest extent possible, 

but lacks comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. DOD’s 

utilization data are based on a model that was developed in calendar year 

2003. However, the model has not been completely updated to reflect actual 

DTS usage. The lack of accurate utilization data hinders management’s 

ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard 

travel system. GAO also found that the military services have initiated 

actions that are aimed at increasing the utilization of DTS. 

Finally, GAO found that DTS still has not addressed the underlying problems 

associated with weak requirement management and system testing. While

DOD has acted to address concerns GAO previously raised, GAO found that 

DTS’s requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting. For example, DTS 

displaying up to 25 flights for each inquiry is questionable because it is

unclear whether this is a valid requirement. Until DOD improves DTS’s 

requirement management practices, the department will not have reasonable 

assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality.
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

Validity of DTS Economic Analysis Questionable 9 

DTS Remains Underutilized by the Military Services 17 

Previously Reported DTS Requirements Management and Testing 

Deficiencies Have Not Been Resolved 23 

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 31 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 38 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 40 

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 43 

Tables 

Table 1: Summary of DTS Estimated Annual Net Savings Reported 

in the September 2003 Economic Analysis 8 

Table 2: Summary of Estimated Annual Personnel Savings 10 

Table 3: DTS Reported Utilization Percentage for the Period 

October 2005 through April 2006 18 

Figure 

Figure 1: March 2006 DTS Display of Flights between Santiago, 

Chile, and San Antonio, Texas 27 

Page i GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Abbreviations 

BTA Business Transformation Agency 

CTO commercial travel office

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

DOD Department of Defense 

DTS Defense Travel System 

FTR Federal Travel Regulation 

GDS Global Distribution System 

GSA General Services Administration 

IOC Initial Operating Capability 

NCAD Naval Cost Analysis Division 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PMO-DTS Program Management Office—Defense Travel System 

RTS Reserve Travel System 

TDY temporary duty 

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Page ii GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 26, 2006 

Congressional Addressees 

In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) embarked upon the daunting 

challenge of implementing a standard, departmentwide travel system in 

response to a report by the DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel.1

 The 

report pinpointed three principal causes for DOD’s inefficient travel 

system: (1) travel policies and programs were focused on compliance with

rigid rules rather than mission performance, (2) travel practices did not 

keep pace with travel management improvements implemented by 

industry, and (3) the various existing travel systems were not integrated.

To address these concerns, DOD established the Program Management 

Office—Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS) to acquire travel services that

would be used DOD-wide. The department launched this program with the 

goal of replacing existing travel systems with a single departmentwide 

system to more effectively support nonintegrated travel processes and 

procedures across its component organizations. The Defense Travel 

System (DTS) is envisioned as being the department’s standard end-to-end

travel system.

2

The department estimates that DTS will be fully deployed at all 11,000 

intended locations during fiscal year 2007.

3

 The September 2003 economic 

analysis noted that DTS, when fully implemented, would result in annual

net savings of over $56 million. The economic analysis noted that savings 

would be realized by the department during fiscal years 2009-2016. In 

 1

 Department of Defense, Report of the Department of Defense Task Force to Reengineer 

Travel (Arlington, Va.: January 1995). 

2

 DOD expects DTS to perform all functions related to travel or ensure that other systems 

are provided with adequate information to provide this functionality. For example, 

obligating funds associated with travel is a necessary function, and DTS is expected to 

(1) make sure that adequate funds are available before authorizing travel either through 

information contained in its system or by obtaining the necessary information from another 

system, (2) obligate funds through issuance of approved travel orders, and (3) provide

DOD’s financial management systems with the necessary information so that those systems 

can record the obligation. Since DTS is required to ensure that all travel-related 

functionality is properly performed, DOD commonly refers to DTS as an “end-to-end travel 

system.” 

3

 As of September 2005, the department had estimated that DTS would be fully deployed 

during fiscal year 2006. 

Page 1 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
December 2003, the department’s Chief Information Officer approved a 

DTS funding level of approximately $564 million. Of this amount, the 

contract for the design, development, and deployment of DTS was for 

about $264 million. The remaining costs are associated with areas such as 

the operation and maintenance of DTS, operation of the PMO-DTS, the 

voucher payment process, and management and oversight of the 

numerous contracted commercial travel offices (CTO). 

This report is a follow-up to our September 2005 testimony and January 

2006 report in which we highlighted problems encountered by the 

department in its efforts to successfully implement DTS.4

 One of our major 

findings was that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that flight 

information was properly displayed for DOD travelers because the 

department failed to properly test the system interfaces through which the 

data are accessed for display. We further noted that the continued use of 

the existing legacy travel systems at locations where DTS has been 

deployed results in underutilization of DTS and reduces the envisioned 

savings. 

The objectives of this audit were to determine whether (1) two key 

assumptions related to the estimated cost savings in the September 2003 

economic analysis were reasonable, (2) DOD is taking action to ensure full 

utilization of DTS and gathering the data needed to monitor DTS 

utilization, and (3) DOD has resolved the previously identified problems 

with properly displaying DTS flight information. To address the first 

objective, we obtained and reviewed the September 2003 economic 

analysis to (1) ascertain if the economic analysis was prepared in 

accordance with criteria prescribed by the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) and DOD; (2) analyze two key assumptions on which the 

majority of the estimated savings were predicated—personnel savings and

reduced CTO fees; and (3) analyze the underlying supporting 

documentation related to these two assumptions. In addition, we 

interviewed PMO-DTS and military service officials to obtain an 

 4

 GAO, DOD Business Transformation: Defense Travel System Continues to Face 

Implementation Challenges, GAO-06-18 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2006), and DOD 

Business Transformation: Preliminary Observations on the Defense Travel System, 

GAO-05-998T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
understanding of the basis they used to compute the reported annual net 

savings of over $56 million.5

To address the second objective, we obtained and analyzed DTS utilization 

data from the PMO-DTS. We also met with military service officials to 

obtain an understanding of the efforts they have underway to help ensure 

the full utilization of DTS. Further, we obtained from the military services 

an understanding of the data they used to monitor DTS utilization. Finally,

to address the third objective, we analyzed 246 U.S. General Services 

Administration (GSA) city pair flights to determine if the information 

being displayed to the traveler was consistent with DTS’s stated 

requirement. We also met with PMO-DTS and contractor officials. 

Because of the continued widespread congressional interest in DTS, this 

assignment was performed at our initiative under the statutory authority 

provided to the Comptroller General of the United States. Our work 

focused on the validity of the assumptions that were the principal drivers 

of the net annual estimated savings of over $56 million. We determined 

that the data were sufficiently reliable for this purpose. We did not review

the accuracy and reliability of the specific dollar amounts shown in the 

September 2003 economic analysis. Our work was performed from 

October 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with U.S. generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Details on our scope and 

methodology are included in appendix I. We requested comments on a 

draft of this report from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. We 

received written comments from the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Personnel and Readiness), which are reprinted in appendix II. 

Our analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that two 

key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable 

information. Two primary areas represented the majority of the over 

$56 million of estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize—

personnel savings of $24.2 million and reduced CTO fees of $31 million. 

The $24.2 million estimated annual personnel savings were attributed to 

Results in Brief 

 5

 The total estimated annual savings were $123.5 million and the total estimated annual 

costs were $67.1 million for a net annual savings of $56.4 million. The annual net savings 

are in constant fiscal year 2003 dollars. The department estimated that savings would start 

in fiscal year 2009. 

Page 3 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
the Air Force and Navy.

6

 However, the Naval Cost Analysis Division has 

stated that the Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings 

from the implementation of DTS. In regard to the estimated annual savings 

of $31 million attributed to lower CTO fees, we requested, but the PMODTS could not provide, any analysis of travel data to support the 

assumption that 70 percent of all airline tickets would be considered “no 

touch”—meaning that there would be no or minimal intervention by the 

CTO, thereby resulting in lower CTO fees. We found that the 70 percent 

assumption was based solely upon an article that appeared in a travel

industry trade publication. 

In addition, the economic analysis was not prepared in accordance with 

guidance prescribed by OMB and DOD. Both sets of guidance require that

an economic analysis be based on facts and data and be explicit about the 

underlying assumptions used to arrive at future benefits and costs. DOD 

guidance also states that life-cycle cost estimates should be independently

validated. An independent review is intended, in part, to provide program 

management some degree of assurance that the life-cycle cost estimates 

are reasonable and the cost estimates are built on realistic program 

assumptions. However, an independent validation was not performed. 

Based on these factors, the estimated annual net savings of over 

$56 million included in the 2003 economic analysis is highly questionable. 

While the reliability of the economic analysis is questionable, the 

department’s system acquisition criteria do not require that a new 

economic analysis be prepared because DTS has already completed all of 

the major milestones related to a major automated system. However, the 

department’s business system investment management guidance stipulates 

that all business systems must be reviewed annually and provides an 

opportunity for DOD management to assess whether DTS is meeting its 

planned cost, schedule, and functionality goals. 

Our analysis also found that the department did not have quantitative 

metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used. The 

reported DTS utilization rates were based on a methodology that was 

developed using estimated data, and PMO-DTS program officials 

acknowledged that the model had not been completely updated with 

actual data as DTS continued to be implemented at the 11,000 sites. As a 

 6

 The economic analysis identified annual savings of $11.3 million and $12.9 million for the 

Air Force and Navy, respectively. 

Page 4 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
result, the PMO-DTS continues to rely on outdated information in 

calculating DTS utilization rates that are reported to DOD management 

and the Congress. Additionally, while the military services have initiated 

actions to help increase the utilization of DTS, they pointed out that 

ineffective DTS training is a contributing factor to the lower than expected 

usage rate by the military services. 

Finally, DOD still has not addressed the several functional problems 

associated with weak requirements management and system testing. 

Requirements represent the blueprint that system developers and program 

managers use to design, develop, test, and implement a system. Because 

requirements provide the foundation for system testing, they must be 

complete, clear, and well documented to design and implement an 

effective testing program. Our February 2006 analysis disclosed that DOD 

still did not have reasonable assurance that the flight information was 

being properly displayed to DOD travelers. We identified 246 unique GSA 

city pair flights that should have been identified on one or more DTS flight 

displays according to the DOD requirements. However, 87 of these flights 

did not appear on one or more of the required listings. We also identified 

instances in which DTS displayed flights for selection that did not appear 

to comply with the Fly America Act.7 By not displaying flights in 

accordance with the Fly America Act’s criteria, DTS places the traveler 

who purchases a ticket or the individual authorizing, certifying, or 

disbursing a payment made when a ticket is paid for directly by DOD 

through a centrally billed account at unnecessary risk of personal liability, 

because the travelers can be held accountable for the cost of the trip. 

While the PMO-DTS has taken action to address our concerns, these 

actions do not fully address the fundamental problems we found during 

this audit and on which we have previously reported.8

 For example, the 

DTS requirements we reviewed were still ambiguous and conflicting. 

 7

 49 U.S.C. § 40118(c). The act requires federal employees and their dependents,

consultants, contractors, grantees, and others performing U.S. government-funded air

travel to travel by U.S. certificated flag air carriers except under certain circumstances, 

such as when travel by a foreign air carrier is a matter of necessity as defined by the statute 

or when U.S. certificated flag air carrier service is not available. 

8 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

Page 5 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Adequately defined and tested requirements are one of the key elements to 

help reduce a project’s risks to acceptable levels.9

We are making four recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed 

at improving the department’s management and oversight of DTS. More 

specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) evaluate the 

cost effectiveness of the Navy continuing with the CTO management fee 

structure, (2) update the DTS Voucher Analysis Model to report DTS 

actual utilization rates, (3) require the PMO-DTS to provide periodic 

reports on the utilization of DTS, and (4) resolve inconsistencies in DTS 

requirements. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with three and 

partially agreed with one of the recommendations. For those 

recommendations the department agreed with, the comments briefly 

outlined its actions for addressing two of them, but did not comment on 

the third. In regard to the recommendations to which it responded, the 

department’s planned actions are in keeping with the intent of our 

recommendations. 

DOD disagreed with our finding that the estimated personnel savings are 

unrealistic. DOD stated that recognizing fiscal constraints, the department 

continues to identify efficiencies and eliminate redundancies to help 

leverage available funds. As noted in our report, DOD officials responsible 

for reviewing economic analyses stated that while shifting personnel to 

other functions is considered a benefit, it should be considered an 

intangible benefit rather than tangible dollar savings since the shifting of 

personnel does not result in a reduction of DOD expenditures. Because 

none of the military services could validate an actual reduction in the 

number of personnel as a result of DTS implementation, we continue to 

believe that the estimated annual personnel savings of $54.1 million is 

unrealistic. The Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of this 

report provides a more detailed discussion of the department’s comments. 

We have reprinted DOD’s written comments in appendix II. 

 9

 Acceptable levels refer to the fact that any systems acquisition effort will have risks and 

will suffer the adverse consequences associated with defects in the processes. However, 

effective implementation of disciplined processes, which includes project planning and 

management, requirements management, risk management, quality assurance, and testing, 

reduces the possibility of the potential risks actually occurring and prevents significant 

defects from materially affecting the cost, timeliness, and performance of the project. 

Page 6 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
In September 1993, the National Performance Review recommended an 

overhaul of DOD’s temporary duty (TDY) travel system. In response, DOD 

created the DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel to examine the travel

process. The task force found that the current process was expensive to 

administer and was neither customer nor mission oriented with the net 

result being a travel process that was costly, inefficient, fragmented, and 

did not support DOD’s needs. On December 13, 1995, the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer issued a memorandum, 

“Reengineering Travel Initiative,” establishing the PMO-DTS to acquire

travel services that would be used DOD-wide. Additionally, in a 1997 

report to Congress, the DOD Comptroller pointed out that the existing 

DOD TDY travel system was never designed to be an integrated system.10

The report stated that because there was no centralized focus on the 

department’s travel practices, the travel policies were issued by different 

offices and the process had become fragmented and “stovepiped.” The 

report further noted that there was no vehicle in the current structure to 

overcome these deficiencies, as no one individual within the department 

had specific responsibility for management control of DOD TDY travel. 

Background 

DOD management and oversight of the DTS program has varied over the 

years. DTS was designated a “Special Interest” program in 1995. It retained 

this status until May 2002 when it was designated a major automated 

information system,11 with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

(DFAS) being designated as the lead component for the program. This 

meant that DFAS was responsible for the management oversight of DTS 

program acquisition, including DTS compliance with the required DOD 

acquisition guidance. 

 10 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Travel 

Reengineering Pilot Report to Congress (Arlington, Va.: June 1997). 

11 A major automated information system is one in which the DOD component head 

estimates that (1) program costs in any single year will exceed $32 million in fiscal year 

2000 constant dollars, (2) total program costs will exceed $126 million in fiscal year 2000

constant dollars, or (3) total life-cycle costs will exceed $378 million in fiscal year 2000

constant dollars. The life-cycle cost is the total cost to the government for an information 

system over its expected useful life and includes the costs to acquire, operate, maintain, 

and dispose of the system. DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System, specifies current mandatory policies and procedures for major acquisitions. The 

policy also specifies that the DOD Chief Information Officer is the milestone decision 

authority, responsible for program approval, for all major automated information systems.

Page 7 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
In September 2003, DOD finalized its economic analysis for DTS in 

preparation for a milestone decision review.12 The highlights of the 

economic analysis are shown in table 1. In December 2003, the DOD Chief 

Information Officer granted approval for DTS to proceed with full 

implementation throughout the department. 

Table 1: Summary of DTS Estimated Annual Net Savings Reported in the September 

2003 Economic Analysis

Constant fiscal year 2003 dollars in millions 

Cost components Estimated annual net savings

Records management $19.8

Centrally billed accounts 1.7

CTO acquisition and administration 2.4

CTO services 31.0

Voucher process and compute 54.1

Voucher pay 0

Legacy systems 14.5

PMO (8.8)

Help desk/DTA (36.8)

System operations (21.5)

Total net savings $56.4

Source: September 2003 economic analysis provided by the PMO-DTS. 

Note: In arriving at the estimated annual net savings of over $56 million, the economic analysis took

into consideration the estimated costs of over $2.1 billion, which covers fiscal years 2003-2016. The 

estimated costs included the costs that are estimated to be incurred by the PMO-DTS, the Army, the 

Navy, the Air Force, and the defense agencies. 

In October 2005, DOD established the Business Transformation Agency 

(BTA) to advance DOD-wide business transformation efforts, particularly 

with regard to business systems modernization. DOD believes it can better 

address managing defensewide business transformation, which includes 

planning, management, organizational structures, and processes related to

all key business areas, by first transforming business operations to support 

the warfighter, while also enabling financial accountability across DOD. 

BTA operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, who is the 

vice chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee—

 12 This is an addendum to the July 2003 DTS economic analysis. 

Page 8 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
which serves as the highest ranking governing body for business systems 

modernization activities. Among other things, BTA includes a Defense 

Business Systems Acquisition Executive who is responsible for centrally 

managing 28 DOD-wide business projects, programs, systems, and 

initiatives—one of which is DTS.13 In October 2004, responsibility for the 

policies and procedures related to the management of commercial travel 

throughout DOD transferred to the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Personnel and Readiness). 

Our analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that two 

key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable 

information. Consequently, the economic analysis did not serve to help

ensure that the funds invested in DTS were used in an efficient and 

effective manner. Two primary areas represented the majority of the over 

$56 million of estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize—

personnel savings and reduced CTO fees. However, the estimates used to 

generate these savings were unreliable. Further, DOD did not effectively 

implement the policies relating to developing economic analyses for 

programs such as DTS. Effective implementation of these policies should 

have highlighted the problems that we found and allowed for appropriate 

adjustments so that the economic analysis could have served as a useful 

management tool in making funding decisions related to DTS—which is 

the primary purpose of this analysis. While the department’s system 

acquisition criteria do not require that a new economic analysis be 

prepared, the department’s business system investment management 

structure provides an opportunity for DOD management to assess whether 

DTS is meeting its planned cost, schedule, and functionality goals. 

The economic analysis estimated that the annual personnel savings was 

over $54 million,14 as shown in table 2. 

Validity of DTS 

Economic Analysis 

Questionable 

Personnel Savings Are 

Unrealistic 

 13 Examples of some of these DOD-wide programs, systems, and initiatives besides DTS

include the Standard Procurement System, the Defense Integrated Military Human 

Resources System, and the Standard Financial Information Structure. 

14 During fiscal years 2009 through 2016. 

Page 9 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Table 2: Summary of Estimated Annual Personnel Savings 

Constant fiscal year 2003 dollars in millions 

DOD component Estimated annual savings

Army $16.0

Navy 12.9

Air Force 11.3

Marine Corps 5.8

Defense agencies 6.3

Permanent change of station 1.8

Total savings $54.1

Source: September 2003 economic analysis provided by the PMO-DTS. 

As shown in table 2, approximately 45 percent of the estimated savings, or

$24.2 million was attributable to the Air Force and Navy. The assumption 

behind the personnel savings computation was that there would be less 

manual intervention in the processing of travel vouchers for payment, and

therefore fewer staff would be needed. However, based on our discussions 

with Air Force and Navy DTS program officials, it is questionable as to 

how the estimated savings will be achieved. Air Force and Navy DTS 

program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the 

number of personnel with the full implementation of DTS, but rather the 

shifting of staff to other functions. According to DOD officials responsible 

for reviewing economic analyses, while shifting personnel to other 

functions is considered a benefit, it should be considered an intangible 

benefit rather than tangible dollar savings since the shifting of personnel 

does not result in a reduction of DOD expenditures. Also, as part of the 

Navy’s overall evaluation of the economic analysis, program officials 

stated that “the Navy has not identified, and conceivably will not 

recommend, any personnel billets for reduction.” Finally, the Naval Cost 

Analysis Division (NCAD) October 2003 report on the economic analysis 

noted that it could not validate approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s 

total costs, including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost estimates 

because credible supporting documentation was lacking. The report also 

noted that the PMO-DTS used unsound methodologies in preparing the 

DTS economic analysis. 

The extent of personnel savings for the Army and defense agencies, which

are reported as $16 million and $6.3 million respectively, is also unclear. 

The Army and many defense agencies use DFAS to process their travel 

vouchers, so the personnel savings for the Army and the defense agencies 

Page 10 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
were primarily related to reductions in DFAS’s costs. In discussions with 

DFAS officials, they were unable to estimate the actual personnel savings 

that would result since they did not know (1) the number of personnel, 

like those at the Air Force and Navy, that would simply be transferred to 

other DFAS functions or (2) the number of personnel that could be used to 

avoid additional hiring. For example, DFAS expects that some of the 

individuals assigned to support the travel function could be moved to 

support its ePayroll program. Since these positions would need to be filled 

regardless of whether the travel function is reduced, transferring 

personnel from travel to ePayroll would reduce DOD’s overall costs since 

DFAS would not have to hire additional individuals. 

Savings Associated with 

Reduction of CTO Fees 

Are Unknown 

According to the September 2003 economic analysis, DOD expected to 

realize annual net savings of $31 million through reduced fees paid to the 

CTOs because the successful implementation of DTS would enable the 

majority of airline tickets to be acquired with either no or minimal 

intervention by the CTOs. These are commonly referred to as “no touch” 

transactions. However, DOD did not have a sufficient basis to estimate the 

number of transactions that would be considered “no touch” since (1) the 

estimated percentage of transactions that can be processed using the “no 

touch” was not supported and (2) the analysis did not properly consider 

the effects of components that use management fees, rather than 

transaction fees, to compensate the CTOs for services provided. The 

weaknesses we identified with the estimating process raise serious 

questions as to whether DOD will realize substantial portions of the 

estimated annual net savings of $31 million. 

DOD arrived at the $31 million of annual savings in CTO fees by estimating 

that 70 percent of all DTS airline tickets would be considered “no touch” 

and then multiplying these tickets by the savings per ticket in CTO fees. 

However, a fundamental flaw in this analysis was that the 70 percent 

assumption had no solid basis. We requested, but the PMO-DTS could not

provide, any analysis of travel data to support the assertion. Rather, the 

sole support provided by the PMO-DTS was an article in a travel industry 

trade publication.15 The article was not based on information related to 

DTS, but rather on the experience of one private sector company. 

“No Touch” Transaction 

Volume Estimates Are Not 

Supported 

 15 American Express News Releases: American Express’ Interactive Travel Update (New

York: Aug. 11, 2003), http://corp.americanexpress.com/gcs/cards/us/ni/pr/081303.aspx. 

Page 11 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
The economic analysis assumed that DOD could save about $13.50 per “no 

touch” ticket. Since that analysis, DOD has awarded one contract that 

specifically prices transactions using the same model as that envisioned by 

the economic analysis. This contract applies to the Defense Travel Region 

6 travel area.

16 During calendar year 2005, the difference in fees for “no 

touch” transactions and the transactions supported by the current process 

averaged between $10 and $12, depending on when the fees were incurred 

because the contract rates changed during 2005.17 In analyzing travel 

voucher data for Region 6 for calendar year 2005, we found that the 

reported “no touch” rate was, at best 47 percent—far less than the 70

percent envisioned in the economic analysis. 

PMO-DTS program officials stated they are uncertain as to why the 

anticipated 70 percent “no touch” was not being achieved. According to 

PMO-DTS program officials, this could be attributed, in part, to the DOD 

travelers being uncomfortable with the system and making reservations 

without using a CTO. Although this may be one reason, other factors may 

also affect the expected “no touch” fee. For example, we were informed 

that determining the airline availability and making the associated 

reservation can be accomplished, in most cases, rather easily. However, 

obtaining information related to hotels and rental cars and making the 

associated reservation can be more problematic because of the limitations 

in the data that DTS is able to obtain from its commercial sources. 

Accordingly, while a traveler may be able to make a “no touch” reservation 

for the airline portion of the trip, the individual may need to contact the 

CTO in order to make hotel or rental car reservations. When this occurs, 

rather than paying a “no touch” fee to the CTO, DOD ends up paying a 

higher fee, which eliminates the savings estimated in the economic 

analysis. 

 16 Defense Travel Region 6 includes the Air Force and defense agencies in the states of 

Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, 

South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The contract also applies to Army activities in 8 of the 11

states (excluding Kentucky, Missouri, and Nebraska). As discussed later, the Navy uses a 

management fee contract, and is therefore not included in the Defense Travel Region 6

contract. 

17 According to DTS officials, these savings are consistent with the DTS contracts that have 

been awarded to small businesses. The average savings per “no touch” ticket under these 

contracts is about $12.88. Because the contractors are paid these fees directly by the

traveler, they are unable to determine the percentage of transactions that are actually paid 

using the “no touch” rate. 

Page 12 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
The economic analysis assumed that (1) DOD would be able to modify the 

existing CTO contracts to achieve a substantial reduction in fees paid to a 

CTO when DTS was fully implemented across the department and (2) all 

services would use the fee structure called for in the new CTO contracts. 

The first part of the assumption is supported by results of the CTO 

contract for DOD Region 6 travel. The fees for the DTS “no touch” 

transactions were at least $10 less than if a CTO was involved in the 

transactions. However, to date, the department has experienced difficulty

in awarding new contracts with the lower fee structure. On May 10, 2006, 

the department announced the cancellation of the solicitation for a new 

contract. According to the department, it decided that the solicitation 

needed to be rewritten based on feedback from travel industry 

representatives at a March 28, 2006, conference. The department 

acknowledged that the “DTS office realized its solicitation didn’t reflect 

what travel agency services it actually needed.”18 The department would 

not say how the solicitation would be refined, citing the sensitivity of the 

procurement process. The department also noted that the new solicitation 

would be released soon, but provided no specific date. 

The economic analysis assumed that the Navy would save about 

$7.5 million, almost 25 percent, of the total savings related to CTO fees 

once DTS is fully deployed. The economic analysis averaged the CTO fees

paid by the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps—which amounted 

to about $18.71 per transaction—to compute the savings in Navy CTO fees. 

Using these data, the assumption was made in the economic analysis that

a fee of $5.25 would be assessed for each ticket, resulting in an average 

savings of $13.46 per ticket for the Navy ($18.71 minus $5.25).19 While this 

approach may be valid for the organizations that pay individual CTO fees, 

it may not be representative for organizations such as the Navy that pay a

management fee. The management fee charged the Navy is the same 

regardless of the involvement of the CTO—therefore, the reduced “no 

touch” fee would not apply. 

Navy Impact of CTO 

Management Fees Not 

Adequately Considered 

We were informed by Navy DTS program officials that they were 

considering continuing the use of management fees after DTS is fully 

implemented. According to Navy DTS program officials, they paid about 

$14.5 million during fiscal year 2005 for CTO management fees, almost $19 

 18 “DOD Retracts Solicitation for Travel Agency Services,” FederalTimes.com (May 16, 

2006), http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php? (downloaded June 14, 2006). 

19 These savings translate to about 572,000 tickets annually. 

Page 13 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
per ticket for approximately 762,700 tickets issued. Accordingly, even if 

the department arrives at a new CTO contract containing the new fee 

structure or fees similar to those of Region 6, the estimated savings related 

to CTO fees for the Navy will not be realized if the Navy continues to use 

the management fee concept. 

Effective Implementation 

of Existing Policies Should 

Have Identified Problems 

with the Economic 

Analysis 

Effective implementation of DOD guidance would have detected the types 

of problems discussed above and resulted in an economic analysis that 

would have accomplished the stated objective of the process—to help 

ensure that the funds invested in DTS were used efficiently and effectively. 

DOD policy20 and OMB guidance21 require that an economic analysis be 

based on facts and data and be explicit about the underlying assumptions 

used to arrive at estimates of future benefits and costs. Since an economic 

analysis deals with costs and benefits occurring in the future, assumptions 

must be made to account for uncertainties. DOD policy recognizes this and 

provides a systematic approach to the problem of choosing the best 

method of allocating scarce resources to achieve a given objective. 

A sound economic analysis recognizes that there are alternative ways to 

meet a given objective and that each alternative requires certain resources 

and produces certain results. The purpose of the economic analysis is to 

give the decision maker insight into economic factors bearing on 

accomplishing the objectives. Therefore, it is important to identify factors,

such as cost and performance risks and drivers, which can be used to 

establish and defend priorities and resource allocations. The DTS 

economic analysis did not comply with the DOD policy, and the 

weaknesses we found should have been detected had the DOD policy been 

effectively implemented. The PMO-DTS had adequate warning signs of the 

potential problems associated with not following the OMB and DOD 

guidance for developing an effective economic analysis. For example, as 

noted earlier, the Air Force and Navy provided comments when the 

economic analysis was being developed that the expected benefits being 

claimed were unrealistic. Just removing the benefits associated with 

personnel savings from the Air Force and Navy would have reduced the 

overall estimated program cost savings by almost 45 percent. This would 

have put increased pressure on the credibility of using a 70 percent “no 

 20 DOD Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking, November 7, 1995. 

21 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for

Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Revised Jan. 18, 2006). 

Page 14 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
touch” utilization rate. The following are examples of failures to effectively 

implement the DOD policy on conducting economic analyses and the 

adverse effects on the DTS economic analysis. 

• The DTS life-cycle cost estimates portion of the economic analysis was not 

independently validated as specified in DOD’s guidance.22 PMO-DTS 

officials acknowledged that there was not an independent assessment of 

the DTS life-cycle cost estimates. However, they noted that the 

department’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation had provided 

comments on the economic analysis.23 Program Analysis and Evaluation 

officials informed us that they did not perform an independent assessment 

of the DTS economic analysis because the data were not available to

validate the reliability of that analysis. Program Analysis and Evaluation 

officials also noted that they had raised similar concerns about the July 

2003 economic analysis, but those issues had not been resolved when the

September 2003 economic analysis was provided for their review. Because 

the September 2003 DTS life-cycle cost estimates were not independently

assessed, the department did not have reasonable assurance that the 

reported estimates were realistic, that the assumptions on which the 

analysis was based were valid, or that the estimated rate of return on the 

investment could reasonably be expected to be realized. 

• The September 2003 DTS economic analysis did not undertake an 

assessment of the effects of the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of 

benefits and costs, as required by DOD and OMB guidance.

24 Because an 

economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that a 

sensitivity analysis be performed to understand the effects of the 

imprecision in both underlying data and modeling assumptions. This 

analysis is required since the estimates of future benefits and costs are 

subject to varying degrees of uncertainty. For example, according to 

DOD officials, the number of travel transactions has remained relatively 

stable over the years. On the other hand, as discussed previously, the 

 22 Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 

May 12, 2003. 

23 Department of Defense Regulation 5000.2-R, Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook 

(Oct. 30, 2002), para.c4.5.1.61, required the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation to 

assess certain aspects of the economic analysis. 

24 Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis of Decisionmaking 

(Nov. 7, 1995), and Office of Management and Budget Revised Circular No. A-94, 

Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29, 

1992). 

Page 15 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
number of transactions that can be processed as “no touch” is unknown. 

Sensitivity analysis refers to changing the value of a given variable in a 

model to gauge the effect of change on model results. More importantly, it 

identifies key elements—data and assumptions—as discussed above—and 

varies a single element while holding the others constant to determine 

what amount of change in that element is required to raise or lower the 

resulting dominant benefit and cost elements by a set amount. In this way, 

data and assumptions can be risk-ranked for decisionmaking and auditing. 

In the case of DTS, we requested that the PMO-DTS determine the effects 

of a change in “no touch” transaction percentage. With all other factors 

remaining the same, DTS would have to achieve a 35 percent “no touch” 

transaction rate just to break even—where tangible costs and benefits are 

equal. Had DOD performed such an analysis, it would have understood 

that depending solely on an industry trade publication as its support for 

the “no touch” transaction percentage had major implications on the 

potential savings. 

Although the September 2003 economic analysis was not based on 

supportable data, the department’s criteria do not require that a new 

economic analysis be prepared. DTS has already completed all of the 

major milestones related to a major automated system, which require that 

an economic analysis be prepared or at least updated to reflect the current 

assumptions and the related costs and benefits. However, the fiscal year 

2005 defense authorization act25 requires the periodic review, but not less 

than annually, of every defense business system investment. Further, the 

department’s April 2006 guidance26 notes that the annual review process 

“provides follow-up assurance that information technology investments, 

which have been previously approved and certified, are managed properly, 

and that promised capabilities are delivered on time and within budget.” If

effectively implemented, this annual review process provides an excellent

opportunity for DOD management to assess whether DTS is meeting its 

planned cost, schedule, and functionality goals. Going forward, such a 

review could serve as a useful management tool in making funding and 

other management decisions related to DTS. 

New Economic Analysis 

Not Required by DOD 

Criteria 

 25 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 

108-375, § 332, 118 Stat. 1811, 1851-56 (Oct. 28, 2004) (codified, in part, at 10 U.S.C. §§ 186, 

2222). 

26 DOD, DOD IT Business Systems Investment Review Process: Investment Certification 

and Annual Review Process User Guidance (Apr. 10, 2006). 

Page 16 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 report27 noted the 

challenge facing the department in attaining the anticipated DTS’s 

utilization. While DOD has acknowledged the underutilization, we found 

that across DOD, the department does not have reasonable quantitative 

metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used. 

Presently, the reported DTS utilization is based on a DTS Voucher Analysis

Model28 that was developed in calendar year 2003 using estimated data, but

over the years has not been completely updated with actual data. While 

the military services have initiated actions to help increase the utilization 

of DTS, they pointed out that ineffective DTS training is a contributing 

factor to the lower than expected usage rate by the military services. 

The DTS Voucher Analysis Model was prepared in calendar year 2003 and 

based on airline ticket and voucher count data that were reported by the 

military services and defense agencies, but the data were not verified or 

validated. Furthermore, PMO-DTS officials acknowledged that the model 

has not been completely updated with actual data as DTS continues to be

implemented at the 11,000 sites. We found that the Air Force is the only 

military service that submits monthly metrics to the PMO-DTS officials for 

their use in updating the DTS Voucher Analysis Model. Rather than 

reporting utilization based on individual site system utilization data, the 

PMO-DTS continues to rely on outdated information in the reporting of 

DTS utilization to DOD management and Congress. We have previously 

reported29 that best business practices indicate that a key factor of project 

management and oversight is the ability to effectively monitor and 

evaluate a project’s actual performance against what was planned. 

DTS Remains 

Underutilized by the 

Military Services 

Metrics to Measure DTS 

Utilization Are Inadequate 

 27 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

28 DOD developed a model in calendar year 2003 that compares the expected usage against 

the actual usage. The expected usage is obtained by using historical data, such as ticket

counts, to determine the expected number of vouchers processed by a given location. For 

example, if a location had 1,000 vouchers as its expected number of vouchers per the

model, but now processes 750 actual vouchers through DTS, then the PMO model 

considers that that location has achieved a 75 percent utilization rate. It then takes the 

individual computations for each DTS location and “rolls them up” to determine the total 

utilization for individual service performance on a monthly basis. 

29 GAO, Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Key 

Causes of Modernization Failures, GAO-06-184 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006), and

Financial Management Systems: Lack of Disciplined Processes Puts Implementation of

HHS’ Financial System at Risk, GAO-04-1008 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2004). 

Page 17 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
In order to perform this critical task, best business practices require the 

adoption of quantitative metrics to help measure the effectiveness of a 

business system implementation and to continually measure and monitor 

results, such as system utilization. This lack of accurate and pertinent 

utilization data hinders management’s ability to monitor its progress 

toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system, as well as to 

provide consistent and accurate data to Congress. With the shift of the 

DTS program to BTA, which now makes DTS an enterprisewide endeavor, 

improved metrics and training are essential if DTS is to be DOD’s 

standard, integrated, end-to-end travel system for business travel. 

Table 3 presents DTS’s reported percentage of utilization during the period 

October 2005 through April 2006. PMO-DTS officials calculated these 

utilization percentages by comparing the actual number of travel vouchers 

processed through DTS to the outdated universe of travel transaction data

per the model, as described previously. Because the PMO-DTS was not 

able to identify the total number of travel vouchers that should have been 

processed through DTS (total universe of travel vouchers), the utilization 

percentages shown in table 3 may be over- or understated. 

Table 3: DTS Reported Utilization Percentage for the Period October 2005 through 

April 2006 

Month Army Navy Air Force

October 2005 46 28 33

November 2005 59 32 48

December 2005 50 27 38

January 2006 40 20 29

February 2006 54 30 40

March 2006 66 39 47

April 2006 59 35 40

Average 53 30 39

Source: PMO-DTS. 

PMO-DTS program officials confirmed that the reported utilization data 

were not based on complete data because the department did not have 

comprehensive information to identify the universe or the total number of 

travel vouchers that should be processed through DTS. PMO-DTS program 

and DTS military service officials agreed that the actual DTS utilization 

rate should be calculated by comparing actual vouchers being processed 

in DTS to the total universe of vouchers that should be processed in DTS. 

The universe would exclude those travel vouchers that cannot be 

Page 18 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
processed through DTS, such as those related to permanent change of 

station travel. 

The Air Force was the only military service that attempted to obtain data 

on (1) the actual travel vouchers processed through DTS and (2) those 

travel vouchers eligible to be processed through DTS, but were not. These 

data were site specific. For example, during the month of December 2005,

the PMO-DTS reported that at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 2,880 

travel vouchers were processed by DTS, and the Air Force reported that 

another 2,307 vouchers were processed through the legacy system—the 

Reserve Travel System (RTS). Of those processed through RTS, Air Force 

DTS program officials stated that 338 travel vouchers should have been 

processed through DTS. DTS Air Force program officials further stated 

that they submitted to the PMO-DTS the number of travel vouchers 

processed through RTS each month. These data are used by the PMO-DTS 

to update the DTS Voucher Analysis Model. However, neither the Air 

Force nor the PMO-DTS have verified the accuracy and reliability of the 

data. Therefore, the accuracy of the utilization rates reported for the Air 

Force by the PMO-DTS is not known. As shown in table 3, PMO-DTS 

officials reported utilization data for the Air Force from a low of 29 

percent (January 2006) to a high of 48 percent (November 2005) during the 

7-month period ending April 2006. 

Because Army and Navy DTS program officials did not have the 

information to identify the travel transactions that should have been 

processed through DTS, the Army and Navy did not have a basis for 

evaluating DTS utilization at their respective military locations and 

activities. Furthermore, Navy DTS program officials indicated that the 

utilization data that the PMO-DTS program officials reported for the Navy 

were not accurate. According to Navy DTS program officials, the Navy’s 

primary source of utilization data was the monthly metrics reports 

provided by the PMO-DTS, but Navy DTS program officials questioned the 

accuracy of the Navy utilization reports provided by the PMO-DTS. 

• For example, the Navy PMO-DTS utilization site report has a site name of 

Ballston, Va.; however, Ballston, Va. is not listed on the map site names on 

the DTS contractor’s database. As a result, the PMO-DTS Navy utilization 

report for this location indicates no usage every month. Our analysis 

indicated that this was 1 of at least 33 similar instances where no usage 

was reported for a nonexistent location. Navy DTS program officials 

stated that an effort is underway to “re-map” all Navy organizations to the 

correct site name, but as of June 2006 this effort had not been completed.

Page 19 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
• Another example indicates the inconsistencies that exist in the different 

information used by the Navy and the PMO-DTS program officials to 

report utilization rates for the Navy. The PMO-DTS program officials 

reported that the Navy had a total of 9,400 signed, original vouchers 

processed through DTS during December 2005; however, this is less than 

the 10,523 reported by the DTS contractor for the same month. According 

to Navy DTS program officials, they have not been able to confirm 

whether either figure is correct. Since the number of DTS vouchers is 

required to calculate utilization, the Navy is unable to determine the 

accuracy of the utilization metrics reported by the PMO-DTS officials, as 

shown in table 3. 

While the military services have issued various memorandums that direct 

or mandate the use of DTS to the fullest extent possible at those sites 

where DTS has been deployed, resistance still exists. As highlighted 

below, deployed sites are still using non-DTS systems, or legacy systems, 

to process TDY travel. 

DOD Has Taken Steps to 

Improve DTS Utilization, 

but Further Action Is 

Needed 

• The Army issued a memorandum in September 2004 directing each Army 

installation to fully disseminate DTS to all travelers within 90 to 180 days 

after Initial Operating Capability30 (IOC) at each installation.31

Subsequently in September 2005, DFAS officials reported that 390,388 

travel vouchers were processed through the Army’s legacy system—the 

Windows Integrated Automated Travel System, but DFAS officials could 

not provide a breakout of how many of the 390,388 travel vouchers should 

have been processed through DTS. 

• The Air Force issued a memorandum in November 2004 that stressed the 

importance of using DTS once it was implemented at an installation. The

Air Force memorandum specifically stated that business, local, and group 

travel vouchers should be electronically processed through DTS and that 

travel claims should not be submitted to the local finance office for 

processing. However, we found that Air Force travelers continued to 

process travel claims through legacy systems, such as RTS. For example, 

during the month of November 2005, the Air Force reported that 3,277 

 30 When a military service location has declared Initial Operating Capability (IOC), that 

location moves into an “operational phase” in which all units/activities are fully proliferated

for use of DTS.

31 The memorandum included a list of sites to which DTS should be fully disseminated and 

the types of vouchers that must be processed through DTS.

Page 20 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
business vouchers, 1,875 local vouchers, and 1,815 group vouchers were 

processed through RTS that should have been processed through DTS. 

Additionally, a DFAS internal review32 analyzed Air Force vouchers during 

the period January 2005 through June 2005, at locations where DTS was 

deployed, and found that Air Force travelers used legacy systems to 

process 79 percent of all routine TDY transactions. 

• The Navy issued a memorandum in May 2005 that directed the use of DTS 

to generate travel orders throughout all Navy locations. Navy DTS 

program officials reported in an April 2006 briefing that 18,300 travel 

vouchers were processed in DTS during the month of March 2006, but that

over 90,000 travel vouchers were still being processed monthly through 

the Integrated Automated Travel System—a legacy system. 

Thus, despite memoranda issued by the military services, it appears that 

DTS continues to be underutilized by the military services. As discussed in 

our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 report,33 the unnecessary 

continued use of the legacy travel systems results in the inefficient use of

funds because the department is paying to operate and maintain 

duplicative systems that perform the same function—travel. 

Besides the memorandums, DOD is taking other actions to increase DTS 

utilization as the following examples illustrate. 

• The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management (Financial 

& Accounting Oversight Directorate) holds monthly Senior Focus Group 

meetings with the installation leadership of major commands to discuss 

DTS utilization issues and possible corrective actions. 

• The Navy conducts quarterly video and telephone conferences with major 

commands and contacts commands with low usage to determine the 

causes for low DTS usage. 

• The PMO-DTS conducts monthly working group meetings with the military 

service and defense agency DTS program officials to discuss DTS 

functionality issues and concerns, DTS usage, and other related DTS 

issues. 

 32 Department of Defense, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Internal Review, Audit 

of the Defense Travel System (DTS), October 2005 – February 2006, CO06SRP005AR 

(Arlington, Va.: Feb. 22, 2006). 

33 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

Page 21 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Although the military services have issued various memorandums aimed at 

increasing the utilization of DTS, the military service DTS program 

officials all pointed to ineffective training as a primary cause of DTS not 

being utilized to a far greater extent. The following examples highlight the 

concerns raised by the military service officials. 

• Army DTS program officials emphasized that the DTS system is complex 

and the design presents usability challenges for users—especially for firsttime or infrequent users. They added that a major concern is that there is 

no PMO-DTS training for existing DTS users as new functionality is added 

to DTS. These officials stated that the PMO-DTS does not do a good job of

informing users about functionality changes made to the system. We 

inquired if the Help Desk was able to resolve the users’ problems, and the 

Army DTS officials simply stated “no.” The Army officials further pointed 

out that it would be beneficial if the PMO-DTS improved the electronic

training on the DTS Web site and made the training documentation easier

to understand. Also, improved training would help infrequent users adapt 

to system changes. The Army officials noted that without some of these 

improvements to resolve usability concerns, DTS will continue to be 

extremely frustrating and cumbersome for travelers. 

• Navy DTS program officials stated that DTS lacks adequate user/traveler 

training. The train-the-trainer concept of training system administrators 

who could then effectively train all their travelers has been largely 

unsuccessful. According to Navy officials, this has resulted in many 

travelers and users attempting to use DTS with no or insufficient training. 

The effect has frustrated users at each step of the travel process and has 

discouraged use of DTS. 

• Air Force officials stated that new DTS system releases are implemented 

with known problems, but the sites are not informed of the problems. 

Workarounds are not provided until after the sites begin encountering 

problems. Air Force DTS program officials stated that DTS releases did 

not appear to be well tested prior to implementation. Air Force officials 

also stated that there was insufficient training on new functionality. PMODTS and DTS contractor program officials believed that conference calls 

to discuss new functionality with the sites were acceptable training, but 

Air Force officials did not agree. The Air Force finance office was 

expected to fully comprehend the information received from those 

conference calls and provide training on the new functionality to 

users/approvers, but these officials stated that this was an unrealistic 

expectation.

Page 22 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Our September 2005 testimony and January 200634 report noted problems 

with DTS’s ability to properly display flight information and traced those 

problems to inadequate requirements management and testing. DOD 

stated that it had addressed those deficiencies and in February 2006, we 

again tested the system to determine whether the stated weaknesses had 

been addressed. We found that similar problems continue to exist. We also

identified additional deficiencies in DTS’s ability to display flights that 

comply with the Fly America Act.35 DTS’s inability to display flights that 

comply with the Fly America Act places the traveler who purchases a 

ticket or the individual authorizing, certifying, or disbursing a payment 

made when a ticket is paid for directly by DOD through a centrally billed 

account at unnecessary risk of personal liability. Once again, these 

problems can be traced to ineffective requirements management and 

testing processes. Properly defined requirements are a key element in 

systems that meet their cost, schedule, and performance goals since they 

define (1) the functionality that is expected to be provided by the system 

and (2) the quantitative measures by which to determine through testing 

whether that functionality is operating as expected. 

We briefed PMO-DTS officials on the results of our tests and in May 2006 

the officials agreed that our continued concerns about the proper display 

of flight information and compliance with the Fly America Act were valid. 

PMO-DTS officials stated that the DTS technology refresh, which is to be 

completed in September 2006, should address some of our concerns. 

While these actions are a positive step forward, they do not address the 

fundamental problem that DTS’s requirements are still ambiguous and 

conflicting—a primary cause of the previous problems. Until a viable

requirements management process is developed and effectively 

implemented, the department (1) cannot develop an effective testing 

process and (2) will not have reasonable assurance the project risks have 

been reduced to acceptable levels. 

Previously Reported 

DTS Requirements 

Management and 

Testing Deficiencies 

Have Not Been 

Resolved 

 34 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

35 49 U.S.C. §40118, commonly referred to as the Fly America Act, requires federal 

employees and their dependents, consultants, contractors, grantees, and others performing 

U.S. government-funded air travel to travel by U.S. certificated flag air carriers except

under certain circumstances, such as when travel by foreign air carrier is a matter of

necessity as defined by the statute or when U.S. certificated flag air carrier service is not

available. See 41C.F.R. § 301-10.135. 

Page 23 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
In our earlier testimony and report,36 we noted that DOD did not have 

reasonable assurance that the flights displayed met the stated DOD 

requirements. Although DOD stated in each case that our concerns had 

been addressed, subsequent tests found that the problems had not been 

corrected. Requirements represent the blueprint that system developers 

and program managers use to design, develop, and acquire a system. 

Requirements should be consistent with one another, verifiable, and 

directly traceable37 to higher-level business or functional requirements. It is 

critical that requirements be carefully defined and that they flow directly 

from the organization’s concept of operations (how the organization’s dayto-day operations are or will be carried out to meet mission needs). 

Improperly defined or incomplete requirements have been commonly 

identified as a cause of system failure and systems that do not meet their 

cost, schedule, or performance goals.

Requirements represent the foundation on which the system should be 

developed and implemented. As we have noted in previous reports,38

because requirements provide the foundation for system testing, 

significant defects in the requirements management process preclude an

entity from implementing a disciplined testing process. That is, 

requirements must be complete, clear, and well documented to design and

implement an effective testing program. Absent this, an organization is 

taking a significant risk that its testing efforts will not detect significant 

defects until after the system is placed into production. Our February 2006 

analysis of selected flight information disclosed that DOD still did not have 

reasonable assurance that DTS displayed flights in accordance with its 

stated requirements. We analyzed 15 U.S. General Services Administration

Providing Complete Flight 

Information Has Been a 

Continuing Problem 

 36 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

37 Traceability allows the user to follow the life of the requirement both forward and 

backward through these documents and from origin through implementation. Traceability 

is also critical to understanding the parentage, interconnections, and dependencies among

the individual requirements. This information in turn is critical to understanding the impact

when a requirement is changed or deleted. 

38 See, for example, GAO-04-1008 and Army Depot Maintenance: Ineffective Oversight of 

Depot Maintenance Operations and System Implementation Efforts, GAO-05-441 

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

Page 24 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
(GSA) city pairs,39 which should have translated into 246 GSA city pair 

flights for the departure times selected. However, we identified 87 flights 

that did not appear on one or more of the required listings based on the 

DTS requirements. For instance, our analysis identified 44 flights 

appearing on other DTS listings or airline sites that did not appear on the 

9:00 am DTS listing even though those flights (1) met the 12-hour flight 

window40 and (2) were considered GSA city pair flights—two of the key 

DTS requirements the system was expected to meet. 

After briefing PMO officials on the results of our analysis in February 2006, 

the PMO-DTS employed the services of a contractor to review DTS to 

determine the specific cause of the problems and recommend solutions. In 

a March 2006 briefing, the PMO-DTS acknowledged the existence of the 

problems, and identified two primary causes. First, part of the problem 

was attributed to the methodology used by DTS to obtain flights from the 

Global Distribution System (GDS). The PMO-DTS stated that DTS was 

programmed to obtain a “limited” amount of data from GDS in order to 

reduce the costs associated with accessing GDS. This helps to explain why 

flight queries we reviewed did not produce the expected results. To 

resolve this particular problem, the PMO-DTS proposed increasing the 

amount of data obtained from GDS. Second, the PMO-DTS acknowledged

that the system testing performed by the contractor responsible for 

developing and operating DTS was inadequate and, therefore, there was 

no assurance that DTS would provide the data in conformance with the 

stated requirements. This weakness was not new, but rather reconfirms 

the concerns discussed in our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 

report41 related to the testing of DTS. 

 39 GSA awards contracts to airlines to provide flight services between pairs of cities. This is 

commonly referred to as the GSA city pair program. Under this program (1) no advanced

ticket purchases are required, (2) no minimum or maximum length of stay is required, 

(3) tickets are fully refundable and no charges are assessed for cancellations or changes, 

(4) seating is not capacity controlled (i.e., as long as there is a coach-class seat on the

plane, the traveler may purchase it), (5) no blackout dates apply, (6) fare savings average 

70 percent over regular walk-up fares, and (7) fares are priced on one-way routes

permitting agencies to plan for multiple destinations. We selected the first 15 city pairs that 

were provided by DOD to GSA in support of a GSA study on accuracy of flight displays and

fare information by DTS and the GSA eTravel providers. 

40 A flight window is the amount of time before and after a specified time and is used for 

determining the flights that should be displayed. DTS uses a 12-hour flight window for

domestic flights and a 24-hour flight window for foreign flights. The system is also

expected to display up to 25 flights for the flight window. 

41 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

Page 25 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Our analysis also found that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that 

the system displayed flights in compliance with the requirements of the 

Fly America Act. In 1996, Congress assigned the Administrator, GSA, the 

responsibility42 to determine the situations for which appropriated funds 

could be used consistent with the Fly America Act, and GSA has published 

its rules in the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR).43 Within the basic 

guidelines that GSA publishes, agencies must establish “internal 

procedures” to ensure that agency reimbursements with federal funds for 

travelers’ air carrier expenses are made only in compliance with the Fly 

America Act and the FTR rules. As a result, DTS places the traveler who 

purchases a ticket or the individual authorizing, certifying, or disbursing a 

payment made when a ticket is paid for directly by DOD—such as those 

tickets purchased using a centrally billed account—at unnecessary risk of 

personal liability. DOD guidance expressly states that for code-sharing44

airline tickets related to foreign travel (1) the entire airline ticket must be 

issued by and on the U.S.-flag carrier (not necessarily the carrier operating 

the aircraft) and (2) the flight must be between a centennial United States 

and a foreign destination. If these conditions are not met, DOD requires a 

determination that a U.S.-flag carrier is not available or use of a non-U.S.-

flag carrier is necessary.45 These requirements are commonly referred to as 

the Fly America Act requirements. According to PMO-DTS officials, DTS’s 

requirements are intended to comply with the Fly America Act. However,

our analysis of March 2006 flight display data identified several instances 

in which flights were displayed to the DOD traveler that did not meet the 

requirements of the Fly America Act. For example, six of the first seven 

flights displayed between Santiago, Chile, and San Antonio, Texas, did not 

appear to comply with the Fly America Act requirements since they did 

not involve a U.S.-flag carrier. More importantly, several flights that 

appeared later in the listing and involved U.S.-flag carriers were more 

advantageous to the traveler because they required less actual travel time. 

Figure 1 shows the DTS display of flights. 

 42 See 49 U.S.C. § 40118(c). 

43 See 41 C.F.R. §301-10.143. 

44 A code-share agreement is a marketing arrangement in which an airline places its

designator code on a flight operated by another airline and sells, advertises, and issues 

tickets as its own flights. U.S. carriers must obtain authorization for foreign code-share 

operations from the Department of Transportation. 

45 JTR, C2204-C, and JFTR, U3125-C.

Page 26 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Figure 1: March 2006 DTS Display of Flights between Santiago, Chile, and San Antonio, Texas 

According to DTS program officials, after our discussions relating to the 

flight displays and compliance with the Fly America Act, they did a 

“requirements scrub” to define the requirements that should be used to 

display flights, including those requirements relating to displaying flights 

that comply with the Fly America Act. The previous requirement stated 

that “DTS shall examine international trip records for compliance with 

DOD policy on the use of non-U.S.-flag carriers.” The revised requirement 

relating to international flights stated that the system should display flights

Page 27 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
that are (1) part of the GSA city pair program or (2) offered by U.S. 

carriers. If the system cannot find flights that meet these criteria, then the 

system is expected to instruct the user to contact their CTO to arrange the 

flight. According to PMO-DTS officials, this change has been incorporated

into the production system. We conducted a limited nonstatistical test to 

determine if the examples of flights not complying with the Fly America 

Act identified in our earlier tests had been eliminated and found that these 

flights no longer appeared on the DTS displayed flights. However, as we 

noted, the DOD policy is compliant with the Fly America Act requirements 

and this was a DTS requirement in effect when we identified the examples

of flight displays not complying with the Fly America Act. In effect, this is 

another example of (1) inadequate testing by the DTS contractor and 

(2) DOD’s inability to ensure the system is meeting its requirements. Until 

DOD effectively analyzes and properly documents the functionality it 

desires, it has little assurance that the proper requirements have been 

defined. 

DOD’s Planned Corrective 

Actions Will Not Address 

Fundamental 

Requirements Management 

Problems 

While DOD’s planned actions, if effectively implemented, should address 

several of the specific weaknesses we identified related to flight displays 

and the Fly America Act, they fall short of addressing the fundamental 

problems that caused those weaknesses—inadequate requirements 

management. DTS’s requirements continue to be ambiguous. For example, 

a system requirement was changed to “display,” that is, show the fares 

relating to the full GSA city pair fare only if the GSA city pair fare with 

capacity limits46 was not available. Based upon information provided by 

PMO-DTS officials, after the requirement was supposed to have been 

implemented, both fare types were shown on the DTS display screen. 

PMO-DTS officials stated that although both fares were shown, DTS was 

still expected to book the lower fare and that the requirement was really 

designed to ensure that the lower fare was booked. This requirement is 

ambiguous because it is not clear what the word “display” means in this 

context. Based upon the stated requirement, the most common 

interpretation would be that the word display implies information that is 

provided (or shown) to the DOD traveler. However, based on the PMODTS official’s explanation, the word display, in fact, means the fare that is 

booked. This type of ambiguity was one cause of problems we noted in the 

 46 Several GSA city pair flights have two contract fares. These fares are commonly referred 

to as an unrestricted GSA city pair fare and a GSA city pair fare with capacity limits. The 

latter fare is cheaper than the unrestricted GSA city pair fare and applies to a limited 

number of seats when available. However, it has no other restrictions. 

Page 28 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
past where testing did not identify system defects and DTS did not 

properly display the proper flight information to the user. 

Furthermore, DOD is currently undergoing a technology upgrade of DTS 

that is scheduled for completion by September 30, 2006. This technology 

upgrade is expected to provide additional functionality; however, DOD 

still has not adequately defined the requirements that are needed to define 

flight displays for DOD travelers. According to DTS program officials and

the contractor responsible for the technology upgrade, the upgrade is 

intended to do the following: 

• Replace the current display of up to 25 flights on one page in a 

predetermined order47 and separate the 25 flights into three categories—

GSA city pair flights, Other Government Fares, and Other Unrestricted 

Flights—and then sort the flights by additional criteria such as elapsed 

travel time (rather than the current flight time), time difference from the 

requested departure time, number of stops, and whether the flight is 

considered a direct flight. This approach, if effectively implemented, 

addresses one problem we noted with the current process where flight 

time48 rather than elapsed travel time is used as one of the sorting criteria. 

It will also present flights that have the shortest duration in relation to the 

requested departure time at the top of the listing. 

• Display the prices on all flights returned to the traveler. The current 

system displays the prices for the GSA city pair flights and allows the 

traveler to request prices for up to 10 additional flights at a time. This 

significantly improves the ability of the system to present information to 

the traveler that can be used to select the best flight for the government 

and allows the system to help ensure that the lowest cost flights are 

 47 Under the current release, DTS will attempt to display up to 25 flights in two categories—

GSA city pairs and other. The flights within GSA city pairs are then displayed according to 

elapsed travel time. 

48 Flight time is the actual time a plane is in the air while elapsed travel time is the total 

time from the original departure to the ultimate arrival. For non stop flights, the times are 

the same. However, in cases of connecting flights, the “layover” time is only included in the

elapsed travel time. 

Page 29 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
selected by the user.49 This is especially true when a GSA city pair fare is 

not available. According to DOD officials, it is cost prohibitive to obtain 

the pricing information for non-GSA city pair flights using the current 

technology.50

Although these planned improvements should provide the DOD traveler 

with better travel information, they still fall short of adequately defining 

the requirements that should be used for displaying flights. For example, 

DOD has retained a requirement to display 25 flights for each inquiry. 

However, it has not determined (1) whether the rationale for that 

requirement is valid and (2) under what conditions flights that are not part 

of the GSA city pair program should be displayed. For example, we found 

that several DTS flights displayed to the user “overlap”51 other flights. 

Properly validating the requirements would allow DOD to obtain 

reasonable assurance that its requirements properly define the 

functionality needed and the business rules necessary to properly 

implement that functionality. As previously noted, requirements that are 

unambiguous and consistent are fundamental to providing reasonable 

assurance that a system will provide the desired functionality. Until DOD 

improves DTS requirement management practices, it will not have this 

assurance. 

 49 According to DOD officials, once the display of pricing information is implemented, the

system will require a justification when the lowest cost flight is not selected. This edit 

would be similar to the edit for GSA city pair fares, which requires the user to provide a 

justification if a GSA city pair flight is available but not selected. When a user does not 

select the lowest cost fare, unless it is a GSA city pair fare, the user would be required to 

provide a justification. A justification is not expected when the user selects a GSA city pair

fare rather than a lower cost fare, assuming one is available, which is displayed by DTS 

because of government policy that encourages the use of the GSA city pair program. 

50 DOD estimates that the current technological approach—querying the GDS for the prices 

of the flights displayed to the user—would cost about $6 million for the 3 million trips that 

DTS is expected to book each year. DOD did not provide the estimated fees that will be 

paid for the technology that will enable these prices to be displayed. 

51 For example, DTS displayed a GSA city pair flight between Washington, D.C., and 

Atlanta, Ga. that departed at 10:05 a.m. and arrived at 1:50 p.m. This flight “overlapped” two 

other GSA city pair direct flights that were available and required less travel time. One

flight left at 10:05 a.m. and arrived at 12:02 p.m. while another left at 11:05 a.m. and arrived 

at 12:56 p.m. Furthermore, DTS displayed a non-GSA city pair flight that left at 9:20 a.m.

and arrived at 1:05 p.m. This flight did not meet any of the acceptable criteria for not using 

a GSA city pair flight. 

Page 30 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Overhauling the department’s antiquated travel management practices and 

systems has been a daunting challenge for DOD. While it was widely 

recognized that this was a task that needed to be accomplished and 

savings could result, the underlying assumptions in support of those 

savings are not based on reliable data and therefore it is questionable 

whether the anticipated savings will materialize. Even though the overall 

savings are questionable, the successful implementation of DTS is critical

to reducing the number of stovepiped, duplicative travel systems 

throughout the department. We have reported on numerous occasions that 

reducing the number of business systems within DOD can translate into 

savings that can be used for other mission needs. Furthermore, the shift of

DTS to BTA, which makes DTS an enterprisewide endeavor, should help in 

making DTS the standard integrated, end-to-end travel system for business 

travel. Management oversight is essential for this to become a reality.

Equally important, however, will be the department’s ability to resolve the 

long-standing difficulties that DTS has encountered with its requirements 

management and system testing. Until these issues are resolved, more 

complete utilization of DTS will be problematic. 

To improve the department’s management and oversight of DTS, which 

has been declared a DOD enterprise business system, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel 

and Readiness) and the Director, Business Transformation Agency, to 

jointly take the following four actions: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Evaluate the cost effectiveness of the Navy continuing with the CTO 

management fee structure versus adopting the revised CTO fee structure,

once the new contracts have been awarded. 

• Develop a process by which the military services develop and use 

quantitative data from DTS and their individual legacy systems to clearly 

identify the total universe of DTS-eligible transactions on a monthly basis. 

At a minimum, these data should be used to update the DTS Voucher 

Analysis Model to report DTS actual utilization rates. 

• Require the PMO-DTS to provide a periodic report on the utilization of 

DTS to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and the 

Director, Business Transformation Agency, once accurate data are 

available. The report should continue until the department has reasonable 

assurance that DTS is operating as intended at all 11,000 locations. The 

report should identify at a minimum (1) the number of defense locations at 

which DTS has been deployed, (2) the extent of DTS utilization at these 

Page 31 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
sites, (3) steps taken or to be taken by the department to improve DTS 

utilization, and (4) any continuing problems in the implementation and 

utilization of DTS. 

• Resolve inconsistencies in DTS requirements, such as the 25 flight display, 

by properly defining the (1) functionality needed and (2) business rules 

necessary to properly implement the needed functionality. 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), which are reprinted in 

appendix II. DOD concurred with three and partially concurred with one 

of the recommendations. In regard to the recommendations with which 

the department concurred, it briefly outlined the actions it planned to take

in addressing two of the three recommendations. For example, the 

department noted the difficulties in obtaining accurate utilization data 

from the existing legacy systems, but stated that the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and BTA will evaluate 

methods for reporting actual DTS utilization. 

Additionally, DOD noted that the Defense Travel Management Office 

developed and implemented a requirements change management process 

on May 1, 2006. In commenting on the report, the department stated that 

this process is intended to define requirements and track the entire life 

cycle of the requirements development process. As reiterated in this 

report, and discussed in our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 

report,52 effective requirements management has been an ongoing concern, 

and we fully support the department’s efforts to improve its management 

oversight of DTS’s requirements. In this regard, the department needs to 

have in place a process that provides DOD reasonable assurance that 

(1) requirements are properly documented and (2) requirements are 

adequately tested as recommended in our January 2006 report.53 This 

process should apply to all existing requirements as well as any new 

requirements. As discussed in this report, we reviewed some of the 

requirements in May 2006, that were to have followed the new 

requirements management process, and found problems similar to those 

noted in our January 2006 report. While we did not specifically review the 

new process, if it does not include an evaluation of existing requirements, 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

 52 GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

53 GAO-06-18. 

Page 32 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
the department may continue to experience problems similar to those we 

previously identified. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to evaluate the cost 

effectiveness of the Navy continuing with the CTO management fee 

structure. DOD stated that all military service secretaries should 

participate in an evaluation to determine the most cost-effective payment 

method to the CTOs. DOD’s response indicated that the Defense Travel 

Management Office is currently procuring commercial travel services for 

DOD worldwide in a manner that will ensure evaluation of cost 

effectiveness for all services. If DOD proceeds with the actions outlined in

its comments, it will meet the intent of our recommendation. 

Finally, DOD strongly objected to our finding that the personnel savings

are unrealistic. In its comments, the department stated that DOD is facing 

an enormous challenge and the department continues to identify 

efficiencies and eliminate redundancies to help leverage available funds. 

We fully recognize that the department is attempting to improve the 

efficiency and effectiveness of its business operations. In fact, the 

Comptroller General of the United States testified in August 2006 that 

increased commitment by the department to address DOD’s numerous 

challenges represents an improvement over past efforts.54

The fact remains, however, that the results of an economic analysis are 

intended to help management decide if future investments in a given 

endeavor are worthwhile. In order to provide management with this 

information it is imperative that the underlying assumptions in an 

economic analysis be supported by valid assumptions. The September 

2003 economic analysis noted that personnel savings of $54.1 million, as 

shown in table 2 of this report, would be realized by the department 

annually for fiscal years 2009 through 2016. However, based upon our 

review and analysis of documentation and discussion with department 

personnel we found that the underlying assumptions in support of the 

$54.1 million were not valid. 

Furthermore, as noted in the report Air Force and Navy DTS program 

officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of 

 54 GAO, Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to Effective Financial 

and Business Management Transformation, GAO-06-1006T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3,

2006). 

Page 33 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
personnel with the full implementation of DTS. Further, as discussed in 

the report, the Naval Cost Analysis Division review of the DTS economic 

analysis noted that approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s total costs, 

including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost estimates could not be 

validated because credible supporting documentation was lacking. 

The report does note that Air Force and Navy DTS program officials noted

that while they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, 

there would be a shifting of personnel to other functions. The report 

further points out that DOD officials responsible for reviewing economic 

analyses stated that while shifting personnel to other functions is 

considered a benefit, it should be considered an intangible benefit rather

than tangible dollar savings since the shifting of personnel does not result 

in a reduction of DOD expenditures. Additionally, in its comments the 

department provided no new data that was counter to our finding. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Personnel and Readiness); the Director, Business Transformation Agency;

and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies of this report 

will be made available to others upon request. In addition, the report is 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact McCoy Williams at (202) 512-9095 or williamsm1@gao.gov

or Keith A. Rhodes at (202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

Page 34 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III. 

McCoy Williams 

Director 

Financial Management and Assurance 

Keith A. Rhodes 

Chief Technologist 

Applied Research and Methods 

 Center for Technology and Engineering 

Page 35 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 36 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Norm Coleman 

Chairman 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Coburn 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government 

 Information and International Security 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Page 37 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the reasonableness of the key assumptions made by DOD to 

arrive at the net annual estimated savings of over $56 million shown in the 

September 2003 economic analysis addendum, we (1) ascertained if the 

economic analysis was prepared in accordance with the prescribed 

standards, (2) analyzed two key assumptions that represent the largest 

dollar savings for the DTS program, and (3) analyzed the supporting 

documentation related to these two assumptions to determine whether the 

assumptions were valid. Furthermore, we met with the military services 

and DFAS officials to ascertain their specific concerns with the estimated 

savings. Further, we met with Program Analysis and Evaluation officials to

identify any issues they had with the DTS estimated savings. In performing 

this body of work, we relied heavily upon the expertise of our Applied 

Research and Method’s Center for Economics. 

To determine the actions being taken to enhance the utilization of DTS, we 

met with military services officials to obtain an understanding of the 

specific actions that were being taken. In addition, we obtained and 

reviewed various memorandums related to the utilization of DTS. We also

obtained an overview of the method and data used by the PMO-DTS to 

report the rate of DTS utilization for the various DOD components. We 

also met with the military services to ascertain how they use the PMO-DTS 

data to monitor their respective utilization and whether they augment 

these data with any other data and if so, the source of those data. 

To ascertain whether DOD has reasonable assurance that the testing of 

DTS was adequate, and thereby ensure accurate flight information was 

displayed, we met with Northrop Grumman and the PMO-DTS officials to

obtain an explanation of the corrective actions that were to have been 

implemented. To ascertain if the noted corrective actions have been 

successfully implemented, we analyzed 246 GSA city pair flights to 

determine if the information being displayed to the traveler was consistent 

with DTS’s stated requirement. 

We did not review the accuracy and reliability of the specific dollar 

amounts shown in the September 2003 economic analysis. Given the 

department’s previously reported problems related to financial 

management,1

 we have no assurance that the underlying data supporting 

the economic analysis were complete. Furthermore, our emphasis was 

directed more towards the validity of the assumptions that were used to 

 1

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005). 

Page 38 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

arrive at the net annual estimated savings of over $56 million. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this 

audit. We performed our audit work from October 2005 through July 2006

in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 

Defense or his designee. We received written comments from the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), which are reprinted in 

appendix II.

Page 39 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-06-980 Defense Travel System
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 43 GAO-06-980

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

McCoy Williams, (202) 512-9095 or williamsm1@gao.gov

Keith A. Rhodes, (202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov

In addition to the above contacts, the following individuals made key 

contributions to this report: Darby Smith, Assistant Director; 

J. Christopher Martin, Senior-Level Technologist; F. Abe Dymond, 

Assistant General Counsel; Beatrice Alff; Harold Brumm, Jr.; Francine 

DelVecchio; Jason Kelly; and Tarunkant Mithani. 

Defense Travel System

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

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