*

Honorable George C. Young, Senior U.S. District Judge for

the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. 

 1

Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

A local city government is a "person" that can be sued

within the meaning of § 1983. Monell v. Department of

Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56

L.Ed.2d 611, 635 (1978). 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 94-8481.

Pamela D. YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, CITY OF, Through its Mayor Charles DeVANEY, in

his official capacity, and its council members, et al., DefendantsAppellees.

July 28, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Georgia. (No. CV191-215), Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., Judge.

Before HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge,

and YOUNG*

, Senior District Judge.

HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

 Pamela D. Young appeals from the judgment entered in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia

granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the City of

Augusta, Georgia (the City) in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal

liability action and dismissing her pendent state law claims.1
 2

Manic-depression is an affective psychosis characterized by

extreme and pathological elation alternating with severe

dejection. 8 McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology

114 (5th ed. 1982). 

 3The complaint also invoked the First, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments as providing grounds for relief, as well as 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive persons of

their civil rights. The only cognizable federal cause of action

implicated by the allegations of the complaint, however, is one

under § 1983 for possible violations of the Eighth Amendment,

After a review of the record, we conclude that genuine issues of

material fact remain in the case. We therefore reverse and remand

for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 1989, Young, who was eighteen years old at the time

and afflicted with a manic-depressive disorder,2 was arrested for

stealing a package of cigarettes at a local grocery store. She was

thereafter found guilty of misdemeanor theft and was sentenced to

pay a $500.00 fine or to serve ninety days in the City jail.

Unable to pay the fine, Young was faced with service of the jail

sentence. Prior to being transported to the jail, she was placed

in a holding cell adjacent to the courtroom, where she removed her

underwear and shoes and set them on fire. This led to another

charge for destruction of City property as a result of the damage

to the cell. The next day, she pleaded guilty to that offense and

was again sentenced to a $500.00 fine or ninety days in jail.

Young filed this action on October 10, 1991, alleging, inter

alia, that, during her imprisonment, jail officials were

deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in violation

of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, giving

rise to a cause of action under the authority of § 1983.3

 She also
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 

 4Because this case involves the grant of summary judgment,

we view the evidence and all inferences arising therefrom in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. James v. City of

St. Petersburg, Fla., 33 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.1994) (en

banc). 

contended that her treatment at the jail ran afoul of Georgia law.

Young sought damages, attorneys fees and unspecified injunctive

relief. The complaint named as defendants the City, through its

Mayor and City Council members, the Chief of Police, Freddie Lott,

and Bobbie Jean Gentle, a guard at the jail. Because Young failed

to serve Lott and Gentle with process, they were never made parties

to the lawsuit. Consequently, this appeal is confined to only

those allegations of the complaint as they relate to the liability

of the City.

 The evidence gleaned from the record construed in the light

most favorable to Young4

 discloses that her father informed "one or

more persons associated with the Augusta judicial system" that she

was manic-depressive and requested that she be allowed to serve any

jail time imposed at the Georgia Regional Hospital at Augusta.

("Georgia Regional") (R1-5 at 1). Instead, on August 15, 1989, she

was taken to the City jail. Although Young had been treated for

psychiatric and behavior problems during various periods since she

was fourteen years old, at the time of her arrest and initial

incarceration she was not being treated by a doctor and was not

taking medication.

Young's stay at the jail apparently was uneventful until

September 6, when she was transported to the University Hospital
 5

In its motion for summary judgment, The City claimed that

prior to this emergency room visit, Young underwent a psychiatric

evaluation pursuant to a court order. It produced a copy of the

court's order dated August 23, 1989 in support of this statement,

but failed to offer any evidence showing that Young was actually

checked by a medical professional or the results of the alleged

examination. The City also contended Young received medical

treatment on September 7, 1989, but again, there is no proof of

this allegation in the record. 

 6Lithium is a drug prescribed during manic episodes of

manic-depressive illness. Physician's Desk Reference 2304 (47th

ed. 1993). 

emergency room because of complaints of abdominal pain.5 On

September 11, she was returned to the emergency room because of

violent behavior. She was subsequently transferred to Georgia

Regional for a psychiatric evaluation, where it was determined that

she would not pose a danger to herself or others if she were

returned to the jail. However, by September 13, Young was in an

overtly psychotic state and in need of hospitalization. She was

admitted that day to Georgia Regional and psychotropic medication

was prescribed for her. She was released to the jail on September

21, with a warning that she might continue to act out or make

suicidal statements. A letter written by Eloise Hayes, D.O.,

advised that Young was manipulative and could pose a danger to

herself. The letter instructed that if she engaged in such

behavior, she should be placed in a stripped cell. On October 1,

Young was examined at the emergency room again for possible lithium

toxicity.6

 Upon her release, jail officials were instructed to

withhold the drug until they were advised of test results. The

record does not contain evidence of those results or show whether
 7

Handwritten activity notes show that Young was examined

also at the Augusta Area Mental Health Clinic on October 2, 16

and 20. What, if any, treatment she received is not discernible

from the notes. 

 8Young also testified that she was maced by guards on

various other occasions while being escorted to and from the

shower. 

 9Young's claim regarding the course of medication she

received during her imprisonment is somewhat vague and

conflicting. In her answers to interrogatories, she states that

she received no medicine between August 16 and September 30. 

(R1-5, Answer to Interrogatory 1, ¶ 6). She also admits,

however, and the record shows, that she was medicated as an

they were passed on to jail officials.7

On October 3, Young told a guard she was hearing voices. In

response to this information, she was placed in an isolation cell,

which she attempted to flood, thereby wetting her clothes. She was

then stripped naked and chained to the metal bed, which contained

no mattress. She was shackled in such a way that she could not

reach the toilet and was forced to eliminate her bodily wastes

where she sat on the floor. When a meal was served, she threw it

against the wall. While in isolation, Young, in a delusional

state, repeatedly banged on the door, which resulted in her being

sprayed with mace by both male and female guards. 8

 She was

confined in this manner, naked and chained to the bed amid filth

and excrement and subjected to macings until October 6, when she

was provided with clothes, allowed to take a shower and her cell

was finally cleaned by another inmate. The next day she was taken

to the Augusta Area Mental Health Clinic and then to Georgia

Regional Hospital, where she was treated for her mental disorder

with shots and medication. She was returned to the jail on October

10, but continued to receive psychotropic medication.9
inpatient at Georgia Regional from September 13 through September

21. (R1-29, Answer to Interrogatory 24; R1-19, Exhibits D-1 and

D-2). She contends that after medications were prescribed for

her, "the City did not give them at prescribed times. They were

only given at medication time[,]" (R1-29, Answer to Interrogatory

24), and that, after her release from the hospital on September

21, she was "given medications, perhaps not as scheduled ...

until they ran out on approximately October 2, 1989, after which

time [the] receipt of medication was even more sporadic[,]" (R1-

29, Answer to Interrogatory 1, ¶ 17). She states in her

complaint and in answers to interrogatories that between October

10 and November 2 "she was given medication every day, three

times a day, Haladol and Lithium." (R1-3, Complaint at ¶ 30; 

R1-5, Answer to Interrogatory 1, § 9). We can only construe

these statements as meaning that there were periods of time

during her imprisonment when jail officials failed to dispense

her medicines as prescribed. 

Nevertheless, on November 3, she informed a guard that she again

was hearing voices. As before, she was placed in an isolation

cell, which she proceeded to flood and which resulted in her being

handcuffed to the bed. A short time later, she engaged in a verbal

altercation with one of the guards, Bobbie Jean Gentle. The

confrontation escalated into a physical assault during which Gentle

struck Young in the eye with her fist. Gentle continued to beat

Young, who was still shackled to the bed, until other jailers

intervened. Later that day Young was again taken to the Augusta

Area Mental Health Clinic and then to Georgia Regional, where she

was admitted for treatment. She remained there until November 17,

when she was released to her family.

In her charges of municipal liability, Young alleges that the

City failed to adequately select or train jail personnel to deal

with inmates suffering from mental illness, or to provide on-site

medical treatment. Because of these deficiencies, she contends,

treatment for her psychiatric condition was delayed until it

reached emergency proportions. Although not alleged directly,
implicit in the complaint also is the claim that the brutality to

which she was subjected in the isolation cell from October 3

through October 6, the macings and the beating she received from

Gentle, were the result of inadequate training of jail personnel.

The City moved for summary judgment urging that (1) the

portions of the complaint concerning events occurring between

August 15, 1989 and October 10, 1989 were barred by the statute of

limitations; (2) the state law claims were foreclosed because of

Young's failure to provide the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 36-33-

5 (mandating that notice of claims against municipal corporations

be presented to the municipality for possible settlement within six

months of the alleged wrongful conduct); and (3) her damages were

not caused by a custom, practice or policy of the City. In support

of the motion, the City submitted the affidavit of Lena J. Bonner,

the custodian of the records of the City Council, who stated that

no evidence existed to show that Young had served the City with the

aforementioned notice required by Georgia law. In addition, the

City proffered the affidavit of M. James Cullinan, identified as

"the official in charge of the City of Augusta Jail." (R1-19 at ¶

2). Cullinan attested, inter alia, as follows:

3. At all relevant times the City of Augusta Jail

employed a nurse who was charged with treating minor medical

problems and directing non-minor problems to the appropriate

medical facility and personnel.

4. According to the policy and procedures of the City

Jail, medical attention is available at all times when

emergencies occur. Emergencies are defined as medical

conditions which appear to require immediate attention and are

not limited to severe or life threatening conditions. Inmates

in need of care are immediately transported to University

Hospital and its clinics.

5. The staff at the City Jail is and has been at all
pertinent times instructed and trained to respond promptly to

any report of a medical need by an inmate and further trained

that when in doubt, the inmate must be transported to the

hospital. It is and has been at all relevant time [sic] the

practice of the City jail to consistently provide prompt and

adequate medical care to the inmates.

6. The staff of the City Jail not only receives initial

training pertaining to medical needs of inmates at the time of

employment but they also receive continuing education and

training of at least four hours per month with regard to such

matters.[ ]

7. Such training specifically emphasizes the necessity

for all City Jail personnel to be alert to inmates' medical

needs and to respond to medical needs by providing prompt

care.

8. At all relevant times, City Jail personnel have also

been trained to be aware of inmates' psychiatric needs. They

are trained to observe the inmates' behavior and to report

unusual behavior to the nurse, University Hospital physicians

and to personnel at the Augusta Area Mental Health Clinic.

Observations and reports are according to national guidelines

which are contained in a standard form.

9. During the time period referred to in Plaintiff's

Complaint, City Jail personnel were trained and had been

trained to follow orders and directions from physicians and

psychologists and to transport inmates to the appropriate

facility for psychiatric treatment or observation as

necessary.

10. During said time period, City Jail personnel were

trained and had been trained to detect potential suicidal

behavior and take immediate action.

11. Procedures have been in place at all pertinent times

to provide medication to inmates pursuant to physicians'

orders to ensure that inmates take them as prescribed

regardless of whether such medication was prescribed prior to

their incarceration or during their stay at the City Jail.

....

26. On each and every occasion when Plaintiff acted out

or otherwise appeared to require medical care either (physical

or mental) Plaintiff was promptly delivered to the appropriate

medical authority.

27. Jail personnel followed orders and recommendations of

medical authorities at all times.

(R1-19 at WW 3-11, 26-27). Cullinan also asserted that it is
 10An officially promulgated written policy concerning inmate

medical care and personnel training, if one exists, was not made

a part of the record. 

 11Young's attorney, John P. Batson, also represents the

plaintiff in Arnold, who was incarcerated at the City jail during

approximately the same time period as Young. Like Young, Arnold

contends that, because of a City policy or practice, jail

officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental

health needs. We take judicial notice of the fact that the

district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment

filed in Arnold. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553

(11th Cir.1994) (a court may take notice of another court's order

for the limited purpose of recognizing the judicial action taken

or the subject matter of the litigation). It thereafter ordered

that the case be closed for statistical purposes pending the

outcome of the present appeal. 

against jail policy to keep an inmate naked for longer than it

takes to provide dry clothes and to use mace, except when needed to

prevent injury by an out-of-control prisoner. (Id. at WW 21-22).

Cullinan stated further that he immediately terminated Gentle's

employment when he learned of her fracas with Young. ( Id. at ¶

25). Portions of the record of Young's medical treatment, jail

medication charts and excerpts from testimony she gave during a

deposition were also submitted as evidence in support of the City's

motion for summary judgment. In its brief to the district court,

the City argued that, assuming, without conceding, that Young's

constitutional rights were violated by jail employees, such conduct

was in contravention of, rather than caused by, City policy.10

 In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Young filed

a brief in which she purported to incorporate arguments made by the

plaintiff in another case pending in the same district court,

Arnold v. City of Augusta, Ga., Civil Action No. CV 191-177, in

response to the City's motion for summary judgment filed in that

case.11 Young also cited to her answers to interrogatories and her
 12Young filed this action in forma pauperis. 

 13Section 636(b)(1)(A) permits a district court judge to

designate a magistrate to determine any pending pretrial matter,

except certain enumerated types of motions, including motions for

summary judgment. Because the motion for a hearing to present

oral testimony was not dispositive of the motion for summary

judgment, the court acted within its authority in delegating this

request to the magistrate. 

entire deposition testimony as evidence in opposition to the motion

for summary judgment. In addition, she contended that the statute

of limitations for filing the action was tolled for fifty-seven

days during periods when she was hospitalized in 1991 and submitted

her affidavit and that of her attorney in support, as well as

portions of her medical record. Finally, she requested that she be

allowed to "subpoena witnesses and cross-examine them for purposes

of responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment should there be

any doubt as to the existence of material facts in dispute." (R1-

20, ¶ 3). In a separate motion for a hearing she stated that she

could not "afford other processes of discovery by which to respond

to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment."12 (R1-23).

 In ruling on Young's motion for a hearing the magistrate

judge to whom certain pretrial matters were assigned, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A),13 acknowledged that oral testimony at the summary

judgment stage may be warranted in some limited circumstances. He

found this unusual step to be unnecessary in the present case,

however. The magistrate noted that Young had personal knowledge of

her treatment at the jail and thus, could oppose the City's motion

by way of her own affidavit without incurring the expense of

deposing the City's witnesses. He therefore denied the motion for

a hearing to elicit oral testimony and advised Young to submit an
affidavit containing factual information known to her for the

district court's consideration. He also instructed Young to

request a hearing to present oral argument if necessary.

Young did not submit an affidavit, nor did she move for oral

argument. Instead, she asked the court to appoint an expert, as

authorized by Fed.R.Evid. 706, to assist it in its determination of

the motion for summary judgment. In a brief in support thereof,

she urged that the testimony of a psychiatric expert was necessary

to prove that the medical treatment afforded to her by jail

personnel was deliberately indifferent. In addition, she asked the

court to consolidate her case with the Arnold case, as permitted by

Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a), on the ground that the actions involved common

issues of law and fact. The magistrate judge denied both of

Young's motions, after which, she offered nothing further in

opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment.

In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the district

court found that Cullinan's affidavit was sufficient to rebut

Young's contention that a City policy or procedure caused her

damages. The court additionally found that the affidavits

concerning the statute of limitations, which Young submitted in

opposition to the City's motion, did not contradict any of

Cullinan's averments regarding the jail's policy with respect to

inmates' medical care. The court consequently held that the City

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the § 1983 cause of

action. In view of this disposition, the court declined to address

the statute of limitations issue. Nor did the court reach the

City's argument that the state law claims were barred under
 14Because no findings were made by the district court on the

viability of the statute of limitations or state law notice

defenses, we confine our inquiry to the question of whether the

record contains a genuine issue of material fact with respect to

§ 1983 municipal liability. 

 15Young complains that the district court failed to evaluate

all of the evidence of record, including her answers to

interrogatories and deposition testimony. Although the district

court did not refer to this evidence in its order granting

summary judgment to the City, we cannot say that the court failed

to consider it. In light of our duty to conduct a plenary review

of the grant of summary judgment, we have taken this evidence

into account. 

O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5. Instead, it opted to dismiss them in view of

the dismissal of the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

(district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

where all claims over which it had original jurisdiction have been

dismissed).14

On appeal, Young maintains it was error to deny her motions

for appointment of a mental health expert, for a hearing to present

oral testimony and to consolidate her case with Arnold. To

facilitate a determination of whether the magistrate judge abused

his discretion by denying the motion to consolidate, Young requests

that we supplement the record on appeal with the record in the

Arnold litigation. Young also challenges the district court's

finding that Cullinan's affidavit was sufficient to carry the

City's burden of proof.15

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to supplement the record on appeal.

 Young's motion to supplement the record on appeal was carried

with the case and therefore requires our initial attention.

Generally, a reviewing court will not consult the evidence or
record of another case if it was not first considered in the

district court, although it has that power. See Jones v. White,

992 F.2d 1548, 1566-68 (11th Cir.) (invoking the court's inherent

equitable powers to supplement the record on appeal), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 448, 126 L.Ed.2d 381 (1993), and --- U.S.

----, 114 S.Ct. 727, 126 L.Ed.2d 691 (1994). This court has not

articulated a particular test to make that determination. Rather,

we review such requests on a case-by-case basis. Cabalceta v.

Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir.1989); Ross v.

Kemp, 785 F.2d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir.1986). Factors we have

considered in deciding to grant a motion to supplement include

whether the additional material would be dispositive of pending

issues in the case and whether interests of justice and judicial

economy would thereby be served. Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475. However,

these are only guidelines for exercising our discretion. Even when

the added material will not conclusively resolve an issue on

appeal, we may allow supplementation in the aid of making an

informed decision. Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1555.

 With these considerations in mind, we grant Young's motion to

supplement the record on appeal, in part. Young's proffer of

certain portions of the record in Arnold was accompanied by a

proper motion to supplement, which has not been opposed by the

City. Furthermore, we cannot effectively review Young's assertion

that this case should have been consolidated with Arnold without

looking to certain pleadings in that case. We find it unnecessary,

however, to supplement the record on appeal with the entire record

of Arnold. Instead, it is sufficient for our purposes to
 16In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209

(11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as precedent all

decisions of the former United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. 

incorporate only the complaint and Arnold's affidavit filed in that

case, which elaborates on the allegations of the degree of care

prevalent in the jail at the time both he and Young were

incarcerated.

B. Motion to consolidate.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) codifies a district

court's "inherent managerial power " "to control the disposition of

the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for

itself, for counsel, and for litigants." ' " Hendrix v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir.1985) (citations

omitted). It provides:

(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common

question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may

order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in

issue in the actions; it may order all the actions

consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning

proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or

delay.

The Rule " "is permissive and vests a purely discretionary power in

the district court.' " In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida

Everglades, 549 F.2d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir.1977) (citations

omitted)16; Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1495; see also 9 Charles A.

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2383,

at 439-40 (1994) (although consolidation under Rule 42(a) may be

warranted because of a common issue of law or fact, it is not

required).

 In denying Young's motion for consolidation, the magistrate
 17An element of both actions is that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' medical needs. See

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50

L.Ed.2d 251, 260 (1976). As we discuss more fully in Part E of

this section of the opinion, although Young's allegations do not

present as clear-cut a case of deliberate indifference, a genuine

issue of material fact does exist as to whether treatment for her

mental condition was unduly delayed. Furthermore, the evidence

submitted by the City fails to demonstrate that the psychotropic

drugs prescribed for her were dispensed by jail employees as

directed. The Eighth Amendment prohibits state caretakers from

intentionally delaying medical care or knowingly interfering with

treatment once prescribed. Id. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. at 291, 50

L.Ed.2d at 260; see also Aldridge v. Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970,

972 (11th Cir.1985). In addition, Young's allegations regarding

the beating by Gentle and the conditions to which she was

subjected in the isolation cell from October 3, 1989 through

October 6, 1989, which stand unrebutted by the City, could

possibly, if proven, support § 1983 claims for cruel and unusual

punishment. Young consequently passed the first hurdle of

precluding summary judgment by sufficiently demonstrating that

her rights may have been violated. 

judge found there were no common issues of law or fact in her case

and the one prosecuted by Arnold. We disagree with this

assessment. Granted, differences in the two actions do exist.

Each plaintiff has alleged a different set of facts concerning his

or her particular medical needs and the responses made by jail

employees. Furthermore, Arnold appears to be in a stronger

position than Young to prove the threshold issue of whether there

was an Eighth Amendment violation with respect to his medical

care.17 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816-17

& n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432 & n. 4, 85 L.Ed.2d 791, 799-800 & n.

4 (1985) (for § 1983 municipal liability to attach, there must

first be established an underlying violation of a federal right).

Nevertheless, both actions allege that jail officials were

deliberately indifferent to the psychiatric treatment needs of the

plaintiffs during their imprisonment, due to a City custom,
practice or policy. The core issue of liability, that is, whether

the City can be held accountable for the alleged deprivations

suffered by the plaintiffs, is the same in both cases. The

district court apparently recognized this overlap when it ordered

that Arnold be stayed pending the outcome of the present appeal.

See supra note 11.

 District court judges in this circuit "have been "urged to

make good use of Rule 42(a) ... in order to expedite the trial and

eliminate unnecessary repetition and confusion[.]' " Gentry v.

Smith, 487 F.2d 571, 581 (5th Cir.1973) (quoting Dupont v. Southern

Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386

U.S. 958, 87 S.Ct. 1027, 18 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967)). Consolidation of

the present case with Arnold certainly would have made sense.

Counsel for the parties is the same in both cases. The actions

were filed approximately one month apart, both were assigned to the

same district court judge and they have followed a similar course

of development. In both actions, the plaintiffs will have to prove

that a City custom, practice or policy regarding the medical care

of mentally ill inmates caused their damages. This necessarily

will mandate proof that the alleged violations were not isolated

instances. See City of Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 821-24, 105

S.Ct. at 2435-36, 85 L.Ed.2d at 802-04. Thus, it is important to

each plaintiff's case to introduce evidence of the others'

allegations. On the other hand, the establishment of their claims

can be accomplished without consolidating the cases.

 Even though consolidation would have been warranted, given

the permissive nature of Rule 42(a), we cannot conclude that the
 18In just compensation cases and in prosecutions involving

indigent criminal defendants, expert witness fees may be paid

with funds provided by law. Fed.R.Evid. 706(b). 

magistrate abused his discretion by denying Young's request.

Decisions to consolidate have been reversed in cases where a party

was prejudiced because his substantive legal interests conflicted

with those of a co-party. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 549 F.2d

at 1013 n. 10. We have found no cases, however, in which a court's

refusal to order consolidation has been overturned. Of course,

there is nothing to prevent the district court from reconsidering

Young's motion upon remand if it is renewed in light of the

foregoing discussion. We also observe that, absent consolidation,

Young is not precluded from offering evidence of Arnold's claim to

support her allegations of an unconstitutional policy or practice.

C. Motion for appointment of a mental health expert.

 Under Fed.R.Evid. 706(a), a trial court may, on its own

motion or on the motion of a party, appoint an expert witness

selected by the parties or of its own choosing. The Rule provides

that, in civil actions not involving just compensation under the

Fifth Amendment, an expert so appointed "shall be paid by the

parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs,

and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs." Fed.R.Evid.

706(b).18 Young sought to have an expert appointed without cost to

her, to aid her in opposing the City's motion for summary

judgment—specifically, to show that the psychiatric care she

received was substandard. Due to Young's indigent status, the

appointment of an expert in this case would have necessarily

required the court to apportion all of the cost to the City. This
 19The Ninth Circuit held in McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d

1500 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 502 U.S. 903, 112

S.Ct. 291, 116 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991), that the Rule permits a

district court to apportion all of the cost to one side in an

appropriate case. Id. at 1511. 

 20We express no opinion as to whether the appointment of an

expert might be warranted should this case proceed to trial. 

court has never held whether, or under what circumstances, such an

arrangement might be allowable and we need not do so now.19 The

presence of a genuine issue of fact with respect to deliberate

indifference to Young's medical needs is apparent from the face of

the record. See supra note 17. Expert opinion testimony would

have been superfluous. The court's refusal to appoint an expert

was not error.20

D. Motion for a hearing to present oral testimony.

 This court's predecessor has recognized that Fed.R.Civ.P.

43(e), governing evidence on motions, permits a district court to

consider oral testimony in connection with a motion for summary

judgment. See Hayden v. First Nat'l Bank of Mt. Pleasant, Tex.,

595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir.1979). This method of pinpointing

factual disputes is not favored, however, "because the summary

judgment hearing is not meant to be a preliminary trial....

Accordingly, oral testimony should be used [only] when there is

reason to believe that it will be of significant assistance to the

court and is reasonably circumscribed in scope." 10A Charles A.

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2723, at 63 (1983) (footnotes omitted) (alteration

added).

 Young desired to present oral testimony for the same reason
she sought an expert—to expose factual issues concerning the

sufficiency her medical treatment. As we have already pointed out,

she accomplished this feat without a hearing. We therefore affirm

the denial of her request.

E. Motion for summary judgment.

 We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary

judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards employed by the

district court. Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609,

612-13 (11th Cir.1995). Summary judgment must be granted "if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

In a case such as this, where the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial, "the moving party, in order to prevail,

must do one of two things: show that the non-moving party has no

evidence to support [an essential element of] its case, or present

"affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will

be unable to prove its case at trial.' " Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d

1137, 1141 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels

of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc)).

Only then does the burden shift to the nonmoving party to

designate, through affidavits or as otherwise provided in

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

As stated earlier, to prevail, Young must be able to prove

that the conditions of her confinement violated constitutional
mandates. She contends that treatment for her mental condition was

unduly delayed, that she did not receive medication as prescribed

and that the events she endured in the isolation cell fell below

standards of human decency. These allegations, if proven and

supported by the requisite evidence of intent, could lead to a

finding that her rights were violated.

 Although the record shows that Young received some treatment

for mental illness at various times during her imprisonment and

that medication was furnished on certain occasions, it does not

demonstrate the absence of a factual dispute with respect to undue

delay or that medication was dispensed by jail employees as

prescribed. The City asserted in its statement of undisputed facts

in support of the motion for summary judgment that Young "was

regularly given her medications as prescribed by medical personnel

by the staff of the City of Augusta Jail." (R1-16, ¶ 6). In

addition, the City's affiant, Cullinan, stated that "[a]t all times

when Plaintiff was placed on medication, jail personnel ensured and

monitored Plaintiff's taking the medication." (R1-19, ¶ 16). The

documentation proffered by the City to support these assertions,

however, is rife with gaps. The jail medication charts pertain to

only one day of Young's incarceration in September and an

unidentified day or days in October. Moreover, it cannot be

discerned from the charts whether the medicine dispensed on those

days was given as directed, or, if there were other medications

Young should have received. Much of the medical record submitted

by the City, which presumably contains the information concerning

the prescribed treatment, is handwritten and replete with medical
 21Although the City contended that the conditions of which

Young complained were contrary to jail policy, it did not dispute

the truth of her allegations. 

abbreviations, making it indecipherable. No summaries interpreting

this evidence or affidavits of the persons in charge of Young's

medical care at the various treatment centers or the jail were

provided. Furthermore, the City proffered no evidence to rebut

Young's claims of inhumane treatment while in isolation. 21

Accordingly, if this action had been filed against the individual

jailers responsible for Young's care, summary judgment plainly

would not have been warranted.

 Because this case is confined to municipal liability rather

than individual fault, however, Young must also be able to

demonstrate a direct causal link between a City policy or custom

and the alleged constitutional deprivations. City of Canton, Ohio

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d

412, 424 (1989). It has long been settled that respondeat superior

principles of liability do not apply to municipalities in § 1983

actions. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 636 (1978). Liability

will attach only where a government custom or policy is " "the

moving force of the constitutional violation.' " City of Oklahoma

City, 471 U.S. at 820, 105 S.Ct. at 2434, 85 L.Ed.2d at 802

(quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445,

454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509, 521 (1981), and Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98

S.Ct. at 2038, 56 L.Ed.2d at 638).

 Young attributes her alleged damages to a City custom of

inadequate selection and training of employees when it comes to
inmates suffering from mental illness and of failing to provide

on-site medical care at the jail. We reject, as a matter of law,

her contention that municipal jails should be equipped to offer

on-site, expert psychiatric care for inmates. The City's stated

policy of transporting prisoners to local hospitals when they are

in need of medical attention not available at the jail is

compatible "with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.' " Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102, 97

S.Ct. at 290, 50 L.Ed.2d at 259 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.

86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 (1958)); see City

of Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 386-87, 109 S.Ct. at 1203-04, 103

L.Ed.2d at 425 (policy requiring jailers to take inmates needing

medical care to a hospital for treatment is constitutional on its

face). Young's claim that jail employees are inadequately selected

or trained to recognize the need to remove a mentally ill inmate to

a hospital or to dispense medication as prescribed is cognizable,

however, if the deficiency reflects deliberate indifference by City

policymakers to the rights of inmates and it is closely related to

the ultimate injury. City of Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 388-92, 109

S.Ct. at 1204-06, 103 L.Ed.2d at 426-28. This requires proof that

the failing was a conscious choice by policymakers among

alternative courses of action, which in turn, caused the jailers'

deliberate indifference. Id. at 389-91, 109 S.Ct. at 1205-06, 103

L.Ed.2d at 427-28.

The issue in a case like this one ... is whether [the]

training program is adequate; and if it is not, the question

becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be

said to represent "city policy.' It may seem contrary to

common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have

a policy of not taking reasonable steps to train [or select]
its employees. But it may happen that in light of the duties

assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more

or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so

likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,

that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to

have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that

event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be

said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible,

and for which the city may be held liable if it actually

causes injury.

Id. at 390, 109 S.Ct. at 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d at 427-28 (footnotes

omitted) (alterations added); see also Thomas v. Town of Davie,

847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir.1988) (liability may be founded upon

proof of a policy of deficiencies in staffing or procedures such

that the inmate is effectively denied access to adequate medical

care).

 Before it may be said that a municipality has made a

deliberate choice among alternative courses of action, its

policymakers must have had "actual or constructive notice that the

particular omission is substantially certain to result in the

violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens." City of

Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1208, 103 L.Ed.2d at

431 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(cited with approval in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. ----, ----, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 1981, 128 L.Ed.2d 811, 827-28 (1994)). This may be

demonstrated in one of two ways.

First, the need for a particular type of training may be

obvious where jailers face clear constitutional duties in recurrent

situations. See, e.g., id. 489 U.S. at 390 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at

1205 n. 10, 103 L.Ed.2d at 427 n. 10 (citing the obvious need to

train officers with respect to the constitutional limitations on

the use of deadly force). Young's claims do not fit within this
category. See id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1209, 103 L.Ed.2d at 432

(observing that contentions "that police officers were inadequately

trained in diagnosing the symptoms of emotional illness—falls far

short of the kind of "obvious' need for training that would support

a finding of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights on

the part of the city") (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

Alternatively, the need for more or better training may be

obvious where a pattern of constitutional violations exists such

that the municipality knows or should know that corrective measures

are needed. Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1397-98

(11th Cir.1994). This court has therefore held that,

[t]o prove § 1983 liability against a municipality based on

custom, a plaintiff must establish a widespread practice that,

"although not authorized by written law or express municipal

policy, is "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a

"custom or usage' with the force of law[.]" In other words,

a longstanding and widespread practice is deemed authorized by

the policymaking officials because they must have known about

it but failed to stop it.

Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th

Cir.1991) (citations omitted); see also City of Oklahoma City, 471

U.S. at 823-24, 105 S.Ct. at 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d at 804 (where a §

1983 claim turns on the failure of an officer to comply with an

express, constitutional policy, proof of more than a single

incident will be necessary to establish both the requisite

municipal fault and the causal connection between the practice and

the constitutional deprivation).

 The record in this case reveals that Young is not the only

City inmate who has complained of a lack of adequate treatment for

serious medical problems stemming from mental illness.
Furthermore, the alleged mistreatment and omissions suffered by

Young occurred over a period of several months. According to her

deposition testimony, at least three different jailers were charged

with her care during her incarceration. Construing this evidence

in the light most favorable to Young, an inference may be made that

a pattern of deliberate indifference to the psychiatric needs of

mentally ill inmates existed at the jail of which City policymakers

should have been aware.

 We agree with Young that Cullinan's affidavit is insufficient

to counter this inference. It emphasizes the City's general,

formal policy concerning inmate medical care and the training of

jail personnel, which has no bearing on the alleged custom which

Young complains was actually in place. The record does not confirm

Cullinan's contention that the official policy regarding prompt and

appropriate medical attention was followed in this case.

Furthermore, it cannot be determined from Cullinan's broad

statements with respect to the initial and continuing training of

jail staff that the instruction provided to the particular guards

charged with Young's care was sufficient. Evidence of the details

of the training program is conspicuously absent from the record.

We therefore cannot say that the need for more or better training

was not obvious or that deficiencies in training did not cause

Young's injuries. Nor did the City submit any evidence concerning

the selection of jail employees. Lacking such evidence, the City

was not entitled to summary judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, we AFFIRM the
denial of Young's motions for appointment of a mental health

expert, for a hearing to present oral testimony and to consolidate

her case with Arnold. Because issues of material fact remain with

respect to whether Young suffered constitutional deprivations

caused by a custom of inadequate selection or training of jail

employees of which the City should have been aware, we REVERSE the

district court's grant of summary judgment and REMAND for further

proceedings.